KN v KR & Anor

I am concerned with a 7 year old child, KF, born on 30 April 2018, in proceedings brought by her father, KN, under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985, incorporating the 1980 Hague Convention (the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980). He seeks her return from the UK to Australia so that long-term welfare decisions can be taken there. That application is opposed by the mother, KR, with whom KF currently lives in the UK. I shall refer to the parents as ‘the father’ and ‘the mother’.

The parents have three other children – KA (18), KB (17) and KC (16). Both parents and all four children are Australian nationals. Neither the mother nor KF had previously visited or had any connection with the UK.

On 07 July 2024 the mother, accompanied by KA, removed KF from Australia, travelling first to Thailand, then to the UK on tourist visas on 16 July 2024. KA and KF remain in her care in the UK. KB and KC live with the father.

It is common ground that KF was habitually resident in Australia prior to her removal to the UK (alternatively prior to her retention there – I shall return below to the question of whether this was a removal or a retention). It is also agreed that the father was exercising rights of custody at the time of the removal, which was therefore wrongful in Article 3 terms. The mother seeks to defend the application on the basis of Article 13(b) alone.

There are pending private law proceedings before the Family Court in Australia, within which KF and her two brothers are separately represented through an independent children’s lawyer. The next hearing is listed on 11 September 2025.

In September 2024 the mother applied for asylum in the UK with KF as a dependent. On 19 March 2025 Keehan J. joined KF as a party to these Hague Convention proceedings, appointed a Children’s Guardian to represent her and invited the Secretary of State for the Home Department to intervene. The mother’s asylum application has now been refused and there has been no intervention by the Secretary of State.

At the start of the hearing there was some uncertainty as to whether the asylum application had been certified as “clearly unfounded” under s.94 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, such that no statutory right of appeal arises. At the PTR on 11 August 2025, Ms Khalique KC had directed the mother’s immigration solicitor to file and serve a letter setting out whether she had a right of appeal (and, if not, why not) and a summary of the basis for any potential judicial review claim. A further direction was given for the Home Office to clarify matters. It transpired at the final hearing that the court had not yet sent the EX660 to the Home Office. No letter had been filed by the mother’s immigration solicitor. Further enquiries made by Mr Gration KC established that her protection claim had indeed been certified as “clearly unfounded”. Accordingly her only right of challenge is by judicial review. Her immigration solicitors sent a pre-action protocol letter on 30 July 2025, with a response due by 14 August 2025, however the Home Office has required more time to respond, given the case’s complexity. No judicial review application can be made, therefore, until that response has been received, albeit that does not preclude an application for urgent relief. No party has suggested that the Hague Convention proceedings should be adjourned or that the outcome might be affected by the possibility of a future judicial review of the asylum decision.

The parents married in 2005 and lived thereafter in Australia. The marriage was unhappy. Both parents’ families were active members of their Church (“the Church”). The mother asserts that the marriage was arranged by the Church; the father says not. KF and her siblings have been brought up within that Church. The mother’s case is that the Church is a cult and that all four of her children have, like her, been subject to its abusive and controlling practices. She states that she has now left the Church, as has KA, but that the father and her two sons remain within it. The father denies those allegations.

The mother also alleges that the father has been abusive towards her. He denies those allegations. During the course of the marriage, the Department of Justice and Communities in Australia received several referrals relating to the parents’ deteriorating relationship and the risk of harm to the children. There appear to have been some 12 reports received in total between 2009 and 2024. In 2011 the mother obtained an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (“ADVO”) from the court, protecting both her and the children.

In 2019 the mother alleged that the father had physically chastised the children, causing them bruising and emotional distress, but no further action was taken. In 2022 she alleged that the father, in a rage, drove erratically, swerving the family car from side to side whilst they were in it. She said to the father “, stop, you’re going to kill us all”, to which he said “good”. Further incidents of alleged abuse are set out in a chronology appended to her second statement. In 2023 the mother alleged that the father had again driven dangerously with the children and had been abusive and threatening towards her. Later in 2023 she alleged that the father had driven the children whilst under the influence of alcohol, causing them to believe they would die. The frequency of allegations increased in 2023, coinciding with the breakdown of their relationship and the mother’s attempts to leave the Church. The mother was offered support from the police and from domestic abuse services. She repeated her accounts of abuse to the social workers involved, as she has done in these proceedings.

The parents separated in February 2023, the mother remaining in the family home, whilst the father moved to rented accommodation. He continued to see the children on several occasions per month.

The mother then asserts that in April 2023 the children were abducted from her care by the father, supported by other Church members, for 2 weeks, before being returned to her. During this period, she was admitted (she says at the father’s instigation) to a Hospital for a mental health assessment, then was discharged the following day with no evidence of mental illness.

