W v X

I am deciding an application for relief under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 made on behalf of C, who is eight years old. The application is made by his mother, [M]. The respondent to the application is C’s father [F]. M was represented at this hearing by Ms Deborah Bangay KC and Ms Olivia Currie. F was represented by Mr Nicholas Wilkinson. I am grateful to all three counsel for their helpful written and oral submissions.

I will turn first to the background. M is 45 and F is 36. Both are French nationals. They met in August 2015 in Country X, when M was 35 and F was 26. The information I have about the parties’ lives prior to this is very limited. I believe that F had been working in some branch of finance and was living in Country Y. M had been in a relationship with a wealthy man, living in the South of France . F suggests that he was by that stage already relatively rich. M disputes this and says he made all his money during their time together. I need make no finding on that issue as nothing turns on it. The parties’ relationship blossomed. They began spending time with each other in the South of France and Paris. By 2016, M was pregnant and at some stage that year the parties began to cohabit on a more formal basis in Country Z. M says this was for reasons connected to F’s business dealings and tax affairs. I have no reason to doubt that. In 2016, the parties travelled to Country Y. As a result, C was born there in 2016 and has citizenship there in addition to his French nationality. Soon after the birth, the family moved back to France.

Earlier in 2016, F set up a business to which I will refer as ‘his business.’ He set it up with a partner. He now owns it outright. F described his business as an application, or app, for business startups and it has been phenomenally successful. His business is incorporated outside of the UK. For the first year of C’s life, M says the family were struggling to pay bills. It does not seem to be disputed that the family economy was somewhat tight during this period. In 2017, the family moved to London. The decision appears to have been largely based on F’s need to be working in London. The family rented an apartment in Central London. In 2019, the family moved to another apartment in Central London, the family home. From about 2017, F’s wealth grew exponentially and, alongside it, the family’s standard of living evolved, seemingly in parallel. The family began to enjoy a fabulous standard of living with all the usual markers: private jet charters, helicopter rentals, yachts in the summer, wonderful villas, fine dining and expensive clothing to name but a few.

The parties’ relationship ended either in September 2023, according to F, or October 2023, according to M. Nothing turns on this date but the dispute shines a light on F’s personality and lack of insight. M says that the relationship broke down because she saw F in his Ferrari with another woman in October 2023. F says that M already knew the relationship was over and that it had been over since September 2023. Miss Bangay asked F how M would have known the relationship was over at that stage. He told me that M would have known because C had drawn a picture of him and M in which they were separated. In my opinion, F had convinced himself of the truth of this proposition to excuse the fact that he had brought his (secret) partner to the parties’ home and introduced her to C, when M was away for the weekend in late September. To put it bluntly, this was an impetuous thing to do and which was plainly not in C’s best interests but I remind myself that none of this has anything to do with the decisions that I must make.

Since the breakdown of the relationship, M and C have remained living at the family home and F lives in rented accommodation with his new partner.

C started at kindergarten in Spring 2019. He was not able to settle when left at school and was often disruptive. He moved to another nursery later in 2019. The patterns of behaviour continued. In 2020, he began at an international bilingual school in London. C’s difficulties continued. In 2023, he was diagnosed with ADHD by his treating psychiatrist at the time. Later in 2023, C was given a formal warning by his school for poor behaviour. In September 2023 he was suspended for two days for violent behaviour. This behaviour coincided with the breakdown of the parties’ relationship.

The parties have been able to work together with the school to provide C with the support and assistance he needs. The school agreed to allow C to remain as a pupil on the basis that he must have a chaperone. C has also had further therapeutic assistance and has been prescribed medication for his ADHD. This has improved his aggression and he is more able to focus. It has had a positive impact on his schooling. There is some dispute between the parties about how often C should be having therapy. I am confident that the parties will be able to resolve these matters. It seems that C’s behavioural issues are, more or less, under control and the parties are in the fortuitous position of being able to afford the intervention necessary to enable C to attend and thrive at school.

I accept and find that F is actively involved in C’s day to day life. He often takes C to school and it seems to be F’s intention that he has C for half the school holidays. However, M is C’s primary carer and inevitably the day-to-day tasks, such as maintaining a strict routine, fall to M. It is clear to me that, despite their personal animosity towards one another, both parents are committed to C and want the very best for him.

On 23 November 2023, M issued these Schedule 1 proceedings on C’s behalf. On 15 March 2024, F issued an application in D11 seeking an order dispensing with the requirement that he file a Form E1 and that instead he should serve a schedule of his assets, income and liabilities. This application was sought pursuant to the so-called ‘millionaire’s defence’. On 30 March 2024, M issued an application in D11 for interim provision by way of maintenance and legal service orders. On 3 April 2024, the matter came before His Honour Judge Hess on a first appointment. He made a consent order which inter alia (a) recorded F’s reliance on the millionaire’s defence and directed him to make disclosure by schedule, (b) directed M to answer two questions relating to the value of her chattels and her ability to access two policies, (c) made directions for an FDR and (d) listed a hearing for interim provision.

