W v M

These are the ex tempore judgments of the court.

This is the matter of W v M which is before me today, initially on an application for permission to appeal by the father of a young girl, G, who is aged 12 years old.

There is a preliminary application made by Father at this hearing which is to be able to rely on fresh evidence. That evidence is contained within a fairly lengthy witness statement with accompanying exhibits and which in broad terms, refers to two matters.

Firstly, an ongoing and, father would say, further significant deterioration in G’s presentation and behaviours since this matter was before HHJ Vincent at the end of last year.

Those matters include a refusal to attend school, her behavioural presentation with concerns around use of social media, emerging vulnerabilities in terms of her peer relationships and concerns around who she may be spending time with, concerns around her behaviours towards Father, including episodes of rudeness and at least verbal aggression, and a recent MASH referral by the school to the Local Authority given their concerns.

The second matter detailed within the statement relates to G’s older brother, J, who has been the subject of these proceedings, although this appeal does not relate directly to any arrangements for him.

Nevertheless, part of the case before HHJ Vincent was that J who was permitted to go to school in V last year having previously refused for a period of two years to attend school, was doing well and making progress in V and that that formed part of the reasoning of HHJ Vincent in her decisions relating to G and her schooling.

The evidence that Father seeks to adduce today, is that he says that the information he has from V is that the picture is much less positive than Mother and NYAS gave to the court, and that that has continued in terms of deterioration since the end of last year.

I remind myself that the starting position for any appeal in accordance with the Family Procedure Rules Part 30.12 is that the function of this Court is limited to a review of the decision of HHJ Vincent. It is not the purpose or function of the appellate court to rehear or engage in new matters of dispute.

In accordance with FPR Part 30.12, the starting position is that the appeal court does not therefore hear or receive any oral evidence on the appeal. Nor does it consider any new evidence that was not before the lower court unless it orders otherwise.

In the invitation to order otherwise, made on behalf of Father, the court is referred to the decision of Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 as to the three principles for adducing new evidence before a court.

Those three principles in brief are that it must be shown that the evidence had not been obtained nor could it have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at trial.

Secondly, the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive. Third, the evidence must be apparently credible.

Turning to those principles, the argument made on behalf of Father and clearly correct, is that the matters and incidents that he refers to within his statement are matters and incidents relating to G and J, that he says are relevant, but which have occurred since the hearing before HHJ Vincent and therefore in his submissions, constitute new evidence which should properly be before me.

In terms of why it is new or different, the position of Father is that whilst it may be, to use counsel’s words, more of the same, these are more stark, more troubling, more concerning incidents culminating in the MASH referral to the Local Authority.

He therefore argues it constitutes new evidence and important evidence that would have an important influence on the result.

It is further asserted that these are facts, not opinions, and therefore would meet the apparently credible threshold.

That is firmly opposed by the mother and by NYAS on behalf of G. Their position is that this is more of the same with nothing new, nothing different and whilst there may have been deterioration in G’s presentation and behaviours since Christmas, they are entirely foreseeable and to be expected, in light of the events since the decision of HHJ Vincent. Perhaps most powerfully, they point to this appeal leading to the failure to implement the decisions of HHJ Vincent.

They therefore vehemently oppose the admission of any new or further evidence.

Furthermore, it is made clear on behalf of Mother that much of the content of Father’s statement is challenged in terms of its accuracy or the interpretation which is being placed upon facts. It is argued it would be inappropriate for this Court to admit highly contested evidence at this appeal which Mother has not had a proper and fair opportunity to challenge or indeed respond to.

I refuse the father’s application to adduce new evidence before me and I say so for the following reasons.

Firstly, in considering Father’s evidence and its credibility, I take into account that there have been highly contested proceedings between these parents since their separation stretching back over a number of years.

This is, I believe, the fourth set of proceedings and these proceedings themselves have been ongoing since early 2023. Almost everything that is placed before the court is contested and disputed between the parents with different interpretations placed upon matters.

In that regard, it is clear that the lengthy statement that Father seeks to adduce today, is challenged by Mother and is highly contested in terms of its accuracy and the interpretation which may be put upon certain matters, such as the fact that a MASH referral has been made.

