RT v GT

This is a 2 day fact-finding hearing in Wardship proceedings concerning a child, A, born on 2 May 2024, who was made a Ward of Court on 13 March 2025 by order of Lieven J.

The applicant, RT, is the mother and wife in this case. The father, and husband, who opposes the application, is the respondent: GT. I refer to them as the mother and father in this judgment.

There are five allegations to be determined according to the schedule of allegations, of which the father admits one, that he misled the Moroccan court about his income, and denies the remainder. The most important allegation is whether or not the father stranded the mother and their child in Morocco in January 2025; it is alleged that he removed their travel documents by deception and returned to England after he had initiated divorce proceedings in Morocco.

The importance of that issue is that it will assist in the determination of the mother’s immigration status. At present she cannot enter, or return to, England. She and A remain in Morocco, on her case, very much against her will.

Practice Direction 12J of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 defines the various strands of domestic abuse and provides that

“Abandonment” refers to the practice whereby a husband, in England or Wales, deliberately abandons or “strands” his foreign national wife abroad, usually without financial resources, in order to prevent her from asserting matrimonial and/or residence rights and/or rights in relation to childcare in England or Wales. It may involve children who are either abandoned with, or separated from, their mother”.

The other four allegations, in precis, are

There is a further application. The mother seeks financial relief against the father, pursuant to Schedule 1, para 7 of the Children Act 1989 for

The hearing was conducted on a hybrid basis as the mother is in Morocco, cannot come to England and thus had to give evidence remotely. The mother had an interpreter who spoke Arabic but not, it appears, the Moroccan dialect, however, I am satisfied that they were able to communicate effectively. The hearing was adjourned briefly for technical issues to allow the mother to access a laptop. I pause here to say that in cases involving international hybrid hearings, particularly those involving interpreters, it is vital to ensure, as much as possible, that the parties have access to papers in a way that does not mean they lose connections with the court because they have to look at the bundle on their phone. But I also remind myself that the mother was publicly funded in this matter and funds are thus limited.

The applicant was represented by Ms Baker and the respondent by Ms Andrews. I am grateful to both.

The applicant wife is a Moroccan national. She is [X] years old. She qualified as a physiotherapist in Morocco but needs to requalify here. She does not work and is publicly funded. She speaks and writes fluent French and Arabic (Moroccan dialect). Her English is limited. The husband is a Moroccan, French and British national. He was born in France. He is [X] years old. He has lived in the UK since 2012. He has a full-time job earning c £3,500 pcm net. He is paying privately. He does not read or write Arabic (but can speak Arabic). He gave his evidence in English.

The parties married in an arranged marriage in Morocco on 21 February 2022. The families had a distant family connection. After the wedding the father returned to England to apply for the mother’s visa. The mother’s visa arrived two months later. The father travelled to Morocco to collect her and they returned to England together. I understand that she arrived on a fiancée visa which was then converted to a spousal visa. This was a second marriage for the husband. He was previously married to an American from whom he divorced with no financial claims being made against each other in 2016. There were no children of that marriage.

According to the advice from the immigration lawyer, the mother was granted leave to remain in the UK on 7 June 2022. That leave expired on 4 January 2025.

There is a dispute about the nature of the marriage. The mother says she was subject to coercive control, particularly in relation to finance. The father denies the allegations.

A was born in spring 2024 in town X. He has a British passport. He has been registered with the Moroccan authorities.

The parties purchased a mortgaged property home in [X] in December 2023 It is in the father’s sole name.

The key issues in dispute relate to events at the end of 2024 and the beginning of 2025.

The parents and A travelled to Morocco in December 2024. It is agreed that the tickets were one-way and that no date had been set for a return, the father saying in his statement that the date of when she would return was left “up in the air”. It is also agreed that the mother’s visa expired on 4 January 2025.

The father’s case is that he had told the mother he wanted a divorce in September 2024; that the mother had asked him to delay the proceedings until December 2024 when they were in Morocco and that she intended to remain in Morocco after December 2024. The mother’s case is that she believed that they were going on holiday and she had no intention of either divorcing in Morocco or remaining there. She was shocked when she received the divorce papers.

After arrival it is agreed that the father retained A’s British passport and left it with his grandmother. He says that this was not done for the purpose of stranding.

