Raj Kumari Passi & Ors v Roshan Lal Hansrani

This case is a classic example of how confusing and embittered property ownership can become within a family when it is not clearly recorded in writing, exacerbated by the absence of wills from the parents. This is multiplied as the dispute relates to not one property but eleven. As a result, a brother on one side and his three sisters on the other have between them spent over £800,000 feuding about their properties, with all the animosity and anguish which comes with that. The case was crying out for settlement, but now it falls to me to decide. After I have done so, I will have to decide which side is the ‘winner’ for the purposes of costs. But the truth is that in this litigation, the whole family has lost.

Mr Shiv Darshan Hansrani (whom I shall call ‘Father’) came to the UK from India, permanently from 1964 with his son the Defendant (whom I shall refer to as such or more commonly as ‘Roshan’). They were joined in 1966 by Mr Hansrani’s wife Mrs Kaushalya Devi Hansrani (whom I shall call ‘Mother’) and their three daughters, the First, Second and Third Claimants (whom I shall call ‘Raj’, ‘Pawan’ and ‘Ravi’ respectively). The Fourth Claimant (whom I shall call ‘Rashmi’), is one of Raj’s daughters. (She only played a minor role and I exclude her from the criticisms I level at the other parties). Mother and Father worked hard through the 1960s-1970s and the four children went on to successful careers. The family built up a portfolio of properties in Leicester (and Pawan’s house at 812 Greenford Road, Uxbridge). In order of purchase those featuring in this case were: 65 Worthington Street (bought in 1965 and sold in 1980), 159 Nansen Road (bought in 1974), 163 Nansen Road (bought in 1978), 76 Romway Road (bought in 1979), 812 Greenford Road and 44, Bonsall Road (bought in the 1980s), 146, Nansen Road (bought in 1981), 157 Nansen Road (bought in 1984), 10 Sawley Street (bought in 1986), 11 Egginton Street (bought in 1988), 25 Lyme Road (bought in 1992), 45 Thurlby Road (bought in 1996), 164 Nansen Road (bought in 1999), 8 Quenby Street and 21, Trafford Road (bought in 2001), 15, Thurlby Road and 130, Nansen Road (bought in 2002) and 21 Bannerman Road (bought in 2005). Roshan has the sole legal title to 45 Thurlby Road and shares it on a few others but title to most of the properties is held by the Claimants. For years, he managed the rental of the properties and distributed the rent. Though nothing was in writing. That reared its head, as it so often does, when the parties fell out.

Mother died intestate in 2005 and Roshan, who had lived with her as well as his own family at 159 Nansen Road for many years, was her Administrator but he did not administer her estate or instruct solicitors to do so for several years and Ravi was eventually appointed alongside him. In March 2011, Roshan’s marriage was unravelling and he separated from his wife, Mrs Veena Hansrani (whom I shall call ‘Veena’) and saw his GP for depression. Around this time, he removed his name from joint bank accounts with his sisters and in Autumn 2011, he transferred title in 159, Nansen Road (his home) and 11, Egginton Street from himself and Ravi as Personal Representatives to his three sisters, Ravi, Raj, and Pawan (and Roshan was also removed from the title of 21 Bannerman Road). Veena blamed the Claimants for the estrangement and when she reconciled with Roshan in 2019, relationships between him and his sisters deteriorated. He stopped paying them rent and in May 2022, they issued these proceedings.

In their Particulars of Claim, the Claimants effectively sought five remedies:

In his Defence and Counterclaim, the Defendant responded as follows:

Whilst Raj had also issued a claim in the Land Tribunal about 45, Thurlby Road, that was stayed in August 2022. On 15^th August 2023, DJ Rich made case management directions to this trial and on 13^th September 2023, he granted the Claimants’ application for the Defendant to pay them 2/3 of the net income for 10 Sawley Street and 8 Quenby Street, 1/3 of it for 164 Nansen Road, 75% for 21 Bannerman Road and 50% for 25 Lyme Road. The case came before me at Pre-Trial Review on 6^th February 2024, primarily for the Claimants’ application for summary judgment, which I dismissed. However, it was also clear to me that the antagonism between the parties was hampering the litigation. Statements on both sides were full of irrelevant vitriol (and inadmissible opinion evidence) about the other and I was clear that I expected both parties to focus on the issues. To that end, I ordered a more detailed list of issues in the form of a Scott Schedule.

I am grateful for the detailed Schedule, which I would simplify into these issues:

These issues do raise some legal questions, especially as to whether there are constructive or resulting trusts of the Disputed Ownership Properties and what orders should be made under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (‘TLATA’). But there is no real dispute on the legal principles and I deal with them briefly later. However, it is worth saying now that both Counsel agree there is a presumption that the equitable estate follows the legal estate, although they disagree as to its effect in this case. The Defendant, through Mr Burton, argues the crucial presumption is that of resulting trust. The gist of his case is that he bought the relevant properties, but put them in others’ names, who hold them on resulting trust for him. The Claimants, through Mr Mitchell, argue the presumption of resulting trust is rebutted by the wording of the transfers if they declare the beneficial interests (in effect an express trust), or by oral agreement and detrimental reliance (in effect a constructive trust). So, the gist of the Claimants’ case is that equitable title does indeed reflect legal title (save on 45 Thurlby Road) relying on the transfers, asserted agreements and asserted financial contributions. Ultimately of course, all these issues turn on the facts.

As I made clear to the parties both at PTR and the start of trial, it was my job to resolve the legal issues between them, not to make findings of fact about the whole history of the family over the last sixty years, or indeed for that matter every petty little dispute between them – many of which go back decades and doubtless have some roots in childhood grievances. I will limit my focus – and findings of fact – to the issues the pleadings require me to resolve. Bluntly, I doubt this will resolve all the gripes between these squabbling siblings. However, I do hope that it will bring some clarity for the younger generation, who sadly have allowed themselves to be dragged into this futile and petty dispute, so at least they are not left unaided to clear up the mess left by their parents in relation to these properties. Therefore, in this judgment, I will first analyse the evidence – written and oral – and discuss the balance between the two types given the difficulties with both. Then, I will make my findings of fact – but only on the matters I need to decide to resolve the legal issues. Next, I will consider the law – relatively briefly as it is not in dispute. Finally, I will set out my conclusions: again briefly.

Before turning to my impressions on the evidence of and on behalf of the Claimants and Defendant, it is helpful first to discuss some principles relevant to their evidence to different extents. The first is that as there is a claim and counterclaim, the burden is on each party to prove on the balance of probabilities the ‘facts in issue’ on which their case relies, but findings need not be made on every single allegation a party makes if unnecessary for the disposal of the case. So, in Shagang v HNA [2020] 1 WLR 3549, the Supreme Court held that a trial judge had been entitled to reject a defence of bribery in obtaining a shipping contract on other evidence, even on the assumption that a confession to bribery had not been obtained by torture by police in another state, but without actually making a finding about it. It was the bribe that was the ‘fact in issue’ needing proof on the balance of probabilities, not the reliability of the confession, which was simply ‘background’ that did not need to be so proved. Lords Hamblen and Leggatt emphasised at [62] that judges need not make findings on parties’ allegations that were unnecessary to resolve the case and added at [99]:

Part of the evidence on which findings on ‘facts in issue’ may be made is hearsay evidence (also discussed in Shagang). It is admissible in civil proceedings under s.1 Civil Evidence Act 1995 (‘CEA’) even without a Hearsay Notice under s.2, but the Court must take into account its absence in weighing its weight: s.2(4). Any hearsay evidence must be weighed under s.4 CEA, including whether it was contemporaneous, whether it was multiple hearsay and whether it is adduced in circumstances which ‘attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight’.

This distinction between hearsay and direct evidence is particularly important bearing in mind the risk of so-called ‘Chinese Whispers’ and the fallibility of memory. As is well-known, the latter was discussed by Lord Leggatt when a High Court Judge in Gestmin v Credit Suisse [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm) at [16]-[22].

It is precisely this concern which fed into the changes to trial witness statements introduced in 2021 in Practice Direction 57AC. Its Appendix states:

I respectfully agree with the observations of my BPC colleague in Manchester, HHJ Pearce, in Cumbria Zoo v Zoo Investment Ltd [2022] EWHC 3379 (Ch):

PD57AC (and its enforcement) has gone some way to address witness fallibility identified by Lord Leggatt (as he has become) a decade ago in Gestmin. However, his own solution to it in Gestmin itself at [22] has been more contested:

However, in Martin v Kogan [2020] EMLR 4 in giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Floyd LJ emphasised at [88]:

Moreover, as Floyd LJ went on to observe in Martin at [89], Gestmin was a commercial case with plentiful documentation, but Leggatt J’s approach at [22] cannot not be translated to cases where the documentary record is patchy or particular events are undocumented (as in Martin itself which was about how two domestic partners had authored a screenplay). In Cumbria Zoo, HHJ Pearce noted that in Natwest Markets Plc v Bilta (UK) Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 680, the judgment of the Court (Asplin, Andrews and Birss LJJ) explained at [49]-[50]:

I note the Court in Natwest spoke of ‘overall plausibility’ of particular evidence rather than its ‘inherent probability’. In a note of caution about the latter in his essay ‘The Judge as Juror’ which is now almost 40 years old, Lord Bingham said:

Having said that, Equity is extremely familiar with untangling transactions between family and friends where little is put in writing. As Lord Briggs said in the (Bahamian) case of Whitlock v Moree [2017] UKPC 44 at [25] and [23]:

So, this case requires that usual ‘equitable toolkit’ to dismantle convoluted family transactions, but with sensitivity to this family’s values. But it also requires focus upon all the evidence, written and oral, including the evidence of later events, as Sir Nicholas Patten explained in Enal v Singh [2023] 2 P&CR 5 (PC) at [37]-[38]:

Before turning to the evidence, as Mr Burton observed, it helps to start with the broad shape of the parties’ cases from the pleadings:

With that in mind, it is helpful to tease apart five different layers of evidence here:

However, first it is fairer to each of the four key protagonists to explain three overlapping difficulties with their evidence, weakening them to different extents and making my fact-finding task quite difficult, especially on the Disputed Ownership Properties. The first is the particularly sharp differentiation in this family between legal and equitable title. I would make these points about that:

That brings me onto the second evidential difficulty, which relates to the patchy documentary record I have mentioned. For example, with 76, Romway Road, we have the original transfer into the family in 1979 – to Mother - and we have a transfer from 1998 from Ravi to Raj, but not the transfer which ‘joins those dots’ in 1989, only a solicitor’s invoice. However, with 11, Egginton Street, 159 and 163 Nansen Road, we do not have the original transfers into the family at all. Yet we do have the transfers in September 2011 within the family from Roshan and Ravi as Mother’s Administrators to Raj, Pawan and Ravi (in her own right), that are the most contested transactions of all. Indeed, we have a veritable glut of documents relating to those transfers from a solicitors’ Probate file. Those documents are key to Roshan’s credibility and understandably was the centrepiece of Mr Mitchell’s cross-examination. But, as Mr Burton submitted, it must be seen against the context of Roshan’s situation at that time and the earlier history of those – indeed all – the properties which is much less well-documented. The absence of some of the key transfers of the Disputed Ownership Properties also complicates the arguments on both sides that beneficial ownership was dealt with by written express trust. There is also nothing in writing which actually proves constructive trust; and whilst resulting trust is generally a ‘last resort’ (c.f. Whitlock at [25]), it is more of an option in this case than others. But that just raises another problem – the usual documentary foundation of resulting trust cases – bank statements evidencing contributions to purchases - is also patchy and relatively recent, so does not cover some of the key properties from the 1970s-1980s. Indeed, the bank accounts were often in turn in joint names within the family (which is why I referred Counsel to Whitlock about that issue), yet Raj and her children Rashmi and Ravinder contend there was a family tradition that the money truly belonged to the first-named account holder, which Roshan denies. In fact, it transpires this rather self-serving assertion is not borne out by the evidence. I simply have to do my best with the (relevant) documentation which I do have.

