MP (A Child; Habitual Residence), Re

I have to decide whether a young boy, MP, is habitually resident in England and Wales or in another country (“Country B”).

MP is the only child of his parents who married before he was born. They are a family of considerable wealth who have enjoyed a lifestyle which has meant that MP’s childhood to date has been characterised by frequent travel, with his time divided between homes in England, Country B and a third country (“Country C”). This has meant that MP, who is now aged 4 has not spent a continuous period of more than about three months in any country throughout his life. He is currently living in Country B with his mother without his father’s consent. A dispute as to whether the English courts have jurisdiction to make decisions in relation to MP’s welfare means that his habitual residence now falls for determination.

The immediate context in which this issue arises is as follows:

The father’s position is that MP is habitually resident in England and Wales and that therefore the English court has jurisdiction over matters of his welfare. The Mother asserts that MP is habitually resident in Country B and that MP’s welfare is therefore a matter for the courts of Country B.

Both parties are represented by highly experienced legal teams. The father is represented by Ms Deirdre Fottrell KC and Ms Charlotte Baker, instructed by Hughes Fowler Carruthers. The mother is represented by Mr Edward Devereux KC and Mr Edward Bennett instructed by Mills & Reeve. I am grateful to all counsel for their extensive written and oral submissions and the detailed analysis contained therein.

Although Harris J had listed the issue of the child’s habitual residence for a one-day hearing, the bundle prepared by the parties ran to some 900 pages and was supported by extensive position statements / skeleton arguments from counsel. Mr Devereux KC also applied for both parties to be subject to cross-examination. I refused this latter application as I did not consider it to be necessary given the limited issue before the court and the wealth of material that had already been lodged. I also considered that if cross examination were permitted it would not be possible to conclude the hearing within the time that had been allowed, and that an adjournment would lead to an unacceptable delay in determining the question of the court’s jurisdiction.

However, even without cross-examination, counsels’ submissions on the evidence and law took all day and it has been necessary for me to reserve my judgment in order to do justice to the voluminous material filed and the extensive arguments raised by both parties.

I make clear that I have read the totality of the witness evidence and exhibits, as well as the parties’ skeleton arguments and have also listened to a recording of a discussion that took place between the parents this summer.

There is common ground between the parties on the legal test that I have to apply to determine MP’s habitual residence. The parties are agreed that habitual residence is a question of fact to be determined by a global analysis of the relevant factors. Both Ms Fottrell KC and Mr Devereux KC referred me to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re F (A Child)(Habitual Residence) [2025] EWCA Civ 911 and the summary of the relevant principles that can be derived from the numerous appellate authorities on this issue that is to be found at paragraph [58] of the judgment of Moylan LJ:

“The determination of habitual residence is not a formulaic exercise because it requires a broad consideration of the child's and the family's circumstances and because different factors will be present in different cases with the same factor being more significant in one case than another. Accordingly, as was said in the case of HR, at [54], "guidance provided in the context of one case may be transposed to another case only with caution". With those caveats, I set out the following elements (which are not intended to be exclusive) drawn from the cases:

(a)

"The identification of a child's habitual residence is overarchingly a question of fact": Re B, at [46]. It is "focussed on the situation of the child": Re A, at 54(v) and Re R, at [17]. It is an issue of fact which requires the court to undertake a sufficient global analysis of all the relevant factors. There is an open-ended, not a closed, list of potentially relevant factors;

(b)

As set out, for example, in Proceedings brought by HR, at [41]: "In addition to the physical presence of the child in the territory of a [member] state, other factors must be chosen which are capable of showing that that presence is not in any way temporary or intermittent";

(c)

Factors of relevance, as set out in Proceedings brought by HR, at [43], and reflected in many other domestic cases, include: "the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the child's stay in the territory of the different [member] states concerned, the place and conditions of the child's attendance at school, and the family and social relationships of the child in those member states";

(d)

The intentions of the parents are also a relevant factor and there is no "rule" that one parent cannot unilaterally change the habitual residence of a child: Re R, at [17];

(e)

As set out in Re R, at [16], it is "the stability of the residence that is important, not whether it is of a permanent character" but there "is no requirement that the child should have been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time" because habitual residence can be acquired quickly: e.g. A v A, at [44];

(f)