The father issued divorce proceedings on 26 December 2024 by attending alone at court. The proceedings are ongoing. The father says that the mother was aware he was issuing proceedings; the mother says she did not know of the divorce until she was served with notice of the Petition on 13 January 2025. The application for the divorce was on the basis of “discord”. It is possible to divorce consensually in Morocco but the father elected the alternative route.

The father returned to England on 30 December 2024 leaving his wife and child behind.

I deal with the period of time after 30 December later in the judgment.

The mother’s visa expired in January 2025. She cannot return to live in this jurisdiction. Advice has been received from an immigration joint expert. She has advised that the preferential option for return for the mother would be to apply for indefinite leave to enter as a victim of transnational abandonment. The mother could “as a matter of last resort” apply outside of the rules relying it appears on a need to return to this jurisdiction to deal with these proceedings. That option is clearly more difficult and would result in short term leave. The mother cannot apply under a tourist visa as she would be required to declare that she intends to leave the country at the end of her visit.

In response to a question from the court the immigration expert confirmed that the mother would need the assistance of the father to obtain a new spousal visa. But once the father had left the mother behind in Morocco and had issued divorce proceedings the mother could not have applied as it is a requirement of the rules that the marriage is genuine and subsisting.

On 13 March 2025 the mother issued a wardship application, heard without notice by Mrs Justice Lieven on 13 March 2025. It took a long time, the mother says, to organise her public funding because of issues to do with her access to the joint bank account.

Lieven J declared on a provisional basis that A was habitually resident in England and Wales and that he has been stranded outside the jurisdiction. She made A a Ward of Court until the conclusion of the proceedings, forbade the respondent from removing A from his mother’s care and made a Passport order.

The Tipstaff attended at the father’s address on 14 March 2024 and seized the father’s British and French passport and A’s French passport.

There were two further hearings before Judd J on 4 April 2025 and MacDonald J on 6 May 2025 at which the respondent was represented. The orders continued the Wardship and provided that the passports collected from the father (his passports and A’s French passport) be retained by the respondent’s solicitors. The father confirmed before Judd J that A’s passport was with the father’s grandmother.

The order of MacDonald J of 6 May 2025 provided that respondent was forbidden to remove A from his mother. That day he filed closing submissions in Morocco stating that he insisted on retaining custody of his son.

The mother sought financial relief for A on 20 May 2025 and the father offered to pay £200 a month on 6 May 2025. He made one payment but ceased as he says that the matter is being dealt with by the Moroccan court.

On 30 May 2025 the mother made an application to replace one of her exhibits to her statement, a letter from her sister and brother in law in which they suggested that England was fairer than Morocco and highlighted corruption risks, with a different letter. I understand that the father reported the sister and brother in law to the police in Morocco as a result of that letter.

Directions were made for trial on 13 June 2025 by HHJ Vavrecka. The court declined to make substantive financial remedy orders. The father declined to concede the stranding allegations. The case was listed for trial.

The mother issued a form A on 23 June 2025 for child maintenance and a lump sum order for A.

The matter was listed for a 2 day hearing.

The father issued proceedings on 26 December 2024.

On 21 January 2025 the first conciliation hearing took place. Both parties were represented. The father gave reasons for the divorce including that she neglected her marital duties, that she failed to clean their child, that she left the house dirty. I address the divorce documentation later in my judgment in relation to findings of fact.

There was a further conciliation hearing on 18 February 2025 following which the father says that he gave the mother £2,000 worth of Dirhams in cash. At that hearing the father stated that he had an income of 1,100 Dirhams a month, or £800 and that he had not assets. Those assertions were untrue, as he accepts: his income was more like £3,300 pcm and he owns a mortgaged property in [X].

There was a short hearing on 4 March 2025 dealing with evidence. The mother did not attend.

On 17 March 2025 the father sought sole custody of A.

On 18 March 2025 the mother issued her “reply and counterpetition” seeking

Divorce compensation of 300,000 dirhams (£24,500)

Interim living expenses of 30,000 dirhams (£2,450)

Spousal and child support of 30,000 dirhams per month (£2,450 pcm)

Gratification for religious celebrations of 20,000 dirhams per year (£1,634 p.a.)

