DS Developing Limited v A Hughes and Son (Skellingthorpe) Limited

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWHC 2634 (BP)

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DS Developing Limited v A Hughes and Son (Skellingthorpe) Limited

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWHC 2634 (BP)

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2634 (BP)

Claim No: PT-2024-LDS-000109

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION
PROPERTY, TRUSTS & PROBATE LIST IN LEEDS

The Business and Property Courts in Leeds,

Fourth Floor,

West Gate,

6 Grace Street,

Leeds, LS1 2RP.

Date: 30/10/2026

Before:

HH JUDGE KLEIN SITTING AS A HIGH COURT JUDGE

Between:

DS DEVELOPING LIMITED

Claimant

- and -

A HUGHES AND SON (SKELLINGTHORPE) LIMITED

Defendant

Mark Harper KC (instructed by Milners Solicitors) for the Claimant

Tom Weekes KC and Camilla Lamont (instructed by Birketts LLP) for the Defendant

Hearing dates: 15-17, 20-22, 24 July 2026

Further written submissions: 12, 13 August 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 30 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

.............................

HH JUDGE KLEIN

HH Judge Klein:

1.

British meat rendering, for Category 1 animal by-products (“ABPs”), is a small world, with only two main operators; the Lincoln Protein group (comprising, principally, the Defendant (“Hughes”) and Inztec Ltd (“Inztec”)) and the ABP Food group. The Leo group (of which the Claimant (“Developing”) is a part) has a smaller share of this market, through Omega Proteins Ltd.

2.

The Category 3 ABPs meat rendering sector is also a small world. The Leo group has the largest market share for the rendering of white meat and poultry, but only has a smaller share of the market for the rendering of red meat. On the other hand, the Lincoln Protein group has a large (30%) market share for the rendering of red meat, but only a small share of the market for the rendering of white meat and poultry. These variations in market share may be explained by the fact that, in 2015, Dawn Holdings Unlimited (“Dawn Meats”) acquired a substantial interest in the Lincoln Protein group. Dawn Meats is one of the largest red meat processing companies in the UK. Inevitably, its Category 3 red meat ABPs are rendered by the Lincoln Protein group.

3.

The rendering of all ABPs produces three products; meat and bone meal, or greaves, (“meal”), tallow and, unless a meat renderer uses a thermal oxidiser, condensate. Condensate is the liquid produced from the condensing vapours from what is called bound water or moisture, released by the rendering process. A thermal oxidiser treats (effectively cleaning) uncondensed vapours. Condensate can be highly polluting. So it has to be treated before being disposed of, unless it is intended to be used as an agricultural fertilizer because of its high ammonia content. Because it has a high ammonia content it has a strong odour.

4.

Category 1 ABPs are those which are a high risk to health and they are unfit for human or animal consumption. They include the carcasses of animals affected by TSE (previously known as BSE) and avian flu. Customers have to pay meat renderers to render Category 1 ABPs. Category 1 meal and tallow can only be used for fuel.

5.

Category 3 ABPs, which are a lower risk to health, include animal carcasses which are fit, but not intended, for human consumption. The meal from rendered Category 3 ABPs can be used in animal feed – it is a source of protein – and in industry. Meat renderers pay customers for Category 3 ABPs.

6.

The Lincoln Protein group’s Category 1 ABPs rendering plant is operated by Hughes at Jerusalem Farm in Skellingthorpe, Lincolnshire (“Jerusalem Farm”). Inztec operates the group’s Category 3 plant near York.

7.

The Leo group has a Category 1 plant, in Bradford.

8.

As I have demonstrated, the Leo group and the Lincoln Protein group are competitors in an industry (meat rendering) in which they both have, more or less, a dominant position.

9.

Developing has two directors; Danny Sawrij and Manjit Singh Powar. Mr Sawrij told me that they make decisions for the company, without either of them needing to consult the other.

10.

Gary and Jayne Hancock, and their son Samuel (“Mr Hancock”), are directors of Hughes, as are nominees of Dawn Meats.

11.

Mr Hancock is heavily involved in the operation of the Jerusalem Farm plant (“the Plant”). He is responsible, in particular, for the disposal of condensate. He also oversees production at, and is otherwise involved in the operation of, the three other meat rendering plants operated by the Lincoln Protein group; particularly, the Inztec plant near York.

12.

Alan Asker is the operations manager at the Plant and at the Inztec plant near York. He also oversees human resources issues arising in Gary and Jayne Hancock’s transport business, GH By Products (Derby) Ltd, which has about 80 employees.

13.

Hughes occupies Jerusalem Farm under a 28 May 2004 lease which has a thirty seven year term (“the lease”).

14.

Developing took an assignment of the freehold reversion in Jerusalem Farm on 19 August 2016, and so, since then, not only have the parties effectively been competitors, they have also been in a landlord and tenant relationship.

15.

Mr Sawrij and Gary Hancock used to be on friendly terms, but shortly after Developing became Hughes’ landlord, relations between the parties broke down. This case is the latest litigation between the parties. The evidence given at trial and the parties’ approach to the underlying dispute has demonstrated that the protagonists, Mr Sawrij, on the one hand, and Mr Hancock and Mr Asker, on the other hand, are suspicious of the conduct and motives of each other.

The case

16.

By the claim, Developing seeks possession of Jerusalem Farm on the ground that the lease has been forfeited, following the service of a notice under section 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925 in April 2024, because, Developing alleges, Hughes breached the lease by:

i)

between February 2022 and February 2024 (“the Relevant Period”), the depositing of untreated condensate in a settlement pond (which, Developing also alleges, is connected to condensate storage tanks by a pipe) and/or in lagoons at Jerusalem Farm. To be clear, Developing’s claim is that Hughes has actively deposited untreated condensate in the lagoons and/or the settlement pond or has allowed untreated condensate to run off from industrial processes and be deposited there;

ii)

installing a thermal oxidiser at Jerusalem Farm as part of the Plant;

iii)

not providing information Developing sought by its solicitors’ letter, dated 20 March 2024, to Hughes’ solicitors.

17.

Hughes contends:

i)

in relation to the allegation that untreated condensate was deposited in the lagoons and/or the settlement pond during the Relevant Period, that:

a)

that has not happened. By the end of the trial, its case, as explained by Mr Hancock, was:

i)

the Russia-Ukraine war began in February 2022. After that, electricity costs increased. However, this did not have any impact on Hughes before October 2022 because Hughes benefited from a fixed price contract until then;

ii)

the effluent treatment plant at the Plant (which is capable of treating condensate) is inefficient, and so more costly to run, when the external temperature is low (15oC or below);

iii)

until October 2022, because Hughes’ electricity costs were low, most of the condensate produced by the Plant was treated in the effluent treatment plant even though it is inefficient at low external temperatures. The condensate not treated in the effluent treatment plant was tankered to the Severn Trent Water plant at Stoke Bardolph (“Severn Trent”) for treatment;

iv)

after that, when the external temperature was low, most of the condensate produced by the Plant was tankered to Severn Trent for treatment, rather than being treated in the effluent treatment plant, and, when the external temperature was high enough to make the effluent treatment plant more efficient to run, a greater proportion of the condensate produced was treated in the effluent treatment plant;

v)

he decided, on a virtually daily basis, where the condensate being produced by the Plant was going to be treated. The cost of fuel was not the determinative factor for his decision. Rather what was the determinative, or at least a key, factor was the efficiency of the effluent treatment plant.

A schedule (“the Tanker Schedule”) was produced at trial which broadly shows that:

vi)

between March 2022 and October 2022, every week a similar small number of tankers of condensate (no more than about ten a week on the whole) were taken to Severn Trent;

vii)

between October 2022 and March 2023, every week a greater, and increasing, number of tankers of condensate (peaking at seventy three in the third week of January 2023) were taken to Severn Trent;

viii)

between March 2023 and October 2023, every week a consistent small number of tankers of condensate (almost invariably ten) were taken to Severn Trent;

ix)

between October 2023 and February 2024, every week a greater number of tankers (usually numbering in the forties) were taken to Severn Trent;

Because Hughes renders less red meat in the summer months – Mr Hancock said: “generally, people don’t have roast dinners in the middle of summer” – that, comparatively, a smaller number of tankers were taken to Severn Trent each week between March and October 2022 and 2023 may be explained, at least in part, by the overall volume of ABPs processed, but that may also be explained by the greater efficiency, and so use by Hughes, of the effluent treatment plant in those months;

b)

in any event, the depositing of untreated condensate as Developing alleges is not a breach of the lease; but, if it is,

c)

Developing has waived any right to forfeit the lease by accepting the rent due under the lease on the March 2024 quarter day, which was paid on 7 March 2024 (“the rent payment”);

d)

if the lease has in fact been forfeited on this ground, relief from forfeiture should be given, as Developing agrees, on conditions to be determined, as is also agreed, by me at any hearing after judgment has been handed down to determine outstanding costs and consequential issues, (“the costs and consequentials hearing”);

ii)

in relation to the installation of the thermal oxidiser, that:

a)

although the installation was in breach of the lease, Developing has waived the right to forfeit the lease by accepting the rent payment; but, if not,

b)

the breach was remedied before the claim began when Hughes sought consent retrospectively to instal the thermal oxidiser, in its solicitors’ letter dated 9 May 2024; but, if not,

c)

relief from forfeiture should be given, as Developing agrees, on conditions to be determined, as is also agreed, by me at the costs and consequentials hearing;

iii)

in relation to the provision of information:

a)

any breach of the lease was remedied, before the claim began, by the provision of the information, sought in the 20 March 2024 letter, to which Developing is actually entitled under the lease, in the response letter from Hughes’ solicitors dated 9 May 2024; but if not,

b)

relief from forfeiture should be given, as Developing agrees, on conditions to be determined, as is also agreed, by me at the costs and consequentials hearing.

18.

Hughes counterclaims for (i) the appointment of a receiver and manager of Developing’s reversionary interest in Jerusalem Farm on the ground that Developing is in breach of its landlord covenant for quiet enjoyment and such an appointment is just and convenient and (ii) declarations that Developing has unreasonably withheld consent to certain alterations Hughes proposed to complete at Jerusalem Farm.

19.

Hughes contends that Developing has breached the covenant for quiet enjoyment by taking the following steps “for an improper purpose…of harming [Hughes] as a business rival…making [Hughes’] occupation of [Jerusalem Farm] intolerable” (see paragraph 3(6) of the Amended Defence & Counterclaim):

i)

by its solicitors writing to North Kesteven District Council (“the council”) on 5 March 2024 claiming that Hughes had breached its permit to operate the Plant granted under the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010 (as amended);

ii)

by the solicitors repeating the allegations in the 5 March 2024 letter to the Environment Agency (“the EA”) and to the Animal and Plant Health Agency (“APHA”);

iii)

by the solicitors writing again to the council on 12 and 15 March 2024, on 7, 12 and 19 April 2024, and on 8 May 2024;

iv)

by, on 31 March 2024 (Easter Sunday 2024), permitting Mr Sawrij’s son to exercise a right to fish at Jerusalem Farm reserved to the landlord and those it permits in the first schedule to the lease;

v)

by its solicitors “inundating” Hughes with requests for documents and information on 2 January, 16 February, 23 February 11 March, 20 March, 21 March and 5 April 2024;

vi)

by its solicitors “bombarding” Hughes with allegations that it had breached the tenant covenants in the lease in the letters dated 16 February, 23 February, 6 March, 11 March and 21 March 2024. By my estimation, the documentary basis for this and the previous allegation are eight letters, albeit that they are said to have raised multiple requests for documents and information and to have contained multiple allegations of breaches of tenant covenants;

vii)

by the solicitors raising “bogus questions and requests” in relation to eight requests Hughes made for Developing’s consent for Hughes to:

a)

complete work to enclose the effluent treatment plant begun before the lease was granted;

b)

demolish an asbestos-roofed heavily dilapidated building at Jerusalem Farm known as Building J;

c)

apply for planning permission to demolish Building J;

d)

instal a portacabin (“the portacabin”) at the Plant;

e)

add an airlock to the Plant’s building that has historically been used, but is not now being used, to render Category 3 ABPs (“the airlock”);

f)

instal a mains gas supply, and related equipment, at Jerusalem Farm to power the Plant;

g)

build a trailer garage at Jerusalem Farm (“the trailer garage”);

h)

construct buildings at Jerusalem Farm for which Developing has obtained planning permission.

20.

By the end of the trial, Hughes was seeking declarations that consent has been unreasonably withheld by Developing in relation to all the matters I have just referred to, save for the first (the completion of the work to enclose the effluent treatment plant) which Hughes no longer intends to do.

21.

It is convenient to mention now some matters relating to Hughes’ counterclaim for declarations.

22.

The parties provided me with further written submissions after the end of the trial, at my request; principally on matters relating to whether Developing has unreasonably withheld consent in relation to Hughes’ proposed alterations (“the Further Submissions”).

23.

Hughes’ case in June 2024 was that planning permission is not needed for the demolition of Building J. Hughes has reverted to that position in its Further Submissions.

24.

Hughes has previously sought Developing’s consent for it to make an application for planning permission for, and to construct, a replacement Building J. These matters are not raised in the Amended Defence & Counterclaim. Hughes confirmed in its Further Submissions that it does not seek any remedy in these proceedings in relation to that work, whilst Developing confirmed in its Further Submissions that consent has been given, subject to licence, for the construction of a replacement building.

25.

In fact, Hughes has not, in terms, sought consent to build a trailer garage. By its solicitors’ 19 March 2024 letter, it sought Developing’s consent for it to make an application for planning permission for the garage, which is needed and for which consent has not been given. However, the parties have agreed, in their Further Submissions, that Hughes’ request for Developing’s consent did, in fact, extend to the building of the trailer garage.

26.

Clause 4.14(a) of the lease provides that:

“The tenant covenants with the landlord not without the prior consent of the landlord to apply for any planning permission in respect of the premises…” (“the planning covenant”).

