Hasbro Consumer Products Licensing Limited & Anor v Cong Ty Tnhh Dau Tu Cong Nghe Va Dich Vu Sconnect Viet Nam & Ors

The Claimants say that they own various intellectual property rights and goodwill associated with the animated children’s series “Peppa Pig” which, since its 2004 UK launch, has become one of the most successful such series globally available through a variety of media channels. The claims before the Court concern the alleged infringement of those rights and transgression of their goodwill in the following territories:-

The alleged infringing acts are said to have been carried out by the Defendants’ animated children series called “Wolfoo” and the sale by the Defendants or under their licence of related merchandise. The Claimants say that such infringement is taking place to deceive the young Wolfoo viewership, most aged between two and five, into believing that Wolfoo is the same character as Peppa Pig or comes from an economically related source. The Claimants also allege damage to their goodwill on account of this association, Wolfoo said to be of inferior quality and unsuitable for the typical age group of Peppa Pig viewers. Wolfoo is said to have been made available to the public since around May 2018 by means of YouTube and other online platforms.

This judgment is concerned with one aspect of these claims, namely the copyrights claimed in certain sound recordings which, it is said, the Defendants have infringed through their indirect copying in, and communication to the public by, their Wolfoo videos. On 1 August 2025, the Claimants issued an application for summary judgment on that aspect (SJ Application). This was heard in March. This judgment is concerned with that application.

These proceedings have some history, the claim having been served in January 2022. That was followed by a jurisdiction challenge heard later that year and dismissed by Chief ICC Judge Briggs (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge). The Defence was filed in March 2023. The Defendants denied the entire claim, albeit accepting that certain pre-May 2020 Wolfoo videos (or those re-mixed thereafter) included copies of Peppa Pig sounds. The Defendants say that this was the result of an independent third party contractor (Mr Khoa) providing these sounds to the Defendants for use in the Wolfoo videos without their knowledge. The Claimants do not accept this version of events which they say is implausible but also irrelevant for present purposes given that the alleged infringement of the relevant sound recordings does not depend upon the Defendants’ knowledge in any event.

After some procedural toing and froing, the Claimants applied to amend their Particulars of Claim, including on account of the Defendants’ framing of their pleaded case with respect to (i) subsistence of copyright in various copyright works and their related chain of title (ii) the alleged infringement by non-English language Wolfoo videos and (iii) the alleged infringements by Wolfoo videos since the claim was issued to answer the Defendants’ claim that such acts had stopped. The Claimants complain, in particular, that the Defendants’ position on subsistence and title made matters unnecessarily complex and protracted. Following further updates to the proposed draft APoC for different reasons, the amendment application was heard on 3 October 2024. Formal permission was subsequently granted in May 2025, the final ‘definitive’ APoC also reflecting various points made at the hearing itself.

The Claimant issued the SJ Application, together with a related application to adduce expert evidence. The former application was supported by the fourteenth witness statement of Mr Andrew Lee of the Claimants’ solicitors, Brandsmiths, dated 1 August 2025. Mr Philip Davies, one of the founders and shareholders of the Second Claimant, also served a witness statement dated 1 August 2025, explaining the creation and development of the copyright works the subject of the SJ Application. In his witness statement dated 7 July 2025, Mr Simon Weir, an independent sound analyst, explained how he performed an analysis and comparison of various sounds present in the Wolfoo videos and produced related spectograms. Mr Foster is an audio expert who explained in his report his analysis of Mr Weir’s methodology and his opinion as to what the spectrograms show.

On 17 October 2025, I gave directions for the hearing of the SJ Application, including permission for the parties to rely on expert evidence and service of responsive evidence by the Defendants.

On 28 November 2025, the Fourth Defendant, and representative of the Second, Mr Manh Hoang Ta (Mr Ta), served his sixth witness statement opposing the application on various grounds addressed below. In the event, the Defendants did not rely on expert evidence of their own.

On 7 January 2026, Mr Lee served a reply statement on behalf of the Claimants.

On 7 March 2026 (Saturday), the Defendants sent an e-mail to my clerk indicating that they may not be in a position to attend the hearing in person and asked whether the SJ Application could be dealt with on the papers, albeit recognising that the Court may proceed with the hearing in their absence. The reasons given were their suggested financial constraints, geographical location and their evidence already being before the Court. My clerk responded on 9 March explaining that the applications needed to be considered at a hearing, noting too that this had been in the Court’s diary for some time and that no request for permission to attend the hearing remotely or adjournment application had been made.

Later that day, the Defendants e-mailed my clerk again, now seeking a short adjournment on various grounds, including their unrepresented status, their presence in Vietnam, the volume of materials on the application and prior procedural aspects. I directed that, if the Defendants wished to apply for an adjournment, they should do so in the usual way and that any such application would be heard at the outset of the hearing. In the event, the Defendants did not make that application, and they did not attend, or arrange representation for, the hearing. However, the Defendants produced a substantial skeleton argument which I carefully considered, together with Mr Ta’s evidence and their Amended Defence.

As noted, the SJ Application is for summary judgment on that part of the Claimants’ claim relating to the alleged infringement of their copyright in certain sound recordings. These recordings are described as the “Audio Clips”, said to be recordings of sounds (for example words uttered by Peppa Pig characters or sound effects) comprising individual audio clips included in whole or in part in numerous Peppa Pig episodes. The APoC explains that each Audio Clip was recorded individually as a separate recording, not an extract from a longer recording. Mr Davies confirms the same in his evidence.

The Audio Clips alleged to have been copied by the Defendants are listed in Schedules 4 and 4A-4D to the APoC. Those schedules distinguish between the clips that appeared in English or non-English Wolfoo videos and when those videos were available (if known). Schedules 6 and 6A-6B to the APoC detail the alleged ownership of the relevant copyright works, including in the Audio Clips, and identify the related documents. Mr Davies again provides further information in his evidence. Schedule 7 to the APoC details the relevant Peppa Pig sounds and, where identified, a time stamp indicating where they are believed to appear within a Peppa Pig episode.

By now, the universe of Wolfoo videos runs into the tens of thousands. As Ms Sevdali explained in her witness statement from April 2024, a representative sample of 91 Wolfoo English language videos uploaded prior to commencement of these proceedings was randomly selected for the purpose of the APoC (Schedule 4) from seven English-language Wolfoo channels. Ms Sevdali also explained the process for selection of foreign language and/ or later uploaded materials.