Child breastfeeding allowance of 3000 dirhams per month (£245 pcm)

The father put in further submissions on 8 April 2025 stating that her claims were materialistic and she had breached two of the objectives of marriage: chastity and fidelity. The mother and father made further submissions in April and May

On 20 May 2025 the mother sought permission to limit her claim to spousal maintenance only and for this court to make orders in relation to A. She said that matters relating to A’s maintenance were being dealt with by this court. The father has asserted that the Moroccan courts have rejected her application.

On 17 June 2025 the Moroccan court awarded compensation to the mother of 3,000 dirhams for “post divorce housing during the iddah period” and 77,000 dirhams in respect of consolation, equivalent to compensation (“mut’ah”). In total they amount to £6,400. The husband has paid those sums into court in Morocco. I am not clear whether the mother has access to those now.

On 15 July 2025 there is another hearing where there will be further consideration. I am not clear whether this is the final hearing or not.

I have been assisted by counsel’s skeletons here.

The hearing was, primarily, a fact finding hearing. The burden of proof is on the applicant. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. It is a binary system.

Findings must be based on evidence, rather than suspicion or speculation. See Re A (A Child) (Fact-finding Hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12. I must look at all the relevant evidence. I need to take care given that these are allegations as between private individuals. As Baroness Hale cautioned in Re W (Children) [2010] UKSC 12,

“there are specific risks to which the court must be alive [in private law children proceedings]. Allegations of abuse are not being made by a neutral and expert local authority which has nothing to gain by making them, but by a parent who is seeking to gain an advantage in the battle against the other parent. This does not mean that they are false but it does increase the risk of misinterpretation, exaggeration or downright fabrication.”

As to demeanour I need to be cautious and guard against an assessment solely by virtue of behaviour in the witness box and indicate if I have done so. See Macur LJ in Re M Children [2013] EWCA Civ 1147 :

“Any judge appraising witnesses in the emotionally charged atmosphere of a contested family dispute should warn themselves to guard against an assessment solely by virtue of their behaviour in the witness box, and to expressly indicate that they have done so.”

The focus of the court should be placed on matters such as the internal consistency of the evidence, its logicality and plausibility, details given or not given and consistency against other sources of evidence (including what the witnesses have said on other occasions) and other probable or known facts. However, where facts are not likely to be primarily found in contemporaneous documents, an assessment of credibility does include the impression made upon the court by the witness, with due allowance being made for the pressures that may arise from the process of giving evidence: Re B-M(Children: Findings of Fact)[2021] EWCA Civ 1371. Further, memory may be fallible.

The father has admitted lying to the Moroccan court. I pay close regard to the Lucas direction R v Lucas [1981] QB 720. I remind myself that it is common for a party or witness to tell lies in the course of the proceedings or within their evidence. The court must be careful to bear in mind that someone may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress. The fact that somebody may have lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything. As Lord Lan CJ stated in Lucas:

“To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness.”

The most useful guidance is provided by Re H-N & Others [2021] EWCA Civ 448 as to the need for sophisticated analysis which spans the relevant timeline. The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 contains definitions of domestic abuse. Behaviour is “abusive” if it consists of any of the following and it does not matter whether the behaviour consists of a single incident or a course of conduct:

Paragraph 3 of PD 12J FPR 2010 provides a definition of coercive behaviour and controlling behaviour:

“a)

‘coercive behaviour’ means an act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten the victim;

b)

‘controlling behaviour’ means an act or pattern of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour.”

The definitions of coercive and controlling behaviour were further expanded upon in the judgment of Hayden J in F v M[2021] EWFC 4 in which he referred to paragraph 60 the statutory guidance published by the Home Office pursuant to Section 77 (1) of the Serious Crime Act 2015 which identified paradigm behaviours of controlling and coercive behaviour, and said:

“‘coercion’ will usually involve a pattern of acts encompassing, for example, assault, intimidation, humiliation and threats. ‘Controlling behaviour’ really involves a range of acts designed to render an individual subordinate and to corrode their sense of personal autonomy. Key to both behaviours is an appreciation of a ‘pattern’ or ‘a series of acts’, the impact of which must be assessed cumulatively and rarely in isolation.”