In their Further Submissions, the parties apparently agree that the effect of section 19(2) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, in this case, is that Developing cannot unreasonably refuse to consent to Hughes making any necessary applications for planning permission for the proposed alterations.

27.

Hughes sought Developing’s consent for it to make an application for planning permission for the mains gas supply installation. Hughes now maintains, in the Further Submissions, that planning permission is not needed for this work (see also Mr Asker’s 28 February 2023 letter to Developing)). In its Further Submissions, Developing has acknowledged that, if planning permission is needed, it has consented to Hughes making an application for permission.

28.

Hughes has sought Developing’s consent for it to make an application for planning permission for the installation of the portacabin. Developing has not given consent. However, in its Further Submissions, Hughes says that planning permission for the installation of the portacabin is not needed.

29.

Apparently, planning permission is needed for the addition of the airlock, because a previous permission has lapsed. Hughes has not sought Developing’s consent for it to make an application for planning permission, and this matter has not been raised in the Amended Defence & Counterclaim.

30.

Turning now to Developing’s response to Hughes’ claim that Developing has been in breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, Developing denies the claim and contends that, if it has been in breach, the court cannot, or ought not, to appoint a receiver and manager.

31.

Developing’s position on the alteration-related consents Hughes has sought and pleaded in the Amended Defence & Counterclaim is as follows (I understand, from Mr Harper KC’s closing submissions and Developing’s Further Submissions):

i)

it has consented in principle to the demolition of Building J;

ii)

if planning permission is needed for the demolition of Building J, it has consented to Hughes making an application for permission;

iii)

it has no reason for not consenting to the installation of the portacabin;

iv)

it has no reason for not consenting to the addition of the airlock;

v)

it has consented in principle to the installation of the mains gas supply and related equipment;

vi)

it has not withheld consent for the construction of the trailer garage. It is waiting for further information before it can finally consider whether or not to consent;

vii)

it has not withheld consent for the construction of buildings for which Developing has obtained planning permission. It is waiting for information from Hughes.

32.

To be clear, the dispute between the parties, as I have just set it out, summarises the parties’ respective cases at the close of the trial, and following my receipt of their Further Submissions. The claim had previously been made more broadly, particularly in the Particulars of Claim, and the counterclaim had also been made more broadly, until counsel’s closing submissions, in one respect which I ought to mention now.

33.

Until closing submissions, Hughes contended that Developing was in breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment by withholding consent to the alterations proposed by Hughes (see, for example, paragraphs 3(6), (7) of the Amended Defence & Counterclaim, where Hughes pleads that, because of Developing’s conduct, Hughes has reduced investment at the Plant. Any reduction in investment was caused by the fact that Developing did not consent to particular proposed alterations (see also paragraphs 10(1)-(6) of a CPR Part 18 Response dated 1 November 2024)). As I will explain, and as I understood Mr Weekes KC to acknowledge, the covenant for quiet enjoyment is not breached by a landlord not consenting, or by withholding consent, to a tenant’s alterations, at least where, as in this case, the lease contains a conventional covenant under which the tenant cannot alter the demised premises without the landlord’s consent, even if, as here, that consent is not to be unreasonably withheld.

34.

As it happens, having received Mr Hancock’s and Mr Asker’s evidence, it is clear to me that their belief, that Developing had an improper motive when dealing with some, at least, of Hughes’ proposed alterations and that that has damaged Hughes’ business, has contributed very much to their suspicions about Mr Sawrij’s conduct and motives generally. (It may also be said that what Mr Sawrij thought he saw when he was at Jerusalem Farm on 21 February 2024, that is, untreated condensate in a settlement pond which he believed Hughes had recently dug, has very much coloured his suspicions about the conduct of the Hughes protagonists and their motives generally).

35.

In some respects, the counterclaim was presented more narrowly in the Amended Defence and Counterclaim than at trial; in particular, because, in the Amended Defence and Counterclaim, Hughes does not rely on the letters to the council from Developing’s solicitors which were sent between 12 March and 8 May 2024. Most favourably to Hughes, I have considered that correspondence before determining the counterclaim, because Mr Harper KC was able to deal with that correspondence without any difficulty.

The trial

36.

I heard oral evidence of fact for Developing from Mr Sawrij and from Josh Eldridge, Developing’s environmental compliance consultant who visited Jerusalem Farm on its behalf on 6 March 2024 and 15 March 2024, and who viewed drone footage of Jerusalem Farm which Developing had collected.

37.

I heard oral evidence of fact for Hughes from Mr Hancock and Mr Asker, and from:

i)

Peter Rogers, the council’s environmental protection team leader, who is a long-serving environmental health officer, and who is in charge of the council’s regulatory functions relating to the Plant. He has inspected the Plant each year since 2022, in about April, and he has also, since then, conducted regular, sometimes unannounced, inspections throughout the year. His annual inspection of the Plant in 2024 was on 4 April. He also carried out a further, unannounced, inspection on 24 April 2024, because of emails he had received from Developing’s solicitors;

ii)

Martin Glossop, who is also a long-serving environmental health officer, specialising in the environmental management of meat rendering plants, and who acts as a consultant to the council. He has visited Jerusalem Farm about nine times since about 2011. He wrote the permit under which Hughes operated the Plant between 2022 and 2024 (“the Permit”), and he also wrote Hughes’ most recent (2025) permit. He accompanied Mr Rogers on his 4 April 2024 site inspection;

iii)

Charlotte Roke an APHA animal health officer since 2011, who carried out six routine inspections of the Plant in 2024.

I also read the witness statements, filed on Hughes’ behalf, of:

iv)

Catarina Soares, a qualified vet and an APHA veterinary inspector since 2009 who carried out an inspection of the Plant on 17 April 2024, the outcome of which was satisfactory;

v)

Michael Maunder Taylor, Hughes’ proposed receiver and manager.

38.

The parties relied on expert environmental evidence. Dr Jon Burton, a pollution and contaminated land expert, was Developing’s expert. Mr David Green, an environmental permitting expert, was Hughes’ expert. Because of the extent of their agreement, as recorded in their joint statement, on the matters for which permission was originally given for their expert evidence, their evidence on those matters was given in writing. For the reasons I gave in a judgment I delivered at the trial, I permitted them to give evidence on a further issue. Because it was anticipated at the pre-trial review that I would likely have to consider at the trial whether to extend the scope of their evidence, I had then given directions for further reports and a joint statement provisionally, so that the experts could be cross-examined on the further issue at trial, as they were. The further issue was defined, in the pre-trial review order, as follows:

“If [Hughes] had disclosed the weighbridge tickets and commercial documents for the period between February 2022 and February 2024, would it have been possible to carry out a “mass balance” exercise to establish whether untreated condensate might have been deposited in lagoons”.

39.

I also visited Jerusalem Farm.

40.

Developing was represented by Mark Harper KC, as I have indicated, and, as I have also indicated, Hughes was represented by Tom Weekes KC, and it was also represented by Camilla Lamont. I am grateful to them for all their help, and for their collaboration which made the management of the trial easy.

Summary of decision

41.

Before reaching my decision, I considered all the evidence to which I was referred and which I heard, as well as counsel’s submissions. This judgment sets out my reasons for dismissing the claim, in summary because:

i)

Hughes did not deposit untreated condensate, or allow untreated condensate to be deposited, in the lagoons at Jerusalem Farm or in the settlement pond in the Relevant Period;

ii)

Developing has not established that it was illegal and/or a breach of the Permit for untreated condensate to be deposited in the lagoons or the settlement pond;

iii)

Developing’s right to forfeit the lease on the ground that the thermal oxidiser was installed without its consent was waived by its acceptance of the rent payment;

iv)

Hughes provided the information which Developing had sought in the 20 March 2024 letter to which it was entitled in the 9 May 2024 letter, so that Hughes remedied its remedial breach of the tenant covenant in the lease relating to the provision of information before the claim was begun, in circumstances where Developing is prevented, by section 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925, from forfeiting the lease because Hughes had not responded substantively to the 20 March 2024 letter before 9 May 2024.

42.

I therefore do not need to consider Hughes’ other defences to the claim in this judgment. However, I should record that, had I concluded that untreated condensate was deposited in the lagoons or in the settlement pond, that is likely to have been, in part, because I accepted Mr Sawrij’s evidence (which I have in fact rejected) that he saw untreated condensate in the settlement pond on his February 2024 visit to Jerusalem Farm. In that case, in agreement to a significant extent with Ms Lamont, I would have held that Developing waived any right to forfeit the lease on the ground of condensate deposits by its acceptance of the rent payment.

43.

This judgment also sets out my reasons for:

i)

declaring that Developing has unreasonably withheld consent to the installation of the portacabin;

ii)

declaring that Developing has unreasonably withheld consent to the addition of the airlock;

iii)

otherwise dismissing the counterclaim.

44.

I dismiss most of the counterclaim because, in summary, in relation to Hughes’ claim that Developing has breached the covenant for quiet enjoyment, none of Developing’s activities Hughes has complained of which could amount to a breach of the covenant have substantially interfered with Hughes’ enjoyment of Jerusalem Farm, whether those activities are taken together or separately, and because, in relation to Hughes’ claim that Developing has unreasonably withheld alterations-related consents:

i)

Hughes has not established that Developing has withheld consent to the demolition of Building J. In fact, Developing has consented to Building J’s demolition;

ii)

a declaration that Developing has unreasonably withheld consent for Hughes to make an application for planning permission to demolish Building J is not appropriate, because (i) Hughes does not apparently need planning permission to do that work and (ii) Developing has (now) given consent if planning permission is needed;

iii)

Hughes has not established that Developing has withheld consent to the installation of the mains gas supply and related equipment;

iv)

Nor has Hughes established that Developing has withheld consent to the construction of a trailer garage or any buildings for which Developing has obtained planning permission.

45.

I therefore do not need to determine whether or not a receiver and manager of Developing’s freehold reversion in Jerusalem Farm ought to be appointed. That is a very difficult question which I tend to think, at the moment, needs to be approached cautiously because any appointment would have the practical effect of divesting Developing, even if only in part, of the principal benefit from its proprietary interest in Jerusalem Farm – the rent due under the lease – whilst a receiver and manager is in place.

The key events

46.

The Permit was issued on 10 September 2007, and varied on 21 June 2016. It was issued by the council and drafted by Mr Glossop, as I have said. It is a long document. Section B sets out how Mr Glossop understood Hughes’ business operated. It records, in particular:

“Animal by-products arrive on site in dedicated specialist transport trailers or containers. The vehicle is weighed and logged at the weighbridge…”

That is not correct. Some ABPs are delivered to the Plant in trailers or other specialist containers (which I refer to in this judgment as “trailers”). Some ABPs, including from butchers, are delivered in domestic wheelie bins. The bins are collected for Hughes by the Hancocks’ transport company, which may bring multiple bins to the Plant in flatbed trucks. A small amount of ABPs, for example birds killed by avian flu, are delivered to the Plant in bags and, at least sometimes, are delivered by APHA staff.

Section B also records that:

“…The cooking vapours which arise…become “rendering condensate” which is directed towards the effluent treatment plant…”

47.

Section C contains the Permit conditions, which include:

“2.1

All emissions to water shall be controlled, as a minimum, to avoid any breach of water quality standards (BAT14)

…

2.3

The operator shall maintain a water emissions management plan which identifies the potential risk to the environment from the drainage systems recorded in condition 2.1 above. This shall include an inspection, monitoring and maintenance programme that has regard to the nature and volume of waste waters, groundwater vulnerability and proximity of drainage systems to surface waters (BAT27, 108 & 109)

2.4

There shall be no point source emissions to groundwater from any part of the process or site (BAT19)

2.5

All run-off from the installation shall be controlled and managed. Where necessary (as identified in the water emissions management plan) it shall be treated before discharge in the effluent treatment plant (BAT15)

…

2.7

All process effluent shall be kept separate from surface drainage unless by written agreement of the local authority (BAT17)

2.8

Where effluent is treated off site at a sewage treatment works the operator shall demonstrate that a suitable monitoring programme is in place to avoid a breach of sewage discharge consent conditions (BAT18)

…

3.3

Records shall be kept of the amount, type and origin of all raw materials used in the process hereby permitted. These records shall include details of the date and time of receipt and the time of discharge in the reception area. All records shall be kept for at least two years and made available for examination by the Local Authority

…

12.1

The operator shall monitor emissions, make tests and inspections of the process and keep records. The operator shall keep records of all audits, inspections, tests and monitoring, including all non-continuous monitoring, inspections and visual assessments. Where appropriate, monitoring shall include process variables and operating conditions where relevant to emissions.

• Current records should be kept on site and be made available for the regulator to examine

• Records should be kept by the operator for at least two years…”

48.

Just over a week before Developing acquired the freehold reversion in Jerusalem Farm the Leo group prepared an internal “strictly private and confidential” memo, which said:

“The site is located to the south west of Skellingthorpe approximately 6 miles west of Lincoln. It is currently leased to A Hughes and Son (Skellingthorpe) Ltd. There is long term lease agreement in place expiring in 2041, which was entered into in 2004. Current rental income £120,000 pa.

A Hughes has Category 1 and Category 3 animal by-product processing facilities located on the site. They are a competitor of Leo Group. A Hughes processes approximately 2000t per week.

Rationale for Purchase

The purchase of the site gives us control over land that has planning permission for a rendering plant, these permissions as discussed are extremely difficult to obtain for new sites.

We will then look to exercise the break clause to the current tenant which gives them 6 months to leave the site.

This will then allow us to take possession of the site and remove the current occupier. This gives us a site in the south with planning for rendering. We will then look to upgrade the facilities and run the site as a rendering plant.

The acquisition also safeguards our partnership with Dawn Meats UK who are a meat processor in the UK, they account for about 60% of the volume input to the site.

