Gabriela Mozerle Teixeira v Amir Ahmed Moaven & Ors

By my judgment, handed down on 22 May 2026 ( [2026] EWHC 1215 Ch.), followinga five day trial, I determined that certain declarations of trust (the Declarations of Trust) executed by Amir Abbas Moaven (Abbas), on 19 April 2012, were sham documents, having no legal, or equitable, effect. The successful parties now seek their costs. This judgment pertains to those costs.

The sham documents had been executed by Abbas in respect of four properties (the Properties) held by Abbas in his sole name and had been executed with the purpose of disguising the full extent of Abbas’ assets from those, specifically his wife, Gabriela, and HMRC, who might have claims on his assets. The context of the Declarations of Trust was that, on 19 April 2012, Abbas was gravely ill and the Declarations of Trust were executed in contemplation of his death and in order to purportedly reduce the size of his estate available to his wife, the Claimant, Gabriela Mozerle Teixeira (Gabriela) and her two young children, the Fifth and Sixth Defendant, Elis Teixeira Moaven (Elis) and Amir Aryan Moaven (Aryan), as well as to avoid taxation on the true and full value of his estate. The full and detailed circumstances surrounding the execution of the Declarations of Trust, as set out in my handed down judgment, at paragraphs 145 to 170 and paragraphs 176 to 184, will, save as necessary, not be repeated here.

The Declarations of Trust were confirmatory in nature, purporting to confirm informal trust arrangements entered into between Abbas, his brother, the First Defendant, Amir Ahmed Moaven (Amir), and their mother, Shokouh Nazemi Tehran (Mrs Nazemi), whereby all their assets were agreed to be pooled and owned by each of the three of them in one third equal shares.

Following the five day trial, I determined that no such informal arrangement had ever existed and that the extensive evidence given by Amir at trial was a fiction designed to underwrite, or support, the false narrative contained in the recitals to the Declarations of Trust. The Declarations of Trust, themselves, were no more than deceitful forms of words, or ‘pieces of paper’, designed to convey to those to whom they were deployed that Abbas’ estate was very much smaller than it truly was.

The costs sought in this case, on the indemnity basis, are sought by Gabriela, Elis and Aryan against Amir and against the Second and Third Defendants, Behzad Faiz (Mr Faiz) and Marios Robert Pittalis (Mr Pittalis). Costs are also sought from Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis, again on the indemnity basis, by the Third Parties, Simon Treherne (Mr Treherne) and Helen Bunker (Ms Bunker). In both cases, it is submitted that the liability for costs, as against each of these three parties, should be joint and several.

Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker were appointed by the court, in 2020, as independent administrators of Abbas’ estate, in substitution for, or replacement, of, Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis, the original executors named in Abbas’ will. Amir, as already stated, is Abbas’s brother. Mr Faiz was Amir and Abbas’ long standing accountant. Mr Pittalis was their long standing conveyancing solicitor. All three of them were, as set out in paragraphs 145 to 170 and, in particular, paragraphs 181, 182 and 189 of the handed down judgment, complicit with Abbas in the creation and execution of the sham Declarations of Trust and, as explained in the handed down judgment, the alternative sham declarations of trust, ultimately rejected by Abbas, in favour of the Declarations of Trust.

The procedural history giving rise to this trial and to the handed down judgment is set out in some detail in paragraphs 18 to 53 of the handed down judgment.

As appears from those paragraphs, the issues determined at trial derived from and related to a number of separate claims.

By my order of 2 May 2025, I gave permission to Ms Bunker and Mr Treherne to bring proceedings as to the validity and effectiveness of the Declarations of Trust and as to the beneficial interests of Abbas’ estate, Amir and Mrs Nazemi in the properties (the Declarations of Trust claim).

By the same order and in alignment with the Declarations of Trust claim I gave permission, later extended to Elis and Aryan, for Gabriela to bring 1975 Act proceedings, on the footing, as explained in paragraph 34 of the handed down judgment, that the question of the validity of the Declarations of Trust and the beneficial ownership of the properties should be determined within the context of that claim, as well as in the context of the independent administrators’ claim.