The application for interim provision came before a deputy district judge on 31 May 2024. The DDJ reserved judgment to 20 June 2024. The order itself bears the date 9 July 2024. By the date of that hearing, F had made disclosure by schedule. This put F’s total resources at £67,608,000 and his income at £3,275,000 per annum. In contrast, M had provided disclosure which showed that she had c.£70,000 in bank accounts, a life insurance policy with Company D worth c.£320,000 (‘Policy D’), another life insurance policy with Bank E worth £116,000 (‘Policy E’) and a collection of jewellery and handbags with a purchase price of c.£1,350,000. So on the face of it, M had £1,756,000 worth of resources and no income. M had suggested that (a) the policies were for C and (b) there would be tax of 15% on withdrawal. The DDJ rejected these points.

At the hearing, the parties agreed that F should continue to pay for rent on the family home and C’s school fees. In addition, M sought c.£51,500 per month (or c.£618,000 per annum), comprising household bills, general maintenance, a holiday fund and C’s birthday fund. She also sought a lump sum to repay loans of £160,000. F offered £10,000 per month and additional costs paid directly of c.£11,500 per month. The latter are difficult to equate with M’s position as the figure of £11,500 per month included school fees and may have included some items sought by M. The DDJ ordered F to pay £13,115 per month/£157,380 per annum with an additional £36,000 holiday fund, giving total provision of £193,380 per annum. As to provision for legal services, the DDJ decided that M should use her own resources to pay for legal services. The DDJ gave a considered and lengthy judgment. The decisions made by the DDJ were plainly a proper exercise of judicial discretion. I make no comment at all about the interim maintenance provision. I note that, perhaps, another judge might have reached a different conclusion about how to exercise his or her discretion in respect of the interim funding of legal fees in a claim brought on behalf of a child who has one very rich parent and one impecunious by the metric of the other’s wealth, albeit rich by a more standard metric. M was unhappy with the outcome and issued a notice of appeal on 12 July 2024. By that notice she sought to challenge both the decision on quantum of general income provision and legal services provision.

The parties attended mediation in September 2024. I was told that there were three mediation sessions in total. I do not know the dates of all the sessions but I do know that mediation was not successful. The case then came before Judge Hess for an FDR hearing on 2 October 2024. The FDR was effective but, like mediation, unsuccessful. It is a great shame that the parties were unable to reach a resolution of this claim. They could not have been in better hands than their selected mediator’s and Judge Hess’s. At the conclusion of the FDR, Judge Hess directed that the matter be allocated to a High Court Judge, listed for a post FDR directions hearing and a three day final hearing. M’s application for permission to appeal was to be heard by the allocated judge. After the FDR, the parties served open offers. M’s was served on 11 October 2024 and F’s on 24 October 2024.

On 19 February 2025, M issued an application to adduce further evidence in the appeal relating to her two policies with D and E. In short, that evidence identified possible criminal sanctions against M in France were she to draw down on the policies and also gave evidence that F had paid her an extra £90,000 on top of the £36,000 ordered by the DDJ so that she could go on additional holidays. On 28 February 2025, M issued a further application for a legal services provision order. She sought payment of £113,700 to cover the anticipated costs of these proceedings and of section 8 proceedings. In her statement in support, M explained that her then solicitors would not continue to act without this payment.

The case was allocated to Lieven J and listed for directions on 7 March 2025 and final hearing on 4 June 2025. At the directions hearing, Lieven J made orders for updating disclosure and for the production by M of a bank account she had failed to disclose. She also directed the parties to exchange property particulars and statements. Lieven J decided that she would determine M’s permission to appeal application on paper and listed the case for a one day hearing on 4 April 2025 before McKendrick J to deal with M’s appeal, if she granted permission, and M’s application for a legal services provision order. On 14 March 2025, Lieven J delivered a written judgment refusing M’s application for permission. This was hardly surprising. As I have already stated, the DDJ’s judgment was clearly an unimpeachable exercise of discretion. I have not been able to ascertain whether the application to adduce further evidence in the appeal was decided. To my mind this makes no material difference. The appeal was always bound to fail. For reasons that are not entirely clear to me the hearing listed on 4 April 2025 did not take place. It may or may not be connected with M’s decision to dis-instruct her previous solicitors on 26 March 2025 and instruct her current solicitors. That change was hardly surprising – in her statement in support of further legal funding M had explained that her then solicitors would cease to act were she unsuccessful on her application. They may well have taken the view that her chances of success on 4 April 2025 were limited given the outcome of the appeal and the DDJ’s earlier order.

