Karima Gadekrab Elsayed Mahmoud v Daniel Glanville & Anor

In this matter I am concerned with the welfare of Adam Glanville, born on 27 July 2017 and now aged seven. Before the court are an application by Karima Mahmoud, the mother of Adam, for permission to apply for a child arrangements order, there being an order pursuant to s.91(14) of the Children Act 1989 in force in respect of the mother, and an application by Daniel Glanville, the father of Adam, to restrict the exercise of the mother’s parental responsibility in circumstances which I shall come to. In addition, the mother seeks the discharge of a non-molestation order made against her by this court in November 2024 and the return of her passports.

The mother was born in Egypt in October 1980 and is now 44 years old. She is an Egyptian national. The father was born in the United Kingdom in July 1977 and is now 47 years old. The father is employed with a European Agency that moved its operations to the Netherlands in 2019 as a result of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union.

In considering the applications before the court, I have had the benefit of reading the court bundle, including the judgments of Francis J delivered in March, June and July 2024 and of the written and oral submissions of Ms Jala Patang of counsel on behalf of the mother, Mrs Hena Vissian of counsel on behalf of the father and Mr Sam Watts of counsel on behalf of Adam.

The detailed background to this matter is set out in the judgments of Francis J and this judgment should be read with those judgments (see Glanville v Mahmoud [2024] EWHC 1739 (Fam)). On 8 April 2020 HHJ Willans made a child arrangements order by consent that provided for Adam to live with the mother and to spend time with the father as provided in that order. That order also prohibited either party removing Adam from the jurisdiction of England and Wales without the written consent of the other parent or further order of the court.

The mother applied on 21 February 2022 to suspend and vary the child arrangements order made on 8 April 2020. On 7 April 2022 the father issued a cross-application to vary that order. On 10 May 2022 the mother made an application for an order under s.91(14) of the Children Act 1989. On 26 May 2022 Adam was joined as a party to the proceedings and a NYAS Guardian was appointed pursuant to FPR 2010 r.16.4. On 14 November 2022 the mother left the jurisdiction of England and Wales with Adam without obtaining the consent of the father, traveling to Oman for 8 weeks. This was in breach of the terms of the child arrangements order of 8 April 2020. NYAS applied for a location order and a prohibited steps order. The parents’ cross applications to vary were finalised by consent on 21 December 2022 by way of a further child arrangements order that again provided for Adam to live with his mother and spend time with his father. Adam was returned to the jurisdiction of England and Wales on 26 December 2022. The prohibition on removing Adam from the jurisdiction of England and Wales without the written permission of the other parent was repeated.

On 11 September 2023, the mother alleged to the police that the father had made death threats against her and applied for a non-molestation order. On the same date the father applied for a location order and a passport order after being notified by the police that the mother intended to leave the jurisdiction with Adam by air. A location order was granted by Williams J on that date without notice to the mother and the mother’s passport seized after she had been turned away from the airport. On 13 September 2023 the father applied for a child arrangements order, including an order that provided that Adam reside temporarily with the father. The mother issued a cross-application on 19 September 2023. Adam was again joined as a party to the proceedings on 5 October 2023 and a NYAS Guardian appointed. The order of 5 October 2023 provided for the father to have additional contact with Adam. However, on 20 October 2023 the mother wrote to the court stating that she could not and would not obey the order of 5 October 2023.

On 18 October 2023, HHJ Downey refused an application by the mother for her passports to be released to her to enable her to travel to Egypt. On 23 October 2023, the mother again left the jurisdiction of England and Wales with Adam and travelled to Belfast by ferry without obtaining the consent of the father, in contravention of the order of 21 December 2022 and despite the existence of the location order and the passport and port alert provisions contained therein. The mother returned Adam to the jurisdiction on 24 October 2023. On 24 November 2023, HHJ Parker sitting as a Judge of the High Court made a further passport order in respect of the mother. The order of HHJ Parker of 24 November 2023 records that the court was concerned that the mother had avoided detection by the National Border Targeting Centre and that Adam may have been removed with the assistance of traffickers.