The "degree of integration of the child into a social and family environment in the country in question" is relevant, Re R, at [17]. It is clear that "full integration" is not required, "Re B (SC)", at [39], but only a degree sufficient to support the conclusion, when added to the other relevant factors, that the child is habitually resident in the relevant state;

(g)

The relevant factors will reflect the age of the child (see Mercredi v Chaffe [2012] Fam 22, at [53]-[55]; A v A, at [54(vi], and Re LC, at [35]). Accordingly, "The social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those (whether parents or others) on whom he is dependent. Hence it is necessary to assess the integration of that person or persons in the social and family environment of the country concerned": Re A, at 54(vi);

(h)

The court is considering the connections between the child and the country or countries concerned: A v A, at [80(ii)]; Re B (SC), at [42]; and Proceedings brought by HR, at [43]. This is a comparative analysis as referred to, for example, in Re M, at [60]; Re B (EWCA), at [86]; and Re A, at [46]. As observed by Black LJ in Re J, I repeat:

"What is important is that the judge demonstrates sufficiently that he or she has had in mind the factors in the old and new lives of the child, and the family, which might have a bearing on this particular child's habitual residence."

An example of this is seen in Re B (SC) in which Lord Wilson, at [49]-[50], referred to the factors which pointed to the child having "achieved the requisite degree of disengagement from her English environment" and those which pointed to the child having "achieved the requisite degree of integration in the environment in Pakistan".”

I have had regard not only to that summary but to the totality of Moylan LJ’s analysis of the law that is found from paragraph [38] onwards of that judgment.

Although there is no dispute between the parties as to the underlying principles to be applied by the court, including the fact that parental intention is relevant but not determinative of the issue of habitual residence, there was a significant difference in the emphasis placed by the parties on this factor, and in this context I was also referred by Mr Devereux KC to the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in OL v PQ (8 June 2017) Case C-111/17 PPU. At paragraphs [47] and [48] the court stated:

“47.

Thus, according to the Court’s case-law, the intention of the parents cannot as a general rule by itself be crucial to the determination of the habitual residence of a child, within the meaning of Regulation No 2201/2003, but constitutes an ‘indicator’ capable of complementing a body of other consistent evidence.

48.

Admittedly, the weight to be given to that factor, for the purposes of determining where a child is habitually resident, depends on the circumstances specific to each individual case (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2010, Mercredi, C-497/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:829, paragraphs 50 and 51).”

I review below the various factors that have been drawn to my attention by the parties and which it is said I must consider as part of my global analysis.

The Family Background

This is an international family. The father was born in the UK, although neither of his parents was a British Citizen. He was a British Citizen and a citizen of another state (“Country D”) from birth. The father grew up in London. After school, the father attended a university abroad (“Country E”). Having worked in Country E for some years he returned to England in 2008 to work in a senior role in a company based here.

The mother was also born in the UK, as her parents (both citizens of Country B) were working in London at the time. She has British Citizenship and is also a citizen of Country B. She lived in London for the first year of her life before her family moved abroad. When she was aged five her parents returned to Country B, and she grew up and was educated there. Like the father she attended university in Country E. She returned to Country B and was working there when she met the father. She subsequently returned to Country E for further study. However, when the Covid pandemic began in March 2020, the father invited her to stay with him in Country C.

After a period of cohabitation spent in Country C and Country B, the parents married in a civil ceremony in Country C. Shortly before doing so, they entered into a pre-nuptial agreement that was negotiated by the same English solicitors who are acting for them in the present litigation. That agreement recites that at that time the father was habitually resident in Country C, and the mother was habitually resident in Country B. The parents had homes available to them in London, Country C and City B and moved regularly between them. MP was born in Country B in 2021 and his birth was registered in that jurisdiction.

The following summer the parents underwent a religious marriage ceremony in Country B.

MP is entitled to British citizenship. He is also entitled to citizenship of Country B and Country D. He has been registered since birth in Country B.

