Karima Gadekrab Elsayed Mahmoud v Daniel Glanville & Anor (No2) (Pro Bono Costs Order)

On 8 May 2025, I handed down judgment with respect to applications concerning the welfare of Adam Glanville, born on 27 July 2017. Those applications comprised an application by Karima Mahmoud, the mother of Adam, for permission to apply for a child arrangements order, there being an order pursuant to s.91(14) of the Children Act 1989 in force in respect of the mother, and an application by Daniel Glanville, the father of Adam, to restrict the exercise of the mother’s parental responsibility. In addition, the mother sought the discharge of a non-molestation order made against her by this court in November 2024 and the return of her passports.

The issue now before the court is whether the court should make two costs orders in favour of the father. The first order concerns the costs paid by the father to his solicitors prior to them agreeing to act pro bono on his behalf. The N260 form dealing with those with costs with Teelan & Silwal LLP is before the court in the sum of £118,720.20. The form indicates that in addition to the pro bono work carried out by Teelan & Silwal, that firm has written off £19,212.50 against billed costs during the period 11 September 2023 to 19 February 2024, as a gesture of good will. The value of the pro bono work carried out by Teelan & Silwal, if it had been charged, is set out in a separate Form N260 in the sum of £29,478.00. Within this context, and in addition to the costs order sought by the father, the father seeks a pro bono costs order under s.194 of the Legal Services Act 2007 (hereafter “the 2007 Act”). Finally, the court has before it a third Form N260 dealing with costs of £ £20,497.60 that would have been incurred by the father with Moore Barlow, who stepped in when Teelan & Silwal were unable to continue to assist pro bono.

In considering the applications, I have had the benefit of written submissions prepared by the father on 23 May 2025, and by Teelan & Silwal LLP dated 8 April 2024, together with a draft order that provides for the mother to pay costs for pro bono representation to the Access to Justice Foundation summarily assessed or to be assessed on the standard/indemnity basis if not agreed. I have also had a response to the costs application from the mother by way of a further witness statement and a Skeleton Argument.

The detailed background to this matter is set out in the judgments of Francis J (see Glanville v Mahmoud [2024] EWHC 1739 (Fam)) and in my judgment of 8 May 2025 (see Mahmoud v Glanville [2025] EWHC 1064 (Fam)). I do not set that history out here. However, the following matters from those judgments are relevant:

In April 2025 the mother sought to permission from the Court of Appeal to appeal the decisions of Francis J in March 2024 and July 2024 out of time. On 7 April 2025 Lord Justice Baker refused the mother permission to appeal. In the circumstances, the findings made by Francis J in March 2024 and the findings and final orders made by Francis J in July 2024 stand.

On 8 May 2025, following a further hearing, this court reiterated that the ‘lives with’ order made by Francis J, providing for Adam to live with his father, and the order made   by Francis J, permitting the father to remove Adam permanently from the jurisdiction of England and Wales to the jurisdiction of the Netherlands. The court further confirmed that the order made by Francis J pursuant to s.91(14) remains in force until 1800hrs on 9 July 2029. This court declined to vary the non-molestation order granted in November 2024, which was extended that order until 1800hrs on 9 July 2029.

In addition, the court dismissed the mother’s application for permission to issue an application for a child arrangements order. On the father’s application to restrict the exercise of the mother’s parental responsibility, the court made the following prohibited steps orders and specific issue order:

On 31 July 2025 Lord Justice Baker refused the mother’s application for permission to appeal the orders made by this court on 8 May 2025.

The law applicable to the making of costs orders in proceedings with respect to children is well settled. The exclusion of CPR 44.2(2) by FPR 2010 r.28.2 exempts all family proceedings covered by the FPR 2010 from the general rule that the unsuccessful party should pay the costs of the successful party.