Within the foregoing context, on 24 November 2023 the court made an order that Adam live with his father until the next hearing. The mother’s application to set aside the order of HHJ Parker of 24 November 2023 was dismissed on 28 November 2023. On 8 December 2023 HHJ Downey made an order preventing the mother from making an application with respect to where Adam should live without the permission of the court. Adam continued to reside with the father. The final report of the Children’s Guardian notes that in late 2023 and early 2024 Adam appeared happy and relaxed living with his father. On 26 February 2024, the father applied for permission to remove Adam permanently from the jurisdiction of England and Wales to the jurisdiction of the Netherlands in consequence of his job being moved to that country following the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union.

On 6 March 2024, following a finding of fact hearing, Francis J determined that the removal of Adam from the jurisdiction of England and Wales by the mother on 10 November 2022 was wrongful and done in knowing breach of the order of 8 April 2022. Francis J was further satisfied that the attempt by the mother on 11 September 2023 to remove Adam from the jurisdiction was not provoked by the father making a threat to kill the mother, Francis J rejecting that allegation as unfounded. Francis J further found that the mother’s removal of Adam to Northern Ireland between 21 and 24 October 2023 was wrongful and that the mother’s case as to the circumstances of that removal was fabricated. Francis J was satisfied that the mother’s intention was to put Adam beyond the jurisdiction of the English High Court. Finally, Francis J found that the mother had a propensity to make false and baseless allegations against the father for the purpose of harassing and abusing him, with there being no evidence to substantiate her repeated allegations of abuse or that the father had acted inappropriately with regard to Adam’s care. Having assessed the mother’s credibility, Francis J was not prepared to accept the mother’s evidence on any matter save where it was corroborated with independent evidence. He concluded that the mother “is not competent to have any time on her own with him at all, not even within a contact centre.”

Following the finding of fact hearing in March 2024, the court gave permission for a jointly instructed psychological assessment of the family. That family assessment was provided in April 2024 by Dr Derry, Consultant Clinical Psychologist. The key conclusions of that assessment, as also reiterated in Dr Derry’s oral evidence to which I shall come, were as follows:

The mother strongly disputed the conclusions of Dr Derry. She denied that she had acted in a manipulative manner and maintained that she had always acted in Adam’s best interests. With respect to the risk of absconding identified by Dr Derry, the mother contended that the incidents found to have occurred by Francis J had been misunderstood and misrepresented. The mother further contended that she had provided a stable and loving environment for Adam. The mother went on to accuse Dr Derry of “bias”. With respect to contact, the mother contended that she was fully capable of caring for Adam without the need for supervision.

As I have intimated, Francis J listed the matter for a final hearing with a time estimate of 3 days commencing on 3 June 2024 at 2.00pm. That hearing was not effective for reasons set out by Francis J when he handed down a further judgment on 9 July 2024:

“On 3 June 2024, not far from the school gates where Adam goes to school in Richmond, in broad daylight, Adam was taken from the father. I have seen photographs of two men, who I described in my previous judgment as "heavies". Having heard from the father, I am satisfied that they deliberately blocked his way, they were big men and he was obviously overwhelmed by them if he was to try and fight, and whilst that was going on, Adam was taken from him. Adam was taken away by his mother into a nearby car, and the father has not seen him since. Although I have not heard the mother's account, it seems to me on the evidence presently available that this was a wicked and heinous snatching of Adam by the mother from the father.”

Before dealing with the aftermath of the mother’s abduction of Adam and the steps taken to recover him to the care of his father, it is important to note the further findings made by Francis J in his further judgment of 9 July 2024, he having also heard evidence from Dr Derry in June 2024. Francis J was satisfied that:

With respect to the mother’s capacity for change in the context of the foregoing matters, in his report of April 2024, Dr Derry concluded as follows:

“Ms Mahmoud did not present with the clinical indicators of change. She remained defensive, defiant of any Court judgement and in denial of any intention to remove Adam from the country. She was not able to demonstrate the necessary self-reflection or analysis that would help her to start to make meaningful personal change. In this, she would be unlikely to make significant internal change although she may be able to make some external changes to her behaviours and presentation in response to the current situation.”

Dr Derry confirmed in his oral evidence in June 2024 that the mother was prone to deploying a dual strategy of self-pity and victimisation and, when that was not effective, of coercive control and force. Having regard to the genesis of the mother’s difficulties, which Dr Derry located in her childhood, Dr Derry considered that to effect change the mother would need to engage in therapeutic intervention over a period of years rather than months. As to prognosis for change, Dr Derry considered that in circumstances where the mother was not able to question her own actions, recognise her own behaviour or think correctively about herself, a change of approach by the mother was unlikely, and in any event one that would take a period of years if it were to be achieved. Dr Derry considered that the potential for the mother to engage in therapy was poor. Francis J accepted this evidence and there is no evidence before this court to gainsay the conclusions of Dr Derry. Indeed, I am satisfied that the information available to the court since Dr Derry provided his expert opinion has reinforced the accuracy of that expert opinion.