Mr Weir explains in his statement how each Peppa Pig and Wolfoo sound can be represented by its own unique spectrogram and how such spectrograms have been prepared by him and then compared, allowing similarities or differences to be identified. He concludes that a number of the Wolfoo sounds are either exactly the same as the corresponding Peppa Pig sounds or they have been altered in some minor way after the initial copies were made, albeit digital copies nonetheless. Mr Foster opines in his report as to the soundness of Mr Weir’s methodology as well as explaining his own sample testing.

The Claimants say that the summary judgment should be entered on the sound recording claim because the Defendants have no realistic prospect of disproving the spectrogram analysis. Any other competent spectrogram analysis would show the same thing. The Claimants say that they are reinforced in their argument by the Defendants’ admission that Mr Khoa had copied for use in Wolfoo animations sounds from downloaded episodes of Peppa Pig animations available on YouTube. Moreover, although the Defendants say that all newly produced Wolfoo animations after mid-2020 use only sounds created in-house by the First Defendant’s sound recording facility (except for certain ‘re-mixes’), this can be disproved. A number have been uploaded (and likely produced) well after mid-2020.

Moreover, to use my vernacular, the Defendants’ approach in their Defence and, now on the SJ Application, is said to be one of ‘throwing stones’ from the sidelines about what the Claimants have to prove without meaningful engagement with the comprehensive evidence that has been served. The Claimants say that, having avoided addressing the evidence, the Defendants then descend into speculation about what might turn up in due course and what further investigation is said to be required, including at a trial, to that end.

That opposition from the Defendants to the SJ Application is framed by reference to a number of overarching grounds including as to (i) the identification of the alleged copyright works and subsistence of copyright (ii) the scope and alleged ownership of the alleged sound recordings (iii) the alleged similarity between the respective works and (iv) the proper role of expert evidence in determining those issues. Based on their related arguments, they invite the Court to dismiss the SJ Application. These points (and others) are developed in some detail in the Defendants’ skeleton argument and Mr Ta’s witness statement for the SJ Application. The merits apart, the Defendants also say that there are a number of compelling reasons why this aspect of the Claimants’ claims must be resolved at trial, drawing in particular on the various matters which need to be investigated further and the related steps required before this aspect of the Claimants’ claims can fairly or sensibly be resolved. I address their points where they most conveniently arise below.

The Claimants say that there is there no compelling reason for the sound recording claim to be disposed of at trial. There is no realistic room for dispute given that the copying has been exact and there is no factual evidence that the Defendants could adduce to rebut the related findings. The claim is a discrete one and determining it now would narrow the issues for trial and reduce the complexity of those that remain to be dealt with, possibly encouraging settlement. The desirability of dealing with the sound recording claim now is said to be reinforced by the extent of the Defendants’ activities indicated by the evidence. Some 38,642 Wolfoo videos had been released by the end of 2024. Subscribers across the various YouTube channels were in excess of 113 million by April 2025. Based on analytics data commissioned from a third party, the Claimants estimate the total number of YouTube views worldwide for Wolfoo to 2024 to have been more than 48 billion. At their peak in September 2021, viewers reached 2 billion per month, since decreased significantly, possibly as a result of more effective ‘take-down notice’ action. The Claimants estimate the Defendants’ corresponding revenues from YouTube to have run into tens of millions of US dollars to 2024.

Although the Defendants have denied ‘targeting’ in the UK and EU Member States, the Claimants say that the Defendants’ own unverified data exhibited to Mr Ta’s third witness statement indicates UK viewing figures in 2022 to the date of his statement (July) of approximately 158 million, with worldwide viewing figures running into the billions.

There was no dispute about the principles engaged on a summary judgment application, albeit the parties emphasised different aspects. These principles were helpfully summarised by Lewison J as he then was in Easyair Limited v Opal Telecom Limited [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) (at [15]) (as approved by the Court of Appeal in AC Ward & Son v Catlin (Five) Ltd & ors [2009] EWCA Civ 1098 (at [24]) in the following terms on an application in that case for summary judgment against the Claimant on its claim):-

“i)

The court must consider whether the claimant has a “realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of success: Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91;

ii)

A “realistic” claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8];

iii)

In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a “mini-trial”: Swain v Hillman;

iv)

This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10];

v)

However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550;

vi)

Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63;

vii)

On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent’s case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant’s case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725.”

The SJ Application is directed to the First and Fourth (not the Second) Defendants. The Defendants plead that the First Defendant carried out the activities of creating and uploading the Wolfoo animations in issue in Vietnam. They admit that, from early 2018 to mid-2020, the First Defendant’s employees used the soundtracks for Wolfoo animation from sound files created and provided by Mr Khoa who himself admitted in December 2022 that he copied sounds from downloaded episodes of Peppa Pig from YouTube before sending sound files to the First Defendant for use in Wolfoo animations.

As for the Fourth Defendant, the Defendants plead that (i) he directed the activities of the First Defendant, albeit ceasing in January 2025 (ii) his role was limited to “overall management” and was of a “general managerial and legal” nature (iii) he did not participate directly in the creation, production or uploading of Wolfoo content (iv) he had no knowledge that any of the First Defendant’s activities were infringing and (v) he did not carry out the alleged infringing acts or direct the First Defendant to carry them out or commit them pursuant to a common design. In his evidence, Mr Ta has also stated that he (i) established the First Defendant (TA2) (ii) was its owner and principal investor (TA6) (iii) was its CEO and sole director, directly in charge of the business management (TA1) (v) was responsible for setting business goals and making strategic decisions for the business affairs (TA3) and (vi) as at November 2025, was the First Defendant’s representative and directed and oversaw its activities (TA6).