We would transfer the category 3 material to our Penrith site thus maximising capacity and efficiency at one of our existing sites. We would then look to convert the cat 3 line to a cat 2 line – which will be the only cat 2 line in the UK enabling us to offer another product in the market. This then gives us a strategic edge to the rest of the industry.

We see this as our last strategic acquisition in the UK due to the limited options available within the UK rendering and by-products sector.

Lease Termination

The current lease agreement has many flaws in it and there is a break clause option in the lease based around obtaining outline planning position for residential use as decided by the owner of the site.

There are other issues within the lease to the current tenant trespassing and no actual right or permission to gain access to the site as the entry will be owned by us with no permission currently existing to cross it.

We have obtained solicitor and Barrister opinion on the lease they see no legal reason why we cannot exercise the break clause once we have determined the planning.”

49.

In October 2016, Mr Sawrij had a meeting with Niall Browne of Dawn Meats to discuss co-locating a Developing plant to render Category 2 ABPs at, or adjacent to, Jerusalem Farm. He emailed limited further information to Mr Browne about the proposal after the meeting, but he received no response, even though he had apparently expected one. Mr Browne then suggested that Mr Sawrij meet with Gary Hancock and Paddy Walsh of Dawn Meats at Jerusalem Farm to discuss the proposal further. As far as I am aware, the meeting never took place. By the time the further meeting was suggested, it appears that relations between Developing and Hughes had broken down.

50.

Sanderson Weatherall provided a valuation for Lloyds Banking Group on 31 March 2017 for proposed secured lending to the Leo group, in which it said:

“…we understand that the property is let in its entirety to…Hughes…with approximately 24 years unexpired term…Hughes…are a competitor to your customer and therefore your customer has purchased the freehold interest as a strategic business acquisition.

It is your customer’s intention to unlock vacant possession by investigating various ways to unlock vacant possession…”

51.

In September 2017, Developing served a notice under section 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925 relating to Jerusalem Farm on Hughes.

52.

With encouragement from the council, Hughes purchased the thermal oxidiser, which was delivered to Jerusalem Farm, in 2022. It was commissioned at some point between March and July 2024, which, I understand, means that it operated, at least for some of the time, under the supervision of the manufacturer. Although Mr Hancock apparently suggested in his witness statement that the thermal oxidiser’s installation had been completed in 2022, his oral evidence was different. In re-examination, he explained:

“Obviously, we put the plant in in 2022, and was putting all the attachments and the parts, assembling it to it, and that was finished in March 2024.”

I proceed therefore on the basis that the thermal oxidiser’s installation was completed in March 2024, albeit it was at least partially installed about two years before.

53.

Hughes did not seek Developing’s prior consent for the installation of the thermal oxidiser. When there was an internal discussion within Hughes about whether consent should be sought, Mr Asker said, in a 7 April 2021 email:

“When we have sent formal letters in the past to [Danny Sawrij] they are ignored and are a proven waste of time. If it is ignored we have done our bit so to speak and can do no more. If it’s ignored it cements the low opinion the village already have of him.”

54.

APHA carried out an inspection at Jerusalem Farm on 24 February 2023. The inspection report confirms that the inspecting officer saw daily records showing the weight of ABPs processed. During the inspection, a mass balance exercise was carried out for January 2023. The inspection report records that, in January 2023, Hughes processed 2109.054 tonnes of “by-product”. What is clear from the report is that the inspection was of the rendering of Category 2 pork and poultry ABPs. Mr Hancock explained that Hughes ran a Category 2 rendering operation at the Plant as an experiment, to produce meal for sale to Italy for use in gardens. To run the experiment, Hughes agreed with the APHA vet that a traceability scheme would be in place. That scheme required all Category 2 ABPs delivered to the Plant to actually be weighed, however they were delivered.

55.

On 2 January 2024, in anticipation of an inspection of Jerusalem Farm by Mr Sawrij, Developing’s solicitors asked for a copy of Hughes’ buildings insurance and its electrical safety certificates. Documents were provided by Hughes on 18 January 2024. On 16 February 2024, Developing’s solicitors apparently suggested that Hughes’ buildings insurance did not comply with its tenant covenant in the lease in relation to insurance. Hughes’ solicitors provided further information in relation to insurance on 27 February 2024, 19 March 2024 and 25 March 2024, when they described the position as “not…straight forward”. They sought to draw a line under the matter on 28 March 2024, by stating that Hughes had complied with its insurance obligations, and that, if Developing took out further cover, it would be at its own cost. There the matter rested, at least until 18 April 2024 (when Developing’s solicitors served on Hughes a notice under section 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (“the section 146 notice”) as I have said).

56.

Mr Sawrij visited Jerusalem Farm with an electrician, Kevin Watret, on 20 February 2024. On 26 February 2024, he emailed Mr Singh Powar:

“I can’t get this Hughes site out of my head. I know Pears have been in the media lately but how the hell does this site operate I will never know. I spoke to Ian Naylor on Friday who said he is calling them early this week and get some indication of where they are coming from. In the meantime I will call Ian Holgate and bring him out of the retirement and he will write an appropriate engineering email for us. What I think we should do is me, you and Jane to have a 15 min call tomorrow to make sure entity is aware and goes to the site immediately. As you can see the permitting officer has changed and I bet he has never been to the site. In this state, for sure nobody and I mean nobody would insure it.”

57.

Meanwhile, on 23 February 2024, Developing’s solicitors wrote to Hughes’ solicitors asserting that Mr Sawrij had found breaches, by Hughes, of tenant covenants on his visit, but they provided no particulars of how Hughes was alleged to have breached the lease. They also sought documents from Hughes. On 5 March 2024, Hughes’ solicitors responded substantively, including by asking for particulars of the alleged tenant covenant breaches to be provided and by asserting that Hughes regarded Developing’s “unspecified alleged breaches of the lease as attempts to badger and intimidate [Hughes] and are increasingly tiresome”. (When a similar allegation was made in April 2024, Developing’s solicitors responded that it was “as daft as it is offensive”).

58.

Also on 5 March 2024, Developing’s solicitors wrote to the council’s environmental protection team (“the 5 March 2024 letter”) complaining about the operation of the Plant, including that:

“…there is evidence that the untreated effluent is being deposited on land adjacent to the property in addition to the property itself…”

The solicitors then, in highlighted text, said:

“One major concern is that there appears to be raw effluent deposited in a hole dug in the adjacent field.”

This is a reference to the settlement pond.

59.

On 6 March and 15 March 2024, Mr Eldridge visited Jerusalem Farm. There was a dispute about his access to Jerusalem Farm on 6 March 2024, which resulted in Developing’s solicitors emailing Hughes’ solicitors asserting that he was entitled to access the property under a right of way reserved to the landlord in the lease.

60.

Developing’s solicitors had responded to Hughes’ solicitors’ 5 March 2024 letter by providing photographs of the alleged breaches on 11 March 2024 when they also asked for further documents and when they apparently also threatened that Developing would enter Jerusalem Farm to remedy the alleged depositing of untreated condensate in the lagoons and the settlement pond if Hughes did not provide a remediation plan within seven days. Hughes’ solicitors provided a comprehensive response on 19 March 2024.

61.

On 20 March 2024, Developing’s solicitors sought confirmation that Mr Eldridge could return to Jerusalem Farm to take water samples, said that Developing intended to carry out a survey of the buildings at Jerusalem Farm and asked for information. They also enquired the next day whether Mr Eldridge could visit Jerusalem Farm the following day. Any response to that latter request is not in the trial bundle.

62.

On 31 March 2024 (Easter Sunday 2024), Mr Sawrij’s son arrived at Jerusalem Farm claiming that he wished to fish there. He travelled from Manchester to do so; a journey of about two hours each way. Having visited Jerusalem Farm (an operating meat rendering (industrial) plant), I expressed some surprise to Mr Sawrij that his son might wish to fish there. Mr Sawrij suggested that this was not unusual. What happened, according to Hughes, is set out in its solicitors’ 2 April 2024 letter:

“…a male, accompanied by a woman and child, drove onto the factory site. Contact was made as the male had not identified himself at the security gate and proceeded to walk around the site.

A senior member of our client’s staff was called to the site as there was a concern that the persons who entered the factory site were trespassers.

It was confirmed they were not trespassers but attending to purportedly exercise rights reserved to the Landlord in Schedule 1 of the Lease…The male was identified as the son of the Director of your client company…The persons attending on 31 March 2024 had no appropriate PPE…

…

Although the male did walk the site alone, a child (girl) did alight from the vehicle for a period of time.”

Developing’s solicitors never took issue with this account, although Mr Sawrij told me that, at the time, his son and his son’s partner did not have a child.

63.

Mr Rogers carried out his annual inspection of the Plant on 4 April 2024. He wrote to Developing’s solicitors on 9 April 2024:

“The site receives regular inspections from the APHA and I am not aware there are any biosecurity issues with the site…During the inspection there was no evidence to suggest that untreated effluent was being deposited on the site, nor adjacent to the site. There was a former lagoon [(the settlement pond)] which did appear to be septic and possibly a source of odour (algae and rotting detritus).The operator has confirmed they will investigate the removal of the contents of this lagoon. There didn’t appear to be any connections from the waste processing on the site to this lagoon.

…

Environmental Permitting

During the inspection no breaches of the permit were identified.

Specifically;

…

ii)

Contamination of soil and groundwater: There wasn’t any evidence of waste being buried, nor unsafe lagoons…I walked to the water course on the perimeter of the site and didn’t observe any pollution or evidence of chemical contamination of the water.

…

iv)

There was no evidence of effluent being deposited in the lagoon identified in your photo. This appears to be a historic lagoon as mentioned above.

…

Officers from [the council] regularly visit the site, mainly through appointment but also unannounced. We will continue to monitor the site and ensure that the site continues to comply with their permit.”

64.

On 5 April 2024, Developing’s solicitors sent Hughes what they effectively said was a pre-claim letter in which they claimed that Hughes had created not only the settlement pond but also the lagoons as places to deposit untreated condensate. By the letter, they also claimed that Hughes was depositing untreated condensate in the lagoons and the settlement pond and that pipework for that purpose had been observed by Mr Sawrij. The letter also confirms that Mr Sawrij saw the thermal oxidiser when he visited Jerusalem Farm. By the letter, the solicitors sought multiple undertakings from Hughes. Hughes’ solicitors responded on 9 May 2024, as I discuss below.

65.

Developing’s solicitors served the section 146 notice on Hughes on 18 April 2024, as I have said. The notice alleged the following breaches, by Hughes, of tenant covenants in the lease:

i)

the excavation of the settlement pond, as an untreated storage facility for waste products;

ii)

the depositing of untreated condensate in the lagoons and/or the settlement pond and/or the lagoons;

iii)

allowing the lagoons and/or the settlement pond to be contaminated with untreated condensate;

iv)

a failure to comply with clause 4.8 of the lease;

v)

a refusal to allow Developing to sample the lagoons or the settlement pond;

vi)

the installation of the thermal oxidiser;

vii)

a failure to provide the information sought in the 20 March 2024 letter;

viii)

a failure to produce insurance documents.

66.

As a result of further correspondence from Developing’s solicitors, Mr Rogers made an unannounced visit to the Plant on 24 April 2024. He reported on that visit to the solicitors two days later:

“I visited the site on Wednesday 24th April and witnessed the Effluent plant in operation. During my last inspection on the 4th April there was a tanker removing condensate and yesterday I asked to see the consignment note from Severn Trent which confirms this, along with all the other consignment notes which are stored digitally, when tankers are used from Severn Trent. The effluent treatment plant is not always in operation, e.g. when maintenance is required. I am completely satisfied that whenever the effluent plant is not operating that Severn Trent remove the condensate. Severn Trent sample the condensate for their trade effluent purposes. The small lagoon which looked to be septic on the 4 April 2024 has been dredged, the material was organic/detritus/algae that can result from eutrophication. This lagoon now looks like a healthy water body. There was no odour during my visit from the lagoons nor the plant itself.

In summary, I am completely satisfied that the site is operating within their permit. As previously mentioned, I will continue to visit the site, with both booked appointments or to drop in as I did on Wednesday.”

Mr Rogers had sent a substantively similar email to Mr Asker the day before.

67.

Developing then began the claim on 11 June 2024.

The protagonists

68.

None of the protagonists, Mr Sawrij, Mr Hancock and Mr Asker, was a wholly reliable witness on important points and, in the case of Mr Sawrij and Mr Asker, both tended, at times, to argue their party’s case rather than answer the questions they had been asked. I therefore only accept their evidence where it is supported by other evidence, where it is adverse to their party’s case or where it was not challenged.

69.

Mr Sawrij was responsible for Developing’s acquisition of the freehold reversion in Jerusalem Farm. He claimed in his witness statement that his objective in doing so was for Developing to take possession of Jerusalem Farm when the lease expired by effluxion of time in 2041. That was untrue. His claim is inconsistent with the August 2016 Leo group internal note, which made clear that Developing acquired the freehold reversion with the intention of taking possession of Jerusalem Farm within a short timeframe for the purpose of the Leo group operating its own meat rendering plant, “in the south”, from the site, and to preserve the group’s relationship with Dawn Meats. That that was Developing’s intention at the time is supported by the 2017 Sanderson Weatherall valuation and is consistent with Developing’s service, on Hughes, of the 2017 section 146 notice.

70.

An example of Mr Sawrij’s tendency, in his cross-examination, not to answer Mr Weekes’ questions, but, at times, instead to argue Developing’s case is the following exchange. Mr Weekes asked Mr Sawrij:

“So, you purchased the freehold in August 2016. We’re now in October 2016, and this is an email from Niall Browne of Dawn Meats -- 50 per cent owner of the defendant -- to you. You’ll see it says:

“Danny, Thank you for travelling over to Waterford last Wednesday to meet with us.”