Mother does not dispute that G has deteriorated and is exhibiting distressing behaviours and that that has deteriorated since December. As I say, beyond that, there are many matters within the statement that she simply does not accept.

I am satisfied that it would be inappropriate and unfair to Mother for this Court to accept a one-sided account of events since Christmas as contained within the statement of Father, on what are highly disputed and contested matters.

Furthermore, I am satisfied that what Father seeks to adduce before the Court is not new or different evidence or information which would have an important influence on the result.

I am satisfied that the matters that Father details within his statement are simply a sad continuation of the themes and issues and disputes which were very clearly before HHJ Vincent at Christmas and the subject of her determinations.

The issues around G’s attendance at school, and Father’s case that she was beyond Mother’s control and capacity to get back into education, were all squarely and firmly matters which were before HHJ Vincent, as were concerns around G’s general presentation and behaviours; Father’s case being that Mother was unable to parent effectively to ensure G’s wellbeing and safety.

Those matters, were all squarely the subject of the final hearing. The evidence that Father seeks to adduce is simply a continuation of those core themes and issues.

In addition, I am satisfied that having been dealt with squarely and firmly by HHJ Vincent, the admission of those new matters would not have any important influence on the outcome either of the substantive case before HHJ Vincent, but similarly on this appeal.

As regards the matters relating to J. Again, those are matters which are highly contested by Mother and she does not have, within this process, a fair opportunity to put her contra position.

Again, in terms of whether this is new or different evidence, the issues relating to J were firmly before HHJ Vincent. The father’s case in December of last year was that J was not doing well in V, that his educational progress was not positive in the way that Mother presented, and that his own relationship with J had deteriorated significantly since he had moved to V. All of that was very firmly before HHJ Vincent in December.

I am therefore not satisfied that this is new or different evidence that would have an important influence on the result of the case. In addition, being highly contested information and evidence that has not been fairly challenged or mother having had the opportunity to challenge, I do not accept it is apparently credible.

Therefore, for all of those reasons I dismiss that application.

I turn next to the substantive application for permission to appeal.

This is an application for permission to appeal which involves one child, G, who is now aged 12.

She has an old brother, J, who is 15, who has been the subject of these proceedings, but this appeal does not involve any arrangements for him.

The application for permission to appeal is brought by Father from a decision of HHJ Vincent. That judgment was handed down on 6 February of this year, following a hearing before her in December of 2024.

HHJ Vincent concluded that G should continue to live with her mother and attend school in V.

Father’s position at the final hearing, and remains his position today, is that G should live with him on at least a 50:50 shared care basis and attend a school in England.

There is a deeply troubling and sad history to this case that lays bare, in stark terms, the significant harm caused to children who become embroiled in years of conflict and litigation between their parents.

At this juncture, I say no more than this litigation has been ongoing since the parents separated in 2015.

The is the fourth set of proceedings which began in January of 2023. The childhood of these two children has been characterised by dispute, conflict and court proceedings.

It is clear, that J, before moving to V last year, had not attended school for two years. His relationship with his father is now in a state of almost complete breakdown.

G’s attendance at school was clearly problematic by 2023 and that problem has escalated and continued. She has not attended school regularly, and in this academic year has attended only for a few days in the Autumn.

Her relationship with her father is fraught. She identifies a large degree of anxiety around that relationship and the pressure which she perceives that her father places upon her.

I understand that there has been no contact whilst these proceedings before me have been ongoing.

I note how difficult lengthy litigation between parents can be. The impact on children and the impact on the parents can be devastating. Perspective can be completely lost. I do discern at times in the evidence and in the position of father, a somewhat critical approach towards the children, particularly towards J, but also towards G, for the difficult behaviours that they have demonstrated, which at points, have included anger and rudeness directed at him.

As I say, I understand the impact of difficult proceedings on relationships between children and their parents. However, I need to be clear. Responsibility for the awful position that these children have found themselves in lies not with the children but with the parents.

I will repeat how HHJ Vincent commenced her judgment with the words of G. “It is just hell, and I want it to stop. I really want to go to school but I just can’t make myself do it. I just want a fresh start and for mum and dad to stop fighting and to be able to go to V to get away from it all like J”.

