AA (Mother) v XX (Father)

This is an application for committal made by the mother, AA, against the father, XX, for multiple breaches of court orders. The orders concern a child, B, who is a girl aged 11 currently in Iran. The mother was represented before me by Ms Kirby KC and Mr Basi. The father was not legally represented.

Before I go further, I should explain the situation in relation to the father’s attendance today. He was ordered to attend court with a penal notice attached to the order by Mr Nicholas Allen KC sitting as Deputy High Court Judge on 4^th July 2025. The father did attend at court this morning at the Royal Courts of Justice but refused to come into court unless his conditions were met. He came in for few short periods and left. I explained to the father, when he was in court, that he was not just at serious risk of being sent to prison, but that if he were sent to prison it could impact on his immigration status, and I could order the judgment to be forwarded to the Home Secretary.

The father, during the time that he was in court, consistently raised his voice, sought to dictate the terms on which he would remain in court and made clear he would not come into court unless I asked the security officers to leave. In light of his previous conduct in many of the previous hearings, his aggression to court staff and counsel and disrespect to court, I ordered security to attend today.

I note the recitals in Mr Allen KC’s order of 4^th July 2025 where he said at paragraph 16 of the order:

“The mother’s solicitors shall, not later than 7 days before the hearing liaise with the Clerk of the Rules and HMCTS to ensure that security measures are available in the court room on the day of the hearing such that counsel for the mother are satisfied that they can safely and properly represent their client. In the event that such security measures cannot be provided in the court room, arrangements will be made for counsel for the mother to attend the hearing from a different room in the court complex but to attend the court room in which the hearing is taking place by video link.”

Ms Kirby and Mr Basi attended in court all day but the father refused to come in. I made it clear to the father on his brief appearances that my duty is to protect staff and counsel who are in court and it is not for him to place conditions on his attendance. The father continued to refuse to come into court. I make entirely clear that there are genuine concerns for security of staff and counsel. I would not be fulfilling my duty to these people, but particularly Ms Kirby and Mr Basi who would have been sitting close to the father, if I did not have security present. I record that, for most of the hearing, the father was not present but sat outside the court door. I made four attempts during the hearing to persuade him to return to court, through the good offices of the interpreter.

I will deal next with the preliminary issue of interpretation and language. The father is an Iranian Kurd. It is clear to me at this hearing, as it has been clear to judges at previous hearings, that the father speaks quite good English and has had no difficulty understanding me in the brief periods when he did come into court. The father’s language of origin is Kurdish Sorani and there has been an interpreter in that language present to interpret throughout. The father had expressed preferences in the past for an Iranian Kurdish Sorani speaker. I understand that is a matter of preference and that the father perhaps prefers Iranians to Iraqis. It has been made clear by the interpreter in court today that the father fully understood the language she is speaking. I note that all the documents in the case have been translated into Farsi which is the father’s written language.

For these reasons I have no doubt that the father has had a full opportunity to participate and all appropriate interpretation and translation services have been provided.

The background to this case is that the father is Iranian. The mother was born in Western Azerbaijan Province in Iran. B was also born in Iran on 24^th August 2014 and so now is nearly 11. In 2020, the father travelled from Iran and entered the UK illegally and claimed asylum. At some point he was granted limited leave to remain. Throughout these proceedings, the father has refused to allow the mother’s solicitors to see his immigration documents. However, the Home Office confirmed in the related wardship proceedings that the father submitted a claim for asylum on 22^nd September 2020 which was granted on 8^th June 2022 until 7^th June 2027 with a right to work and recourse to public funds.

On 7^th December 2023, the mother and B entered lawfully as the spouse and child of the father who, by that stage, was lawfully here. According to the Home Office they were granted Entry Clearance as a family reunion valid for entry from 13^th September 2023 until 7^th June 2027. On 10^th January 2024, the mother and B travelled to Iran for a holiday. When they arrived at Tehran airport, as they were coming out of the airport, B was abducted by paternal uncle H who threatened the mother with a gun and removed B. That was the last time the mother saw B – so now more than 19 months ago. The mother immediately returned to the UK in the hope of trying to secure B’s return.