Tax Status

Although the father works for a UK registered company, he is tax resident in Country C and not the UK. UK tax residency is governed by the provisions of Schedule 45 of the Finance Act 2013 and in circumstances where a person is not automatically treated as resident in the UK (and the father is not so treated), residency is assessed by looking at the number of days spent each year in the UK as against the number of statutory “ties” that the individual has to the UK. The existing ties that father has to the UK (such as owning a property in London and the time he has spent in the UK in previous tax years) has meant that in order to maintain his non-resident status for UK taxation he has been unable to spend more than 120 nights in the UK within each tax year. It has also meant that he has had to be careful not to create additional ties, and he has therefore been unable to carry out more than 40 day’s work for his company from within the UK each year. The father’s status means that the mother and MP must also adhere to the same limits on the time spent in the UK; were they to become resident in the UK for tax purposes, then this would give the father an additional tie and mean that he would become tax resident, if he spent more than 90 days (rather than 120) in the UK in any one year (Finance Act 2013 Sch 45 para 32).

The mother has business interests in Country B and is tax resident there.

The Homes Available to the Parties

The parties have a number of properties available to them. These are as follows:

The Parties’ Intentions

A considerable part of the evidence and the submissions of both counsel focussed on the parents’ intentions regarding MP and his future.

For the father, I was referred to the terms of the pre-nuptial agreement entered into by the parties. This is subject to English and Welsh law and provides for the courts of England and Wales to have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any claim or dispute arising from the agreement. It recites that the initial intention of the parties was to live in Country C after the marriage. I was told that the agreement also provides for the purchase of a property for the mother in London in the event of the relationship ending. In fact the agreement does not expressly require the property to be in London, although it was doubtless within the contemplation of the parties that it may be, as the fund available for its purchase is calculated primarily by reference to the Central London house price index.

In any event I am satisfied that the intention of the parties at the time of their marriage was that they should spend time in all three of the relevant jurisdictions namely England, Country B and Country C, and this is precisely what they have done. The father has provided various text messages which he says point towards an agreement that the centre of their family life would be London including a message from the mother dated October 2022 in which she states “I can’t wait to be in one place and have roots here” and another where she sends a photograph to the father of her in London saying “Going home, our street”. This may demonstrate a mutual understanding by the parents that London was in some way to have a degree of priority over their other homes in Country B and Country C. However, the reality of the family’s life has meant that their time in the UK has been strictly limited each year.

It is also clear from the documentary evidence that the father has had a fixed desire, from the moment of MP’s birth, that he should be educated in England and attend a specific prep school in London. Indeed, MP’s name was put down for this school within 24 hours of his birth with the intention that he should start there in September 2026. Until very recently, it appeared that the mother was also in agreement with this plan and in 2023 the mother took the lead in arranging for MP to be registered to start at a pre-school in London that is linked to the identified prep school for the 2024 autumn term. It was agreed by the parents, and reiterated in the Parenting Agreement, that MP would again attend the same London pre-school for the 2025 autumn term.

The mother has complained that this agreement arose from pressure applied to her by the father. In her witness statement the mother describes the father as a “very forceful person who, frankly, is used to getting his own way” and included among the documents exhibited to the mother’s second witness statement is a transcript of a conversation that took place between the parties shortly after the Parenting Agreement had been signed. Both parties were aware that this conversation was being recorded. I have also listened to the recording of the conversation. In my view the father’s behaviour in that conversation bears out the mother’s description of him. He is critical of the mother and frequently interrupts and cuts across her; he comes across as intent on setting out his view of matters, rather than engaging in a mutual dialogue. On the subject of MP’s education he states:

“It’s super simple. I told you from the beginning. London is non-negotiable. [MP’s] schooling has to be the best schooling. You used to say you have a value around education. Well why don’t you live that value? You used to say you have a value around integrity. Then live with integrity”

“It was always obvious we lived in London. It was always obvious that [MP] was going to school at [name of schooll], everything was always obvious.”

I accept that the father does appear in this conversation to be applying pressure on the mother to come round to his way of thinking. That said, I note that the mother has been legally represented, and she and her solicitors had already signed the Parenting Agreement, agreeing to MP attending school in London for the autumn term of 2025 when this conversation took place.

Recent Negotiations

Since their separation, tensions have arisen between the parties which have resulted in exchanges between their solicitors seeking to formalise the arrangements for MP’s care and schooling. In a letter this summer the mother’s solicitors raised the issue of MP’s habitual residence stating:

“It is important to reiterate that [the mother and MP] are not habitually resident or domiciled in the UK, and there is no basis for the English court to assert jurisdiction in this matter”.