The judgment of HHJ Vincent is carefully reasoned. It is nuanced and it is inciteful into the appalling situation of these children and it is very firmly focused on the welfare needs of G. It is grounded in a careful analysis of the welfare checklist, the powerful evidence of the NYAS Guardian, and HHJ Vincent’s own observations of the parents, and their evidence before her.

It is exceptionally sad for G that her ‘hell’ has continued and that this appeal was pursued.

I turn to the permission to appeal.

The court reminds itself in accordance with Family Procedure Rules 20.10 Rule 30.3 subsection (7) that permission to appeal may only be given where the court considers that the appeal would have a real prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.

If I was to grant permission, Family Procedure Rules Part 30.12 (3) provide that an appeal may only be allowed where the decision was wrong or unjust for procedural irregularity.

I turn to the individual grounds of appeal.

Ground one: that the learned judge failed to consider adequately or at all father’s proposals for alternatives to school in V, i.e. a school in England as had been set out in his statement of 4 November of 2024.

The same failure to consider boarding as a realistic option and to conduct an appropriate comparative evaluation of realistic proposals was what gave rise to Mother’s successful appeal against HHJ Tolson’s August 2024 judgment. It was asserted on behalf of Father before me, that HHJ Vincent fell into the same error.

That ground of appeal is misconceived. It has no real prospect of success.

HHJ Vincent was faced with a proposal from Father that either G live with him, and she attend a school in England, or she lived with him on a shared care basis, again, attending a school in England. His position was that she could not live with her mother and there was no prospect of her attending school if she did.

I have considered carefully paragraphs 86 to 99 and paragraphs 102 to 134 of the judgment of HHJ Vincent. Within those paragraphs, HHJ Vincent carefully considers the reasons for the children’s school refusal, the impasse that had been reached, and the advantages and disadvantages of schooling in V.

She carefully considers in accordance with the welfare checklist the respective capacities of each parent to meet G’s needs holistically understood, including both her emotional and educational needs.

HHJ Vincent recognises the complexity of the reasons for G’s school refusal. In a nuanced understanding of G’s needs, she explains why the answer is not simply to transfer residence to her father against her wishes and to bring a firm and controlling hand to school attendance as had been suggested by HHJ Tolson.

She concludes, having looked at these matters carefully, that it is not in G’s best interests to live with her father and that he would not simply be better able to get her to school. She sets out clear, properly grounded reasons as to why Father’s position regarding a change in residence was not realistic or workable.

Similarly, she gives clear reasons why it was not in G’s best interests to live with her father either full time or in a 50:50 shared care arrangement.

Those reasons lay in his capacity to understand and respond to G’s emotional needs, the high conflict that continues between her parents and the impact upon her, and the increased levels of stress that living with her father would cause her.

HHJ Vincent sets out clearly the distress and anxiety that had been caused to G by the prospect of being forced to move to live with her father against her will following the decision of HHJ Tolson KC last year.

Fundamentally, she was clear in her reasons that father is unable to meet G’s needs holistically understood.

Therefore, a detailed analysis of the pros and cons of the particulars of different schools in England was neither necessary nor proportionate in terms of HHJ Vincent’s decision making. Those issues were entirely secondary to the fundamental problem that father’s proposals were all premised on a move of G to his care which was not in her best interests or even realistic.

In so far as the reasons for the successful appeal against HHJ Tolson are at all relevant to the matters before me in this appeal, the situation and the issues were clearly different.

At that point, G living with either parent was still regarded as realistic and therefore the school proposals that mother was proposing needed within that context to be carefully considered and balanced.

I am satisfied there is no real prospect of success on ground one.

I turn to ground two: that the learned judge wrongly considered that G’s relationship with Father could be sustained and nurtured by regular contact if she moved to V, and in doing so, failed to take into account and see the relevance of the fact that J’s relationship with Father had significantly deteriorated after his move to V.

This includes, it is argued, a failure by the learned judge to give weight to the fact that the order made by HHJ Tolson KC that J would live with both his parents during school holidays had not been complied with and that the mother had been unable to bring J back to this country to give effect to that order.

Ground two, similarly, has no real prospect of success.