Within the foregoing context, orders for costs in children proceedings will generally be rare. In Re T (Care Proceedings: Serious Allegations not Proved) [2012] UKSC 36, [2012] 1 WLR 2281, Lord Philips, delivering the judgment of the court, noted obiter that in family proceedings there are usually special considerations that militate against the approach that is appropriate in other kinds of adversarial civil litigation, particularly where the interests of a child are at stake, that explain why it is common in family proceedings, and usual in proceedings involving a child for no order to be made in relation to costs. Such considerations include that orders for costs between the parties will diminish the funds available to meet the needs of the family (either now or in the future) and that it is undesirable to award costs where this will (further) exacerbate feelings between two parents, or more generally between relations, to the ultimate detriment of the child. In Sutton London Borough Council v Davis (No 2) [1994] 1 WLR 1317 at 1317 Wilson J (as he then was) said:

“Where the debate surrounds the future of a child, the proceedings are partly inquisitorial and the aspiration is that in their outcome the child is the winner and indeed the only winner. The court does not wish the spectre of an order for costs to discourage those with a proper interest in the welfare of the child from participating in the debate. Nor does it wish to reduce the chance of their co-operation around the future life of the child by casting one as the successful party entitled to his costs and another as the unsuccessful party obliged to pay them…”

Unreasonable behaviour may, however, lead to a costs order even though the proceedings in question concern children. For example, in Timokhina v Tomohkin [2019] EWCA Civ 1284, [2019] 1 WLR 5458, costs were order in circumstances where the mother attempted to bribe a police officer to bring a spurious case against the father to support her case. In Re A and B (Parental Alienation No 3) [2021] EWHC 2602 (Fam), costs were awarded where the mother's approach to the proceedings was found to be wholly unreasonable and a totally ill-judged litigation tactic. In C v S [2022] EWHC 800 (Fam), [2023] 2 FLR 128 a costs order followed where a mother was found to have acted reprehensibly and unreasonably in fact-finding proceedings. In The Mother v The Father [2023] EWHC 2078 costs were awarded where an appeal had been brought with no proper basis.

However, even where the court considers that a party has taken an unreasonable stance in proceedings concerning children, it does not follow that an order for costs will inevitably be made. A conclusion that a party has taken an unreasonable or reprehensible stance in proceedings simply enables the court to consider making a costs order (see The Mother v The Father [2023] EWHC 2078. In Re N (A child) v A and others [2010] 1 FLR 454, Munby J (as he then was) summarised the position as follows:

“A judge must be careful not to fall into the trap of simply assuming that because there has been unreasonable behaviour in the conduct of litigation an order is therefore to be made without more ado. Careful attention must be paid to all the circumstances of the case and to the factors which, on the authorities I have referred to, indicate that it is normally inappropriate to make such an order – factors which do not simply disappear or cease to have any weight merely because the litigation has been conducted unreasonably.”

It is important to note that there may well be circumstances other than where there is unreasonable or reprehensible behaviour or unreasonable conduct of the proceedings which justify a costs order (see Re S (A Child) [2015] UKSC 20, [2015] 1 WLR 1631 at [31]).

As I have noted, in this case the father also seeks a pro bono costs order that provides for the mother to pay costs the father’s would have incurred but for his pro bono representation to the Access to Justice Foundation (hereafter “the AJF”), summarily assessed or to be assessed on the standard / indemnity basis if not agreed. Jurisdiction to make such an order is provided by ss 194 of the Legal Services Act 2007:

“194 Payments in respect of pro bono representation civil courts in England and Wales

(1)

This section applies to proceedings in a civil court in which—

(a)

a party to the proceedings (“P”) is or was represented by a legal representative (“R”), and

(b)

R's representation of P is or was provided free of charge, in whole or in part.

(2)

This section applies to such proceedings even if P is or was also represented by a legal representative not acting free of charge.

(3)

The court may order any person to make a payment to the prescribed charity in respect of R's representation of P (or, if only part of R's representation of P was provided free of charge, in respect of that part).

(4)

In considering whether to make such an order and the terms of such an order, the court must have regard to—

(a)

whether, had R's representation of P not been provided free of charge, it would have ordered the person to make a payment to P in respect of the costs payable to R by P in respect of that representation, and

(b)

if it would, what the terms of the order would have been.