On 22 September 2023, following mediation and separate legal advice, the parents agreed a parenting plan under s.63C Family Law Act 1975 which provided for equal parental responsibility and for the children to spend time each week, including overnights, with the father.

The father pleaded guilty on 23 February 2024 to an offence of “stalking/intimidation” committed in 2023. The parties dispute whether this plea related to the use of a tracking device on the car the mother used, in order to monitor her movements, or whether it related to him swerving the car to frighten the family, but that distinction has no bearing on the present proceedings. The Local Court made another ADVO for 12 months.

On 13 April 2024 the father saw KF face-to-face for the last time.

On 28 April 2024 KB told the father that the mother intended to abduct KA and KF to Hawaii. She removed the two girls from home, leaving KB and KC there alone. The boys were, in effect, taken into police protection until the father collected them and took them to his home, where they have since remained. On 28 April 2024 the father applied out of hours for “parenting orders” and for the children to be placed on an “Airport Watch List”. The following day Judge Kelly injuncted both parents from removing or attempting to remove any of the four children from Australia for the period of one month. The children were placed on the “Airport Watch List” at all points of arrival and departure – the equivalent of a port alert in the UK.

On 06 June 2024 Registrar Aitken gave case management directions, appointed an independent children’s lawyer to represent the children, ordered alcohol testing of the father and directed that a child impact report be prepared. The case was adjourned until 27 November 2024 then subsequently stayed pending the conclusion of these Hague Convention proceedings.

On 07 July 2024, the children’s “Airport Watch List” status having lapsed, the mother travelled with KF and KA to Thailand, then on 16 July 2024 to the UK. Her position is that this was initially intended to be a temporary trip only. On 30 July 2024 the mother’s Australian lawyer wrote to the father’s lawyer stating “our client intends on returning to [city] with the children”. Further correspondence on 06 August 2024 referenced the mother’s intention to return, alluding to the 1980 Convention as a means of redress open to the father should he not believe her.

The father had contacted the Australian Central Authority on 29 July 2024, then formally applied for the children’s summary return on 20 August 2024. On 04 February 2025 ICACU referred his case to his English solicitors. The proceedings were issued on 17 February 2025 and have been case managed through to this week’s final hearing.

The parties agreed to interim contact twice weekly by video call for 30 minutes. Many of those sessions have not taken place.

On 27 November 2024 Judge Shoebridge conducted a Family Court hearing in Australia, determining that KB and KC should live with the father and that he should have exclusive occupation of the former matrimonial home. The court affirmed that the ADVO “as it relates to the Applicant, KA and KF remains valid and in force”.

In May 2025 the parties submitted a final financial remedies consent order in Australia by which the mother received a settlement of $1,570,000, equivalent to approximately £750,000. The father retained the family home. His previous spousal maintenance payments to the mother ceased as a result of the financial settlement, she having received the sums due to her.

I have read the main and supplemental bundles which include detailed statements from both parents and from KA. Before the start of the hearing, counsel forwarded me a message sent by KA to both parents saying that she did not wish to take any part “in the legal dispute between you” and that “for this reason, I no longer wish for this statement to be used in court. The decision is made of my own free will and reflects my wish to remain out of it”. She had also sent her mother the message “I’m really sorry I didn’t say this sooner.  I should’ve told u way earlier, especially with how much pressure you’re under right now, I didn’t want to let you down but I just can’t go through with this statement. it’s not because I don’t agree with u, I just don’t feel right doing it myself. I really don’t want to upset you, I just hope you understand”. No party made any further submissions about the weight to be attached to her statement.

The court permitted the instruction of Dr. McClintock, a consultant psychiatrist, to report on the mother’s mental health. I shall address his report and his response to further questions within my analysis below.

KF was referred by CAFCASS to the London Borough of Hillingdon Children’s Services at the point the case was allocated. A social worker, Joan Namukasa, has completed a child and family assessment. This identified a positive relationship between mother and daughter but noted that KF has been living in difficult conditions since her arrival in the UK – principally hotel rooms with limited space to play, little stimulation and a lack of privacy – that she was missing out on education “in her formative years” and has not been enrolled with health services. Ms Namukasa writes “Reports indicate that KF is exhibiting concerning behaviours, such as picking at her skin until it becomes red and continually washing her hands. The mother suspects there may be an underlying mental health issue”. The social worker recommended a referral the “Stronger Families Team”. As I understand it, this offer has not been taken up by the mother.

