G, Re (A Child)

This case was listed to be heard on 1 May 2025. That hearing had to be vacated by reason of matters beyond this court’s control. It was relisted for hearing the next day in a busy list. An urgent hearing was required as was a decision.

On 2 May 2025 I made a decision and gave an ex tempore judgment. I reserved judgment to a date to be confirmed. In the interim, I indicated that the court declined to make a further Deprivation of Liberty order. I did so on both “the balance of convenience” and on best interests’ grounds. I stated that within my reserved judgment I would address what was termed before me – the jurisdiction issue, namely whether the application for a deprivation of liberty order sought in this case cut across the statutory scheme of the Children Act 1989.

The young person at the heart of this judgment will be referred to herein as G. He was born in March 2008. In October 2023, G expressed himself to be suicidal. He left his mother’s care and went to live with his father. Whilst living with his father, G again expressed suicidal ideation and on occasion absconded. G has been accommodated by the local authority since 18 March 2024, shortly after his sixteenth birthday. That accommodation has been pursuant to Section 20 Children Act 1989; the local authority accepting that G has the relevant capacity to provide consent to his own accommodation by the local authority. The accommodation followed G’s relationship with his father breaking down and G referring himself to social services. G is estranged from his parents and does not want them to know of the identity he now uses or where he is. They and the local authority have accepted his wishes. Consequently, they have limited knowledge of their son’s current circumstances.

Within that context, G whilst accommodated has been provided with a number of local authority placements. These have included children's homes, supported lodgings and foster care. When he has become dissatisfied with his placement, he has absconded to random locations, attended hospital and threatened to harm himself, on occasion he has threatened to kill himself. By his actions, G has put himself at risk, including at risk of death. Whilst professionals (social care and health) consider that G makes these threats to get his own way rather than because he is truly suicidal, there is nevertheless a real risk that he will unintentionally cause himself significant harm or indeed kill himself.

On 7 March 2025 G presented himself to the emergency department of a hospital with his social worker. He was in distress. He was expressing suicidal ideation. He was admitted to hospital as a voluntary patient. G is considered Gillick competent. Since his admission, G has not required any medical care with the only exception being a course (ten days) of phenoxymethylpenicillin on 7 March 2025. This treatment would ordinarily be given in the community rather than in an acute hospital. G has not required or received any other medical treatment. The hospital will not detain him against his will. His mental health is vulnerable, but he is outwith the statutory scheme provided for by the Mental Health Act 1983. He is medically fit for discharge, as he has been since admission. In the normal course of events, he would receive mental health support in the community. G cannot remain on the hospital ward indefinitely given:

G does not present with any substance misuse issues, or offending behaviour. He poses no risk to others. He is a bright and articulate young person who is pursuing and achieving his academic goals. He has a clear vision of what he wants for his future. It is accepted before me that he has capacity - including capacity to instruct his own solicitor - and to voluntarily admit himself as an inpatient to hospital. As already stated, in March 2024 he was considered by the local authority to have the capacity to consent to be voluntarily accommodated under section 20 Children Act 1989.

G’s parents have parental responsibility for him until he turns eighteen - Sections 3, 4 and 105(1) Children Act 1989. G’s father does not consent to his son’s accommodation by the local authority; his mother does. However, G strongly objects to either of his parents being given any pertinent information about him. He objects to them knowing the name he now uses or where he is placed. There is thus an issue about his mother’s ability to give fully informed consent. The local authority cannot acquire parental responsibility for him under a care or interim care order. By reason of his age, they cannot apply for a care order, including an interim care order, in relation to him - Section 31(3) Children Act 1989 applied. They could apply for an emergency protection order but that would be for limited duration – Sections 44 and 45 Children Act 1989. Such an order would not meet the needs of this case.

Against that background, the local authority applied for permission to invoke the inherent jurisdiction - Section 100 Children Act 1989. If permitted, within that jurisdiction they sought an order that will deprive G of his liberty for 6 months. They sought an order which will permit them to use force to take him from the hospital ward to the placement they consider will meet his needs and to keep him there. G does not wish to go to that placement, will not go there of his own free will and is unlikely to stay there unless prevented from leaving.

The local authority has identified a placement designed for therapeutic help for children aged 16 upwards and for adults. The placement is registered with the CQC but not with Ofsted. Within this judgment, I refer to this placement as option 2.