Thus, the scene was set for this hearing.

I have been given very little information about the section 8 proceedings relating to arrangements for C. I understand that F issued an application for shared care on 8 February 2024. During the same month both parties applied for non molestation orders. Those Family Law Act applications were resolved by way of cross undertakings given to the court on 27 February 2024. On 8 March 2024, F applied for a specific issue order in respect of holidays. He made a further application on 15 May 2024 relating to the same issue. The holiday application came before Recorder Bickler on 29 May 2024. I don’t know what order was made. At some stage, M made an application for leave to remove C from the jurisdiction on the basis of a move to Paris. On 11 July 2024, M made an application in respect of homeschooling and other matters. On the same date, F made an application for C to spend Wednesday nights with him. There was an FHDRA hearing before DDJ Morris on 18 July 2024. On 17 December 2024, M applied for leave to withdraw her application for leave to remove C. There was a PTR in the section 8 proceedings on 13 May 2025 and the extant applications are listed for a two day final hearing on 7 July 2025.

These other proceedings have no bearing on the outcome of the case before me save that I must consider in due course the question of funding M’s legal fees for them.

The final hearing was originally listed for three days before the allocated judge, Lieven J, commencing on Wednesday 4 June 2025. For administrative reasons, the hearing was re-allocated to me. As I was unable to sit on 4 June 2025, I took my reading day on Tuesday 3 June 2025 and heard the case over two days on Thursday 5 June and Friday 6 June 2025. I am very grateful to counsel for providing me with written submissions prior to my reading day and for complying with the timetable I imposed for the oral evidence and oral submissions.

I was provided with a core bundle of 434 pages, a supplemental bundle of 998 pages, a bundle of additional documents provided by F running to 329 pages, a bundle of M’s updating disclosure comprising 686 pages and an authorities bundle running to 238 pages. That gives a total of 2,680 pages. Lieven J’s PTR direction permitted a maximum of 700 pages plus an authorities bundle. I read the core bundle and those documents to which I was referred in writing and orally.

I circulated this judgment in draft late on 12 June 2025. I received corrections from the parties on 18 June 2025 and was asked to rule on a minor issue relating to the figures I used for M’s liabilities. My ruling on that issue is incorporated in this judgment. I handed down this judgment in its final form by email on 23 June 2025.

The costs of the proceedings have been very high. M’s total costs including £10,000 for implementation amount to £554,000. F’s amount to £271,000. The parties have spent £825,000 on this litigation. It is a huge amount of money but, to put it into the context of this case, I note that F gave me figures for the holidays he took in 2024 which totalled about £720,000.

Unfortunately, the drama and anger created by the breakdown of the parties’ relationship has seeped into these proceedings and at times both parties have been guilty of failing to focus on the real issues in this case. Neither party’s written evidence was edifying. Both sought to besmirch each other by trawling through irrelevant issues. M’s statement is littered with half made allegations relating to F’s behaviour during the relationship and F sought to rely on M’s behaviour in the aftermath of the breakdown of the relationship. It is a great shame that the parties have litigated this case in such a fashion.

I heard oral evidence from both parties during the morning and afternoon session on Thursday 5 June and during the morning session on Friday 6 June 2025. Very little of that evidence helps me to decide this case. Both parties were unsatisfactory witnesses. I do not believe that either party came to court to tell the truth in a straightforward way. Both parties were fixated on the righteousness of his or her own position. Both parties were willing to bend the truth when it suited them. I intend to deal with what I consider to be irrelevant issues as swiftly as I can. I do not wish this judgment to become a focus of further discord between M and F. They both need to reflect on the fact that they will be co-parenting C for many years to come and the sooner that they can move on from the unhappy circumstances of the breakdown of their relationship the better it will be for C.

Before considering M’s resources, the parties’ open positions, the law and my disposal of this application, I will turn to the issues raised by the parties.

For the purposes of deciding this case, it is important for me to know the length of the parties’ committed relationship. I need to know this because I need to understand how long the parties have enjoyed a particular standard of living. I do not need to know the extent to which one party alleges he or she has helped to create the wealth in this case. I do not need to know how close the parties did or did not come to becoming engaged. Engagement is irrelevant to the exercise I am conducting. M was undoubtedly given a very valuable diamond by F in 2019. She says that delivery of that diamond to her by a third party constitutes an engagement. In cross examination, a series of texts were put to F in which he appeared to accept that the ring signified an engagement. That does appear to be his view in the exchange but in the very same exchange M appears to say that there was no engagement. For what it’s worth I find the parties were engaged in 2019 but nothing turns on this. Likewise, nothing turns on the extent to which M helped F in his business ventures. I have no doubt that F used M’s contacts to assist him and that M helped with decorating the office spaces and offered her opinions and assisted where she could.