The Claimants also rely on Mr Ta’s own prior evidence as to the work that he undertook with the First Defendants’ team in coming “ … up with the idea of rebuilding the wolf image to Wolfoo and images to other familiar characters as well to get over stereotypes and win sympathy of the audience.” Mr Ta also explained how, based on his common sense, Wolfoo is “essentially an animal that represents intelligence, self-control, courage and teamwork.” He also did some research on the familiarity of wolves in various fields and found that they represent strength, dynamism, enthusiasm, bravery and intelligence in America. He also explains how “[w]e target children between the ages of 3 and 8”, realising the need to create characters suitable for children’s tastes, habits and behaviours. Finally, he explains how he and the First Defendant’s production team chose the character named Wolfoo, built a set of characters for Wolfoo, created Wolfoo videos according to a five stage process and researched and targeted the US and Vietnam markets. The Claimants say that their targeting went wider but, having gone through all these decisions with his production team, it is implausible that the man who owned and created Wolfoo was not involved in the allegedly infringing videos.

Indeed, the First Defendant clearly being Mr Ta’s own vehicle, the Claimants say that it is inevitable that he will be found to have directed or authorised or procured the infringements with knowledge of the essential facts, thus making him liable as a joint tortfeasor under the principles indicated in Lifestyle Equities CV v Ahmed [2024] UKSC 17 at [135]-[137], the essential facts being that the Claimants have rights in the sound recordings and that they have been copied without a licence. On the basis of what the Defendants admit as to Mr Ta’s control and direction of the First Defendant, and what they positively assert themselves as to his involvement with the activities of the production team, there is no real prospect of any defence to the claim that he is jointly and severally liable for any infringements.

The Defendants say that the Claimants’ approach to the allocation of liability between the different Defendants is misconceived since, as the Amended Defence and Mr Ta’s evidence explains, their respective roles were materially different. As such, the attribution of any liability could not be addressed on a summary basis rather than at trial following the provision of disclosure and witness evidence.

As a preliminary point, the First Defendant created and uploaded videos which contained sounds from Peppa Pig videos. The fact that Mr Khoa may have provided those sounds is irrelevant for the purpose of infringement by their copying and communication. Liability is strict. Accordingly, subject to the other elements of the sound recording claim discussed below, the First Defendant would be primarily liable as tortfeasor with respect to both types of infringement alleged. I return to the question of the Fourth Defendant’s potential accessory liability after considering the elements of the cause of action in issue here.

As noted, the Claimants allege that their sound recording copyrights have been infringed in a number of countries other than in the UK. Although the evidence indicates that the alleged copying of the Claimants’ sound recordings, initially by Mr Khoa and later by the First Defendant, took place in Vietnam, the other alleged infringement - communication - occurred in a number of different jurisdictions. The Claimants have not pleaded the relevant local law applicable in those jurisdictions but rely on the ‘default rule’ that the Court will apply English law in default of a plea of foreign law and/ or the evidential ‘presumption of similarity’ between English and foreign laws.

The nature and operation of the ‘default rule’ and the ‘presumption of similarity’ were discussed by Lord Leggatt (with whom the other Justices agreed on this aspect) in FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) LLC v Lady Brownlie [2021] UKSC 45 (at [113]-[126]). The former rule is not concerned with establishing the content of foreign law rather than treating English law as applicable in its own right where foreign law is not pleaded. The rationale for the rule is that, in the English adversarial system, the issues in proceedings are defined by the parties’ statements of case. It is for the parties to choose whether to plead that foreign law applies to the claim. Neither party is obliged to do so. If neither does, the court will apply its own law to the issues in dispute. The rule is one of English civil procedure. Since the Rome I and Rome II Regulations do not apply to “evidence and procedure”, they do not operate to oust the rule. With limited exceptions, it will apply even if the case is one to which a foreign system of law would clearly have to be applied if either party had chosen to rely on that fact.

If either party pleads that, under the relevant rules of English private international law, foreign law applies to an obligation, and that case is well founded, it is the duty of the court to apply foreign law. The burden is on the party making or defending a claim to prove that it has a legally valid claim or defence. Where the law applicable to the claim or defence is a foreign system of law, this will require the party to show that it has a good claim or defence under that law. Where the party fails to prove its claim or defence, the claim is dismissed or the defence rejected. There is no scope for applying English law in its own right. If English law has any role to play, it can only be on the basis of a presumption that the content of the applicable foreign law is materially similar to the English law on the matter in question. Since this presumption is part of the law of evidence, it is also not affected by the Rome I and Rome II Regulations.

The presumption recognises that there are often similarities between the laws of different countries, even where the foreign system of law is a civil one. It is enhanced where, often in the sphere of commercial law, international treaties promoting the harmonisation of laws have been adopted. Doing practical justice between the parties does not require a party to be put to the trouble and expense of proving a foreign law unless there is a real likelihood of differences with English law leading to a different outcome. Nor does the presumption of similarity itself determine any legal issue or operate to change the legal burden of proof. Where the presumption applies, it merely places a burden of adducing evidence on the party wishing to show that it is materially different from English law on the point in issue.

Finally, Brownlie recognised the flexibility of the presumption and how there was no warrant for its application unless fair and reasonable to do so in the particular case. The question is one of fact: is it reasonable in the circumstances to expect that the applicable foreign law is likely to be materially similar to English law on the matter in issue such that any differences between the two systems are unlikely to lead to a different substantive outcome?

To that end, the Claimants say that the immateriality of any differences is readily apparent from the regimes engaged in the different territories implicated. In this case, the Claimants’ claim is concerned with three country ‘categories’. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CPDA) governs the position in the UK. In the European Union, copyright law is harmonised by the Information Society Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC) (ISD). Prior to the UK leaving the EU, UK law was harmonised with EU copyright law. I accept that, on the implementation period completion day (31 December 2020) (IP Day), EU copyright case law then in existence passed into UK law as ‘assimilated’ law, the CPDA being “EU-derived domestic legislation” within the meaning of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2000 (s.1B(7)). Although not itself enacted to implement EU requirements, the CPDA was the means by which the UK had demonstrated compliance in the copyright field.

The Claimants says that there have been no relevant material changes since made to UK or EU law, the Defendants have identified none and their (pleaded) suggestion that the Court should “adopt a flexible approach in assessing the relationship between UK and EU law under the principle of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, recognising that individual cases may bring swift and significant changes”, is pure Micawberism. The Claimants also say that the Defendants have failed to identify a single respect in which the law of any EU Member State is different from UK law. The mere pleaded assertion of material difference in France, Germany and Spain is highly improbable given the harmonisation described.