By my order of 11 November 2025, I directed that the issues as to the validity of the Declarations of Trust and the beneficial ownership of the properties, arising in both the Declarations of Trust claim and the 1975 Act proceedings should be determined together, along with the other issues set out in paragraph 50 of the handed down judgment and which, as explained in that judgment, did not, in the event, proceed to a determination. Directions were given such as to ensure that all relevant parties were before the court and Gabriela, Elis and Aryan were directed to act as claimant in respect of the validity of the Declarations of Trust and the beneficial interest issues in both sets of proceedings.

Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis, having been defendants in the original proceedings, leading to their removal as executors, were already before the court. As set out in paragraphs 24 to 27 of the handed down judgment, they had been removed as executors by my order of 23 July 2020 and ordered to account for the assets of the estate in their hands. They had, however, failed to properly account in respect of their dealings and conduct of Abbas’ estate, including in respect of rents accruing to the estate and paid, nonetheless, to a company, Mellcraft Ltd, controlled by Amir and which, as it transpired, had been incorporated by Mr Faiz as a receptacle for those rents.

As accounting parties, they and each of them were necessary parties to the Declarations of Trust and beneficial interest issues, since the extent of their accounting obligations were necessarily dictated by the true extent of Abbas’ estate, both in respect of the properties and generally and would be either enhanced, or diminished, dependent upon the court’s determination as to those issues.

Specifically, given that my 11 November 2025 order gave permission to the independent administrators to prosecute an account against the removed executors on the basis of wilful default, and given that Amir had been in payment free occupation of one of the properties (Holland Park) throughout his executorship, it was a live question as to the extent, if at all, that he and his then co-executors were accountable to Abbas’ estate, by way of occupation rent, in respect of that eight year period of occupation. That accountability would arise, against all three removed executors, if, as has transpired to be the case, Holland Park formed part of Abbas’ estate, but would not arise, or would be radically diminished, had Holland Park been owned beneficially, as purported in the recital to the relevant Declaration of Trust. The same point can be made in respect of their accountability for rents accruing to the estate from another of the properties (Harrow Road), where, as already outlined, rents were diverted to Mellcraft Ltd. Had it been determined that that property had been held pursuant to the arrangements recited in the relevant Declaration of Trust, then the removed executors would only have been accountable for one third of the diverted rents rather than the whole.

Looked at more broadly, the validity of the Declarations of Trust and the truth, or otherwise, of the facts asserted in the recitals and said to underlie the Declarations of Trust, were of wider significance to Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis, as removed executors

If those facts had been made good and if, therefore, the Declarations of Trust had confirmed the existence of the long standing arrangements and informal trust interests averred in the recitals to the Declarations of Trust, as part of the tri-partite arrangement alleged by Amir, whereby all assets of Amir, Abbas and their mother were pooled and shared, then not merely would that have affected their accountability in respect of Amir’s occupation of Holland Park and any of the Harrow Road rents diverted from the estate to Mellcraft Ltd but it would have reduced their accountability in respect of any other assets which, but for the alleged tri-partite arrangement, would have fallen into Abbas’ estate.

By way of example, it is the independent administrators’ case, in respect of the account on the basis of wilful default, that a number of leasehold properties, other than the properties, potentially falling into Abbas’ estate, had been transferred by the removed executors to Amir and Mrs Nazemi, in apparent breach of the self-dealing rule, and sold, traded, or rented out by Amir, with rents being paid into Mellcraft Ltd. If, on investigation, within the account, those leaseholds are shown to have formed part of Abbas’ estate, then Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis will be accountable to the estate in respect of all losses accruing to the estate by reason of those transfers.

In that context, a finding that the Declarations of Trust were real and not sham and reflected the truth of the facts alleged in the recitals to the Declarations of Trust and the underlying pooling arrangements averred by Amir would have had the effect of reducing the removed executors’ liability to the estate by two thirds. Put shortly, all of Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis would have been well served had the case advanced by Amir succeeded.