On 4^th June 2024, the mother lodged an application for wardship and for the return of B to England. There have since then been a large number of hearings – 12 on my count. That may not be correct but I count approximately that this is the 13^th hearing. It is not necessary to list every hearing so I will only refer to the ones relevant to the application before me today. I note at the outset that at every inter partes hearing, the father has appeared. In all but one, the father was a litigant in person. There was one hearing where he did instruct lawyers, but they applied to come off the record at the start of that hearing (in June 2025).

The first hearing I will refer to is 11^th July 2024 before Victoria Butler-Cole KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. She made B a ward of the court and made an order for contact.

Then, on 11^th October 2024 there was a hearing on those applications before Deputy High Judge Naomi Davey. The father attended in person but left during closing submissions. That Judge confirmed the wardship and made a return order directing the father to return B by 8^th November 2024 and made an order in respect of replacement of Iranian passports for B.

B was not returned and, on 15 November 2024, the matter came back before Trowell J who continued wardship and made a further return order.

Then the matter came back on 10 December 2024 before Mr Justice Trowell again who continued the return order and gave directions for a potential committal application. In that order, Mr Justice Trowell (at paragraph 11) set out information for the father’s benefit under the heading ‘important notices’ to the respondent father. Inter alia, that notice provides for the respondent father to be provided with a list of solicitors by the mother’s solicitor and sets out all relevant rights that apply to any committal application, such as his right to give evidence but that he is not obliged to; the right to remain silent; and the right to non-means tested legal aid. Mr Justice Trowell effectively advised the father to get legal aid and to seek representation.

The first committal application was issued on 8 January 2025 and listed for hearing before Mr Justice Harrison on 21 February 2025. There were difficulties with the applications at that stage including that the documents which required translating into Farsi had not been served on the father until 2 days before the hearing. Harrison J adjourned the application.

The next relevant hearing was on 2 April 2025 before Mr Justice Trowell where he made a very specific contact order setting out precisely what steps should be taken in respect of interim contact. On 12 June 2025, the main application and the committal application came back before Mr Justice Trowell and there are parts of that order which are important for matters I have to consider later. In that order of 12 June 2025, Mr Justice Trowell referred to an expert report on Iranian law which had been ordered in the main proceedings from the expert, Mr Andrew Allen KC and referred to issues of return. The following is in the order by way of recitals:

“The court had regard to the expert report on Iranian law by Andrew Allen KC dated 6 June 2025 and made a fresh order against the father to cause the return of B to this jurisdiction in what it considered to be a realistic timeframe, allowing for the renewal of the child B’s passport and any visa application in respect of the paternal uncle H.

The father told the court in terms that, with his agreement, the child B could be returned to the jurisdiction of England & Wales.”

The father told the court that B could be returned to the jurisdiction of England and Wales. As I have said, Mr Justice Trowell went on to set out clearly defined interim contact order and made a further order for return by 16 August 2025, which is in 2 days’ time.

There was then a further hearing before Deputy High Court Judge Nicholas Allen KC on 4 July 2025 in anticipation of a fresh application for committal being made. It effectively stands as a hearing for directions for the present committal application. Mr Allen KC on 4 July again set out in the order, in recitals and in an ‘important notice’ addressed to the father, his rights including his right to have non-means, non-merits-tested legal aid; the right to give or not to give evidence; his right to remain silent. He again strongly suggested that the father would benefit from legal advice.

On 16 July 2025 the committal application was made setting out in clear terms which parts of which orders are alleged to have been breached, and I will go through those in a moment. The matter was set down for a 1-day hearing today to consider that application for committal.

I note that every one of the orders was translated into Farsi and served on the father by post or email in English and in Farsi with covering letters.