As for the rest of the world, copyright in sound recordings is the subject of international treaty protections in terms of minimum standards and reciprocity, most relevantly for these purposes under the (i) 1961 Rome Convention on the International Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome Convention) with 99 contracting parties (ii) 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) between all 166 World Trade Organisation member states and (iii) 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) with 114 contracting parties.

Article 1(3) of TRIPS requires compliance with Article 3(b) of the Rome Convention, the latter defining a “phonogram” as “any exclusively aural fixation of sounds of a performance or other sounds”. Article 2(b) of WPPT defines “phonogram” as the fixation of the sounds of a performance or of other sounds, or of a representation of sounds, other than in the form of a fixation incorporated in a cinematographic or other audiovisual work. This exception is concerned with film copyright. However, the Claimants say that, contrary to some of the suggestions made by the Defendants in these proceedings, this claim concerns the separate sound recordings in the form of the short Audio Clips which are afforded protection in their own right.

Article 3(c) of the Rome Convention provides that “producer of phonograms “means the person who, or the legal entity which, first fixes the sounds.” Article 2(b) of the WPPT defines the “producer of a phonogram” as “the person, or the legal entity, who or which takes the initiative and has the responsibility for the first fixation of the sounds of a performance or other sounds, or the representations of sounds.”

Article 10 of the Rome Convention and Article 14(2) of TRIPS both provide that “[p]roducers of phonograms shall enjoy the right to authorise or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms”. This is directed to the prevention of the copying of phonograms. Articles 11 of the WPPT has the same effect.

Article 14 of the WPPT also goes on to provide that “[p]roducers of phonograms shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of their phonograms, by wire or wireless means, in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.” The Claimants say that this article would be engaged where, as here, the Defendants made available Wolfoo videos on YouTube for viewing at the time chosen by the viewer. Although an equivalent article does not feature in the Rome Conventions or TRIPS, the Claimants say that reliance on treaties for that purpose is not necessary; it would be astonishing if a country did not protect the right of a phonogram producer to the public under its own national laws. Certainly, the Defendants have not identified any.

Each of the treaties accords “national” or “most-favoured nation” treatment such that, subject to potential reservation(s) (none pleaded by the Defendants), each contracting party is obliged to provide nationals of all other contracting parties with the same level of protection as it provides to its own nationals (Rome Convention, Articles 2 and 5; TRIPS, Articles 1(3) and 3; WPPT, Articles 3 and 4). The UK is a member or contracting state for purpose of each of these three treaties such that the Claimants benefit from such treatment.

Finally in this regard, although the Defendants suggest that local laws in various specified non-EU foreign countries are “materially different” to the laws of England, the Claimants say that this too is mere assertion, not a plea of foreign law, and it does not come close to rebutting the presumption of similarity.

The Defendants say that this aspect presents real problems for the Claimants. The Claimants recognise that copyright is a matter of national law and that issues of subsistence, qualification, ownership and infringement fall to be decided under the governing law of the country where the alleged infringement took place (lex loci proctectionis). They must know which legal regime is said to govern these issues. However, they have failed to identify the elements of national law relied on for any country. They cannot simply proceed on the basis that English copyright law may be applied across multiple jurisdictions. The Claimants’ reliance on Brownlie to say that English law applies by default or that the foreign law should be presumed to be materially the same reveals a clear dispute between the parties as to the legal framework for the claim.

Although the Claimants argue otherwise, I am prepared to accept, at least for the purpose of the SJ Application, that the Defendants have sufficiently put in issue on their pleading that the claims here are governed by the local law of the jurisdiction where the infringement occurred. In the case of infringement by copying, that would appear to be Vietnam. For the alleged infringement by communication, that would cover a much larger number of jurisdictions, the alleged infringing Wolfoo videos being available globally for download from YouTube. Although I am willing to assume for present purposes that the ‘default rule’ is not engaged, I do agree that the Claimants are entitled to rely on the presumption of similarity to contend that there is no material difference between the laws of those jurisdictions and the UK. Consistent with the flexibility of the presumption indicated in Brownlie, there is more than ample basis to conclude that it is fair and reasonable to apply the presumption.

Indeed, given the UK’s recent historical membership of the EU and application of copyright law in a manner consistent with EU law, there is no basis for this court to conclude that the courts of France, Spain, Germany or of the other EU27 states would apply their own related laws materially differently from those of the UK. For the rest of the world, the treaty regime described also provides a compelling basis for the application of the presumption, confirming as it does the international protection of phonogram producers from infringement by copying and, in the case of the WPPT, by communication. Save for limitation (addressed below), the Defendants have not identified in their pleading or in their evidence for the SJ Application any material differences between the laws of the UK and those of other jurisdictions, even by way of example. I agree that it is not enough, even for the purpose of the SJ Application, for the Defendants simply to assert a somewhat bald belief that such material differences exist and that further investigation is required at or before trial. Consistent with Brownlie, it is incumbent on the Defendants to indicate some basis for that assertion and to do so with a sufficient degree of conviction. Both are lacking here. As such, I agree that the Defendants have no real prospect of defending the sound recording copyright claim on this account. That view is reinforced by my analysis below of the substantive elements of the sound recording claim.

The copyright at issue here protects the sound recording itself, not the underlying recorded sound. As such, there is no need for the recording to be “original” in the sense that it is the product of creative choice(s). Nor do the treaties considered above contain any requirement for originality of sound recordings. The Defendants appear to rely in this regard on two copyright authorities, Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 2416 and Baigent v Random House Group Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 247. However, apart from stating in general terms the legal principles to which they say these cases are directed, I could not discern their suggested relevance or application here. Those cases concerned literary and artistic works, both requiring (differently from sound recordings) “originality” for copyright protection.

CPDA, s.5A(2) provides that “[c]opyright does not subsist in a sound recording which is, or to the extent that it is, a copy taken from a previous sound recording.” This brings us to the Audio Clips themselves, as to which, the Claimants plead that each clip was recorded individually as a separate recording and not as part of a longer recording. The Claimants say that the Defendants have sought to characterise them as relying for the purpose of the sound recording claim on the copies of the audio clips as they feature in the Peppa Pig videos but that this is misconceived. As Chief ICC Judge Briggs found on the jurisdiction application, that was the Defendants’ invention, not the Claimants’ actual claim. Despite this, the Defendants’ Amended Defence also says (at [31A]) that “it is inherent in the description” that these clips are taken from another larger and unidentified audio or film source. This does not follow. A ‘clip’ may be a standalone recording or it may be part of something larger.