I have also read a welfare report, described as a “child impact report” dated 09 September 2024, from the “court child expert”, Ms R, directed by the Australian Family Court on 06 June 2024. This was completed after interviews with each parent but not with any of the children. I note that the report states “In interview, KR indicated that she intends to stay in the UK at present with KA and KF, stating she had travelled there in order to flee what she deems to be a cult (referring to the Church that she and KN have belonged to throughout their lives). She said she would ideally want KB and KC to be with her but believes they do not wish to be with her”.

Ms R’s report records the mother’s allegations that the father was abusive throughout their relationship – behaving aggressively, making threatening gestures to her, driving erratically, undermining her by describing her as mentally ill, handling KB and KC roughly so as to cause bruises and scratches and slapping KA when she was young. The mother also stated that she felt controlled by the Church, which had brainwashed the two boys. The father denied the allegations.

The child impact report did not purport to reach any conclusions in relation to the parties’ allegations but noted that the use of a tracker device supported the mother’s allegations of stalking and control. This behaviour would take “a significant toll on her sense of safety and mental health which in turn would have impacts on the children”. Ms Arthur also indicated that the mother’s mental health might cause her to believe that the father and the Church were controlling her and that the father’s behaviour might therefore be borne out of genuine concern for the children. The report noted that “both KN and KR did not seem to indicate significant concern for the children’s physical safety in the other’s care though and their main concern seems to be in relation to the children’s psychological and general wellbeing”.

Within her conclusions, Ms R states that if the mother’s allegations are true, a forced return to Australia might have “a significant negative impact” on her wellbeing and therefore on KF, if the father persisted in stalking, controlling and undermining her. Alternatively, KF might be at risk if the mother’s mental health compromised her ability to parent her properly. Ms R noted “it would have been significantly destabilising for KF to be taken away from her home to a new country where she is living in a very precarious situation…KF has missed a significant amount of school at a foundation time…KF has also been separated from her brothers and her father and perhaps other important people in her life”.

I have also received a CAFCASS report from Ms Daisy Veitch who had an introductory video call with KF on 14 April 2025, then a face-to-face meeting at the CAFCASS office on 06 June 2025. Ms Veitch expresses concern that KF remains out of education and that although the mother registered herself with a GP in order to obtain a prescription, she has yet to register KF, despite prompts from both Ms Veitch and Ms Namukasa. The mother has not applied for a primary school place but told Ms Veitch that she was “working on enrolling [KF] in an educational programme with the online school, KS”.

Ms Veitch indicates that she has offered to refer the mother on several occasions to the local authority for Early Help or social work support. She writes “However, KR moves with the children very frequently and has so far not confirmed to me that she will be remaining in one place for long enough for any meaningful support to be set up for KF. The concerns about KF being under stimulated, lacking social interaction and missing out on an education as well as being unmonitored by universal health services, therefore remain unresolved”.

During their meeting, Ms Veitch noted “positive, attuned parenting and gentle encouragement” from the mother towards KF, enabling her to relax after she left the room. Ms Veitch has not been able to assess KF’s relationship with her father but recorded both parents’ views that “KF…enjoys the calls with [him]”.

KF referred to Australia as “home” on several occasions. Ms Veitch states “KF is likely to have struggled to begin to feel settled or at home in the UK because of how frequently she has moved, and due to the often transient nature of the places she is living, such as hotel rooms or short term holiday lets”. When asked what she wanted to happen, KF said “I don’t know”. If she returned to Australia she would feel “a bit upset because I do like it here” but she had no particular worries about returning there and said she would like to go back sometimes even if she stayed in the UK. She missed some of her friends at her old school and spoke of getting on well with her brothers. When Ms Veitch used some communication cards with her, she chose, in relation to Australia, “happy” (specifically how she feels when she is with her school friends) and “sad” (because she had not known quite how long she would be in the UK and she was not seeing her friends). She chose “excited” for England (because she was able to visit new places), as well as “surprised” (at the length of their stay) and “loved” (how she feels with her family in England). She also said she was bored here. I include this information as broad background – not because any defence is being run based on KF’s objections to a return.

KF said she did not know that she would be coming to England for such a long time and appeared “really keen” on living near to and attending a school. Ms Veitch writes “in my view she is struggling without the structure, stimulation and social interaction which regular attendance at primary school would provide her with”.

Ms Veitch states in her report that the mother’s allegations of domestic abuse by the father and harassment and control by the Church are serious and appear corroborated, at least in part, by the ADVO and the father’s guilty plea in relation to an allegation of stalking/intimidation. If the mother’s allegations are true, KF and her siblings have witnessed her being subject to verbal abuse, psychological abuse and coercive control from the father and from the Church and are likely to have suffered emotional harm. Accordingly Ms Veitch is concerned, on the basis of the mother’s account, that KF would be exposed to a risk of further emotional and psychological harm, “should she return to the same circumstances in which she was previously living in Australia”. She and her family would need support and possibly protection from Children’s Services and it would be important to ensure that “safe family time arrangements” could be made. As such, if the court made a return order, there should be a detailed child protection referral to the relevant child protection agency in Australia, and the Hague Convention case papers should be disclosed to the Australian court and all relevant protection agencies.