The Parenting Agreement was signed by both parties and their respective solicitors. This confirmed that MP would travel with the mother to the UK on 31 August to enable him to attend the agreed pre-school in London for autumn term 2025. It is the father’s case that he only permitted MP and the mother to travel to Country B on the strength of the mutual agreement reached in the Parenting Agreement that MP would be brought back to England in time to start the autumn term.

There then followed further correspondence between the solicitors seeking to agree other aspects of MP’s child arrangements, including where he would be spending the following year, where he would be schooled during 2026 and the split of days that he would spend with each parent. The basis for those discussions was a proposal document sent by the mother to the father. The father’s solicitors proposed reflecting any final agreement in a court order. However, on 7 August the mother’s solicitors again raised the issue of habitual residence stating:

“In circumstances where MP is not habitually resident in England, the court here does not have jurisdiction to, and would not make an order, even by consent in the proposed terms. It is, however, accepted that if it were agreed that [MP] attends [the agreed school] from September 2026, the English court could then seize jurisdiction, and final order could be made. [The mother] has been clear that she cannot agree to a permanent relocation to London unless and until there is a clear path in terms of the pattern of [MP’s] care ie until final terms are agreed.”

In the meantime, on 11 July 2025 the father had filed an application to the Central Family Court under the Children Act 1989, although this was not issued until 29 July 2025. A copy of the unissued application was provided to the mother’s solicitors, although they were not instructed to accept service. On 5 August 2025 the mother, through her lawyers in Country B issued an application before the court in Country B for temporary sole custody of MP. The father’s solicitors were not informed of this until 2 September.

Correspondence between the parties and their lawyers continued and the parties moved close to agreeing the terms of a parenting agreement, although a concluded agreement was not reached. However, at the end of August it became clear that the mother had decided not to return to London with MP for the autumn term as previously agreed and the High Court proceedings were issued by the father shortly thereafter.

Time Spent in Each Jurisdiction

A further issue upon which the parties, and in particular the mother, has sought to place weight is the question of where MP has spent the most time. As I have already indicated, this is a family whose way of life has involved constant travel and it is clear that MP has never spent a continuous period of more than three months in any one location. The parties have compiled competing tables of dates showing where MP was on any given date. Although there are some differences between the two tables, the broad picture that they disclose is the same with significant periods of time being spent in England, Country B and Country C.

The overall differences between the two competing tables are relatively modest (and the more substantial difference in figures given for 2025 can be explained by an error in the father’s addition). However, of the two, I consider that the table complied by the father is likely to be the more accurate. His tax status means he has had clear reason to keep very careful track of his and his family’s international travel. His table also calculates trips by the number of nights spent in each place, which avoids double counting days of travel, which appears to me to largely account for the discrepancies between the two analyses. He is also able to provide additional details, for example explaining when MP was staying with his grandparents whilst the parents were abroad without him. There is however an error in the father’s addition for the total number of days that MP has spent in Country B in 2025; the calculated total does not match the individual stays that he accepts occurred. The table that I set out below is based on the father’s figures but with the figures for 2025 corrected and updated to 17 September 2025.

On the father’s figures (as corrected) the total days spent by MP in each jurisdiction and the longest continuous period of time that he spent in each country in each year is as follows:

However, although I consider that this information is relevant to the assessment that I am undertaking, equally it is far from being determinative. The assessment of habitual residence is not a mathematical exercise, and the qualitative experience of MP’s life in each jurisdiction is of significantly more importance than the total number of days that he has spent in each country.

It should also be noted that when the figures are looked at against tax years rather than calendar years, it is clear that MP, like his father, spent less than 120 days each year in the UK. The relevant figures are as follows:

In terms of the time spent by MP each year in Country B, the father takes the point that the time that MP has spent in Country B includes not just time spent in the parental property in City B but also at other locations, including the maternal grandparents’ holiday home and rental properties. I do not attach significant weight to this distinction. MP is a frequent visitor to this holiday home, and I consider that regular visits to another family property will not be qualitatively different from time spent by him at home in City B. I accept that time at a rented holiday property may be different, but in the last couple of years, the total time spent at locations in Country B other than family properties has been no more than a week or two annually.