The Defendants also seek to compound the suggested uncertainty by relying on the lack of disclosure of the original Audio Clips and on Mr Weir having undertaken his sound comparison using Peppa Pig videos from YouTube rather than from the underlying Audio Clips themselves. On this basis, Mr Ta concludes in his sixth witness statement that he does not understand “what copyright works the Claimants rely on in respect of their audio infringement allegations.” Again, I found the Defendants’ position unavailing. It is perfectly clear that the Claimants rely on the Audio Clips as the copyright works. Mr Davies explained the process of the production of the Audio Clips and how these were subsequently used in Peppa Pig episodes. Mr Lee explained the filing and storage system for the Audio Clips, including based on his own discussions with the current production company, Karrot. Mr Weir also carefully explained the process of analysis of the Peppa Pig and Wolfoo videos. Given the Claimants’ evidence as to how these Audio Clips are stored and the difficulties in locating them, it is understandable why they say it would be onerous and disproportionate to search for the original Audio Clips and why the Claimants have used the Peppa Pig videos to seek to demonstrate infringement by copying. The Audio Clips were obviously created to allow them subsequently to be used in the Peppa Pig videos.

Whether on the SJ Application or at trial, it would be open to the Claimants to seek to prove the “original” sound recording by evidence other than the original itself (see Copinger on Copyright 19^th ed. ¶24-404). Although the Defendants continue to cast doubt in their evidence and submissions on the identity of the copyright works, they have again not engaged meaningfully with the Claimants’ related body of evidence, let alone indicated with a sufficient degree of conviction why it cannot be relied on. Simply raising a doubt is not sufficient to demonstrate a real prospect of success in the Defendants’ ability to meet this aspect of the sound recordings claim.

CPDA, s.9 provides that the author in the case of a sound recording is the “producer”, itself defined in s.178 as “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the making of the sound recording [..] are undertaken”. In seeking to identify the producer, the Court will adopt a multi-factorial assessment (see for example, Henry Hadaway Organisation Ltd v Pickwick Group Limited [2015] EWHC 3407 (IPEC) at [77-79]). Relevant arrangements would include, for example, booking the recording studio and the performer(s). The Defendants suggest in their skeleton argument that the Claimants have provided no particulars of creation of the sound recordings, the date of their creation, the alleged authors or the persons or companies responsible for the creation of works. I agree that this is a hopeless argument. These matters are addressed comprehensively in Schedule 6 to the APoC and Mr. Davies’ witness statement (at [38]-[50]). During the relevant period, Mr Davies was responsible for producing Peppa Pig through the various production companies he mentions. The evidence shows clearly that those companies were responsible for a whole range of activities, including arranging the sound recordings. There is again no meaningful challenge to that evidence. As noted, the CPDA previously fell to be interpreted in a manner consistent with EU law. The concept of “producer” is consistent with that indicated by the WPPT. Although they do not define the producer in the same terms, there is no reason to believe that the production companies involved in the Peppa Pig series would not be treated in the same way by the courts of those countries which participate in the Rome Convention or TRIPS. Although Mr Ta suggests that the laws of initial copyright ownership in foreign countries are different to the UK, he does not indicate any material difference in this regard with the laws of the UK. Again, this is mere assertion which lacks a sufficient degree of conviction for these summary judgment purposes.

The Defendants do raise certain specific points, for example with respect to the lack of written contracts with the recording studios at which the Audio Clips were recorded. However, I agree that this point goes nowhere. There is no basis for suggesting that the recording studio might be the producer and, therefore, the first owner of the copyright. The production companies undertook the relevant arrangements to make the sound recording. Booking the studio was but one element. Mr Ta also complains about the absence of agreements with the voice actors but the point is to the same inconclusive end. The Claimants have, in fact, produced a selection of such contracts from the first series of Peppa Pig. These underline the existence of the ‘original’ sound recordings in the form of the Audio Clips. However, the performance rights those voice actors might enjoy under the CPDA are not at issue in this case. The claim is concerned with copyright in the sound recordings.

Finally in terms of qualification for copyright, a sound recording will enjoy UK copyright protection if its author was, amongst other things, a company incorporated under UK law when the recording was made (CDPA, s.154(1)(c)). The evidence indicates that the production companies involved were all UK registered companies. As such, they qualified for UK copyright protection (and the same treatment as overseas nationals by reason of the treaty regime described).

The Claimants’ claim to ownership of the copyright in the sound recordings is set out in detail in Schedule 6 to the APoC. Those details are not admitted by the Defendants who put the Claimants to proof thereof. Schedules 6A-6B of the APoC set out details of the relevant documents. The position is also explained in detail by Mr Davies, the individual responsible for the Peppa Pig production between 1999 and 2021, in his statement. This explains the identity and role of the producer and author production companies and the transactions undertaken by which the Claimants came to be the owners of the copyright in the Audio Clips, including in each Peppa Pig series.

Mr Ta has sought to suggest that Mr Davies’ evidence is “vague recollection.” To the contrary, having followed the chain of copyright title by reference that evidence, I consider that Mr Davies’ evidence is cogent, compelling and corroborated by the record. Mr Ta’s attempt to cast doubt in that regard again lacks conviction.

Mr Ta also seeks to criticise a particular agreement said to have been made between Mr Astley and Mr Baker, two of the original Peppa Pig progenitors. However, like the Claimants, I found the Defendants’ point unclear. I was unable to discern any sound recording agreements between those individuals personally. Rather, the evidence and documents showed that the producer and first copyright owner of the relevant Audio Clips was Creative Film Productions Limited.

More generally, Mr Ta criticises the redactions made to the documents supporting the chain of title. However, the Claimants have confirmed their compliance with CPR, PD 57AD with respect to the redaction of only commercial confidential and irrelevant material. There is no basis for me to question the Claimants’ approach. No specific complaints are made that particular redactions need to be unsealed to deduce title. I agree that this does not take the Defendants anywhere.

