Liverpool City Council v A & Ors

The child who is at the heart of these proceedings is N, aged 7 years old. He is of dual Italian and Romanian heritage. He currently resides in local authority foster care.

The applicant local authority is Liverpool City Council who have been represented at this final hearing by Ms Targett-Parker. The local authority seeks a final care order and approval of their final care plan that N remains placed in long-term foster care. They propose contact should continue with mother on a fortnightly basis. Their plan as regards N’s contact with his father is a more complex one. They seek for the contact to progress over the next few months to unsupervised staying contact with the hope that, if all goes well, N will be able to spend extended holiday time with his father, initially in the UK and then in Italy. The possibility of N being rehabilitated to his father’s care will be kept under consideration as part of the LAC review process.

N’s mother is Ms A who has been represented at this final hearing by Mr Jones KC and Ms Johnson. Ms A supports the Local Authority’s application and the final care plan.

N’s father is Mr O, represented by Ms Lorraine Cavanagh KC and Mr Haggis. Mr O opposes the application and final care plan. He seeks for N to be placed in his immediate care under an order of the Italian courts whereby parental responsibility would be shared with the local child protection services and a range of services and support provided to him. Pursuant to an Article 33 request under the Hague Convention 1996, Al Servizio Sociale Unione Comuni Verona Est have confirmed by letter dated 11th April 2025 their willingness to support N’s return to his father’s care in Italy on those terms.

N’s guardian is OD represented by Ms Cheetham KC and Miss Squires. The guardian supports the Local Authority’s application and final care plan. She opposes a move to father’s care in Italy.

The Court notes at the outset of this judgment the lamentable delay that there has been in reaching final welfare decisions for N. It is now more than 3 years since the local authority first made their application. The impact of that delay and the ongoing uncertainty on N’s welfare should not be under-estimated.

As noted, this matter has a lengthy litigation history. Ms A has three children: M (aged 14), N (aged 7) and O (aged 3). Ms A came to the UK with M and N in 2020. O was born here in August 2021. Final orders were made by HHJ Coppel in February 2024 for M (a care order and placement in long-term foster care) and O (a supervision order with O remaining in his father’s care). A final child arrangements order was made for N to live with his father to facilitate his return to Mr O’s care in Italy. That order was successfully appealed (see Re N (A Child) (Care Order: Welfare Evaluation) [2024] EWCA Civ 938). This is the re-hearing of welfare decision-making for N.

Ms A’s relationship with Mr O began in 2013. They lived together between October 2013 and June 2019, although the arrangements were complicated with Ms A being in an overlapping relationship with Mr U. N was born in November 2017. The exact care arrangements for N in the first couple of years of his life are unclear, but the relationship between the parents finally broke down in June 2019 and Mr O moved out of the rented home that Ms A was providing. Regular contact did however continue between N and his father. Mother moved to England with M and N in 2020. There were court proceedings in Italy in 2021 that resulted in court ordered arrangements for ongoing contact between N and Mr O in Italy. Mother’s new partner, Mr U, travelled regularly to Italy with N to facilitate the contact. The last contact in Italy between N and his father was over the Christmas period 2021/22.

In January 2022, Mr U made allegations to the children’s school that Ms A was physically and emotionally abusing the children. Wider concerns emerged regarding the complex dynamics between Ms A and the children’s respective fathers (Mr O, Mr U and Mr Z). Serious allegations were made involving sexual exploitation, criminality and violence. The Local Authority issued proceedings on 22nd February 2022. O remained in the care of his father. M and N were removed into foster care when Mr U notified the local authority he was unable to care for all three children. On 18th March 2022, after a short period with a temporary foster carer, M and N moved into the care of their current foster carer, ER.

The final composite hearing was heard by HHJ Coppel between April 2023 and January 2024. Judgment was handed down on 12th February 2024. Findings were made against the mother, Mr O, Mr U and Mr Z. HHJ Coppel determined that none of the children could return to Ms A’s care. No party sought to appeal the factual findings, threshold determination or welfare assessment with respect to Ms A. The Court therefore records for completeness the threshold findings relevant to Mr O:

Following the Court of Appeal decision, Dr Parsi di Landrone, a registered clinical psychologist, was instructed to carry out a psychological assessment of Mr O. She was appointed as she is dual qualified in Italy and the United Kingdom and has worked in both jurisdictions. Upon receipt of her report, it was unanimously agreed between the parties that her report was fundamentally flawed, could not be relied upon, and a new psychologist would need to be instructed.

Dr Parsi di Landrone met with Mr O by MS teams to carry out the psychological assessment on 23rd and 24th August 2024. Her report is dated 17th September 2024. One of the key issues impacting on welfare decision-making for N is whether there remains a risk of harm from domestic abuse given the finding that Mr O physically assaulted Ms A on 24th April 2018. Dr Parsi di Landrone was instructed to opine on whether there were any aspects of Mr O’s personality that inhibit his ability to care for N. She concluded there were not, but in doing so appeared to challenge and go behind the finding of domestic abuse made by HHJ Coppel. The key passage from the abstract of her report reads:

“I disagree with the finding about his violent nature in reference to the hospital record brought as evidence by [Mrs. A] as the record do not specify the name of the partner involved in that incident and [Mrs. A] was in a relationship with Mr. U as well as Mr. O at the time of the incident. Since Mr. O has not been charge[d] by the Italian local authority for this incident, this evidence is not an acceptable for me; especially considering that there is no further evidence that Mr. O has been violent before or after this incident or in any other romantic relationship. In my professional opinion, this evidence is also not acceptable as the court demonstrated that [Mrs. A] has res[orted] to lying and manipulate facts according to her benefit and the partner she chose in such circumstances. Indeed, it has also been found by the court that [Mrs. A] is a vulnerable woman in a co-dependent relationship with Mr. U who has often remarked his dislike towards Mr. O. Ultimately, it is clear that the competitions and animosity between the fathers fueled by the ambiguous and enmeshed behaviors of [Mrs. A] towards the fathers, has often led to conflictual relationship between these parties.

Considering the unacceptability of such evidence and lack of further evidence of domestic abuse, as well as the consistent and copious evidences that Mr. O has always cared for Master N at the best of his capacity; it appears that Mr. O has no risk of domestic abuse and therefore, it appears that he is not a threat for his son.”