Against this background, I turn to the position adopted by each of Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis at trial.

Amir’s position was and is straightforward. He elected to put forward an entirely fictional and dishonest case, in order to give credence to the sham Declarations of Trust. In candid and realistic submissions, his counsel, Ms Pemberton, accepted his liability for costs, both in respect of the costs incurred by Gabriela and her children and in respect of the costs incurred by the independent administrators. She accepted, also, that her client’s conduct in advancing an entirely dishonest defence was manifestly outside the norm of acceptable litigation behaviour, such that he had no answer to the contention that he should pay costs on the indemnity basis. She concurred with each of the applicants for costs that Amir’s costs liability should be joint and several with Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis, while questioning whether that liability should also be shared by Mrs Nazemi’s estate. The short answer to that question is that it is for those claiming costs to elect from whom those costs are sought and that, if Amir had sought contribution, or indemnity, from Mrs Nazemi’s estate he should have (but has not) taken appropriate steps.

Ms Pemberton’s core submission, shared, in this regard, by Ms O’Neill, for Mr Pittalis, was that, taken as a whole, the costs incurred by Gabriela and her children and the independent administrators were, or had been, unreasonably incurred, by reason of duplication and the unnecessary use of excessive resources, such that any costs order should be subject to a percentage discount to reflect that unreasonableness. She ventilated, also, a concern that costs had been inflated by the delay on the part of the independent administrators and Gabriela and her children in prosecuting their challenge to the Declarations of Trust and to the facts said to underlie the recitals to the Declarations of Trust and that this, too, should be reflected in a percentage reduction in the recoverable costs.

The role of the independent administrators, in this case, has been unusual. As appears and as is explained in the handed down judgment, they have been the prime movers in bringing the Declarations of Trust and beneficial interest issues before the court. They have done so, despite the terms of my 2020 order, whereby their obligations as administrators were made contingent upon the provision of funds from the estate or from the other parties to this litigation, and in consequence of their perception that the proper preservation and administration of the estate required them to take action. None of that conduct can be criticised, or reflected, adversely, in any order as to costs.

In regard to the trial, itself, as explained and discussed in paragraphs 58 to 63 of the handed down judgment, having initially determined to take a neutral position at trial, the independent administrators, in the event, elected to lend their active support to the case advanced by Gabriela, Elis and Aryan.

As set out in paragraph 62 of the handed down judgment that was their entitlement and, as set out in paragraph 63 of the handed down judgment, given the circumstances in which the Declarations of Trust came into being and the conduct, as displayed in Mr Pittalis’ attendance notes and set out in paragraphs 145 to 170 of the handed down judgment, of those (including, of course, Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis) involved in the evolution of the sham Declarations of Trust and the potential and possibly disastrous impact upon Abbas’ estate, if weight had been given to the Declarations of Trust, there cannot be (and, in fairness, on this application has not been) any criticism of the stance that the independent administrators elected to take.

All that said and while my own impression as to the manner in which this litigation has been organised, as between the independent administrators and Gabriela and her children, is that the bulk of the trial preparation has fallen on the independent administrators with, as Mr Learmonth KC put it, Gabriela and her children’s claim riding on their coat tails and with, therefore, on the face of it, little obvious duplication of work and resources it was not, in my view, inappropriate for Ms Pemberton (or, indeed, Ms O’Neill) to draw my attention to the possible dangers of duplication of work and of an excessive application of resources when two separate sets of legal advisers pursue the same litigation end.

The answer, however, to that legitimate concern is not for the court to make some speculative deduction from the recoverable costs in order to reflect those concerns, but for those matters to be given proper consideration as and when there is a detailed assessment of the extent of the recoverable costs.

The same approach seems to me to be appropriate in dealing with any potentially uplifted, or unreasonably incurred, costs arising out of the fact that, although the dispute as to the validity of the Declarations of Trust was identified very early on (2013), the dispute was not crystallised by the inception of the current proceedings until the independent administrators’ application was issued in July 2024.