HHJ Vincent carefully explored the reasons for the break down in J’s relationship with his father. She makes clear in the reasons contained within her judgment that it is not a problem with geography and the demands of travel. Therefore, it is not a problem per se with a move to V.

She makes clear it is not a problem with Mother and the support that Mother provides for the contact arrangements and the children’s relationship with their father.

What her reasons make clear is that in her judgment the issue is father’s own relationship with his son.

Some of the dynamics of that relationship are set out in very sad terms in paragraphs 95 and 128 to 130 of HHJ Vincent’s judgment.

The responsibility for Father’s break down in his relationship with his son and the ability to mend that relationship, as HHJ Vincent makes clear, lies with Father and his need to develop his insight and understanding into his children’s experiences of parental conflict throughout their childhoods, the impact that that has had upon them and how it continues to impact on how they experience their relationship with their Father.

HHJ Vincent quite properly examines G’s relationship with Father and how a move to V may impact upon their relationship. She recognises quite properly that of course, G’s relationship with her father is different from that of J. She recognises the strengths of that relationship as well as the challenges.

She is therefore, having looked carefully at that evidence, satisfied the problem is not with geography, but with the inherent dynamics of those individual relationships. Contact with G will be of course different if she moves to V but there is, as HHJ Vincent sets out clearly in her judgment, still scope and opportunity for her to continue to have a relationship in a meaningful way with a father that she loves if the move to V takes place.

History need not repeat itself in terms of Father’s relationship with his daughter.

HHJ Vincent is also very clear in her analysis that in terms of G’s relationship with her father, the great risk lies in the current situation continuing and G being ordered to live with him and attend a school in England.

Again, I am satisfied ground two has no real prospect of success.

I turn to ground three: that in assessing the parents, their respective behaviours and their relationships with each of the children, the court failed to take any account of the un-appealed findings made by previous judges, HHJ Tolson KC in his March 2024 judgment and that of DJ Harrison in 2017 and 2020.

Again, I am satisfied that ground of appeal is misconceived and has no real prospect of success.

HHJ Vincent was hearing a final hearing following a successful appeal against the decision of HHJ Tolson KC, and she was hearing these matters de novo. Afresh. It was not part of her function to review the previous decisions of judges that came before her. Her duty in accordance with Section 1 of the Children Act of 1989 was to make welfare decisions on the basis of all of the evidence before her. The written evidence and the oral evidence.

It is clear, abundantly clear from her judgment, that she had carefully read all of the documents and the previous proceedings before different judges. In addition, of course, by this point she had the benefit of updating evidence from the NYAS Guardian, and the parents themselves.

HHJ Vincent also had the significant benefit to any trial judge at final hearing of being able to hear and see the evidence of the parents themselves and to be able to form her own findings and judgments upon it.

It is wrong, in my judgment, to suggest that she was bound by any previous findings, even if they are properly so called, of previous judges making welfare decisions.

The evidence has moved on. The issues have moved on. Her duty, I repeat, as a judge making decisions de novo, was to make welfare decisions on the basis of the evidence now before her and to give clear, careful reasons for her judgment framed properly within the law, the welfare checklist and her assessment of the evidence before her.

In my judgment, that is what she did.

Furthermore, and with respect to counsel for Father, her reasons for taking a different view from HHJ Tolson as to what was in G’s best interest were very clearly set out at length and in detail in her judgment.

That different outcome is rooted in the evidence she had read and heard. The suggestion she should have looked at each previous judgment and assess what evidence that judge had before him or her and then explain what was now different and why she took a different view, is wrong. She was making a decision de novo and explaining her decision on her view of the evidence before her.

That said, HHJ Vincent explains in some detail why she took a different view from HHJ Tolson on the reasons for school refusal by the children and why therefore Father’s proposals were not workable or in G’s best interests.

In my judgment, those reasons were nuanced, inciteful and absolutely child centred.

I turn to ground four: that the learned judge’s finding in relation to professionals’ views of Father is not one supported by any evidence and was not one that HHJ Tolson found.

Again, in my judgment and having considered the reasoning of HHJ Vincent that has no real prospect of success.

There was evidence in the NYAS report to support that conclusion: it was reported to the NYAS Guardian from the school regarding their relationship with Father.