The primary focus of the court is on establishing whether or not there has been a pattern of behaviour, following the guidance of the Court of Appeal in H-N and Others (Children) (DomesticAbuse: Fact-finding Hearings)[2021] EWCA Civ 448. The primary focus is on patterns of behaviour and whether the evidence taken as a whole supports a finding of overarching coercive and/or controlling behaviour.

I repeat what I set out at the outset of the judgment namely that PD12J sets out that domestic abuse includes transnational marriage abandonment:

“2B. For the avoidance of doubt, it should be noted that “domestic abuse” includes, but is not limited to, forced marriage, honour-based violence, dowry-related abuse and trnsnational marriage abandonment.

Abandonment is defined as:

“… the practice whereby a husband, in England and Wales, deliberately abandons or “strands” his foreign national wife abroad, usually without financial resources, in order to prevent her from asserting matrimonial and/or residence rights and/or rights in relation to childcare in England and Wales. It may involve children who are either abandoned with, or separated from, their mother;”

As Moylan LJ observed in Re A (Children) [2019] EWCA Civ 74 at [§70-71]:

“It is clear from the Practice Direction that the words abandonment and stranding are not terms of art and that they are not intended to be applied in a formulaic manner. This is because there are a number of ways in which a spouse might be said to have been abandoned or stranded abroad or in which the other spouse might have sought to achieve this. I would agree with Mr Gration when he submitted that cases can include many differing elements which militates against their being placed in distinct categories.

The core feature of the concept of stranding or abandonment is the exploitation or the attempted exploitation by one spouse of the other's vulnerability or weakness to seek to ensure that they are not able to come to or return to the UK. As Peter Jackson J (as he then was) said in ZM v AM[2014] EWHC 2110 (Fam), at [1], it can be the "opportunity" the secure immigration status of one spouse and the insecure immigration status of the other gives "the former to exploit the latter's weakness". However, as PD12J makes clear, it is based more generally on "controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse".

It is the father’s position that he told the mother that he wanted a divorce in September 2024 and that they had numerous conversations about it. He says she asked him to wait until December 2024 to initiate the process so that she could “figure matters out” and return to Morocco where all of her family lived. She told him that he would be ready to divorce by December 2024. He also says that she was aware that he initiated the proceedings on 26 December 2024 and her intention was to live in Morocco.

The mother says that she has been stranded in Morocco. She does not and did not wish to remain in Morocco. She was shocked to receive the divorce petition. She had no intention of returning to Morocco to live. She had asked the father to assist with obtaining a new travel visa and had undertaken an English test to facilitate the visa process. The father retained her travel documents and abandoned her in Morocco.

The mother was clearly agitated and emotional about the proceedings. She feels very wronged. But she answered the questions directly, without attempts, in my view, at embellishment. I considered that she was doing her best to assist the court and her oral evidence was consistent with her written evidence, and her case.

The father was polite and calm in evidence. He accepted that he had not told the truth to the Moroccan court about his income stream and had repeated the lie the following day in a further court document. He explained that was because the mother had exaggerated his income. He accepted that he had lied to the mother about renewing her visa and, in fact, had not done so. He said that he reacted in that way because the mother had told him that he would not see A again.

I felt that the father was unable to provide a plausible explanation on a number of points

The following facts are agreed in the written evidence.

The parties left for Morocco on 19 December 2024. Both parties knew that the mother’s visa would expire in January 2025. It was agreed that the father would return early. The mother had asked the father to help obtain a new visa and he had approached a solicitor to do so. She undertook an English test, paid for by the father, in November 2024.

The father accepts that he did not attempt to renew the visa and lied to the mother about it.

The parties stayed with their families in Morocco. On 26 December 2024 the father issued divorce proceedings.

The father returned to London on 30 December 2024.

On 31 December 20204 and 1 January 2025 the mother sent photos to the father. The photos were of the family together and she said “bonne annee mon amour”.

The parties exchanged text messages on 30 December 2024 to 11 January 2025.

On 11 January 2025 A was unwell and the mother had sought medical assistance. She texted the father to say that was at the doctor’s and the father asked for information about the treatment

The father did not contact the mother after 11 January 2025

The mother was served on 13 January 2025. She then left a large number of voice notes in January and February 2025 that the father accepts he did not listen to.

