London Borough of X v Mrs Z & Anor

This is an application issued pursuant to the High Court’s wardship jurisdiction to determine where a seventeen year old child should live. He is anonymised in the judgment as ZE. The applicant is the relevant local authority which exercises safeguarding and other statutory duties to ZE. The first respondent is his mother. The second respondent is his father. He has litigation capacity and instructs his own solicitors. The Guardian, who was appointed, has helpfully remained and appeared in person. Ancillary issues regarding contact with his mother also arise.

I heard the pre-trial review in this matter on 15 July 2025 and the final hearing took place over three days on 21 to 23 July 2025. I heard evidence from one single joint expert (a clinical psychologist); an educational psychologist; a social work manager; the respondent mother and the respondent father. I received submissions of a very high quality from counsel and reserved my decision.

I have decided that it is in ZE’s best interests to continue to live with his father. He will continue to have contact with his mother but there will be restrictions on this which will be reduced and which will then cease before a short hearing in October when I can review contact. Wardship will continue until then, at which point I hope it will be able to end. I set out my reasons for arriving at these decisions.

ZE was born in March 2008. He is the only child of the short lived relationship between Mrs Z and Mr E, his parents. He has lived nearly all his life with his mother and his older half-brothers. His mother lives in a cramped council flat.

Public law proceedings were issued by the applicant on 18 February 2025 seeking an interim supervision order. ZE was then sixteen. The application pointed out ZE would turn seventeen in March. The applicant sought for him to reside with his father under a child arrangements order and for there to be twice weekly supervised contact with his mother. Whilst the application notice sought an interim supervision order, in the applicant’s witness evidence, its social worker sought the immediate removal of ZE from his mother’s care. The applicant – through the social worker – stated they recognised it was unusual to seek public law orders in respect of an older child but this was an exceptional case and was “so concerning” that the removal was urgent.

The social work evidence charted the background of the applicant’s involvement. It noted ZE has a diagnosis of sinus tachycardia. That he was removed from school by his mother in 2017. That his mother had not provided him with any proper home education and had not engaged with the applicant’s Elective Home Education Team (“EHE Team”). It stated she had failed to engage him in education or socially. The evidence was that he was subjected to chronic neglect. He had missed many medical appointments and the cardiology team had discharged him in 2022 because of his mother’s non-engagement. It noted the history. ZE came to the attention of children’s services in July 2019 under the category of neglect. The referral had been made by the EHE Team. In August 2023 a Police Merlin report raised concerns about ZE in the light of his mother’s mental health. She had made delusional allegations against her neighbours. A section 47 Children Act 1989 Act (hereafter “the 1989 Act”) assessment began which led to a Child Protection Plan for neglect in October 2023. It noted the case was then closed in June 2024. In August 2024 the Fire Brigade made a referral because of severe hoarding in the family home and noted significant black mould on the walls. It noted a Community Mental Health Team jointly visited with the police in August 2024. The witness statement states Mrs Z was sectioned and ZE was placed with his father. It notes the ‘section’ was overturned at a ‘tribunal’ and ZE returned home, apparently without children’s services being informed. A further child and family assessment took place in October 2024 which led to a Child Protection Plan in January 2025. No mention is made in the evidence of the failure to consider the Public Law Outline.

The applicant served an interim threshold which alleged inter alia that whilst ZE had a heart condition he had not been seen by any medical professional since 2019. The interim threshold alleged he “has been out of education since 2017……[the mother] has since refused to engage with the Elective Home Educations Team or provide [ZE] with a formal education”. The applicant’s pleading further alleged ZE was socially isolated, shared a bedroom with his mother and she, Mrs Z, has a history of “delusional paranoia” and, in 2024, was “sectioned under S3 of the Mental Health Act” admitted to hospital and ZE was placed under police protection. This application was served on Mrs Z.

A hearing took place before District Judge Hudd on 3 March 2025. Mrs Z did not attend nor was she represented. The court made an interim care order. The social worker attended the family home to explain the court order on 4 March 2025 in the morning. Nobody answered. The matter returned to court that day and the applicant sought, and obtained, a recovery order pursuant to section 50 of the 1989 Act.

