Jamiyat Tabligh-Ul-Islam & Ors v Greengate Jamia Mosque & Ors

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWHC 1283 (Ch)

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Jamiyat Tabligh-Ul-Islam & Ors v Greengate Jamia Mosque & Ors

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWHC 1283 (Ch)

Neutral citation number: [2026] EWHC 1283 (Ch)
Case No: BL-2025-MAN-000035

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS IN MANCHESTER

BUSINESS LIST (ChD)

Manchester Civil Justice Centre

1 Bridge Street West
Manchester M60 9DJ

Date: Friday, 17 April 2026

Before:

HIS HONOUR JUDGE HODGE KC

Sitting as a Judge of the High Court

Between:

(1) JAMIYAT TABLIGH-UL-ISLAM

(a registered charity in England and Wales)

(2) ULFAT HUSSAIN

(In his capacity as Trustee and Beneficiary of Jamiyat Tabligh-Ul Islam)

(By his litigation friend, Akib Hussain)

(3) MANSOOR AHMED

(In his capacity as Trustee and Beneficiary of Jamiyat Tabligh-Ul Islam)

(4) ZAHID MAHMOOD

(In his capacity as Trustee and Beneficiary of Jamiyat Tabligh-Ul Islam)

(5) NAZAR HUSSAIN

(In his capacity as Trustee and Beneficiary of Jamiyat Tabligh-Ul Islam)

(6) OMAR SHARIF

(In his capacity as Trustee and Beneficiary of Jamiyat Tabligh-Ul Islam)

(7) RAJA QAMAR ZAMAN

(In his capacity as Trustee and Beneficiary of Jamiyat Tabligh-Ul Islam)

Claimants

- v -

(1) GREENGATE JAMIA MOSQUE

(A registered charity in England and Wales)

(2) GREENGATE JAMIA MASJID OLDHAM LIMITED

(Company no. 12354665)

(3) NAVAID AFZAL

(In his individual capacity and in his capacity as Trustee of D1 and Director of D2)

(4) MUHAMMED RASHID

(In his individual capacity and in capacity as Trustee of D1)

(5) ABDUL ISLAM

(In his individual capacity and in his capacity as Trustee of D1 and Director of D2)

(6) NADEEM MAZHAR

(In his individual capacity and in his capacity as Trustee of D1 and Director of D2)

(7) NADEEM AHKTAR

(In his individual capacity and in his capacity as Trustee of D1 and Director of D2)

Defendants

Hearing dates: 13-15 April 2026

Mr PAUL LAKIN (instructed by John Howe & Co Solicitors, Pudsey) appeared on behalf of the Claimants

Mr ROBERT DARBYSHIRE (instructed by Pearsons Solicitors & Financial Advisers Limited, Oldham) appeared on behalf of the Defendants

APPROVED JUDGMENT

(Approved on 28 May 2026)

__________________

This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.

HIS HONOUR JUDGE HODGE KC:

Introduction

1.

This is my extemporary judgment following the trial, over three days in Manchester between Monday 13 and Wednesday 15 April 2026, of a claim concerning the affairs of a Sunni Muslim mosque which is located at Greengate Street, Oldham.

2.

The claim originally began on 18 May 2023 as a claim in the County Court at Manchester for possession of the new mosque building, and of part, but not the whole, of the original mosque building, on the south side of Greengate Street, which is now used as an Islamic school. However, the claim has since expanded (in terms of the number of parties) and has metamorphosed into a claim (and counterclaim) for declarations as to the true beneficial ownership of the mosque and related relief. It is now proceeding in the Business List of the Business and Property Courts in Manchester under claim number BL-2025-MAN-000035.

3.

At its heart, this is a battle for control of the new mosque, and its ancillary, and associated, buildings. At issue is whether the Oldham mosque is controlled by, and subservient to, a rival, and longer established, mosque in Bradford which follows the same Sunni, Barelvi, Muslim faith tradition, or is a self-governing, and wholly independent, institution. The claimants contend for the former position, and the defendants for the latter.

4.

On the first day of trial I appointed one of his sons to act as the litigation friend for Mr Ulfat Hussain (the second claimant). I set out my reasons in a preliminary judgment that I delivered orally that morning. Yesterday, and without any opposition from the defendants, I gave the claimants permission to re-amend the particulars of claim to remove ‘Persons Unknown’ as co-defendants; and to claim the remedies, relief, declarations, accounts, recovery of moneys, and removal of the defendants as trustees of the first claimant trust, as set out in full in the amended particulars of claim dated 14 October 2024.

5.

The first claimant is Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam. It was incorporated as a company limited by guarantee on 26 April 2011. It was entered in the charities register on 6 February 2015. There are now six individual claimants. They are all described as ‘trustee and beneficiary of the first claimant’. Only one of them, Mr Nazar Hussain (the fifth claimant), has produced a witness statement, and was called as a witness on behalf of the claimants. All of the claimants are represented by Mr Paul Lakin (of counsel), instructed by John Howe & Co Solicitors.

6.

The first defendant is Greengate Jamia Mosque. It was entered on the charities register on 26 July 2022. Its constitution is dated 13 November 2020. This states that the overall aim and objective of the mosque is to serve the Muslim community in Oldham and the surrounding areas. The second defendant is Greengate Jamia Masjid Oldham Limited. It is a company limited by guarantee, incorporated on 9 December 2019. Its name has been struck off the register of companies, but it was restored by a consent order made by DJ Woodward on 5 May 2023, on the application of the third defendant, for the sole purpose of realising, and distributing, funds held in a named bank account. The company undertook that, immediately upon the expiry of three months from the conclusion of that action, the directors, or a majority of them, would apply to the registrar of companies for the voluntary strike-off of the company, and would comply with all relevant requirements for such application. This has not been done. The evidence of the sixth defendant (Mr Nadeem Mazhar) is that these funds were paid into the mosque’s bank account, in the name of the first defendant; and that it was left to the company’s accountants to see to the striking off of the second defendant company. In answer to the questions from the court, during his oral closing, counsel for the defendants, Mr Robert Darbyshire, instructed by Pearsons Solicitors and Financial Advisers Limited, accepted that since the second defendant is in breach of this undertaking, it would not be appropriate for the court to grant any relief, or award any costs, in favour of the second claimant in this litigation.