As with the issue, or question, of duplication and the use of excessive and unnecessary resources, the court is in no position, at this stage, to determine, other than by way of pure speculation, whether the costs sought by the independent administrators, or by Gabriela and her children, have been unreasonably, or unnecessarily uplifted by reason of delay and, if so, to what extent. That question can only be resolved by the detailed examination of the conduct of those claiming the relevant costs as part of the process of detailed assessment.

In that consideration, the costs judge dealing with any detailed assessment will, necessarily be alive, among other things, to two particular matters.

Firstly, that it is (and will be in any detailed assessment) the independent administrators’ case that any delay in initiating the Declarations of Trust claim has to be seen in the context of email correspondence from Amir in the summer of 2023, in which he repeatedly indicated his early intention to seek a declaration as to the validity of the Declarations of Trust. It is the independent administrators’ submission that, given those indications, they cannot be criticised for any delay in initiating the Declarations of Trust claim. In that context, they submit that any costs arising from the delay in initiating the Declarations of Trust claim should not fall at their door, that they acted entirely reasonably in awaiting Amir’s indicated claim and, correspondingly, when it was not forthcoming, they acted entirely reasonably in initiating the process which eventually brought the Declarations of Trust claim before the court.

While I think there is force in those submissions and certainly sufficient force to preclude this court from reaching any conclusion, at this stage, adverse to the independent administrators, arising out of any alleged delay, I reiterate that the question of delay, the responsibility for that delay and any uplift in costs incurred consequential upon delay remains open for examination and determination as part of any detailed assessment.

Secondly and materially both to detailed assessment and, as set out later in this judgment, to my conclusions as to any costs payable on account, it is important to note the limits, or boundaries, of the decisions that I am making as to costs. The position is different as between Gabriela and her children’s 1975 Act claims and that of the independent administrators.

By my order of 3 June 2026, consequential upon the handed down judgment, Gabriela, Elis and Aryan’s claim was brought to a conclusion. The issue as to the Declarations of Trust having been resolved in their favour, they have been able to reach settlement with the independent administrators as to the final resolution of their claims. Their costs claim, therefore, is for the entirety of their costs of the proceedings.

The position of the independent administrators is quite different. Their prospective entitlement to costs is limited to the costs of the trial, leading to the handed down judgment. They are not entitled to claim, or recover, at this stage, any of their costs appertaining only to their steps and their actions in relation to the general administration of Abbas’ estate. Their contention, at the hearing of the application, was that because, although not pursued at trial, Amir’s position had amounted to an assertion of a general partnership and because much, if not all, of their investigations had borne upon, or related, to that question, all, or virtually all, of their incurred costs, in the administration, should be regarded as referable to the current trial.

While leaving the question open to a costs judge, on detailed assessment, I did not find myself completely persuaded. It is plain from the letter before action, dated 24 January 2023, which preceded the eventual initiation, in July 2024, of the proceedings leading to the current trial, that the question of partnership was not then an issue that, at that stage, the administrators had in mind. That position is confirmed by the July 2024 application itself, which did not advert to the question of partnership, or seek declaratory, or any relief, as to that question. As appears from the handed down judgment, at paragraph 50, the question of partnership was only raised, as an issue for trial, in November 2025 and, as already stated, was not pursued at trial. Amir, in his December 2025 witness statement, stated, in terms, that he did not claim that he and Abbas had worked within a formal partnership.

In the result, I indicated at the hearing, on 3 June 2026, of the costs application that, for purposes of any determination of a payment on account, the independent administrators should exclude from their costs summary the bulk of the costs, described in that summary, as administrative. It will, as already stated and if pursued at detailed assessment, be for the costs judge to determine what, if any element of these so-called administrative costs are properly related to the trial and recoverable as trial costs.

Although I have set out much of the foregoing by reference to Amir’s liability for costs, the same questions, of duplication, delay and, as regards the independent administrators, the proper apportionment of their overall costs to the current trial, apply in respect of the costs claims advanced against Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz.