However, thirdly, Roshan, Raj, Ravi and Pawans’ memories also had to do the best with the documents we have. As emphasised in Gestmin, it is well-known that both time and the litigation itself distort the retrieval of memories from long ago, yet the witness fervently believes that their own mind’s sketch of events from back then has the verity of a photograph. This is a particular issue for Roshan over the 2011 transfers as I will explain. Moreover, as I mentioned, despite the objective evidence of Mr Kaushal that the jewellery they accuse Roshan’s son Sanjeev of stealing was later found, Raj, Ravi (and their children) and Pawan still fervently believe in his guilt. Just as Pawan mixes that allegation up with other rumours of alleged thefts by Sanjeev, it has stiffened her ‘memory’ that Roshan wrongly retained £18,000 she found in Mother’s bedroom after she died (In fact, Prinaka explained Mother counted rent money there). Ravi has convinced herself that distrust of Sanjeev over the (I repeat, alleged) theft is why Roshan transferred her £40,000 in 2016 for ‘safekeeping’. However, this makes no sense as Sanjeev had no access to Roshan’s money. Raj says the £40,000 Roshan transferred to her in 2016 was repayment for Sanjeev’s 2004 ‘theft’. Yet the evidence that Sanjeev ‘confessed’ is quite muddled. Ravinder’s statement actually says that Sanjeev admitted to shoplifting, not to theft of Raj’s jewellery, yet Ravinder believed Sanjeev had confessed and this belief spread to others. Yet Raj’s statement is unclear on this and does not explain why Roshan would have ‘repaid’ her only twelve years later when they threatened Sanjeev with the Police back in 2004.

That brings me to Raj, who while she gave evidence last for the Claimants is the first of them and is clearly the main driving force for this claim:

There were also problems with Ravi’s evidence. In fairness I am conscious that she has struggled with her health for many years. However, the fact remains that large sections of her statement were irrelevant and bordering on spiteful to Roshan so I excised them at PTR. It is plain that Ravi dislikes her brother for reasons unrelated to this case. That is her prerogative, but it plainly means her evidence is not balanced and it also weakens the objectivity of the evidence – especially in their witness statements - of her own sons Navin and Nitin Vig. It also undermined Ravi’s evidence that Roshan in October 2018 demanded a bag of Mother and Father’s jewellery and used aggressive and violent language towards his sisters (which he denies). Yet, whilst Ravi’s statement plays up the drama and emotion, it does not actually say that Roshan took the bag from her - the pleaded allegation - and her belated assertion that he did in oral evidence was unconvincing. Moreover, again despite signing the PD57AC declaration, Ravi accepted in cross-examination that much of her understanding about the purchase of the properties came from others. Again, I cannot accept Ravi’s evidence unless corroborated by contemporary documents. But they partly support three points:

On that subject, Pawan’s absence living in the USA from 1984 (and not living in Leicester with the rest of the family from the mid-1970s) means that her evidence is less central than that of Raj and Ravi. Unfortunately, one could not have told that from her statement, which is extremely detailed and which understandably led Mr Mitchell to call Pawan first. Yet in cross-examination, Pawan accepted most of her understanding of events since the early 1980s depended on what her siblings had told her – i.e. was hearsay. Despite Pawan having a PhD, I had to explain to her the PD57AC declaration that her evidence should be based upon her personal knowledge. Since her statement was unclear as to the source and reliability of much of her understanding, some even seeming to be multiple hearsay, I cannot attach very much weight to large sections of her evidence. However, Pawan could give reliable first-hand evidence on three topics:

I turn lastly to Roshan’s evidence. I start with the difficulties. As I said, Roshan’s pleaded case is extreme – that he fully beneficially owns all the Disputed Ownership Properties, despite only one of the six of them being in his name. That is difficult to square with those parts of Raj, Pawan and Ravi’s evidence supported by documentary evidence I have found reliable, such as Pawan on 163, Nansen Road, Raj and Ravi on 76 Romway Road and 10 Sawley Street and Raj on 45 Thurlby Road. Yet on the other two Disputed Ownership Properties, 159 Nansen Road and 11 Eggington Street, especially the 2011 transfers, there is not so much documentary support for Raj, Pawan and Ravi as documentary contradiction to Roshan’s account. Here, as Mr Mitchell said, Roshan’s account that he was depressed, vulnerable and influenced by his sisters into the transfers, is difficult to square with the file of the solicitors handling Mother’s Probate, Freeths:

I certainly accept that what Roshan told Ms Patel is consistent with the Claimant’s case that the 2011 transfers of 159 Nansen Road and 11 Eggington Street were straightforward distributions of Mother’s estate over which Roshan disavowed any claim. However, the consistency of that narrative with Freeth’s file does not mean that the narrative has ‘overall plausibility’ with all the evidence for several reasons:

Likewise, Freeth’s file is only partly inconsistent with the Defendant’s case. As I have said, Roshan says he transferred 159 Nansen Road and 11 Egginton Street when (i) he was vulnerable and depressed under the influence of his sisters who wanted (ii) to stop Veena having any claim on them in any divorce. I have separated out those two propositions because in my judgement, whilst the Freeth’s file is certainly inconsistent with (i), it is not inconsistent with (ii).

This then leads to the question of not so much whether Roshan was lying, but when and to whom he was lying about the 2011 transfers. Was it to Ms Patel (and in his signed oaths) in 2011 or to me in evidence ? It is true that Roshan has persisted with the line that the plan to hide properties from Veena was his sisters’ and not his own, which as I have said is unconvincing. However, that does not mean that was not the actual plan at that time, even if he was the driving force behind it with his sisters’ willing help. As encapsulated in the well-known Lucas direction, witnesses can lie for various reasons – one is because their whole case is a lie, but another is a foolish attempt to bolster what is actually a perfectly good case. A lie does not necessarily mean the whole of their evidence should be rejected – it depends on the lie. Having had the benefit of watching Roshan’s response to Mr Mitchell’s skilful and detailed cross-examination, in particular on the Freeths file, in my judgment Roshan was indeed lying to Ms Patel in 2011 and to some extent he was seeking to excuse that lie by not being fully open about it even now – especially to his wife Veena and daughter Prinaka – and even perhaps to himself:

Whilst Mr Mitchell relied on this last point as undermining Roshan’s evidence, to my mind, in truth it explains Roshan’s evidence. This is what he has told his wife and daughter (and possibly his sons, though they did not give evidence) to excuse his behaviour in 2011 which prompted the long estrangement. Here ‘demeanour’ (to use that complicated and contested word) has some relevance. Not in the old-fashioned discredited way definitively dismantled by Lord Bingham in his great 1980s essay of preferring one witness over another because of their confidence and the plausibility in their story – as he said, the hallmark of confidence tricksters down the ages. Instead, what I mean by Roshan’s ‘demeanour’ in this context is more subtle. As Mr Mitchell also spotted, Roshan was evidently far more pained and hesitant on this subject than on any other, incredibly reluctant to be drawn into or to give away what he meant by ‘removing risk’ by not placing properties in Veena’s name (including 45 Thurlby Road in 1996, which was his original plan with Mother until he changed it to himself and Mother’s joint names). However, my conclusion is different from Mr Mitchell’s in the light of all the evidence. In my judgement, Roshan’s evident discomfort in evidence on this subject did not stem from dishonesty, but rather from guilt. He did not want to be open about what he meant by ‘removing risk’ in front of his daughter in giving evidence, because of his guilt and shame about what he had done in the past. When one reads between the lines of his statement and oral evidence, it is clear that he had never wanted to put properties into Veena’s name in case they got divorced, just as his sisters Raj and Ravi had done. After all, he seemed to put properties in everyone else’s name but Veena – he even preferred his niece and nephew over his wife for this purpose. However, that does not mean that Roshan’s evidence on this subject was a full-blown lie. As I say, I accept that the plan was indeed to hide 159, Nansen Road and 11 Egginton Street from any claim by Veena. I also accept that Roshan’s sisters (or at least Ravi and Raj, as Pawan only discovered it later) were fully signed-up to that plan. After all, 159 Nansen Road had been their parents’ home and was next door to Raj’s home. Of course they did not want Veena ending up with it if divorced from Roshan. Ravi, Raj and Roshan had helped ‘keep properties in the family’ during Ravi’s divorce in 1998 (76 Romway Road and Ravi’s home at 104 Downing Drive) and did so again, with 11 Egginton Street thrown into the package as also in Mother’s name. Moreover, I also accept Roshan was generally depressed – as the GP notes in March-May 2011 demonstrate – even if he hid it from his sisters and nephews: even the doctors Navin and Nitin. I accept all that, but not that he was so depressed to be under the influence of his sisters. That was a ‘spin’ on the truth for the benefit of his wife and children, not a lie. For all these reasons and others, I will find on the balance of probabilities it was a joint plan.

Indeed, in other respects, Roshan’s evidence was reliable, even allowing for the difficulties with his evidence on the 2011 transfers and 163, Nansen Road, 76 Romway Road and 10 Sawley Street and 45 Thulrby Road. His statement did not entirely comply with PD57AC, in that it made detailed reference to documents all the way through, rather than focussing on his first-hand knowledge. However, under cross-examination, it became clear that Roshan had a command of the detail which was not simply based on documents, but on his own calm, careful and clear recollection – after all, he was the one who ran all the properties for decades, even if he was not a brilliant record-keeper. Moreover, as Mr Burton submitted, at certain key moments, Roshan’s evidence had the clarity of detail and nuance strongly suggestive of accurate recollection – ‘the ring of truth’:

So, where does all this leave my own approach to the evidence if I cannot wholly accept the evidence for the Claimants on one side or Defendant on the other ? And where the documentary record is patchy and where even some documents which I do have do not always mean what they appear to say ? Here, I think cautious reliance on another old judicial cliché helps: ‘actions speak louder than words’, although by ‘words’ I would include words in transfers and other documents prepared by third parties. Ultimately, I place more weight on how these siblings actually interacted with each other over time – especially from 2011 and 2019 when Roshan was ‘in their camp’ and estranged from his wife and children – than what they purported to say in transfers, when there was a long-standing family tradition of marked divergence between legal and equitable ownership. I also place particular weight on the financial position of family members at the time and the actual later distribution of rent as evidence of the earlier understanding (Enal). I will call this actual rather than formal reality ‘the actual position’. However, that is not straightforward as Roshan did not keep proper clear accounts, so to an extent he is reliant on fragments of notes and memory. Otherwise, I must simply do my best with the complex evidence I have, giving weight to all the different types of it in the holistic way described in Natwest. However, on several topics, I believe I can safely accept the broad thrust of Roshan’s evidence, except where it is contradicted by: (i) ‘the actual position’ as I have explained it; and/or (ii) documents which on all the evidence I find reliable on their face; and/or (iii) on the specific subjects on which I have found the evidence of Raj, Ravi and (particularly) Pawan to be reliable as discussed above, which particularly relates to 163 Nansen Road, 76 Romway Road, 10 Sawley Street and 45 Thurlby Road.

Against that background, I can turn to my findings of fact on the balance of probabilities, with the burden of proof on the party asserting a claim, including to a beneficial interest in a property in which they do not share legal title. I hope to do so relatively briefly and in five chronological sections: (i) 1964 to 1987 being Father’s lifetime in the UK; (ii) 1987 to 2005 when Mother died; (iii) 2005 to 2010 after Mother’s death; (iv) 2010 to 2019 when Roshan and Veena separated on the day of Prinaka’s wedding in 2011 and the aftermath of that; and finally (v) 2019 onwards when Roshan and Veena reconciled but this dispute between him and his sisters then broke out. As I have explained by reference to Shagang, I will not make findings of fact on every contested point, but only on those relevant to the issues which I must resolve. I must leave the many other disputes festering in this family to the family – I doubt they are capable of legal resolution anyway.