7.

There are five named defendants. All are sued in their individual capacities, and as trustees of the first defendant, and (apart from the fourth defendant) also as directors of the second defendant company. In fact, the seventh defendant (Mr Nadeem Ahktar) is not named as one of the six original trustees in the second defendant’s constitution. Of the individual defendants only the third (Mr Navaid Afzal), the fifth (Mr Abdul Islam) and the sixth (Mr Nadeem Mazhar) have produced witness statements, and were called as witnesses, on behalf of the defendants.

Title to the Oldham mosque

8.

The original Oldham mosque occupied premises at 87 Greengate Street. This was purchased on 16 June 1918 by three individuals, Mr Mohammad Hussain, Mr Mohammad Yaseen and Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed, expressly “As Trustees of the Oldham Branch of the Religious Association of JAMIYAT TABLIGJ-UL-ISLAM”. This expression (to which I shall refer simply as ‘JTI’) is explained at paragraph 8 of the witness statement of Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed thus:

‘Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam’ is a generic term used throughout South Asia to indicate the teaching of Islam through collective assembly and congregation.

Mr Ahmed reiterated this explanation in re-examination. This is consistent with the explanation that is also to be found at paragraph 3 of the first witness statement of Mr Navaid Afzal (the third defendant):

‘JTI’ is a term loosely that refers to spreading the teaching of Islam collectively or through congregation which is … a genuine [sic] term used by mosques in the Indian subcontinent with no-one holding any exclusive rights to JTI. The founders/original trustees of the mosque used that terminology from the subcontinent to name the mosque.

Mr Darbyshire emphasises that ‘JTI’ is not a description of the first claimant, which only came to exist as a corporate body on 26 April 2011.

9.

The first two of the transferees of number 87 have sadly passed away. But the third of them (Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed) gave evidence for the defendants, as did the adult son of Mr Mohammad Hussain, Mr Abdul Qayyum, who was 11 years of age in 1971. This land, lying on the south side of Greengate Street, is registered under title number OL250. On 29 August 2017 it was registered in the names of Zulfiqar Ahmed and three other individuals (none of whom is a party to, or a witness in, this litigation). 87 Greengate Street was not the subject of the original claim for possession.

10.

The adjoining (and smaller) plot of land at 89 Greengate Street was purchased by Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed and Mr Mohammad Yaseen on 22 November 1985, expressly “as Trustees for the Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam (‘the Jamiyat’) of 89 Greengate Street, Oldham”. Mr Mohammad Hussain was still alive at this time, but there is no evidence explaining why he did not join in this transfer. This land, also lying on the south side of Greengate Street, is registered under title number LA263940. The purchasers were registered as the proprietors of No 89 on 23 December 1985. This land formed part of the original mosque, and is now used, with No 87, as an Islamic school.

11.

Land on the north side of Greengate Street intended to be the site for the construction of part of a new, and much larger, purpose-built mosque was purchased by Mohammad Yaseen, Zulfiqar Ahmed and Mohammad Hussain on 9 January 1992. Clause 2 states that:

The Buyers are the trustees of the Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam Mosque (‘the Mosque’), which is an unincorporated members organisation. They bought the property with money held on behalf of the Mosque and therefore hold the property for the members of the Mosque in accordance with its rules.

The purchasers were registered as the proprietors of this land on 17 March 1992 under title number GM598540.

12.

Following the deaths of his co-purchaser (and subsequent co-purchasers), in March 2017 Zulfiqar Ahmed transferred the land in each of titles numbers LA263940 and GM598540 to himself and three other individuals (who were different in the case of each property) expressly “on trust for the benefit of Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam” (in the case of the former) and (in the case of the latter) “for the purpose of giving effect to the appointment of new trustees pursuant to a resolution duly passed at a meeting of the Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam appointing new trustees”. These transfers were completed by registration on 29 August 2017 and 4 October 2018. None of these transferees is a party to this litigation. With the exception of Zulfiqar Ahmed, none of them is a witness in this litigation.

13.

The first claimant became the registered proprietor of the land comprised in each of the two titles numbered LA263940 and GM598540 on 18 February 2021. This appears to have followed on from two separate transfers of the land in these two titles to the first claimant dated 9 February 2021 made by the same four individuals expressly “together acting as the present trustees of Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam”. None of these four persons are parties to, or witnesses in, this litigation. They appear to have acquired title to the land under, and by virtue of, a deed of appointment made in their favour on 13 March 2018 by Syed Mahroof Hussain Shah, purporting to act as the administrator of the Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam and as chairman of an executive committee meeting held on 30 March 2018 which is said to have nominated new trustees of JTI. Clause 2 of this deed recites that:

By reason of the death and the resignation of various previous trustees and the previous records detailing the appointment of previous and current trustees being lost the appointment of new trustees has become necessary.

14.

However, the difficulty facing the claimants is that there is no evidence that the sole surviving original trustee of the land comprised in either of these two titles had ever resigned. Nor was any such suggestion put to him when he gave evidence on the second day of this trial. Indeed, only a year earlier (in March 2017) he had transferred the land in these two titles to himself and three other individuals, who were duly registered as the proprietors of these titles on 29 August 2017 and 4 October 2018 respectively.

15.

In his skeleton argument, Mr Darbyshire emphasises that none of the 2017 owners authorised the 2018 appointment or the later transfers. Mr Darbyshire, rightly, says that the claimants’ evidence on the matter is thin in the extreme; indeed, it is really non-existent. Mr Darbyshire characterises the matter of how title to LA263940 passed to the first claimant as a ‘mystery’, and as a ‘significant hole in its case’. Later, Mr Darbyshire describes the matter of how the individuals purportedly appointed in 2018 came to claim that they could transfer title to the land registered as GM598540 to the first claimant as opaque, with its case based on a simple assertion of title as to which there is no evidence that legal title was ever validly transferred. For the claimants, Mr Lakin had no answer to any of these criticisms.

16.

On the evidence, I find that legal title to the land comprised within LA263940 and GM598540 never validly passed to the first claimant. The register of title is clearly in error. However, I note that there is no claim to rectification of those two titles within these proceedings.

17.