Within that passage Dr Parsi di Landrone directly challenges the findings of HHJ Coppel and the soundness of the evidence on which those findings are based. She points to the ‘unacceptability of that evidence’ to justify her conclusion that Mr O does not pose a risk of domestic abuse.

The united position of all parties is that Dr Parsi di Landrone wholly misunderstood and failed to comply with her instructions as an expert. Most crucially, her conclusions and recommendations were fundamentally flawed by reason of her failure to proceed on the basis of the factual findings made by HHJ Coppel.

Dr Parsi di Landrone was notified in writing by the parties of their concerns and that they would be seeking for adverse comments to be made regarding her report within this judgment. Dr Parsi di Landrone has attended two hearings before me to deal with this issue and has submitted a lengthy response to the parties’ concerns. Within the response, Dr Parsi di Landrone denies that she refused to accept the findings of HHJ Coppel. She argues that in carrying out a psychological risk assessment she must consider not just historical findings but a wide range of factors including current risk indicators. She opposed being named within any published judgment.

The Court does not take issue with the methodology for carrying out a psychological risk assessment as set out by Dr Parsi di Landrone in her response. The fundamental difficulty is that contrary to the duties of an expert, Dr Parsi di Landrone did not consider the Court’s findings within that broader framework of assessment, but challenged the validity of the findings themselves. It is not a case of different professionals utilising different assessment tools, but a court appointed expert failing to proceed on the basis of the facts as determined by the Court in carrying out the risk assessment as instructed. The Court notes the objection raised by Dr Parsi di Landrone that she was not given an opportunity to respond to concerns before a new psychologist was appointed. However, given the fundamental and pervasive nature of this failing, the Court is satisfied it was not susceptible to remedy through the raising of questions or points of clarification. The Court also has to note that Dr Parsi di Landrone’s detailed response, continues to conflate the factual findings of the Court (which are not subject to question or challenge), with the process of assessing current risk.

In terms of the impact these failings have had on proceedings, it ultimately led to further cost and delay whilst a new psychologist was instructed. The assessment of Mr O had to be undertaken de novo. For those reasons, I am satisfied the fees of Dr Parsi di Landrone should not in principle be met from the public purse. The Court understands that Dr Parsi di Landrone has in fact already been paid in full by the local authority and the legal aid agency for her work. In light of the Court’s comments, I would invite her to consider whether she should out of good will return her fee to those public bodies.

Dr Parsi di Landrone requested that she is not named within this judgment. She naturally fears the impact on her reputation and capacity to secure future instructions as an expert within this jurisdiction. Practice Guidance on the publication of judgments was issued by the President of the Family Division on 19th June 2024. The Guidance at 5.5.4. provides that anonymisation of professional witnesses is only usually justified where its purpose is to ensure the anonymisation of the child/family. That does not apply in this case. Anonymisation may also be justified on other grounds depending on the specific facts, but a speculative concern about harassment or criticism is insufficient.

In the Court’s judgment, Dr Parsi di Landrone has not raised any matters which would be capable of justifying departure from the usual position that experts should be named. There is a clear public interest rooted in ensuring the fair, just and efficient administration of family justice that experts should not be anonymised, the more so when their assessments and recommendations have been found to be flawed. The Court observes that experts have clear and important duties to the Court as set out within Part 25 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010. It is vital instructed experts understand those rules and comply with them. If they fail in those duties, it not only causes harmful delay and significant cost to the public purse, but undermines fair, sound and just decision-making by the courts.

There may be some cases where an expert is able to demonstrate that publication will result in a significant interference with their own Article 8 right to respect for private and family life which, when balanced against the competing public interest in publication, is sufficiently weighty to prevail. A credible threat to the expert’s physical safety is one such possibility. However, whilst no doubt publication may be uncomfortable for Dr Parsi di Landrone and may impact on her professional standing, she has not been able to point to any matters that would engage her Article 8 rights in any significant way.

Weighing these considerations, the Court is satisfied Dr Parsi di Landrone should be named.

The Court has received detailed submissions on the law relevant to welfare decision-making in care proceedings. It is not, however, contentious. Whether the Court should make the order as sought by the Local Authority is a question relating to N’s upbringing and N’s welfare under s 1 of the Children Act 1989 (‘CA 1989’) is thus the paramount consideration. Section 1(4) of the CA 1989 directs the Court to have particular regard to the welfare checklist in s 1(3). Crucial to the Court’s assessment of N’s welfare is the Local Authority’s final care plan, in which is set out their plan for permanency.

In undertaking its welfare analysis, the Court reminds itself of what was said by Munby P, in Re B-S (Children), [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, namely, that the court must consider all options which are realistically possible, carrying out a proper balancing exercise in order to determine whether it is necessary to make the order as sought. As it was put by our now President in Re G (A Child) (Care Proceedings; Welfare Evaluation) [2013] EWCA Civ 965, the court is required to carry out a global, holistic and multifaceted analysis. The pros and cons, advantages and disadvantages, of each option must be carefully considered.

The Court of Appeal reiterated the correct approach in giving judgment in this case. Once threshold is crossed, the court must carry out a ‘pure’ welfare analysis. There is no presumption or starting point that a child should be brought up by a parent that the applicant local authority is required to displace (Re: N (A Child) (Care Order: Welfare Evaluation) [2024] EWCA Civ 938, [61]-[62]). Whilst there are of course generic and specific advantages and disadvantages to a child being raised by a parent, and generic and specific advantages and disadvantages to a child being raised in foster care, all of these matters must be weighed and balanced in light of the individual circumstances of each case.

Finally, the Court remains mindful that the Article 8 rights of Mr O and N to respect for their private and family lives are also engaged. Any order the Court makes which constitutes a prima facie interference with the Article 8 rights of Mr O or N must be necessary and proportionate to protect the rights and interests of others. In balancing these rights and interests, the best interests of N will prevail. There is thus no tension with the approach mandated by section 1 of the CA 1989.

The Court has read and considered the full court bundle. It heard oral evidence from the following witnesses:

Ms Russo has prepared a parenting assessment and an addendum assessment of Mr O dated 23rd September 2024 and 15th January 2025. She has also now undertaken direct work with Mr O and the paternal grandmother on some of the areas of identified vulnerability. She concludes, in brief, that she is cautiously optimistic that Mr O is able to meet all of N’s holistic needs – physical, social, emotional and educational – to a good enough standard, and that any residual risks can be managed with ongoing intervention and support. She would support N being placed in his father’s care in Italy with the support and oversight of local child protection services. They would share parental responsibility.