On 7 March 2025, eight police officers arrived at the family home, with two social workers. They used force to enter the home. I have seen the police body camera video footage. The flat was dirty and cramped. Mrs Z was present with ZE and his older brother. A number of police officers entered the hallway. Mrs Z was visibly upset and angry. She was shouting at the police officers and demanding to see a signed warrant. The police saw a hammer and a knife on furniture in the hallway and they removed them from the flat. She was shown the recovery order and she pointed out it was not signed and contained the wrong date of birth. ZE was taken away by the police. His mother can be seen to ensure he has clothes, a hot water bottle and his heart medication before he leaves. ZE was placed with his father. The social work evidence filed following the removal states: “the removal was challenging, requiring the presence of eight police officers. Upon arrival, the police found [ZE]’s mother was armed with a meat cleaver and a hammer, which were taken from her and secured by officers.” It states she “became physical” and “had to be restrained” in order for the police to gain access to ZE. The statement continues: “his mother has significant mental health challenges, including delusional thinking and paranoia, and has previously demonstrated violent behaviour.”

Mr E filed a witness statement dated 11 March 2025. He agreed with the applicant’s interim threshold. He pointed out that Mrs Z stymied his attempts to develop a relationship with ZE and she failed to comply with various private law orders made for him to spend time with his son. He says he has seen ZE two or three times a year over the last few years. He has not been in her home since ZE was a baby and he was not aware she had taken him out of school. He notes ZE was upset over being removed from the family home. He notes ZE has become calmer and settled in the days after his removal. He gets on well with him.

On 17 March 2025, the applicant issued an application to make ZE a ward of court. It noted that it could not obtain a care order before ZE turned seventeen and therefore sought wardship to permit the court to exercise parental responsibility over ZE. Poole J made ZE a ward of court on 24 March 2025. The order noted the applicant is committed to reviewing contact with a view to arranging supervised telephone contact between ZE and his mother. Disclosure orders were made against the Metropolitan Police. At a further hearing, various case management directions were then made and a final hearing was listed with a pre-trial review, as directed by Mr. David Rees KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge.

At the pre-trial review all parties submitted the final hearing should be adjourned because the local authority had not filed all their evidence, disclosure was missing from ZE’s medical records and the Metropolitan Police had not complied with the previous disclosure orders made. I refused to discharge the trial. A further hearing before a High Court Judge would likely not have taken place prior to December 2025. This would have led to the interim position, based upon untested evidence, enduring from March 2025 to December 2025. Furthermore, it did not seem proportionate to list a five day trial at the end of the year for an order that would only endure until ZE turns eighteen in March 2026. I made directions for the urgent disclosure of GP records, for the Metropolitan police to comply with the earlier disclosure orders made and directed a final witness statement from the applicant and a response to the “threshold” from Mrs Z.

At the hearing, the parties’ positions were as follows. The applicant submitted I should make findings of fact based upon the document that began as the interim threshold but had been amended and renamed Schedule of Findings. The applicant submitted that it was in ZE’s best interests to remain in his father’s care and to live with him until eighteen. They submitted there should be only supervised contact between ZE and Mrs Z. I was invited to maintain wardship. The respondent father, supported this position. Mrs Z sought the return of ZE to her care and the conclusion of the proceedings. In the alternative she sought unsupervised contact. She invited me to make findings to correct the false position put forward by the applicant. Counsel for ZE submitted he wanted to go home to his mother. The Guardian’s final analysis supported ZE remaining living with his father. After having heard the evidence, the Guardian supported unsupervised contact between ZE and Mrs Z to avoid ZE “falling off a cliff” when he turns eighteen.

It is important to briefly chart the legal position. Section 31 (2) of the 1989 Act sets out the well-known ‘threshold’ for the making of a care or supervision order. Section 31 (3) prohibits the making of a care or supervision order in respect of a child who has turned seventeen. In theory, at least, it is not necessary to make findings of fact to make a welfare decision in wardship. The court may conduct a welfare analysis with ZE’s welfare as my paramount consideration. The disputed issues in these proceedings are, namely: (i) should ZE live with his mother or his father; and (ii) should he live with his father should he spend unsupervised time with his mother.