Within the foregoing context, Francis J was satisfied in July 2024 that Adam should continue to reside with his father. Francis J was further satisfied, applying the principles set out in Re F (A Child) (International Relocation Cases) [2015] EWCA Civ 882 and in Re C (Internal Relocation) [2015] EWCA Civ 1305 that it was in Adam’s best interests for the father to be given permission to remove Adam permanently from the jurisdiction of England and Wales to the jurisdiction of the Netherlands. Francis J declined to make any order for contact between Adam and his mother. Further, Francis J discharged the order subsisting under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 under which the father was required to make payments to the mother. Finally, Francis J made an order against the mother pursuant to s.91(14) of the Children Act 1989. Francis J made each of the foregoing orders in anticipation of the recovery of Adam following his abduction by the mother.

Following her abduction of Adam, the mother managed to conceal Adam’s whereabouts from the father, the court and the police for a period of some eight months. During that period, it was clear that the mother was actively hiding Adam. For example, on 24 October 2024 the mother attended a contact centre in disguise, wearing a wig, to seek assistance from a contact supervisor. As recorded by the Children’s Guardian in her final report:

“Beyond what appears to have been some limited home schooling, Ms Mahmoud has appeared to have made no attempts at all to meet Adam’s wider social, emotional and educational needs of a child living in the UK. It is not known how Ms Mahmoud accessed funds or resources to keep her and Adam living in the house, where they were located...”

After multiple hearings before this court during that period, Adam was located by the Police on 13 February 2025, with the considerable assistance of the Tipstaff. The mother was taken into police custody and Adam was returned to his father’s care. The two men involved with the abduction of Adam were arrested on suspicion of child abduction and remain on bail during the continuing investigation.

The court also has before it the final report of the Children’s Guardian, Ms Timmis, dated 8 April 2025. The Children’s Guardian recounts Adam’s view of the period during which he was concealed by his mother as follows:

“I asked him about when he was with his Mum, he told me he didn’t go out much when he was with his Mum. He told me that they went to the shop sometimes but stayed indoors most of the time; he couldn’t remember going to playgrounds. He told me when he was with Mum that he ‘didn’t know where I was’ and felt a bit ‘lost’. He said he had missed his Dad and his Grandad but he thought his Mum looked after him OK although it was a bit frightening not knowing what would happen next. He was frightened when the police came.”

With respect to Adam’s wishes and feelings, on 27 February 2025 Adam stated to a social worker that if he had a “magic wand” he would “want to see mummy Monday to Friday and daddy at the weekend”. The Children’s Guardian followed this up with Adam when she met him in March 2025. Adam initially reiterated that he would like things to go back to “normal”, that being “staying with Mum on school days and going to dad’s from Friday after school for the weekends”. However, Adam also conceded that such an arrangement may no longer work in light of the events that had taken place. He stated he would rather live with his father than go back to the situation in which he had been found by the police. He was happy to have contact with his mother by way of video calls.

In April 2025 the mother sought to permission from the Court of Appeal to appeal the decisions of Francis J in March 2024 and July 2024 out of time. On 7 April 2025 Lord Justice Baker refused the mother permission to appeal. In the circumstances, the findings made by Francis J in March 2024 and the findings and final orders made by Francis J in July 2024 stand.

The law relating to permission to apply for a child arrangements order where there is an order in force pursuant to s.91(14) of the Children Act 1989 is considered in comprehensive terms in Re S (Permission to Seek Relief) [2006] EWCA Civ 1190, [2007] 1 FLR 482. In that case, the Court of Appeal observed as follows with respect to the correct approach to an application for permission to apply:

“[78] In relation to the judicial approach to applications for permission to apply, we should say, by way of preliminary observation, that we see no inconsistency between Thorpe LJ's test in Re A set out at paragraph 53 above: ("Does this application demonstrate that there is any need for renewed judicial investigation?") and Butler Sloss LJ's test in Re P set out at paragraph 54 above: ("the applicant must persuade the judge that he has an arguable case with some chance of success"). In our judgment the two complement each other. A judge will not, we think, see a need for renewed judicial investigation into an application which he does not think sets out an arguable case. In the first application, Judge Murdoch adopted the Re A approach, albeit with a cross reference to Re P. This seems to us perfectly sensible.