At paragraph 53 of F’s statement, he sets out 18 allegations of conduct against M. Three of those allegations might be described as litigation conduct but 15 are straightforward plain allegations of conduct, largely relating to M’s behaviour in reaction to F’s infidelity. The issue of conduct was not raised at the first appointment and was not raised at the hearing before Lieven J. I do not intend to give any further airtime to these allegations. They should not have been raised. The only purpose of raising such allegations would be in the hope that they might prejudice the tribunal. I have not taken these ill-judged allegations into account.

In oral and written evidence M suggested that she was financially controlled by F during the relationship. During her oral evidence, it appeared to be suggested by M that this was coercive control. I have no doubt that F controlled finances during the relationship but it is equally clear to me that, prior to separation, M had access to funds as she needed. I was not asked to make any findings about coercive and controlling behaviour and I do not do so. Although I make no general statement, I find it difficult to see how in any Schedule 1 case dealing with the claim of a child that the conduct of one parent to the other could have any bearing on the outcome of that child’s claim, unless that conduct had a bearing on the party’s ability to care for the child and additional expenses were thereby incurred.

On a date in October 2023, M opened a Revolut account. That account has what might be described as sterling wallet and euro wallet. M signed her Form E1 on 2 April 2024. That form has on its face a warning of the consequences of failing to make full disclosure, including potential criminal proceedings. The statement of truth which she signed on that date also carries a warning. At the date she signed the statement of truth, her Revolut account had a balance of €28,395 in the euro wallet and £200 in the sterling wallet. She failed to disclose that account. M accepted that she did this.

M tells a very convoluted story about this. She says that F told her to place an order for a handbag from Hermes in September 2023 because she had previously been accused of purchasing bags for resale. She says that she placed the order in September. M says that after separation she reminded F that he told her to make the order and she asked him to pay for it. There is a text message in which F says he would pay for it. M says that in May 2024 she was told that the bag was ready for collection. F refused to pay for it. She says that she frantically tried to find money to pay for it and eventually borrowed £30,000 from a friend, R. She says that she was unable to repay R and so gave him the handbag. Her Revolut account tells a different story. It shows that R gave her €30,000 on 16 October 2023, not May 2024, and that she paid €27,900 for the handbag on 22 June 2024. I find that she supressed the Revolut account because the money from R was a gift she wished to hide and not a loan. I further find that she has not given the handbag to R. I find that she still has the handbag.

During the proceedings in about June 2024, an issue arose between the parties about a holiday M was taking with C. M had planned to take C out of school early for the purposes of the trip. She envisaged that F would object to C being taken out of school early. To avoid any complaint about this, she took the extraordinary step of forging an EasyJet ticket so that it would show a later time of departure and F would not suspect that C was being removed from school early. The forged ticket was sent by M’s then solicitors to F’s solicitors who noticed irregularities in the ticket. M admitted in correspondence not long after this that the ticket had been forged. This is reprehensible behaviour. But neither party seems to care much about forgery.

F’s financial probity is certainly susceptible to criticism. F’s income is described by him as being gross in his disclosure schedule. He explained to me that he does not pay tax on that income. I was shown an analysis of the parties’ expenditure during the period from October 2022 to September 2023. The analysis was of three accounts in M’s name. Those accounts received credits of £1,428,227 during that period. The money all came from F’s income. M is not employed by any entity. My understanding is that F is non-domiciled for tax purposes in the UK and so would only be liable for income tax on remitted income. I make no specific finding but it would probably be generous to describe the payments to M as a tax avoidance scheme.

As to forgeries, F accepted that he had signed several documents on M’s behalf during the relationship. It is not unusual in committed cohabiting relationships for parties to sign on behalf of one another. It may not be best practice but it happens and I do not find anything nefarious in the fact that F signed documents on M’s behalf. I will deal with this issue in relation to the policies later but I note here that F forged a series of documents to show falsely that M was employed by his entities for the purpose of opening and subscribing to those policies. I note also and find that F lied to me when he told me that one such false document addressed to one of the insurance companies was created for general use rather than specifically to open the policy. I’m not sure where the finding takes me. Both the parties are willing to forge documents when they consider it appropriate. Nor do I find anything problematic in M’s allegations that F set up email accounts in her name. I have no doubt that he did this, but the purpose was not to control M but to maintain control over family finances which were channelled through M’s accounts.