On 3 April 2025, the local authority issued an application under the inherent jurisdiction. If permitted to do so, they sought an urgent deprivation of liberty order permitting them to take G from the hospital ward by force and restrict his liberty to prevent him from absconding from the placement they had identified. They wished the order to be in place before G was told of it.

On the same day, the application on the papers came before HHJ Weston KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge in the Royal Courts of Justice. He joined the young person as a party and appointed a CAFCASS guardian for him. He gave directions for the service of the application and supporting papers on the parties.

The local authority sought an urgent hearing without notice to G. Notification of the hearing listed on 3 April at 3.30pm was provided at 2.57pm via e-mail to the local authority and CAFCASS; the father was reported to have been notified by the local authority but not to be in a position to attend at short notice. It had not been possible to notify the mother and it had not been possible for G to be represented at short notice by a Children’s Guardian or solicitor who did not know of the application. The hearing was without notice to G himself. In those circumstances, the Court was concerned to protect the article 6 rights of the parties.

The hearing came before HHJ Weston KC via MS Teams. The Local authority confirmed that it was possible for G to stay a further night in hospital and that in the circumstances they did not oppose the Court listing the matter the next day. Holding directions were made as to non-notification of G and provision for limited information to be given to his parents.

The application came into my list on 4 April 2025. The hearing was again remote via MS Teams. The hearing was attended by the local authority and their representatives; the father appeared in person and G was represented by Counsel and his Guardian. G was not in attendance and had not been told of the local authority’s plans. Also in attendance was a legal representative of the Trust responsible for the hospital in which G was an inpatient.

On 4 April 2025 I permitted the Local authority to invoke the Inherent Jurisdiction. With the Trust’s consent, the court approved a plan for G to remain on the hospital ward whilst he was told of the local authority’s plan and whilst those who represented him sought his wishes and feelings. Given the local authority’s evidence that once G knew of the plan, he was likely to abscond and harm himself, the court acting under the Inherent Jurisdiction permitted the local authority and the Trust to deprive G of his liberty for the purpose of keeping him safely on the ward whilst his solicitor and Guardian consulted him. In that context I gave directions for the filing of an initial analysis by the Child’s Guardian and listed the case for a return hearing before me on 15 April 2025.

On 11 April 2025 the local authority applied to ward G and made an application to restrict disclosure of information about G to his parents. G’s parents have respected his wishes, and they have not sought information about him nor to attend any hearing before me whilst G has been in attendance.

The hearing before me on 15 April 2025 was again listed remotely via MS Teams. The local authority and Guardian attended and G was legally represented. G’s mother attended in person. I permitted the local authority to make a wardship application in relation to G and gave directions to enable full written submissions and legal argument on the next occasion. G had expressed through his Children’s Guardian his clear wish that he did not agree to be placed in the placement identified by the local authority and that he would only wish to be placed in a semi-independent placement in the areas that he has identified. He agreed to remain accommodated on his current hospital ward pending the next hearing. The Trust confirmed that they would be prepared to accommodate G until the outcome of the next hearing and confirmed that they would request a continuation of the current restrictions, the restrictions having been necessary in their care of him to date. The deprivation of liberty permitted by the court on that occasion were:

In depriving of his liberty, the local authority and the Trust were directed by me to use the minimum degree of force or restraint required only in circumstances such that these are necessary. The authorisation of the restriction of G’s liberty was permissive not mandatory. The local authority and Trust were only to restrict his liberty if it was both necessary and proportionate to do so.

The next hearing was listed before me on 1 May 2025. That hearing had to be adjourned to the next day because of a power cut in the area in which I was sitting. It was heard on 2 May 2025 in a busy list.

By the time of the hearing before me on 2 May 2025, there was evidence from the hospital that the restrictions on G’s liberty I had authorised were no longer necessary. He had been outside of the hospital with 1:1 support and supervision. There had been no risk incidents during his admission and pertinently he had not attempted to abscond since he became aware of the applications before me. The hospital wished to assist the court, but they needed G’s bed on the acute ward and that need was becoming more pressing with each day that passed. A decision needed to be made that day although the hearing time my list allowed was short.

The local authority continued to consider the placement they had identified for G was in his best interests. They wanted me to permit secure transport and restraint of G to enable him to be taken against his will to a placement I have referred to as option 2. They proposed I should make an order for 6 months which permitted:

The Local authority’s case was that after a period of six months and appropriate support had been implemented for G, it might be possible at tat stage to identify a semi-independent placement that can support him through to independence safely.