As I started this judgment by saying, until they descended into this bitter and futile dispute, the Hansrani family was a demonstration of the successful immigration from people from all over the Commonwealth after the Second World War, which has made the UK the country it is today. In very brief summary, Father and Mother previously lived in Rurka Kalan, a rural village in Punjab, India and they had four children. Raj was born just after the war finished in 1945, Roshan in 1948 after the traumas of Partition, and Pawan and Ravi soon followed. In 1953, Father came to the UK for the first time, to work and remit money home as so many people did then and still do, but he obviously missed his family and returned to India in 1960.

However, the Hansrani family’s story here really started in 1964, when Father came back across to the UK, this time for good. A few months later, Roshan – then aged 16 – followed with his uncle. They settled in Leicester to prepare the way for Mother and the three girls to come to the UK in 1966. Mr Dhian Singh remembered those two years, working alongside Roshan at Premier Screw at Woodgate, Leicester and knew that outside his full-time job, Roshan was also studying O-Levels in the evenings. Roshan had learned English in India and was ambitious to better himself. Roshan’s income in those days was only £14-£15 a week. It is likely that Father’s income was better, but not dramatically so: even a decade later in 1974 – famously a time of high inflation after the 1973 Oil crisis – Father’s wages were £41-£43 a week according to a sponsorship declaration disclosed by the Claimants during the trial. Whilst those sums appear tiny now – that is simply the very effect of inflation over those 50 intervening years.

The start of the Hansrani property patrimony was the purchase of 65, Worthington Street in Father’s name in 1965. The Claimants were then still teenagers in India and their knowledge of this is entirely second-hand. I prefer Roshan’s clear first-hand account – full of detail, as one would expect given it was the start of his climb of the property ladder and a milestone in anyone’s life. For the first year or so he was in the UK, Roshan was living in very cramped conditions sharing a room with Father in Roshan’s uncle’s home. Whilst Father - well-used to these conditions from his stay in the 1950s - did not seem very interested in buying a house, Roshan was heavily influenced by his uncle’s encouragement to buy property and I accept it was Roshan’s initiative to go to the estate agents and buy 65 Worthington Street.

As it is clear – not least from Mr Dhian Singh’s evidence - that Roshan was earning in 1964-66 when he turned 18, I find that it is more likely than not that he did open a bank account with his father. However, (as Roshan admitted in evidence) it may well not have been the one with Leicester Building Society he pleaded ending -519. As Mr Mitchell spotted, it looks like that account (which is relevant in the 1980s) was Father’s account to which Roshan’s name was only added later and which was not used for a period after Father’s death in 1987 until 1990 and finally closed in 1991. I do not accept the 1960s joint account was all Roshan’s money. Indeed, in the less than a year he had worked in the UK on £15 a week, it is unlikely Roshan could have saved up enough for a deposit on his own. However, this income was enough to service the mortgage. Some pre-decimalisation slips from 1970 show the mortgage repayment on 65, Worthington Street in Father’s name was 8 old pounds and 16 shillings, comfortably within Roshan’s then-pay.

Therefore, for all the Claimants’ protestations, it is entirely plausible that Roshan could have afforded to service the mortgage in Father’s name in the late 1960s when working in a variety of factory jobs and as a bus conductor and studying part-time. However, that is not the same as finding he was the sole contributor in that period, still less in 1971-1975 when studying for his degree in Mechanical Engineering at Surrey University, although one of those years was a paid internship and he took other part-time jobs. By the 1970s, his sisters were all working and contributing to ‘the family pot’. However, I accept Roshan’s evidence that related to household expenses, not the mortgage, which he often paid. In 1971, Raj married and bought 19, Kings Newton Street, Leicester. At the same time, Pawan went off to study Pharmacology at University in Bath. However, Ravi still lived at home but started working for the NHS in 1969 and paid all her money into the ’family pot’, at least until she too married in 1976 and they bought their own home together at 4 Bradbourne Road in 1977, using £2,000 she had saved and a £2,000 loan from Father (despite Roshan’s objections). However, Ravi cannot say that the money she paid ‘into the pot’ from 1969 to 1976 was used on the mortgage for 65 Worthington Road as she left that to Father and Roshan. Indeed, when it was sold in 1980 (with a solicitor’s letter tellingly addressed to Roshan not Father who had just retired), the sale price was £6,500. I accept Roshan kept that money.

However, those proceeds of sale of 65 Worthington Street which Roshan took in 1980 had nothing to do with the purchases of 159 Nansen Road in 1974, or indeed 163 Nansen Road in 1978, nor 76, Romway Road in 1979, all of which predated the sale of 65, Worthington Street. Roshan had rented that out for £500 a year since the family moved to 159, Nansen Street in January 1975 (not 1974 as said in statements). By then Raj was living with her husband in Leicester, Pawan was still in Bath, Roshan coming to the end of his studies in Surrey, but Ravi was at home.

Contemporary purchase documents from solicitors from January 1975 show that the purchase price for 159 Nansen Road in Father’s name was £8,500, comprised of a £850 deposit, a further payment of £5,650 and a Leicester Building Society mortgage of £2,000 repayable at c.£30 a week even in 1979 – again in Father’s name. It is the Claimants’ case that Father bought it alone without Roshan’s help. I do not accept that and find on the balance of probabilities that Roshan was the sole financial contributor to the purchase and the help Father gave him was lending his name, as Roshan could not get a mortgage when still a student in 1975.

According to the document disclosed by the Claimants during the trial I mentioned earlier, only a few months before the purchase, in August 1974, Father declared that his weekly income was £41-43 and his savings were £4,200. That is not enough for him to have paid unaided the total of £6,500 in early 1975 which was not by mortgage. Receipts show a payment of £850 in January 1975 and £5,650 less than a month later in February 1975. That supports Roshan’s evidence that the payment came from him from a combination of three sources. Firstly, his grant money – that he had not spent as he had worked part-time jobs and lived frugally. Second, pay from his one-year internship at the Atomic Energy Authority on his Engineering Degree which would have finished by then. Third, money he had saved in the joint account with Father from his work back in Leicester up to 1971 not used to service the very modest mortgage on 65, Worthington Street.

However, I accept it was Roshan’s idea in 1975– inspired by his uncle – not to sell 65, Worthington Street but to rent it out which covered that mortgage from then on and left a surplus. By then, with inflation and higher interest rates, the mortgage on it probably had risen from £8 a month, but I find would still have been well-below the £500 rent a year Roshan earned and declared in his tax returns. This would have meant that Roshan had more than enough to service the mortgage on 159 Nansen Road from 1975 onwards, which was only £30 a month by 1979. By 1975, Roshan was in teacher-training and by 1976 he was working full-time as a schoolteacher back in Leicester living with his parents at 159, Nansen Road, but also supplementing that income with other jobs like teaching in a prison. Whilst that would not have amounted even in total to £20,000-£25,000 (he muddled-up his teacher’s salary in 1997 for that in 1977), it would have been more than enough to cover the mortgage for 159 Nansen Road entirely by himself. This in turn supports Roshan’s evidence, which I accept on the balance of probabilities, that 159 Nansen Road and the mortgage was put in Father’s name because Roshan could not get a mortgage and out of respect for his father and it was agreed between Roshan and Father that 159 Nansen Road actually belonged exclusively to Roshan. (This is also consistent with later events and expenditure I shall describe later).

After all, by 1975, Raj was married and had her own home; Ravi would soon be married and have her own home as well and Pawan was coming to the end of her time back at home in Leicester after her degree in Bath and was just about to start her Masters’ Degree in Pharmacology in Manchester. Roshan did not intend to continue studying for long, but to work as a teacher on more money than his Father earned working in the factory and he had always been keen to own property. It made sense for Roshan to buy 159 Nansen Road for his parents but put it in Father’s name. It may well be they all anticipated Roshan would move out later.

However, I do not accept that Roshan bought 163, Nansen Road in 1978. By then, after Ravi had bought 4 Bradbourne Road with her husband, the only one of the siblings who did not own property was Pawan. At this stage, she was studying for her PhD in Pharmacology in Nottingham, but did not intend to live there full-time. Whilst Pawan was still studying, just like her brother in 1975, she was also working part-time as a locum Pharmacist; and again just like her brother, had accumulated enough money for a deposit and to service a mortgage. But unlike her brother, whilst she was still studying, her income was enough for her to get a mortgage in her own right and 163 Nansen Road was bought in her name.

I find on the balance of probabilities that for 163 Nansen Road, both the purchase money and the mortgage repayments were paid by Pawan, who clearly remembered handing over that money to her Father. Whilst of course she does not know with certainty that he used the money for that purpose, I find on the balance of probabilities that he did. I accept Roshan found the property and handled the purchase but I find he did not pay towards it. After all, he was already servicing the mortgage on 65 Worthington Street by renting it out and was paying off all the mortgage on 159 Nansen Road too. I accept that he was still working towards an MSc so could still not get a mortgage himself. However, 163, Nansen Road was in Pawan’s name not due to that, but because she wanted to get onto the property ladder herself. Roshan’s sense of grievance towards all his sisters – and in fairness his management of the rental of 163 Nansen Road for years on Pawan’ behalf -without personal gain, has distorted his memory. I find that in relation to 163 Nansen Road, he was indeed simply Pawan’s informal agent, collecting her rent. Rashmi remembers discussions about rent for 163 Nansen Road and there are envelopes relating to it with what appear to be rent figures and Pawan’s name on. Indeed, Pawan admits Roshan paid her the due rent until November 2019.

Another reason I prefer Pawan’s evidence on the purchase of 163 Nansen Road in 1978 to Roshan’s evidence is that the following year, I will find he bought 76 Romway Road as well, before he had sold 65 Worthington Street in 1980 and whilst still paying for his mortgage on 159 Nansen Road, all on a teacher’s salary. Moreover, by 1978, Roshan also had a wife to support. Veena had also qualified as a teacher back home in India, but after she arrived in the UK in 1978 as part of an arranged marriage to Roshan, she did not take up teaching. Indeed, I sense that Veena was quite frustrated. She did not work but was expected by Roshan’s family to stay and look after their home, as she was living with Father and Mother who were both then working. This was entrenched when Veena and Roshan’s first child was born in 1979. Moreover, Veena was excluded from the family properties as well. Whilst only Veena, Raj, Ravi (and to an extent Pawan although she was not local and was not so involved) will understand why, I accept that Veena did not feel welcomed by her new sisters-in-law. I also accept that Roshan was close to his sisters - especially Raj - and their antipathy towards Veena undermined her marriage to Roshan. Whilst Raj and Ravi simply deny any issue with Veena; and Veena’s statement is emotional and ill-focussed, I accept there was an issue.

However, the 1970s ended positively for Roshan. He was newly-married and a new father, settled into a permanent teaching job and in 1979, I accept that he felt financially comfortable enough to buy another rental property – 76 Romway Road. A letter from November 1978 confirming the subject to contract purchase referred to Roshan as buyer, but he could not get a mortgage because he was still technically a Masters’ student. Likewise, the mortgages on 65 Worthington Road and 159 Nansen Road were still in Father’s name, so I accept Mother agreed to have the mortgage and the property in her name for Roshan. However, the final price was £16,500 and I accept the mortgage was for £8,000 with the monthly repayments starting in 1979 at £67.70. Mother was working in a factory and is unlikely to have had £8,500 in savings to pay the balance of the price – over twice the savings Father had in 1974, who had worked for much longer. By contrast, I find Roshan had accumulated that in savings again in his over five years – most of those working as a supply teacher - since 1974 when he bought 159 Nansen Road.