(5)

The court may not make an order under subsection (3) against a person represented in the proceedings if the person's representation was at all times within subsection (6).

(6)

Representation is within this subsection if it is—

(a)

provided by a legal representative acting free of charge, or

(b)

provided under arrangements made for the purposes of Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.

(7)

Rules of court may make further provision as to the making of orders under subsection (3), and may in particular—

(a)

provide that such orders may not be made in civil proceedings of a description specified in the rules;

(b)

make provision about the procedure to be followed in relation to such orders;

(c)

specify matters (in addition to those mentioned in subsection (4)) to which the court must have regard in deciding whether to make such an order, and the terms of any order.

(8)

“The prescribed charity” means the charity prescribed under section 194C.

(9)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(10)

In this section—

“legal representative”, in relation to a party to proceedings, means a person

exercising a right of audience or conducting litigation on the party's behalf;

“civil court” means—

a)

...

b)

the civil division of the Court of Appeal,

c)

the High Court,

ca) the family court,] or

d)

the county] court;

...

“free of charge” means otherwise than for or in expectation of fee, gain or reward.

(11)

The court may not make an order under subsection (3) in respect of representation if (or to the extent that) it is provided before this section comes into force.”

The jurisdiction to make a pro bono costs order thus encompasses the Family Court and the Family Division of the High Court. A pro bono costs order reflects the financial value of the free legal help provided and the amount is based on what a paying client would recover. The costs cover any period when free representation was provided. Any costs order should provide that payment is made to the prescribed charity, namely the AJF, pursuant to s.194C of the 2007 Act. The objectives of the AJF are to receive and distribute financial resources to be utilised in helping to provide pro bono legal advice or assistance to those who need it most, for example through advice centres and law centres (see the White Book, paragraph 46.7.1).

In Manolete Partners v White [2024] EWCA Civ 1558, [2025] 1 WLR 1094 (in which the question on appeal was whether, and if so, how, when considering whether to make such an order, the court should take into account the fact that the successful party who was represented pro bono owed a large and unsatisfied judgment debt to the potential paying party), the Court of Appeal noted that the power to make an order under s.194(3) of the 2007 Act is discretionary in circumstances where the requirement under section 194(4) obliging the court to "have regard to" the order it would have made if "P" had not been represented pro bono does not amount to an obligation on the court make an order that exactly, or even so far as possible, corresponds to the costs order it would have made in the absence of pro bono representation.

Further, and importantly having regard to the principles that apply to costs orders in children proceedings, in Manolete Partners v White the Court of Appeal made clear that, although often called a "pro bono costs order", an order under s.194 of the 2007 Act is not a conventional order for costs. As such, while s.194(4) of the 2007 Act “in effect requires the court to have regard to the principles that apply to such costs orders”, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the power to make an order under s.194 must also be exercised having regard to the legislative purposes behind the enactment of that section. With respect to the legislative purpose of s.194 of the 2007 Act, in Manolete Partners v White the Court of Appeal held at [20] and [21]:

“[20] The legislative purposes of section 194 are relatively easy to see. Before the introduction of section 194, a privately funded party who was litigating against a person who was represented pro bono had the tactical advantage that they were not exposed to the usual risks of an adverse costs order. The introduction of section 194 was designed to put the parties on a more equal litigation footing by exposing the privately funded party to a similar risk of adverse costs. In addition, the identification of a charity as the beneficiary of an order under section 194 and the designation of the AJF makes clear the intent that orders under the section should provide a source of funding to support organisations involved in the provision of free legal help to a wider cross-section of the public who might be in need.

[21] ... Parliament must have enacted section 194 in the knowledge that the majority of litigants who obtain pro bono representation do so because they do not have the financial means to pay for legal services. Parliament therefore could not have envisaged that an order for payment to the AJF should be made conditional upon such litigants finding the money to pay legal fees, because the practical result of imposing such a condition would be that in most cases, no payments would be required to be made to the AJF. This would defeat the statutory purposes which I have identified.”