MP’s Education

MP has attended nursery in both Country B and London. It is clear that it has always been the father’s wish that MP should be educated in London, and his name was put down for a specific prep school from birth with a view to him starting in September 2026. Although I have no doubt that the impetus for this decision came from the father, this is something that the mother has clearly agreed to in the past.

However, although there may have been an agreement between the parents that MP would attend this prep school, for the purpose of considering MP’s habitual residence, I consider that it is MP’s actual experiences rather than his parents’ intentions which carry the most weight.

The periods when MP has attended nursery are as follows:

Medical Matters

MP has a medical insurance number in Country B and is registered with a GP and a dentist in that jurisdiction. His records show that he had the majority of his early childhood vaccinations there. In November 2023 he had the MMR vaccine and received a further vaccination in May 2025. There is a dispute about whether MP is also registered with a GP in England, although I have seen a text message from the mother referring to “our GP” in London, and I understand that MP received the polio vaccine in London in 2021. He has apparently been registered with a dentist in London since earlier this year. However, it is unclear when and by whom that registration was made, and it does not appear to have been suggested by either parent that he has in fact seen that dentist.

MP’s Family Life

Until the breakdown of the marriage MP would spend the majority of his time with both of his parents. The father’s figures for the time spent with each parent in each jurisdiction are as follows:

For the father, Ms Fottrell KC cautioned against my singling out either parent as a primary carer for the purpose of assessing MP’s habitual residence, and I entirely accept that until their separation, the parents sought to organise their lives so that for the majority of the time they and MP were living together as a family unit in one or other of their homes. However, I consider that the figures that I have set out above (and which are based on the father’s own figures) demonstrate that although the parents sought to spend much of their time together, there were significant periods, amounting to more than two months each year, when they were in different countries. Whenever this happened MP would be living with his mother. Whilst there were short periods when he spent time with the father alone, the longest of these periods was for only 5 nights. Whilst I do not for one moment seek to diminish the crucial role that the father has had in MP’s life, it is clear that it is his mother who has been a near-constant presence in his life.

Wider Family

Unsurprisingly given the international nature of his family, MP has relatives in a number of countries. His paternal grandparents are based in Country C and his maternal grandparents live in City B. A sibling of the father lives in London. Other family members regularly visit London and father gives evidence about family parties being held at the house in London. One of the mother’s sisters is based in London, other siblings are based in City B. The mother has close friends living in both London and City B.

The Family Dog

The family own a dog which MP is extremely fond. She belonged to the father before he met the mother. I am told that she is based in London for eight months of the year, although she also spends four months a year in Country C. This means that for around four months a year the dog is not with any members of the family and is looked after by others in the UK. I do not consider that, when compared with other factors in MP’s life, the presence or absence of the dog in any particular jurisdiction carries any great weight in the assessment that I am required to undertake.

Activities

MP is extremely fortunate in that he is given the opportunity to participate in a large number of activities, wherever he is in the world. The parents are members of a private members club in London where he is taken swimming, and the father has given evidence of trips to the park, playgrounds, museums and adventure activities. He takes football classes and often plays with his cousin. In City B, the parents also have a private club membership which gives access to a swimming pool which MP uses. The mother’s evidence is that activities in Country B are less formal, involving play dates rather than clubs, but that MP participates in regular activities such as dance classes and music lessons and enjoys visits to the zoo or to a farm owned by a friend. One afternoon a week, he participates in sport after nursery. The mother gives evidence of frequent playdates and names various friends with children of a similar age to MP with whom they spend a lot of time. Both parents have exhibited numerous photographs of MP undertaking activities and playing with friends in both countries.

Language

The parents have sought to ensure that MP is brought up to speak a number of languages. I am told that when alone with his father they speak in the language of Country D; when he is alone with the mother, they speak the language of Country B. The mother describes English as MP’s least used and least proficient language. However, I note that the parents communicate with each other in English and all of the nurseries that MP has attended are English-speaking institutions. The report from the School D (in City B) that the mother has exhibited to her statement describes MP’s English vocabulary as blossoming over the past year.

The Parents’ Habitual Residence

There was a dispute between the parents as to their own habitual residence. The father’s position is that both parents are habitually resident in England and Wales. The mother’s position is that she is habitually resident in Country B and that the father is likely to be habitually resident in Country C.