[79] It is self-evident that a party who is the subject of an order under section 91(14) which has been made because of particular conduct by that party must have addressed that conduct if his application for permission to apply is to warrant a renewed judicial investigation or to present an arguable case. Thus, to take an obvious example, a man who has been made the subject of a section 91(14) order following findings of fact by the court of both persistent domestic violence to his former partner and his children and a fixed and delusional belief that his children are the victims of parental alienation syndrome, is unlikely to succeed in an application for permission to apply for contact or residence if he makes it without any acceptance of the court's previous findings.”

In Re P & N (Children)(Section 91(14): Application for Permission to Apply: Appeal) [2019] EWHC 421 (Fam), [2019] 2 FLR 53, Cobb J noted that the approach set out in Re S (Permission to Seek Relief) remained the settled law. At [40] Cobb J set out the correct procedural approach to such an application for permission to apply:

“The appropriate procedure for a court to follow when presented with such an application, in my judgment, is that laid out in the judgment in Re S (see [18] above), namely that the application should be considered 'in the first instance' on the papers, or at on an oral hearing which can be 'without notice' to the respondent particularly if there are concerns about the effect on the respondent of learning of a fresh application (what Wall LJ referred to in Re S at [92]/[93] as "certain sensitive circumstances… a case in which the stress of previous litigation has destabilised the family, and in which the fragile capacity of the resident parent may well be adversely affected by the service of an application for permission to apply"– see [18] above). If the applicant seeks an oral hearing, he/she should not be denied this. If the application is without merit, then it can be dismissed at that stage, and the potential respondent may well have been spared any engagement with the process. However, if the application shows sufficient merit (i.e. the applicant has demonstrated a prima facie case that there is a need for renewed judicial investigation on the basis that he has an arguable case), the court should list the application for an 'on notice' hearing to allow the respondent to make representations.”

With respect to the application to restrict the exercise of the mother’s parental responsibility in respect of Adam, the approach to be applied was summarised with pellucid clarity by the President of the Family Division in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re A (Parental Responsibility) [2023] EWCA Civ 689:

“[10] Irrespective of whether or not there is a statutory power to bring parental responsibility to an end, in every case the court may control and limit a parent's ability to exercise parental responsibility through the making of prohibited steps orders, and may enhance the ability of the other parent to exercise parental responsibility with respect to specific issues. CA 1989, s 8(1) provides that:

'"a prohibited steps order" means an order that no step which could be taken by a parent in meeting his parental responsibility for a child, and which is of a kind specified in the order, shall be taken by any person without the consent of the court;

"a specific issue order" means an order giving directions for the purpose of determining a specific question which has arisen, or which may arise, in connection with any aspect of parental responsibility for a child.'

Whilst a prohibited steps order and/or a specific issue order may normally be made to regulate one or more aspects of the exercise of parental responsibility, it is accepted that, where the facts of the case justify it, the court may make a combination of orders which have the effect of prohibiting a parent from taking any step in the exercise of his or her parental responsibility and clothing the other parent with the exclusive right to exercise parental responsibility without reference to any other person who holds parental responsibility.”

The statutory framework that grounds the foregoing approach, and the principles of application were examined by Peter Jackson LJ in Re T-D [2024] EWCA Civ 793 at [41] to [48], who highlighted the following matters:

I am satisfied that the mother’s application for permission to apply for a child arrangements order should be dismissed. I am further satisfied that the father’s application to restrict the exercise of the mother’s parental responsibility should be granted to the extent that I set out below. I intend to continue the non-molestation order granted in November 2024 until 1800hrs on 9 July 2029 or further order of the court, whichever is sooner. I grant the mother’s application to have her passports returned to her. I am further satisfied that it is in Adam’s best interests to make an order for indirect contact between him and his mother in the terms set out below. My reasons for so deciding are as follows.

As made clear by the Court of Appeal in Re S (Permission to Seek Relief), in determining whether the mother has demonstrated a need for renewed judicial investigation or an arguable case, it is self-evident that the mother must have addressed the conduct that led to the making of an order under s.91(14) of the 1989 Act if her application for permission to apply is to warrant a renewed judicial investigation or represent an arguable case. Having regard to the matters set out above, and despite the comprehensive submissions of Ms Patang on behalf of the mother, I am satisfied that the mother has not addressed the matters that led to Francis J imposing an order under s.91(14) of the Children Act 1989 and has not demonstrated a need for renewed judicial investigation or an arguable case.