Ms Russo is an experienced ISW. Her parenting assessment of Mr O is exceptionally thorough. It reaches positive conclusions but is appropriately cautious, fair and balanced. The positives offered by Mr O, as well as the vulnerabilities, risks and disadvantages of placing N in his care, are carefully considered. The assessment is based on significant time spent with Mr O, as well as a number of hours spent observing Mr O and N together. She also spent some time with N alone. Ms Russo has clearly spent much more time with Mr O and observing his relationship with N than any other professional in the case. She has also liaised closely with the social work team in the local child protection services in Italy. In the Court’s judgment, the assessment process itself and the conclusions reached were robust.

Ms Russo could be criticised for going beyond her remit in expressing a view in oral evidence, albeit in response to detailed questions put by counsel on behalf of all parties, that N’s sibling relationship should not prevail over the possibility of N being placed in his father’s care given his significant dependency needs at 7 years of age and the need to be parented by ‘a natural parent’ for a number of years to come. Ms Russo did however acknowledge that her role was limited to assessing Mr O’s parenting capacity and was not to conduct the overall welfare analysis of whether N should return to his father’s care, which she accepted was the role of the social worker and the guardian. The Court is also satisfied that when her responses to questions are looked at across her evidence as a whole, she was not applying a presumption in favour of ‘a natural parent’, but giving an informed professional view on the particular needs of this young child and how his father may be better placed to meet them throughout the course of his childhood than a corporate parent. Those welfare and needs-based observations do not amount to the application of a presumption and in the court’s judgment do not undermine the force of her evidence regarding Mr O’s parenting capacity.

In the Court’s assessment, Ms Russo was an impressive and authoritative professional witness. The Court found her evidence to be entirely persuasive.

AY authored the local authority’s final evidence dated 1st October 2024 and the addendum dated 29th January 2025. She also authored the second Together and Apart Assessment dated 16th August 2024. She confirmed to the Court that the Local Authority’s care plan for N remained one of long-term foster care. She set out a willingness to develop N’s contact with his father to overnight holiday contact in Italy, and to provide a roadmap to keep the possibility of rehabilitation to his care under review. In reaching that conclusion, she confirmed the local authority do not seek to criticise or depart from the assessments of Dr Hellin, who carried out the psychological assessment of Mr O, or Ms Russo. AY was clear that she accepts those assessments, describing them as balanced and helpful in understanding and managing the risks. Ultimately, however, she told the Court that in assessing N’s welfare the balance fell in favour of him remaining placed in long-term foster care in this country with M. Of particular concern to AY, was the assessment of father’s capacity to promote N’s other significant relationships, particularly with his mother, M and his current foster carer ER, if he was to return to Italy.

Unfortunately, the Court did not find AY welfare evidence to be appropriately balanced or persuasive. It is acknowledged that AY has been the allocated social worker since August 2023. She has therefore been involved for significant time and knows all the sibling group extremely well. There was, however, in the Court’s judgment, a clear imbalance in her final welfare analysis.

It has been the sustained position of the local authority for considerable time that N should remain placed with M in local authority foster care. AY accepted that it is only very recently that there has been any professional openness within the local authority to N moving to his father’s care in Italy. Even so, in considering AY’s evidence, there was a clear sense that the recent evidence of Dr Hellin and Ms Russo has not led to a new and open assessment of N’s needs and welfare, unencumbered by previous institutional positions of the local authority. In the Court’s judgment, the local authority have continued to look for reasons as to why the cautiously positive assessments of Dr Hellin and Ms Russo, the work now completed by Mr O, and the extensive ongoing support and oversight which will be mandated in Italy are not sufficient to shift their original welfare analysis. There are numerous examples of that imbalance being entrenched within the Local Authority’s evidence.

Fundamentally, in the Court’s judgment, the local authority has not carried out a fair and balanced analysis of the positives and the risks of a move to father’s care in Italy, compared with the positives and the risks of N remaining in local authority foster care. The Court is satisfied, for example, that a number of protective factors which would mitigate against the risks and vulnerabilities of a move to Italy were not identified by AY and properly considered within the welfare balance:

Compounding that imbalance, the Court is satisfied that the local authority’s final evidence failed to acknowledge and fairly assess a number of the risks and disadvantages of N remaining in long-term foster care. If identified, a number of those risks were minimised:

Having considered AY’s oral evidence and her response to these issues in cross examination, the Court is satisfied that the balancing of the advantages and disadvantages in each of the various placement options has been skewed. It is a legitimate criticism of AY that if there is an identified risk of N remaining in foster care that AY believes can be managed, she has not included it within her final welfare analysis. In contrast, any risk involved in a move to Italy has been highlighted, regardless of whether effective steps are available to manage or mitigate that risk to a safe level. The court is satisfied there has been a basic inequality in approach.

The Court has to note other concerns about the social worker’s approach. Although AY knows the children very well, she has not observed any contact between Mr O and N. Given how finely balanced she says she has found this case to be, and given the local authority are not proposing to rehabilitate a child to the care of a parent who has been subject to a very thorough, comprehensive and cautiously positive parenting assessment, it is surprising she did not consider it important to observe the quality of the attachment between Mr O and N for herself.

It is also surprising AY has not sat down and spent time with Mr O to assess for herself the strengths and weaknesses he might bring to caring for N. She accepted that direct contact between herself and Mr O has been limited to one or two meetings online and the formal setting of LAC and care planning meetings. Again, in a case she says is this finely balanced, it might have been expected that the local authority would take some time with Mr O to satisfy themselves that long-term foster care was the right plan for N.

The Court also found some of AY’s oral evidence to lack clarity and certainty. Having made a number of concessions, it became somewhat unclear exactly what the local authority were contending should happen within the final care plan as regards any potential rehabilitation of N to his father’s care. The contact and support plan filed by the social worker in response to the Guardian’s analysis, alongside her oral evidence, suggested a move by the local authority towards a plan that would see N rehabilitated to his father’s care in 12 months’ time. It has been confirmed that this is not the local authority’s final care plan, but, in the Court’s view, it revealed a lack of confidence by the social worker that a care plan of long term foster care was in the best interests of N.