The procedural approach to determining whether to make a pro bono costs order in a case concerning children will be broadly the same as the approach to the question of costs in any other children proceedings. In the circumstances, the principles that are set out above governing whether or not to make a costs order in proceedings concerning children will apply to the question of whether or not to make a pro bono costs order.

The statutory power in s.194 is given effect by CPR 46.7 and guidance is contained in CPR PD46. Within this context, statements of costs should be filed indicating what fee work was provided and how much it would have cost a paying client at the lawyer’s   normal rate. The task of the court will be to determine whether, having regard to the principles set out above, a costs orders should be made notwithstanding the proceedings concern a child or children and, if so, to assess the quantum of costs that would have been awarded for the pro bono party’s representation if that representation had been on a fee paying basis and to award the equivalent amount in pro bono costs. Ordinarily, the assessment of the appropriate quantum of costs will be a summary one. The suggested wording for a pro bono costs order is as follows:

“The [party] must pay costs for pro bono representation on or before [date] to the Access to Justice Foundation (The Access to Justice Foundation, 7 Bell Yard, London WC2A 2JR), [summarily assessed at £____] [or] [to be assessed on the standard /indemnity basis if not agreed].”

In his written representations regarding costs, the father relies on the following submissions with respect to his application for a costs order and a pro bono costs order as being indicative of the mother’s unreasonable and reprehensible conduct with respect to the litigation:

The mother responded to the costs application by way of submitting a document entitled “Witness Statement of the mother in opposition to costs application and to provide factual clarification” and a Skeleton Argument dated 21 May 2025. Whilst I bear in mind that the mother is a litigant in person, those documents are further symptomatic of the mother’s overall approach to this litigation in that they sought to re-argue the entirety of the case, the mother using the father’s application for costs as a further opportunity to raise allegations against him and his solicitors. In so far as the document addresses the issue of costs, the mother makes the following submissions:

I am satisfied that this is a case in which it is appropriate to make an order for costs against the mother in favour of the father in the sum of £95,000. I am further satisfied that it is appropriate to make a pro bono costs order against the mother in the sum of £20,000. My reasons for so deciding are as follows.

In this case, and as set out in the previous judgments of the court, it is beyond dispute that the mother’s litigation conduct has been wholly unreasonable and reprehensible.

During the course of the proceedings, as found by Francis J, the mother repeatedly sought to manipulate, frustrate and delay the litigation process by making false and baseless allegations against the father without evidence to substantiate her repeated allegations of abuse or inappropriate care of Adam. Even now, in response to the application for a costs order against her, the mother continues to raise spurious allegations and to seek to use the litigation to malign the father and the legal professionals who have been assisting him, latterly pro bono.

Most egregiously, the mother sought to frustrate and delay the litigation by abducting Adam from the care of his father with the assistance of two other adult individuals and deliberately concealing him from the court and the police and authorities for 8 months, resulting in multiple court hearings before the High Court in an effort to locate Adam and return him to his father’s care, with the considerable expenditure of resources attendant thereon by those representing the father. For the mother now to contend in these circumstances that she made “multiple genuine attempts to reach an amicable agreement” with the father lacks any contact with reality. In so far as the mother complains about the father issuing “over 30 ex parte applications”, the need for such extensive litigation was brought about solely by the conduct of the mother in the circumstances set out above.

In addition, the mother has repeatedly sought to cast unevidenced and unjustified assertions against the father’s legal representatives and the court, alleging that the father’s high legal costs are evidence not of her frustration and obstruction of the   litigation, but of bribery and corruption in the courts. By way of example in her email to the father of 14 November 2022, she said “you have given dozens of thousands of pounds to your phony and liar lawyer ... to lie and forge official documents to discredit me by lying in court to deceive and mislead the judge to get what you want.” In her email to the father of 1 March 2023 she said “you paid thousands of pounds to your swine lawyer to lie and mislead the court and the judge to get what you want.” In a video posted online in October 2024, which the mother describes an email of 17 October 2024, the mother asserted that bribery and corruption among the judiciary and the legal profession was evidenced by the large sums of money the father was spending on his legal fees.