Therefore, I find on the balance of probabilities that it was Roshan who bought and paid for 76 Romway Road, but out of respect for Mother, he did see it as in part her property as well. Indeed, doubtless he was proud to have found his Mother a property to have in her name as well. However, I find he serviced the mortgage in its entirety, through renting it out, it appears to students from Leicester University. I also accept Roshan went on to make overpayments so the mortgage on 76 Romway Road – albeit still in Mother’s name, was paid off in full in 1986.

Moreover, by 1981, Roshan was in a permanent teaching role and was finally able to get a mortgage in his own name, for another local house: 146 Nansen Road. It may have been anticipated by his sisters that Roshan would move there and leave Mother and Father in 159 Nansen Road. However, in Roshan intended to stay in his family home. After all, in 1977, he had obtained approval to erect a garage and carport and in 1980 planning permission to erect an extension, which I accept he paid for himself. I also accept that in September 1980, Roshan paid off the c.£1280 outstanding on the mortgage for 159, Nansen Road. It is unrealistic that Father did that having retired. Notably, that was a reflection of Roshan’s financial stability, as that was paid off before Roshan received the £6,500 sale proceeds for 65, Worthington Street in October 1980. Whilst it had been bought in Father’s name and I have found he also contributed to the purchase back in 1965, it had been Roshan who had enabled the family to move to 159, Nansen Road and to rent out 65, Worthington Street and I accept Father, who had just retired and claiming his pension, was happy to let Roshan enjoy the fruits of his own labours with the sale proceeds. True to form, Roshan soon afterwards in Summer 1981 found another neighbouring property to buy – 146 Nansen Road, which he finally bought in his own name with a mortgage (which he subsequently paid off in full in 1991).

At the same time – 1981 – Pawan had finished her PhD and found a job in the South-East with Glaxo and she bought 812 Greenford Road in Middlesex for £32,850 with a deposit of £3,285 with the balance on a mortgage with Abbey National (which Pawan redeemed in 2001). However, Roshan was still managing the rental income for Pawan on 163 Nansen Road with her responsible for the mortgage, which was gradually reducing from December 1979 (when the balance was £3910.91) to December 1981 (when it was £3708.57).

However, 1981 was a more difficult year for Raj, who separated from her husband with their two young children – Ravinder (born in 1973) and Rashmi (the Fourth Claimant, born in 1978). Back in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Raj was earning £8-£9 a week – less than her brother Roshan’s first job. Obviously, by the early 1980s, not least with inflation, Raj would have been on more, but she had no spare money, as Raj admitted herself. Rashmi described that Raj’s life as a single mother was hard and she was very careful with money – they lived frugally, with even a restaurant meal a huge treat. Clearly, the family would have been concerned about Raj and her children and after she had been divorced in 1984, Mother and Father wanted her and the children closer to them. Roshan had not long bought the neighbouring property at 157 Nansen Road for £18,500 and in 1985, he sold it to Raj for £18,500 which she had raised from selling her own property at 19 Kings Newton Street. Therefore, not only was Roshan and Veena living with Mother and Father with their son, Raj and her two children were now living next door. Given Raj’s antipathy towards her, that was unlikely to have improved things for Veena.

However, there was still more upheaval in 1984, as Pawan found a dream job in the USA and emigrated. Whilst she describes Roshan as disapproving of this as he wanted her to work as a pharmacist in Leicester, Roshan was open and fair about this in evidence – despite the dispute - that it was Pawan’s career and her choice. However, Roshan did insist on Pawan transferring 163 Nansen Road to Father in 1985. Pawan met her husband in the USA and married there in 1986 and has lived there ever since. This is why Pawan is the least involved – and certainly the most objective – of the three sisters in the family dealings back in Leicester. Roshan also rented out 812 Greenford Road (at some stage used by his son) and accounted to Pawan for the proceeds. There are envelopes referring to rent for Pawan on both.

Meanwhile, also in 1984, Roshan had found an additional source of income on top of his continuing teaching career. He started the building firm Crown Construction. Mr Kuldip Singh worked for Roshan in this role at 159 Nansen Road (with a further rear extension in 1985) and on 76 Romway Road. Mr Singh also recalls working on 10 Sawley Street, though that was bought in 1986, so he may be mistaken that he stopped working in construction in 1985.

10 Sawley Street was bought for £12,250 in July 1986, again in Father’s name. Roshan again found it and arranged the purchase – without a mortgage – and claims that he paid for it in full. I accept the deposit of £1,225 and a further £3,000 – essentially a third share – was paid in September 1986: exactly the same time as a receipt for payment on the purchase. This was from a joint account for Roshan and Father: the account ending -519 mistakenly pleaded as the 1960s one. However, since Father had retired in 1980 but there were still additions to it in 1986, I accept by then it contained mixed funds, indeed probably more of Roshan’s money than Father’s. Yet it remained with Father’s name first – contrary to Raj’s suggested ‘family tradition’. However, there is no documentary evidence of any payment of the balance of £11,175 from Roshan’s other accounts. Indeed, at the same time Roshan spent £5,178.74 paying off the mortgage on 76, Romway Road. By contrast, here Ravi does give a clear and vivid account of an agreement between herself, Raj and Father where they all agreed to put into 10 Sawley Street a 1/3 share of £4,000 each – Ravi from her maternity pay, although she was less clear about Raj’s £4,000. Mother’s later accounts show she split the rent between Raj and Ravi – Roshan is not mentioned. However, Roshan did undertake works through Crown Construction to 10, Sawley Street (as Mr Singh recalled). But despite this and use of his money for the deposit, Roshan did not pay himself rent.

10, Sawley Street was Father’s last act in the story as he passed away in 1987. This obviously hit the family hard, particularly Mother. She was not yet bed-bound – and indeed travelled to see Pawan in the USA in 1988. I also accept that Mother gathered her children at 159 Nansen Road and had a discussion that Roshan would continue to manage the properties and the rent at 10 Sawley Street would be split three ways between herself, Raj and Ravi; and that Pawan would receive the rent from 163 Nansen Road as the Claimants plead in their Particulars of Claim. However, notably, the Claimants plead no such agreement at that point about 76 Romway Road, or 159 Nansen Road even though the latter (valued at £55,000 in November 1990 in the only Probate document) was also part of Father’s estate along with 163, Nansen Road (valued at £45,000) and 10, Sawley Street (valued at £35,000), which therefore passed on his intestacy to Mother, not to Roshan.

After Father’s death, Roshan had increased financial responsibility for the family, as well as he and Veena becoming Mother’s carers as her health declined and she retired. In 1988, she signed a power of attorney for Roshan to deal with 159 Nansen Road on her behalf. Whilst I have found he had paid in full for it, he did not take the opportunity after Father’s death to transfer it into his own name. I find he transferred it into Mother’s name: both for her own sake as it was her home with his own family; but also that he did not want Veena to have any claim on it. Roshan said in his statement para.57 (which I accept on balance of probabilities):

However, Roshan also succeeded in bringing Mother out of her shell of grief after Father’s death by having her do book-keeping for rent. Prianka, who shared a room with her grandmother for a while when younger, remembers Mother counting the rent money and tying it up with elastic bands (which is why I will find that Pawan discovered £18,000 of cash in Mother’s room after she died – it was the rent money, not Mother’s own). Mother also filled out the accounts of rent for the properties in diaries, which support Raj and Ravi’s claim to shares of 10, Sawley Street. He also brought Mother into his property portfolio. Not only was 76 Romway Road in her name, Roshan also found another property which he decided to put in her name, again partly to involve her and partly to exclude Veena’s potential claim: 11 Egginton Street. I find again Mother agreed that it was truly his property. The circumstances of the purchase are again patchily-evidenced, but it is not disputed that it was bought in Mother’s name without a mortgage. The completion statement records the purchase price was £25,000. The three cheques comprising £16,200 came from Roshan’s Crown Construction accounts and I accept that Roshan paid the balance in cash and Mother made no financial contribution. Indeed, Mr Durgai gave essentially unchallenged evidence that he sold 11 Egginton Street to Roshan who told him that he would buy it in Mother’s name. Mr Durgai also confirmed that Roshan later did building work on it and Mr Hussein also re-wired the house. Again, 11 Egginton Street was rented out, but no rent was ever distributed to Mother, Raj, Ravi or Pawan for it, which they accepted.

However, as Mother’s health continued to deteriorate, in 1989 Roshan decided it would be easier to put 76 Romway Road in joint names. Whilst he had paid the deposit and serviced and paid off the mortgage, again he preferred not to be on the title himself because of the situation with Veena, so Ravi agreed to be added. She recalls that she ‘purchased’ a share, but we do not have the copy of the transfer in 1989 or any evidence of payment and Roshan contends that she paid nothing. Yet unlike most other internal family transfers, Ravi did later ‘sell’ her half-share in 76 Romway Road to Raj in 1998 for £25,000 (which was more than the whole purchase price of 45 Thurlby Road, albeit that was at auction). That is consistent with Ravi’s ‘share’ being a beneficial interest, not just legal title. I find that as with Raj on 157, Nansen Road, Roshan would have allowed his sister to pay what she could afford, so I accept Ravi ‘bought’ a half-share in 76 Romway Road in 1989, even the amount has been forgotten. However – perhaps because she paid an undervalue - I find Ravi was not paid rent – she does not mention receiving it and the evidence of Mother’s rent accounts is that the rent from 76 Romway Road was not split. I find that Ravi never had any expectation of rent from that property and nor did Raj when she bought Ravi’s half-share in 1998, as I describe below.

By contrast, in 1991, two of the other Disputed Ownership Properties were transferred for nil value, which I find were both part of the working-out of Father’s estate and which reflected Raj’s greater involvement in the family properties as Ravinder and Rashmi grew up. 163 Nansen Road was transferred from Pawan (to whom it was presumably transferred after Father’s death as she had transferred it to him beforehand) to herself and Raj as legal and equitable joint tenants. After all, Pawan was far away in the USA. In any event, she makes no complaint of unpaid rent until 2019. However, according to Mother’s accounts, the rent from 163 Nansen Road was not split and she noted £600 received in October 2004 and a total of £600 in March 2005, at a time when the tenancy agreement records the rent as £600 (although it was clearly not always paid). Likewise, later envelopes link ‘163’ ‘Pawan’ and ‘670’, suggesting her rent had increased. Furthermore, 10, Sawley Street was transferred around the same time from Mother to Raj and Ravi as legal and beneficial joint tenants. Here, Mother’s later accounts show the rent from there was split between Raj and Ravi with their rent shares being £100 pcm around the late 1990s (although some of the figures look more like £200, that may be double-instalments). Yet Roshan is not mentioned. Whilst Roshan is not a party to either deed, he accepts organising for them to be done. Yet neither leaves room for any beneficial share in either property for him. This shows that it was not just Roshan who had already benefitted from Father’s estate, Pawan had by receiving back 163, Nansen Road and Raj and Ravi between them 10, Sawley Street. So, it is entirely consistent with Roshan later retaining an interest in 159, Nansen Road.

Also reflecting Raj’s increased involvement, in 1992 she and Roshan bought 25 Lyme Road together, each paying 50% of the purchase price. There is no dispute about this, or that 50% rent was duly paid to Raj by Roshan until November 2019. I do not accept there was for this or any other property any agreement of a ‘management fee’ for Roshan. He managed the properties informally for his family, not as their contractual agent. But he was unquestionably in charge and still keen on sharing out legal title (except to his wife) – including for 25 Lyme Road as I said: putting it in Ravinder’s joint name without telling him and after he was challenged by a Council Tax Officer, later putting it in Rashmi’s joint name.