Mr Ta also points to the lack of agreements or assignments with respect to the voice actors. In fact, as noted, Mr Davies has produced a number of such agreements for the first series. Mr Ta does not explain their relevance but I agree that these have no bearing on copyright ownership in the sound recordings save to confirm the existence of the copyright works in the form of the Audio Clips.

In the face of the comprehensive position set out in the Claimants’ evidence, I agree that the Defendants’ points do not come close to the degree of conviction required for the latter to show a real prospect of successfully challenging the existence of the copyright works in the form of the Audio Clips, the Claimants’ title to the copyright therein or their right to sue for its infringement.

Copying - the law

The Claimants say that one aspect of the infringement is the Defendants’ copying of the Audio Clips. Although the Defendants accept that some sounds were copied from episodes of Peppa Pig downloaded from YouTube, they do not say where this copying occurred. I agree that this was likely Vietnam (where the creation and uploading of the Wolfoo videos is accepted to have taken place). The Defendants do not indicate any reason why Vietnamese law relating to copyright infringement might be materially different from UK law. If it were, they could readily have explained in what respect(s).

CPDA, s.17 provides that “[t]he copying of the work is an act restricted by the copyright in every description of copyright work.” The state of mind of the infringing party is not relevant for this type of infringement whether under UK law, EU law (under the ISD) or the treaty regime described above. Copying can be direct or, as alleged here, indirect (CDPA, s. 16(3)(b); Article 2 of the ISD).

The effect of CPDA, s.16(3)(a) is that infringement occurs by copying the “whole or any substantial part of” the relevant copyright work. Before IP Day, “substantial” was required to be interpreted consistently with EU law, the ISD not referring to “substantial” rather than merely “in whole or in part”. The Grand Chamber in Pelham (C-476/17 of 29 July 2019) held that the producer’s exclusive right under Article 2(c) of the ISD to reproduce and distribute his phonogram entitled him to prevent another person from taking a sound sample, even if very short, of his phonogram for the purposes of including that sample in another phonogram, unless that sample is included in the phonogram in a “modified form unrecognisable to the ear”. Although it would now be open to the Court of Appeal to depart from Pelham, no basis for doing so has been indicated by the Defendants. A number of the relevant infringements are said to have occurred before IP Day in any event.

As to the facts said to support the copying infringements here, the Claimants say that the relevant Peppa Pig production companies copied the Audio Clips into the soundtracks of Peppa Pig videos with sounds from those soundtracks then copied by the Defendants. This amounted to indirect copying of the Audio Clips which, as noted, is no less an infringement than direct copying. The Claimants also say that the copies of the Audio Clips featuring in the Peppa Pig videos are “faithful” copies. The evidence of Mr Lee and Mr Davies indicates some minor alterations on account of changes to speed and pitch when, for example, a voice actor gets older. However, the sounds featuring in the videos remain recognisable as copies of the “original” Audio Clips. The whole point of making the Audio Clips was their use in Peppa Pig videos in the form recorded.

As to the comparison of the sounds featuring in the Peppa Pig and Wolfoo videos, the Claimants rely on the evidence of the sound recording analyst, Mr Weir, who carried out the task of comparing spectrograms and confirmed that they are copies. His methodology was endorsed by Mr Foster. Mr Foster’s own comparison of some of the sounds also revealed them to be copies. Although he doubted one of Mr Weir’s conclusions given the level of extraneous noise, he still found it to be a copy using an alternative methodology. On the basis that Mr Weir had followed his stated methodology and was respectful of the uncertainty that can be caused by extraneous noise, he had no reason to doubt Mr Weir’s conclusions. As to the latter point, it is apparent that Mr Weir did pay appropriate regard to background noise, rejecting some Peppa Pig samples on that account.

As Mr Lee and Mr Weir explain in their evidence, the Claimants’ solicitors compiled two tables listing (214) Peppa Pig sounds believed to have been copied and, where a sound reference had been identified, a link to an audio file of the Peppa Pig sound in question and details of the Peppa Pig episode in which the sound appeared. In relation to the pre-issue English language Wolfoo videos (APoC, Schedule 4), all videos from two of the 7 English language Wolfoo channels were selected. Videos from the other 5 English language Wolfoo channels were selected on the basis of randomly allocated YouTube identifiers. According to Mr Weir, 91 out of 92 of the (pre-issue) English-language videos contained at least three confirmed ‘matches’ to a Peppa Pig sound, with a total of 1175 matches found across 92 videos (92 out of 92 once the relevant full length video (WV84a) was identified rather than the trailer (WV84)). For proportionality reasons, only the first three confirmed matches were tested such that the 1175 figure is a minimum number.

Post-issue videos were also tested to see whether Defendants had continued to upload videos including copies of Audio Clips following the commencement of proceedings. Of the post-issue English language videos (APoC, Schedule 4A), 8 videos were selected from the 4 Wolfoo channels that were still active after service of the claim form. These were chosen by duration. 7 out of the 8 videos confirmed a match with a total of 51 matches across the videos, the eighth being significantly shorter than the others.

Foreign language videos were also tested, the Defendants having attempted to dismiss the Claimants’ infringement claims outside the UK on the grounds that the Audio Clips relied on were in the English language. However, the Claimants say that, on investigation, it transpired that numerous English language Audio Clips had been copied into foreign language Wolfoo videos too.

74 foreign language videos were selected. Of the pre-issue foreign language videos (APoC, Schedule 4B), 31 were selected. Of the post-issue foreign language videos (APoC, Schedule 4C), 23 were selected. Of the foreign language videos with unidentifiable upload date (APoC, Schedule 4D), 20 were selected. For the Schedule 4B and 4C videos, those selected comprised the oldest 5 videos on 19 Wolfoo channels. 75 were, in fact, tested with 57 out of 75 containing sounds that were matches and a total of 331 matches identified. For proportionality reasons, only the first confirmed match was tested. As such, this is again a minimum figure, the actual total likely to be much higher.

After de-duplication, the above matches correspond to a total of 67 Peppa Pig sounds.