The two parcels of land on which the remainder of the new mosque was constructed, between about 1996 and 2016, are comprised in title numbers MAN350745 and MAN352258. They were purchased from Oldham Borough Council on 15 March 1996 by Ulfat Hussain (the second claimant), Mohammed Bashir (now deceased) and Mansoor Ahmed (the third claimant). None of them gave evidence before me. The second claimant is a protected party. In this transfer, the expression ‘Mosque’ is defined as meaning “the Independent Jamia Mosque Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam, Oldham.” Clause 6 of the transfer declares that:

… the Purchasers are the duly appointed trustees of the Mosque and that the Property is vested in them as such trustees on trust for the Mosque according to the rules of the Mosque and to be sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise dealt with by the Trustees as the rules of the Mosque shall from time to time direct.

Although the purchase was completed on 15 March 1996, the transfer was not forwarded for registration until very much later. The purchasers were first registered as the proprietors of the land on 6 November 2019 (with their personal addresses recorded in the proprietorship register). They were re-registered on 18 March 2021 (following a transfer from themselves to themselves dated 6 January 2021, expressly as “Trustees of the Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam, Oldham”), with the first claimant’s central office address in Bradford recorded for each of them in the proprietorship register.

18.

In his skeleton argument, Mr Lakin points out that there is no deed that subsequently alters the beneficial ownership of the various properties; and neither party has advanced any case that beneficial ownership had changed over time, whether by constructive trust or otherwise. In those circumstances, it appears that any change in the legal title has not affected the underlying beneficial ownership. Therefore, as all parties agree that thereafter the properties were all held on trust, the nature of the trust is to be determined by the construction of the various transfers by which the land was purchased. I accept that submission.

The law

19.

This is not in dispute between the parties. Mr Lakin points out that the correct approach to the construction of any legal document has been set out in a number of cases of high authority. In Sara & Hossein Asset Holdings v Blacks Outdoor Retail Limited [2023] UKSC 2, reported at [2023] 1 WLR 575, at paragraph 29, Lord Hamblen summarised the principles as follows:

(1)

The contract must be interpreted objectively by asking what a reasonable person, with all background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties when they entered into the contract, would have understood the language of the contract to mean.

(2)

The court must consider the contract as whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality of its drafting, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to its objective meaning.

(3)

Interpretation is a unitary exercise which involves an iterative process by way each suggested interpretation is checked against the provisions of the contract and its implications and consequences are investigated.

Mr Lakin emphasises that the law excludes from the admissible background the parties’ prior negotiations and their declarations of subjective intent: see Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896.

20.

Mr Lakin also reminds the court of the approach to evidence formulated in Gestmin SGPS S.A. v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm), reported at [2020] 1 CLC 428, at paragraphs 15 to 22. There Leggatt J suggested that memory is unreliable, and a better approach is to place reliance upon such written documents as are available to the court.

21.

During the course of his oral closing, Mr Darbyshire referred me to the decision of HHJ Cadwallader (sitting as a judge of the High Court) in Mohammed v Daji [2023] EWHC 2761 (Ch). He took me to paragraphs 68 to 70, concerning the relevance of a mosque being purchased with funds mostly raised locally, the purchase not only being principally by the local community, but for the use primarily of the local community, and of the context at the time that the funds were raised for the acquisition off the mosque. I note that (at paragraph 71) the judge concluded as follows:

Taking into account the totality of the evidence, I find that there would have been an expectation at the relevant time on the part of both the fundraisers for and the potential donors to the acquisition of property for a markaz in the UK that it could not be held on terms which might allow it to be devoted to purposes which excluded primary use, and at least a high degree of control, by local members of TJ, unless the contrary had been spelt out: the expectation would be that if bought by locals it would be used for and controlled by locals. That is not necessarily the same as an expectation about ownership, but it tends to point towards an intention that there should be local ownership on local terms.

Mr Darbyshire also referred me to paragraph 29:

In general terms I would also accept that the approach to be adopted when considering how objectively to ascertain the donors’ intention against the background factual matrix should be informed by the principles applicable to the ascertainment of intention when interpreting written or oral contracts, as set out, for example, in Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36 and Wood v Capita [2017] UKSC 24.”

22.

In the present case, I derive particular assistance from paragraph 27 of the judgment:

As stated in Tudor on Charities, 11th ed., 18-048, in the case of charitable appeals

‘If a simple appeal is made for funds for particular purposes which are in law charitable, then as soon as funds are received pursuant to it a charitable trust will be constituted. Those funds will be held on trust for the purposes which have already been referred to in the terms of the appeal. Where a charitable trust is initially created by donors in general or vague terms, it may be open to the trustee to execute a more specific deed which limits the terms of the trust, provided that it does not conflict with the terms on which the donors made their donations: Khaira v Shergill [2014] UKSC 33.’

It is still a question of ascertaining the intentions of the donors. The terms of the appeal to which the donors have responded will be at least good evidence, and perhaps (depending on the facts) determinative evidence, of the intention of the donors as ascertained objectively.

23.

I also note what is said at paragraph 30:

... where a charitable trust is initially created by donors in general or vague terms, it is open to the trustees to execute a more specific deed which limits the terms of the trust, provided it does not conflict with the terms on which the donors made their donations.

The witnesses

24.

The claimants rely upon the evidence of four witnesses: Mr Liaqat Hussain, Mr Nazar Hussain, Mr Ishtiaq Hussain and Mr Abdul Shakoor (who were called to give evidence in that order). Of the four, only Mr Nazar Hussain is a claimant (the fifth claimant). They gave evidence from about 12.15 on the morning of day one of the trial until about 10.40 on the morning of the second day.

25.

The defendants rely upon the evidence of five witnesses: Mr Nadeem Mazhar (the sixth defendant), Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed, Mr Navaid Afzal (the third defendant), Mr Abdul Islam (the fifth defendant) and Mr Abdul Qayyum. They gave evidence (in that order) from about 10.40 on the morning of day two until about 10.50 on the morning of day three.

26.

In his oral closing, Mr Darbyshire accepted that all nine witnesses had been trying to present to the court their candid, open, and honest appreciation of events. Without exception, all were men of a profound faith. Their evidence should be considered through that lens. However, they could not give evidence of matters outside their own knowledge. There was said to be a signal lack of content to the claimants’ witness evidence (both written and oral) on important matters.

27.