In terms of the factual situation today, B has not been returned to England and Wales and there has been no interim contact. The mother’s solicitors have filed a detailed statement setting out precisely which orders have been breached and the evidence of breach. The mother has filed a statement setting out her numerous efforts to facilitate interim contact. The father has filed no evidence and has given no oral evidence - as is his right.

I now turn to the law. The procedure relating to contempt is found in FPR 2010 rule 37.4 which sets out the requirements for contempt. Rule 37.4(2) sets out the precise requirements for contempt applications.

“(2)

A contempt application must include statements of all the following, unless (in the case of (b) to (g)) wholly inapplicable—

(a)the nature of the alleged contempt (for example, breach of an order or undertaking or contempt in the face of the court);

(b)the date and terms of any order allegedly breached or disobeyed;

(c)confirmation that any such order was personally served, and the date it was served, unless the court or the parties dispensed with personal service;

(d)if the court dispensed with personal service, the terms and date of the court’s order dispensing with personal service;

(e)confirmation that any order allegedly breached or disobeyed included a penal notice;

(f)the date and terms of any undertaking allegedly breached;

(g)confirmation of the claimant’s belief that the person who gave any undertaking understood its terms and the consequences of failure to comply with it;

(h)a brief summary of the facts alleged to constitute the contempt, set out numerically in chronological order;

(i)that the defendant has the right to be legally represented in the contempt proceedings;

(j)that the defendant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation and to apply for legal aid which may be available without any means test;

(k)that the defendant may be entitled to the services of an interpreter;

(l)that the defendant is entitled to a reasonable time to prepare for the hearing;

(m)that the defendant is entitled but not obliged to give written and oral evidence in their defence;

(n)that the defendant has the right to remain silent and to decline to answer any question the answer to which may incriminate the defendant;

(o)that the court may proceed in the defendant’s absence if they do not attend but (whether or not they attend) will only find the defendant in contempt if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the facts constituting contempt and that they do constitute contempt;

(p)that if the court is satisfied that the defendant has committed a contempt, the court may punish the defendant by a fine, imprisonment, confiscation of assets or other punishment under the law;

(q)that if the defendant admits the contempt and wishes to apologise to the court, that is likely to reduce the seriousness of any punishment by the court;

(r)that the court’s findings will be provided in writing as soon as practicable after the hearing; and

(s)that the court will sit in public, unless and to the extent that the court orders otherwise, and that its findings will be made public.”

In Re L (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 173, Theis J set out the requirements of a committal application and in particular the need to set out allegations with complete clarity. I note that this pre-dates amendments made to the Family Procedure Rules but the judgment still sets out the important principle about the need for complete clarity. I do not need to set out all of the case law in detail.

Contempt proceedings are analogous to criminal proceedings. All breaches must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In Omay Ali Elhag Elkndo v Elnoaman Gassam Elsyed (Committal: Sentence)[2024] EWHC 2230 (Fam), Mr Justice Cobb, as he then was, made clear that a court can proceed to consider a committal application and to make orders for committal even in the absence of a party. In this case, the deliberateness of the father’s absence could hardly be clearer. The father is sitting outside the court, refusing to come in.

In terms of sentence, Mr Justice Peel set out the law in detail in Bailey v Bailey (Committal)[2022] EWFC 5, and I fully take that into account. In my view, the most important passage in respect of sentencing which appears at [60] in Peel J’s judgment is in the judgment of Lady Justice Hale as she then was in Hale v Tanner [2000] EWCA Civ 5570 at [25]–[35].

“25.

In making those points I would wish to emphasise that I do so only in the context of family cases. Family cases, it has long been recognised, raise different considerations from those elsewhere in the civil law. The two most obvious are the heightened emotional tensions that arise between family members and often the need for those family members to continue to be in contact with one another because they have children together or the like. Those two factors make the task of the court, in dealing with these issues, quite different from the task when dealing with commercial disputes or other types of case in which sometimes, in fact rarely, sanctions have to be imposed for contempt of court.

26.