Other Matters

A number of other matters have been drawn to my intention including:

I have not found this to be a straightforward decision. In many cases, the jurisdiction in which a child is habitually resident is clear. However, the reality of this case is that although this family’s wealth has meant that MP has enjoyed experiences and travel significantly beyond those available to other children of a similar age, the itinerant nature of his day-to-day experiences means that he has not had the opportunity to put down strong roots in any one place. This appears to me to be a case where MP might be said to have “some degree of integration” in all three countries where he has regularly spent time, and in reaching my conclusions I must carefully consider the factors which connect MP to each state in which he is said to be habitually resident (see Re A (A Child) [2024] 4 WLR 49 per Moylan LJ at [46]).

I am conscious that the primary question that I am deciding is where MP was habitually resident at the date of issue of these proceedings. In Re F the Court of Appeal criticised the first instance judge for asking the question whether the child in question had gained habitual residence in England and Wales. Consequently, rather than seeking to identify where MP may (or may not) have been habitually resident earlier in his life and then looking to see whether there has been a subsequent change, my focus in this judgment has been on where MP was habitually resident when the father issued his English proceedings on 29 July and 4 September 2025.

In reaching my conclusions I have considered the totality of the evidence and submissions before the court. Given the volume of material that was presented to me, it has not been possible or feasible to set out and address within this judgment every last point made by the parties. However, I have sought to conduct a global analysis of all the factors applicable to this case and have identified in this judgment those points that I consider to be of particular significance to my determination.

Although MP has spent nearly 25% of his life in Country C, neither parent seeks to argue that he is habitually resident in that jurisdiction, and I have therefore been presented with very little information about his life there. In the absence of such evidence my analysis must primarily focus on a comparison between MP’s life in England and his life in Country B.

There are many similarities between the two. MP has a home that is available to him in both countries. I do not consider the fact that the property in Country B has been rented rather than owned outright makes any difference to this analysis, given that it has been his main home in Country B throughout his life. Indeed, he has known more change in the properties available to him in London than he has in Country B. He has attended nurseries or pre-schools in both countries. He clearly has family and friends in both countries whom he sees regularly when in that jurisdiction. He enjoys a wide range of activities in both countries. His parents’ means and their membership of private members clubs in both jurisdictions has meant that he has access to facilities such as swimming pools in both England and Country B. In many ways his life in London and his life in City B have much more in common than they are different. Because of these similarities, the parents’ evidence at times has sought to place weight on what are objectively very small distinctions and I have not found some of the points pressed upon me to be of any great assistance, such as where specific toys belonging to MP are to be found, or seeking to draw contrasts in the wide range of activities that MP clearly undertakes and enjoys in both countries.

Nonetheless, there are qualitative distinctions between MP’s life in London and City B which have assisted me in reaching a conclusion as to where MP is habitually resident.

First, in assessing habitual residence, physical presence is by itself not sufficient, and the court is required to consider “other factors … which are capable of showing that presence is not in any way temporary or intermittent” (see Proceedings brought by HR [2018] Fam 385 at [41]) and “the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the child’s stay” in each jurisdiction (ibid at [43]). I consider that in this case, throughout MP’s life, there has always been an element to his presence in England that has been temporary and intermittent.

There is, in my judgment, a fundamental tension between the father’s argument that MP and both parents are habitually resident in England and Wales and his status as non-resident for UK tax purposes. Whilst I entirely accept that these are two separate legal concepts I consider that there is a dissonance between the father’s position that the entire family has achieved a sufficient degree of integration so as to be habitually resident in England and Wales, but that their connection with the UK is sufficiently distant that neither parent is treated as resident here for tax purposes.

As I have already mentioned the mother has exhibited messages that demonstrate that the family have always carefully counted the days that they have spent in the UK each year and have had to adapt their plans to ensure that none of them (including MP) exceed the number of days that they are permitted to be present in the UK without obtaining tax residency here. Alongside this maximum number of days spent in the UK, the family have also had to be careful not to acquire additional statutory “ties” to the UK; hence the father’s need to work no more than 40 days a year from the UK.

The parents’ desire throughout MP’s life to preserve the father’s non-resident status for UK tax purposes has meant that there has been a need to limit the number of days spent here to no more than 120 in each tax year. This has meant that in the background, for every day that MP has spent in this jurisdiction, another date has been crossed off the calendar, counting down towards this 120 day limit. Such an arrangement, in my view gives rise to an inherent lack of stability to MP’s presence in this jurisdiction. Every arrival in England carries with it an implicit date by which he must leave again.