Dr Derry concluded that before the mother was in a position to meet Adam’s emotional needs “There would need to be some shift in her thinking about her need for dominance and control within relationships and of her parenting and vicariously controlling Adam's relationship with his father”. There is no evidence before the court that the mother has made this shift and developed any insight into the adverse impact on Adam of her behaviour. Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary. In her report, the Children’s Guardian concludes that:

“My work with Ms Mahmoud and with Mr Glanville has led me to find Ms Mahmoud deceptive, dishonest and brazenly combative, and it is often difficult to believe her account of virtually any matter big or small. She has asserted that there are undertones of racism/xenophobia, and that professionals in this case have displayed impropriety which amounts to disbarment from their profession (including purported police complaints). Despite there being zero evidence of such impropriety, and despite there being responses from objective bodies dismissing her concerns, she perpetuates the same issues without any concern nor remorse.”

In his report dated 19 April 2024, Dr Derry noted that the mother continued to “contest every aspect of the Court’s findings” and continued to attempt to persuade Dr Derry that she “was the innocent victim of domestic violence, that leaving the country with Adam was within her rights, or that this was at Mr Glanville’s behest” and that “the findings of the court were false and were predicated on the Court’s racist attitudes towards her.” During the course of her submissions to this court nearly a year later, it was clear that Ms Patang had been instructed by the mother to concentrate on the mother’s persisting grievances against the father, against the court and against the professionals, at the expense of any substantive arguments regarding Adam’s best interests. Through Ms Patang, the mother made clear to the court that she continues to refute the findings made by Francis J, persists in her view that she has been the victim of a grave injustice at the hands of the court and of professionals and disputes that her conduct in June 2024 amounted to the abduction of Adam. In this context, I accept the analysis of the Children’s Guardian about the validity of the mother’s assurances of change made to the court:

“Ms Mahmoud has failed completely to reassure those involved in planning for Adam’s future that she would not again attempt to extract Adam suddenly and devastatingly from his settled and happy life with his father. She has provided no acceptable explanations of her actions beyond believing she is the subject of a conspiracy against her. She tells us she ‘sincerely apologises’ to the court for removing her son. She tells us she had ‘strong reasons’ for doing so. And yet she perpetuates multiple strands of already disproven concerns as a means of meeting her own needs, evidenced most recently in her (now dismissed) appeal. It would very much appear that any apology, acknowledgement or insight is not genuinely held, and is rather with a tactical/strategic aim.”

In his addendum report in May 2024, Dr Derry considered that the history of the matter predicted that the mother would continue to maintain an adversarial attitude towards the father in circumstances where the mother had been unable to accept the findings made against her as indicating a need to change her attitudes towards relationships and parenting. On the basis of the information before the court, I am satisfied that indeed remains the position.

Finally, I agree with the Children’s Guardian that the mother continues to present a serious risk of abduction and that Adam would be at risk of significant harm should his mother discover his whereabouts and again attempt to abduct him. Francis J was satisfied in July 2024 that the mother:

“...is reckless as to whether she harms Adam or not. I do not go so far as to find that she is deliberately causing emotional harm to Adam, although I think it is probably true that she does not much mind if she does if it furthers her long-term goal of removing Adam from the care of his father and the reach of this Court”.

In the foregoing circumstances, and having regard to the fact that Adam has now been the subject of litigation for the majority of his young life and his urgent emotional need for a period of security and stability in the care of his father, I am satisfied that the mother has failed to demonstrate a need for renewed judicial investigation or an arguable case justifying permission to make a further application for a child arrangements order.

I am further satisfied that the mother’s motivation for making an application for a child arrangements order is not one centred on Adam’s best interests, but rather remains her desire to continue her adversarial battle with the father and to dominate the parenting of Adam to his exclusion. I am further satisfied that, beyond the indirect contact proposed by the father and supported by the Children’s Guardian, having regard to the history of repeated child abduction in this case it would be wholly unsafe to permit the mother to have the level of contact she seeks at this stage, namely unsupervised shared care of Adam. I accept the evidence of the Children’s Guardian that the current limits to any contact should be maintained unless and until the mother accepts her actions have been damaging to Adam and embarks on significant and comprehensive therapy.

In the circumstances, I dismiss the mother’s application for permission to apply for a child arrangements order. For the avoidance of doubt, the order made by Francis J under s.91(14) of the Children Act 1989 on 9 July 2024 remains in force such that the mother is prohibited until 18.00hrs on 9 July 2029, or until further order, from making any application for a child arrangements order without first obtaining the permission of the court.

As this court observed nearly ten years ago now in H v A (No1) [2015] EWFC 58, the bundle of rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority that compromise parental responsibility are contingent on and inseparably connected with a parent’s obligation to meet the welfare needs of the child. Where a parent chooses to exercise an aspect of their parental responsibility in a way that is detrimental to the welfare of the child the court may prescribe, to whatever extent is in the child’s best interests and proportionate, the exercise of parental responsibility. In this case, having regard to the matters set out above, I am satisfied that the mother has repeatedly chosen to exercise her parental responsibility for Adam in a manner that adversely impacts on his welfare such that it is necessary and proportionate to make prohibited steps orders and a specific issue order restricting the exercise of the mother’s parental responsibility in order to safeguard and promote Adam’s welfare.

It is clear on the evidence before the court that the mother perpetrated a premeditated and blatant abduction of Adam from the care of his father, in breach of orders put in place by the court and in circumstances that must have been frightening for Adam. Thereafter, the mother prevented Adam from having any relationship with his father for a period of eight months, during which time she kept Adam concealed from the court, from the police and from the statutory authorities. I accept the evidence of the Children’s Guardian that Adam has suffered significant emotional, social and educational harm as a result of the mother’s actions, being suddenly and dramatically removed from the life he was settled into at school and with his father in June 2024 and being kept hidden for 8 months, during which he was deprived of his developing social life and independence.

The abduction of Adam by the mother in June 2024, and his subsequent concealment for a period of eight months, stood at the end of a long line of conduct by the mother whereby she took unilateral decisions on matters of parental responsibility to the exclusion of the father, including changing Adam’s nursery and preventing the father having contact with medical and educational professionals. Further, there is ample evidence before the court that the mother has obstructed the exercise of parental responsibility by the father. This has extended to making repeated false allegations against the father. The mother has, on the evidence before the court, also shown herself repeatedly to be unable to work with professionals concerned with Adam’s welfare, on occasion actively seeking to obstruct them to Adam’s detriment.

Within this context, there is evidenced in the papers a long history of the mother being unable to share parental responsibility with the father to Adam’s benefit. I am satisfied that the matters I have summarised render it likely that the mother will frustrate the exercise of parental responsibility by the father in seeking to meet his welfare needs and the work of professionals seeking to work with Adam to mitigate the damage caused by the mother’s actions. Given the mother’s history of the most blatant disregard for court orders, I am not satisfied that these difficulties could be managed simply by, for example, attaching conditions to a child arrangements order or accepting undertakings from the mother, as she now seeks in her statement to offer to the court. The mother’s pattern of non-compliance with orders of the court, and her propensity for taking unilateral action in respect of Adam, necessitate stricter orders.

Finally, given the history of the mother abducting and concealing Adam, including the employment of third parties, extreme lengths to avoid police detection over an extended period, I consider there remains a very high risk of further abduction by the mother. In this context, I am satisfied that Adam’s safety and security further militates against the mother being able to exercise parental responsibility in respect of him in an unfettered manner, particularly with regard to receiving information that may disclose to her the whereabouts of Adam’s home, school, leisure activities and general practitioner. In this regard, I accept the view of the Children’s Guardian that:

“I would also support Mr Glanville’s application to limit Ms Mahmoud’s rights due to having parental responsibility and in particular her rights to access information concerning her son. I recommend she should not be provided with knowledge of Adam’s address nor the identity or location of his school; and should not be provided with health and education updates except for general updates as to Adam’s wellbeing. Any school/health reports should be anonymised Mr Glanville should be free to travel without providing information as to his destination or return.”

Once again, Dr Derry’s expert opinion is that the mother’s conduct in the past predicts that the mother will continue to maintain an adversarial attitude towards the father in circumstances where the mother had been unable to accept the findings made against her as indicating a need to change her attitudes towards relationships and parenting. Within this context I am satisfied that there is no current prospect of the mother’s behaviour changing such that the matters militating against her exercising parental responsibility for Adam in a manner that meets his welfare needs can be mitigated. Once again, there is at present no evidence before the court that the approach of the mother, and the thinking that underpins that approach, has been addressed by her to the extent that she would now be able to co-operate constructively with the father in the exercise of parental responsibility for Adam.