Within the bundle compiled for the hearing I had a statement from G in his own words. From that it was clear G had invested in these proceedings. Within that statement he set out with reasons his clear preference for a placement I have called option 3 below and gave his reasons. He stated with equal clarity why he did not want to go to option 2 which was the local authority’s preferred placement. He said this about the application for a Deprivation of Liberty order:

Within his statement G then set out that he will consent to section 20 accommodation on condition that his requests are met.

Within her initial analysis dated 14 April 2025, the Guardian stated this:

That evidence was provided by the local authority who placed three options before the court whilst clearly maintaining their plan to take him by force to option 2 and deprive him of his liberty to ensure that he remained there. G and his Guardian opposed his placement at option 2 and the intended deprivation of his liberty. G and the Guardian strongly argued that the local authority were seeking to use restrictions authorised by the court to deprive G of his liberty to compel accommodation of G against his wishes. G was not willing to move to the local authority’s placement, but he had an open mind about both the other options ( options 1 and 3 ), having expressed a preference for one in his statement. He was very keen to obtain the rest of his belongings, as he has been left in hospital with only very limited clothing and he was worried about being left without things when he moves, as has happened in the past.

G spoke to me at the hearing on 2 May 2025 and watched the proceedings on the link; giving instructions when appropriate to his legal team. By the time of the hearing on 2 May 2025, G’s requests had modified and reduced He had also changed his mind about his preferred placement option which was ultimately what I have termed option 1. He gave reasons for changing his mind about the placement options and why he preferred option 1 to option 3. His Guardian considered his reasoning to be cogent and reasonable. The Guardian considered that G’s future welfare was sufficiently secured by the continuation of the wardship order. No other order was required.

At the hearing before me the local authority was represented by Mr Butler of Counsel . G and the Guardian were aligned in their case and represented by Mr Lamb of Counsel. I am grateful to both Counsel and the professionals involved in this case for their diligence and hard work. I had skeleton arguments from both Mr Butler and Mr Lamb which succinctly captured the issues and addressed them. Both are to be commended for the quality of the written advocacy in this case which enabled me to proceed to make a decision when hearing time was short and a decision was needed urgently.

On 2 May 2025 the court determined that G should continue to be subject to the Wardship jurisdiction of the High Court but the interim Deprivation of Liberty order which had been in place should not be extended. The local authority’s application to deprive G of his liberty and take him by secure transport to option 2 where he would be deprived of his liberty for a period of 6 months to prevent him from absconding was dismissed.

At the time of the hearing, the local authority had already confirmed that if the court did not make a Deprivation of Liberty order, the local authority would, on this occasion, accommodate G in his placement of choice despite the local authority submitting that this does not meet his needs as they have assessed. The NHS trust confirmed that it would provide transport to take G from hospital to his chosen accommodation. G confirmed that he was willing to travel to the accommodation provided by the local authority that he had chosen, namely option 1.

Prior to G’s admission to hospital, G consented to his accommodation by the local authority. He wished to consent to his accommodation on discharge but would only do so if the placement provided by the local authority accorded with his wishes and feelings.

The local authority argued that G is a looked after child. They ask me to exercise the inherent jurisdiction and grant orders depriving him of his liberty to compel him by use of restraint if necessary to leave the hospital ward and be transported to a placement to which he does not wish to go. They argued, in essence, that as he wished to be accommodated, he could not dictate his placement and should be taken, if necessary, against his will to a placement they considered best met his welfare interests.

The Guardian and G opposed the orders sought both on the grounds that this court does not have the jurisdiction to make the order sought and that even if it did, it would be contrary to G’s welfare to do so. The Guardian argues that G’s welfare will be sufficiently protected by him remaining a ward of court until he turns eighteen and reaches adulthood.

Under s.22 Children Act 1989 a child is looked after if they are provided with accommodation by the local authority. A child is provided with accommodation either under a care order or under Section 20 Children Act 1989. G is a child as defined within the Children Act 1989, namely a person under the age of 18 - Section 100(5) Children Act 1989 applied.

G is 17 years old. He cannot be the subject of a care order – s.31(3) Children Act 1989 applied. He can only be accommodated under Section 20 Children Act 1989.

Section 20 Children act 1989, in so far as is relevant to the case before me states:

In HXA v Surrey County Council [2023] UKSC 52, the Supreme Court made seven points in relation to Section 20 Children Act 1989. They were;

Under Section 20 Children Act 1989 all those with parental responsibility for G must consent to his accommodation – Section 20(9) and (10) Children Act 1989. Here, G’s mother consents but his father does not. Section 20(10) therefore applies. G, however, can consent to his own accommodation and that consent cannot be overridden by parental objection – Section 20(11) Children Act 1989 applied.