The purchase of 45, Thurlby Road in 1996 must be seen against this background of Raj’s increasing involvement with Roshan’s properties. Again, Roshan found the property advertised at an auction, which he could not attend but he sent along Veena and his agents. This may explain why the original sale contract is in the joint names of Mother and Veena on 22^nd May 1996. However, within a couple of weeks, Roshan wrote to his solicitor on 2^nd June 1996 saying he wanted it in the joint names of Mother and himself. Clearly, the nagging doubts about his marriage overcame Veena’s enthusiasm finally to have property in her name. At the end of May 1996, Roshan paid £21,000 – first a cash deposit of £2,100 and then three cheques from three Alliance and Leicester accounts. One was in Mother’s name for £8,500, as Mr Mitchell showed, the account went through her Probate after she died. The second was in Roshan’s sole name for £3,000. The third account (-369) was in the joint names of him and Raj (£7,400). I will have to consider the legal implications of that later, but I do not accept that £7,400 was all Raj’s money on her asserted family convention that it came from a joint account on which she was first-named. That was not Roshan’s practice. Indeed, in joint account ending -159 with Father, I have found that by the 1980s the money in that was mainly Roshan’s, yet he was second-named on the account. I also do not accept Raj paid £3,100 in cash, as the deposit was £2,100 in cash at the auction at which she was not present.

More generally, I also do not accept Raj’s evidence that it was agreed between her and Roshan that she would have a 50% beneficial interest. Raj’s belief appears to derive from the fact that she did later receive some rent on 45 Thurlby Road. There are notes which Roshan accepts are in his handwriting mentioning figures for 45 Thurlby Road alongside other properties on which he accepted he paid Raj rent. Someone has written ‘Premji’ - the family name for Raj. Moreover, that £190 figure is similar to an envelope with ’45 Th 200’, ‘Saw 150’ (a reference to 10, Sawley Street) and ‘Quenby 153’ (a property bought in 2001, for which Raj was paid 1/3 of the rent). Finally, there is a ‘Post-It’ note referring to Sawley Street (180), Lyme Road (270) and Thurlby (270). Whilst one note in isolation may have been consistent with Roshan’s evidence that these were just his own notes, these recurring addresses suggest these were rent distributions. However, that does not prove that Raj was paid 50% of the rent – these scraps of notes are undated and Raj’s case of an agreement is based essentially on evidence that I have rejected. Whilst I prefer evidence of ‘the actual position’ to Roshan’s recollection, here all that it proves is that Raj received some of the rent on 45 Thurlby Road, not that she received 50% of it. The burden of proving a beneficial interest here is on her. That rent may be a smaller proportion, consistent with Raj contributing from her joint account with Roshan £7,400 of £21,000, being slightly more than a third. However, more fundamentally, the transfer itself in 1996 from the vendor to Mother and Roshan as ‘Transferees’ included this declaration (in standard terms but which was specifically chosen rather than a ‘tenancy-in-common’ clause):

In any event, in 1998 Ravi transferred to Raj her 50% share in 76 Romway Road for payment of £25,000 mentioned earlier. Roshan says this deed came about because in 1998 Ravi was going through a divorce. I have already mentioned that around the same time, Roshan entered a formal legal mortgage with Ravi for a loan of just over £20,000 to her secured on her home at 104, Downing Drive. As for 76 Romway Road, Roshan says that to protect the property (even though he says Ravi had no beneficial interest) he changed the second name on the title along with Mother from Ravi to Raj, but no money changed hands between them. However, this is a formal deed which – importantly unlike the 2011 transfers - explicitly transfers Ravi’s beneficial interest to Raj (albeit only as tenants-in-common, not beneficial joint tenants, which is also important). Roshan accepted in evidence £25,000 would have amounted to 50% of the value of 76 Romway Road at the time. The family already had a track record of transferring for nil consideration (or ‘love and affection’ in the quaint phrase), as with 163 Nansen Road and 10 Sawley Street in 1991. Therefore, I do not accept Roshan’s unclear explanation that this transfer meant the same when the face of the deed said otherwise: Raj was liable to pay Ravi £25,000, whether or not she in fact did so. Ultimately, whilst Roshan was not a party to this deed and it does not bind him, since he admits organising it, it is evidentially inconsistent with his case that he owned all the beneficial interest. However, it is not evidentially inconsistent with him owning the other 50% of the beneficial interest in 76 Romway Road, since the deed declared that after the transfer Raj and Mother held their shares as tenants-in-common not joint tenants (unlike 163 Nansen Road and 10 Sawley Street). Roshan’s case is that Mother held on trust for him and I will find she held 50% of the beneficial interest on trust for him for reasons I explain in my conclusions. Standing back, these two 1998 transactions with Ravi were precedents for the siblings transferring family property among them to protect it on divorce – as I will find Roshan did in 2011 with 159 Nansen Road and 11 Egginton Street.

I find similar motives – yet again to protect Roshan’s property from any claim on divorce by Veena - underlay yet another joint purchase in 1999 by Roshan and Raj in this period of 164, Nansen Road (as opposed to 146, Nansen Road he bought in his own name in 1981 as discussed). The purchase price was £65,000 and it was bought in cash without a mortgage. Raj contributed 33% of the price and Roshan 66%. In May 1997, Roshan filled out a similar immigration sponsorship declaration as his Father had made for another relative 20 years earlier. Roshan had declared that he owned 146, Nansen Road and 44, Bonsall Street, but also had accommodation for the relative at 159 Nansen Road, was earning £22,000 a year as a teacher (which I find is where he mistakenly got the estimate of his salary in the late 1970s from) and had £41,000 in an Alliance and Leicester account. That was plainly not his only account but alone would have been enough for Roshan’s share in 164 Nansen Road in 1999. Yet again Roshan did not want it in his name – it went into Raj’s sole name, but she does not dispute she held his 66% beneficial interest on trust for him and that he paid her 1/3 of the rent until 2019.

However, in 2001, Roshan – now aged 53 - was able to take a step down from teaching full-time and he retired from teaching in 2004. He now had a substantial roster of rental properties and a successful construction business. Indeed, whilst still reluctant to buy any properties in Veena’s name, he became more relaxed about developing the family’s property portfolio and including the next generation

However, in 2004, Sanjeev was in a difficult time of his life. As I have said, he is accused by Raj and her children (and in hearsay by Ravi and Pawan, but that adds little) of stealing jewellery from Raj’s home in 2003-2004. Yet Ravinder’s (hearsay) evidence of Sanjeev’s confession is vague – since Ravinder’s account is of Sanjeev admitting to shoplifting which led to his dismissal from the Police, not to theft of Raj’s jewellery. That was was her and her children’s assumption, not Sanjeev’s admission. Nor did Roshan admit it on Sanjeev’s behalf – indeed Ravinder criticised him for that. As with the unreliable confession in Shagang, it is unnecessary to make a definitive finding about Sanjeev’s guilt – and I am reluctant to adjudicate a serious allegation against a non-party who has not been called to give evidence. Yet equally I decline to draw no adverse inference against Roshan from the failure to call his son as he called Mr Kaushal who confirms (and I accept) that Raj’s allegation was well-known in the local community at the time but was later proved to be unfounded when the jewellery was found in 2005. If necessary to make a finding, I would find on the balance of probabilities that Sanjeev did not steal the jewellery. However, if I am wrong about that, it makes no difference because whilst Mr Kaushal says Roshan offered to pay at the time, that was before the jewellery was found. Therefore, Roshan is hardly likely to have paid Raj £40,000 twelve years later in 2016 because of something he did not believe had happened, as Raj seeks to claim. I will prefer Roshan’s explanation that it was a loan. However, its relevance at the time is that the shadow of family suspicion fell on Sanjeev and Ravinder had to be dissuaded by his grandmother from calling the Police. One of Mother’s final acts in the family saga was to try her best to keep the family together and to prevent it from splintering. Sadly, in March 2005, Mother passed away and the last restraint on family conflict fell away. Civil war did not break out straightaway, but its seeds were already sown.

At the time of Mother’s death, sadly Raj, Ravi and Pawan were all abroad – Raj and Ravi in India and Pawan at home in the USA, although she flew on the day Mother died – 15^th March 2005 – back to Leicester to support Roshan. There is a slight difference between Pawan’s recollection of seeing her Mother the last time and that of a relative Kanta Hansrani and whether she told Pawan there was £18,000 in Mother’s bedroom. This is clearly an extremely emotive subject which may affect recollection, but there is a simple explanation which I reach on the balance of probabilities. I accept that Kanta told Pawan that Mother handled money in her room, not that she kept her own money there. I also accept Pawan found £18,000, but she put 2 and 2 together to make 5. As I said, Prinaka recalled her grandmother counting rent money in her bedroom when keeping her handwritten accounts. I find that the £18,000 Pawan found was the last tranche of that money – which belonged not to Mother, but to Roshan and his sisters. Indeed, since they all accept that he continued paying them rent after Mother’s death (except on 159, Nansen Road; 11 Eggington Street and 76 Romway Road when I find he did not pay them rent before Mother’s death), it is more likely than not that much of that £18,000 was passed on to his sisters by Roshan as rent.

However, I accept Pawan’s evidence that she removed the jewellery Mother had been wearing when she died, which she also gave to Roshan. He accepted in evidence he still has that jewellery at a shrine to Mother at his home, but agreed his sisters could share it with him. But there is also what the Claimants contend was Mother and Father’s jewellery for which Pawan, Raj and Ravi claim an account, relying on a list they say Roshan prepared in 2014, which they have had valued at c.£230,000. As I said, Raj contends that Roshan drew up a list of Mother and Father’s jewellery in his safety deposit box he shared with her and gave the bag of it and the list to Ravi in 2014, who in turn says he angrily demanded it back in 2018. However, there are a number of difficulties with this claim. Kanta Hansrani – who was close to Mother – explained the only jewellery Mother still owned at her death was that which she was wearing. She had already distributed other gold and jewellery, if not as a dowry then to her family. However, Veena also remembered that in 1993 when travelling to India, she gave Mother for safekeeping some of her own jewellery which was returned to her. This appears to have fed confusion as to whose jewellery was whose. I also accept that Roshan had bought a considerable amount of gold and jewellery himself and kept it in his safe deposit box with Raj. However, I accept from his various receipts and his evidence that it only contained his jewellery. Whilst there were difficulties with Roshan’s evidence, I simply do not accept that he would have in some way ‘stolen’ Mother and Father’s jewellery. That is an incredibly serious accusation – yet unfortunately the Claimants have a track record of doing that – as with Sanjeev in 2004; and Raj’s accusation towards HSBC employees which is unproven. Roshan does not accept that he wrote the list the Claimants have produced, although it has what may (or may not) be his, Father and Mother’s initials on it. But there is no evidence from the Claimants that they know Mother and Father had the jewellery on that list. There are also substantial difficulties with Ravi’s evidence, not least her evident dislike of her brother. However, it goes deeper, since whilst she says Roshan gave her a bag and the list of jewellery in 2014 and demanded it back angrily in 2018, she does not actually say that he took it and I find he never did.

In short, there is so much confusion and emotion swirling around this subject that it is best if my findings of fact are as short and simple as possible. I do not accept on the balance of probabilities that Roshan has retained Father or Mother’s jewellery, save that she was wearing when she died which he has agreed to share. Given Kanta’s evidence, I find Mother did not still own any other jewellery. Moreover, it is also clear from various receipts that Roshan had bought considerable quantities of gold and jewellery himself. I do not accept that he prepared the list Ravi produces, nor her tendentious evidence about the bag of jewellery in 2014 or 2018 and I repeat that on the latter in her statement, she does not allege that Roshan actually took it. I find that Ravi is so full of dislike for her brother now that she is not able to give objective evidence about this. After all, she was Mother’s joint administrator with Roshan in 2011 and surely if Mother and Father’s gold and jewellery had been missing since 2005, she would have said so or even investigated it then with Raj and Pawan’s help, but did not. I do not know what the list represents or who drew it up, but I find that it was not Roshan and does not relate to Mother and Father’s jewellery. I find on the balance of probabilities that Roshan has not wrongfully retained or disposed of his parents’ gold and jewellery – as I say, except the jewellery Mother was wearing when she died Pawan removed, but he has agreed to share that with his sisters.