Then the next paragraph, it says:

“Based on the premise that going forward [the defendant] act as a good tenant and [the claimant] act as a good landlord, Dawn and the Hancocks are both happy to consider the following outline proposal discussed at the meeting ... [namely that the claimant or another company controlled by you] would develop a Category 2 rendering plant adjacent to the existing [plant]...”

The email then says:

“To allow us to continue to consider the outline proposal further can you please clarify the following...”

There’s a list of five points. Page 54, you respond to that request, and at page 55, there’s an email from you to Mr Brown. You’ll see it says:

“I find it disappointing that two weeks have past and I have not received any response or acknowledgement of my last email. I visited the site last night and then again today and I am alarmed at the continued breaches along with the additional breaches of the tenancy agreement.”

You say you’ve instructed a solicitor and you also want an explanation about works carried out and illegal deposits of contaminated waste. In the final paragraph, you say:

“Our lawyers also are waiting for responses back on enquires made, though there has got to be reasonableness on both sides and in this instance it is not the case. Again the ball is in your court and if no common sense approach is made you can’t expect me just to sit back and be ignored.”

My question’s this: given what you say in the second paragraph of the email relating to alleged breaches of the tenant covenants, I’d like to suggest that what you say in the third paragraph is a threat, and what you are saying is that, if we can’t reach an agreement about the new plant, you would be relying on the terms of the lease to make life difficult for the defendant.”

This question, albeit very long, called for a yes or no answer. Mr Sawrij answered the question, however:

“So, first, I’ll add you’re only referring to the document in October and you haven’t mentioned the meeting we had prior to the warning in October before we even purchased the site, which I was over in Ireland and I met Niall Browne subsequently, before the October. Niall Browne is 37 per cent -- or his family’s 30 per cent owner in Dawn Meats, with 67 per cent owned by the Queally family. So, I had a meeting with the Brownes and the Queallys before the site was even purchased. So I think you have to give the full story, rather than partial story and the two documents you’re asking.”

Mr Weekes continued:

“But what did you mean -- I mean, you can give us as much of the full story as you think is necessary to understand this -- when you say in the final sentence, “Again the ball is in your court and if no common sense approach is made you can’t expect me just to sit back and be ignored”, what did you mean by that?”

Mr Sawrij responded:

“Well, as a reasonable landlord and a landlord that we are in our portfolio, it’s impossible to see land being contaminated and do nothing about it in the way it was.”

Mr Sawrij’s cross-examination continued:

“Q. So why would that depend on whether a deal could be reached over the new plant?

A. Why, a deal to clean the site up, a deal to expand and commercially improve the site, expand it? There are, again, a number of options when you go into a business discussion.

Q. I’d suggest that I am correct about what this means. You were saying that if a deal couldn’t be reached over the new plant -- you were saying you couldn’t expect yourself just to sit back and you were going to use the lease to make life difficult for the defendant.

A. Well, obviously you’re reading it how you want to read it, and the majority owners of Dawn today, the Queallys, if that was the case, we wouldn’t be having ongoing business relationships up to as we speak today and up to yesterday…and our relationship with the Queallys is still ongoing. So they would have read it the same way, and if they read it the same way as you, I don’t think we’d be having a business relationship today and we have done since and do do.”

71.

A second example is the following exchange about the 2017 Sanderson Weatherall valuation:

“Q. …So what we’re looking at here is a valuation obtained by Lloyds Bank in March 2017… the valuer says that:

“However, we understand that the property is let in its entirety to A Hughes & Son (Skellingthorpe) Limited by way of a FRI lease with approximately 24 years unexpired term. The passing rent is £110,000 per annum. [The defendant] are a competitor to your customer and therefore your customer has purchased the Freehold interest as a strategic business acquisition.

It is your customer’s intention to unlock vacant possession by investigating various ways to unlock vacant possession. It is our opinion that this is not a straight forward exercise and is not guaranteed.”

So, my question is: what were the various ways in which the claimant intended to investigate to unlock vacant possession?

A. Just what mentioned earlier in the previous one, joint venture on processing on site is one of the options.

Q. Do you agree that allowing the claimant to operate a separate plant on site would not unlock vacant possession?

A. No, what I’m saying, that was one of the options and there are a number of options which were discussed and you’re just choosing to pick --

Q. So, you tell us what are the various options that were discussed to unlock vacant possession.

A.

Well, to a joint venture and operating the site. I’ve -- we take over the site and process their volume at agreed rate per ton or a joint venture where we construct a processing plant in a certain area of the site which was unused. So three -- Either three of them, and if you sit down it could be four. There could be five, but it’s a one of a number of options.”

In this instance, save for Developing “taking over” Jerusalem Farm, none of Mr Sawrij’s options would have given it vacant possession. Also, the strong impression I was left with was that, save for the option of Developing building its own plant at Jerusalem Farm, which had been discussed with Mr Browne in October 2016, the options Mr Sawrij mentioned in his final answer were not “discussed” at the time of the valuation, about which Mr Weekes asked his final question, but were those which only came to Mr Sawrij’s mind during his cross-examination.

72.

Mr Sawrij also volunteered, in cross-examination, that he saw blood leaking on the floor out of trailers when he visited Jerusalem Farm on 20 February 2024. That allegation was not made in the contemporaneous solicitors’ correspondence. It is true that, in his witness statement, Mr Sawrij claimed that, when he visited Jerusalem Farm, he found, under the top soil, “black like contamination” and he speculated that that might have been “oils, fat, or leaking animal by-products, such as liquid or blood”, but, from February 2024 until his cross-examination, he had not claimed that (i) he did in fact see blood, or (ii) that he saw it leaking out of trailers onto the floor. When I pointed out to him that Developing’s solicitors did not report this to the council in March 2024, he told me that the blood “had been cleaned up”. When I asked him how he could have known that blood had been cleaned up by March 2024, he claimed that he had observed that when he visited Jerusalem Farm again. He could not offer an estimate of when he returned to Jerusalem Farm between 20 February and March 2024. That is not surprising because he later confirmed that, after 20 February 2024, he did not return to Jerusalem Farm until 21 January 2026. Mr Sawrij’s claim that any blood had been cleaned up is without foundation and, I am satisfied, only came to Mr Sawrij’s mind during his oral evidence. More significantly, his claim that he returned to Jerusalem Farm between 20 February and March 2024 (which, I acknowledge, he later resiled from, when he then claimed that other people had told him that “the site…had been cleaned”) was untrue.

73.

So far as Mr Hancock is concerned, how Hughes has disposed of, or otherwise dealt with, untreated condensate has been at the forefront of the parties’ dispute since before the claim began. It is striking, therefore, that his evidence on this subject in his witness statement is different from his evidence at trial, which I have already summarised. In his witness statement, Mr Hancock claimed that, between “2022 (following the increase in energy costs) and December 2024…[tankering untreated condensate to Severn Water] was [Hughes’] default option because it was cheaper” than treating the condensate in the effluent treatment plant.

74.

During Mr Asker’s cross-examination, there were occasions when, it seemed to me, his conscious objective, when answering questions, was to argue Hughes’ case.

75.

When Mr Asker was asked by Mr Harper whether or not Hughes considered asking Developing for permission to instal the thermal oxidiser and, if Developing refused consent, then applying to court for a declaration that consent had been unreasonably withheld, which merited either an affirmative or a negative answer, Mr Asker responded:

“Well, what I was going to say, my Lord, is on page -- the inter-partes bundle, 187, there’s actually a letter which was sent by our solicitors to the landlord about gas, you know, actually asking for gas. We all know anybody with any reasonable sense would know that gas is better than burning tallow. And in the email we got back or the letter we got back, the landlord basically said, in a nutshell, that they don’t know nothing about the operation; they don’t know nothing about this. You know, it was completely wrong. The landlord would have known about what we was asking for. And that was another reason, because we’ve never had any sort of proper engagement from them. It’s always, “clause such, clause such”, or, “point this”. Now, I understand that’s allowed as such, but it’s just not reasonable. So there was no point in asking because we’d just been wasting our time.”

That response did not answer the question asked and the question had nothing to do with the installation of mains gas at Jerusalem Farm. However, as I have demonstrated, it is very much Hughes’ case that Developing has been unreasonably obstructive when responding to Hughes’ requests for consent to make alterations. I then asked Mr Asker whether the letter informed Hughes’ decision “about what to do in relation to the thermal oxidiser”. Mr Asker replied that Hughes’ decision was not just because of that letter. Mr Harper then pointed out to Mr Asker that the letter (which Mr Asker confirmed was the one he intended to refer to) is dated 5 July 2023, a year after the thermal oxidiser had been at least partially installed. Mr Asker responded that his answer to me had been a mistake. He said, of the letter:

“It’s just irrelevant. There would have been another letter in there somewhere…”

76.

Mr Asker also did not give consistent evidence about the proportion of untreated condensate which Hughes tankered to Severn during the Relevant Period. At one point in his evidence, he agreed that substantially all of it was tankered to Severn Trent. Then he suggested that “part” of it was tankered to Severn Trent, by which, he meant, he explained: “it’s the part when the water treatment plant wasn’t operational”. He was cross-examined about the proportion of untreated condensate which was tankered to Severn Trent in the context of an email from Hughes’ solicitors to Developing’s solicitors, sent on 7 March 2026, in which Hughes’ solicitors said: “our client’s evidence is that between February 2022 and February 2024 all/substantially all condensate generated from Jerusalem Farm was transferred to Severn Trent Water for treatment”. Initially, Mr Asker suggested that this statement was correct. When Mr Harper suggested that this statement was inconsistent with Mr Hancock’s trial evidence about how Hughes disposed of untreated condensate, Mr Asker responded, about the statement, that “the terminology is wrong”. Immediately afterwards he said:

“Well, it’s not wrong, my Lord. I just don’t know how much was there. Some went -- I can’t put a figure on it, my Lord.”

Mr Asker’s final statement reflects what I am satisfied is the reality; that Mr Hancock was responsible for the disposal of untreated condensate and that Mr Asker did not know in detail how it was disposed of. As he said to me, he had “no personal knowledge” of the proportion of condensate which was tankered to Severn Trent during the Relevant Period. The evidence I have just considered is another example of Mr Asker arguing Hughes’ case in his cross-examination.

77.

Not only did Mr Hancock’s evidence on the important point of how untreated condensate was disposed of during the Relevant Period in his witness statement and in oral evidence differ, and not only did Mr Asker give inconsistent oral evidence on the matter, there is material to suggest that Hughes’ case at trial about how untreated condensate has been disposed of historically is different to its case earlier in the dispute.

78.

Mr Eldridge said, in his oral evidence, that he was left with the impression, following his 15 March 2024 visit to Jerusalem Farm, that all untreated condensate was tankered, by Hughes, to Severn Trent. I accept, however, that Mr Eldridge had said, in his witness statement, that Mr Asker had told him, on Mr Eldridge’s 6 March 2024 visit to Jerusalem Farm, that the lagoons stored rainwater and, importantly, treated effluent from the effluent treatment plant (which would include condensate treated in the effluent treatment plant). It may be, therefore, that Mr Eldridge misinterpreted what he was told on his 15 March 2024 visit, as Hughes’ solicitors suggested at the time.

79.

Nevertheless, Hughes’ solicitors, on instructions which are likely to have come from Mr Hancock or Mr Asker, said in the 9 May 2024 letter which I discuss below that untreated condensate was then being used as agricultural fertilizer. Mr Hancock said in his witness statement that disposing of untreated condensate by deploying it as fertilizer “is not something [Hughes] had done for many years now”. The two claims are inconsistent.

80.

Also, Mr Green told me that the impression Mr Hancock and Mr Asker left him with is that “the majority” of the untreated condensate produced at the Plant during the Relevant Period was tankered to Severn Trent.

A mass balance exercise

81.

Dr Burton suggested, in the experts’ first joint statement made on 2 April 2026 (“the first joint statement”), that a mass balance exercise could be carried out which “could provide evidence to show that [untreated] condensate may have been deposited to the on-site lagoons”. Indeed, as I mention below, Developing had contemplated such an exercise in March 2024, undoubtedly with the same object. At the time of the first joint statement, Mr Green appeared to think that such an exercise would have no utility.

82.

The purpose of a mass balance exercise would be, in this case, to establish, or to help in the determination of, the volume of condensate produced at the Plant in the Relevant Period.

83.

A mass balance exercise could never establish that untreated condensate has been deposited in the lagoons or in the settlement pond. Dr Burton confirmed this in his reports when he explained (see, for example, his 2 June 2026 report) that:

“…further evidence in the form of historic water monitoring data from the lagoon would be needed to assist…in determining if untreated condensate has been discharged to the lagoons on site…”

84.

However, a mass balance exercise may have had some utility in this case. If the result of the exercise had helped to reveal that almost all of the condensate produced at the Plant in the Relevant Period was tankered to Severn Trent, Developing may have found it particularly difficult to prove that untreated condensate had been deposited in the lagoons and/or the settlement pond. Conversely, if the result of the exercise revealed a significant discrepancy between the volume of condensate produced at the Plant and that tankered to Severn Trent (in the latter case, as recorded in the Tanker Schedule and, in more detail, for example in Severn Trent waste water transfer notes for the Relevant Period which were provided to Developing’s solicitors on 18 December 2024), Hughes may been obliged, in practice, to establish – it may have had the heavy evidential burden of establishing – that the condensate not tankered to Severn Trent in the Relevant Period was treated in the effluent treatment plant.

85.

How useful a mass balance exercise would have been in this case would therefore have depended on two factors; that is (i) how accurate its result was and (ii) the extent of the discrepancy it indicated between the volume of condensate produced at the Plant in the Relevant Period and that tankered to Severn Trent.

86.