AY sensibly conceded on a number of the issues noted above, accepting she had made mistakes or omitted important considerations from her welfare analysis. She gave striking evidence about how she had carefully reflected following the hearing before Knowles J in October 2024 when issues over father’s contact had required the intervention of the Court. Following that professional reflection and supervision, she told the Court that she had ‘re-set’ her approach to father. That was professionally honest and impressive evidence, and the social worker should be commended for it. However, the concessions she made about the gaps in her welfare analysis, and her acceptance that father had not been fairly considered or included in the local authority’s thinking until the last few weeks of this long 3-year process, is wholly unacceptable. It inevitably undermines the local authority’s case on welfare.

The Court did not find AY to be a persuasive professional witness.

Mr O’s final evidence is contained within his statement dated 14th February 2025. He was subject to very lengthy cross examination by counsel on behalf of the local authority. However, despite the challenges of giving such lengthy evidence through an interpreter, Mr O generally impressed the Court as genuine, balanced and child-focused. In reaching that view, the Court has been very mindful of, and carefully reflected upon, the contrary findings of HHJ Coppel at the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing that Mr O is manipulative, deceitful and dishonest. In assessing his credibility, the Court has reminded itself that a parent who finds himself in the position of Mr O will often have conflicting and complex views and feelings about professionals and foster carers. That does not make them untruthful. The Court also notes the local authority’s closing submissions that Mr O has attempted to ‘play the game’ and manipulate the Court in the reassurances he has provided about such things as promoting N’s sibling relationships. It is, the local authority say, disguised compliance. In the Court’s view, that submission is undermined by Mr O’s ongoing refusal to accept the domestic abuse findings against him; something he knows provides a very significant obstacle to persuading professionals and ultimately the Court that N can return to his care and which it would therefore be very much in his interests to ‘strategically accept’. On matters of N’s welfare, this Court therefore found him to be an honest and open witness.

There were a number of aspects of Mr O’s evidence that the Court found impressive:

It should also be recognised at this point that Mr O has demonstrated an extraordinary level of commitment to N and to this process. He has maintained consistency in flying over from Italy for contact since direct contact was first facilitated in autumn 2022. He has attended all meetings, engaged positively in all assessments and interventions, and worked with all professionals despite the tensions that have existed. His commitment to this process has been unwavering and has not been without sacrifice for Mr O. It is clear that his life is currently on hold whilst he remains focused on N and securing his return to his care.

Stepping back and considering Mr O's evidence, it is important not to hold him and his parenting to unrealistic standards of perfection. It is clear he presents with vulnerabilities and risks, but also with considerable strengths. In my judgment his evidence was measured and balanced, and demonstrated good insight into the needs of N.

OD's final analysis is dated 21st February 2025. Her final position, confirmed in her oral evidence and closing submissions, is that she has been persuaded to support the local authority’s care plan because of the stability and security foster care will continue to offer to N and the ability of his current placement to maintain all of his important family relationships. She did not believe that would be achieved for N if he was placed in his father’s care. She emphasised that it was not a question of which relationship should have priority, but trying to ensure stability so that all important relationships can be maintained. In her closing submissions she recommends that: “N’s best interests would be best met at this stage by the drawing up of a robust care plan which works towards the father and N developing their relationship, to include extended periods of contact in Liverpool, the opportunity for N to develop his Italian to a level where he would be able to communicate effectively with his father and grandmother in Italian and N being able to spend extended holiday periods in Italy, so that the father’s home becomes an environment which is comfortable and familiar to him.”

Unfortunately, in assessing OD’s evidence, many of the same criticisms that were made of AY can also be made of the guardian. Her oral evidence was particularly weak.

In the Court’s judgment, whilst a number of the issues were more thoroughly assessed in OD’s final written analysis, there remained important gaps and omissions. Most notably, as with the social worker, many of the risks and disadvantages of foster care were not fairly considered, including:

On the other side of the balance, and as with the social worker, the Court is satisfied the guardian has not fairly considered how the risks of placing N in his father’s care can be managed or mitigated:

There were other concerns about OD’s oral evidence. At times OD came across as inappropriately defensive and overly deferential to the local authority. She had a rather passive approach to the unacceptable way in which father has been treated by the local authority. Similarly, she appeared somewhat complacent as regards the failings of the local authority to promote contact between N and his father, and ensuring N’s linguistic and cultural rights were properly protected. She was similarly highly defensive of the foster carer, being reluctant to criticise her for any behaviours that may have undermined N’s relationship with his father. The guardian should be deeply concerned about those issues on N’s behalf, not just in terms of past failings, but perhaps most importantly what it may signify for N’s future if he remains in local authority care. The Court did not gain any clear sense that the guardian had these important issues very firmly at the forefront of her mind.

Sadly, the Court is therefore driven to the conclusion that the guardian’s analysis similarly lacked fairness and balance. Her oral evidence was disappointing for a professional witness. The Court is left in the unenviable position where the final welfare analysis of both the allocated social worker and the guardian have fallen somewhat short.

There are just two realistic options placed before the Court for consideration:

The Court begins its welfare analysis, as it always does, with N and his particular characteristics and needs.

N is still a very young child. He is 7 years old. He is, and will remain for some time, almost entirely dependent on his primary care giver(s) to meet his most basic needs. In that regard, his needs are no different from any other young child. He needs security, stability and consistency. He needs to know that all of his needs – physical, social, educational and emotional – will be consistently met to a good enough standard. He needs to feel a sense of belonging; that he is wanted and that he is loved.

N has a strong sense of family. It is essential that all of his core family relationships - with his mother, father and both siblings - are supported and maintained. He has a strong attachment to his foster carer: ER. He is also a child of dual Italian/Romanian heritage. His linguistic and cultural identity must similarly be supported and maintained to ensure he grows and develops with a confident and secure sense of self.

It is important N’s vulnerabilities are also recognised. He suffered serious physical and emotional abuse in the care of his mother. His lived experiences have caused him significant trauma. He is not yet at a point when he can begin to engage in therapeutic life story work. He will need to be supported through a process of recovery. He needs a nurturing environment and will require emotionally attuned, therapeutic parenting.