It was not so rancorous between the siblings in the years immediately following Mother’s death. On the contrary, it seemed to bring them together for a time. In August 2005, Roshan found 21 Bannerman Road for £109,000 and unusually expressly they put it in equal shares between Roshan, Pawan, Ravi and Rashmi legally and as beneficial joint tenants, though Roshan contributed most to the price. This was formally completed in 2009 as there was a problem with the first transfer. (However, that was not the reason as Pawan recalls for the removal of Roshan’s name in 2011, as I will describe). Roshan continued distributing rent equally on that property until 2019. Shortly after that purchase, in September 2005, Roshan also put 25 Lyme Road in Rashmi’s name as well as his own, again jointly in title and as beneficial joint tenants. Roshan’s sharing of wealth with the next generation continued. In 2006, 21 Trafford Road, which had been in Sanjeev’s sole name, perhaps understandably given his troubles, was transferred into the names of Roshan and his sons Sanjeev, Shub and Vivak. In 2007, Roshan bought 39, New Way Road for £170,000 with the benefit of a mortgage and put it in the names of himself and his sons Sanjeev and Shub. In short, I find that things were relatively harmonious between Roshan and his siblings, nephews, niece and his own children, otherwise he would not have undertaken all of those transactions.

This period covers the breaking-down of Roshan and Veena’s marriage, the crisis around Prinaka’s wedding and Roshan’s use of Mother’s Probate process to transfer 159, Nansen Road and 11 Egginton Street to his sisters. These are topics which I have already discussed in detail in my consideration of the evidence in the case and I therefore will keep my actual findings of fact short and to the point.

The brewing problem in 2010 between Roshan on one hand and Prinaka and Veena on the other (in fairness supported by their sons as well) related to Prinaka’s impending wedding which was originally scheduled for October 2010. The problem was that the husband Prinaka had chosen for herself was related to Ravi’s ex-husband and I accept this was a concern for Ravi and Raj in particular (as I say, Pawan was removed from this situation). However, Roshan himself was not blameless in this. I accept Pawan’s evidence that well before the planned wedding, in June 2010, Roshan and Veena visited Pawan in the USA and he complained to her that he felt excluded from the wedding plans. Another issue – in addition to Prinaka’s choice of husband – was her insistence that she wanted Veena’s family at the wedding which Pawan felt Roshan did not want. Indeed, Roshan himself admits he put back the wedding from October 2010 to March 2011. However, notably, Pawan herself, as well as Raj and Ravi, were invited.

Pawan travelled across to stay with Roshan and Veena at 159, Nansen Road for the wedding on 12^th March 2011. She gave a vivid (and not strongly challenged) account of hearing Roshan and Veena arguing, which fits what soon followed. But I do not accept that Pawan was ‘stirring’ as Roshan portrayed – this was another example of him blaming his sisters for his own past conduct. I find Pawan was trying to defuse the tension. However, the evening before the wedding, Roshan suddenly announced that he and his family would not attend it. Understandably, this provoked arguments overnight and in the morning, I accept that Veena, in fairness at the end of her tether with Roshan’s petulance, said that ‘We do not have time for you. You do not need to come to the wedding’ and left without him, In his state of high dudgeon, Roshan decided this meant he had been ‘excluded’ from Prinaka’s wedding when the truth was in fact that he excluded himself. I accept Pawan’s evidence that Roshan brooded on this during the day and finally in retaliation excluded his wife and children from getting back into their house – on Prinaka’s wedding day. This precipitated the separation between Roshan and Veena which took eight years to heal. Little wonder that in evidence Roshan was so pained in his recollection about this. He has tried to minimise his own disgraceful conduct, relying on Veena’s viewpoint that his sisters disliked her. For the same reason, when she could not gain access and her sons called the Police, I do not doubt that Roshan minimised his own behaviour with the Police as well, even if he was not quite so melodramatically as Navin suggests. However, as Navin and Nitin accepted as doctors, the fact they did not notice any depression in Roshan over the following weeks does not detract from the GP’s clinical judgement when Roshan attended a few days later on 16^th March 2011 complaining about ‘being excluded from his daughter’s wedding’. The GP felt Roshan was depressed, so prescribed the anti-depressant Citalopram. However, Roshan did not report much improvement when he returned in April or May and I accept that he simply stopped going to the GP, but continued to feel depressed.

It is not clear why Roshan initiated a Lasting Power of Attorney (‘LPA’) for Personal Welfare in March 2011 in favour of Pawan, Nitin and Ravinder, as opposed to a LPA for Property and Affairs which would be more logical in the situation. However, if this was not a mistake, it may indicate Roshan was dwelling psychologically on his own vulnerability. In short, he may well have ‘felt vulnerable’, but that does not mean he ‘was vulnerable’ to the influence of his sisters. On the contrary, Freeth’s file shows that he was the one in control, with Ravi only playing a minor role with the solicitors (if a major one with Raj behind the scenes). Roshan instructed Freeths in February 2011 – before Prinaka’s wedding, having not started Mother’s Probate for the six years since she died. I do not doubt that he felt low without his mother, for whom he had cared for many years and that he was particularly close to her. However, until 2011 it had suited Roshan to leave things as they were and to carry on as before. In hindsight, his instruction of Freeths in February 2011 gives a sense that the Probate process from the start went hand-in-hand with Roshan’s worsening problems with Veena.

However, after they separated in March, in Roshan’s mind, what he long feared and what his sisters long warned him about had come true - the breakdown of the marriage and potential claims in divorce against the properties by Veena. Whilst he could not realistically ‘hide’ from Veena properties in his own name or his son’s names, he could at least remove his name from assets in joint names with his sisters, like 21 Bannerman Road; and the joint accounts he had with Raj at the Chelsea Building Society. This included account -245, from which he removed his name on 14^th March 2011, even before the GP visit. Having rejected Raj’s ‘first-name owner’ convention, it is clear that even assuming the £17,200.74 paid in back in 2006 came from Raj and Roshan’s joint account in India, the vast majority of money in that Chelsea BS joint account -245 was paid in by Roshan:

However, in Roshan’s mind, removing his name from bank accounts (and eventually 21, Bannerman Road) was not enough to protect his and his sister’s family home 159, Nansen Road from a potential claim in divorce by Veena, who had lived there for many years. Such a claim would have been the last thing Raj wanted too, as she lived next door but did not get on with Veena. Therefore, just as Raj and Roshan helped Ravi protect her home and share in 76 Romway Road respectively when she was getting divorced in 1998, so Raj and Ravi – as I say Pawan only found out about this later – helped Roshan do the same after 12^th March 2011. As I said, this was a joint plan, not something they manipulated or influenced Roshan into doing. This is why Raj helped Roshan remove his name from their joint accounts but it did not end there. Mother’s Probate process which Roshan had already finally initiated offered a ready-made solution for protecting 159, Nansen Road – on which he had expended so much effort and money (and for good measure 11 Egginton Street, the other asset in Mother’s name he owned outright). There was no need to do anything with 76 Romway Road in which Roshan had a 50% share with Raj, because it was already in Raj’s joint name with Mother, which is why that did not go through the Probate process. Fortunately, 10, Sawley Street and 163 Nansen Road were already in Raj or Pawan’s names. 45, Thurlby Road was in Roshan’s name, but it could not realistically be ‘hidden’.

Nevertheless, Roshan and Ravi as Mother’s Administrators (as Ravi had also become by April 2011) could hardly be entirely open about this plan with Ms Patel. If it was not actually unlawful (as Veena had no beneficial interest in the properties) they realised Ms Patel could not properly have assisted them to ‘hide’ assets from a potential divorce claim by Veena. This is why – as I have discussed – Roshan instructed Ms Patel and indeed swore oaths in Probate and tax forms that Mother owned 159 Nansen Road (which he had not only paid for in full but spent thousands on developing and which Mother had repeatedly told him belonged to him) and indeed 11 Egginton Street (which again he had bought in full). However, this was not a fraud on HMRC: Roshan was over-declaring the size of the Estate and so the liability to tax, not minimising it as HMRC would be more concerned about. As I say, it was also not a fraud as such on Veena, who did not actually have any beneficial interest and in fact had not yet (and never did) launch divorce proceedings. It was however serious that Roshan swore misleading oaths and I have borne it in mind in weighing his credibility.

However, moving to the 2011 transfers themselves, it is important to recognise what they purported to do (and not to do). Unlike the TRI transfers in 2005 of 21 Bannerman Road and 25 Lyme Road which specifically declared the beneficial interests, neither of the TR1 transfers of 23^rd September 2011 of 159 Nansen Road and 11 Egginton Street respectively did so. Indeed, they each specifically stated that ‘Roshan Lal Hansrani and Ravi Kanta Vig as Executors (sic) for the late Kaushalya Devi Hansrani [i.e. Mother]’ were ‘transferors’ to the transferees namely Pawan, Ravi and Raj and that the transfers were ‘not for money or anything that has a monetary value’ and ‘with limited title guarantee’ and the transfers were silent on beneficial interests. 11 Egginton Street had the additional provision that the transferees will perform obligations affecting the property and indemnify the transferors, as 11 Egginton Street had covenants registered. Notably however, so did 159 Nansen Road and there was no such additional provision, possibly because Roshan was living there and would continue to do so.

Mr Mitchell relied on Roshan’s instructions to Ms Patel on 11^th August 2011 leading her to draft those transfers as ‘he wants the houses to be transferred into the names of his three sisters and he wants to step out of the equation’. However, that is precisely what Roshan did want – to step out of the legal title to these properties, which was all that was being transferred. The transfers did not affect the underlying beneficial interests and did not purport to do so. This is why after the estate accounts were approved, in February 2012 Ms Patel returned to the subject of beneficial interests and her suggested deed of gift. However, as I said, when Ms Patel took Roshan through her draft in March 2012, his instructions had changed to ‘selling’ his sisters the property, which Ms Patel queried. She could tell this did not make sense for him to surrender any interest in his home. Roshan’s insouciance in the face of that firm advice is striking. I find he knew full well he was not surrendering anything, as he had agreed with Raj and Ravi (if not Pawan until he later visited her) that they would hold the properties on trust for him and he could have them back when he wanted them – and could stay at 159, Nansen Road. Indeed, I accept Roshan’s evidence that his real fear about leaving came not from the transfers to his sisters, but the threat of a claim by Veena on divorce. That is consistent with his long-standing ‘mistrust’ and ‘risk’ as he vaguely put it.

These findings do Roshan no credit and I find that is why he has been so reluctant about admitting the full truth to me – and more importantly to Veena and Prianka – as well as his son Shub whose wedding he missed in 2013. Whilst he attended his third son Vivak’s wedding in 2016, he did not really engage. Of course, his wife and children may not accept my findings. However, if they do, it is worth pointing out in mitigation of Roshan that I have also found that this was a joint plan with at least Ravi and Raj. It is also my finding that Roshan has been wracked by guilt about his behaviour – which is another reason he has perhaps minimised it even to himself. I suspect he brooded on it for those long eight years and often bitterly regretted it, which explains his about-face in 2019. However, absolution or damnation for Roshan’s conduct is for Veena and Prinaka, not me.

Be that as it may, transferring 159 Nansen Road to his sisters made no practical difference to Roshan, who continued to live there – alone as Veena and the children did not have contact with him for a while. Notably, Ravi complains that Roshan continued to rent out 11 Egginton Street and keep the rent and also about his lack of openness on 21 Bannerman Road, yet there is no objective evidence that she, Raj or Pawan complained about this at the time, suggesting that ‘the actual situation’ was they expected no rent. Tellingly, Ravi accepts that in 2016 or 2017, Roshan asked her to return 159, Nansen Road and 11 Egginton Street to him and she refused and he got angry. I am not surprised he got angry, as I find that Ravi was reneging on their deal, which is what Roshan asked her to honour.