The utility of a mass balance exercise became a focus of the parties’ attention after Dr Burton reported, as the first joint statement confirms, that there is no direct evidence that untreated condensate was discharged into the lagoons or the settlement pond in the Relevant Period. Indeed, the first joint statement confirmed that neither expert had “seen any evidence in the disclosed material to confirm or suggest that untreated condensate had been deposited…”

87.

Even more so did it become a focus of the parties’ attention after a specific disclosure application by Developing was dismissed on 27 April 2026, in which application Hughes explained that the weighbridge tickets for the relevant period, which showed the weight of ABPs delivered to the Plant in trailers, and the significance of which I will explain in a moment, were no longer available, having been destroyed by March 2026 as part of Hughes’ normal document retention policy. Mr Asker has since explained that, because Hughes has a regulatory obligation to retain weighbridge tickets for two years and because of the number of paper weighbridge tickets which have to be retained from time to time, every month Hughes’ office staff destroy the weighbridge tickets for the previous month two years beforehand. So, for example, they destroyed the February 2024 weighbridge tickets in March 2026.

88.

The revelation that weighbridge tickets, in particular, had been destroyed resulted in Developing making an application, on 13 May 2026, for Hughes’ defence to Developing’s claim based on the alleged contamination of the lagoons and the settlement pond with untreated condensate to be struck out, including on the ground that Hughes has abused the court’s processes. It was in support of that application, which Developing had wanted to be determined at trial, that, at the pre-trial review, I provisionally permitted written reports from the environmental experts on the utility of a mass balance exercise and I permitted oral evidence from the experts on that issue at trial.

89.

At a later stage of the trial, Mr Harper asked me not to determine the application until the costs and consequentials hearing. Because Mr Harper asked me to defer determining the application, I have been prepared to do so, and I proceed on the basis that, formally at least, the application has not been abandoned, although it seems to me, at present, that, if Developing does pursue it, that I have delivered this judgment and what I have decided on the question of contamination of the lagoons and the settlement pond by untreated condensate, is likely, at least, to be relevant in the application’s determination. Although the determination of the application has been deferred, Mr Harper invited me, in closing, to draw an adverse inference from Hughes’ destruction of the weighbridge tickets in particular. In the circumstances, I do need to consider, in this judgment, how accurate a mass balance exercise would have been because that may be relevant to the weight I should attach to any adverse inference. At present, I think it is likely that that decision too will be relevant to the strike out application.

90.

To reach a conclusion about how accurate a mass balance exercise would have been in this case, I have needed to consider how it would have been carried out. The following summary is sufficient for present purposes, although the exercise is more complex than the summary suggests, because it takes into account losses of uncondensed vapour from the rendering process to evaporation to the atmosphere for example.

91.

Someone carrying out a mass balance exercise in this case would need to know the weight of ABPs delivered to the Plant in the Relevant Period. They would then need to take account of the free water attributable to all the deliveries in the Relevant Period. Every delivery of ABPs to the Plant is tipped onto the floor of the building where Hughes carries out the rendering, before they are then collected and deposited in the rendering machine (the cooker). Free water is the ABP liquid run off from that tipping, from the trailer which has delivered the ABPs in question for example, which liquid, in the case of the Plant, then passes through a separation screen in the floor of the building. Having accounted for free water, the person carrying out the exercise would know, or be able to estimate, the actual weight of the ABPs rendered in the Relevant Period. The volume of condensate produced by the rendering of any ABP is capable of being calculated, I understand with sufficient accuracy, by taking a percentage, depending on its type, of the actual weight of that ABP, so that, once the weight of ABPs rendered in the Relevant Period was known or estimated, and the proportion of each type of ABPs rendered was also known, the volume of the condensate produced in the Relevant Period could be established or estimated.

92.

With this in mind, and for the reasons I now give, I have concluded that a mass balance exercise would have had some utility in this case, but I cannot say any more than that. In particular, I am not confident that the exercise would have been very accurate, and so particularly useful, in this case. Dr Burton and Mr Green said much the same when they gave oral evidence, albeit that the impression I formed was that Dr Burton thought that a mass balance exercise would have had somewhat more utility than Mr Green did, though even Dr Burton acknowledged, in answer to a question from me, that it is very difficult to say if a mass balance exercise would have had any “real utility” in this case.

93.

As I have explained, the first step in a mass balance exercise would have been to establish the weight of the ABPs delivered to the Plant in the Relevant Period. The weighbridge tickets would have been key to establishing that, so far as trailer deliveries were concerned. Their destruction inevitably created an obstacle to a mass balance exercise of any utility being carried out. However, as I have explained, only some of the ABPs were delivered to the Plant, during the Relevant Period, in trailers. Hughes has claimed that ABPs delivered otherwise than by trailer, so in domestic wheelie bins for example, were not weighed. Although Developing challenged that claim at trial, for reasons I explain in the next section of this judgment, I satisfied that ABPs delivered to the Plant otherwise in trailers were not weighed. Not knowing the weight of the non-trailer deliveries to the Plant would have undermined the accuracy of any mass balance exercise.

94.

There is no dispute that Hughes did not record the volume of free water passing through the separation screen. Also, as Dr Burton accepted, the free water produced by an ABP depends on, and is variable because of, the nature of the ABP, the extent of its decomposition by the time it comes to be unloaded at a rendering plant and how it has been previously stored. All of this would have meant that the accuracy of any mass balance exercise would have been further undermined.

95.

Further, as Dr Burton accepted in cross-examination, because the amount of vapour the rendering of an ABP produces depends on what type it is, or, to put it another way, because the amount of bound water or moisture released in the rendering process, depends not only on the weight of an ABP but also on its type, it is not possible for a person carrying out a mass balance exercise to take a single percentage figure for the purpose of working out the volume of condensate produced by any particular weight of ABPs unless a rendering plant only renders a single type of ABP, which is not this case. In this case, deliveries to the Plant could include multiple types of ABP. I am not aware that there have ever been any records which have showed, accurately at least, the proportion of different types of APBs in a single delivery. Absent such records, the accuracy of any mass balance exercise would have been called into question yet again.

Was Hughes required to weigh, and did it weigh, ABPs delivered to the Plant otherwise than in trailers?

96.

Contrary to Developing’s case, I am satisfied that Hughes was not required to weigh ABPs delivered to the Plant otherwise than in trailers.

97.

Although Section B of the Permit sets out, inaccurately on the question of weighing on Hughes’ case, what happened at the Plant, it was not a condition of the Permit that ABPs were weighed on delivery. The Permit conditions are in Section C. Condition 3.3 is the relevant condition. That only requires that a record is kept of the amount, not specifically the weight, of ABPs delivered.

98.

More significantly, Mrs Roke’s recollection, from her inspections of the Plant, was that Hughes did not weigh ABPs on the weighbridge when they were delivered to Jerusalem Farm otherwise than in a trailer. She also confirmed that the ABPs regulations do not require all ABPs delivered to a rendering plant to be weighed. What they require is an accurate description of the ABPs delivered, including of what is being delivered and how (e.g. a bin, or a skip).

99.

Because Hughes was not required to weigh ABPs delivered to the Plant (at least in the case of those delivered otherwise in trailers) and because of Ms Roke’s evidence, I am satisfied that Hughes did not weigh ABPs delivered to the Plant otherwise than in trailers.

100.

Before reaching this conclusion, I bore in mind that Section B of the Permit suggests that, during the Period of the Permit, all ABPs delivered to the Plant were weighed, but, as I have already explained, it also suggests that all deliveries were made in dedicated specialist trailers or containers, which is not correct. I have not therefore attached much weight to the Permit’s suggestion that all ABPs delivered to the Plant were weighed.

101.

Before reaching this conclusion, I also considered APHA’s 24 February 2023 inspection, during which a mass balance exercise was carried out, using daily weight records. On this subject, I accept Mr Hancock’s evidence that the weight records which Hughes kept and which were used for the mass balance exercise related to a special case; namely, the rendering of Category 2 ABPs as part of an experiment for which Hughes was required, unusually, to keep comprehensive weight data. As the August 2016 Leo group internal note confirms, there were, at least in 2016, no plants for rendering Category 2 ABPs. It was not suggested that that may have changed by 2023. It is probable therefore that Hughes’ Category 2 operation was an experiment.

Was untreated condensate deposited in the lagoons and/or the settlement pond in the Relevant Period?

102.

I have decided that untreated condensate was not deposited in the lagoons or in the settlement pond in the Relevant Period, for the following reasons.

103.

Developing’s claim to the contrary has relied on (i) Mr Sawrij’s evidence about what he saw when he visited Jerusalem Farm on 20 February 2024 and (ii) adverse inferences Mr Harper invited me to make, including from the fact that Hughes’ case has changed during the dispute about how condensate was treated in the Relevant Period.

104.

I do not accept Mr Sawrij’s evidence, because it is not supported by other evidence. In fairness to Mr Sawrij, all he claimed in paragraph 35 of his witness statement was that the lagoons “could contain untreated effluent”, although he later claimed, in paragraph 36 of his witness statement, that there “appeared to be raw effluent” in the settlement pond. What Mr Sawrij saw was, in fact, rotting organic matter, as Mr Rogers explained to Developing’s solicitors on 9 April 2024 and as Mr Glossop has since confirmed in his witness statement (from which I quote below).

105.

What Mr Sawrij did not say in his witness statement is notable, however. He did not say that he detected an offensive odour, which he would have been likely to detect, particularly given his experience of meat rendering plants, had there been any offensive odour at Jerusalem Farm at the time of his visit.

106.

In the first joint statement, the environmental experts agreed that:

“The deposition of untreated condensate at scale into any of the lagoons would create offensive odour over a wide area and potentially breach the odour conditions of the environmental permit.

Whilst there have been odour complaints relating to the site as shown in the disclosures provided, it is not possible to specifically link these to the lagoons rather than the general factory operations nor have NKDC officers noted the same in their site visit reports provided to us.”

107.

Indeed, Dr Burton went somewhat further in his first report, where he said (whether correctly or not):

“If untreated condensate was discharged to the lagoons on site, it is likely that a pollution incident would occur as a result of the subsequent discharge of water polluted with a high ammonia concentration, high BOD and high COD to watercourses in proximity to the site (e.g. Skellingthorpe Catchwater Drain). A discharge of this polluted water could lead to a fish kill owing to the toxicity associated with the high ammonia content and the reduction in dissolved oxygen levels that would be caused by the presence of water with a high BOD and COD.

The discharge of such polluted water to the adjacent watercourses, as seen following previous pollution incidents from the site, would likely result in prosecution of [Hughes] under Regulation 38(1)(a) of the Environmental Permitting Regulations 2016. As stated above, there have been no recorded pollution incidents from the site since October 2013.”

108.

It is likely, had untreated condensate been deposited in any significant quantity in the lagoons and/or the settlement pond some time before the end of the Relevant Period (February 2024), that an offensive odour would have lingered at Jerusalem Farm in March and April 2024, because that volume of untreated condensate would cause an offensive odour over a wide area, as the environmental experts explain, which is likely to take some time to happen.

109.

Because Mr Sawrij did not apparently detect an offensive odour at Jerusalem Farm when he visited it in February 2024, it is unlikely that untreated condensate was being deposited in the lagoons or the settlement pond at around that time.

110.

Far more significant is the evidence of Mr Rogers, Mr Glossop and Mr Eldridge.

111.

As I have said, both Mr Rogers and Mr Glossop are experienced environmental health officers. Both too are familiar with Jerusalem Farm and the Plant. Importantly, Mr Rogers was effectively Hughes’ regulator with responsibility for odour control at the Plant during almost all of the Relevant Period. Importantly too, he regularly visited Jerusalem Farm in that period, including when he made unannounced visits. It is likely that, had untreated condensate been deposited in the lagoons or in the settlement pond in any significant quantity in the Relevant Period, he would have detected it, from the offensive odour, and, on the council’s behalf, he would have taken regulatory action. Mr Rogers is particularly concerned about, and alive to, offensive odours. In response to a question, in cross-examination, from Mr Harper about the disposal of condensate, he said:

“I think at the time [(i.e. April 2024)] we didn’t have any major concerns with that. When I do a site inspection, a lot of the time you’re walking around the plant, you’re assessing if anything’s changed, you’re using your nose. “Does anything smell or look wrong?” I had no sort of problems with the condensate and the treatment plan.”

Even though Mr Rogers is sensitive to offensive odours when he carries out the council’s regulatory functions, it seems that, at no time during the Relevant Period, did Mr Rogers have any concern about odour from the Plant which might have been caused by the depositing of untreated condensate in the lagoons or the settlement pond.

112.

By the time Mr Rogers and Mr Glossop made their inspection of the Plant on 4 April 2024 (when it is likely an offensive odour would have been present had untreated condensate been deposited in the lagoons or the settlement pond earlier in the year), they had both been alerted to Developing’s condensate complaint. As Mr Glossop confirmed in terms, Developing’s condensate complaint was at the forefront of Mr Roger’s mind and his mind at the time of the visit. Yet, they did not detect any offensive odours. Mr Glossop gave evidence that “no offensive odours were witnessed on the site associated with the rendering process, effluent treatment or effluent storage”. He continued, in his witness statement:

“An extensive walkover of the perimeter and fields around the lagoons was undertaken including off site inspection of the wooded area and surface water course that runs immediately adjacent to the north-western boundary. There was no evidence of any effluent, wastewater or materials being allowed to soak into the ground and fields, no materials being buried and no evidence of any surface water features being contaminated.

There was no evidence of effluent being deposited in [the settlement pond, which in] my opinion was subject to natural organic decay associated with lack of oxygen. There were no mal odours emanating from this lagoon (which I would have expected to be present if the hole was filled effluent).

…

The points that were being made in the [5 March 2024] letter about environmental permitting and numerous breaches of permit conditions were not evident or substantiated at the site inspection.”

113.