Ms Veitch notes the protective measures offered by the father – to fund the children’s flights back to Australia, not to attend the airport on arrival, not to pursue any criminal complaint against the mother, to source her a home and to secure KF a school place at his expense. She indicates that the offer to identify a home was not appropriate, given the background to the case, and that it would not be right for one parent unilaterally to choose a school. In addition she advocates the following additional measures, if a return were ordered:

Under Article 1, the object of the Convention is:

“(a)

to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and

(b)

to ensure that rights of custody and access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in other Contracting States”.

In Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, Baroness Hale stated:

“The whole object of the Convention is to secure the swift return of children wrongfully removed from their home country, not only so that they can return to the place which is properly their 'home', but also so that any dispute about where they should live in the future can be decided in the courts of their home country, according to the laws of their home country and in accordance with the evidence which will mostly be there rather than in the country to which they have been removed.”

Article 3 defines when a removal or retention is to be considered wrongful:

“The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where –

(a)

it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, or under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and

(b)

at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.

The rights of custody mentioned in subparagraph (a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State”.

Article 12 applies so as to require the court to return the child to the Contracting State of origin where there has been a wrongful removal under Article 3. The only relevant exception in the present case is set out in Article 13(b):

“Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that:

…

(b)

there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.”

The law in relation to the Article 13(b) exception has been defined in several Supreme Court judgments - Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, Re S (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2012] UKSC 10 and Re S (Abduction: Article 13(b) Defence) [2012] UKSC 257. A helpful summary is contained in the decision of MacDonald J. in E v. D [2022] EWHC 1216:

When a parent’s Article 13(b) case depends on a combination of issues, for example, domestic abuse and the risk of deteriorating mental health, the court must consider the allegations cumulatively. Thus, in Re B (Children) [2022] EWCA Civ 1171, Moylan LJ stated:

“The authorities make clear that the court is evaluating whether there is a grave risk based on the allegations relied on by the taking parent as a whole, not individually. There may, of course, be distinct strands which have to be analysed separately but the court must not overlook the need to consider the cumulative effect of those allegations for the purpose of evaluating the nature and level of any grave risk(s) that might potentially be established as well as the protective measures available to address such risk(s)”.

In Re S (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2012] UKSC 10, the Supreme Court gave guidance as to the correct approach where a parent submitted that the risk of harm or intolerability arose from their own anxieties:

“In In Re E [2012] 1 AC 144, this court considered the situation in which the anxieties of a respondent mother about a return with the child to the state of habitual residence were not based upon objective risk to her but nevertheless were of such intensity as to be likely, in the event of a return, to destabilise her parenting of the child to the point at which the child's situation would become intolerable. No doubt a court will look very critically at an assertion of intense anxieties not based upon objective risk; and will, among other things, ask itself whether they can be dispelled. But in In re E it was this court's clear view that such anxieties could in principle found the defence. Thus, at para 34, it recorded, with approval, a concession by Mr Turner QC, who was counsel for the father in that case, that, if there was a grave risk that the child would be placed in an intolerable situation, "the source of it is irrelevant: e.g. where a mother's subjective perception of events lead to a mental illness which could have intolerable consequences for the child.

…

In the light of these passages we must make clear the effect of what this court said in In re E [2012] 1 AC 144.  The critical question is what will happen if, with the mother, the child is returned. If the court concludes that, on return, the mother will suffer such anxieties that their effect on her mental health will create a situation that is intolerable for the child, then the child should not be returned. It matters not whether the mother's anxieties will be reasonable or unreasonable. The extent to which there will, objectively, be good cause for the mother to be anxious on return will nevertheless be relevant to the court's assessment of the mother's mental state if the child is returned”.

Moylan LJ gave further guidance in relation to the approach to be taken to the assessment of risk in a case involving mental health consideration in Re B (A Child) (Abduction: Article 13(b): Mental Health) [2024] EWCA Civ 1595:

“It can be seen, therefore, that the court has to consider both the likelihood of the risk arising and the nature or gravity of that risk if it does occur. As I noted in Re S (A Child) (Abduction: Article 13(b): Mental Health) [2023] 2 FLR 439, at [90]:

"There is a connection between the nature of the risk and the assessment of whether it is a grave risk within the scope of Art 13(b). The more serious or significant the character of the risk, the lower the level of the risk which 'might properly be qualified as "grave"', and vice-versa."