N has also suffered considerable change, instability and uncertainty throughout his life. He has experienced his parents’ separation, a move to England, and has now been in limbo in foster care for over 3 years. His need for security, stability and a real sense of permanency is acute. As father’s counsel emphasise in their closing submissions, achieving permanence for N is fundamentally important. In this regard it is helpful to remind ourselves what permanency means for young children. The statutory guidance contained in the Children Act 1989 Volume 2: Care Planning Placement and Case Review (July 2021) defines permanence as: “[2.3] Permanence is the long term plan for the child’s upbringing and provides an underpinning framework for all social work with children and their families from family support through to adoption. The objective of planning for permanence is therefore to ensure that children have a secure, stable and loving family to support them through childhood and beyond and to give them a sense of security, continuity, commitment, identity and belonging.” N deserves nothing less.

N is still only 7 years old. He clearly is of an age where he has some understanding of his situation. He is able to articulate his wishes and feelings, albeit they have at times been somewhat inconsistent and confused. In accordance with s 1(3)(a) of the CA 1989 the Court is to have regard to his ascertainable wishes and feelings, in light of his age and understanding. N’s ascertainable views need to be listened to and given careful consideration. The Court is however mindful of the limits of his understanding and that his views cannot be determinative. They are just one factor to be placed within a holistic analysis of his welfare.

N has expressed a wish both to live with his father and in Italy. It is apparent however that there are some limits to his understanding. He has at one point also expressed a wish to live in Australia and he struggles to comprehend that M won’t be with him if he moves to live with his father. He consistently expresses M’s fundamental importance to him. AY gave evidence that N’s wishes and feelings are confused, and his understanding limited. What does not appear from the evidence is that N exhibits any distress or anxiety about the prospect of a move to live with Mr O in Italy. The Court is concerned that the drawn-out nature of these proceedings is only exacerbating N’s sense of uncertainty and confusion.

N and Mr O have a strong and loving relationship. N has a secure attachment to his father. N lived with his father for at least some of the time until the parents’ separated when he was 2 years old. He maintained regular contact with his father thereafter. It is unfair to suggest Mr O has not parented N before. It is significant to note that whilst the local authority does not support N being placed in Mr O’s care, AY was absolutely clear that she had no concerns about their relationship, describing it at various times as ‘lovely’ and ‘beautiful’. AY was also clear that N always named his father as one of the people most important to him. Mr O offers to N a clear and strong sense of belonging. He is undoubtedly wholly committed to his son and will remain so throughout his life. This is a life-long enduring relationship.

It is the unchallenged but cautious conclusion of Ms Russo, the ISW, that Mr O is able to meet all of N’s needs, holistically understood, and any ongoing risks of harm can be safely managed. In terms of Mr O’s parenting capacity, she gave evidence:

The local authority and guardian continue to express concerns regarding Mr O’s capacity to promote N’s important relationships with his mother, siblings and the current foster carer if N moves to Italy. The guardian noted that in her discussions with Mr O he was particularly reluctant to promote an ongoing relationship with the foster carer. As to the siblings, whilst Mr O expressed commitment to maintaining those relationships, the guardian was worried about the longevity of those arrangements. There were concerns not just over the practical challenges but whether Mr O would continue to encourage direct contact over a significant period. The Guardian was clear that those relationships were key to N’s identity and broader welfare.

Mr O gave evidence on these issues prior to the additional work being completed with him by the ISW. Nevertheless, he presented as very open to promoting these relationships, particularly with the siblings. He was more reluctant about the relationship with ER but accepted it was important. As regards the sibling relationships with M and O, he told the Court that any issues were between the fathers, not the siblings, and he was confident solutions could be found. Mr O spoke very fondly and respectfully about M. He described him as the person who had been there for N when everyone else had let him down. He openly described the foundational nature of N’s relationship with M; describing him as the pedestal on which the statue stands. Although he was clear N should be living with him, he did not deny the importance of M’s relationship. Furthermore, having heard the social worker’s evidence about some of M’s recent behaviours in foster care, his response was entirely appropriate. He did not suggest that M needed to be separated from N, but noted that M was not a bad boy, and it was concerning that he is struggling. In the Court’s judgment, Mr O’s previous conduct towards M has been similarly child focused, initially trying to include M in his contact with N and writing to him to thank him for looking after N. In the Court’s judgment, there was nothing within Mr O’s evidence to suggest he is not genuinely committed to ensuring N’s relationship with M (and O) is maintained, particularly with support from the Italian authorities.

Clearly if N moves to his father’s care, N’s contact with his mother will need to reduce from the fortnightly contact proposed by the local authority. There is however no evidence it will not continue in Italy, albeit at a slightly reduced level. Mother is committed to it. Mr O has given no reason to believe he does not regard it as important. The relationship will change but will not be lost. There is also a potential advantage of N being in Italy if mother is deported as it is more likely direct contact can still be facilitated in Italy than in the UK. The parents will again have the support of the Italian authorities in ensuring the contact takes place.

With the additional work completed and the ongoing support of local child protection services, the ISW was satisfied Mr O would maintain N’s important family relationships. Again, her assessment was not challenged. Having heard Mr O give evidence, the Court is similarly satisfied.

A further welfare advantage for N of being placed within his father’s care is that his Italian/Romanian identity will be promoted and supported in the most natural way possible. His paternal uncle lives in Romania and there are Romanian friends and neighbours within father’s network.

Turning then to the ongoing risks of harm if N were to move to reside with Mr O, the magnetic issue is that of the potential exposure of N to domestically abusive behaviours given the findings made against father by HHJ Coppel. Mr O does not accept the finding that he physically assaulted mother, although he does accept the relationship was toxic and unhealthy and he accepts making threats against Mr U. He was firm there would be no resumption of his relationship with mother and told the court he had already enquired of his Italian lawyer what steps he could take to keep her away. He does not however believe she would risk disrupting the placement and he was clear he would not risk losing his son again.

Given Mr O continues to deny the finding he physically assaulted mother, AY regards the risks from domestic abuse as static, with any intervention unlikely be effective. Her position, contrary to that of Ms Russo, is that it would be necessary for domestic abuse work to be successfully completed with Mr O before N could move to his father’s care.