Having said that, firstly, these cases have to come before the court on an application to commit. That is the only procedure which is available. Not surprisingly, therefore, the court is directing its mind to whether or not committal to prison is the appropriate order. But it does not follow from that that imprisonment is to be regarded as the automatic consequence of the breach of an order. Clearly it is  not. There is, however, no principle that imprisonment is not to be imposed at the first occasion: see Thorpe v Thorpe [1998] 2 FLR 127, a decision of this court. Nevertheless, it is a common practice, and usually appropriate in view of the sensitivity of the circumstances of these cases, to take some other course on the first occasion.

27.

Secondly, there is the difficulty, as Mr Brett has pointed out, that the alternatives are limited. The full range of sentencing options is not available for contempt of court. Nevertheless, there is a range of things that the court can consider. It may do nothing, make no order. It may adjourn, and in a case where the alleged contemnor has not attended court, that may be an appropriate course to take, although I would not say so in every case. It depends on the reasons that may be thought to lie behind the non-attendance. There is a power to fine. There is a power of requisition of assets and there are mental health orders. All of those may, in an appropriate case, need consideration, particularly in a case where the court has not found any actual violence proved.

28.

Thirdly, if imprisonment is appropriate, the length of the committal should be decided without reference to whether or not it is to be suspended. A longer period of committal is not justified because its sting is removed by virtue of its suspension.

29.

Fourthly, the length of the committal has to depend upon the court’s objectives. There are two objectives always in contempt of court proceedings. One is to mark the court’s disapproval of the disobedience to its order. The other is to secure compliance with that order in the future. Thus, the seriousness of what has taken place is to be viewed in that light as well as for its own intrinsic gravity.

30.

Fifthly, the length of the committal has to bear some reasonable relationship to the maximum of two years which is available.

31.

Sixthly, suspension is possible in a much wider range of circumstances than it is in criminal cases. It does not have to be the exceptional case. Indeed, it is usually the first way of attempting to secure  compliance with the court’s order.

32.

Seventhly, the length of the suspension requires separate consideration, although it is often appropriate for it to be linked to continued compliance with the order underlying the committal.

33.

Eighthly, of course, the court has to bear in mind the context. This may be aggravating or mitigating. The context is often the break-up of an intimate relationship in which emotions run high and people behave in silly ways. The context of having children together, if that be the case, cannot be ignored. Sometimes that means that there is an aggravation of what has taken place, because of the greater fear that is engendered from the circumstances. Sometimes it may be mitigating, because there is reason to suppose that once the immediate emotions have calmed down, the molestation and threats will not continue.

34.

Ninthly, in many cases, the court will have to bear in mind that there are concurrent proceedings in another court based on either the same facts or some of the same facts, which are before the court on the contempt proceedings. The court cannot ignore those parallel proceedings. It may have to take into account their outcome in considering what the practical effect is upon the contempt proceedings. They do have different purposes and often the overlap is not exact, but nevertheless the court will not want, in effect, the contender to suffer punishment twice for the same events.

35.

Tenthly, it will usually be desirable for the court to explain very briefly why it has made the choices that it has made in the particular case before it. One understands all the constraints in a busy county court, dealing with large numbers of these cases these days, and one would not wish to impose too great a burden on the judiciary in this respect. Nevertheless, it would be appropriate in most cases for the contemnor to know why he or she was being sentenced to a period of imprisonment; why it was the length that it was; if it was suspended, why the suspension was as it was, but only very briefly.”

It is important to note that the court has a range of choices in terms of sentencing options for contempt of court – albeit not as wide as in the criminal courts. Lady Justice Hale at [28] on the length of committal says that it must be decided without reference to whether it is suspended. There are two objectives in the sentence – first, to mark the court’s disapproval of breaches of its orders and the other is to secure compliance with those orders. The length must have a reasonable relation to the maximum of 2 years.