M says that F has a criminal record. She produced a judgment from 2023from a French Court which convicted F and his business of deceptive business practices. He was sentenced to one year of suspended imprisonment and fined €300,000. He did not attend before that tribunal. It is unclear to me whether that was an appeal judgment or a first instance judgment. It is clear on the face of the judgment that it is subject to an appeal. H says he has no criminal record pending that appeal and has produced a criminal records search which shows that he has no record. M points out that the French judgment also records that F was convicted by another French court in 2022 for misleading commercial practices. If he has such a conviction, it is curious that it is not shown on his criminal record. In an email sent to me after closing submissions by Ms Bangay it was asserted that the criminal records search provided by F captures only serious offences and not those where the prison sentence is less than two years. I find on the balance of probabilities that F was convicted by the French Court in 2022 as described in the French judgment and for some reason that conviction is not shown in the records. It is an agreed fact that F was convicted by another French Court in 2023 but I note that the conviction is subject to appeal and that F was confident of acquittal on appeal. I cannot make any finding about what will happen on appeal. I don’t think these findings help me to determine this case. They may tangentially go to the issue of security with which I shall in due course deal.

Up until the breakdown of the relationship, M had access to more or less whatever funds she wanted or needed. On breakdown F imposed a ‘voluntary’ regime of £10,000 per month. Having the full facts before me, unlike the DDJ who heard the interim application, I consider that this was an inadequate amount and it was inevitable that M would need to borrow money to supplement her income needs. I also note, in connexion with this, that F has only paid £63,861 towards M’s costs, despite assuring her several times that he would meet her costs. He also offered to pay her costs on a pound for pound basis equal to his own costs. He stopped doing this in February 2024.

I turn now to M’s resources.

In her Form E1, M disclosed bank accounts with balances of £71,612, Policy D worth £322,442 and Policy E worth £116,735. As to the policies, she said that C was the beneficiary and that therefore they had no value to her. In addition to this she said she had a Tracey Emin painting gifted by F worth £30,000, a Smart car worth £13,730 and watches and jewellery to which she did not ascribe a value. She also had €28,000 in a Revolut account which she failed to disclose. It was suggested in cross examination that she also had £20,000 in cash given to her by her mother. I accept M’s evidence that she had spent this money by the date she had made her Form E1. In addition in the Form E1, she set out liabilities of £170,000 made up of a loan of £60,000 from Company A made on 13 November 2023, two loans from Company B, one of £20,000 made on 26 October 2023 and one of £80,000 made on 27 October 2023, and credit card debts of about £10,000.

I now turn to M’s current resources. These represent my findings as to value. M has £88,000 in bank accounts. Policy D is worth £334,000 and Policy E is worth £119,000. F said in evidence that the total tax on disposal would be about €6,000/£5,000. I accept this evidence. The total net value of the policies is therefore £448,000. I will have more to say about the policies below. M’s Smart car is worth £14,000. I turn now to debt. The findings I make are not about apportionment (i.e. who should pay them) but about quantum. M owes £64,000 to Company A, an entity controlled by a wealthy ex-boyfriend of M’s. There is a loan agreement dated 13 November 2023. F says the loan is soft and not repayable. I remind myself of the case of P v Q [2022] EWFC B9 in which Judge Hess gave a textbook analysis of the appropriate treatment of loans. He was not sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, as he so often does, and so that authority does not bind me by doctrine of stare decisis but it is nonetheless a useful tool. I remind myself of his analysis in respect of all loans made to M. I note in particular that this is a loan made by a third party in writing who has issued a demand for repayment. I find that this loan is repayable by M. M owes £87,000 to Company B, an entity owned by another wealthy friend of M. I note again that this is a loan made by a third party in writing who has issued a demand for repayment. I find that this loan is repayable by M. I note also that these loans were taken at a time when I consider that F was making inadequate interim provision for M. I will ignore M’s credit card debt of £14. M pleads as a debt £3,150, which she says F owes her because her G-Wagon was impounded for non-payment of parking tickets. I ignore this. She has paid it and it is not a debt she owes. She says she has outstanding utility bills but gives no figures. I do not take these unvouched debts into account. She says she owes £42,000 to HMRC in respect of PAYE etc for the nanny. I find that she does owe this money. M has outstanding legal costs of £286,000 for these proceedings and outstanding anticipated costs of £80,000 for the Section 8 proceedings. In addition to these assets and liabilities, M has her chattels.

M gave no figures for her chattels in Form E1. With her answers to questionnaire she provided a table of her chattels and said: ‘The values provided are the items’ purchase price, based on the original invoice or the current retail price online. The applicant is unsure of the individual items’ resale value. If the respondent requires this information then he will need to meet the cost of instructing an expert valuer.’ The table she produced gave a total value of £1,125,000. The handbags were valued at £97,000, watches at £524,000 and other jewellery at £505,000. Three items, two watches and one pair of earrings were not given a value. F did not challenge the values. M produced without permission an expert’s report from reputable valuers giving new values for the collection. The total new valuation was £400,000. F was given no opportunity to test these figures or to be involved in the instruction of the valuer. It would be grossly unfair for me to accept this expert evidence. Much of the diminution in valuation is referable to M’s assertion that she does not have the full paperwork. I do not accept this. M’s first schedule clearly identified where she had access to invoices and I find that where she has an invoice she also has full paperwork. I do not accept her story that she may have returned the paperwork along with F’s clothing and other belongings.