Furthermore, HHJ Vincent sets out clearly why she formed the view she did of Father’s intense presentation and the dynamics that created with professionals. That was based not only on the documents before her but on the NYAS Guardian’s evidence, including what she had directly observed at professionals’ meetings, as well as her own views having heard Father give evidence before her.

That ground has no real prospect of success.

I turn to ground five: that the learned judge failed to pay any or any sufficient regard to the lack of communication from V schools with Father and the indication that J is not engaging fully in the educational system with low attendance and struggling to achieve grades due to lack of skill in written V. The judge failed to take account of the fact that G, similarly, cannot write in V.

Again, I am satisfied that ground has no real prospect of success.

HHJ Vincent did not accept Father’s evidence as to J’s progress in V or the difficulties with schooling in that country, preferring the more positive view of Mother and the NYAS Guardian. She was clearly entitled to take that view on her analysis of the evidence before her.

Furthermore, HHJ Vincent gave careful consideration to the challenges of schooling in V for G, including, I note, her observations that G may have an overly rosy view of what life in V and schooling may be like.

She placed all of that within the balancing exercise but reached a view that the challenges of schooling in V were outweighed by the harm of the current position continuing and the clear welfare benefits for G of giving her a fresh start away from the continuing harm that she is now experiencing.

Again, that reasoning is properly focused on G and a balancing of the challenges versus the advantages of a move to schooling in V.

I turn to ground six: the learned judge wrongly determined that G should not visit any potential schools in England pending judgment being given by HHJ Vincent and shut down any possibility of evidence as to what alternatives were available in England and G’s view of them.

That was not pursued with any enthusiasm by counsel on behalf of Father, given she has to concede that that was a decision at PTR by a different judge that was not appealed and therefore is not a proper ground of appeal against any decision of HHJ Vincent.

That also has no real prospect of success and indeed should be struck out given, as I say, it is a ground of appeal against a different judge.

Therefore, for all of those reasons, I reiterate that application for permission to appeal is refused.

I am satisfied there is no real prospect of demonstrating that the judgment of HHJ Vincent was wrong or is unjust for reason of procedural irregularity.

I repeat that when one stands back and considers the judgment of HHJ Vincent, it is thorough, inciteful and entirely child focused.

I not only dismiss this appeal, but I certify it as totally without merit.

I turn now to the matter of a section 91(14) order.

I gave notice to all parties that having considered the papers in giving my initial directions, the court would consider, depending on the outcome of the appeal, the making of a section 91(14) order and, therefore, all parties have been on proper notice and able to address me upon it today.

In terms of the basis upon which such order could be justified, I remind all parties of the recent legislative change as contained within section 91A which now permits the court to make a section 91(14) order where it is satisfied that any further application to the court for an order would place the subject child at risk of harm.

I remind myself that a s 91(14) order is an interference with a parent’s right of access to the courts and therefore is an important order and needs to be carefully weighed and balanced both in terms of the impacts on the children of any further litigation and any harm that will cause, but also the impact upon a parent and their access to justice.

However, in that regard, I do remind myself that a section 91(14) order is not a bar. It provides a procedural safeguard that any future application must first go through a permission stage whereby the merits of that application being allowed to proceed and potentially causing further harm or disturbance to the child or primary carer, can be properly considered by a judge.

It must be clear to both parties in light of HHJ Vincent’s judgment and indeed my judgment today, the profound harm that has been caused to G, and indeed J, by the years of litigation, the intrusion of professionals into their lives, the uncertainty, the hostility between the parents, the conflict, all being played out before the courts over almost 10 years and four sets of proceedings.

It is overwhelmingly clear to me that G more than anything, needs this litigation and this conflict to stop. She needs respite. She needs peace and she needs time to recover.

I cannot say it clearly enough, it jumps out from these papers that there is a girl emerging into her teenage years in a profoundly vulnerable position. Profoundly vulnerable. Acting out her distress in her behaviours, in her relationship with her father, and in her persistent, now absolute refusal to engage in education. Her future prospects could not be more endangered by this process.

I am more than satisfied that any further litigation would deepen and exacerbate the harm that she has already suffered.

In addition, I would not be doing my duty to G, if I were to simply permit the parents to return to court again, with all that would follow for G.