Mr Liaqat Hussain, who lives, and worships, in Bradford, rather than in Oldham, was said to display an ignorance of recent works to the Oldham mosque. He could not say whether those who had attended certain meetings were still living. Two of them whom he thought were still living had not been called as witnesses (although that is a point that works in relation to both sides to this litigation). Mr Darbyshire pointed to the limitations on the evidence given by the claimants’ other witnesses.

28.

The defendants’ witnesses, by contrast, had at least given evidence of matters within their own knowledge, and which was material to the real issues in the case. Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed had been present at most, but not all, of the meetings in 2016, and he had chaired at least one of them. Moreover, he had been one of the original three mosque trustees; and there was no evidence that he had ever resigned from his trusteeship. Nobody had been able to explain how the title to the properties of which he had been appointed as trustee had ever passed to third parties without the involvement of Mr Ahmed, as the sole remaining trustee.

29.

In his closing remarks, Mr Lakin expressly disavowed any submission that any of the witnesses had come to court to lie, or to seek to mislead the court. But even an honest witness can be mistaken as to material facts. Mr Lakin relied on the observation of Leggatt J in Gestmin: Even an honest witness can convince themselves that something is true when it is not.

30.

Where there are disputes of fact between the witnesses, I unhesitatingly prefer the evidence of the defendants’ witnesses as more reliable than the evidence called by the claimants. I do so because the defendants’ witnesses, and particularly Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed, were more closely, and directly, involved in relevant events; and because their evidence is more consistent with the reliable, contemporaneous documents, and with the inherent probabilities.

31.

As a Bradford resident, and as a worshipper who has been very much involved in the affairs of its mosque since the mid-1960s, and who became one of its trustees in the early 1980s, Mr Liaqat Hussain (who was born in September 1951) is firmly aligned to the claimants’ case. I find that this affects his perception of events. Thus, he would not accept the proposition put to him in cross-examination that the two mosques were separate organisations. I find that Mr Liaqat Hussain has little direct knowledge of relevant events concerning the Oldham mosque, and is heavily reliant upon hearsay accounts of such events. However, in cross-examination, he did make some admissions which tend to support the defendants’ case. He accepted that donations would be used for the benefit of each mosque. Since he said that he had not been involved in fundraising to buy land in Oldham, either in 1987, or in 1989, if that is true, it must relate to the later purchase of land for the new mosque. Liaqat Hussain said that he had been involved in fundraising in Bradford to buy the new mosque in Oldham, although this was not mentioned in his witness statement, and he was unable to point to any supporting documentary evidence. When pressed, Liaqat Hussain said that this was not mentioned in his witness statement because he did not consider it to be important. He said that money does not move between different mosques, although Oldham had taken advice from Bradford when they had purchased their mosque. Liaqat Hussain said that up until 2021 to 2022, there had been only been three trustees of the Oldham mosque. That is inconsistent with the 2018 deed of appointment, on which the claimants place reliance.

32.

Mr Nazar Hussain was the only one of the claimants to give evidence before me. He was born in January 1972 and he has been a lifelong attendee at the Oldham mosque. However, his direct knowledge of events is very limited. He was not involved in any of the land purchases. He accepted that the various parcels of land had been purchased for the benefit of worshippers in Oldham for the long-term. He referred to raising money to buy the mosque using a bucket. He said that worshippers would go to Bradford to raise money in that way. He added that receipts were issued which named the organisation in receipt of each donation, and stated that the purpose was the building of a mosque in Oldham. I consider that that evidence supports the defendants’ case.

33.

Mr Ishtiaq Hussain was born in August 1982. He came to the UK in 2002. At first, he worshipped only occasionally at the Greengate Street mosque until 2018, when he became a committed regular worshipper. He had no direct knowledge of the land purchases, the last of which had taken place some six years before he came to the UK.

34.

The final witness for the claimants was Mr Abdul Shakoor. He is 60 years of age and serves as an Iman at the Oldham mosque. He was of limited assistance to the court. He stated that he did not handle the day-to-day business of the mosque. He was involved in the mosque’s religious activities, and not in property matters, or in the selection or appointment of trustees, or in the raising of money.

35.

I turn to the defendants’ witnesses. Mr Nadeem Mazhar (the sixth defendant) was born in 1988. He was in the witness box for some two hours. I found him to be a considered, reflective, helpful, and honest witness. He had no personal knowledge of events before about February 2016 (although in his witness statement he does refer to sustained unrest within the mosque between 2014 and early January 2016). Mr Mazhar was not aware of any complaints about the purchase, or the construction, of the mosque before 2014. He said that the mosque existed for the benefit of the charity. He was cross-examined about the restoration order, dated 5 May 2023, and the undertakings contained within it. He said that it had been left to the second defendant’s accountants to apply to strike it off the register once the relevant funds had been released to the mosque account in the name of the first defendant. He was cross-examined at length about the degree of support for the defendants’ position within the Oldham mosque. He said that in January 2016 there were an average of 900 people who attended for Friday prayers. Only 40 to 50 were formal members of the mosque. He accepted that those who did not agree with the defendants did not sign up for membership and so could not vote at meetings.

36.

Mr Lakin describes the defendants and their supporters as a ‘self-selecting group’. There is no evidence that there was at any time more than 63 ‘members’ of the mosque. Less than 50 attended the first annual general meeting since 1981, which took place on 26 June 2016. There were two later AGMs: on 30 June 2018, attended by 20 worshippers; and on 30 June 2019, when 16 attended, including one new member. Paragraph 8.8 of the minutes of that meeting record that all members voted in favour of the registration of the new mosque as a charity. There have been no further AGMs, or any EGMs.

37.

In re-examination, Mr Mazhar emphasised that the appointor under the 2018 deed of appointment had no connection to any of the properties and no right to appoint any new trustees. Mr Mazhar said that he may have first seen that deed of appointment in 2024. He had no knowledge of the circumstances in which it had come to be made.

38.

Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed was born in February 1951. His evidence lasted for about an hour and a half, spread over the luncheon adjournment, on day two. Mr Ahmed is an important witness because he was one of the three trustees (and the only one to survive) involved in the purchase of the first three parcels of land. He was also one of the authors of the 1981 constitution. Mr Ahmed said that it was Mr Mohammed Hussain who had gone to Bradford to seek advice about the purchase of a new mosque. However, this had been purchased for the worshippers of Oldham. Mr Hussain had been seeking advice about the teachings of JTI. Mr Ahmed accepted that this was the name of the Bradford religious organisation, but he rejected all suggestions that the mosque in Oldham had been put under any ‘umbrella’ organisation. He emphasised that it had been bought for the worshippers of Oldham. At one point, shortly before lunch, Mr Lakin put to it Mr Ahmed that the purchase of the Oldham mosque had been for the people of Oldham within a bigger organisation from Bradford. Mr Ahmed’s response was: “Yes, you can say that.” It was also put to him that that was why the constitution was in the terms that it was. His answer was: “Yes.” The court then adjourned for lunch. When the court resumed after lunch, Mr Darbyshire reported that Mr Ahmed’s son had indicated that his father appeared not to be understanding all that was being put to him. As a result, an Urdu interpreter - from Birmingham, and not from either Oldham or Bradford - was made available to assist Mr Ahmed’s understanding of the questioning. Mr Ahmed gave evidence that nobody from Bradford had had any input into the 1981 constitution. The Oldham mosque had continued to seek guidance and advice from Bradford after 1971 until the present dispute had arisen at some time before 2016. Mr Ahmed emphasised that the two mosques are completely independent. All the financial costs had come from the people of Oldham. Mr Ahmed had not been involved in the later land purchases in 1996, nor in the construction of the new mosque. In re-examination, Mr Ahmed said that he had not understood the question that Mr Lakin had posed to him shortly before lunch. Mr Ahmed was clear that from the first day (in 1971), the Oldham mosque had been independent from Bradford.

39.

In his closing submissions, Mr Lakin invited the court to treat the evidence of Mr Ahmed with caution. He emphasised Mr Ahmed’s acceptance, in cross-examination, that one could say that the Oldham mosque was part of the umbrella body of JTI. Mr Lakin acknowledged that Mr Ahmed had later said that he had not understood the question; but he submitted that, in fact, Mr Ahmed had understood the question put to him in cross-examination very well. He also emphasised Mr Ahmed’s evidence that one of the other two trustees had been to Bradford. As a result, Mr Lakin submitted that it was always intended that the Oldham mosque should rest under the JTI Bradford umbrella.

40.

I accept that there had been some misunderstanding of Mr Lakin’s questioning on the part of Mr Ahmed. I accept his evidence, in re-examination, that from the first day (in 1971), the Oldham mosque had been independent from Bradford. That is consistent with the whole tenor of Mr Ahmed’s evidence, both written and - apart from that answer – oral, whereas his answer to Mr Lakin, shortly before the luncheon adjournment, was contrary to all of Mr Ahmed’s other evidence.

41.

The third defendant (Mr Navaid Afzal) had made two witness statements; and he gave evidence for about 45 minutes. I accept Mr Afzal as an honest, and reliable, witness; but his evidence was of little real assistance to the court. He was not around in the 1970s. He was not involved in the management or the running of the mosque until about 2016. I find that his evidence was firmly rooted in the paperwork, and on information derived from others, especially Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed and others within the worshipping Oldham mosque community. Mr Afzal accepted that no one should have been serving on the Oldham mosque committee for more than four years, whereas he had been on that committee for almost nine years (in fact it would appear to me to be for almost 10 years). When it was put to Mr Afzal that the Charity Commission’s understanding was that the Oldham mosque owned no land, Mr Afzal confirmed that the mosque was the property of the worshippers of Oldham.

42.

The fourth of the defendants’ witnesses was Mr Abdul Islam. He was born in about 1966. His association with the mosque had begun in the late seventies, as a student at the age of eight. His evidence at paragraph 15 of his witness statement was that:

No outside organisation had contributed financially to the purchase or the maintenance of the mosque. It had been financed exclusively by the residents of Oldham.

However, Mr Abdul Islam had not been directly involved in the running of the mosque until about 2012. He accepted that donations had been sought from other Muslim communities; but he said that no specific organisation had contributed. He went on to accept that the claimants (on their evidence) had carried out some repairs to the roof of the mosque. Overall, I did not derive much assistance from Mr Islam’s evidence.

43.

The defendants’ fifth (and final) witness was Mr Abdul Qayyum. He gave evidence at the start of the morning on day three, for about 15 minutes. He is the son of Mr Mohammed Hussain, who was one of the founders of the Oldham mosque. Mr Qayyum would have been about 11 years of age in 1971 (when the first property was purchased). Mr Qayuym explained that his father, and others, had wanted to set up a new mosque where they could follow their own particular Sunni Muslim, Barelvi beliefs. The discussions that had taken place with the Bradford mosque had been founded upon those shared beliefs. They had approached the Bradford mosque because they had not wanted to be in a similar situation of conflict with other Muslims, with different faith beliefs and traditions, as had been the case with an existing mosque at Churchill Street, Oldham. However, Mr Qayyum’s evidence was that the Oldham mosque had never been set up as a branch of a broader organisation. At the end of his evidence, Mr Qayum explained that there are 73 different faith traditions within Islam.

44.

In the course of his closing, Mr Lakin submitted that I should place considerable reliance on the evidence that Mr Qayyum had given that morning. Because of the unrest with members of the existing Churchill Street mosque, those seeking to establish a new mosque in Oldham had sought to bring themselves within the protective arm of JTI in Bradford; and that could only have been before the first transfer of land in 1971. They had sought the protective arm of the established mosque in Bradford. Mr Lakin submitted that the 1981 constitution evidenced that the Oldham mosque was continuing the traditions of the Bradford religious organisation with which it had associated itself under the rubric of ‘JTI’.

45.

I do not find the dissension with other Muslim worshippers at the Churchill Street mosque, which acted as the spur for the establishment of the first mosque at 87 Greengate Street, of any real assistance in determining the issues that I have to decide. It seems to me that that dissension is entirely neutral: On the one hand, it may have spurred those seeking to establish a new mosque at Greengate Street to seek the protection of another established mosque, reflecting their own faith beliefs. On the other hand, it may have made the founders of that new mosque even more determined to maintain and assert their own independence from any outside influence. I do not find the circumstances attending the establishment of the new mosque at 87 Greengate Street of any real assistance in determining the issue of construction of the various conveyancing instruments either way.

The submissions

46.