What value should I use? I will use a rough and ready approach. M says that she has lost the tennis bracelet worth £46,000. I accept this. She has sold a watch valued at £178,000 and used most of the proceeds towards costs. She says she has sold three handbags for £22,000. I accept this. I therefore deduct £246,000 from £1,125,000 giving £879,000. As to the values of three items for which M gave no values, doing the best I can, I will take the values given by M’s valuers of £50,000 and £30,000 for the watches and £10,000 for the earrings. I take these lower values because I accept M’s assertion that, in respect of these particular watches, she does not have the relevant paperwork. That gives a total value of £969,000 which I round up to £1 million to take account of the additional Hermes handbag which I have found that M retains.

Thus, I find that the total resources available to M and her liabilities are:

M has no income. It has not been suggested by F that M has any relevant earning capacity. This is not surprising. M produced a schedule of C’s daily routine which was not challenged. It is clear from that document that it would not be easy to find employment which fit around the demands of being C’s primary carer.

All of this must be compared with F’s total resources at £67,608,000 and his income at £3,275,000 per annum.

On 31 May 2017, M subscribed to Policy E. This is more like a tax effective savings account than an insurance policy. In May 2019, she subscribed to a similar policy with D. I have dealt with the current values above. She maintains that she had no knowledge of the latter policy. I believe she accepts she knew about the former. For the subscriptions to be made properly it was necessary for M to pay the funds from her accounts and, seemingly, to provide evidence of the source of the funds. M has produced an undated letter signed by F addressed to D. In the letter he says that M is employed by his business and has a salary of €650,000 and regular bonuses. This was untrue. F accepted he wrote the letter and that it was untrue but he told me that it was for general purposes and not for the policy. As I have already said I find he was not telling me the truth about this. It was important for him to minimise the problems which might exist with encashment of these policies because it had always been his case that these policies could be encashed and used by M without problems. He also falsified payslips and an employment contract. I do not find that he did this without M’s knowledge. The subscription documents bear M’s phone number and personal email address.

Both parties have obtained letters from French lawyers about these policies. It seems to me that there are and have always been two potential problems. If the source of the funds for the subscription were gifts from F to M, then it appears agreed that F owes gift tax to the French Revenue. F now concedes this and offered on the first day of the hearing an undertaking to inform the relevant tax authorities and pay all taxes due on that gift. This, however, leaves a potential problem for M which neither I nor F can resolve. False declarations were made on her behalf in support of the subscriptions. Those false declarations may be exposed by F’s undertaking to resolve the tax issue.

It seems to me that having now seen all the documents (unlike the DDJ at the interim hearing) I can safely conclude that until F offered to resolve the French gift tax issue it would have put M into jeopardy to draw down on the policies. This makes no difference to the way in which the case developed as the DDJ found that M could sell her chattels to fund legal fees.

I now turn to the open offers.

The first open offers were made after the FDR last October. M’s first open offer of 11 October 2024 in outline terms sought:

F’s open offer dated 24 October 2024 agreed that he would pay the rent on the family home until conclusion of C’s tertiary education, that he would pay C’s school fees, other educational costs and medical expenses and transfer the G-Wagon to M and offered the indemnities sought. The difference between them in outline was as follows:

It is a great shame that the parties were unable to bridge the gap between them in October and avoid this final hearing.

Both parties withdrew their October open offers and put in new ones in May 2025. F’s was first in time and is dated 20 May 2025. In that proposal, he significantly reduced the provision he had offered in October 2024. His proposals were broadly as follows:

M moved even further away from the October positions. M’s open offer dated 27 May 2025 was in broad outline as follows:

Thus the lines were drawn for my determination.

The law I have to apply is well settled. In Y v Z [2024] EWFC 4, Peel J summarised the principles to be applied in Schedule 1 cases, where he said:

In same case, Peel J considered the question of whether or not in the reported ‘big money’ cases it was possible to deduce a pattern of awards. He noted at paragraph 37 that, discounting the cases of Al Maktoum and Fuchs, the spread of awards appeared to range from £125,000 per annum to £204,000 per annum. However, in paragraph 38, he suggested that those cases did not demonstrate a standard tariff and concluded that ‘each case will be determined on its own facts and specific context’. In that case he made an award of $500,000 or £368,000 for two children. He did not consider the interrelationship of award per child and the number of children. I see no reason why he should have done so. Each case should be decided on its own facts but it is an obvious truth that there are economies of scale if the parties have more than one child. It is quite obvious that a $500,000 award for two children is much more generous than a $250,000 award for one child.

I will approach this case as guided by the law.