In their case there is, also, the further consideration, applicable in respect of the costs claims advanced by Gabriela and her children, that Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz are before the court only in respect of the issues relating to the Declarations of Trust and the facts allegedly underlying those declarations. Unlike Amir, whose involvement with the 1975 Act claims embraced the issues relating to section 423 of the Insolvency Act and the application of section 10 of the 1975 Act (as set out in paragraphs 198 to 230 of the handed down judgment), Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz are not before the court in respect of any aspects of the 1975 Act claims, save as they relate to the validity of the Declarations of Trust and the size of Abbas’ estate and should not, as I see it, bear any liability for the costs of those aspects of those claims which do not bear upon those issues. Assuming, therefore, their liability for those of Gabriela and her children’s costs pertaining to and in connection with the Declarations of Trust, some, albeit, relatively modest, allowance will need to be made in respect of costs incurred by Gabriela and her children unrelated to the validity of the Declarations of Trust.

As to their broad liability for the costs of the Declarations of Trust issues, I am satisfied that both Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis must, subject to any appropriate allowance, bear those costs on a joint and several basis with Amir.

As set out in paragraph 64 of the handed down judgment, Mr Pittalis’ position changed in the course of the trial.

In his witness statement dated 30 January 2026, while, for the first time acknowledging the context and circumstances in which the Declarations of Trust had come into being, nonetheless contended that the Declarations of Trust were valid and that Gabriela and her children’s claims as to their validity should be dismissed. Mr Pittalis’ earlier witness statement dated 14 August 2025 had, at paragraph 15, entirely omitted any mention of the circumstances in which the Declarations of Trust had come into being and the fact that various alternatives, containing factually inconsistent recitals, had been prepared and executed before eventually alighting upon the formulation chosen to be advanced by way of the Declarations of Trust. His position, at that stage, reflecting, in essence, the position advanced by Amir, was that he had simply drafted the Declarations of Trust as requested by Abbas.

Reflecting the foregoing, Ms O’Neill’s skeleton argument, upon Mr Pittalis’ behalf, robustly contended that Gabriela and her children’s claims as to the Declarations of Trust were ill-founded and that those claims should be dismissed.

By the end of the trial, all that had dissipated and Mr Pittalis was put forward by his counsel, simply as someone who had become innocently involved in giving effect to Amir’s (and Abbas’) dishonest scheme. Reflecting that position, Ms O’Neill now contends that her client should not have to pay any part of the costs of either Gabriela and her children, or those of the independent administrators. She contends, further, that her client, having been deceived by Amir’s dishonesty and duplicity, Amir should be directed to pay her client’s costs. In the alternative, she contends that any costs liability should reflect the difference in culpability, as between her client and Amir and, she says, Mr Faiz, that, consequentially, his liability should not be joint and several, should be assessed on the standard and not indemnity basis and should reflect, by way of a percentage of the overall costs, the costs attributable to Mr Pittalis’ conduct.

I cannot accept these submissions.

It is perfectly plain from the handed down judgment and from Mr Pittalis’ own detailed attendance notes, on 17, 18 and 19 April 2012, that Mr Pittalis knew exactly what was going on and was fully involved in the creation and then selection of the sham Declarations of Trust.

He knew, as nobody else, except Amir and Mr Faiz, did, before he gave his evidence at trial, that the multiple declarations of trust that he had prepared, setting out different and entirely inconsistent factual recitals, such as to support the particular declaration in question, had been executed by Abbas. He knew, also and necessarily, that those recitals, given their inconsistency, could not, each of them, represent the truth. He was, himself, fully involved in the discussion, on 18 April 2012, of the clutch of declarations then to hand, as to which declaration best served Abbas’ purpose, in purportedly diminishing his estate, and which of those declarations were best capable of being sustained. As I commented to Ms O’Neill, in the course of argument, the truth, or falsehood, of the declarations was never an issue in that debate. The declarations and each of them, and, ultimately, the Declarations of Trust, were, consistently with Mr Pittalis’ own conduct in 2002, when, as set out in paragraphs 176 to 179 of the handed down judgment he drafted declarations of trust purportedly transferring all of Abbas’ then assets to his mother, to preclude any matrimonial claims by Gabriela, never anything more than dispensable and interchangeable pieces of paper designed to obscure, or hide, the true facts from those concerned with Abbas’ estate. They were never intended to reflect, or give effect to, the truth.