As I have said, Mr Eldridge’s evidence is also significant. Mr Eldridge is an environmental compliance consultant, as I have also said. He apparently also did not detect any offensive odours from the lagoons or the settlement pond on his 15 March 2024 visit to Jerusalem Farm, even though he was particularly conscious of odours at the Plant. He said, in paragraph 16 of his witness statement:

“It was also noted that there was little in the way of odour coming from the effluent plant. There was a slight odour in the effluent treatment plant area that smelled like condensate.”

He took a water sample from one of the lagoons. All the lagoons are connected. If a significant quantity of untreated condensate had been present in any of the lagoons, as it is likely to have been if untreated condensate had been deposited there earlier in the year, it is likely that his test of the sample would have revealed that. However, he confirmed, the ammonia content of the sample was consistent with results of tests Hughes had apparently taken recently and reported to Mr Eldridge and, as Mr Eldridge explained in his witness statement, the analysis of his sample was “generally in line with [what] could be achieved by an effluent treatment plant, although a well operated and optimised effluent treatment plant should be able to achieve full nitrification with ammoniacal nitrogen concentration” at a very low level.

114.

It is also appropriate to place a little weight on the fact that Ms Soares’ 17 April 2024 inspection of the Plant on APHA’s behalf was satisfactory. Mr Rogers’ 9 April 2024 email to Developing’s solicitors suggests that, had Ms Soares had any bio-security concerns then, as the depositing of untreated condensate in the lagoons or the settlement pond is likely have been, APHA would have followed them up, which did not happen.

115.

There is a pipe which connects the effluent treatment plant to one of the lagoons. Mr Sawrij claimed, in his witness statement, however that he saw a pipe attached to an untreated condensate storage tank which was connected to the settlement pond and, he asserted, he is “confident” about that. Despite that confidence, the environmental experts have confirmed the there is no pipe linking any untreated condensate storage tank with the settlement pond designed to discharge untreated condensate into the settlement pond. What Mr Sawrij saw, and thought was a pipe connected to a storage tank, is in fact an extraction fan. Developing has not offered any alternative theory about how, in the light of the environmental experts’ confirmation, untreated condensate might have come to be deposited in the lagoons or the settlement pond.

116.

Further, as Ms Lamont suggested, it makes no sense for Hughes to have deposited untreated condensate in the lagoons or the settlement pond or allowed that to happen, when, even before the Relevant Period, Hughes had spent a significant sum on buying the thermal oxidiser, which is designed to treat render vapours before they condense, and when, during the period, Hughes incurred the cost of tankering large volumes of untreated condensate to Severn Trent. Nor, as Ms Lamont also suggested, does it make any sense for Hughes to have taken the reputational, and financial, risk of the regulatory action which is likely to have followed if it had acted as Developing claims.

117.

Mr Harper asked me to draw an adverse inference from the fact that, according to Mr Eldridge, he was not permitted to take a water sample from all the lagoons on 15 March 2024. I do not do so, because he was permitted to take a water sample from one of the lagoons, which is connected to the other lagoons.

118.

Mr Harper asked me to draw an adverse inference from the fact that Hughes only provided Severn Trent waste water transfer notes in December 2024. I do not do so, because, as I will show, in their 9 May 2024 letter, Hughes’ solicitors had set out their instructions about how untreated condensate was disposed of and had then provided information about the weight of untreated condensate tankered to Severn Trent in the Relevant Period.

119.

Nor do I draw an adverse inference from the destruction of the weighbridge tickets, as Mr Harper asked me to do, because I am not satisfied that that took place to hide what had happened at the Plant, rather than, say, as part of an established document retention protocol.

120.

In any event, I doubt that the destruction of the weighbridge tickets has had a significant impact on the outcome of the claim, because I cannot say that a mass balance exercise (for which they would have been referred to) would have had any real utility and because, had a mass balance exercise been undertaken, the difference between the volume of condensate produced at the Plant and the volume of condensate tankered to Seven Trent may have been easily justifiable by the use of the effluent treatment plant. Also, any destruction of the weighbridge tickets to hide what happened at the Plant is not obviously consistent with the permission Hughes gave to Mr Eldridge to take a lagoon water sample on 15 March 2024 or the detailed explanation given in the 9 May 2024 letter by Hughes’ solicitors about how condensate was treated.

121.

The changing nature of Hughes’ case about how condensate was treated during the Relevant Period did give me considerable pause for thought before I decided that untreated condensate was not deposited in the way Developing has claimed. However, I concluded that Hughes’ change in case does not outweigh all the other evidence and analysis which strongly points to untreated condensate not having been deposited in the lagoons or the settlement pond during that time.

Would the depositing of untreated condensate in the lagoons or the settlement pond be illegal or a breach a permit condition?

122.

Mr Harper submitted that the depositing of untreated condensate in the lagoons or the settlement pond in the Relevant Period would be a breach of the lease, because such deposits would be illegal, and so contrary to clause 4.7 of the lease, and because they would be in breach of the Permit and so also in breach of clause 4.8(a) of the lease. To a large extent, I cannot agree.

123.

Clause 4.7 of the lease provides that:

“The tenant covenants with the landlord not to do any act matter or thing on the premises which shall or may be illegal…save that use in accordance with the permitted use shall not be a breach of this clause…”

The permitted use (as specified in the lease particulars) is:

“the rendering of animal products together with such other ancillary uses within Class B2 (general industrial) and Class B8 (storage or distribution) of the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 as the Landlord shall first approve in writing such approval not to be unreasonably withheld or delayed”

The parties did not make submissions about whether, even if the depositing of untreated condensate in the lagoons or the settlement pond was illegal, that would not be a breach of clause 4.7 because the permitted use of meat rendering is excluded from the prohibition in the clause. So, I do not consider the point in this judgment.

124.

Regulation 38(1) of the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016 (“the Regulations”) provides that:

“(1)

It is an offence for a person to…contravene regulation 12(1)…

(2)

It is an offence for a person to fail to comply with or to contravene an environmental permit condition.

…”

125.

Regulation 12(1) provides that:

“A person must not, except under and to the extent authorised by an environmental permit…cause or knowingly permit a water discharge activity or groundwater activity.”

126.

A water discharge activity is defined, in Schedule 21 to the Regulations, for present purposes, as:

“the discharge or entry to inland freshwaters…of any…poisonous, noxious or polluting matter,…waste matter, or…trade effluent…”

127.

The lagoons and the settlement pond are not “inland freshwaters”. So, the depositing of untreated condensate in them is not a water discharge activity. Section 104 of the Water Resources Act 1991 defines inland freshwaters as:

“the waters of any relevant lake or pond or of so much of any relevant river or watercourse as is above the fresh-water limit”.

The same section defines a relevant lake or pond as:

“…any lake or pond which (whether it is natural or artificial or above or below ground) discharges into a relevant river or watercourse or into another lake or pond which is itself a relevant lake or pond”.

I understand that it is not disputed that the lagoons and settlement pond do not discharge into any other body of water.

128.

Paragraph 3 of Schedule 22 to the Regulations defines groundwater activity, for present purposes, as:

“(a)

the discharge of a pollutant that results in the direct input of that pollutant to groundwater;

(b)

the discharge of a pollutant in circumstances that might lead to an indirect input of that pollutant to groundwater;

(c)

any other discharge that might lead to the direct or indirect input of a pollutant to groundwater;

…”

129.

Regulation 2 defines groundwater as:

“all water which is below the surface of the ground in the saturation zone and in direct contact with the ground or subsoil”.

130.

It has not been suggested, or established, that water in any of the lagoons or the settlement pond is groundwater. Nor has it been established that the depositing of untreated condensate in the lagoons or the settlement pond might lead to its input to groundwater. I am therefore not satisfied that any deposit of untreated condensate in the lagoons or the settlement pond in the Relevant Period was groundwater activity.

131.

Clause 4.8(a) of the lease provides that:

“The tenant covenants with the landlord…to…comply with all…requirements to be complied with in respect of the user from time to time being made of the premises…”

The full clause does not appear to me to be grammatically correct. The words I have quoted are those Mr Harper suggested express a covenant which Developing contends Hughes has breached. He also suggested that that covenant, and so this clause, is breached if Hughes has not complied with conditions of any permit. Although I indicated that they could do so, neither Mr Weekes nor Ms Lamont argued that Mr Harper’s suggestions were wrong.

132.

There is no Permit condition which, in terms, prohibited the depositing of untreated condensate in the lagoons or the settlement pond. The Permit did require that “all emissions to water shall be controlled…to avoid any breach of water quality standards”, but it was not suggested, let alone has it been established, that any water quality standard would have been breached if untreated condensate had been deposited in the lagoons or the settlement pond. The Permit also required Hughes to “maintain a water emissions management plan”, but, again, it was not suggested, let alone has it been established, that Hughes would not have followed any water emissions management plan if untreated condensate had been deposited as Developing has claimed.

133.

The Permit did require Hughes to control and manage “all run-off”. If Hughes had, say, allowed untreated condensate to leak from the Plant onto the ground and then run off into a lagoon (which is within Developing’s case), this Permit condition may have been breached and, if the condition was breached (which would require the underlying facts to be established), I accept that such an event would be illegal.

The thermal oxidiser – waiver of the right to forfeit

134.

I am satisfied that the installation of the thermal oxidiser was at least almost completed by the time of Mr Sawrij’s visit to Jerusalem Farm on 20 February 2024.

135.

Mr Hancock’s evidence that its installation was completed in March 2024 was not challenged. Indeed, Mr Sawrij explained in his witness statement that he saw the chimney of the thermal oxidiser on his visit, which is consistent with my conclusion.

136.

The thermal oxidiser is a large and complex unit (as Mr Sawrij explained in his witness statement) and, as Mr Sawrij confirmed in his witness statement, he saw it, in what I am satisfied was at least an almost complete state, and he knew, when he saw it on 20 February 2024, what it is. By that time, on the available evidence, I am satisfied that the tenant’s non-nuisance covenant (clause 4.7(a)(iv) of the lease) and its non-alteration covenant (clause 4.11 of the lease) had in fact been breached.

137.

Developing also knew, by the time of the (later) rent payment, that it had not consented to the thermal oxidiser’s installation. Mr Sawrij had not given consent and Mr Singh Powar, the company’s other decision-maker, had also not given consent.

138.

It is clear, therefore, that, by accepting the rent payment and thereby unequivocally recognising the continued existence then of the lease (see Central Estates (Belgravia) v. Woolgar (No.2) [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1048, 1054), Developing waived any right to forfeit the lease because the breaches of tenant covenant arising from the installation of the thermal oxidiser, such breaches being breaches of “once for all” tenant covenants (see paragraph 17.121 of Woodfall: Landlord and Tenant). Even more so is this the case if Mr Harper is right that the date to judge whether Developing waived any right to forfeit is the March 2024 quarter day, by when it is likely that the installation of the thermal oxidiser had been fully completed.

139.

In deciding that Developing waived any right to forfeit the lease because the installation of the thermal oxidiser by accepting the rent payment, I have found the decision of the Court of Appeal in Cornillie v. Saha (1996) 28 HLR 561 to be helpful, both on when a company may be imputed with knowledge of facts and what facts a landlord must know for a waiver to occur. Aldous LJ explained at pages 570-1:

“Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd v. Cordery [1979] 2 EGLR 78 was a case in which the covenant prevented assignment, underletting and sharing possession or occupation of the flat. A Miss Cordery had been in possession for about three years, and the main issue related to whether knowledge of the porters of the block of flats could be imputed to the landlords. The Court of Appeal held that it could. However, the plaintiffs also submitted that they should not be deemed to have knowledge because the facts had not been sufficiently established to give rise to a waiver. That was rejected. Bridge LJ said, at page 80H:

“Given that imputed knowledge, and given the admitted facts as to the scope of the knowledge of the porters which were pleaded in the defence and counterclaim and the further and better particulars, it inescapably came to the notional knowledge of the landlords that there here had been a change of occupation amounting to a breach of the stringent covenant in clause 3(9) of Mr Scarth’s lease.

Mr Colyer nevertheless argues that the breach might not have gone so far as to amount to a subletting, and accordingly the landlords are not to be held to have waived a breach in the form of a subletting so as to be precluded from arguing today that Miss Cordery’s subletting is unlawful. I cannot accept that argument. Once the landlords had notice, as notionally they had in the circumstances of this case, of a breach of the covenant in question it was for them to inquire as to the nature of the breach. Of course, if they had been misled, a different situation would have arisen; but if they choose to make no inquiries and it turns out that in the event the breach did amount to a subletting, in my judgment they are held to have waived that breach of covenant.”

…

We were also referred to David Blackstone Limited v. Burnetts (West End) Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 1487. That was a case where a clerk employed by the landlord demanded rent during the period when the landlord was considering whether the facts known to him amounted in law to a breach of covenant. Swanwick J said:

“In my judgment, again without the guidance of any direct authority, the knowledge required to put a landlord to his election is knowledge of the basic facts which in law constitute a breach of covenant entitling him to forfeit the lease. Once he or his agent knows those facts an appropriate act by himself or any agent will in law effect a waiver or a forfeiture. His knowledge or ignorance of the law is, in my judgment, irrelevant. If it were not so, a vast gap would be opened in the administration of the law of landlord and tenant and a facile escape route for landlords would be provided. Indeed, if this were the position unscrupulous landlords could hardly have failed in the past to take advantage of it long before now.”

I accept the proposition stated by Swanwick J that it isknowledge of the basic facts, in effect knowledge of the relevant facts, that is required” (emphasis added).

The provision of information: remedying the breach and the 9 May 2024 letter

140.

By clause 4.18 of the lease:

“The tenant covenants with the landlord within 28 days of demand made by or on behalf of the landlord to furnish to the landlord in writing any information concerning the occupation of [Jerusalem Farm] the user of [Jerusalem Farm] and other matters relative to [Jerusalem Farm] as may be specified in the demand in so far as the tenant has or can obtain the information demanded…”

141.