It is clear from the foregoing matters that the unreasonable and reprehensible conduct relied by the father in support of his application for a costs order relates to the mother’s conduct of the litigation and not to Adam’s welfare. A costs order may be made in proceedings concerning children where a party has behaved unreasonably or reprehensibly during the course of the litigation. Within the foregoing context, I am satisfied that this a paradigm case for a costs order against a parent who has acted both unreasonably or reprehensibly with respect to the litigation concerning Adam. The net effect of the mother’s appalling conduct was to delay, obfuscate and frustrate the proceedings and to increase markedly the father’s legal costs as a direct result of that unreasonable and reprehensible conduct.

With respect to the question of the pro bono costs order sought in respect of the pro bono assistance received by the father, it is important to start with consideration of s.194 of the 2007 Act and the extent to which legislative purpose behind s.194 is consistent with the position with respect to costs orders in proceedings relating to children.

As noted by the Court of Appel in Manolete Partners v White, s.194 of the 2007 Act must be applied having regard to the legislative purposes behind the enactment of that section. As further made clear in Manolete Partners v White, the purpose of s.194 is to address the issues arising from the fact that a privately funded party who is litigating against a person who is represented pro bono has the tactical advantage that they are not exposed to the usual risks of an adverse costs order (the party represented pro bono having incurred no costs against which an adverse costs order could bite against the privately funded party). The introduction of s. 194 of the 2007 Act was thus designed to put parties on a more equal litigation footing by exposing the privately funded party to a similar risk of adverse costs to the party represented pro bono should the privately funded party be unsuccessful.

In children proceedings, the scenario with which s.194 is intended to address does not ordinarily arise in circumstances where the exclusion of CPR 44.2(2) by FPR 2010 r.28.2 exempts all family proceedings covered by the FPR 2010 from the general rule that the unsuccessful party should pay the costs of the successful party. In these circumstances, in proceedings relating to children a privately paying party in children proceedings is not ordinarily at an advantage against a party represented pro bono, in that neither party to proceedings concerning children would ordinarily be at risk of an adverse costs order in any event.

In my judgment, however, this does not mean that a pro bono costs order is unavailable in proceedings concerning children where the case has proceeded in a manner that leads the court to consider whether a costs order is justified notwithstanding the proceedings   concern children, on the grounds of unreasonable behaviour. If s.194 did not cover this situation, a party to proceedings concerning children who is litigating against a party represented pro bono could act entirely unreasonably or reprehensibly without fear of costs consequences, on the basis that they are not at risk of an adverse costs order in favour of the party represented pro bono. This would also in my judgement run contrary to the purpose of s.194 intended by Parliament.

Accordingly, the approach of the court where an application is made for a pro bono costs order in proceedings concerning children will be broadly the same as in any other case of that type. Depending on the facts of the case, a costs order may be made in proceedings concerning children where a party has behaved unreasonably or reprehensibly during the course of such proceedings. When deciding whether there has been unreasonable conduct, each case must turn on its own facts (see Re W (A Child) [2020] EWCA Civ 77 at [10]). The unreasonable conduct relied on must relate to the litigation and not the child's welfare (see Re T (A Child) [2005] EWCA Civ 311 at [36], citing R v R (Costs: child case) [1997] 2 FLR 95). Where the court is satisfied that there has been unreasonable conduct of the nature and extent that justifies a costs order, the court will move to assess the quantum of costs that would have been awarded for the pro bono party’s representation if that representation had been on a fee paying basis and to award the equivalent amount in pro bono costs to the AJF. As I have noted, ordinarily the assessment of the appropriate quantum of costs will be a summary one.