It follows from the foregoing, that far from being duped by Amir, Mr Pittalis was, as set out in paragraph 189 of the handed down judgment, complicit with Amir and with Mr Faiz in the creation and execution of the sham Declarations of Trust and complicit, therefore, in the creation of the state of affairs that has given rise to this trial.

Notwithstanding that fact and his full and detailed knowledge of all the circumstances leading to the execution of those Declarations of Trust, Mr Pittalis chose both to give, in his 14 August 2025 witness statement, an abbreviated and misleading account of the provenance of the Declarations of Trust and, even after his disclosure, in August 2025, of his attendance notes, to continue to assert the validity of the Declarations of Trust. His position only changed when, under forensic examination at trial, the true position as to the Declarations of Trust became indisputably clear.

In these circumstances, I can see no reason at all as to why Mr Pittalis should not be liable in costs for his role in the conduct that, in complicity with Amir and Mr Faiz, has given rise to this trial. Correspondingly, given that complicity, I see no reason at all as to why that liability should not be joint and several with Amir and Mr Faiz. There is no sensible basis, in these circumstances, for any order that his costs, or any part of them, should be paid by Amir.

Mr Pittalis was not, as portrayed by his counsel, an innocent bystander as to what went on. He was a full participant in the creation of the sham Declarations of Trust and, as explained in paragraphs 13 to 18 of this judgment, someone who had his own interest in asserting the validity of the Declarations of Trust. It has always been open to Mr Pittalis (or, indeed, Amir and Mr Faiz) to tell the truth about the Declarations of Trust and, thereby, obviate, or reduce, the need for this trial. They and each of them have elected not to do so. The costs have had to be incurred and they should be liable for those costs.

In regard to the basis of that liability, I can, likewise, see no reason as to why that liability should not be assessed on the indemnity basis.

As explained in Excelsior Commercial & Industrial Holdings Limited v Salsbury Hammer Aspden & Johnson [2002] EWCA Civ 879 and Esure ServicesLimited vQuarcoo [2009] EWCA Civ 595, the court’s discretion as to an award of indemnity costs arises where the conduct of the party in respect of whom indemnity costs is sought has been outside the norm to be expected in properly and reasonably conducted litigation. That conduct, as set out in CPR44 (5)(a) includes conduct before, as well as during the proceedings. It includes, but is not limited to conduct amounting to misconduct, or calling for moral condemnation. The width of the discretion, as to conduct falling outside the norm, is deliberately set wide to allow for the infinite variations and possibilities which arise in the course of litigation.

In this case the conduct of Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz, which, in concert with Abbas, has given rise to this litigation, has been manifestly and radically outside the norm. They chose to deliberately put in place sham documents with the intention, not merely of misleading those to whom they were deployed, but, ultimately, with the intention of misleading the court.

It is this latter aspect which, over and above the entirely dishonest case advanced a trial by Amir, renders the case an appropriate one for an order for indemnity costs. The discussions that took place on 18 April 2012, centred upon the sustainability of the various forms of declaration of trust that might be put in play, meaning their sustainability, if challenged, before a court. Similar discussions took place, after Abbas’ death, as recorded in Mr Pittalis’ attendance notes of 31 May 2012 and 12 April 2013, in respect of the Declarations of Trust, as executed, and in respect of their sustainability, if challenged before the court.

The conduct of Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz, in respect of the Declarations of Trust was, from the very outset, directed towards the creation of sham documents which could be sustained in court and which might, or would, deceive the court. That conduct was, in consequence, central to and causative of the current trial and it is, for that reason and in consequence of their role in the creation of sham documents for those purposes that they should now, the dishonest nature of the documents having been exploded, be liable, on the indemnity basis, for the costs that have had to be incurred in exposing the deceitful nature of the Declarations of Trust.