Roshan may also have been angry at Ravi’s refusal as he had been very supportive of her. As I said, Ravi had a 1/3 share in 15, Thurlby Road, which was sold for £130,000 in 2016 (it was transferred from Raj and Nitin first to Roshan’s son Virat in March 2016 and then finally sold in October 2016). I accept Roshan’s explanation that Ravi was pressing to release her share in 2014, so he paid her up front £35,000 in three payments in January 2014 with the rest to follow on the actual sale. He then paid her another £3,610 on sale in October 2016, completing her 33% share of the net balance of £127,831 (as seen in his Natwest account).

However, Ravi has sought to argue that an additional £40,000 which I find on the balance of probabilities Roshan immediately then loaned her in two payments of £25,000 and £15,000 in October 2016 was her share of the sale proceeds of 15, Thurlby Road. But she could not explain why Roshan then paid her £35,000 in 2014 with an extra £3,610. In truth, this was yet more generosity from him to her, as she had already received her share of 15, Thurlby Road but then was loaned another £40,000 from Roshan’s share. Ravi did pay back £40,000, but her suggestion that she was ‘hiding Roshan’s money from Sanjeev’ makes no sense. Moreover, Ravi has not paid back yet another £40,000 which Roshan loaned her in December 2016 and she was unable to explain that at all. I find she still owes it.

Raj also sought to explain away what I find was plainly a £40,000 loan by Roshan to her in December 2016 (again from his proceeds from 15, Thurlby Road in which Raj had no beneficial interest) by reference to Sanjeev. She claims that this was Roshan ‘repaying’ her for Sanjeev’s theft of her jewellery twelve years earlier in 2004. However, I reject this for the reasons I have already given. Firstly, if necessary to make a finding, I have found that Sanjeev did not steal that jewellery (although he was guilty of shoplifting, that is very different), which is why Mr Kaushal recalls the allegation but also that Raj and Ravi later found the jewellery. In any event, Roshan did not believe the allegation against Sanjeev – and whilst he offered to pay the value at the time, that was before the jewellery was then found. Having been shamed by an inaccurate allegation twelve years earlier, Roshan was hardly likely to pay Raj in respect of it in 2016. This was a straightforward loan of £40,000 to Raj, that again she has not repaid and still owes.

It is in part because of these serious problems with Raj and Ravi’s evidence that I mentioned earlier that I have also rejected their uncorroborated accusation – again for the reasons I have already given - that Roshan in some way wrongfully retained Father and Mother’s jewellery (other than that Mother wore when she died Pawan removed and gave to Roshan which he accepts he still has). As I said, this was not the first thin allegation of theft Raj made about a safety deposit box and I do not accept that Roshan prepared the list they rely on. In any event, even if I accept every word Ravi said in her statement about this issue (which I do not) and find Roshan gave her Mother and Father’s jewellery for safekeeping in 2014 with that list but angrily demanded it back in 2018, she does not actually say he took it and I find on the balance of probabilities that Roshan has not had or disposed of it. However, more fundamentally, I do not accept there was such a collection of jewellery in the first place – again for the reasons that I have already given.

I can deal with this final period in my findings of fact very briefly (not least as I have already summarised the procedural history from 2022 in my introduction). As already observed, the closer Roshan was to his sisters, the further he was from his wife. However, the converse was true. Having missed his son and daughter’s wedding, when his youngest son Virat told him he was getting married in August 2019, Roshan finally was determined to re-engage with his own family. He had years to come to regret his actions in 2011-2013 and had begun to re-engage – characteristically – with property transactions - including his son Vivak in the sale of 15, Thurlby Road the year he married in 2016. From this point, he had begun to see his children more frequently and to improve his relationship with them.

Roshan’s paranoia about a divorce by Veena had also subsided, which is why in 2016-17 he had asked Ravi to return 159 Nansen Road and 11 Egginton Street. Whilst she had rebuffed him, in fairness I accept Raj did not refuse to return Roshan’s money in their joint accounts from which his name was removed in March 2011. Of the total of £89,001.35 Raj owed Roshan from his money in their former joint accounts, she paid him £15,000 in March 2019 when they were still on good terms, but it took her until 27^th November 2019 to repay the other £74,001.35. Raj now says that this was a loan to Roshan to help Virat purchase a house. This is inherently implausible in the circumstances of this family in March 2019, let alone in November 2019. Roshan was in a better financial position than Raj to help his own son – and would obviously want to do so himself as part of the bridge-building exercise with his wife and children, not rely on money from Raj.

This was successful, since after Roshan attended Virat’s wedding in August 2019, a short while later he reconciled with Veena and she moved back into 159, Nansen Road. Moreover, in September 2019, Roshan added Sanjeev to the title of 146, Nansen Road. On 22^nd November, Roshan terminated the Personal Welfare LPA in favour of his sisters and stopped paying rent on 164 Nansen Road, 21 Bannerman Road and 25, Lyme Road. It may be that Raj was hoping on 27^th November 2019 by repaying to Roshan the £74,001.35 he was still owed that this would pull him back in their orbit. However, given that the dispute had broken out, I do not accept Roshan would have accepted that as a loan for Virat then. It was the repayment of Roshan’s money Raj had kept for him. It was the last consensual act between them as by late 2019, the battle-lines in the dispute had hardened.

In 2020, as the COVID Pandemic drove families apart, the Hansrani family were managing to do that on their own. Whilst Pawan had authorised Roshan to manage 812 Greenford Road in 2017 and he concluded a contract with the Council in respect of it in January 2020, by March 2020 Pawan’s rent had stopped and she emailed him to ask for it. Whilst Roshan briefly tried to involve Ravinder ‘to sort the family mess out’, by April 2020, he was demanding to him that Raj repay the £40,000, hardly the most sensitive timing given COVID. In May 2020, Roshan emailed Pawan to demand the properties’ titles be put into his name and by August 2020 he stopped distributing rent for 8, Quenby Street and in September, his solicitors sent pre-action letters. Pawan responded in October alleging he took jewellery and in January 2021 asserting ownership of her two properties. In March 2021 Roshan applied for restrictions against 163 Nansen Road and 164 Nansen Road, then 10 Sawley Street, 163 Nansen Road, 159 Nansen Road, 11 Egginton Street, 76 Romway Road and 164 Nansen Street. Shortly following an email from Rashmi to Roshan in June 2021, the Claimants’ lawyers then responded. There was then an exchange of solicitors’ correspondence throughout Summer 2021, with Roshan then regaining possession of 812, Greenford Road in September. In addition to an application to the Lands Tribunal over 45 Thurlby Road which has been stayed as I said earlier, these proceedings were finally issued in May 2022.

Both Counsel described this as not a ‘law’ but an ‘evidence’ case – although Mr Burton was keen to submit that it was not purely a ‘document’ case and it will be apparent that I agree. I have not entirely accepted either side’s factual case. That is not so surprising when both sides adopted such extreme positions. It remains to deal with the legal principles and my conclusions, but I can deal with both briefly.

Whilst Counsel referred me (and I referred them) to various authorities, it is unnecessary to discuss them in detail. However, given the complexity of the legal and equitable ownership in this case, I will start with basic principles. The leading case on domestic equitable co-ownership is Jones v Kernott [2011] 3 WLR 1121. The Supreme Court were concerned with ownership in joint legal names, but Lady Hale and Lord Walker did make this observation about single-name cases at [17]:

In this case, Mr Mitchell invokes a further layer of analysis at the first stage of any written instrument: Estoppel by Deed. As explained in Phipson on Evidence (2024) 20^th Ed at para.5-09-5-16, such an estoppel can arise either from operative provisions or recitals of a deed. The former binds the grantor and all persons claiming under them on the basis that the grantor is precluded from disputing the validity or effect of the grant; whilst the latter only binds the parties or their privies. However, this principle also overlaps with the first stage of Lord Briggs’ analysis in Gany. As he had explained in more detail in Whitlock at [23]-[24]:

Turning to the second stage - the common intention constructive trust - this was summarised by Lady Hale and Lord Walker in Jones at [51] and they linked that to a sole name case (unlike Jones) at [52]:

As observed in Gany, resulting trust is a ‘last resort’ available only if the written instrument is silent about beneficial interests and there is no common intention constructive trust as to them either. Nevertheless, both Counsel invoke resulting trusts of two types. The first type is a resulting trust arising on a gratuitous transfer of property. This was argued in Gany in relation to a gratuitous transfer between a pre-existing settlor and trustee of a trust of property, held to be trust property but on factual intention not legal presumption. The second type is the purchase of property in another’s name, discussed in Enal by Sir Nicholas Patten at [34]-[36]:

The same principles apply to joint accounts as Lord Briggs said in Whitlock. Therefore, where there is an express declaration of beneficial ownership on a joint account (as in Whitlock) then that is determinative, as Lord Briggs added at [29]:

However, as explained in Lewin on Trusts (2024) 20^th Ed at para.10-095, where the beneficial ownership is not expressly declared and there is no common intention relating to it but there is only one source of payments into the account, there is a rebuttable presumed resulting trust that all the money is held in trust by the account-holders for the person who provided all the money in it. However, as discussed at Lewin at para.10-096, this is subject to the counter-presumption of advancement from parent to child or between spouses, but it may be rebutted, e.g. by evidence that the account is only in joint names for administrative convenience.

By contrast, as explained in Lewin at paras.10-099-9, where there are multiple sources of payments into the account, as between spouses a beneficial joint tenancy is presumed even with unequal contributions. However, where the account holders and joint contributors are a parent and (even adult) child, the presumption of advancement may mean the child has the sole beneficial interest in the account (although as with land, this is a relatively weak presumption and is easily rebutted).

In addition to overhauling the modern principles of common intention constructive trusts discussed in Jones, in Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 WLR 831 (HL) at [93]-[94], Lady Hale also reconciled old equitable accounting for occupation rent with the modern regime of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 s.15:

However, as Mr Burton submits, to seek an account of rent received by the Defendant, the Claimants must prove he had an obligation to pay them rent, either as (i) their contractual managing agent, (ii) a fiduciary, or (iii) a trustee. As to (i), the Claimants must prove offer and acceptance, consideration and intention to create legal relations: see Chitty on Contracts (2024) 35^th Ed at paras 4-207 and 235-240. As to (ii), as explained in Snell’s Equity (2024) 34^th Ed at paras.7-003-013, an individual is only a fiduciary if subject to fiduciary obligations, such as one of the accepted categories of fiduciary relationship like a trustee or an agent; or where someone undertakes to act for another in circumstances giving rise to a duty of loyalty where there is a legitimate expectation that they will not use their position in a way adverse to the interests of the principal. As to (iii), as explained in Snell at p.7-004, a ’trustee’ can obviously include a constructive or resulting trustee, but an agent is not necessarily a trustee of money collected on behalf of a principal, as it depends whether the agent is required to segregate the money, or can treat it as part of their cash-flow: Angove v Bailey [2016] 1 WLR 3179 (SC).

Under s.21(3) Limitation Act 1980, constructive and resulting (as opposed to express) trustees must be sued within six years: Williams v CBN [2014] 2 WLR 355 (SC). Moreover, as discussed in Snell at paras 5-011 and 30-028-030 and Lewin at paras.41-121-4, an account in Equity against a trustee or fiduciary can be defeated by the following equitable defences: (i) ‘acquiescence’ by the beneficiary to a breach by a trustee at the time by consent with full knowledge of the circumstances; (ii) ‘waiver’ by the beneficiary after the breach with similarly full knowledge; or (iii) ‘laches’ by the beneficiary, even within the 6-year statutory limitation period, if there has not just been delay by a claimant, but also prejudice to a defendant such that it would not be inequitable to deny relief to the claimant.