As noted, the Defendants admit that an independent third party, Mr Khoa, included copies of sounds from Peppa Pig videos in Wolfoo videos. Mr Khoa apparently admitted to the Defendants that he copied (unspecified) sounds from (unspecified) downloaded episodes of Peppa Pig and sent (unspecified) sound files to the First Defendant for use in Wolfoo videos. The Defendants say that these sounds were used in 66 of the Wolfoo videos identified in APoC, Schedule 4. They do not plead to the others. However, the Claimants’ own testing by Mr Weir shows copying of Audio Clips in all the Schedule 4 videos. Since that is not the full Wolfoo corpus of videos, the Claimants say that actual copying is likely to be more extensive.

Nor do the Defendants plead to the Schedule 4A-4D Wolfoo videos. As such, the Claimants say that the Defendants are deemed to have admitted that they include copies, CPR, Part 15.5 stating in relevant part that:-

“(3)

If a defendant- (a) fails to deal with an allegation; but (b) sets out in the defence the nature of their case in relation to the issue to which that allegation is relevant, the claimant is required to prove the allegation.

[...]

(5)

Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), a defendant who fails to deal with an allegation shall be taken to admit that allegation.”

The Claimants also say that Mr Ta’s evidence that “all Wolfoo audio material produced from mid-2020 onwards were independently created” is “manifestly unsustainable”. To that end, Mr Lee identifies 108 newly produced Wolfoo videos listed in APoC, Schedules 4, and 4A-4D as containing infringing material. These were uploaded between May 2020 and March 2023. The Claimants say that it is a reasonable inference that these videos were uploaded soon after they were made. In the absence of meaningful engagement by the Defendants on this aspect, I agree.

The Defendants also plead that all allegedly infringing videos had been removed by 15 September 2023 but the Claimants say that that too is demonstrably untrue. To that end, the Claimants point to Mr Lee’s evidence from August 2025 that, although the Defendants had by then taken down around 100 of the videos listed in APoC Schedules 4 and 4A-D of the APOC, they had moved the remaining 70 or so to different channels where they were still live.

Finally, the Defendants have not offered any undertaking not to restore the videos they have taken down to YouTube or otherwise to cease exploiting them.

The Defendants also raise various complaints on the SJ Application relating to the allegation of infringement by copying. For example, they say that they had insufficient time to instruct their own expert. I agree that this complaint is unjustified. The Defendants knew from the issue of the SJ Application on 1 August 2025 that the Claimants would seek to rely on expert evidence and were later given additional time in which to serve this. They have had ample opportunity to do so.

Mr Ta also claims that material uploaded to YouTube is altered by compression, mixing, channel blending and other post-production processes. However, there is no expert evidence to support that proposition. Moreover, as noted, the Claimants’ evidence is that such minor changes to the extent that they occurred in the preparation and uploading of Peppa Pig videos were not significant, the YouTube copies copied by the Defendants being recognisable copies of the original Audio Clips in the sense indicated in Pelham. I agree that the Defendants’ claim is further unsubstantiated assertion.

Relatedly, Mr Ta suggests that the compared sounds extracted from the Peppa Pig and Wolfoo videos may have been extracts of the Audio Clips. However, even if that were right, it is clear from the evidence that such copying by the Defendants would still represent copying “in whole or in part” as indicated by Pelham. This point too was not impactful.

Mr Ta also states that the evidence of Mr Weir and Mr Foster relies on subjective aural impression. I agree that this is wrong. Mr Weir’s evidence is based on spectrographic analysis. Mr Foster confirms the validity of this approach.

Finally, the Defendants also suggested that the Claimants had changed and significantly narrowed their case in this regard. I agree that they have done so but this did not suggest uncertainty or ambiguity in the Claimants’ case rather than their positive decision to take an even more systematic and focused approach to the evidence in light of points raised by the Defendants and the volume of material involved. I accept that this is why the Claimants changed their original case on copying from one based on analysis by ear to a more scientific basis using Spectogram analysis and a manageable number of sample allegations, identifying a small number of copying infringements per video. I therefore reject Mr Ta’s suggestion of the lack of reliability or stability.

The Claimants’ evidence as to the Defendants’ copying of the Audio Clips is compelling. That copying was extensive, seemingly endemic at least so far as the English language Wolfoo videos are concerned. The Defendants themselves admit extensive copying but do not otherwise engage meaningfully with the Claimants’ related infringement claim, let alone the expert evidence. I accept that the Defendants’ assertions as to the non-uploading of new infringing material from May 2020 and the removal of all allegedly infringing videos are readily disproven. More generally, the points they raise on the SJ Application under this issue did not carry a sufficient degree of conviction. The Defendants have no real prospect of successfully defending the claim for infringement by the (indirect) copying of those Peppa Pig sounds which Mr Weir found to match those on the Wolfoo videos.

CPDA, s.20(1)(b) provides that the communication to the public of a work is an act restricted by the copyright in a sound recording. For this type of infringement to occur, it is not necessary that the viewer actually receives or downloads the communication. Liability for this type of infringement is also strict. However, as the Claimants accept as a matter of UK and EU law, and therefore of the presumed law of the other countries in this case, communication to the public requires “targeting”.

The Defendants had claimed in their earlier evidence that the UK was not targeted rather than the US, Canada and Vietnam. The Claimants say that the falsity of this evidence is revealed by other parts of the earlier evidence, including the Defendants’ own YouTube viewer statistics which showed that Wolfoo had very large numbers of users in the UK and most countries in the world. Although UK viewers accounted for around only 3% of Wolfoo viewers, they say that this is not relevant in light of the very large numbers of views (exceeding one billion per year worldwide from 2020-2022). “Targeting” is a multifactorial question but, based on these figures, the Claimants say that there is no doubt that Wolfoo was targeted to the UK and worldwide.

Having considered carefully the Defendants’ viewer figures that were previously produced, I agree. The Defendants have not produced any meaningful evidence on the SJ Application to counter or qualify that. There was a suggestion in Mr Ta’s prior evidence that “no owner of a channel can arbitrarily set restrictions for any country” and that it was only possible to select the restricted countries on a YouTube list on which the UK did not feature. The difficulty with that evidence is that the YouTube documentation relied on indicates the ability to block a video in different territories. If anything, that reinforces the Defendants’ targeting of multiple countries, including the UK.

I therefore find that there is no real prospect of successfully defending the sound recording copyright infringement claim in respect of the Defendants’ communication of the Peppa Pig sounds which Mr Weir found to match those on the Wolfoo videos uploaded by the Defendants to YouTube.