By contrast, no such restrictions apply to the time that MP has spent in Country B each year. There has been no need for the parents to cross days off their calendars or to decline an invitation to an event in Country B because they cannot spend any more time in that country each year.

To be clear, I do not consider that a family’s tax residency is, by itself, sufficient to prevent a child from being habitually resident in England and Wales. It is simply one factor to be considered, and there may well be circumstances where a global analysis of all the factors in a child’s life points towards habitual residence in England, notwithstanding that the parents are maintaining a tax residence elsewhere. However, I consider that such an arrangement carries with it an inevitable degree of impermanence, which must form part of the court’s overall assessment.

A second aspect of this case which also weighs in favour of habitual residence in Country B is the specific nature of MP’s relationship with his mother. Where the court is considering the habitual residence of a young child, the integration in the social and family environment of a particular jurisdiction of the persons upon whom that child is dependent is a relevant feature for its determination (see Re F at para [58(g)]).

As I have already explained, although this has clearly been a family which has sought to spend much time together, the nature of the father’s career and the international nature of the family’s lifestyle has meant that there have been inevitably been periods when the parents have been apart, and MP has been with only one of them. As the father’s own figures demonstrate, the vast majority of time that this has occurred, and MP has been with only one of his parents, he has been with his mother, and he has been in Country B.

For the father Ms Fottrell argues that this demonstrates that there has been a qualitative difference between the time that MP has spent in London and the time spent in City B, and the fact that the time in London has generally been spent with both parents, whilst there have been significant periods of time when MP has been only with his mother in Country B, points towards London being the place of habitual residence. I do not accept this argument. It is on MP’s own life and experiences that I must focus when determining his habitual residence and I do not consider that I should prioritise in my assessment those periods of MP’s life when his father has been present, over those periods when he has not been.

When one examines the overall picture it is clear that the mother’s presence has been a near-constant throughout the entirety of MP’s life to date. Accordingly, to the extent that there is a difference between the parents’ own places of habitual residence, I consider that it is the habitual residence of the mother, which provides the greatest assistance to me in determining that of MP.

The mother is herself a national of Country B. She spent much of her own childhood in Country B, has most of her family and friends living there; she has business interests in City B, and pays her taxes there. The pre-nuptial agreement confirms that the mother was habitually resident in Country B at the time of the marriage. Although the mother has continuing connections with London through the availability of a home, memberships of various clubs, and the use of a London-based therapist, the reality of the situation is that the mother has spent very little time in the UK since 7 December last year. The parties’ tables suggest that since that date she has spent 27 nights in the UK in contrast with spending 79 days in Country C and 178 days in Country B (calculated to the date of the hearing before me). It is clear to me that the mother has sought to base herself primarily in Country B throughout 2025. Given the mother’s multiple and close connections to Country B, I cannot accept the father’s submission that the mother is habitually resident in England. The amount of time that she has spent in Country B over the past year coupled with the breakdown of the marriage and her close connections to that jurisdiction mean that I consider that, wherever her habitual residence may have been during the period between 2022 and 2024, by the late spring of 2025 her integration in Country B was such that she was habitually resident there.

Given the fact that it is the mother with whom MP has spent virtually all of his time, the fact that she was habitually resident in Country B by the late spring of 2025 is a further factor which, in my view, points towards MP also being habitually resident in that jurisdiction by that date.

Although there is much that is similar about MP’s life in both Country B and England, I must also recognise that MP is a four year old and that if I am to look for the place that in practice, is the centre of his life (see Proceedings brought by HR at [42]), his recent experiences are likely to weigh more heavily in the balance than those that took place some time ago. Thus, although MP has attended nurseries and pre-schools in England, the most recent of these was for a single term between September and December 2024. By contrast MP attended his nursery in City B for much of the first half of 2025. He has also returned to that nursery this term, although I recognise that that has happened since these proceedings were issued, and does not assist me in establishing MP’s habitual residence as at the date that these proceedings commenced.

Although the father criticises the standard of education that MP is receiving in Country B, in my view it is MP’s own integration into the school environment, rather than the merits of the school itself which is relevant to my assessment of habitual residence. On this point, I am satisfied that there is clear evidence from the school report that I have seen that by the end of the 2024/25 academic year, MP was fully integrated into that school environment in City B.