S100 (2) Children Act 1989 states:

Similarly, it appears to be agreed between the parties that if G was to become voluntarily accommodated in a future placement, it would be open to the court to exercise its powers under the inherent jurisdiction in those circumstances.

In Re E (Wardship order: Child in Voluntary Accommodation) [2012] EWCA Civ 1773, Lord Justice Thorpe stated that voluntary accommodation is not incompatible with wardship: ‘there is nothing in Section 100 that either explicitly or implicitly precludes the court from making an order in wardship where the child is not required to be accommodated, but is voluntarily accommodated.’

That Court of Appeal decision is at one with the decision of Mr Justice Hedley in Re K (Children with Disabilities: Wardship) [2012] 2 FLR 745 where the court made orders in wardship to support children who were to remain, by the agreement of their parents in that case, in residential accommodation.

In Re: M (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 937Lord Justice McFarlane consideredRe E and Re K (above), stating:

There is a clear distinction in the statutory scheme between Section 20 accommodation and the compulsory intervention of a Local authority in the life of a child or young person – Section 100(2) (a) and (b) Children Act 1989 and paragraphs 35 and 40 HXA(above). As Mr Justice MacDonald stated in A City Council v LS & Ors (Secure Accommodation Inherent Jurisdiction) [2019] EWHC 1384 (Fam): ‘it is clearly established that the High Court cannot exercise its inherent jurisdiction to grant authority to the local authority to accommodate a child where the local authority would not otherwise be able to do so under the statutory scheme (Re E (A Child) [2012] EWCA Civ 1773 at [16] and Re M (Jurisdiction: Wardship) [2016] EWCA Civ 937 at [39])’.

In Coventry City Council v C & Ors [2013] EWHC 2190 (Fam), Mr Justice Hedley stated as follows:

Before me the local authority has relied onA LA v EBY [2023] EWHC 2492 (Fam). In that case the child, like G was 17 years old. Both her parents gave their consent to her accommodation and the court held that under the inherent jurisdiction , the High Court could authorise the derivation of her liberty. It does not seem to me that that case applies where, as here, (i) neither parent can give informed consent,(ii) only one of G’s parents consents , the other objecting and (iii) G does not give his consent to future accommodation at a placement where he does not wish to reside.

Where a child is being accommodated by a local authority under a voluntary arrangement with their parents’ consent, the local authority has no power to arrange a transfer of the child from a residential institution to foster care without the permission of their natural parents; parental responsibility includes the right to decide where a child lives - R v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte J[2000] 1 FLR 942, QBD.

In Re D [2019] UKSC 42the Supreme Court held thatparents cannot provide consent to Deprivation of Liberty restrictions for 16 plus competent children.

The decision of the High Court to authorise the deprivation of a child's liberty does not act to authorise the placement itself. The task of the court when determining whether to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to grant a declaration authorising the deprivation of liberty is to determine (a) whether the restrictions proposed constitute a Deprivation of Liberty for the purposes of Art 5 of the ECHR and (b) if so, whether the that Deprivation of Liberty is in the child's best interests - Tameside MBC v AM & Ors (DOL Orders for Children Under 16) [2021] EWHC 2472 (Fam).

It was agreed before me that that the court cannot use the inherent jurisdiction in a manner which would offend Section 100(2)(b) Children Act 1989.

G has been an inpatient on a hospital ward on a voluntary basis. It is agreed that nothing within Section 100 has prevented me exercising my inherent jurisdiction and restricting his liberty, as I have, by making an order depriving him of his liberty whilst he has remained on that hospital ward.

It is agreed before me that without valid consent to section 20 accommodation, there would be a clear violation of s.100(2)(b) ‘so as to require a child to be accommodated by or on behalf of a local authority.’

G does not want his parents to know where he is placed or any details about him, including his current identity. G has the capacity to make that decision. His wish is being honoured by the local authority and his parents. In my judgment they cannot, absent that knowledge, make informed decisions about him. Without that knowledge they cannot exercise their parental responsibility effectively or give informed consent, even if they were minded doing so. Thus, whilst his mother has stated that she consents to G’s accommodation, I do not consider in the circumstances of this case that consent can be regarded as informed or valid. Further, even if the mother’s consent was valid (which it is not), G’s father objects to G’s accommodation. Thus, section 20 (9) and (10) Children Act 1989 apply and G cannot be accommodated with parental consent. Even if he were accommodated on his mother’s consent, G’s father could remove G from accommodation without notice at any time -section 20(10) Children Act 1989 and paragraph 37 HXA (above).