In Oliver v Shaikh [2020] EWHC 2658 (QB), Mr Justice Nicklin sets out the two purposes or principles behind a sentence of committal. He says that the sanction should only be imposed where the court is satisfied that the contempt was so serious that no other penalty is appropriate. A suspended sentence is equally a prison sentence. I also have regard to the very recent judgment of the Court of Appeal, the leading judgment being given by Lady Justice King in B (a child) (Sentencing in contempt proceedings)[2025] EWCA Civ 1048 where she emphasises the importance of parties complying with court orders.

With the backdrop of law set out, I turn to each alleged breach.

In the case of each alleged breach, I have to consider the order made, whether a penal notice was attached, whether it was interpreted and translated, whether there was knowledge of rights and service. I have already dealt with interpretation. Every order was interpreted into Farsi in writing, and the father has been served with each one.

The first order on which the mother alleges breach is that of Ms Davey sitting as Deputy High Court Judge on 11 October 2024. At paragraph 12, she required the defendant to cause B to return by 23.59 on 8 November 2024 and that obligation to return was continuing. There was a penal notice attached to that order. It was served by post, a form of service that was specifically allowed by the order. Also, at paragraph 14, the order required the father to do all that was required of him to renew B’s Iranian passport. I will not make a finding on that alleged breach as the later orders were much more specific about what precisely he was required to do, and I do not see any benefit in making a finding in respect of paragraph 14.

In relation to paragraph 12, there is no doubt that B has not returned to England and Wales. The only possible defence to such non-compliance would be as to the father’s ability to achieve B’s return. In many such cases, a parent will say they used their best endeavours but failed to be able to achieve return. This case, and this is critical, is different. Andrew Allen KC was instructed as an expert on Iranian law. He set out his professional opinion that the father could delegate parental rights, for example to the paternal uncle H, to get B a passport and facilitate her return. The father has not done that. Most importantly, as I already alluded to, the father, on 2 April 2025, before Mr Justice Trowell expressly said he could return B. I will read out the relevant recitals (5) and (6).

“(5)

During the hearing, the father told the judge that he would be able to return B to this jurisdiction under certain conditions. If the conditions were fulfilled, he would then decide whose care the child would be returned to. The conditions were:

a.

the mother and her family would apologise to the father and his family for what they have done;

b.

the mother would return the gold jewellery given to B;

c.

the mother would reimburse the father for all expenses he has incurred in Iran and in this country; and

d.

the person who appears in a video filed by the father with the court who the father alleged today molested B must be brought to justice / investigated.

(6)

The father’s position in relation to contact between the mother and B was that he would not allow any contact until the above demands were met. After the court confirmed its order in relation to contact, the father said that it would be impossible to comply with the order without an order of an Iranian court.”

The evidence before the court is therefore both from Andrew Allen KC that the father could obtain or allow the uncle to obtain passport for B and the father positively asserted to Mr Justice Trowell that he could return B if he wished. Furthermore, at the hearing on 12 June 2025 (again before Mr Justice Trowell), the following is recorded as recital 6 to that order:

“The father told the court in terms that, with his agreement, the child B could be returned to the jurisdiction of England & Wales”.

I have no hesitation in finding that, on the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the father breached the order of Ms Davey in respect of failing to return or facilitating the return of B to England and Wales. As I have said, the order was served by post and that was allowed by the order, and order was interpreted. The father has not filed evidence as is entirely his right. I merely record that to suggest there is no evidence that the order could not have been complied with. On the standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, I find paragraph 12 to have been breached.

In the order of Mr Justice Trowell on 15 Nov 2024, there are 3 paragraphs allegedly breached.

Paragraph 11 directed the father to return or to facilitate B’s return by 23:59pm on 27 November 2024. It had a penal notice attached.