The position is compounded by the conduct of Mr Pittalis (and Mr Faiz) at trial. I have already discussed Mr Pittalis’ active opposition, up until trial, to the attacks made upon the validity of the Declaration of Trust. Even, however, when the point came when he appreciated that the Declarations of Trust were unlikely to be sustained, his position was not to tell the truth as to the Declarations of Trust but to stand by and abide events. That was the position adopted by Mr Faiz from the outset. While, in many circumstances, it may be legitimate for a litigant to abide events, where the party standing by is both aware of the truth and, more importantly, is at the source of the conduct whereby, to his, or her, knowledge an untrue case is being advanced before the court, that conduct is, in itself, sufficiently outside the norm as to warrant an award of indemnity costs.

Although, in the foregoing paragraphs, my focus has been on the role, conduct and liability of Mr Pittalis, I have, necessarily, given their joint complicity in the creation of the sham Declarations of Trust, had regard, also, to the position of Mr Faiz.

Mr Faiz, although warned of the likelihood that costs would be sought against him, elected to take no part in the hearing on 3 June 2026, at which costs were sought, neither attending, nor affording himself representation. He lodged a short statement, as to his involvement as executor, in respect of Abbas’ estate, which did not touch upon the circumstances, or his own conduct, in respect of the creation and execution of the Declarations of Trust. Correspondingly, his written evidence did not touch upon those matters.

The only distinction between his position and that of Mr Pittalis is that, unlike Mr Pittalis, he did not, at any stage, actively assert the validity o the Declarations of Trust. He was, however, equally as involved in their creation as was Mr Pittalis and equally, therefore, as responsible as Mr Pittalis for the creation of the state of affairs that has given rise to this trial. Like Mr Pittalis, it was in his interest, as explained in paragraphs 13 to 18 of this judgment, to see the validity of the Declarations of Trust upheld. Like Mr Pittalis, he could have, at any stage, told the truth about the Declarations of Trust and obviated, or reduced the need for the current trial. Like Mr Pittalis, he did not do so. Instead of which, he stood by, while the costs of this trial were incurred, and awaited events.

In these circumstances, looked at in the round, it seems to me that Mr Faiz’ position is, in substance, identical to that of Mr Pittalis, as set out in paragraph 49 of this judgment, and that Mr Faiz must, jointly and severally with Amir and Mr Pittalis, pay the costs of this trial. For the reasons set out in paragraphs 53 to 56 of this judgment, which apply equally to Mr Faiz as they do to Mr Pittalis, those costs are to be paid on the indemnity basis.

In reaching these conclusions, I have not, in terms, founded myself on any moral condemnation of the conduct of either Mr Faiz, or Mr Pittalis, but rather upon the causative nature of their conduct in enabling a false case to be brought to court and in standing by while that false case was advanced. The fact remains and cannot be overlooked that the conduct of Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis, as professional men, owing professional obligations of probity and integrity, was extraordinary.

There appears to have been in neither of them any loyalty to the truth, or even any interest in the truth. They, manifestly, saw nothing at all wrong in the preparation and deployment, on behalf of a client, of false and deliberately misleading documents. They appear to have seen their role as entirely functional, having no interest, or concern, either in the content, or consequences, of the documentation that they brought into being. Given the way that their actions and conduct were noted by Mr Pittalis, it is evident that this approach to their professional behaviour was regarded by them as entirely normal. While, as already stated, I do not base my conclusions as to costs on these matters, this case cannot be concluded without my expressing my concern as to the quality, or the lack of it, of the professional conduct which this case has disclosed.