The effect of this approach, as noted by Lewis LJ during the hearing, is that the court must assess the nature of the risk, the likelihood of the risk materialising and the consequences of the risk materialising for the child. In a case such as the present, for the purposes of determining whether the circumstances set out in Article 13(b) have been established, this will involve consideration of the nature or extent of any potential deterioration or relapse in the mother's mental health and the nature or extent of any potential impact on A”.

Finally, in relation to the asylum claim, in G v. G [2021] UKSC 9, the Supreme Court addressed the impact of a concurrent protection claim on a Hague Convention application. That issue is now largely academic as the mother’s application has been refused and there is no statutory basis for appeal. Lord Stephens determined however that a pending judicial review claim would not prevent a Hague Convention return order being implemented in circumstances where there was no right of appeal:

“However, where there is no right of appeal, there is no aspect of the asylum process which prevents a return order being implemented after a decision by the Secretary of State has been taken. If there is a judicial review application, then it would be in the discretion of the judge hearing the application whether to grant interim relief by way of an order suspending removal”.

In the event that the mother does issue judicial review proceedings before any return date is effective, Cobb J. (as he then was) has given guidance in Re Y and K (Children: Summary Return Application: Asylum) [2024] EWHC 555 as to how this should be case managed.

As I have stated above, it is common ground that KF was habitually resident in Australia until brought to the UK and that the father, who was exercising rights of custody at the time, did not consent to her removal from the jurisdiction. None of the parties has made submissions as to whether this was a case of wrongful removal (the mother having intended on departure from Australia not to return KF) or wrongful retention (an intention not to return her having only formed during a holiday period in the UK). No submissions were made about this because nothing turns on that distinction. On balance, although the mother’s solicitor asserted in correspondence as late as 06 August 2024 that the mother’s visit to the UK was temporary only, I find her conduct more likely to have been a wrongful removal because:

If I am wrong about the mother’s intentions on leaving Australia, then she had certainly decided in August 2024 not to return and so any legitimate holiday became, at that point, a wrongful retention. KF remained habitually resident in Australia throughout.

There are three separate limbs to the mother’s Article 13(b) defence – she makes allegations of domestic abuse; she asserts that she and KF would be harmed by the Church if she had to return; and she submits that her mental health would deteriorate to the extent that KF’s welfare would be compromised. I must in due course consider those assertions cumulatively for Article 13(b) purposes.

I deal first with the question of domestic abuse. Without prejudice to the more detailed accounts set out in the various police and Social Care complaints, the mother broadly alleges that:

The mother asserts that the Church is a coercive and abusive cult which has been complicit in the father’s domestic abuse, has encouraged it and co-opted her own brother, A , and other church members, to assist the father to abduct the three youngest children from her care in 2023 for two weeks. She describes the extreme pressure that is applied to any Church member who is considering leaving the Church and I quote the following passage from her statement:

“Those seen to have disobeyed the Church are immediately shunned and exiled. Any member who dares to questions the Church rules and beliefs or [the leader of the Church] is instantly labelled as “mentally unstable” and forced to stay silent for fear of their children being removed from their care. A combined effort of family and or mostly male members called ‘Priests’ will organise for the ‘insubject’ member to be seen by a “Church appointed Psychiatrist” to assess the alleged “mentally ill” member to diagnose them with a mental illness so as to then prescribe medications for them. They will be closely monitored and told that they are being prayed for, that they will ‘get right’ about their wicked behaviour and that they are on a path to hell if they continue in their wilfulness of playing into the hands of the devil. This psychological abuse and the resulting religious trauma has led many to suicide or attempted suicides as the level of control and fear is so intense that there appears to be no way to escape”.

She gives a detailed account of the Church’s conduct towards her in her statements and also spoke at length about it to Dr. McClintock. In his report he writes “It was obvious that the most dominant theme in KR’s life history was her interaction with the Church and how various members of the church had treated her. I asked if she had particularly prominent memories or intrusive thoughts about what had happened in her life and she stated “I feel in a cage all my life and I’m trying to escape and they put a cage around me, I don’t want the children to have that life””. He concludes “by the end of the interview I was able to understand that KR has experienced a great deal of control in her life”.

I turn to the question of the mother’s mental health. The father makes multiple references to her mental health in the case papers. For example:

The mother states that she has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression and takes SSRI medication daily. Further she has a complex PTSD diagnosis from an Australian doctor. Notwithstanding this history, she indicates that after the children were taken from her care in April 2023 she was admitted to an acute psychiatric hospital for an assessment and was found not to be suffering symptoms of any mental illness.