Previously, and in my judgment correctly, the local authority has not relied upon parental consent to G’s accommodation. Until he was admitted to hospital, G consented to be provided with accommodation by the local authority under Section 20 Children Act 1989. Whilst he was in hospital G did not withdraw his consent to being voluntarily accommodated by the local authority. He remained a looked after child within the meaning of Section 22 Children Act 1989.

G is 17 years old and has capacity. It is agreed before me that he can consent to his own accommodation by the local authority. He has done just that since March 2024. G is free to withdraw his consent at any time otherwise his accommodation cannot be said to be consensual.

By reason of Section 20 (6) Children Act 1989 before accommodating a child the local authority must so far as is reasonably practicable and consistent with the child's welfare –

Section 20(6) Children Act 1989 does not enable G to dictate this placement. It does, however, enable the local authority to factor into their decisions about accommodation and their placement considerations, his wishes and feelings. It also enables G to give informed consent. Knowing of the placement options available to him, he can either consent or not to his own accommodation under Section 20. Having consented to being accommodated by the local authority, he can withdraw that consent. In my judgment, it is pertinent that a local authority has no power to arrange a transfer of a voluntarily accommodated child from a residential institution to foster care without the permission of their parents - R v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte J [2000] 1 FLR 942, QBD. Similarly, it seems to me that a local authority has no power to transfer a child consenting to his own voluntary accommodation to a placement to which he objects if he withdraws his consent to accommodation by the local authority. Consent to accommodation by a Local authority and the type of placement to be provided by the local authority are in my judgment inextricably interlinked. If G objects to the placement or type of placement proposed by the local authority, he may withdraw his consent to being accommodated. That would leave him in need of housing under the relevant housing legislation. However, that is a choice he is free to make and is one G in this case has decided to make. He is an intelligent 17-year-old with capacity who can weigh in the balance the advantages and disadvantages of the various options open to him and decide what he wants to do. He can decided to accept a service from the local authority or not. Whilst the choice G has made is not one with which the local authority agrees, it appears to me that they should respect it. By accommodating G, the local authority is providing him with service. Accommodation is not compulsory. As Lady Hale stated ta paragraph 1 in Williams, cited with approval at paragraph 35 in HXA: “Compulsory intervention in the lives of children and their families requires the sanction of a court process. Providing them with a service does not.”

The reality of the Deprivation of Liberty order sought by the local authority in this case is that they wish the court to authorise taking G against his will to a placement to which he objects and to confine him there; even though if placed there they know he will not and does not consent to his accommodation within the meaning of Section 20 Children Act 1989. The primary thrust of the application is to compel his accommodation rather than to authorise the Deprivation of his Liberty whilst he is voluntarily accommodated. However, Section 20 accommodation is not intended to be used coercively. I agreed with Mr Justice Hedley that section 20 must not be used compulsively in disguise -Coventry City Council above at paragraphs 27-28. Further an application to deprive a child or young person of their liberty under the Inherent Jurisdiction should not, in my judgment, be used to compel accommodation under section 20 at a placement to which G does not consent and to which both of his parents do not consent and even if they did consent do not have the relevant information to give valid informed consent. Seeking a Deprivation of Liberty order to forcefully remove a young person from a hospital ward to a placement where he does not wish to go without the valid consent of his parents or the young person himself, is in my judgment to seek to take a young person into care when the statutory scheme does not permit them to do so. As Mrs Justice Gwynneth Knowles said in Re Q (a child: interim care order: jurisdiction) [2019] 2 FCR 268 at paragraph 23

In my judgment the primary purpose of the application before the court was to compel G to be accommodated against his will rather than to deprive him of his liberty at a placement in which he consents to be accommodated or to which both his parents validly consent to his accommodation. The application offends against the statutory scheme and section 100(2)(b) in particular. In those circumstances, the court declines to make the order sought by the local authority.

I am reinforced in my view that the primary purpose of the local authority’s continued application for a Deprivation of Liberty order was to compel G’s accommodation, by the local authority continuing to maintain their application that restrictions on his liberty were needed when the evidence from the hospital Trust supported by his Guardian was that the restrictions in place on the ward had not needed to be exercised although G knew of the application before the court. The reason why an order Depriving G of his Liberty was still sought by the Local authority was to compel him to be accommodated at a placement they considered to be in his best interests contrary to his wishes and absent his consent to be accommodated at such a placement. That in my view offends sections 100(2)(a) and (b) Children Act 1989.