In that regard, Mr O gave evidence of the work he has completed in Italy on domestic abuse. He confirmed he had undertaken the freedom programme online as suggested by Dr Hellin. He produced evidence of his commitment to that piece of work, having taken detailed and comprehensive notes. He told the Court he had learnt things about himself and his behaviours and expressed a willingness to learn more. He was frank in his evidence that he understands professionals are saying that without acceptance of the findings the work will be of limited impact in producing the required change. However, he remains firm in his position that he did not assault mother. On an intellectual level, Mr O is able to talk clearly and articulately about the harms of domestic abuse and its impact on children. The issue for Mr O, given his ongoing denial, is being able to internalise that learning and apply it to his own situation.

Despite the impasse reached on this issue, the current and ongoing risks posed to N from domestic abuse have been the subject of a very helpful psychological assessment by Dr Hellin. That assessment is thorough, balanced and nuanced. It has not been challenged. In summary she concludes:

Building on Dr Hellin’s report, Ms Russo’s assessment is that father’s behaviours were anchored in the dysfunctional and chaotic relationship between the mother and the children’s three fathers. She notes that those relationships were toxic, complex and enmeshed. Removed from those relationships, she opines that the risk from Mr O is much reduced and the risk of domestic abuse occurring within a new relationship is very unlikely. She thus concludes that whilst there is a residual risk that will need to be managed, at present, the risk is minimal.

Within that context, Ms Russo believes that Mr O’s relationship with Ms A can be managed by professionals and will not jeopardise N’s contact with her. She notes that the risk of the relationship resuming is very low, and with professional support in place in Italy there is no need for them to come into contact with one another. She notes that the turning point for Mr O in terms of his relationship with mother was hearing the recording of mother beating N.

Ms Russo is therefore of the firm view that the identified risks from domestic abuse can be safely managed under the risk management and support plan to be implemented in Italy. She reiterated that she remained mindful throughout her assessment of the Court’s findings regarding Mr O’s honesty and that he had not told his mother of the Court’s findings. She accepted that openness and honesty by a parent is vital to effective risk management. However, in her opinion, the statutory nature of the intervention in Italy mitigates against that risk, reinforced by the fact that Mr O did engage openly with her, if not the local authority, about the mother’s attempts to contact him.

The Court again reminds itself that the detailed assessments of Mr O by Dr Hellin and Ms Russo have not been challenged. The guardian maintained that there was a risk in any move to Italy. She noted the concern that the paternal family, in particular the paternal grandmother, are not protective as they do not understand the findings against father or the professionals’ concerns. This is compounded by the fact that Mr O has not been open and honest with them about the Court’s findings. Ms Russo’s oral evidence on this issue was however robust. The Court accepts her analysis that any ongoing risk of harm from domestic abuse is minimal and can be safely managed by the professional support in place. This is now reinforced by the work the ISW has completed with the paternal grandmother in Italy, with which she engaged well.

The court is therefore satisfied on the persuasive evidence before the Court that, with the support in place, Mr O is fully able to meet all of N’s needs, including his additional therapeutic needs, to a good enough standard, and that N will be safe within his care.

Long-term foster care will clearly meet a number of N’s most fundamental needs. He will be physically well cared for and safe. With some caveat concerning the ability of the current foster carer, ER, to positively promote and support N’s relationship with Mr O, his emotional needs will be met. The current foster carer has provided both N and M with security and stability for the last three years. N has made significant progress in her care. ER is currently committed to continuing to provide that care on a long-term basis. There is no suggestion that the placement is under such strain that it is at any immediate risk of breaking down. It is tried and tested. The current foster carer is clearly very important to N. He can only ever remember living with her. He has a strong attachment to her. Although long-term foster care, which is at its core a transactional arrangement, always carries with it the risk of placement breakdowns and changes of carer, the current foster carer offers the promise of some certainty and stability in placement. The strength of that promise will be further considered below.

One of the clearest advantages to N of remaining in local authority foster care is that he will be able to continue living with his sibling M. Maintaining this important sibling relationship has been a significant factor in the final welfare assessment of both the social worker and guardian. It is clearly an important consideration. The importance of sibling relationships are well recognised in the courts. They are often expressed to be the most important and enduring relationships a child will ever have. For N, he has lived with M his entire life and struggles to comprehend living anywhere without him. AY believes N regards M as the most important person in his life. She does not believe they should be separated. It can be safely assumed that any separation from M will cause N some immediate distress.

The relationship between N and M and how it impacts on N’s welfare is not however straightforward. The realities of their relationship need to be properly understood. The professionals are all agreed that the sibling relationship is currently formed through trauma-based bonds. That makes the relationship vulnerable. Trauma bonds are intense emotional bonds that can be destructive and damaging. AY insisted in her oral evidence that those behaviours have not been seen between the boys and those potential difficulties are manageable. It has subsequently emerged that there have been ongoing concerns about M’s behaviours towards N, those ‘unkind bullying behaviours’ having been subject to an ongoing risk assessment process since March 2022, with the first recorded incident in April of that year.

There is furthermore concern that the social worker has minimised the impact of M’s trauma-based behaviours on the stability of the placement of N with his current foster carer, whether alone or with his brother.

AY accepts that M is struggling emotionally with foster care. He wants to return to his mother’s care. At the time of the re-hearing before me, the local authority had still not told him the unchallenged decision of HHJ Coppel made in February 2024 that he will not be going home. The local authority is clearly concerned as to the potentially destabilising impact of that news. It is known that over the last few months M has had thoughts of stabbing his foster carer and self-harming. He has thought about the possibility of changing foster placement. There is thus concern M is developing a high level of emotional distress at being in foster care. That is not, of course, unusual for a looked after teenager who has experienced significant trauma and adverse experiences but misses his family and wants to go home. Given his age there is a strong risk M will vote with his feet, particularly if his mother is deported to Romania. AY believes the issues are manageable. M is not absconding from placement and there is no suggestion the placement is under such stress that there is any immediate risk of breakdown. However, given the significant weight placed by both AY and the Guardian on maintaining the sibling relationship through placement together in foster care, these concerns about the stability of M in placement are significant. On the evidence, the risk of placement breakdown is real and needs to be weighed within the balance. It was indeed accepted by the social worker in her oral evidence, despite the emphasis placed by the local authority on the sibling relationship in their final evidence, that N’s care journey cannot be anchored to that of his brother given their differing ages and needs. She recognised future separation may be considered if that is what will best meet the needs of each individual child. It is perhaps notable that the first together and apart assessment completed by EA in March 2023 did not consider that the boys remaining placed together should outweigh the prospect of living with their respective fathers. It is not clear why the subsequent together and apart assessment authored by AY departed from that view.