Dr. McClintock asked her about her “recent mood state”. She indicated that she “did not really feel low” and instead it was “just a fear, I’m such a reject, I feel so lonely, I’ve no friends outside the Church, if I tell people my story they think I’m mental, I just wish I didn’t have this story, I crave to be loved and accepted”. She does not currently have OCD symptoms. She had had five sessions of EMDR and hypnotherapy since coming to the UK, with someone who is not a registered therapist. There have been no sessions since September 2024. Her GP has recommended she contact Time to Talk. Dr. McClintock indicates that this service would not be able to deal with the longstanding and severe nature of her symptoms.

In the diagnostic section of his report, Dr. McClintock writes that the mother has had problems with her mental health “on an episodic basis dating back over many years”. She suffers from depression with marked features of anxiety, and although she has some trauma-based symptoms, a full PTSD diagnosis was not warranted. Her SSRI dose should be increased and she would benefit from 6-12 sessions of CBT in order to allow her to gain better control over her emotional reactions. She should also refer herself to local talking therapies and would benefit from at least 12 sessions of trauma-related therapy “to help her deal with the impact of a lifetime of what she perceived as abusive experiences arising out of her contact with the Church”. These measures would be expected to improve her mental health within 4 weeks of the SSRI dose increase and after at least 6 CBT/trauma therapy sessions. Given however the prospect of a forced return to Australia, it would be very difficult for her to make sustained progress until there is clarity about her country of residence.

Dr. McClintock concludes that the mother’s mental state would be highly likely to deteriorate if she and KF returned to Australia. He is “unable to quantify this deterioration”. Although his basic recommendations for treatment in the UK were the same as those in Australia, it is likely that the SSRI dose and the number of therapy sessions would be higher if she had to return to Australia, given the likely deterioration in her mental state that this would provoke. He writes “It is also possible that KR’s mental state would deteriorate to such a marked degree that she required treatment in a psychiatric unit. It is not possible to quantify this risk. I would be concerned about a return to Australia having an ongoing impact on her mental health in terms of memories of how she had been treated by the Church becoming more prominent and her condition could be chronic rather than showing acute exacerbations in response to stressful life events”.

In accordance with the Re E discipline, I take the mother’s allegations of domestic abuse by the father, and control by the father and the Church, at their highest and place them collectively in the context of the evidence in relation to her mental health. The evidence is not such that I can confidently discount the truth of the allegations. They have been maintained by the mother for a long time and are, at least in part, supported by the making of an ADVO in 2024 and by the father’s guilty plea to a stalking offence.

I am satisfied that the mother’s allegations are cumulatively sufficient to establish a prima facie Article 13(b) defence – that there is a grave risk that KF would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation if returned to Australia with inadequate protective or safeguarding measures. Such risk would arise from:

This is not a case in which the mother’s case is dependent on a subjective anxiety about risk that has no foundation in objective evidence. First, although I am not in a position to make findings within these summary proceedings, the pattern of consistent historical complaints about the father’s and the Church’s conduct provides a sufficient foundation for the court to be satisfied that the risk arises. Second, the ADVO and the father’s guilty plea are in themselves objective markers of risk.

The question that follows is whether the risks could be mitigated and KF therefore protected from the harm that otherwise might arise. The protective measures proposed by the father are relevant to the mitigation of the risk of harm arising from all three limbs of the mother’s Article 13(b) submission. He would be willing to submit to orders or to give undertakings. His proposals, predicated on the mother returning with KF to Australia, whose Family Court is seised of the private law proceedings, are:

Ms Veitch has proposed additional protective measures, outlined above. In addition, in oral submissions, I was told that the father agreed that any contact with KF in the period between a return and a welfare decision by the Family Court would need to be supervised. Plainly any such supervisor would need to be agreed and could not be a Church member, given the nature of the mother’s case.

Some of the measures proposed by the father are designed to address the practical difficulties that a returning parent will face after an abduction. Thus he agrees to fund her and the two children’s flights, not to attend the airport on arrival or to arrange for any other person to attend. He agrees not to pursue any criminal complaint against her in relation to the abduction. It is not unreasonable of him to decline to pay 6 months’ rent for the mother’s accommodation, given her share of the financial settlement. It is however clearly not appropriate for the father to identify any property for her. The mother would be at liberty to choose where she lives without any input at all from the father. I agree that the mother should withhold her address from the father, unless and until required by the Australian Family Court to disclose it. Any school for KF would have to be the product of parental agreement or, in the absence of agreement, as determined by the Family Court. I would expect KF to be placed in an agreed school as soon as possible upon any return.

A key point in relation to the practicality of a return is that the mother has now received a substantial financial divorce settlement. The benefit of that sum is not, I find, limited to enabling her to rehouse. It would give her true financial autonomy in Australia for the first time since the parties married. Insofar as she has been dependent on the father for funds, any perception on her part that this has enabled him to control her would now fall away.