It is a curiosity of wardship, that a child is immediately warded upon the court issuing a C66 application for wardship – see section 41 (2) Senior Courts Act 1981, unless the child is in care. This counterintuitive position is confirmed by Ormrod LJ (with the agreement of Dunn LJ) in Re R (Minors (Wardship: Jurisdiction) (1981) 2 FLR 416 at paragraph 6.

Poole J continued ZE’s wardship when the matter came before him. Wardship is the parental jurisdiction of the High Court. Ultimate responsibility for the child rests with the court. The court remains in control of the child and no major steps can be taken in the life of the child without order of the court. Wardship and the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court are now for all practical purposes synonymous.

Practice Direction 12 D summarises the Inherent Jurisdiction at paragraphs 1.1 to 1.3:

A Practice Direction contains guidance. If it contains an incorrect statement of law, then this is not authoritative, see Brooke LJ in U v Liverpool City Council (Practice Note) [2005] 1 WLR 2657 at paragraph 48.

I have received no submissions on the legal background because it has been assumed I can make a residence decision for ZE. I have a little hesitation in proceeding given that it could be said (although it has not been submitted in these proceedings) that I am, in effect, undermining the prohibition set out in section 31 (3) by resorting to wardship to make orders. And that I am doing so without having to cross threshold. I remind myself, as is well known, that if Parliament has set out a statutory scheme this must be followed without recourse to the court’s Inherent Jurisdiction. Lord Hailsham LC in Richards v Richards [1984] AC 174 at 199 held:

“… where, as here, Parliament has spelt out in considerable detail what must be done in a particular class of case it is not open to litigants to bypass the special Act, nor to the courts to disregard its provisions by resorting to the earlier procedure, and thus choose to apply a different jurisprudence from that which the Act prescribes.”

The text of the last sentence of paragraph 1.1 of PD12D came about following Lord Wilson’s review of the earlier text of the Practice Direction, which he held had incorrectly stated that Inherent Jurisdiction proceedings should only be commenced if the issue cannot be resolved under the 1989 Act – see NY (A Child) [2019] UKSC 49 at paragraph 44. The current iteration of the Practice Direction provides, therefore, for a wider role of the Inherent Jurisdiction. The parties in these proceedings agree that the court cannot make a care order and thereby permit the applicant to exercise parental responsibility to require ZE to reside with his father. No party has submitted that I cannot determine ZE’s residence under wardship because the court cannot make ZE the subject of a care order as he is seventeen. No party has sought to appeal the confirmation of ZE’s wardship on the issuing of the C66 application on 17 March 2025. Therefore I shall accept the agreed position that I can make a decision in respect of ZE’s residence exercising my powers in wardship. For good reasons the courts are slow to place limits on the Inherent Jurisdiction and the court’s role in wardship is clear and established.

All parties are agreed that the test is welfare. Ms Kate Hudson submits with force that given ZE’s age and his clear wishes, factual findings are required to justify the interference in her client’s and ZE’s Article 8 ECHR right to respect of a family life. I cannot agree with that submission. Given ZE’s age and his capacity, his mother’s rights are limited and as such, any interference in her Article 8 right to respect for a family life, would need limited justification for any such interference to be lawful. I have in mind what was said by Lady Hale in Re D [2019] UKSC 49; at paragraphs 23-23 (emphasis added):

This point is further illustrated by the fact Article 8 does not necessarily protect the relationship between an adult child and his parent - see Kugathas v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 31 where Sedley LJ (with the agreement of Simon Brown and Arden LJJ (as they were)) at paragraph 14 accepts a relationship between an adult child and his parents does not necessarily acquire Article 8 ECHR protection. See also Arden LJ at paragraph 25:

“Because there is no presumption of family life, in my judgment a family life is not established between an adult child and his surviving parent or other siblings unless something more exists than normal emotional ties: see S v United Kingdom (1984) 40 DR 196 and Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom [1985] 7 EHRR 471. Such ties might exist if the appellant were dependent on his family or vice versa.”