For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that that the mother has behaved unreasonably and reprehensibly with respect to the litigation concerning Adam such that I am satisfied that this a paradigm case for a costs order against a parent who has acted both unreasonably or reprehensibly. Again for the reasons I have given, in addition to making a costs order in favour of the father, I am satisfied that in such circumstances, it is open to the court also to make a pro bono costs order having regard to the legislative intention behind s.194 of the 2007 Act. Having regard to that legislative intent, in the particular circumstances of this case, I consider it appropriate to make a pro bono costs order in favour of the AJF, in addition to the costs order made in favour of the father. Given the court’s findings regarding the nature and extent of the mother’s unreasonable and reprehensible behaviour with respect to the litigation, the mother cannot be permitted to hid behind the fact that the father was compelled to move to pro bono representation to protect her from the a proportion of cost consequences of her unreasonable and reprehensible behaviour, particularly when the necessity to move to pro bono representation was a consequence of that behaviour drawing out the proceedings unnecessarily.

In assessing the appropriate quantum of costs, the court is exercising a wide discretion, governed by the general principles of reasonableness and proportionality. The court will seek to make an order which is fair, just and reasonable in all the circumstances.

In assessing fairness and reasonableness, the court may consider the paying parties means when making an order for costs, although it is not required to do so (see Attorney General v Dowie [2023] 1 FCR 221). I address this issue in circumstances where the mother specifically raises her contended for impecuniosity as a ground for opposing the father’s application for costs orders.

In this regard, I am conscious that I have limited information regarding the mother’s current financial situation. Against this, whilst the mother contends in her Skeleton   Argument that she is “is homeless and lacks financial means”, for the reasons explained in the judgment of Francis J, the mother is entirely lacking in credibility. Were the court to further adjourn the question of costs to enable the mother to provide details of her current finances, I am satisfied that the court could not safely rely on the mother’s account of her financial circumstances, if indeed any account went beyond the mother’s current bare assertion of destitution.

Further, there is some evidence before the court from which the court can draw inferences that appear to stand at odds with the mother’s assertion of impecuniosity. Within the material before the court is evidence that the mother has been able to take Adam abroad repeatedly, to hold him in Oman and then later to hold him for 8 months in hiding. Within this context, in his judgment Francis J observed that the mother’s capacity to travel to expensive foreign destinations was inconsistent with her being entitled to Legal Aid. The mother has also set out in evidence that her partner, with whom she lives, is successful in his career as a Senior Vice President / Chief Commercial Officer. The mother has further stated that he has access to a family inheritance once her passports are returned to her. The mother now has her passports pursuant to the order of this court of 8 May 2025. In the foregoing circumstances, whilst the court is not required to consider the paying parties means, I am satisfied that the court can reasonably conclude that the mother has access to sufficient financial resources to meet costs order made by this court whilst also discharging her living expenses.

I am further satisfied that it is appropriate to undertake a summary assessment of costs in this case. It would not be proper for the father to have to incur further costs associated with detailed assessment or to further rely on pro bono assistance to do so With respect to the pro bono costs order, in line with the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Manolete Partners v White, in determining the appropriate amount I consider that it would not be appropriate to order a detailed assessment of the costs bill put forward by the pro bono solicitors and counsel, not least as it is unclear who would have the interest to participate in a detailed assessment apart from the mother. It would be unrealistic to expect the father’s pro bono team or the AJF to spend time and money on that exercise.

Taking a broad approach, having regard to all of the factors, I assess the appropriate quantum of the costs order in favour of the father to be £95,000. Considering the Form N260, the costs claimed therein are broadly reasonable having regard to the amount of work consequent upon the circumstances set out above. That schedule already takes account of some £19,000 in costs written off as an act of good will. With respect to the pro bono costs order in favour of the AJF, I consider that the appropriate quantum is £20,000. Once again, considering the relevant Form N260, the costs claimed therein are broadly reasonable having regard to the amount of work consequent upon the circumstances set out above. This gives a total costs liability for the mother of £115,000. I am satisfied that that figure is reasonable and proportionate having regard to the matters I have set out above and properly reflects the egregiously unreasonable and reprehensible conduct of the mother during the course of this litigation and the significantly elevated costs consequent upon that conduct.

Accordingly, for the reasons I have set out, I make the following order on the father’s application for a costs order: