Charles Bellhouse & Anor v Zurich Insurance Plc

This is my extemporary ruling at the beginning of this case management hearing on a claim by Mr Charles Bellhouse and his wife, Mrs Biborka Bellhouse, against Zurich Insurance Plc. This is a matter where I heard a summary judgment and strike out application in June and delivered a substantive judgment on that application which bears the neutral citation number [2025] EWHC 1416 (Comm). I then delivered a consequentials judgment on 24 June which bears the neutral citation number [2025] EWHC 1551 (Comm). The effect of those two judgments is encapsulated in an order of the court which appears at divider 17 of the hearing bundle. Subject to one minor exception, I did not accede to the claimants’ application to strike out parts of the defence and counterclaim. What I did was to order that the defendant was to file at court, and serve, short particulars, briefly setting out its case on both the misrepresentation and the contract works exclusion defences. I made it clear that the further particulars should be no longer than was strictly necessary, and, in any event, no longer than 6 pages in length, and with a font size of no less than 12 points, without any footnotes or annexes. These were to be verified by a statement of truth.

Paragraph 4 of my order provided that the claimants might file and serve an application for any further directions in response to the further particulars by a certain time; and any such application was to be determined by me (if available). That time was subsequently extended by consent. Paragraph 5 provides that, upon the defendant filing and serving the further particulars in compliance with paragraph 2 and, subject to any order made pursuant to any application under paragraph 4, the application was to stand dismissed. Paragraph 9 of my order provided for the claim to be listed for a costs and case management hearing on the first convenient date after 1 October, with a time estimate of half a day, preceded by half a day's pre-reading. That hearing was to be listed before me if available.

What happened was that further particulars were served, purportedly in compliance with my order, on 9 July. The claimants entertained concerns about certain paragraphs of those further particulars, relating to certain aspects of the contract works exclusion defence. As a result, they requested further information on 28 July 2025. I am now concerned with the requests set out in paragraphs 17 and 18 of that request, relating to what are termed the ‘two incendive fault theories’. That is, that two plausible causes of the fire, which were caused by, or resulted from, the contract works are either (1) an incendive fault in the claimants’ contractors' power tools' lithium ion battery, or (2) an incendiary fault in an extension lead (used by the contractors) or contractors' equipment plugged into an extension lead. A request was made for further particulars of that.

A response was given to that on 12 September. The claimants are dissatisfied with that response. They have issued an application (which is to be found at divider 34 of the hearing bundle) on 26 September 2025. They seek an order that the parts of paragraph 19 of the defendant's further particulars filed on 9 July which relate to the allegations about a battery and the extension lead/equipment allegation are struck out and/or those issues are the subject of reverse summary judgment in the claimants’ favour. They say that the defendant's further particulars do not comply with paragraph 2 of my order. They rely upon the fourth witness statement of the claimants’ solicitor, Mr Stephen John Netherway, dated 26 September 2025. There is also an application for an order pursuant to CPR 3.1(m) and/or CPR 31.12, for the reasons set out in Mr Netherway's supporting witness statement, that the audio recordings of conversations on 3 and 9 May 2022 be disclosed by 21 October 2025.

The defendant has filed responsive evidence in the form of a witness statement from its solicitor, Mr Paul Kenneth Annersley, dated 13 October 2025. By reference to the costs statement filed by the defendant in relation to the application, Mr Mesfin (of counsel), who appears for the claimants, points out that in excess of £42,000 would appear to have been spent by the defendant so far in responding to this application. The claimants’ application is not, however, addressed in Mr Crowley's skeleton argument for the defendant. That is on the basis that the application has not been listed for hearing today. Mr Mesfin nevertheless submits that the court should deal with it.

That application was estimated for 30 minutes by the claimants. When I put to Mr Mesfin the consequential division of time, in terms of submissions by the two counsel and judgment, Mr Mesfin recognised that it would be difficult to deal with the matter within 30 minutes.

I have expressed my provisional views on the application. My provisional view, without the benefit of anything more than my reading of the witness evidence and Mr Mesfin's skeleton argument, is that there is no breach of my order because of the tight restrictions I had placed on the length of any particulars, the primary focus of which was on the misrepresentation defence, rather than the contract works exclusion defence. Nevertheless, I recognise that, insofar as the defendant is presently able to do so, it should provide the further particulars requested at paragraphs 17 and 18 of the claimants’ request for further information. I indicated that I would be prepared to make an order in those terms. Mr Crowley, however, wishes to advance substantive arguments against that course. I have also expressed the view that I can see no reason why I should not order disclosure at this stage of the two admitted audio recordings of the May 2022 conversations. Mr Crowley, however, submits that I have no jurisdiction to do so. He says that the documents will be disclosed in due course; but there is no application presently before the court, and there is no jurisdiction in the court, to order the disclosure of these audio recordings at this stage. He has not prepared any substantive response to Mr Mesfin's application.

With great regret, it does seem to me that, as this matter has not been formally listed before me at this case management hearing, I should not make the orders I had provisionally indicated I would make. With regret, it does seem to me that I should allow Mr Crowley, for the defendant, to develop its submissions, both on the strike-out application, and also the provision of the audio recordings. I should, however, make it clear that I did feel prepared to proceed along the lines I have indicated, thereby avoiding the need for any further hearing, incurring further costs. The judge who hears the claimants’ application will no doubt have those observations drawn to their attention in relation, not only to the substance of the application, but also any costs application that may be made as a result of the matter having to be dealt with on a future occasion, rather than at this hearing.

So, as far as the application itself is concerned, all I should do is to direct that it should be listed on the first convenient date before any judge sitting in the London Circuit Commercial Court. That judge will be in a position to take a view different to me as to whether there has been compliance with the terms of my order. Nothing that I say is intended to bind that judge in approaching that application. The judge will need to consider whether, as Mr Crowley has submitted, the court has no jurisdiction to make the order at this stage for the disclosure of the admitted audio recordings. As I say, I reach that conclusion with considerable regret that I am not able to advance aspects of the case management of this case at this hearing simply because insufficient time has been allowed for it, and because Mr Crowley has, despite the apparent expenditure of over £40,000 in costs, not addressed the issue.