The mother accepted that she knew her visa would expire when she was in Morocco but she was clear that the father was applying to get a new visa. She said that the trip was simply for a holiday. She had no intention to living in Morocco - her house was here and her son is British. She had left many of her possessions behind in England. She accepted that she had been lonely in 2022 but by 2024 was happy with the father, “despite the circumstances”. I pause her to say that Ms Baker’s note included, I believe “difficult”.

She accepted she had engaged in proceedings in Morocco but emphasised that the father had started the proceedings. She was forced to engage against her will. She did not want to be divorced in Morocco. It was a “big shock” to be served; if they had agreed to divorce there it would have been a consensual petition. The mother was focussed on the fact that the father had lied about his finances in Morocco. She did not accept that the Moroccan court had awarded a final sum of £6,500. She denied that that the father had given her £2,000 and pointed out that he had supplied no evidence. She denied that she was motivated by money. She told me that the father had reported her sister and brother- in-law to the police and that they wished to retract a statement in which they had suggested that the system was corrupt.

In relation to coercive behaviour she said that she had suffered from violence. She accepted there was no violence in the statements but “I mean control, controlling”. She said her income was restricted, that the father had cut up her card - she described it as an “unusual insult” - and closed the joint account. The father accepted throughout that he closed that account but denied cutting up the card

She denied that the father had given her financial support and said did not own a property in Morocco. She said that the father had deleted all her emails as he had her account details.

In evidence the father was asked about his Moroccan divorce documents. In the reconciliation hearing documents was written:

“He alleges that his wife does not respect him, and that she committed several acts he described as inappropriate for a Muslim woman, including wearing revealing clothes, threatening him with deportation from the UK and neglecting her religious duties. She behaved like a foreigner despite being a Muslim”

He accepted he had made those complaints. He did not withdraw them. He said that he found her clothes inappropriate. He said the mother would stand naked after a shower and in front of the window before the car park. He said his complaint was not focused on being or not being a Muslim but he could not accept her behaviour: she had given strangers her social details on Facebook and Tiktok. She had met people in the market and on the bus and given them details. “I do not accept it”, he said. He complained that she had not allowed him to sleep with her. He said her behaviour was shameful and immodest. He denied that he was a misogynist or controlling.

The father said that he had told her he wanted to divorce in September and that he was going to close the joint account. He had waited until the end of December to give her access. He accepted that he had moved the child benefit to his own account but did not cancel it until March 2025 as he did not think about it.

The father did not accept that he had controlled the mother financially. He had told her to open her own account. He gave her money each month.

In relation to the first allegation the father accepted that the mother had done an English test and she wanted a visa. On being asked why he said: “you can ask her”. He said it was because she wanted to “come and visit whenever she wants”. He accepted that he had not taken steps to renew the visa and that he had lied to the mother in text messages when he said he was doing so. He had started to instruct a lawyer but had not continued. He said that was because the mother had said he could not see his son after he came back to a hearing in Morocco.

He said it was better and easier for the mother to live in Morocco. A, he said was the best thing in his life; it was easier to see him in Morocco than a town in England or Scotland. He said that the parties had agreed that he would see A every two weeks but was unable to explain how that fitted in with the suggestion that the mother said he could not see his son.

He said that the mother was a “smart lady” and she could arrange the visa herself. He did not know how she would get a visa if she was divorced.

He did not remember if they had dinner together on 26 December 2024, the day of the petition. He did not remember if they had shared a bed but said they shared a room. He accepted that the happy photos sent at New Year were a bit weird, in the context of the divorce petition. He accepted that he had not listened to the voice notes which he explained was because the mother would scream at him. He said the voice notes and messages were part of her preparation for the litigation in England: she was trying to make her case.

He accepted that he had not contacted the mother after 11 January 2025 and had not sent any money to her when she asked.

He did not accept he had exploited her vulnerable position: she could get a visa on her own like everyone else. He said that he was not thinking when he left A’s passport with his grandmother: “maybe my mistake” but it “was not done with bad intention”.

The father said it was his right to apply for custody. He said he would live in England, France or Morocco to live with A, even Thailand. He said that it was not safe for A to live near the mother’s brother who was a drug addict.