In addition to relying upon their detailed skeleton arguments, Mr Darbyshire, and then Mr Lakin, addressed me, in total, for just under two hours, from about 11.10 on the morning of day three until the usual luncheon adjournment. I then adjourned until 11 o’clock this morning (Friday 17 April 2026) to map out a roadmap for this judgment.

47.

For the claimants, Mr Lakin submits that all the transfer documents refer to the properties being held on trust for JTI. On the true construction of the various transfers, he says that the correct interpretation, and the natural meaning, of the words used is that the intention at the time was that the trustees should hold the property on trust for JTI, being the organisation based in Bradford, as the only organisation at that time bearing the ‘JTI’ name. He submits that the Oldham Muslim worshippers purchased the land, and built their mosque, without any complaint. They did so following the JTI tradition and form of worship, about which Mr Hussain had travelled to Bradford to seek the advice of the established JTI Muslim community at the Bradford mosque there.

48.

That construction of the conveyancing instruments is said to be in line with what is said in the constitution dated 20 June 1981. Mr Lakin places particular reliance on clause 2.2 where he says it is made clear that the building at No 87 is JTI’s property, and that the three trustees (Mohammed Hussain, Mohammed Yaseen and Zulfiqar Ahmed) are “the Trustees of the Oldham branch of the Religious Association of” JTI. In other words, Mr Lakin says that the mosque in Oldham was always intended to operate under the umbrella of the first claimant, and to serve as a branch mosque of that organisation. Further, clause 1.2 of the constitution provides that the name of the mosque cannot be changed. Mr Lakin submits that this was clearly intended to apply indefinitely. This is because the name indicates that it is part of the wider organisation of the first claimant. Hence, Mr Lakin contends that all of the properties forming part of the Oldham mosque, and its ancillary and associated accommodation, are held in trust for the first claimant, which is the true beneficial owner. The claimants are therefore entitled to a declaration in those terms.

49.

It is the claimants’ case that the Oldham mosque was, and has been at all material times, part of the wider JTI organisation. The 1981 constitution is said to make this clear. The Oldham mosque was a branch of that organisation. As the claimants’ witness, Mr Liaqat Hussain states, at paragraph 9 of his witness statement, the trustees in Bradford were consulted and advised in respect of that constitution, which was “drafted with JTI very much as the religious beliefs at the core of the Oldham mosque’s activities”. Further, it was as part of JTI that the new building for the mosque was conceived and the money raised. It was built on land in which JTI held the beneficial interest. Mr Lakin says that all the documentary evidence is consistent with this view. He also points to the fact that all the signs in the mosque building bore the name of ‘JTI’, clearly indicating that it was part of the wider organisation.

50.

In his closing submissions, Mr Lakin challenges the defendants’ case that a new charity (the first defendant) was registered which, by some magical process, operated to create within itself a beneficial interest in the mosque properties. He emphasises that there is no evidence that the first defendant charity represents a majority of the worshippers in the mosque. Instead, on the evidence, it represents a very small minority of mosque worshippers indeed. There has not been any public meeting since the last AGM in June 2019. Nothing had been done to secure the democratic support of a majority of the worshipping congregation at the Oldham mosque in favour of the first defendant charity. Mr Lakin submits that one cannot simply create a charity by registering a group with similar views and then assert that one has taken charge of a property. He characterises the actions of the defendants as “tantamount to a coup, which cannot operate to affect the beneficial ownership of the Oldham mosque properties”. Mr Lakin characterises the first defendant charity as having been established by a small, self-imposed, self-regulating group of individual worshippers at the Oldham mosque.

51.

For the defendants, Mr Darbyshire emphasises that, despite their length, it is not easy to discern from the amended particulars of claim what the claimants’ case actually is. On the one hand, they assert that the first claimant is the lawful owner of four (rather than five) plots of land, and that the defendants have acted in breach of the first claimant’s rights in respect of the. Alternatively, and contrary to the assertion of legal ownership, that the defendants have acted in breach of trust towards the first claimant. Mr Darbyshire says that whilst it is long in allegations, the amended particulars of claim are acutely short of any detail. What is clear is that there is a factional dispute between the two sides as to which of them is entitled to run the Greengate Street mosque.

52.

Mr Darbyshire contends as follows:

(1)

Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed, who is not a party to the proceedings but who aligns himself with the defendants, complains of a power struggle brought about by the second and third claimants, together with Mohammed Bashir (now deceased), and that it is he who is the true surviving legal owner of the land comprised in titles numbers LA263940 and GM598540 upon which the original mosque stood, and part of the new mosque now stands. Mr Darbyshire says that Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed holds that land on trust for the first defendant.

(2)

He points out that the mosque facility as a whole cannot function without control of 87 Greengate Street. That land was in Mr Ahmed’s legal ownership from the outset, and is also held upon trust for the benefit of the first defendant.

(3)

With the death of Mohammed Bashir, Mr Darbyshire says that the second and third claimants are the surviving legal owners of the other land forming the new mosque (and comprised within titles MAN352258 and MAN350745), and that they hold that land upon trust for JTI, and thus for the first defendant.

53.

Mr Darbyshire says that those matters plainly hinge upon the identity of the owners of the legal and beneficial titles to the mosque buildings. As the true beneficial owner, the first defendant is said to use them to provide space for the local Muslim community to worship and to study. In turn, that community makes donations to support the mosque’s endeavours in those activities and to support its community more widely. Mr Darbyshire acknowledges that this case is not a contest about which ‘side’ has a larger following, or about which is better connected to senior followers of this particular Islamic faith tradition, either in the United Kingdom or in internationally. Rather, the court is being asked to identify, when the mosque buildings were acquired, who were the legal owners on acquisition, and whether the identity of those owners has changed; and then to identify the current beneficial owners of those properties.

54.

Mr Darbyshire says that the purpose for which the buildings were obtained is vital to understanding the underlying beneficial ownership behind them. The original 1981 constitution of the mosque, signed by Zulfiqar Ahmed, is said to make it clear that JTI is not simply a description of the first claimant (which only came into existence as a corporate body on 26 April 2011), or even of the Bradford mosque. Rather, it identifies the office location of the mosque at 87 Greengate Street, which is still in the undisputed ownership of Mr Ahmed. Mr Darbyshire acknowledges that the name ‘JTI’ is exactly the same as the first claimant’s name; but that is just a coincidence of name. Mr Ahmed’s understanding of what the expression ‘JTI’ meant then (and so means now) is said to be clear.