See also Baker LJ’s analysis (with the agreement of Peter Jackson and Warby LJJ) in Re P (Discharge of Party) [2021] EWCA Civ 512 [2021] 1 WLR 3098 at paragraphs 34-36.

I set out this learning because very soon ZE will be an adult. I quite accept Parliament has determined a person under eighteen remains a child. The Article 8 rights of both Mrs Z and ZE remain in play and may well endure beyond his majority. However, importantly, at his age, less justification is required to lawfully interfere in Mrs Z’s rights. The Article 8 ECHR adult to adult relationship case law helps to demonstrate that.

When determining ZE’s residence in wardship, I am more concerned with his rights, than his mother’s. But it is another facet of this litigation that I am not being asked to make any form of deprivation of liberty order. I am not being asked to make any coercive orders. It appears clear from the evidence that none have been required. ZE has never attempted to leave his father’s home to return to reside with his mother, even though her home is close to where he now lives and there are no restrictions on his liberty.

Therefore, I approach my task as follows:

It follows from what I have said above, that I recognise my role in these proceedings is limited. To a large extent I consider I am providing guidance to ZE. The court is at the outer reaches of its powers. All parties have accepted wardship since March 2025. Certainly, there has been no appeal that the test of exceptionality as set out in PD 12D, has not been made out. I have some doubts about the exceptionality of the circumstances I am presented with, however, recognising this is not a case about deprivation of liberty and recognising the limits to the mother’s rights given her capacitous son can choose where he lives, I am persuaded that ZE welcomes the decision making of this court. Furthermore, I note that the decisions made in wardship for him to live with his father and see his mother are not decisions he has sought to undermine or otherwise go against.

Turning then to the disputed facts. Much of the hearing was taken up with the factual disputes between the applicant and Mrs Z. Normally I summarise the written and oral evidence of the witnesses, but having reflected it is not necessary to do so, as the facts were clear by the end of the hearing and there was no real dispute between the parties.

The applicant’s schedule of facts and the mother’s responses are set out below. Mrs Z’s responses on factual matters are straightforward and largely true. She has, however, failed to realise the impact on her son of her neglect.

As I have said, Mrs Z was a straightforward and honest witness. The documentation which has now been produced, but was not available to the applicant earlier (although it plainly should have been) fills in further blanks. The following facts are derived from, the evidence:

These conclusions are clear from the evidence. They are not really disputed. No further reasons are required as the parties know why these are my findings. Given the long history of neglect, it is hard to understand both the sudden ‘urgency’ and the requirement for eight police officers being required to use force to enter the home and remove ZE in March 2025. I did not find the applicant’s case clear on this issue. It was harmful for ZE. Mrs Z accepted she made the situation worse and was right to apologise in the witness box. The applicant’s team also need to reflect on its role.

ZE has lived with his father since March 2025. He is settled. He has been able to “vote with his feet” and contact his mother or return to her home. The evidence is that he has never done so.

The Guardian’s insightful assessment of his wishes and feelings is her report is as follows:

In his report, the single joint expert, Dr Corr, clinical psychologist, notes that “when considering future care arrangements, [ZE] did not express a strong preference between living with his mother or father and indicated that he would be happy to live with either, although at points during the assessment [ZE] did state that he wished to live with his mother. [ZE] stated that if he was to live with his mother, this would need to be in a larger property with four bedrooms.”

ZE’s counsel told me he wanted to go home to his mother. ZE did not want to meet the judge and believed I would make the right decision for him. I was told if he does go home he would like to see more of his mum.

Considering all the written and oral evidence, in my judgment, ZE most clearly wants to go to College in September and succeed and obtain an education. Both expert witnesses assess him to be at least of average or above intelligence. Despite his mother’s inadequate home schooling, he is attaining fairly well albeit with a few deficits. I think he wants to be settled. He knows it is unlikely his mother will obtain a four bedroom house. I find the Guardian’s analysis of the disparity between what he says he wants to her and how he visualises his future at College to be very helpful. It might also be the case that if ZE wanted the judge to know he really wanted to go home to Mrs Z, he would have told me that in writing or at a meeting.