He accepted he had lied to the Moroccan court about his income. He had not formally corrected the untruth but said the court had all the accounts. He denied that he had forced her to work.

The allegation is that the father stranded the mother and child in Morocco in January 2025. He removed their travel documents through deception and returned to England after he had initiated divorce proceedings in Morocco.

The father accepts that the mother’s visa was due to expire in January 2025, that he left the mother and A behind in Morocco and that he initiated divorce proceedings in Morocco on 26 December 2024.

The father’s case is that the mother asked him to delay issuing proceedings until December 2024 when she would return to live in Morocco.

The mother was absolutely clear that she had no intention of remaining in Morocco and was shocked by the divorce petition.

The evidence on this allegation points very strongly, indeed overwhelmingly, in favour of the mother’s case.

I bear in mind that the father has lied both in the Moroccan proceedings and to the mother about the visa. The father’s explanation for the lie to the Moroccan court is that the mother was inaccurate about his income. The father did not lie out of shame, or to bolster a just cause, or to conceal disgraceful behaviour. He lied because he did not want to have to pay the mother very much money. I do not, in fact, need to rely upon those lies as the evidence is so clear cut in favour of the mother’s case, in my view.

I do not find that the mother’s messages in December and January were part of a plan to ask for more money in these proceedings: their tone and content is self-evidently one of confusion and emotional turmoil.

I find that the father deliberately applied for a divorce petition in secret. He took the mother and A to Morocco knowing that her visa would expire, having made a decision not to renew that visa and knowing full well that he was lying to her about the application. He applied for the divorce on 26 December, took her out for dinner and said how much he loved her, and said nothing about the petition. She did not find out until she was served. He left on 30 December 2024 to return to England when the mother still did not know he had issued proceedings. By the time she found out her visa had expired, and she was unable to come to England.

I find that the father exploited the mother’s vulnerability. He knew that her visa would expire. He stranded her deliberately in Morocco.

The mother says that the father had deliberately taken her residence permit. I note that the residence permit was not found by the Tipstaff. I do not need to make a finding on this point. But I have found that he deliberately withheld A’s passport by leaving it with his grandmother.

The mother has proved the first allegation.

I set out the allegation in full. The allegation is that father subjected the mother to coercive and controlling behaviour including financial abuse. The father refused to let the mother have access to her bank account via internet banking. The father destroyed the mother’s debit card. The father refused to allow the mother have access to her own salary during the time she was working. The father pressured the mother to work in jobs she did not wish to and would frequently shout at her if she did not agree. The father abandoned the mother and A in Morocco without funds for their living expenses. The father did not pay for A’s urgent medical treatment at the hospital when A was struggling to breathe as he had bronchitis.

Stranding the mother and A is an example of domestic abuse.

According to Re H-N I need to consider whether a pattern of coercive behaviour has been established. The complaints are primarily financial. It is clear that coercive control can include financial control. The evidence of coercive behaviour is not as clear cut as that of abandonment.

In cross-examination the father was asked about the contents of the submissions at the reconciliation hearing at which the father had said that the mother did not respect him; committed inappropriate acts for a Muslim woman including wearing revealing clothes; threatened him with deportation; neglected his religious duties and behaved like a foreigner spending weekends out with foreigners.

The father did not deny making these complaints to the Moroccan court, nor did he say they were untrue. The allegations could be described as misogynistic, but I note that the complaints did not feature in the schedule of allegation nor feature to a large extent in her written or oral evidence; there the complaints were primarily financial. I get the impression that the father was lying in his divorce petition in order to strengthen the petition in Morocco. But I do have to bear the father’s evidence on the divorce petition in mind in when considering context of the other allegations.

I note that the mother said she was shocked by the divorce petition, and that she has said in her written evidence that “on the whole” the relationship was fine. She said, and I find, that they continued to have intimate relations until separation at the end of December 2024. The photographs and messages that she prays in aid to show that the parties had a normal relationship until January 2025, and thus why she was shocked by the petition, do not support a case as to a coercive and controlling relationship. I accept that coercion and control come in many forms and can result in a loss of personal autonomy. And also coercive control does not mean that every day is awful, as Ms Baker reminds me. But there are quite a large number of positive messages and photos over a prolonged period of time.