Paragraph 13 required the father to arrange an appointment with the Iranian Embassy to provide his formal consent in writing for the renewal of the child’s passport. A penal notice was attached. At paragraph 14, the father was required to serve on Dawson Cornwell LLP evidence that he has contacted the Iranian Embassy in London to arrange an appointment for the purposes of renewing the child’s passport, evidence that he has provided his formal written consent for the renewal of the child’s passport, and evidence of the outcome of the appointment. The evidence of the mother’s solicitor is that paragraphs 13 and 14 have not been complied with. I find beyond reasonable doubt that those paragraphs have been breached

The father has put forward no explanation as to why he has not complied with the order, nor evidence to suggest that he has done so. The burden is not on him but he has provided no counter evidence. That order was served by post as allowed by the order and was translated into Farsi. In respect of all orders and indeed all of the evidence, the mother’s solicitor has in her witness statement explained that, having sent all of the evidence to the father, she checked on Mimecast that the father downloaded those documents in English and Farsi. He did. I find breach beyond all reasonable doubt.

The next order is Mr Justice Trowell dated 10 December 2024 with another return order. A penal notice is attached. Service by post and email was permitted and completed. I again find breach beyond reasonable doubt.

In the 12 June order of Mr Justice Trowell, there is no breach in respect of the paragraph of the return order and none is alleged as that date has not happened yet but, critically, there were also requirements in paragraph 12 to ensure B’s return could happen by 16 August 2025. The father had to take a series of steps to delegate his power to the paternal uncle H. The mother’s solicitors sent father a draft letter to sign and to send to the uncle to delegate his parental rights to his brother but there is no evidence that the father complied with that. It is recorded in the order that:

“The father shall within 48 hours of being given notice of successful renewal of the child B’s Iranian passport by H:

a.

Send to the solicitors for the mother (Dawson Cornwell, using the email address [.......] @dawsoncornwell.com) and the court notice of successful renewal of the child B’s Iranian passport and a copy of the renewed passport;

b.

Purchase flight tickets from Iran to the United Kingdom in the names of the child B and H (“the flight tickets”); and

c.

Send to the solicitors for the mother (Dawson Cornwell, using the email address […..]@dawsoncornwell.com) and the court details of the flight and copies of the flight tickets.”

The father has not done the above. It is not correct to find breach of paragraph 13 as the father cannot do this as he has not complied with paragraph 12. However, I find beyond reasonable doubt a breach of paragraph 12 alone.

Turning to contact, the order of 2^nd April 2025 in respect of indirect contact records:

“The father must ensure that B is available for video contact with the mother by WhatsApp on the following dates and at the following times:

A.

On 7 April 2025 at 4pm Iranian time;

B.

On 14 and 18 April 2025 at 4pm Iranian time;

C.

From the week commencing 21 April 2025, every Monday, Thursday and Friday at 4pm Iranian time and continuing until further order.”

Paragraph 12 had a penal notice attached. The evidence of the mother and the mother’s solicitor is that there was no contact whatsoever despite the mother making numerous attempts to contact B via WhatsApp. There have been efforts made by the mother’s family in Iran to obtain contact through the Iranian court. To some degree this is not relevant to the committal, but I will set it out as part of background and because it has some relevance to sentence in terms of the efforts the mother’s family have gone to. The application went through West Azerbaijan Judicial Office to their Social Welfare Office but in a letter dated 11 June 2025 (in the western calendar), the welfare office says “we hereby inform you based on phone call with the paternal uncle on 31 may that the child is living with the uncle because the father is residing abroad. The uncle explicitly stated that under no circumstances will he allow any office or person to meet with B”. Therefore, it appears that there is simply no prospect of the mother gaining contact with B through the Iranian courts.

The final interim contact order and final alleged breach is of the order of 12 June 2025 at paragraph 17, which records as follows:

“The father shall make sure that the child B is available for video contact with the mother via WhatsApp on the following dates and at the following times:

a.

On 16 June 2025 at 16:00 Iranian time;

b.

On 23 June and 27 June 2025 at 16:00 Iranian time; and

c.

From the week beginning 30 June 2025 every Monday, Thursday and Friday at 16:00 Iranian time and continuing until further order.”

There has been absolutely no contact despite strenuous efforts by the mother. Again, I find beyond a reasonable that the order was breached. A penal notice was attached and, as I already said, the order had been served.

There are therefore breaches of 9 separate paragraphs in orders.