This conclusion is reinforced by the contents of the mother’s statement of 1 April 2025. In that document, the mother disputes the validity of orders that have already been made by the court, repeats allegations against the father that have already been rejected by the court and denies any wrongdoing in respect of Adam’s abduction in June 2024 or any adverse impact on Adam in consequence of that abduction, the mother instead contending that her actions were justified and that her actions have always been in Adam’s best interests. Indeed, in her statement the mother goes so far as to blame the father for her conduct in abducting Adam by contending that it was the father who forced her into this action by fabricating a case against her. Rather than addressing Adam’s physical, emotional and educational needs, the mother’s statement of 1 April 2025 concentrates almost exclusively and in detail on her grievances regarding the litigation process and conduct of professionals. For example, the mother maintains her allegation that the judgment of Francis J handed down in March 2024 “was falsely drafted by the father’s legal team, containing entirely untrue information”. The mother’s clear perception that she has been the co-operative and reasonable party during the course of these proceedings is particularly troubling.

In the foregoing circumstances, and acknowledging as I do that such orders represent an interference with the freedom the mother to make her own decisions regarding Adam as a parent with parental responsibility, I am satisfied that having regard to the matters set out in s.1 of the Children Act 1989, and treating Adam’s best interests as my paramount consideration, that it is in Adam’s best interests, and necessary and proportionate, to make the following prohibited steps and specific issue orders pursuant to s.8 of the Children Act 1989 to circumscribe the exercise of the mother’s parental responsibility for Adam until he reaches the age of majority:

Within the context of the foregoing orders, and the limitations they place on the exercise of the mother’s parental responsibility, I am satisfied that the provisions for indirect contact should be contained in the final order should include a provision requiring the father to provide to the mother periodically appropriately anonymised general updates on Adam’s educational and social progress and to notify the mother in appropriately anonymised terms in the event that Adam suffers a serious illness or accident.

Against all of the matters set out above, and to his enduring credit in the context of the ordeal he has endured as a result of the mother’s conduct, it is recognised by the father that Adam needs to maintain contact with his mother, provided contact can be effected in a safe way having regard to the extant and serious risk of abduction. In Adam’s best interests, this requires that any contact not expose Adam to a risk of a further abduction and be capable of careful monitoring. Within this context the father proposes, and the Children’s Guardian recommends, that Adam have indirect contact with his mother by way of a specialist family communication platform, through which Adam the mother could share messages and pictures with the father’s oversight with a view to indirect contact progressing to video calls once a week for ten minutes in duration. Whilst the Children’s Guardian is prepared to contemplate contact moving to direct supervised contact at a Contact Centre after three months, she emphasises the need for it to be the father who judges whether such a move would be in Adam’s best interests having regard to the risks that pertain in this case.

At the present time, absent the significant shift in the mother’s thinking and approach called for by Dr Derry and having regard to the matters set out in this judgment, I am satisfied that it is in Adam’s best interests for him to have only indirect contact with his mother at this point in time. Whether contact can safely progress beyond that point given what I am satisfied remains the high risk of child abduction and the mother’s manifest failure to acknowledge the need for change, is a question that cannot be answered at this point in time. Whether that question can be answered in three months’ time or longer will depend on the progress of indirect contact and, vitally, on the conduct of the mother. I am satisfied that it should be for the father to decide in the exercise of his parental responsibility, in the first instance, whether contact can safely progress beyond the point ordered at this hearing.

As I have noted above, I am satisfied that the provisions for indirect contact should include a provision requiring the father to provide to the mother periodically appropriately anonymised general updates on Adam’s educational and social progress and to notify the mother in the event that Adam suffers a serious illness or accident.

This court granted a non-molestation order in favour of the father against the mother for a period of 12 months on 1 November 2024. The father seeks for this order to be extended “until further order”, subject to any variation required to facilitate such indirect contact between Adam and his mother. The mother seeks to have the order discharged on the grounds it is without justification or, in the alternative, varied so as to permit her to return to the former family home to collect various belongings she contends remain in that property.