I am deeply concerned that submissions on behalf of Father began with, well, he thinks it will be highly probable he will want to be back in court within the next few months.

Father needs to reflect on what this court has said about the profound vulnerability of his daughter and how he may best support her to recover and move forwards.

For those reasons, I am going to impose a section 91 (14) order, and I do so until she is 16 years old.

I remind the parties it is not a bar to litigation. It is a procedural threshold that they must first seek permission before bringing any issues back before the court.

However, given the length of litigation between these parents and just how vulnerable I am sure this young teenager is, I am clear she needs no more litigation before these courts without very good reason.

Again, this is the matter of W v M and the application which now falls for determination by the court is the application which is made on behalf of Mother for her costs of this appeal.

No application is brought on behalf of NYAS for their costs of this appeal.

The position of Mother, the application for permission to appeal having been dismissed by this Court and certified as totally without merit, is that her costs in responding should be met by the appellant Father.

It is her position that this appeal was unreasonably brought and pursued, that it amounts to unreasonable litigation conduct and that should be reflected in costs orders.

In terms of the response, the position of Father is that the test is not simply one that he has lost or that his permission to appeal has been refused, even that it has been certified totally without merit. The issue is whether or not he has engaged in unreasonable or reprehensible litigation conduct that justifies a costs order against him, which he argues requires more than the simple fact that he has been unsuccessful at this appeal hearing before me.

The appellant points, in particular, to the difficulties that he has had in understanding and reconciling the decision of HHJ Vincent on a re-hearing following shortly behind a very different decision taken by HHJ Tolson KC just a few months before.

It is urged that this is not a litigant who is persistently repeating appeals following judgments which have consistently gone against him. The appeal last year was of course, one brought by Mother not by him.

Therefore, in light of that, the position on his behalf is that, whilst he has been unsuccessful, he has not been guilty of unreasonableness or reprehensible behaviours in pursuing matters today.

I will deal first with the principle of costs and of course I am mindful of the rules. These are family proceedings albeit an appeal. It is not a simple application of the Civil Procedure Rules whereby costs follow the event and, in accordance with the recent Court of Appeal authority of Re E (Children: Costs) [2025] EWCA Civ 183which sets out the relevant principles, this court should still take into account in its decision making whether or not an appellant has behaved unreasonably or reprehensibly in pursuing the appeal.

In terms of the merits of the arguments before me, I have a slight degree of sympathy with Father’s position in that in December of last year he faced a final hearing which when judgment was handed down came to a very different view than that of a different circuit judge a few months before. He has struggled to reconcile that in his own mind.

It is clear that they are very different judgments with very different outcomes.

However, the merits or otherwise of pursuing an appeal against the decision of HHJ Vincent needed to be assessed and its merits analysed on the basis of HHJ Vincent’s own judgment - not in some comparative exercise with that of HHJ Tolson.

In terms of whether or not pursuing this appeal amounts to unreasonable litigation conduct, I am satisfied that that is broad enough to encompass not just the manner in which litigation may be pursued but also encompasses whether or not it was unreasonable to pursue the appeal at all.

That required a careful and proper assessment and analysis of the merits of HHJ Vincent’s judgment within the framework of the rules of appeal, and what Father would need to satisfy an appellate Court of in order to be successful.

When one considers matters in that light, I am satisfied that this is an appeal which should never have been pursued. Within my judgment I have been highly critical of the grounds pursued, a number of which were misconceived. The appeal was certified as totally without merit.

As I said a number of times in my judgment, the judgment of HHJ Vincent properly assessed on its own merits was thorough, clear, very carefully reasoned, nuanced and inciteful. An appeal against that judgment had no prospect of success.

Taking that into account, I am satisfied that pursuing this appeal at all did amount to unreasonable litigation conduct which has not only caused significant financial cost to Mother and the public purse in terms of the position of NYAS but perhaps most importantly, has caused further significant emotional cost to G.

I am therefore satisfied in terms of principle that Father having pursued a wholly unmeritorious appeal which never had any prospect of success and having been certified as such as totally without merit, should bear the cost of today’s hearing.