From 2017 to the end of the relationship in October 2023, the family enjoyed a very high standard of living. Mr Wilkinson on F’s behalf painted a picture of C as a boy, who enjoyed nothing better than a ‘Five Guys’ hamburger. I do not accept this. F did not describe him as such in his evidence. I note that in F’s open position he offers to continue to pay for C’s term time lunches at £15,300 per annum. This is because C is accustomed to dine with the parties’ driver every school day at upmarket restaurants. I am told and I accept that C is well known at a high-end department store Recently at that department store, F purchased an £1,100 T-shirt for him. It has a designer label. For better or worse this eight year old boy has expensive tastes in clothes, restaurants and holidays. It was submitted to me that part of the function of the order I was to make was to educate C about a more normal lifestyle. I do not read into either the Act nor any authority an educative element to the award I will be making.

The markers of the parties’ lifestyle and standard of living are demonstrated in the high-end restaurants they frequented, the clothes they wore, the cars they drove and the jewellery and watches that each has. For reasons that I have never understood the millionaire’s defence seems to abrogate the requirement of the respondent to set out his or her budget. It seems to me that it would be helpful for the richer party to produce a budget to avoid protracted argument about standard of living. In this case as so much of the family economy passed through M’s account it is tolerably easy to construct the rate at which the family spent. It would appear that about £1.3 million was spent through those accounts in the year before separation. This is just part of the family economy which does not capture holiday expenditure and expenses met from F’s other accounts. I find that the family spent most of F’s £3 million income every year.

The family’s holiday expenditure is extremely high. The holidays F took in 2024 reflect the amounts spent during the relationship. He told me that his skiing trip to Courchevel in February cost £62,000. His trip to the Maldives in April 2024 was £72,000. His sojourn in St Tropez in July cost £208,000. In August, he spent £225,000 sailing a yacht out of Croatia. Later that month he went to Fiji for £76,000. A quick trip to Thailand in October set him back £50,000 and he spent £27,000 on St Barts at Christmas. The total holiday expenditure for that year was £720,000. These figures exclude for the most part meals out and trips to beach clubs and night clubs. The DDJ provided for a fund of £36,000 for M’s holidays. It is telling that F provided an additional, nearly, £90,000 to fund extra holidays for M and C once the £36,000 had run out. F told me he provided this because M had mismanaged the fund. I do not accept this. I believe that he provided the funds because he could not envisage C going on the sort of holidays that a £36,000 annual fund would provide.

I turn to C’s first need, his home. I am quite sure that C needs stability. The breakdown of his parents’ relationship has plainly troubled him. The parties agree that C’s housing needs should be met by rental payments. M says she may make an application for a settlement of property order in the future. I do not intend to shut the door on that possibility and therefore, as she has made an application, I will order that part of her application be adjourned.

In October 2024, the parties agreed that F should pay the rent on the family home until conclusion of C’s tertiary education or an equivalent property. At that stage F suggested a cap of £162,000 per annum. The rent now stands at £178,200. F’s position now is that he should pay that rent until April 2027 and then M should move to a cheaper property with a cap of £108,000 per annum. F has produced property particulars of cheaper properties and he suggests that that they meet C’s needs. I have no hesitation in finding that C’s best interests are met by staying at the family home. I will order that F pay the rent on that property without a cap and that in the event M and C move he should pay for a property with a rent of up to £178,200 per annum such figure to be indexed by RPI.

Peel J suggests supra that I should address lump sum provision after housing need but in this particular case I believe it better to look first at maintenance.

It is agreed that F will pay school fees which stand at about £29,000 per annum and extras. He will also fund additional direct costs which he puts at £85,000 per annum. These largely relate to education (including lunches and classroom chaperone). As to the general maintenance or ‘Household Expenditure Child Support Award’, F offers £138,000 per annum plus CPI and M seeks £741,000 per annum plus CPI.

M has produced three budgets: the first on 30 March 2024 with her interim provision application which sought £811,450 per annum, the second with her Form E1 on 2 April 2024 which sought £1,024,798 per annum, and her final third budget on 21 May 2025 which was pitched at £741,000 per annum. How do I reconcile these budgets with her open offer of 11 October 2024 which sought £290,000 per annum? At that stage she was represented by one of the most respected family law solicitors in London.

I do not find any of the budgets produced by M remotely helpful. They are budgets which are plainly pitched at a claim under the Matrimonial Causes Act. They are not child focussed. The claim of £300,000 for holidays has no place in this case. It is motivated by M’s desire to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed during the relationship and which F still enjoys. I do not think that my task can be safely achieved by using a red pen on the budget or by applying some general discount. I must step back from this case and come to a conclusion of what would be a fair figure to meet C’s needs. I must guard against unreasonable claims made on C’s behalf with the disguised intention of providing for M’s benefit rather than C’s. I must ensure that C’s lifestyle with M is not entirely out of kilter with that enjoyed by C with F. I must also bear in mind that the standard of living is an important factor in this case where C has been exposed to it for a relatively long period of his life and he will continue to be exposed to it in the future when he is with F.