By its solicitors’ 20 March 2024 letter, Developing sought:

“…written confirmation (together with supporting evidence) for the period of 2 years up until February 2024 of the following:-

i.

Where exactly the condensate has been disposed of.

ii.

How much condensate has been disposed together with the mass balance calculation to demonstrate the effluent and water flows from the Property.

iii.

Written records confirming the disposal of the condensate to Severn Trent Water.”

142.

Under clause 4.18, Developing was not entitled to written records or supporting evidence. It was only entitled to information in so far as Hughes had it or could obtain it within twenty eight days.

143.

On 9 May 2024, when responding to Developing’s solicitors’ 5 April 2024 letter (which had sought a response to their 20 March 2024 information request) and the section 146 notice, Hughes’ solicitors explained:

“…Our client has an effluent treatment plant at the Property which treats condensate and/or washwater (i.e. water that has been used to wash vehicles and other equipment) and/or effluent (i.e. other liquid produced by the animal rendering process) by (see the flow charts attached): (1) treating the condensate/effluent/washwater in a dissolved air flotation plant (DAF1) (i.e. a water treatment process that clarifies wastewater by causing suspended matter to float to the surface which can then be removed); (2) treating the resulting liquid in a standard “activated sludge plant” (in which the liquid is held in the presence of microflora and fauna to metabolise components in the liquid); and (3) treating the liquid in another dissolved air flotation plant (DAF2).

…what is produced by that process…is simply clear, clean water.

…our client pipes that water to lagoon 1 (which overflows to lagoon 2 and lagoon 3).

[In a footnote:] Condensate not treated on-site is transported off-site by lorry: (1) to a Seven Trent water facility (being a service for which our client pays charges); or (2) to agricultural land to be used as fertiliser under a standard rules permit issued and supervised by the Environment Agency (possible only during the summer) (for which our client receives modest payments).

…

…our client does have records (for the period of two years until February 2024) of the amount of condensate disposed of; (see attached). With regard to condensate figures to the level of the “mass balance calculation” our client does not maintain such data and there is no requirement to do so…”

The “attached” document was a schedule of the weight of condensate tankered to Severn Trent.

144.

Hughes could not at all, let alone within twenty eight days, say how much condensate had been disposed of in the Relevant Period, because the volume of condensate treated in the effluent treatment plant and then disposed of was not measured.

145.

As I have just shown, the solicitors also sought a mass balance calculation to demonstrate “the effluent and water flows” from Jerusalem Farm. No-one has explained to me what this means. If it is intended to mean, as I think is likely bearing in mind how the dispute between the parties has proceeded, that Developing was seeking a mass balance calculation relating to the condensate produced at the Plant which established that the condensate produced was treated otherwise by being deposited untreated in the lagoons or the settlement pond, Hughes did not have that, and could not provide that at all, let alone within twenty eight days, because it did not have, for example, records of the weight of ABPs delivered to the Plant otherwise than by trailers, or records of the volume of the deliveries’ free water, which would be necessary for the calculation as I have demonstrated, and because it did not have a record of the volume of condensate treated in the effluent treatment plant.

146.

I am satisfied therefore that, by the 9 May 2024 letter, Hughes provided the information, sought in the 20 March 2024 letter, which it could provide and to which Developing was entitled and, thereby, Hughes remedied any breach of clause 4.18 of the lease, arising because of its failure to respond initially to the 20 March 2024 letter, within a reasonable time after the service of the section 146 notice. Hughes did not offer Developing any compensation for the breach and Developing has never suggested, during the claim, that any compensation ought to be paid for the breach. I therefore proceed on the basis that Developing takes the reasonable approach that no compensation is payable for this breach. It follows that, by virtue of section 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925, the lease cannot be forfeited for any breach of clause 4.18 relating to the 20 March 2024 letter.

Covenant for quiet enjoyment

147.

As I have shown, Hughes’ case is that Developing had an improper motive for its conduct which Hughes claims breached Developing’s lease covenant for quiet enjoyment. In fact, at the heart of Mr Weekes’ submissions was a contention, as I understood him, broadly, that there are certain categories of conduct which cannot breach the covenant for quiet enjoyment unless accompanied by an improper motive, so that a landlord has a defence, for that conduct, to a claim that they have breached the covenant for quiet enjoyment unless their tenant proves that the motivation for their conduct was improper. Mr Harper disputed that contention. Unusually therefore, the parties’ respective cases were against their own interests; Hughes, through Mr Weekes, contending for a limitation to the breadth of the covenant for quiet enjoyment and Developing, through Mr Harper, contending for no such limitation.

148.

For the reasons I give in this section of the judgment, strictly I have not had to decide who is right, but, in deference to counsel’s comprehensive submissions, I set out my view. Broadly, I agree with Mr Harper. There is no landlord’s conduct which can never, in any case, breach the covenant for quiet enjoyment unless improperly motivated. I will explain why I have reached that conclusion.

149.

Before doing so, I need to record that, in Hughes’ Amended Defence and Counterclaim, it pleaded that Developing’s conduct which it claims breached Developing’s covenant for quiet enjoyment also breached Developing’s obligation not to derogate from grant. No submissions were made on the question of whether Developing may have derogated from grant, and I have understood that a separate claim on that ground is not being pursued by Hughes. That is likely to be because, in the present context, there is no distinction of substance between Developing’s covenant for quiet enjoyment and its obligation not to derogate from grant. As Lord Millett explained in LB of Southwark v. Mills [2001] 1 AC 1, at page 23F:

“…there seems to be little if any difference between the scope of the covenant and that of the obligation which lies upon any grantor not to derogate from his grant. The principle is the same in each case: a man may not give with one hand and take away with the other… As ordinarily drafted…, the covenant shares two critical features in common with the implied obligation. The first is that they are both prospective in their operation. The obligation undertaken by the grantor and covenantor alike is not to do anything after the date of the grant which will derogate from the grant or substantially interfere with the grantee…s enjoyment of the subject matter of the grant…”

150.

Turning then to covenants for quiet enjoyment, in this case clause 5 of the lease is a conventional landlord’s covenant for quiet enjoyment, in the following terms:

“The landlord covenants with the tenant that the tenant paying the rent and performing and observing the covenants of the tenant to be performed and observed may peaceably enjoy the premises during the term without any lawful interruption by the landlord or any person or persons rightfully claiming under or in trust for the landlord.”

151.

Ultimately, what a landlord promises not to do when they give a covenant for quiet enjoyment is to be determined by construing their covenant on conventional documentary construction principles. In Southwark, Lord Millett said, at page 23F:

“Whether a particular matter falls within the scope of the covenant for quiet enjoyment depends upon the proper construction of the covenant”

(see also Lord Hoffmann, at page 12E).

152.

Generally, for a court to find that a landlord has been in breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, a tenant has to establish two matters; namely, that (i) there has been a substantial interference (ii) with their ordinary use of the demised premises. In Southwark, Lord Hoffmann said, at page 10F:

“The covenant for quiet enjoyment is therefore a covenant that the tenant’s lawful possession of the land will not be substantially interfered with by the acts of the lessor or those lawfully claiming under him…[T]here must be a substantial interference with the tenant’s possession. This means his ability to use it in an ordinary lawful way…[I]t is a question of fact and degree whether the tenant’s ordinary use of the premises has been substantially interfered with.”

Lord Millett was of the same opinion. He said, at pages 22G-23D:

“The covenant for quiet enjoyment is one of the covenants of title formerly found in a conveyance of land, and the only such covenant found in a lease of land. It has long been understood that the word “quiet” in such a covenant does not refer to the absence of noise. It means without interference…[I]ts scope [has been] extended to cover any substantial interference with the ordinary and lawful enjoyment of the land…: Sanderson v. Berwick-upon-Tweed Corpn (1884) 13 QBD 547, 551.

Despite this there has lingered a belief that, although there need not be physical irruption into or upon the demised premises, there must be “a direct and physical” interference with the tenant’s use and enjoyment of the land. On this ground the courts have dismissed complaints of the making of noise or the emanation of fumes, of interference with privacy or amenity, and other complaints of a kind commonly forming the subject matter of actions for nuisance. Little harm seems to have been done, since in cases where a remedy was appropriate the tenant has been able to have recourse to the landlord’s implied obligation not to derogate from his grant. But the existence of the limitation has been questioned: (see Kenny v. Preen [1963] 1 QB 499) or circumvented by the round assertion that it is satisfied in what might be thought somewhat doubtful circumstances: (see Owen v. Gadd [1956] 2 QB 99), and I think that we should consider whether it is a proper one.

There is nothing in the wording of the conventional covenant that would justify the limitation. I do not know whether it owes its existence to a desire to maintain some connection with the original scope of the covenant as a covenant securing title or possession, or to the mistaken notion that actions for nuisance “productive of sensible personal discomfort” were actions for causing discomfort to the person rather than for causing injury to the land: see Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655, 706. Now that this fallacy has been exposed, however, I can see no sound reason for confining the covenant for quiet enjoyment to cases of direct and physical injury to land.

Accordingly, I agree with the tenants that the covenant for quiet enjoyment is broken if the landlord or someone claiming under him does anything that substantially interferes with the tenant’s title to or possession of the demised premises or with his ordinary and lawful enjoyment of the demised premises. The interference need not be direct or physical…”

There is no dispute that, in this case, Hughes has to establish both matters I have just identified.

153.

What a tenant needs to prove, to establish that there has been (i) a substantial interference (ii) with their ordinary use of their demised premises, can be gleaned from authorities on the law of nuisance, because both the covenant for quiet enjoyment and the law of nuisance, albeit, importantly, in a different way and in a different context (as I will explain), seek to regulate interference with a person’s occupation, or other enjoyment, of land.

154.

In Fearn v. Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery [2024] AC 1, a majority of the Supreme Court held, in a case of nuisance, that, whether a person’s ordinary use of their land has been substantially interfered with has to be judged objectively. The headnote to the report summarises:

“that anything which materially interfered with the ordinary use and enjoyment of neighbouring land by a person with a legal interest in that land was capable of being a nuisance; that, to amount to a nuisance, the interference had to be substantial, judged not by what the claimant found annoying or inconvenient but by the standards of an ordinary person in the claimant’s position…”

Lord Leggatt explained, at [21]-[23]:

“…the first question which the court must ask is whether the defendant’s use of land [(i.e. the defendant’s conduct)] has caused a substantial interference with the ordinary use of the claimant’s land. The two evaluative judgments involved in this test each merit some elaboration.

The interference must be substantial

Courts have adopted varying phraseology to express the point that the interference with the use of the claimant’s land must exceed a minimum level of seriousness to justify the law’s intervention. The terms “real”, “substantial”, “material” and “significant” have all been used. Put the other way round, the courts will not entertain claims for minor annoyances…

The test is objective. What amounts to a material or substantial interference is not judged by what the claimant finds annoying or inconvenient but by the standards of an ordinary or average person in the claimant’s position. As famously expressed by Knight Bruce V-C in Walter v. Selfe (1851) 4De G & Sm 315, 322, the question is whether the interference ought to be considered a material inconvenience “not merely according to elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions among the English people”…The objective nature of the test reflects the fact that the interest protected by the law of private nuisance is the utility of land, and not the bodily security or comfort of the particular individuals occupying it…”

Whether, therefore, a tenant’s use of their demised premises has been substantially interfered with has to be judged objectively, the tenant needing to prove that, objectively, the interference they have suffered has been substantial.

155.

I have already shown that, for a court to hold that there has been a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, a tenant has to prove that it is their use of their demised premises which has been interfered with. Here too, authorities on the law of nuisance are helpful. It is not enough that they have been personally inconvenienced. As Lord Leggatt said, in Fearn, at [21]:

“…the court must ask is whether the defendant’s use of land [(i.e. the defendant’s conduct)] has caused a substantial interference with the ordinary use of the claimant’s land” (emphasis added).

Recently, Nugee LJ (with whom Moylan LJ agreed) explained, in Thomas v. Nicholas [2026] EWCA Civ 847, at [130]:

“In summary, the requirement that the defendant’s activities substantially interfere with the ordinary use of land is to my mind an important limiting factor in the law of private nuisance, and again reflects the nature of nuisance as a tort to land. The interests which the tort protects are the interests that any owner or occupier of land has in not having the ordinary utility and amenity of their land substantially interfered with; they are not “the bodily security or comfort of the particular individuals occupying it” (Fearn at [23]). Equally they are not the interests of the particular business which the claimant uses the land for. If the defendant’s activities are such as to substantially interfere with ordinary uses of the claimant’s land, then the claimant can recover if their particular business is affected (as in Cooke v. Forbes, as explained by Lindley LJ in Roberston v. Kilvert); but if they are not such as to substantially interfere with ordinary uses, then there is no nuisance: Robertson v. Kilvert, the Cape Town case. So just as the question whether the interference is substantial is to be judged by an objective standard based on the ordinary or average person in the claimant’s position, not by the particular sensitivities of the actual claimant, so too the question whether the interference is such as to affect the utility or amenity of the land is to be judged by an objective standard referable to ordinary or average uses of the claimant’s land, not by the particular sensitivities of the actual use made by the claimant. To put it another way, whether the defendant has committed an actionable nuisance is not determined by what the claimant does with their land, but by the impact on the ordinary or average occupier of the land.”

156.

There are circumstances when, on the proper construction of a covenant for quiet enjoyment, the tenant may, on the particular facts, have to prove more than I have already set out, to establish that their landlord has breached the covenant for quiet enjoyment; for example, when a landlord has exercised a right they have in their lease and thereby caused the interference. These circumstances are most likely to arise where a lease permits a landlord to build or take other steps on their neighbouring retained property. As Lord Hoffman explained in Southwark at page 11G:

“The tenant takes the property not only in the physical condition in which he finds it but also subject to the uses which the parties must have contemplated would be made of the parts retained by the landlord.”