The mother’s principal fear has been that she and KF will be subjected to further abuse and control by the father and by the Church. There would however be no need for her to have any contact whatsoever with the father or any Church member. Her marriage and her membership of the Church are over. It is common ground that KF would remain in her care pending further decisions of the Australian Family Court. She has been her primary carer for her whole life and the bond between mother and child was obvious to Ms Veitch, the CAFCASS reporter.

Insofar as there is any risk that the father would be violent or abusive or controlling towards her or KF, I am confident that the Australian Family Court would take all necessary measures to protect them, not only in the immediate short-term upon arrival in Australia, but thereafter for the balance of KF’s minority. There is no reason for the parents to come into contact or communicate directly with each other. The mother has, in the past, sought and obtained relief from the Family Court, from Children’s Services and from the police.

KF’s contact can be arranged through lawyers. I am confident that the Australian court would be able to make orders that allowed for such contact (if determined to be in KF’s interests) to take place safely. The Australian Family Court would be in a strong position to assess risk. KF, and her siblings, are represented by any independent children’s lawyer, such a step having been justified by the intractable parental conflict, the serious allegations of family violence and drug/alcohol abuse, the mental health allegations and the siblings’ separation. Plainly the Family Court is alive to the issues in the case and the fact sheet produced by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia entitled “International Hague Network of Judges – Assistance with Protective Measures” makes clear that the protective steps it can take mirror those available in the UK.

Pending the Australian Family Court’s consideration of any application the mother might make for protection from domestic abuse (in the UK, a “non-molestation order”), I consider it would be necessary for the father to be required not to molest, harass or pester her, whether by himself directly or by instructing or encouraging any other person. Nor should he contact the mother directly or indirectly by any method or for any reason save through her solicitor. Any communication or attempted communication with the mother by a Church member would risk falling foul of that requirement. For reasons that have not been explained, the father has not offered and the Children’s Guardian did not recommend these non-molestation measures in court, but I consider it would be necessary to order them as part of the protective measures if KF and the mother were to return.

The Australian Family Court would also be able to impose any conditions of supervision on the father’s contact that are warranted, as well as regulating KF’s contact with any other family member. I make clear that within these summary Hague Convention proceedings I have made no findings of fact about either parent’s allegations. These would have to be determined, if necessary, by the Australian court in due course. If, however, the mother’s allegations of control and intimidation are true, it is clear that very great care would be required to manage KF’s contact both with her father and with her brothers. As above, all contact would need to be agreed and supervised pending a substantive Family Court decision.

Pending any decision by the Australian Family Court, it would be essential that the father did not pressurise, or encourage or instruct anyone else to pressurise, the mother or KF to agree to more informal unsupervised contact or contact supervised by a family member or Church member. He agrees this. I anticipate that the Australian Family Court would take any attempts to pressurise her very seriously.

When, therefore, I examine “in concrete terms” the situation that KF would face on a return, I find that she and the mother would be adequately housed in a confidential location (unless and until the Australian Family Court determined that it should be disclosed to the father) and would be financially independent. There would be no contact or communication between the parents, save through solicitors. There would be no need for them to see each other – an agreed third party could be identified to facilitate contact handovers pending the Family Court’s involvement. KF’s own contact with her father would be determined by the Family Court in accordance with her best interests. These measures would protect KF from any direct risk of harm posed by the father or by the Church.

I appreciate that the mother argues that the father has previous breached Australian Family Court orders by stalking her and that the police on one occasion elected to take no action when a private investigator tailed her. Neither of those assertions would deter me, however, from finding that the Family Court and the police in Australia would be able to protect her and KF as necessary.

The measures outlined above, designed to regulate KF’s direct exposure to risk, must be considered alongside the risks arising from a deterioration in the mother’s mental health. In her statement she says “The idea of getting up in the mornings, and getting myself ready, and caring for KF – it would push me to my absolute limits. I don’t know when I would actually break, but the high chance of that occurring is truly real and definitely there…I see nothing but devastation and loss on return…It almost makes me suicidal”.

I accept Dr. McClintock’s evidence that a return to Australia would be highly likely to prompt a deterioration in her mental health. I am not satisfied however that the mother’s mental health would, if the protective measures outlined in this judgment were implemented, deteriorate to the point at which KF would suffer physical or psychological harm or otherwise be placed in an intolerable situation. I note that Dr. McClintock is neither able to quantify the extent of any deterioration nor whether a psychiatric admission would be warranted. The critical point here is that the mother would not be returning to “the same circumstances” (to quote the Children’s Guardian) she left last year. She would have a far greater degree of financial autonomy and, subject to the orders made by the Family Court, of protection than she had before.