If I am wrong about that, then I must make a best interest's decision. In those circumstances my task is to consider whether it is in best interests to deprive G of his liberty in the manner sought by the local authority and whether those proposed restrictions are lawful, necessary and proportionate to the risk of harm from which they seek to protect G.

G is 17 years old. He is intelligent. He has capacity to make his own decisions and has been doing so since March 2024 when he consented to his own accommodation by the local authority. He has recently consented to his own inpatient admission to hospital. He has made clear choices about his future education and is taking active steps to pursue that. The evidence is that he is willing to accept home treatment for his wellbeing and is now willing to engage with the local CAMHs team. He has not acted on any expressed suicidal ideation since September 2024. He does not consider the placement identified for him by the local authority, option 2, is suitable to meet his needs. The Guardian shares his views. Both G and the Guardian articulate their reasons for coming to the view they do. Neither G nor the Guardians views can be regarded as unreasonable. Both G and his Guardian express their concern that forcing G to reside in a placement which does not meet his needs, and which is contrary to his express wishes is likely to impact adversely on his wellbeing, including his mental health and is not in his best interests. Against that the local authority argue that option 2 is the most appropriate placement for G. The local authority argue that the deprivation of liberty order that they seek is necessary and proportionate to the risk that G will abscond from the placement, option 2, and put himself at risk of significant harm and possibly death. G and his Guardian argue that there is no need for a deprivation of liberty order in this case. G is willing to go without restriction to the placement I have called option 1. There he will engage with CAMHS and services intended to meet his wellbeing. In essence, the local authority counter that G is unlikely to remain safe if placed in option 1. It is they say likely that history will repeat itself. G, they argue, will become dissatisfied with his placement, abscond and the cycle of expressed demands and threats to harm and kill himself will start again.

In that context I remind myself that my decision to authorise the deprivation of a child's liberty does not act to authorise the placement itself. The task of the court when determining whether to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to grant a declaration authorising the deprivation of liberty is to determine (a) whether the restrictions proposed constitute a Deprivation of Liberty for the purposes of Art 5 of the ECHR and (b) if so, whether the that Deprivation of Liberty is in the child's best interests - Tameside MBC v AM & Ors (DOL Orders for Children Under 16)[2021] EWHC 2472 (Fam). In this case, it is agreed that the restrictions proposed will constitute a deprivation of G’s liberty. That leaves the issue of G’s best interests. I do not consider that it would be in the best interests of G to be deprived of his liberty. I agree with G’s Guardian that to restrict his liberty in the manner proposed by the local authority is likely to be contrary to his welfare interests. Further I consider that the restrictions proposed are neither necessary nor proportionate to the risk of harm in this case. G has not acted on his expressed suicidal ideation since September 2024 and most recently, whilst on the hospital ward the restrictions authorised by the court have not need to be implemented to prevent him absconding even though he knew of the local authority plan for him. His objections to option 2 are reasoned and reasonable. He has made a reasoned and reasonable decision not to go to option 2 and it is not in his best interests to compel him to go there by making orders which would restrict his liberty.

Very properly the local authority has confirmed that if I do not grant the deprivation of liberty order they seek, they will offer G a placement at option 1, his preferred placement. The hospital Trust will transport him there without the need for any restrictions. G has confirmed that he will accept the option 1 placement and will consent to his own accommodation by the local authority. I have made it very clear to G that given my decisions it is a matter for him which services, including accommodation he accepts from the local authority. However, I have also emphasised that if he chooses not to accept services and accommodation from the local authority, he will be a young person aged 17 or over whose housing needs will be considered in accordance with the housing legislative scheme.

The decision I made in relation to G was an interim decision. G is intelligent and capable of making decisions for himself, but he is also vulnerable. I therefore decided that G should continue to be a ward of court and directed that if between 2 May 2025 hearing and the next hearing, any party needed to make an application in relation to him it should be reserved to me, if available. When I made my decision on 2 May, I had intended to have the case back before the end of the month. In the event, my diary did not permit that. Whilst the delay in re-listing the case was not intended, it is I consider pertinent to note within this judgment that since 2 May 2025 no party has made any application before me in relation to G’s welfare.