I am satisfied that the non-molestation order should remain in force and that it should do so for the same period as the order made by Francis J pursuant to s.91(14) of the 1989 Act. A non-molestation order without limit of time would be an exceptional course for the court to take. I am however, satisfied that it is appropriate for the injunction to continue at this point in time in the context the matters that I have set out in this judgment. There is no evidence that the mother has completed the work to address the concerns regarding her state of mind and psychological profile set out by Dr Derry. As evidenced by the statement the mother filed for this hearing, the mother continues to make baseless allegations against the father and demonstrates little or no insight into the fact that the court has dealt with and rejected the matters about which the mother continues to complain.

I am likewise satisfied that the non-molestation injunction should remain in its current terms. Whilst the mother contends that the order requires to be varied to permit her to collect her belongings from the former family home, the father confirms to the court that the property has been cleared and sold, the mother already having removed all of her personal belongings. In so far as there is a difference between the parties in this regard, I accept the version provided by the father.

Given the history that I have outlined in this case, it is understandable that the father would be given pause by the mother’s request for the return of her passport. The court is likewise wary of providing the mother with the wherewithal to cross international borders given what I am satisfied is a continuing and appreciable risk of abduction. The mother has gone to extraordinary lengths to remove Adam from the care of his father and to conceal him from the court, from the police and from the safeguarding authorities.

Against this, as the Court of Appeal made clear in Lakatamia Shipping Company Ltd & Ors v Nobu Su & Ors [2021] EWCA Civ 1187, the interference with the liberty of the respondent under a passport order must be for no longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it has been granted, the Court of Appeal having held in Bayer A.G. v Winter [1986] 1 WLR 497 that a passport order should be of very limited duration given the interference with the liberty of the subject which is involved.

In this case, the passport order was granted in order to secure the return of Adam to his father’s care. Adam is now back in the care of his father and his passport is secure. As I have noted, Adam’s name remains on the police national computer, providing him with a measure of protection at the country’s borders whereby the police will be notified immediately should Adam be presented at a port with any person other than the father. The mother’s parental responsibility will be circumscribed by way of prohibited steps order and a specific issue order in the manner I have described with regard to her knowing Adam’s current whereabouts. In these circumstances, the continued retention of the mother’s passport in addition represents a significant interference in the mother’s rights, particularly where the purpose for which the passport order was made has been fulfilled and she is a foreign national who has relatives abroad.

Balancing the competing factors, I am satisfied that the time has come for the mother’s passport to be returned to her. Once again, I bear in mind that an information marker on the Police National Computer will act as a port alert in respect of Adam, that prohibited steps orders and a specific issue order will remain in force to regulate the exercise of the mother’s parental responsibility in respect of Adam and that there will continue to be a non-molestation order in place for the reasons I have set out.

For the reasons set out above, and the mother’s application for permission to appeal having been refused, I reiterate that the ‘lives with’ order made by Francis J remains in place, providing for Adam to live with his father, as does the order made by Francis J, permitting the father to remove Adam permanently from the jurisdiction of England and Wales to the jurisdiction of the Netherlands. Likewise, the order made by Francis J pursuant to s.91(14) remains in force until 1800hrs on 9 July 2029. I decline to vary the non-molestation order granted in November 2024, and I will extend that order until 1800hrs on 9 July 2029.

In addition, I dismiss the mother’s application for permission to issue an application for a child arrangements order. On the father’s application to restrict the exercise of the mother’s parental responsibility, I shall make the following prohibited steps orders and specific issue order:

I will make a child arrangements order in favour of the mother providing for the father to facilitate indirect contact between Adam and his mother, initially by way of messages on a family communication platform for a period of six weeks, to be followed by video contact once per week for 10 minutes for a further 12 weeks. In addition, the order will provide that the father shall provide to the mother periodically appropriately anonymised general updates on Adam’s educational and social progress and to notify the mother in the event that Adam suffers a serious illness or accident.

Finally, I will direct that the mother’s passport is returned to her and that Adam’s passport shall be held by the father. The passport order and port alert currently in place will be discharged but, as I have noted, Adam’s name will retain its marker on the Police National Computer such that the police will be alerted should Adam be presented at the border in the company of any one other than the father.

The father applies for his costs, including a pro bono costs order. I intend to deal with the question of costs on paper in light of the decisions set out above. The parties should provide for written submissions as to costs in the order.

I will invite counsel to draw the order accordingly.