I have tried in my findings of fact to follow the history of the Hansrani family and its properties chronologically, to ‘trace’ the different properties and accounts and their relationship to the parties and how they changed over time. However, in my conclusions on the Disputed Ownership Properties, I will deal with each of them in turn, not chronologically as on my findings, they fall into different categories.

The first pair of properties – and perhaps the most important and contested pair – are 159 Nansen Road and 11 Egginton Street. Whilst on the complicated facts of this case, Mr Burton was right to stress the value of that chronological ‘tracing’, on the law Mr Mitchell was right to emphasise that the starting point is the most recent written transfers (see Gany and Whitlock)– i.e. the 2011 transfers of both. Indeed, Mr Mitchell submits that the starting and ending point of the beneficial ownership of 159, Nansen Road and 11 Egginton Street are those two transfers. However, the difficulty with Mr Mitchell’s argument – whether framed as an estoppel by deed or as an express declaration by written instrument as in Whitlock – is that the 2011 transfers were silent on beneficial interest. They expressly transferred legal title of the two properties from Roshan and Ravi as Mother’s ‘Executors’ (strictly, Administrators) to Raj, Pawan and Ravi in her personal capacity. However, they made no declaration of trust in Box 10 of the TR1 – whether as joint tenants, tenants- in-common in equal shares or tenants-in-common in other proportions. As Lady Hale explained in Stack at [52], Box 10 was introduced to reduce the complexity around beneficial ownership. However, it has not done so in this case. Therefore, estoppel by deed does not help the Claimants because Roshan does not deny that the transfers were effective to transfer legal title in the two properties to his sisters, he simply contends that is all the transfers purported to do. Mr Burton submits they were not determinative of the beneficial ownership so as to give rise to an estoppel or qualify as an express declaration of trust (e.g. in the sense contemplated in Whitlock and Gany). I agree. In any event, even if I had concluded otherwise, whilst undue influence has not been pursued, on my findings of fact that these transfers were intended to ‘hide’ 159 Nansen Road and 11 Egginton Street from any claim on divorce by Veena, I would have had no hesitation in concluding that they were a ‘sham’ in the sense discussed in Pankhania. However, while the 2011 transfers were not determinative of the beneficial ownership of 159 Nansen Road and 11 Egginton Street, Roshan must still prove beneficial ownership: so rebut the presumption that Equity follows the Law (Jones). That depends on whether he can establish a constructive or resulting trust on each of the two properties, assessed on their own particular facts.

Nevertheless, on my findings of fact, I am satisfied that Roshan has established sole beneficial ownership of 159 Nansen Road by common intention constructive trust and in the alternative by resulting trust, for the following reasons:

I reach the same decision about 11 Egginton Street for essentially similar reasons:

45 Thurlby Road is in a different category. I found as a fact that Roshan (or strictly, Veena and his agents) bought it at auction, paying £21,000 with £2,100 in cash as a deposit and that he contributed an additional £3,000 of his own funds, £8,500 from an account in Mother’s name and £7,400 from his joint account with Raj. However, I also found that in the ensuing years, Roshan paid Raj rent on 45 Thurlby Road, although given this was only recorded on undated scraps of paper, it was not possible to work out when and so what share of the rent was paid.

However, the crucial aspect of 45 Thurlby Road was that the transfer to Mother and Roshan included this declaration of their beneficial interests:

However, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Raj and her sisters can rely upon an express beneficial declaration against Roshan with the next pair of properties - 163 Nansen Road and 10 Sawley Street. Again, the deeds do not formally bind Roshan through estoppel by deed as he is not a party to them, but as he arranged them he was a ‘privy’ for estoppel by deed. In any event, in each case, they are inconsistent with Roshan having a beneficial interest in either, so the Claimants are entitled to declarations they are joint legal and beneficial owners.

The more straightforward property of these two is 163 Nansen Road. The truth is that there is really not a shred of evidence beyond Roshan’s say-so that he made any contribution to the purchase or mortgage and I have found that he did not, even if he later undertook works on the property and collected the rent. Nor do I find any agreement between Roshan, Father and Pawan either on purchase in 1978 or later that Roshan would have any beneficial interest in the property. Indeed, I have found that Roshan distributed the rent to Pawan. If he did so exclusively to her after she transferred the property to herself and Raj, then Raj may have grounds for complaint, but Roshan does not. He must now account for rent to them both:

Whilst 10 Sawley Street is slightly more complex, ultimately the result is the same. However, it helps to articulate my findings in chronological order rather than following the strict order of the ‘equitable toolkit’ even though I will find the 1991 deed is again determinative. I found as a fact that 10 Sawley Street was bought in 1986 in Father’s name with equal contributions of £4,000 from Raj and Ravi, but that the third share was contributed from Father and Roshan’s joint account -519. I rejected Roshan’s evidence that he bought it outright. Nevertheless, given the third contribution, there might have been an argument for a third share:

I turn to the last Disputed Ownership Property: 76 Romway Road. Here, I found as a fact that Roshan bought and paid for it in 1979 but put it in Mother’s name out of respect and because he could not get a mortgage, which he then serviced in full and paid off. I can therefore understand Mr Burton’s reliance on resulting trust arguments, especially as there is no presumption of advancement from a child to an adult (c.f. Enal). However, I went on to find that in 1989 – with Roshan’s consent - Ravi did ‘purchase’ a beneficial share which she later ‘sold’ to Raj in 1998 for £25,000, which Roshan accepts was 50% of the then-value of 76, Romway Road. However, unlike the previous deeds, it said that Mother (as ‘the continuing trustee’) and Raj (as ‘the purchaser’) declared that: ‘The survivor of them cannot give a valid receipt for capital money arising on a disposition of the Property’. Mr Mitchell accepted that unlike the other intra-family transfers, this was a declaration of beneficial tenancy-in-common not a joint tenancy. Since Raj bought 50% of the beneficial share, it follows that the other 50% did not change and there was no express declaration in respect of it. As I found, whilst this transfer is evidentially (and indeed equitably) inconsistent with Roshan’s claim to the sole beneficial interest, it is not inconsistent with his claim that Mother held the other 50% share of the beneficial interest on trust for him, on one of three bases:

It follows from those findings that Roshan has no liability to account rent to the Claimants for 159 Nansen Road, 11 Egginton Street or 45 Thurlby Road. However, in respect of the other properties, as Roshan was an informal and unpaid agent and the arrangements for the accounting of rent were relaxed, I do not accept that he was a trustee of the rent obliged to segregate it, nor indeed that there was a contractual relationship with the Claimants, not least as there was no consideration. However, by receiving money on behalf of his sisters, I do accept that Roshan took on a role as their agent and in any event a duty not to benefit at their expense, such as to make him a fiduciary with a liability to account. On that footing, Mr Burton did not strongly resist an account from November 2019 onwards in respect of any of the properties in which the Claimants had a beneficial interest. After all, Roshan admits he paid no rent on several of them in that period. Whilst he has prepared some accounts on the Disputed Rental Properties, he has not prepared them on 163 Nansen Road, 10 Sawley Street or 76 Romway Road.

However, speaking of 76 Romway Road, I do not accept that it would be equitable to order an account which goes back before November 2019 even though Roshan has not paid rent to Raj on it since at least the date of Mother’s passing in 2005. After all, I found the reason Roshan in fact never paid rent on 76 Romway Road was because I also found that Ravi – and indeed Raj – never had any expectation of rent and never complained about it until these proceedings. In my judgement, this amounts to ‘acquiescence’ by Mother, Ravi then Raj that Roshan would not pay them rent. Even if that acquiescence ended in 2019, that would only be prospective, not retrospective. Even if I am wrong about that, as Mr Burton says, the claim to an account could only go back six years from the claim in 2022 since Roshan was not a trustee – namely back to 2016. However, since there was no complaint from Raj from 2016 to 2019 and I have found she had the benefit of a loan from Roshan in 2016 which she has not yet repaid, it would be inequitable to require Roshan to account for rent from 2016 on in respect of 76 Romway Road. In any event, there are Roshan’s tax returns from 2016 onwards (which I accept are accurate) deducting declared expenses from rent, he earned £3,064 in 2016/17, £4,932 in 2017/18, £4,814 in 2018/19, £4,700 in 2019/20 and £6,620 in 2020/21 (the last year for which I can see a figure for 76, Romway Road). This totals £24,130.16, which is less than the £40,000 I have found Raj owes Roshan from 2016. Indeed, since Raj would only be entitled to 50%, it would be unnecessary to order an account before 2019 anyway, as Roshan has kept sufficient tax accounts. However, since there are no tax records I can see since 2021 and I can order an account in respect of the properties since 2019, there is no reason why that account should not include 76 Romway Road over that period, even if it should be straightforward for the years covered by tax returns. However, whilst I can see the force of Mr Mitchell’s point that I should not unduly narrow an account over a set period of time, I do not accept that I should extend that set period of time before November 2019. I have explained why in relation to 76 Romway Road, which is the only remaining property for which the Claimants can say they are owed rent before November 2019. I see no purpose whatsoever in ordering an account in respect of an earlier period for properties when the Claimants do not complain they have not been paid rent and never complained at the time. Quite aside from the cost for the parties, it would frankly be a waste of Court time.

I can deal with these claims extremely briefly since they turn exclusively on my findings of fact and so I have already given my conclusions. I found Raj has failed to prove she loaned Roshan £89,000 in 2019 – indeed I have found on the balance of probabilities that she simply returned Roshan’s own money to him. By contrast, I have made findings of fact that Roshan loaned Ravi £80,000 in 2016 of which she has only repaid £40,000 so that £40,000 remains owing. Similarly, I have found that Raj owes Roshan £40,000 from 2016 which she has not repaid. Therefore, whilst I am prepared to order Roshan to account for the rent on the properties in which the Claimants have a beneficial interest from November 2019 onwards, he would also be entitled to set off £40,000 from what is owing to Raj and £40,000 from what is owing to Ravi. Therefore, the net balance is likely to be modest. Therefore I am minded to stay the account for a period to encourage the parties to see if they can resolve mutual accounting/debts by agreement. However, I will hear any submissions on this point at the consequentials hearing.

Likewise, I have already given my factual conclusions on these claims. I have found that Roshan has not retained any gold or jewellery (or for that matter, cash) belonging to Mother and Father, save the jewellery that Mother was wearing when she died, which Roshan has agreed to share with his sisters. So, I am not minded to make any order in respect of delivery-up, but would encourage the parties to agree an order in respect of it – it is an intensely personal matter and for the sake of Mother’s memory I would hope the siblings can reach an agreement about it. If they cannot, again I will hear submissions on both at the consequentials hearing.

I started the trial by making it clear to the parties that I could not ensure a completely clean break between them, although it seems apparent to everyone that would be in the whole family’s interests. From my findings, really the only ‘loose ends’ are (i) 76, Romway Road, (ii) the account of rent from 2019 and (iii) the loans of £40,000 each from Raj and Ravi outstanding from Roshan. As I say, if necessary I will hear submissions about a ‘buy-out order’ for 76 Romway Road following Bagum at the consequential hearing which is listed for 21^st August 2024. But I urge the parties if at all possible to use the time between now and then to agree a way forward to resolve all the loose ends without the need for further proceedings for an account etc. I started this judgment by saying that at that hearing I would have to decide which side was ‘winner’ for the purposes of costs, but that in truth the whole family had lost. It is not too late for both sides to spare themselves the costs risks in this case by trying to reach agreement. I warn each of them that if I take the view that either side has not properly engaged with attempts at settlement, even now, that will have serious consequences on costs.