Michelle Andrea Hargreaves (styling herself as The Lord Jesus Christ) v The District Probate Court, Lessors, Reversioners and/or Tenants in Possession or Persons Respectively

This is my extemporaryjudgment on a claim proceeding in the Business and Property Courts in Manchester under claim number PT-2022-MAN-000075.

The claimant was born on 29 April 1963 and her birth was registered in the name she was given by her parents of Michelle Andrea Derrig. She subsequently married and became known as Michelle Andrea Hargreaves. On 23 September 2017, she was apparently baptised by Eric Hargreaves when she was given the name of Chellemia Dreanah. She changed her name on 22 November 2021 to Jesus Christ and this claim is brought in the name of ‘The Lord Jesus Christ’. The defendants are the ‘District Probate Court Lessors, Reversioners and/or Tenants in possession or persons respectively’.

The claim form places reliance upon a statute, the Cestui Que Vie Act 1666. That was an Act apparently introduced to address the specific problem of cases where property was held on trust for a life estate and the life tenant had gone abroad and was apparently deceased but there was no proof of that fact. I must confess to being totally unable to see the relevance of that statute to the present claim.

The claimant apparently complains that having been wrongly named, she was reborn of water and spirit from the living god in Jesus Christ on 23 September 2017; and she seeks relief, the precise nature of which is unclear but which appears to relate to changing the name on her birth certificate and the registration of her birth.

In addition to the 1666 Act, the claimant has also referred me to the legislation concerning the registration of births, marriages and deaths, specifically the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953. The registrar is not named as a defendant, but that does not seem to me to be particularly material given that I cannot see that the claimant has any legal cause of action in relation to any of the matters of which she complains.

Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides (in CPR 8.2) that where the claimant uses the Part 8 procedure, the claim form must state not only that Part 8 applies (which this claim form does) but it must also identify the question which the claimant wants the court to decide, or the remedy that she is seeking and the legal basis for her claim to that remedy. It is very difficult to discern what particular question is sought to be answered or what relief is sought, but it appears to be some change in the name in which the claimant was registered at the date of birth because she has since been baptised and then changed her name to ‘Jesus Christ’.

When this claim form was first issued, it was referred to me and I made an order of the court's own initiative striking out the claim form and the claim pursuant to CPR 3.3(4) and CPR 3.4(2) as disclosing no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim. I gave as my reason that the claim was “arrant nonsense”. I also recorded that the claim was totally without merit. I stated that I did not consider it appropriate to make a civil restraint order only because there was no evidence that the claimant had previously made any similar claims.

The claimant - as was her right, because my order had been made without a hearing - applied by way of application notice to set aside my order. She says that she is “… just a simple man, a child born in the image of God, wrongly named, numbered and formed on to a Birth Certificate in the image and likeness of the UK”. She asks the “Defendant Registrar General to correct/amend the name to the rightful name Jesus Christ on Birth Certificate”. The application notice was accompanied by a letter dated 5 June 2022.

When that application was referred to me, I originally directed that it should be listed in the Applications List in Manchester last Friday. I directed that the claimant was to file any additional documents on which she wished to rely at the hearing, together with any skeleton argument, at least two clear days before the hearing.

The only further document which the claimant has lodged is the Form and Order of Service for the Coronation of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II at Westminster Abbey on Tuesday, 2 June 1953. The claimant has taken me at length through this document. Essentially, she makes the point that Her Majesty the Queen made certain oaths, and that Her Majesty’s Judges have given corresponding oaths.

The claimant has addressed me for about 20 minutes in total at this telephone hearing. As I have mentioned, I originally listed the hearing last Friday in the Applications List in Manchester for an attended hearing. Due to the difficulties caused by the rail strike, and bearing in mind that the claimant currently lives in Rochdale, I converted last Friday's scheduled hearing to a hearing remotely by Teams, but the claimant indicated that she cannot use any electronic methods as she does not have that facility. She also claimed not to have an email address, although I note that an email address is given on the letters she has written to the court. When the claimant’s difficulties were drawn to my attention, I directed the court to convert the hearing to one by BT MeetMe today, at 1.00 pm on Monday 27 June, and the hearing has proceeded accordingly, with the claimant addressing me by telephone.

I am entirely satisfied, despite all that the claimant has said to me, that the claim form discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim. The Registrar General, as I say, is not a party, but that is not an essential part of my reasoning Essentially, there is nothing in the claim form to suggest that the registration of the claimant's birth was in any way wrongly registered. She was given the name Michelle Andrea Derrig by the father who registered her birth and there is nothing to suggest that there was any error.

I am entirely satisfied that this claim form discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing this claim and that this further application is totally without merit, and the court's order will record that fact.

There appears to be a slight oddity in the provisions relating to the making of civil restraint orders. There has only been one application in this case, which is the instant application, and therefore there is not the basis for making even a limited civil restraint order against the claimant because she has only made one application which has been found to be totally without merit. However, I warn the claimant now that if she makes any further claims or applications of a similar nature, then the court may well find that it has the power to, and that it should, make a civil restraint order against her.

For those reasons, the court's order is that the application to vary my previous order is set aside, the claim remains struck out, and I record that this application was totally without merit.