55.

Mr Darbyshire recognises that the management history of the mosque, and its beneficial ownership, are complex and disputed. The defendants rely on the record of an emergency meeting held on 3 April 2016. The defendants’ evidence describes the discord within the mosque which occurred over the years 2014 to 2016. That description is corroborated by the minute of 28 February 2016. The 3 April 2016 record sets out that those present at the meeting included the third and sixth defendants and Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed. None of the claimants were present. A new committee was appointed to run the mosque. Further meetings followed in 2016. The defendants say that as a result the mosque thrived. The defendants produced a lengthy list of the community’s achievements since the 2016 meeting. The support of the Bradford organisation is acknowledged; but the two bodies remain separate and distinct. There was merely a coincidence of names.

56.

The defendants accept that the new committee was to have remained in place for only four years and that almost 10 years have now past since it was formed. They explain this, initially, by reference to the disruption caused by the Covid pandemic; and then to the creation of the first defendant as the new incorporated charity, which succeeded to the role previously performed by the second defendant. These constitutional dealings are relevant only insofar as they go to the beneficial ownership of the properties in issue. The defendants contend that the weight of available evidence supports their case that it is they who represent the faith community who use the mosque properties for their worship and education.

57.

In contrast, the claimants point to a purported appointment of new trustees on 30 March 2018 by Syed Mahroof Hussain Shah. That deed is said to proceed on the basis of an incorrect statement in clause 2 as to the death and resignation of various previous trustees. It is said that without the authority of the sole remaining trustee (Mr Ahmed) that deed is ineffective to determine how properties legally belonging to the initial trust should be dealt with. Nor is it readily apparent, either from the pleaded case or the evidence, how Mr Shah came to his position, and how the present claimants can derive any authority from that instrument.

58.

In his closing remarks, Mr Darbyshire emphasised that there is not one shred of evidence that even a penny moved from Bradford to Oldham in order to purchase the properties that formed, and now form, the Oldham mosque. The Oldham Muslims raised money from their own community, and from across the country generally. That is the evidence of Mr Ahmed. It is also supported by the document at C141 setting out the income and expenditure account for the Oldham mosque for the period 1 January 1971 to an illegible date in 1972, which must have preceded the date at the foot of the document of 23 September 1972. Under the heading ‘Income, the document records collections and donations from Oldham of just over £1,700, and collections and donations from other towns of just over £1,170. Mr Darbyshire emphasises the expression ‘other towns’, with no separate entry for Bradford. Mr Darbyshire says that apart from the partial coincidence of name, there is no substantial evidence to suggest that the Oldham mosque operates under the authority of the Bradford JTI. The trustees are identified in the documentation as “holding for the benefit of Oldham” rather than the wider, multi-mosque JTI organisation. Mr Darbyshire points to Clause 1.3 of the constitution and says that there is simply a coincidence of name. The address given in the constitution defines what that name means, and it is: “The mosque at 87 Greengate Street, Oldham” . Mr Darbyshire asks, rhetorically: If the Bradford JTI was in overall charge of the Oldham mosque and its trustees, how was that control to be exercised? It was the Oldham trustees who took the transfers of the various parcels of land as trustees for the Oldham mosque.

59.

Mr Darbyshire says that as the body representing the Muslim worshippers in Oldham, the first defendant, as their charity, should be treated as representing the beneficial ownership of the mosque. It is the organisation that represents the worshippers there. He also emphasises the very longstanding relationship between the defendants’ witness, Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed, and this particular mosque. For that reason, he invites the court to attach significant weight to his evidence.

60.

In short, Mr Darbyshire submits that the second and third claimants are the legal owners of those parts of the new mosque which are comprised within titles MAN352258 and MAN350745. They are the legal owners holding upon trust for the independent JTI mosque in Oldham. That conclusion follows directly from the trust declared on acquisition; from Liaqat Hussain’s evidence for the claimants; from the way in which the second and third claimants, as the current legal owners, styled themselves on the relevant transfers; and from the evidence offered by the defendants.

61.

Mr Zulfiqar Ahmed remains the true legal owner of 87 and 89 Greengate Street and of the land to the north of that street comprised in title number GM598540. He holds those parcels of land upon trust for the first defendant, which is the independent JTI mosque in Oldam, as described in his witness statement. Since it is the first defendant which is the registered charity which represents the charitable activities of that mosque, Mr Darbyshire invites the court to dismiss the claimants’ claim (as re-amended) and to grant the first defendant the relief which it seeks within its counterclaim.

Analysis and conclusions

62.

No one has suggested that the beneficial ownership of the various parcels of land comprising the old and the new mosques is in any way different. Any such suggestion would be contrary to the whole tenor of the evidence in this case. That evidence is uniformly to the effect that all the parcels of land were intended to be owned beneficially by, and for the benefit of, JTI.

63.

The question for the court is: What is ‘JTI’ in the present context? I am entirely satisfied, on the evidence in this case, that the beneficial owner of the various properties forming part of the Oldham mosque is the body which represents the worshippers at the Oldham mosque, and not the JTI organisation that operates in Bradford. I reach that conclusion as a result of, first, the terms of the various transfers; secondly, the terms of the 1981 constitution; and, thirdly, the source of the donations that were made for the purchase and construction of the Oldham mosque, and the intentions of the donors of those monies.

64.

Although it was not cited before me, I have borne in mind the explanation of the law relating to the resolution of any latent ambiguity within a document that is to be found at Section 4 of Chapter 8 of Lewison: The Interpretation of Contracts (8th edn). A latent ambiguity is one that only becomes apparent when the language of a particular document is applied to a particular factual situation. It arises only after evidence of the circumstances surrounding the making of the document has been tendered which gives rise to some form of ambiguity in the application of the particular wording of the document in question. In such a case, further evidence has always been admissible in order to resolve such ambiguity. The essential feature of a latent ambiguity is that it only becomes apparent when the terms of the document fall to be applied to the facts of a particular case. No ambiguity appears on the face of the document; it is only when the terms of the document came to be applied to the particular facts that the ambiguity becomes apparent.

65.