The mother says that the father pressurised her to work in jobs that she did not like. she lists three in her statement, all of which appear to be quite brief in duration, and she particularly disliked the massage parlour cleaning job. I pause her to say that the complaints in the divorce petition in Morocco ring particularly hollow in light of the work that the mother undertook.

The mother’s evidence is also that she gave up work when she got ill in December 2022 and she does not appear to have worked since then. She went to Morocco on her own in 2023 and the father provided her with financial support when she went. He does not appear to have forced her to work since December 2022. He says that he bought her a computer to allow her to do online courses. I accept that the mother would have preferred to work as a physiotherapist, but I do not consider that he has demonstrated coercive control here in relation to employment

The mother says that the father denied her access to her own earnings, refused to give her internet access and cut up her card. I deal with these together.

The mother was not working for the majority of the marriage. She accepted in evidence that she and the father had discussed whether they have a joint account or sole accounts and she had eventually agreed. She has a card on that account. The mother says that she was given a budget of £300 to £350 a month which was insufficient. I find that the father was very cautious about money and did impose a budget. The mother says that the father told her to be patient as he wanted to save money to buy a property, which he did, in which the family live. But it does appear that she had access to the joint account until it was closed. There are a large number of transactions on card no. 8512, for example there are 31 in the period from 18 October 2024 to 13 November 2024, albeit they are for very small sums. I don’t have statements going back to 2022 when the mother was working.

I do not have sufficient evidence to find that the father denied access to the banking app internet. That would seem rather pointless if the mother had a card. I also do not find that he was guilty of coercive control in relation to denying access to the joint account when she had her own card.

I do find, however, that he was controlling about finances as part of his plan to strand the mother in Morocco. To that end

I do not find that the father cut up the card in December 2024. He denies that allegation and it would be pointless if he closed the account.

The mother also alleges that the father abandoned her and A without any funds. The father says that he gave then £500 before he left Morocco and £2,000 in February 2025 after he attended court in Morocco. She says that he did not pay when she asked him for help with

On these points I prefer the evidence of the mother. There is no evidence that the father paid these cash sums. He could easily have produced evidence from his accounts. He has evidence from the Moroccan court that he has paid in the 80,000 dirhams that have been awarded to the mother. But he has nothing in relation to £2,000 that he alleges he gave to the mother in February. He accepted that he did not send any money when he was sent pictures of their son having medical treatment and the mother made a request.

So, for the second allegation, I find that the father’s behaviour was controlling in the following manner

The father lied about his income and salary.

This allegation is admitted and proven. The father lied about his income and assets to the Moroccan court on 21 January 2025. He repeated that lie on 27 March 2025.

The allegation is that the father abandoned A and then cut off all communication with the mother about him and left them financially destitute.

The father has accepted that he ceased communication with the mother. I have already found that the father left the mother, and thus A, destitute.

The father has asserted that the mother has rental income. He has relied upon a rental contract in her name that is five years old. The mother has explained in her statement that she does not have access to this income: the flat was taken over by her sister who gives the rental income to their brother. The father also relies upon ownership of the family home in Morocco that is occupied by her brother. I prefer the mother’s evidence which was consistent in both oral and written form.

The father does not wish to say that he has not communicated with A. But given A’s age, that is what stranding the mother and ceasing communication with her has achieved.

The fourth allegation is proved.

The allegation is that the father hacked into the mother’s email account and deleted her emails on 15 January and 20 January 2025. The father denies the allegation.

There is very little evidence on this point. In her statement the mother says that she received a notification that someone in the UK had accessed her laptop on those dates. The document she relies upon says there was activity on 15 January 2025 in the UK and on 20 January 2025 in Morocco from a Galaxy S9. That would coincide with the father’s whereabouts. But there is no other evidence linking the father and this behaviour. In particular, he says that he does not have a Galaxy S9. He has an S21. The mother has an S9.

I do not find this allegation proven.

The mother seeks financial relief against the father, pursuant to Schedule 1, para 7 of the Children Act 1989 for

The sums of money sought are modest.

I have found that the mother has no rental income and has received no financial assistance from the father although he has paid in £6,500 to the Moroccan court. It is not clear if that is available to her now.

The mother’s sister and brother-in-law are supporting her but they have written a statement to say that this cannot continue.