In my view, the mother’s fear of returning to Australia also has to be seen in the context of her hope to remain in the UK. She perceived the UK to be a safe haven for her and KF, yet her asylum application has now been rejected and there is, on present facts, no prospect of her remaining here. The mother’s situation in the UK must itself be highly stressful for her. She and KF have no links to the UK of any substance – no family members or friends to speak of and their circumstances are insecure and unsatisfactory. The mother knows that it is not in KF’s interests to remain living in a single room, to be out of education, to have limited access to public services and to be at risk of deportation. I do not make these points because a comparison between KF’s circumstances in the UK and in Australia is part of my Article 13(b) determination. The court is not undertaking a welfare evaluation in these Hague Convention proceedings. The point is that the intolerability of a return falls to be assessed in the context of a failed asylum application which means that, from an immigration perspective, there is at present no scope for KF and the mother to remain in the UK in any event.

The mother has the means to fund specialist therapy immediately upon her return and she would be able to obtain medical advice with a view to increasing her SSRI dosage as per Dr. McClintock’s recommendation. She has sought help from mental health services in Australia in the past. In my view the availability of medical and therapeutic help would be sufficient to reduce the risk of a catastrophic deterioration. However distressing a return order would be for her, it would bring the certainty that Dr. McClintock advises is a necessary precursor to effective treatment. Whilst I note that the mother has limited support in Australia since she has left the Church, she has been in contact with ex-members of that Church who assisted her historically to make reports to the police and Children’s Services in 2023-2024. I am also mindful of the quality of the mother’s relationship with KF and her focus on her emotional needs, as apparent in Ms Veitch’s meeting with them. If required to return, I anticipate that the mother would, in KF’s interests, take all necessary steps to address her own mental health fragilities.

In conclusion, although there remains a risk that the mother’s mental health would, even with protective measures, deteriorate to the point at which KF suffered harm, I consider that such risk would be significantly mitigated by the availability of those measures and by the likelihood that the mother would engage in treatment. Insofar as she retains a subjective anxiety about the efficacy of the police, the Family Court and Children’s Services to protect her and KF, I do not consider that such an anxiety would, once treatment is accessed and protection put in place, create a grave risk of harm or intolerability for KF.

In the event that a psychiatric admission was required and the Family Court considered that KF could not move temporarily to the father, it would plainly be upsetting for KF to move to foster-care. I am confident however that in those difficult circumstances a social worker would be able to explain to KF in child-friendly terms why and for how long she would be separated from her mother. KF would also have the comfort of being back in the company of the friends she mentioned to Ms Veitch. Further, I note the observations of Sir Andrew McFarlane P. in A v. B and Others [2024] EWHC 1626 that “It is a regular aspect of the work of social workers and the decisions made by Family judges, that children are placed in foster care when they do not want to go there. Whilst unwelcome and upsetting, to be placed in foster care for a short period, in our view, falls well short of being placed in an intolerable situation - namely one that these children should not be expected to tolerate in the circumstances of this case”. The prospect of a longer-term psychiatric admission is not one I can completely discount, but is, on the evidence, too speculative to attract any significant weight in my Article 13(b) evaluation. There is nothing in Dr. McClintock’s report to allow me to say that this would be likely.

For the reasons set out above, I have concluded that the protective measures identified at paragraphs 36, 61-63, 68 and 70 above are, in combination, sufficient to mitigate the risk of harm or intolerability to KF. I do not find therefore that the Article 13(b) is established. I apply these measures by way of order rather than mere undertaking. The Australian Family Court will have a copy of my order setting out all the measures I have determined are necessary precursors to a return.

The next Family Court hearing in Australia is on 11 September 2025, just over two weeks away. I agree with the Children’s Guardian’s submission that my return order should not be implemented until after that date, to give the Family Court the opportunity to read this judgment and to determine what other measures, if any, should be put in place to protect the mother and KF before they arrive. Accordingly I order that KF is returned to Australia no later than Sunday 21 September 2025.

This is not a case in which the mother’s asylum application militates against the making of a return order. The application has been rejected and there is no statutory right of appeal. Whilst the mother intends to make a judicial review claim, none has been made to date. No party has sought to adjourn these proceedings. No-one has argued that the possibility of judicial review should deter the court from making a return order. The impact, if any, of judicial review proceedings, on the implementation of my order, is not an issue on which I can or should speculate.

I grant permission to the parties to disclose the case papers and this judgment to the Family Court in Australia, to Children’s Services and the police. I note, with approval, that the Children’s Guardian intends to make a referral to Children’s Services in Australia, quite aside from any referral the mother might herself wish to make.