Here, it is clear that there is an ambiguity in the wording of the various transfers as to what is meant by the expression ‘JTI’ in the particular context of the various land purchases that made up, first, the old, and then the new, mosques at Greengate Street, Oldham. One needs to work through the various transfers. The original Oldham mosque occupied premises at 87 Greengate Street. Those premises were purchased, on 16 June 1981, by Mohammed Hussain, Mohammed Yaseen, and Zulfiqar Ahmed. They did so expressly “as Trustees of the Oldham branch of the Religious Association of” JTI. There is nothing in that to indicate that the religious association of JTI is in any way the organisation bearing that name in Bradford. However, I accept that at that point the matter is ambiguous.

66.

Slightly more assistance is provided by the next transfer, of the land at 89 Greengate Street (adjoining number 87), which was purchased by two of the original three trustees (Zulfiqar Ahmed and Mohammed Yaseen) on 22 November 1985. They did so expressly as “Trustees for … the Jamiyat, of 89 Greengate Street, Oldham”. It is entirely clear that 89 Greengate Street was to be held upon the trusts that already applied to the land at 87 Greengate Street. Again, there is no reference to any organisation in Bradford. But, again, I accept that the matter is ambiguous.

67.

The next transfer is that of 9 January 1992. It related to land on the north side of Greengate Street, which was intended to be the site of part of a new, and much larger, purpose-built mosque, to be constructed on the opposite side of Greengate Street. The purchasers were the original three trustees (Mohammed Yaseen, Zulfiqar Ahmed, and Mohammed Hussain). In this instance there is a clause (clause 2) which states that: “The Buyers are the trustees of the [JTI] Mosque” (which is defined as ‘the Mosque’). This is said to be “an unincorporated members organisation. They bought the property with money held on behalf of the Mosque and therefore hold the property for the members of the Mosque in accordance with its rules.” It seems to me that that wording is pointing to the existence of a single mosque, which is clearly that constructed and standing on 87 and 89 Greengate Street. There is absolutely no reference to the Bradford mosque, or to the Bradford organisation. In my judgment that is sufficient to resolve the previous ambiguities.

68.

Nothing changes when Zulfiqar Ahmed (as the sole remaining trustee) later transfers the properties to himself and three other individuals.

69.

I have already indicated that the later purported transfer of land within title numbers LA263940 and GM598540 to the four individuals named in the deed of appointment dated 30 March 2018, and then on to the first claimant, was invalid as a matter of law, apart from the fact that the transfers were subsequently registered at the Land Registry. I have already made it clear that the registration of those transfers was made in error. Nothing affected the ultimate beneficial ownership of the land in question.

70.

In my judgment, however, all matters are resolved by the later transfer, which was completed on 15 March 1996, in favour of the second and third claimants and the late Mohammed Bashir. In that transfer (which is only available in the form of a draft, verified by a representative of Oldham Borough Council, as the vendor), the expression ‘Mosque’ is defined as meaning “the Independent Jamia Mosque Jamiyat Tabligh Ul Islam, Oldham”. The word ‘Independent’, and the reference to the location of the mosque in Oldham, seem to me to resolve any continuing ambiguity that there may have been. The mosque is in Oldham, and the mosque is independent. It is, on its face, not part of any other, larger umbrella organisation.

71.

The matter is further confirmed by the reference in Clause 6 to the fact that

… the Purchasers are the duly appointed trustees of the Mosque and that the Property is the vested in them as such trustees on trust for the Mosque according to the rules of the Mosque and to be sold leased mortgaged or otherwise dealt with by the Trustees as the rules of the Mosque shall, from time to time direct.

72.

That is clearly a reference to the 1981 constitution. When one goes to the 1981 constitution, it seems to me to be absolutely clear that this is a self-contained, self-governing instrument. It contains no reference to either the Bradford mosque as a building, or to the JTI in Bradford as an organisation. The 1981 constitution contains no recognition that the Oldham mosque is in any way part of a larger umbrella organisation, or is in any way subservient to the Bradford mosque. One just needs to read through the 1981 constitution to arrive at that conclusion. Nothing thereafter, so it seems to me, can have affected the beneficial ownership of the site of the old and the new Oldham mosques. They remained completely independent of any JTI organisation in Bradford.

73.

That is also confirmed by Mr Ahmed’s evidence that nobody from Bradford had any input into the 1981 constitution. Indeed, that seems to me to be self-evident from the fact that the 1981 constitution contains no reference to Bradford. Had Bradford wished to assert any control over Oldham, it would clearly have been expressed in the governing constitution applicable to the Oldham mosque.

74.

I also derive support in that conclusion from the source of the donations that financed the purchase and construction of the Oldham mosque. I have already referred to the relevance of such matters in citing from paragraphs 27 and 30 of the judgment of HHJ Cadwallader in Mohammed v Daji.

75.

In this regard, it is relevant to bear in mind the evidence of the only claimant to have given evidence before me. Mr Mazhar Hussain has referred to raising money to purchase the Oldham mosque using a bucket. He said that worshippers would go to Bradford to raise money in that way. He added that receipts were issued which named the organisation in receipt of each donation, and stated that the purpose of the donation to be the building of a mosque in Oldham. I have already said that I consider that that supports the defendants’ case.

76.

So, for all of those reasons, I am satisfied that the claimants have failed to make out their claim that the first claimant is the beneficial owner of the Oldham mosque. On the contrary, I am satisfied that the defendants have made out their claim that the Oldham mosque is entirely independent of the Bradford JTI organisation.

77.

I am also satisfied, having considered the constitution of the first defendant as a registered charity, that its charitable objects conform to the trusts upon which the Oldham mosque was always to be held.

78.

It may be that the control of the first defendant should be revisited after the interval of time since the committee was first constituted in 2016; but that is a matter for the Charity Commission, or for separate charity proceedings. It is not a matter for this court in the context of the present proceedings.

79.

It seems clear to me that the first defendant exists to further and promote the very charitable objects on which the Oldham mosque has always been held. In those circumstances, it seems to me that it is appropriate for this court to grant a declaration that the mosque is held on trust for the first defendant.

80.

What is to happen about the registered legal titles to the various properties is not really a matter for this court within these proceedings given that there is no claim for rectification of the Land Register.

81.

That concludes this extemporary judgment.

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