Turning then to the matter of quantum. Again, in terms of the issues and arguments raised, I do note that no issue is taken with counsel’s fees which stand without VAT at some £8,500. The issue is focused more on the reasonableness and proportionality of the costs claimed by the solicitors which stand at a sum of some £10,084. When one adds into that VAT it comes to a total sum of £22,300.80.

There are two approaches for the Court. I can undertake a summary assessment of those costs, or I can, as invited, as one potential route forward, having determined the principle, direct that costs be subject to a detailed assessment if not agreed.

I am satisfied having looked at the costs schedule that it should be subject to summary assessment and further cost and delay should not be brought to bear by a process of deferring costs arguments if the parties are not able to agree. I say so because it is a very simple and straightforward costs schedule relating as it does only to this one hearing.

Having considered the costs claimed, there is not, in my judgment, any proper argument that can be made against the reasonable and proportionate nature of attendances on Mother.

There have been no personal attendances, with matters carried out [inaudible] by letter, email and telephone. There have been again, limited costs incurred in attendance on others. Again, perfectly proportionate and reasonable in corresponding with the court and the other side.

The bulk of the costs in fact come from the attendance of the solicitor at the hearing today, which amount to some £4,240 for eight hours of one day’s attendance.

I have listened carefully to what is said about that by counsel. It is the case that this appeal on a direct access basis was drafted, both in terms of the skeleton argument and grounds, by both senior and junior counsel.

Junior counsel, who appears alone for Mother today, had anticipated facing at this appeal hearing an exceptionally senior silk alongside an experienced junior, and therefore as a junior counsel herself had sought the support of a solicitor to help manage the appeal documentation and other matters.

I am satisfied that it was reasonable and proportionate today for a solicitor to attend on junior counsel in light of the way in which this appeal has been brought, albeit on a direct access basis, but in a highly combative way by instructing a very senior silk and junior to not only draft documentation but, as had originally been anticipated, to be here to advance oral argument today.

In those circumstances, I am satisfied it was reasonable and proportionate for junior counsel for Mother to attend with solicitor, and therefore the solicitor’s costs are also reasonable and proportionate.

When I look at this costs schedule, in my judgment, no specific or particular arguments or points can be made regarding unnecessary or disproportionate wastage of costs. The costs are clear and reasonable.

For all of those reasons, I am not going to embark upon some arbitrary slashing of costs where there is no proper or reasonable or sound basis to do so.

I summarily assess costs in the total amount claimed of £22,300.80.

Finally, on the principle of whether or not there should be a publication of HHJ Vincent’s judgment with anonymisation of the family to prevent the family becoming known, I am going to give that permission.

In terms of competing rights and interests, I recognise under Article 10 the public interest in the publication of information relating to family proceedings and private law proceedings of this nature which are of lengthy duration and, as I remarked, show in stark terms the harmful impact on children of being embroiled in parental conflict and litigation for the majority of their childhoods.

I am therefore satisfied there is a public interest in the publication of the judgment given the insights it provides into those harms. It also touches upon important matters of current public debate, including parental alienation and issues around contact and what may lie behind difficulties in the relationship between a child and a parent.

I do have to weigh, however, against those principles of transparency and why they are important within the Family Courts and the role that publication of judgments has to play within it, the impact on the child if there is any breach of their privacy.

I accept and weigh that for J and G their privacy is of fundamental importance. They have suffered enough, and they do not need to suffer the impact of people within the wider community knowing about these proceedings and the conflict to which they have been subjected.

I am satisfied, however, that there is nothing within the judgment that cannot through anonymisation protect the children’s confidentiality and privacy to ensure that the judgment does not lead to a situation where they are identified.

Whilst of course there are particular features of the judgment, particularly V, potentially also J’s engagement in sport, and the school, that may lead to identification, all of those matters can be appropriately dealt with by anonymisation, changing of countries, removing schools completely and of course ensuring that any geographical location is also removed.

I am satisfied that that can be done and therefore with there being no realistic threat to the identity of the children being revealed, the principles of transparency outweigh.

I will therefore authorise publication of Her Honour Judge Vincent’s judgment.

I am of course sat in open court as this is an appeal and therefore it follows that my judgments should also be a matter of public record. However, I make the usual order that it should be anonymised to protect the privacy and confidentiality of the children.