The father agreed to pay £200 per month towards A at the hearing on 6 May 2025 before MacDonald J, but has paid only once. He makes no other contribution and there are no maintenance orders in place in Morocco

There are ongoing financial proceedings in Morocco. The mother has attempted to claim only spousal maintenance there. It is not clear to me if the court has rejected the severance of child and spousal maintenance orders; that is the father’s position but the mother points out that the documents in the bundle are submissions from his lawyers rather than a judgment.

At the hearing on 15 July 2025 a decision will be made but I am not clear what this will encompass.

The father earns a little more than £3,300 pcm. He is paying privately in these proceedings. He has previously instructed Leading counsel. He says that money has been borrowed to fund proceedings. His mortgage appears to be about £1,504 according to the bank statements which would suggest that he has c £1,800 to live on and pay bills.

The father’s primary position is that the Moroccan court is best placed to deal with this application. His secondary position is that there should be a stay on the basis that it would be more convenient for the Moroccan court to deal with this matter.

Ms Andrews has relied on the case of Timokhin v Timokhina [2023] EWHC 58. That case is very different on the facts. It was a Schedule 1 application where the father who sought provision accepted that the scale of the wealth was such that he did not need financial assistance from the mother to provide the children with the privileged life they led. Here, I have found that the mother is without income or resources. The position could not be more starkly different.

The father has said that the mother and A are not habitually resident in England and Wales absent a finding of stranding. A is a ward of court. The court has earlier determined that A is habitually resident in England. I have found that the mother was stranded in Morocco. On that basis all three parties are habitually resident in this jurisdiction.

Under Schedule 1 of the Children Act, para 1 (7) where a child is a ward of court, the court may exercise any of its power under this Schedule even though no application has been made.

Under s 44 (1) Child Support Act if a person with care (the mother), the non-resident parent (the father) and the children are habitually resident in England and Wales then the CMS has exclusive jurisdiction. That is the case here. The court does not have jurisdiction to make a maintenance award.

Ms Baker has urged me to be practical. The mother’s application under the CMS will take several weeks and she is in need of assistance now. I disagree. The power of the court in wardship jurisdiction is wide but it cannot override the legal jurisdiction of other public bodies. As Munby J said in the case, In the Matter of a Ward of Court [2017] EWHC 1022 at para 9.

“the wardship court cannot exercise its powers, however wide they may be, so as to intervene on the merits in an area of concern entrusted by law to another public authority”.

The CMS clearly has jurisdiction in this case. Whilst I have a great deal of sympathy for the mother’s predicament, I do not consider that it is appropriate for the court to exercise its Wardship jurisdiction to deal with the delays in the procedure of the CMS when the CMS clearly has exclusive jurisdiction.

Given the habitual residence of A, the court does have power to order disclosure, and to make an order for a lump sum. I have found that the father has an income of c £3,300 pcm and a mortgage of £1,500 pcm. I have found that the father has stranded the mother and A in Morocco. The mother and child need provision to assist with legal fees and the application for a visa. The mother has no funds of her own. On the basis of the findings of fact I have made, I consider that the father should pay for the costs of the application and legal fees. After public funding assistance, these fees amount to £3,250. These sums are modest in comparison with the father’s own legal fees. If the mother is successful in her application for legal aid and a fee waive, these figures will reduce. The father has a reasonable income of c £3,300 pcm with a mortgage of £1,500 pcm. I do not consider that the Moroccan court would be better placed to make a determination on this issue of expenditure not least because the father lied to the Moroccan court about his income and capital position.

The mother has also sought financial disclosure. The father says I should not make a substantive order before I order disclosure – what is the point of disclosure if I have already made a determination? I have found that the father as part of his controlling behaviour closed the joint account and opened another account or accounts. I have found that he has not provided for his wife and child financially. He has lied to the Moroccan courts about his finances and does not appear to have rectified the position formally. I have, since the draft of the judgment, been informed that there is a final hearing in Morocco on 29 July 2025. Although I have made a determination on the lump sum and maintenance parts of the Schedule 1 application, I consider that it is necessary to have some understanding of the father’s financial position not least to deal with the practicalities of the mother’s return at the next hearing.

That is my judgment.