Furthermore, it also clearly emerged during the course of AY’s evidence that any breakdown in M’s placement with the current foster carer would have significant implications for N. The current placement is a sibling placement because the boys have to share a room. If one of the children leaves, the other may also have to move given the impact on the foster carer’s income. That may be managed by the local authority if the issue arises, but it is a further risk of instability for N. The Court notes that whilst the generic risk of placement breakdown in foster care is acknowledged in AY’s final analysis, these specific vulnerabilities in the current foster placement are not identified. Moreover, the impact of a placement breakdown on N needed to be specifically addressed. It is known that when he has had to go into respite care because of the foster carer’s recent health issues it has caused him very significant distress. Any placement move would be devastating. Given the risks of placement breakdown are real, as is M just ‘aging out’ of placement in a couple of years’ time, the impact of this needs to be carefully weighed within the decision-making.

The impact of long-term foster care on N’s other family relationships also needs to be carefully weighed within the balance.

In foster care, mother’s contact arrangements, so long as she remains within this country, are stable and will not significantly change. The future arrangements for father’s contact are less clear.

At the final hearing, the local authority and guardian proposed what are highly unusual contact arrangements for a child in care: effectively that N would be spending significant overnight unsupervised time with his father both in this country and in Italy. AY told the Court the local authority is committed to supporting these arrangements. There are however a number of concerns about whether these proposals will be sustained and whether there are indeed some risks to the paternal family relationships if N remains in foster care.

It has to be recognised that the contact proposals place significant strain on Mr O who will need to continue travelling from Italy for a number of days each month to see his son. Although he made clear to the court that N is his priority and he will continue to do whatever is required of him, that has implications for his ability to work and financially maintain himself. The sustainability of such arrangements must be looked at realistically. Furthermore, the local authority’s institutional commitment to maintaining such arrangements in the future cannot be guaranteed. Within these proceedings and with the oversight of the court, contact arrangements between N and his father have been challenging. No direct contact was facilitated for the first 9 months of proceedings, necessitating the involvement of the Italian Consulate. There have continued to be issues. Contact was stopped again after the Court of Appeal decision in May 2024. There remain clear problems with the video contact, despite Knowles J dealing with the issue in October 2024. The fact the local authority now seeks to remove financial support for activities during contact increases Mr O’s anxiety they are not genuinely committed to building his relationship with N. There is also evidence the foster carer is not supportive of N’s time with his father. Despite professional observations to the contrary, she has suggested a number of times that N is reluctant to spend time with his father and does not want to attend contact. She has resisted father providing gifts to N and subjected N to the emotional strain of being placed in the middle of those difficulties. For these reasons, Mr O has no confidence his relationship with N will be maintained once proceedings have concluded and there is no longer oversight by the court. The Court agrees. Once proceedings conclude, personnel change and different priorities take over, and there is in the Court’s view a real danger the contact arrangements will dwindle and paternal family relationships become marginalised. It should be noted N’s relationship with his paternal grandmother and uncle have already been substantially diminished during his time in care.

Long-term foster care also poses challenges in meeting N’s cultural and linguistic needs. There are always steps the local authority can take to try and promote N’s Italian and Romanian heritage. Language classes, books, films and contact arrangements with parents are all means to fostering a strong and confident sense of identity. But none of that is the same as a child being able to live their culture in the home of a parent. He cannot be immersed in his language and culture in the same way. Moreover, there are again concerns about the local authority’s commitment and ability to ensuring the necessary support is in place to protect N’s cultural identity. During the 3 years N has been in care, his Italian language has been lost. It is through language that his Italian culture and heritage are accessed. It is only recently the local authority have taken steps to remedy this lamentable breach of N’s most basic rights.

Finally, the extent to which long-term foster care can meet N’s essential need for permanency is an important consideration. N is just 7 years old. He has 11 years of his minority left. His dependency needs are high. OD accepted in her oral evidence that N has significant dependency needs. She accepted he needed permanency: a clear sense of an enduring home where he knows he belongs and where he knows his needs will be met for the rest of his childhood and beyond. Whilst some children find that permanency in long-term foster care, to be the subject of corporate parenting – and all that that entails - for such a significant period of a child’s minority needs to be carefully weighed. It is significant, in the Court’s judgment, that OD accepted in her oral evidence that real permanency for N will not be achieved in foster care, and he will face ongoing insecurity and uncertainty. In that regard, N’s needs are very different from those of M given their different ages and dependencies. The court found her position in oral evidence that her final welfare analysis was not based upon N remaining with his current foster carer, which cannot be guaranteed, but on her assessment that long-term foster care per se is better able to meet his needs, somewhat surprising.

Any move from foster care to live with his father in Italy will clearly be a significant change in circumstances for N. In her final welfare analysis, the Guardian placed considerable weight on the likely impact on N of such a significant move. Although N was born in Italy and spent the first three years of his life there, he last spent time in Italy over Christmas and New Year 2021/22. He is now very well settled and integrated into the local community in Liverpool. English is his primary language. Undoubtedly, a move to Italy will bring considerable challenges for N, including linguistic given the loss of his Italian language. The guardian is concerned that N will be isolated, struggle at school, struggle to make friendships and may regress emotionally as he did when first placed in foster care. She is concerned that he won’t be able to engage readily with the support available because of the language issues. The guardian notes that it took significant time for N to find stability and to settle in foster care. She was very concerned as to the impact of disrupting that, particularly given the uncertainties of placement with father.

The impact of change on N is an important consideration. However, any rehabilitation of a child to a parent following a lengthy period in foster care can be challenging. The Court should not be unduly focused on the immediate disruption, challenges and potential distress, but look to the child’s longer-term welfare needs. In terms of N’s linguistic needs, both Mr O and Ms Russo are less pessimistic than the social worker and guardian as to the level of N’s understanding and capacity to quickly gain confidence in his Italian. Mr O believes N understands 60-70% of what is said to him in Italian but is shy in speaking it. He is confident they can manage without an interpreter and that N will understand him. If necessary, the paternal uncle speaks English and will be able to assist. He is clear this is not a reason not to return N to his care.