ZE is now enjoying some socialisation. He enjoys he visits to the seaside to see his father’s family and his cousins. His medical care is more consistent. He lives in a cleaner, less cluttered environment. He has his own bed and bedroom. His father is a kind and caring man.

His Guardian’s evidence is:

The welfare analysis is quite straightforward. I think Mrs Z recognised this but did not want to be seen to be giving up on ZE. For the reasons set out above, ZE’s welfare dictates that residing with his father is in his best interests.

The applicant and Mr E are concerned that Mrs Z will undermine ZE’s confidence and security living with his father. They are particularly concerned around the time he begins college in September. There is that risk. However, when I asked the social work manager if there was evidence Mrs Z had tried to undermine the placement with Mr E, she did not identify any. The applicant complains that Mrs Z has raised ‘adult’ themes with ZE. He is nearly an adult and it is hard to police their conversations. ZE has capacity to decide who to spend time with. It would be overly protective to police all his contact with his mother by the requirement for it to be supervised. I feel that ZE is awaiting my decision on where he should reside and he will stand behind it. I also detect that Mrs ZE has contested issues because she has been unfairly characterised by the applicant in these proceedings. She has failed ZE because of her neglect of his education, the cleanliness of the home and her only sporadic interactions with medics and other professionals. That being said, she has brought up her son to be a polite young man. He has reasonable educational attainments and the potential to do much more. She was not assisted by bringing up three boys alone in inner London in a cramped flat. There are obvious risks for any boy growing up in inner London. I was told the risks likely increase because of ZE’s Caribbean heritage. I accept there are risks of involvement in crime or being a victim of crime, of violence and gang related issues. ZE’s counsel was correct to reference ZE’s protected characteristics and the Lammy Review in her submissions. ZE knows nothing or little of this world. His mother has protected him from that albeit she has failed him with her neglect. She is not, however, the seriously mentally unwell, machete wielding, violent woman she has been made out to be by the applicant. She may feel some small level of vindication. She has been well represented by Ms Hudson who has demonstrated through her effective cross-examination and her submissions the errors in the applicant’s case. I say this because I hope, that Mrs Z will also accept my welfare findings for her son. I hope she will, therefore, not undermine his security living with his father.

ZE currently sees his mother in person twice a week for supervised contact. He also enjoys supervised telephone contact.

I am of the view ZE should be able to see his mother for a couple of hours every week in the community (not in her home). This can start from August. This should be the subject of light touch support but not close supervision. This can replace one of the supervised weekly contact sessions. There has to be a balance of building up unsupervised time between ZE and Mrs Z. Supervised video contact can take place as offered from now. Two weeks after he has settled into college, I can see no real reason why he cannot call his mother unsupervised. The applicant must carry out a review of the necessity of support or supervision every 14 days between now and the next hearing, document the same and provide it to the parties. If supervision or support cannot be reduced, justification should be provided. I am providing permission for support/supervision, but the applicant must consider whether it remains necessary. All supervision and support will come to an end by 30 September 2025. That will permit me to assess the situation at the review hearing in mid-October.

If Mrs Z seeks to undermine his home with his father or his college placement, there are measures that can be taken and I am unlikely to hesitate to step in to protect ZE, assuming I have jurisdiction to do so. The applicant will have liberty to apply to cease contact or provide for supervision if this is needed. I hope that will not be necessary.

I agree ZE should have a passport. If he wishes to travel abroad before March 2026, I will consider that issue.

I shall continue ZE’s wardship until a one hour review hearing in October 2025. I would hope at that stage proceedings can come to end. ZE will be informed about my decisions through his solicitor. I would want two key message to me relayed to him from me: (i) his college placement is a wonderful opportunity and I hope he is able to embrace it; and (ii) I have decided where I think it is best for him to live but I have also recognised the importance of his relationship with his mum, who he will continue to see her regularly.

I thank all counsel for their assistance and ask they draft an order to give effect to this judgment.