More generally, the reality of MP’s experience since he finished the autumn term at his London pre-school in December 2025 is that he has spent very little time in the UK. He was not in England at all for the six month period between 7 December 2024 and 13 June 2025. In total he spent a single period of 26 days (less than four weeks) in the UK from the 7 December 2024 to the issue of proceedings on 29 July 2025, whilst during this time he spent 147 days (including a single continuous period of 96 days) in Country B. Thus, when I am asked to compare the connections that MP has with family and friends in England and Country B and to contrast the activities that he has undertaken in each jurisdiction, I have to recognise that to MP, his life in City B will be more immediate to him than his life in London. Although Ms Fottrell seeks to argue in her skeleton argument that the centre of MP’s existence has always been England, and that from his perspective, London is his home and where he goes to school, I do not see how that submission is consistent with the reality of his lived experience, certainly since December 2024.

Another factor, which on its own is in no way determinative of the issue, but again points towards a habitual residence in Country B, include that fact that the majority of MP’s basic health care, by which I mean the provision of the usual childhood vaccinations has been carried out in Country B.

For the father, Ms Fottrell also sought to place significant weight on the intentions of the parties that MP would live and be educated in London. It is, however, important to be clear as to what the parties actually intended. I accept there has always been an understanding between the parents that MP would attend a specific prep school from the autumn of 2026 onwards. However, I do not consider that it can be said that the parties intended that MP should exclusively live and be educated in London until then. The father’s own tax affairs militated against an arrangement whereby the family were living solely, or even primarily, in England and Wales. I recognise that some of the text messages sent by the mother support the father’s case that London was to be the family’s “home”, elevating it in some sense above their other homes in City B and Country C, but this intention must be assessed alongside the tangible steps that they took to give effect to that intention and the life that MP has actually lived.

There, I consider the picture is mixed. The itinerant nature of the family’s lifestyle, when coupled with the straitjacket of the father’s tax status has meant that MP spent less than one third of his time each year in England. Although he attended nurseries / pre-schools in England briefly in 2022, and then for one term in the autumn of 2023 and again in 2024, he spent the spring of 2025 attending a nursery in Country B. Although he has spent time with family and enjoyed playing with friends and undertaking activities when in London, these are not exclusive to the time spent in London; the reality of MP’s life is that he does similar things in City B, (and in all probability in Country C too).

Thus, the intention of the parties that their London home should have a level of priority over their other homes does not in my judgment view add much weight to the contention for a habitual residence in England. I take it into account, but I consider that there are other and weightier factors, that I have set out above which point in another direction.

As I set out at the beginning of the previous section of my judgment, MP is a child who has achieved a degree of integration in all three countries in which he lives and there are factors which are capable of supporting the father’s case for his being habitually resident in England and factors which support the mother’s case that he is habitually resident in Country B. On balance, having considered all of these matters carefully, I find that as at the date of issue of the father’s Children Act proceedings on 29 July 2025 MP was habitually resident in Country B. In particular, I consider that the fact that MP’s presence in England has always been contingent on not remaining here for more than 120 days a year, coupled with the degree of integration that he and his mother have in Country B and the length of time that he has spent there since December 2024 all point towards MP having a habitual residence in Country B, and outweigh those factors that point in other directions.

Although the father’s Children Act proceedings were issued on 29 July 2025, they had been lodged with the court over two weeks earlier on 11 July 2025. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not consider that anything turns upon this point and my conclusions on habitual residence would be the same even if the relevant date was 11 July 2025.

Nothing has happened since 29 July to alter this analysis, so I find that MP was also habitually resident in Country B as at the date of the issue of the father’s High Court applications on 4 September, and that he remains habitually resident in Country B as at the date of this judgment.

Accordingly, it is the courts of Country B that have primary jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility in relation to MP pursuant to Article 5 of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention.

That is my decision on the issue of habitual residence and jurisdiction. If the parties continue down the path that they have started, doubtless further litigation lies ahead, and I wish to conclude this judgment by repeating the appeal that I made to the parents at the hearing before me to ensure that their attention is focussed on MP’s welfare and to look for a solution to their current dispute outside the courtroom.