What should I do? I will make an order which ensures that C has a very comfortable lifestyle with his mother which is not totally out of kilter with the standard of living which he enjoyed while his parents’ relationship subsisted and his father’s current standard of living. It will allow M to employ the domestic help to which she and C are accustomed and to take holidays which are appropriate for C’s needs albeit significantly less expensive than F’s holidays. The order I make for maintenance or the HECSA is £225,000 per annum with CPI and to run to the later of completion of secondary school or conclusion of first degree including gap year as agreed in the open positions.

M’s open position seeks a lump sum of £624,000 referable to debt. I am not sure how this is calculated and I will be considering the indebtedness as I have found it to be above. I must consider whether it would be in C’s best interests for M to be debt free at the conclusion of these proceedings and whether to achieve that goal she should be required to use her resources as I have found them to be. In answering that question I ask myself whether M should be burdened with unnecessary financial anxiety. A question Cobb J asked himself at para 80 of Re Z [2023] 2 FLR 955.

I have no hesitation in concluding that M should be able to retain the £1,550,000 worth of assets she has. They are the only resources she has in the world and she should not be compelled to use them to meet her liabilities. I find that would burden her with unnecessary financial anxiety. I bear in mind in reaching this conclusion F’s wealth and his lavish living. I therefore order that F should pay M a lump sum to meet her indebtedness to Company A , Company B, HMRC and her outstanding costs of these proceedings. Should I also require F to fund her section 8 cost? I believe it is reasonable for F to pay those costs. Therefore, I will order that F pay a lump sum of £559,000. Those liabilities are set out by me above. They are marginally higher than the figure which M sought in the draft order she served at the start of the hearing. Some of those figures were updated during the hearing and I found her liabilities to be in accordance with her updating.

M seeks secured provision for the maintenance in the sum of £3 million. In her October 2024 open position she sought £1 million. She is anxious about non payment because F forged documents and has been convicted of crimes of dishonesty in France. In short, she says he is likely to default and he has no assets in the UK. However, I have found that F is committed to C and plays an active role in his life. I do not think F is likely to default and I do not make an order for security.

I will however adjourn generally M’s application for secured provision.

F must transfer the G-Wagon to M. It is a matter for her as to whether she keeps it or buys a more modest car. She says it is worth £140,000. I find that she does not need more than £50,000 for a car. The balance of the value of the G-Wagon can used by her for the purchase of future cars. I do not make any provision for additional future cars. These will be funded from the proceeds of the G-Wagon and the maintenance award I have made.

M sought an order for the return of a Tracey Emin painting she says was a gift from F. F has possession of it and says that it belongs to his business. I have no power to deal with this issue. As I said in court, if it was a gift, F should return it but I make no order.

F has offered to give all the undertakings and indemnities sought by M. These will be drawn up and agreed by counsel. There will be no undertaking in respect of the housekeeper’s tax liabilities as these are covered by the lump sum.

F will meet the additional payments identified by him in his open offer. He will pay school fees and reasonable extras. M will pay for school uniforms. I make no additional provision for C’s birthday expenses.

F is very critical of the costs expended by M in this case. Her costs are considerably higher than his. He is critical of her litigation conduct. F makes the following complaints:

Many of these allegations can also be made against F. He raised conduct allegations in his statement which should not have been made. I found that the forged documents he produced for subscribing to the policies made it very difficult for M to access those funds. I found that he made inadequate interim provision. I have commented on the change in his open position. It is uncomfortable to hear him complain about the same issue.

These are not financial remedy proceedings and I do not start with a general rule that there should be no order for costs. I must deal with costs as I think just. The starting point is a ‘clean sheet’, albeit one in which I must consider whether costs should follow the event but this presumption can be displaced. I must consider CPR 1998 rule 44.2, which includes the conduct of the parties, whether parties have succeeded on parts or all of their case and I must take into account admissible offers. The only such offers are the parties’ open positions.

I must also recollect that M has brought a claim on C’s behalf and, although there is no general rule, where resources are as disparate as they are in this case, where it is so obvious that C’s needs should be met by F, it is my view that a fair starting point in this case is that F should pay M’s costs reasonably incurred. I now stand back and look at the provision I made for M. It was an order that F meet all her outstanding costs. She sold a watch for £178,600 and applied £140,000 to her own costs. She has spent that money. In my view that is an appropriate contribution by her to her own costs and, effectively, to F’s costs. This adequately takes into account legitimate criticism which can be levelled at M’s conduct of the litigation and importantly the criticisms I have made of F’s own conduct.

That is my judgment.