In paragraph 5E(3) of the Amended Defence, the Defendants refer to claims for alleged infringement subject to different laws and, specifically, their relevant English and foreign limitation periods. The Claimants say that the Defendants presume to suggest that the Claimants say the infringements took place prior to certain dates. Although the Claimants have provided the upload dates for the Wolfoo videos, they have also pleaded that they downloaded copies from YouTube no earlier than January 2022. At that (latter) point, the Defendants continued to communicate to the public the Peppa Pig sound recordings as had been indirectly copied into Wolfoo videos. These proceedings were issued in January 2022. The subsequent amendments to the APoC and substitution of the First Claimant notwithstanding, I agree that there is therefore no real prospect of the Defendants successfully defending the sound recording claim on the basis of the limitation periods identified.

I also agree with the Claimants that there is no other compelling reason why this sound recording element of the claims should be determined at trial. The Defendants say that the present case raises a number of circumstances which, individually and cumulatively, demonstrate that summary judgment would be inappropriate, including the absence of disclosure and contested technical evidence, the substantial narrowing of the Claimants’ case and the unresolved issues concerning the role of the relevant Defendants. I disagree. Although the Defendants take points on every element of the claim asserted by the Claimants for infringement of the copyright in the Audio Clips, these points lead them nowhere. They represent the raising of much smoke but, in the face of a compelling and comprehensive plea of sound recording copyright infringement and a significant body of supporting evidence, they lack substance.

As to those points, disclosure is not necessary because it is open to the Claimants to prove the “original” sound recording by other means. The Defendants do not meaningfully engage with the Claimants’ related evidence in that regard rather than raise doubt which is easily dispelled. The Defendants suggest that the expert issues cannot be properly resolved. However, this also appears to be premised on the “original” sound recording point and related suggestion that audio obtained from video soundtracks may not correspond with the original. The possibility of minor changes is already addressed in the Claimants’ evidence. Again, the Defendants do not engage with this and the suggestion of the potential for such changes during post-production processes is Mr Ta’s assertion. He is not an expert and, despite being afforded the opportunity, the Defendants have adduced no expert evidence of their own.

I have also already explained that the substantial narrowing of the Claimants’ sound recording claim does not advance the Defendants’ case; quite the opposite. I accept that this was undertaken in part due to the Defendants’ approach in raising myriad doubts on the Claimants’ case without advancing a positive defence of their own. The result of that narrowing is an even more tightly drawn and heavily evidenced claim, in the face of which, the Defendants have no meaningful answer on the SJ Application. Likewise, the apportionment of liability question does not have the complexity suggested. The First Defendant is clearly liable for the sound recording copyright infringements as the entity which accepts that it created and uploaded the infringing Wolfoo videos. I return to the Fourth Defendant’s role below. Finally, the applicable law point is another red herring. To the extent that the default rule is not engaged, the Claimants have appropriately prayed in aid the presumption of similarity, reinforced by multiple compelling reasons why they say it would be appropriate to apply it here. Beyond raising doubt, the Defendants have again failed meaningfully to engage, let alone point to any material differences with local laws.

Finally, on the Defendants’ own case, Mr Khoa created copies of sound recordings from Peppa Pig videos and incorporated these into Wolfoo videos. This Court being satisfied that they were indirectly copied from the Audio Clips and that the copyright in those clips is vested in the Claimants, there is no reason for this case to proceed to trial. To the contrary, based on the evidence, I accept that the scale of the Defendants’ copying was prolific. I also reject, even on this summary basis, the Defendants’ suggestion that the infringing Wolfoo videos were all removed. The Claimants’ analysis shows that they were not and a positive decision was taken to move a number of them to different platforms. The Defendants fail meaningfully to address this either. In the circumstances described, the sound recording copyright claim should be resolved at this stage, if possible. Despite the enormous amount of smoke raised by the Defendants, I am satisfied that it is possible, in fact entirely just and consistent with the overriding objective, to do so.

The Claimants are entitled to summary judgment on their sound recording copyright claim to the extent of Mr Weir’s findings of confirmed matches between the compared sounds on the Peppa Pig and Wolfoo videos.

Given its admitted role in the creation and uploading of the Wolfoo videos, I am in no doubt that such judgment should be entered against the First Defendant.

As for the Fourth Defendant, the Defendants say in their Amended Defence that he ceased to direct the activities of the First Defendant in January 2025. However, Mr Ta says otherwise in his latest witness statement from November 2025. The Amended Defence also pleads that he did not participate directly in the creation, production or uploading of Wolfoo content. I agree that this is undermined by his earlier evidence as to his involvement with the First Defendant’s production team, including in the development of the Wolfoo character and the creation and production of Wolfoo videos. I also agree that it is improbable that the owner and CEO of the First Defendant would simply cease involvement with the production team thereafter. Despite these matters and the prolific sound recording copyright infringement by the First Defendant, I am unable to say at this summary judgment stage that Mr Ta’s knowledge prior to the issue of the claim was such that there is no real prospect of him successfully defeating accessory liability.

I do, however, conclude otherwise with respect to the period post-dating the issue of the claim. The Defendants say in their evidence that they removed all infringing Wolfoo videos by 15 September 2023. Mr Lee explains that enquiries undertaken as at August 2025 show that, although the Defendants have removed a large number of such videos, 70 have simply been moved to other YouTube channels. Likewise, despite the Defendants saying that Wolfoo videos were independently created after mid-2020, the Claimants’ evidence shows that new infringing material was uploaded for a significant period thereafter, including after the issue of this claim. I have no reason to question this evidence with which the Defendants again fail meaningfully to engage. I am also quite satisfied that, as the person directing the First Defendant’s activities following the commencement of the claim, Mr Ta was aware of, and authorised and directed, these further and continuing acts of infringement. As such, there is no real prospect of him avoiding accessory liability for the First Defendant’s post-issue infringement of sound recording copyright in the Audio Clips and it is appropriate that judgment be entered against him now to that extent.

There will be a consequentials hearing this term to settle the final terms of relief, including the terms of the injunctive relief necessary to protect the Claimants’ sound recording copyright in the Audio Clips. I heard argument at the hearing of the SJ Application as to the scope of that relief but I will re-visit that discussion with the benefit of my findings above.