To be absolutely clear, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the breaches alleged have been proved. I am satisfied that every order had a penal notice attached to the relevant paragraphs. I am satisfied that every order was translated into Farsi. I am satisfied that they were sent to the father in English and Farsi and have seen evidence that the father has opened and downloaded emails where they have been sent. I am satisfied that the father’s rights were fully explained to him in at least two orders which again have been translated. Every order was served by post and electronically and I am satisfied that the father received and opened them.

In respect of the committal application, that was not served in person because the process server refused to serve in person given the father’s previous conduct. I have an email dated 17 July 2025 to the solicitor at Dawson Cornwell LLP which says:

“hi [I] further to our previous correspondence and phone call, we confirm that in the matter of service of documents upon [the father], our previous colleague is NOT prepared to attempt personal service again upon this subject. As you are aware, on the last occasion [the father] became very physically aggressive to our Server, and even police officers, and additionally made same unpleasant false accusations to the police about our Server's actions. Professional process servers are not plentiful in that area, but I have contacted a number of them but cannot secure anybody willing to accept the assignment under knowledge of the previous altercations which, of course, I am duty bound to inform them. The original Server, who obviously knows the property and location, has stated that he would be willing to attend the property and effect service through the letter box and then quickly leave the location. Of course I am aware that this is not ideal, but I cannot attempt to encourage anybody into a potentially dangerous situation.”

In the light of that material and those issues having been brought to the attention of Mr Nicholas Allen KC in the order of 4 July, he allowed service by post of the draft order, and in paragraph 21, service of the committal application by post. I have no doubt that there has been good service. Firstly, I have seen proof of service by post; secondly, proof that the father has seen them electronically and has downloaded them; and thirdly, that the father is here today and plainly knows what this application is about. Indeed, I can see him sitting outside the court.

I am satisfied that all procedural steps and safeguards have been met. I am satisfied in those circumstances that all necessary procedural safeguards were met.

I turn to the issue of sentence. The leading judgments as I said are Lady Justice Hale in Hale v Tanner and the very recent judgment of Lady Justice King in the Court of Appeal. I have considered carefully the principles set out by Lady Justice Hale as she then was, and I have no doubt that a custodial sentence is required.

I have come to this conclusion for two reasons, the first being the history of this matter, which indicates that such sentence is the only hope of compliance and of securing B’s return. The father has been given numerous opportunities to return B but has ignored them, and ignored any of the preparatory steps required. His attitude throughout is that he will only comply with orders on his own terms. Secondly, that a custodial sentence is required to show the court’s displeasure about what have been complete and deliberate breaches of court orders both in securing B’s return and taking the required steps to secure return and provide for indirect contact.

An aggravating feature of the father’s conduct is that he removed a 9-year-old child by force. I can only assume on the facts that the father was involved in the decision to remove B at the airport in Tehran and to retain her in Iran. B has been kept away from her mother for 19 months. Without being overly emotive, this is an act of extreme cruelty to B and to the mother.

There are two further issues: whether I should suspend the sentence for a short period; and how long the sentence should be. I have closely considered whether or not the suspension would secure the return of B.

The father has been given copious opportunities to comply and has shown contempt for the court and the court’s processes. There is clear conduct at previous hearings that the father believes he can set the terms, and he labours under the belief that he can dictate to the court how to manage processes. I have reached the conclusion that the only way to get the father to appreciate the seriousness of the matter, and to comply, is to make an immediate order of imprisonment.

The sentence is determined at 6 months. These have been deliberate and persistent breaches that have created a cruel situation of no contact between the mother and child. The father has failed to provide for any interim contact. I note that this, as equivalent to criminal proceedings, is a first offence and I am hopeful that a period of 6 months imprisonment – which is likely to in practice involve a significantly shorter time - will give the father enough time to realise that he has no choice but to comply and take steps to secure B’s return.

If the father complies and secures the return of B to the jurisdiction of England and Wales, he can apply back to court to purge his contempt.