Ms Russo was similarly not overly worried about the linguistic barrier between N and his father. She spoke a little to him in Italian and felt he had a good understanding. She was confident the language would be unlocked once immersed. Furthermore, as part of the support plan in Italy, N would have help with his Italian to help him integrate back into the community. Ms Russo did not consider this a reason not to place N in his father’s care.

The court is similarly satisfied that N’s confidence in Italian is not a reason not to rehabilitate him to his father’s care. It was his first language. He has retained a good level of understanding with the recent assistance of a tutor and once immersed in his family and the local community his confidence should grow quickly.

AY and the Guardian also express significant concerns about N regressing in his emotional well-being and exhibiting the same challenging behaviours that were seen when he was first placed in foster care. Ms Russo also acknowledges there is a risk that if N is moved it could cause a regression and re-emergence of the very difficult challenging behaviours seen when he was first placed in foster care. However, she notes that a move to his father’s care in Italy is a very different scenario to being removed from a parent and placed with a stranger in foster care. The fact he is moving to live with a parent with whom he has an established, strong and secure attachment is an important protective factor.

The Guardian was concerned Mr O had an overly simplistic view of caring for N and that he does not fully understand the level of his therapeutic needs, both now and in the future. She emphasised N’s needs are extensive and that meeting his emotional needs will therefore be a huge challenge for any parent. Within that context, she was concerned about the challenges of placement and the risk of placement breakdown. Clearly, any breakdown in N’s placement with his father would be catastrophic. Mr O is however strongly committed to his son and to providing a home for him for the rest of his childhood. He has evidenced that determination and commitment throughout these lengthy proceedings. Whilst there will undoubtedly be challenges, when viewed within the context of Mr O’s love for and commitment to N, the risks of placement breakdown are, in the Court’s judgment, very small.

Furthermore, the Court notes that whilst Mr O was naturally optimistic that N would settle without issue in Italy and that if there were any difficulties he would be able to manage his son’s emotional needs, he was not naïve about the potential challenges ahead. He acknowledged the potential for emotional and behavioural issues. He recognised the losses N will experience and will need to come to terms with, most notably separation from his siblings and foster carer. He noted this would be traumatic for N and he would be open and welcoming of professional support to assist the transition. At no point in his evidence did he suggest support was not needed or beneficial. It is also important not to overstate the challenges. Whilst a return to Italy will result in significant changes to N’s day-to-day life and to his core family relationships, those relationships will not be lost.

There are clearly risks and vulnerabilities, as well as positives and strengths, in both realistic options that have been placed before the Court. Having heard the oral evidence, the Court does not however consider this case to be as finely balanced as the social worker and guardian. In the Court’s judgment, the welfare arguments come down firmly in favour of N returning to Italy to reside with his father.

In its final welfare analysis, the Court has been guided at all times by N’s needs, the most important of which at his young age and given the trauma, uncertainty and instability he has endured are to be safe, to have all of his needs consistently met to a good enough standard, to benefit from a real and enduring sense of permanency and belonging and to have confidence that all his core family relationships will be fostered and maintained. He also has the right (and accompanying welfare interest) to be free from state interference into his private and family life as soon as is possible. In the Court’s judgment, all of those core needs and interests are best met in the care of his father.

Foster care has given N stability and security throughout these lengthy proceedings, and he has undoubtedly benefited from the excellent care ER has afforded to him. N is naturally attached to her. Furthermore, ER continues to offer N a degree of security and stability, with there being no question as to the genuine nature of her commitment to providing long-term care for both him and M. Whilst in long-term foster care, the local authority will hold statutory duties to promote all of N’s core family relationships, as well as his cultural and linguistic heritage. There are however clear risks and uncertainties about long-term placement in foster care. There are risks to N’s paternal family relationships and given the local authority’s past exercise of parental responsibility, risks to his cultural and linguistic identity.

Moreover, long-term foster care is qualitatively different from the life-long enduring relationship between parent and child. In the Court’s judgment that has real welfare consequences for N give his age and level of dependency. Foster care is at heart a transactional relationship and it always carries with it a risk of placement breakdown. In N’s case there are known tensions emerging given the challenging behaviours of M and the impact on placement stability if M cannot continue to be placed with ER, he votes with his feet or simply ‘ages out’. Although N’s relationship with M is clearly very significant and has been a constant protective factor for him throughout his life, it is not without its risks or complexities given their shared traumatic experiences. N’s individual care needs must not be lost in the desire to preserve an important sibling relationship. Given their different ages and individual permanency needs, continued placement together is clearly a relevant consideration in the welfare balance but cannot in the Court’s judgment be determinative. Continued placement in long-term foster care would mean for N he will spend the majority of his childhood in local authority care. That is a very significant prospect for such a young child.

To be balanced against the advantages and disadvantages of long-term foster care, Mr O has been positively, albeit cautiously, assessed as able to meet all of N’s needs. He has a strong, loving, established secure relationship with his son. He has demonstrated the capacity for emotionally attuned and child-centred parenting. He is willing to learn and accept support to respond in a therapeutically informed way to N’s trauma-based needs. Any deficiencies in his care and ongoing risks from domestic abuse are manageable with the assistance of the extensive support that will be mandated in Italy and with which Mr O has expressed a clear willingness and ability to engage. There are clearly risks. The commitment of Mr O to promote and maintain N’s core family relationships with his mother and siblings, as well as the current foster carer, is untested. However, whilst ongoing support may be needed, the assessments are cautiously positive about his growing insight into the importance of these relationships and his responsibility and commitment to maintaining them in N’s best interests. There will be significant change for N to contend with, but, in the Court’s judgment, the risks of placement breakdown are very small. Mr O has parented N before. This is an established relationship and there can be no doubting Mr O’s commitment to N, alongside that of the wider paternal family. Mr O offers his son a real sense of permanency and belonging; a home with a parent with whom he will have a life-long and enduring relationship into his adult years. In my judgment, with the risks at a manageable level and vital support in place from local child protection services in Italy, it is in N’s best interests to move to live with his father in Italy.

I therefore invite the local authority to amend its care plan, and to file a transition and support plan to facilitate N moving into the care of his father over the long summer vacation.