In the result, however, I will make the following orders as to costs. Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz will pay the independent administrators’ costs on the indemnity basis. They will pay Gabriela and her children’s costs on the same basis. In respect of both sets of costs, their liability will be joint and several. In regard, however, to Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis’ liability for Gabriela and her children’s costs, their liability, as foreshadowed in paragraph 38 of this judgment, will be subject to an allowance of 10%, to reflect those aspects of those costs which are unrelated to the validity of the Declarations of Trust. Both sets of costs will be subject to detailed assessment, if not agreed, and I will give permission for the immediate commencement of that assessment.

There remains to consider the question of any payments on account of that detailed assessment and the terms of any such payments.

Granted their liability for costs, it was not submitted either by Ms Pemberton, or Ms O’Neill, that I should not make an order for the payment of costs on account. Nor, given my order that costs be paid on the indemnity basis, was there any serious opposition to the proposition that, as a starting point in the determination of the reasonable sums to be paid on account of costs, I should work on the assumption, or rule of thumb, that, on detailed assessment, the claiming parties would recover something in the order of 80% of their claimed costs. Nor was it suggested, other than in respect of time to pay, that the amount payable should be dictated, or informed, by the paying parties’ ability to pay.

What was submitted, reflecting the concerns as to duplication, use of excessive resources and, in respect of the independent administrators’ costs, the prospect, or possibility, that the costs estimates placed before the court by the independent administrators included costs not properly recoverable and the costs of this trial, all as set out in paragraphs 21 to 37 of this judgment, was that the court should make appropriate allowances in respect of those matters in order to avoid over recovery.

There is force in those submissions.

On the other side of the coin, however and as is now well understood, the court’s task, as explained by Christopher Clarke LJ, in Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc. [2015] EWHC 566 (Comm), is not, simply, to find a figure which reflects the irreducible minimum to be expected on recovery. The court is looking to determine a reasonable sum which reflects all relevant factors.

These include, on the one hand, that the claiming parties are already out of pocket in respect of the costs that they have had to incur and the desirability, where possible, of the court determining a figure which is sufficiently close to the likely figure recoverable on assessment as to avoid the need for such an assessment. On the other hand, where there is a perceived risk that the receiving party might not, or might not be in a position to, repay the sum awarded on account, then that factor will come into play, in reducing to a ‘safe’ sum, the amount payable on account.

I am not persuaded that, in this case, that last risk is material. As a result of my findings, at trial, and the settlement, consequential upon those findings, of the 1975 Act proceedings, there would seem to me to be no significant risk that the two receiving parties in this case would be unable to repay any over recovery that might arise, were it to be the case that the amount directed to be paid on account turned out to exceed the costs recoverable on assessment.

That said, reflecting the submissions made by Ms Pemberton and Ms O’Neill and the concerns that they have properly raised, some further allowances, in reduction of the 80% starting point, seem to me to be appropriate.

The costs estimate provided, on behalf of Gabriela and her children, placed their estimated costs in the sum of £229,361. In regard to Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz, that base figure falls to be reduced by £10%, to £206,425. 80% of that figure would be £165,140. A further 5% of that base figure, however, should be deducted, to reflect the matters which have been raised by counsel, resulting in an amount of £154,819, say £154,800, to be paid jointly and severally by Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis on account of the costs incurred by Gabriela and her children. In Amir’s case, the 10% deduction is inapplicable, with the result that while he is jointly and severally liable. with Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz in the sum of £154,800, payable on account, he is separately liable, on account, for an additional sum of £17,221.

In regard to the independent administrators, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis receive no special allowance. However, as explained in paragraph 36 of this judgment, for purposes of payment on account, I have left out of account the bulk of the costs described in their costs summary as administrative, resulting in a base figure. For purposes of payment on account, of £455,544.39. 80% of that figure is £364,465.61. However, to further reflect the possibility that costs not properly referable to the trial have been included in the costs summary, I think it fair that the figure payable on account should reflect 70% of the base figure rather than 80%. That figure for which Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz are all jointly and severally liable, is £318,881, say £318,880.

In regard to the payment of these very substantial sums, it seems to me to be unrealistic to make the usual fourteen day order. Payment of the sums due on account must be made by 4 p.m. on 21 September 2026.