In such a case, the law of nuisance and the law relating to covenants for quiet enjoyment are most closely aligned, because, in both cases, the law regulates the parties’ potentially competing rights and interests as neighbours.

157.

The law of nuisance regulates the parties’ potentially competing rights and interests as neighbours by providing a defendant with a defence to a nuisance claim if the use they have made of their own land has been ordinary and reasonable. If their conduct has been malicious for example, or, to put it another way, if they have acted with an improper motive, they will not be able to rely on the defence. Such malicious conduct is, necessarily, extraordinary and unreasonable. So, in Christie v. Davey [1893] 1 Ch 316, North J said, at pages 326-327:

“[His Lordship commented upon the evidence as to what had taken place in the Defendant’s house, and said that he came to the conclusion from the Plaintiffs’ evidence, which in substance he trusted, that in the interval between the 1st of October and the issue of the writ in the action the noises made in the Defendant’s house were of a very different character from those which had been previously made. On this point he accepted the evidence of the Plaintiffs’ witnesses, and did not accept that of the Defendant so far as it was opposed to that of the Plaintiffs’. He came to the conclusion that the noises complained of did not arise, as had been suggested, in part from anything which had been done in the due course of the Defendant’s trade. His Lordship continued:]

The result is that I think I am bound to interfere for the protection of the Plaintiffs. In my opinion the noises which were made in the Defendant’s house were not of a legitimate kind. They were what, to use the language of Lord Selborne in Gaunt v. Fynney, “ought to be regarded as excessive and unreasonable.” I am satisfied that they were made deliberately and maliciously for the purpose of annoying the Plaintiffs. If what has taken place had occurred between two sets of persons both perfectly innocent, I should have taken an entirely different view of the case. But I am persuaded that what was done by the Defendant was done only for the purpose of annoyance, and in my opinion it was not a legitimate use of the Defendant’s house to use it for the purpose of vexing and annoying his neighbours.”

Lord Leggatt explained in Fearn, at [27]:

“The other aspect of this core principle is that, even where the defendant’s activity substantially interferes with the ordinary use and enjoyment of the claimant’s land, it will not give rise to liability if the activity is itself no more than an ordinary use of the defendant’s own land. In the leading case of Bamford v. Turnley (1862) 3 B & S 66, 83, Bramwell B formulated a test which has since been regularly cited, approved and applied, including at the highest level. He gave what were then contemporary examples of acts such as “burning weeds, emptying cess-pools” and “making noises during repairs” which (unless done maliciously and without cause) would not be treated as nuisances, even when they caused material inconvenience or discomfort to neighbouring owners. He then said at pages 83–84:

“There must be, then, some principle on which such cases must be excepted. It seems to me that that principle may be deduced from the character of these cases, and is this, viz, that those acts necessary for the common and ordinary use and occupation of land and houses may be done, if conveniently done, without subjecting those who do them to an action.” (emphasis added.)

Bramwell B justified this principle in the following way:

“There is an obvious necessity for such a principle as I have mentioned. It is as much for the advantage of one owner as of another; for the very nuisance the one complains of, as the result of the ordinary use of his neighbour’s land, he himself will create in the ordinary use of his own, and the reciprocal nuisances are of a comparatively trifling character. The convenience of such a rule may be indicated by calling it a rule of give and take, live and let live.””

158.

Where the parties’ relationship is governed by a lease, the same objective, of regulating the parties’ potentially competing rights and interests as neighbours, is achieved as a matter of the construction, of the covenant for quiet enjoyment in particular, because, as I have shown, what a landlord has covenanted not to do under the covenant is a matter of construction. So, for example, in Timothy Taylor Ltd v. Mayfair House Corpn [2016] 4 WLR 100, Alan Steinfeld QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court judge, explained:

“1.

This action raises in an acute form the conflict between a landlord’s right to build reserved to it in a lease and the tenant’s right to enjoy the demised premises pursuant to the landlord’s covenant for quiet enjoyment contained in the lease and/or the landlord’s implied covenant not to derogate from the grant.

…

14.

In Goldmile Properties Ltd v. Lechouritis [2003] EWCA Civ 49; [2003] 2 P & CR 1 the Court of Appeal considered the relationship between the covenant for quiet enjoyment and the (implied) entitlement of the landlord to carry out works on the building of which the demised premises formed part…The landlord had brought in contractors to clean the external walls and windows of the building and to repair various seals between the frames and the wall. The work, which was completed within six months, required scaffolding and sheeting to be fixed to the outside of the building. One consequence of this was that the tenant’s restaurant business was quite seriously disrupted: “from outside, the restaurant appeared to be closed; inside, it became dingy and frequently contaminated with building dust” (see paragraph 4 of the judgment of the Court of Appeal: Sedley and Rix LJJ).

15.

In that case, the test which the district judge at first instance had applied was that the landlord was not in breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment if, in carrying out the works, it had taken all reasonable steps to minimise the “potential risks” to the tenant…

16.

On appeal, the district judge’s judgment was reversed by the circuit judge, who essentially held that there was a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment if the landlord had not taken all possible steps to minimise the disturbance to the tenant. The Court of Appeal reversed the circuit judge and restored the judgment of the district judge. It observed (see paragraph 2) that neither party contended that either of the relevant provisions, i.e. the landlord’s right to do the work and the covenant for quiet enjoyment, trumped the other and said that that was the correct approach. It went on to hold, at paragraph 10:

“the obligation to keep the building in repair has to coexist with the tenant’s entitlement to quiet enjoyment of the premises he is paying rent for. This by itself points towards a threshold, for disturbance by repairs, of all reasonable precautions rather than all possible precautions.”

17.

In paragraph 14, it went on to state:

“The district judge’s construction in our view conforms most nearly with what would have been apparent to the parties when they signed the lease. It would have been apparent that the tenant’s enjoyment of the demised premises might be made temporarily less quiet and less profitable by the carrying out of structural repairs. It would similarly have been clear that the lessor’s rights and obligations were neither to ride roughshod over the lessee’s entitlements nor to be unreasonably impeded by them.”

…

19.

In Century Projects Ltd v. Almacantar (Centre Point) Ltd [2014] EWHC 394 (Ch), the tenant of premises comprised in the Centre Point tower in central London sought an injunction against the landlord to restrain it from carrying out building works to the concrete facade of the tower using scaffolding, on the ground that this would constitute a breach of the landlord's covenant for quiet enjoyment and a breach of its obligation not to derogate from its grant. The lease contained a reservation to the landlord of a right to build on adjoining property not dissimilar from the right reserved to the Landlord by the Lease in the present case. The lease also contained an obligation upon the landlord to carry out repairs to the tower and it was common ground that repairs to the concrete façade were needed. In paragraph 45(5) of his judgment, Nugee J, stated as follows:

“Even without authority, therefore, I would have no difficulty in accepting that where a landlord has let premises for a particular purpose and the lease contains both a covenant for quiet enjoyment and an obligation or right on the landlord to do repairs, neither provision trumps the other. On the contrary, they have to be made to fit together. The landlord cannot say that as the tenant took the demise subject to his repairing obligation, the tenant has to put up with the landlord’s works, however unreasonably they are carried out. But, equally, the tenant cannot say that having given the covenant for quiet enjoyment, the landlord cannot carry out any work unless it is shown to cause the least possible interference with the tenants business. Both positions are too extreme. The way the two provisions fit together is that the landlord can carry out work provided he acts reasonably in the exercise of his right.””

In short, in an appropriate case, as a matter of the proper construction of the covenant for quiet enjoyment in issue, a landlord may not be in breach of the covenant if he has conducted himself reasonably. If, however, the same conduct is carried out with an improper motive (or, to put it another way, unreasonably, or maliciously), it can be a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment.

159.

I accept, therefore, that, in an appropriate case, a landlord’s motive for their conduct may be relevant in determining whether they have breached their covenant for quiet enjoyment.

160.

I think that Mr Weekes’ contention, broadly that there are certain categories of landlord’s conduct which can never be in breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment unless accompanied by an improper motive, stemmed, to a large degree, from Kenny v. Preen [1963] 1 QB 499. The report of the case explains:

“In November, 1959, difficulties began to arise between landlord and tenant, and from November 30, 1959, the landlord sought to terminate the tenancy, claiming that the rooms were furnished, and serving on the tenant a purported notice to quit. Between March 3, 1961, and March 6, 1962, the landlord wrote a number of letters to the tenant…, in which he claimed that the notice to quit had expired, and later he threatened to evict her from the rooms and to put her property into the street. On March 3, 1961, solicitors for the tenant wrote to the landlord on her behalf making it plain that in their view the premises were not furnished within the meaning of the relevant Acts and that, accordingly, the tenant enjoyed the protection of the Rent Acts, that she had been so advised, and that the notice to quit was, accordingly, invalid or, if valid, would only have the effect of turning her from a contractual into a statutory tenant. The landlord did not answer that letter and did not return the tenant’s rent book, as he was asked to do, but continued to write to the tenant direct in the same threatening terms. The threats of eviction and of putting her things into the street were repeated orally by the landlord shouting at the tenant to that effect, knocking on her door on a number of occasions over the period of about a year, and causing her anxiety and fear.”

161.

The County Court judge upheld the tenant’s claim that the landlord had breached his covenant for quiet enjoyment. The landlord appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. As Lord Millett showed in Southwark, at the time Kenny was decided, there “lingered a belief that, although there need not be physical irruption into or upon the demised premises, there must be “a direct and physical” interference with the tenant’s use and enjoyment of the land” for a covenant for quiet enjoyment to be breached. The County Court judge had found in the tenant’s favour on the ground that the landlord had interfered with her title. The basis of the landlord’s appeal was, according to the report, that “the judge did not consider that the facts amounted to a substantial physical interference”. The Court of Appeal agreed that the basis for the County Court judge’s decision was not sound and so considered again the evidence that had been before him. The Court concluding that, taking the landlord’s conduct as a whole, he had substantially interfered with the tenant’s use of the demised premises and had breached his covenant. In the course of his judgment, Pearson LJ said, at pages 510-511, 512-513:

“…In this case the landlord was asserting that the tenant’s title, her right to possession of the premises, although initially valid, had been wholly determined by a notice to quit. In my judgment, a landlord by merely making that assertion, however wrong he may be, does not commit a breach of covenant. He is entitled to make that assertion, at any rate if he believes it to be true, frequently, emphatically and even rudely. He is entitled also to threaten proceedings in the courts for possession and damages.

In the present case, however, there was much more than that. The landlord evaded answering the solicitors’ letters raising the tenant’s defences to his claim. He concentrated his attention on the tenant herself and tried, by a series of threatening communications, to drive her out of her possession of the premises. The threats were not merely of legal proceedings: there were threats of physical eviction of the tenant and removal of her belongings. Moreover, there was an element of direct physical interference by repeatedly knocking on the door and shouting the threats to her. That element of direct physical interference was not trivial but substantial in this case, because it was persisted in and because it has to be seen against the background of the threatening letters.

…

I would decide on two grounds in favour of the tenant’s contention that there was, in this case, a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. First, there was a deliberate and persistent attempt by the landlord to drive the tenant out of her possession of the premises by persecution and intimidation, and intimidation included threats of physical eviction of the tenant and removal of her belongings. In my view that course of conduct by the landlord seriously interfered with the tenant’s proper freedom of action in exercising her right of possession, and tended to deprive her of the full benefit of it, and was an invasion of her rights as tenant to remain in possession undisturbed, and so would in itself constitute a breach of covenant, even if there were no direct physical interference with the tenant’s possession and enjoyment. No case of this kind has ever been considered by the courts before, and I do not think the dicta in the previous cases should be read as excluding a case of this kind where a landlord seeks, by a course of intimidation, to “annul his own deed,” to contradict his own demise, by ousting the tenant from the possession which the landlord has conferred upon her.

Secondly, if direct physical interference is a necessary element in the breach of covenant that element can be found in this case to a substantial extent, as I have already stated” (emphasis added).

162.

Mr Weekes also relied on Horwood v. London Regional Transport [2002] EWHC 2827 (Ch), a decision of Anthony Elleray QC sitting as a Deputy High Court judge. At paragraph 62, the judge said:

“In the context of business tenancies and landlord’s opposition to a new tenancy on, for example, the redevelopment grounds, it may be in a given case, that if the landlord asserts in bad faith an intention to redevelop, having ulterior undisclosed motives for possession, at the least where the tenant relies on the representation as to intention, that landlord might be found, on Kenny v. Preen principles, in breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment.”

163.

I do not agree with Mr Weekes’ contention, for the following reasons.

164.

First, the qualification to the covenant for quiet enjoyment Mr Weekes proposed is not one which was suggested by either Lord Hoffmann or Lord Millett in Southwark.

165.

Secondly, as I have shown, what a landlord has covenanted not to do under their covenant for quiet enjoyment is a matter of construction. Mr Weekes did not explain how a covenant for quiet enjoyment is qualified in the way he contended, in every case, as a result of the application of conventional principles of documentary construction.

166.

Thirdly, in construing a covenant for quiet enjoyment, a court can consider other lease terms. In a case where there is not another express lease term which might qualify the covenant for quiet enjoyment, for the covenant to be qualified because of another lease term an appropriate term would have to be implied into the lease. Mr Weekes did not explain how a term qualifying the covenant for quiet enjoyment might come to be implied in a lease in every case. It is not obvious to me how such a qualifying term would come to be implied in every lease. The implication of a qualifying term is not, for example, obviously necessary to give every lease business efficacy. Nor, by way of a further example, would such a term obviously represent the obvious, but unexpressed, intentions of the parties.

167.

Fourthly, I am doubtful that the qualification Mr Weekes contended for is actually necessary as a measure of protection for landlords. They already have a measure of protection, because their conduct can only be a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment if objectively (rather than subjectively) their tenant’s ordinary use of premises has been substantially interfered with. In an appropriate case, they will have further protection because, as a matter of construction, their covenant will be qualified.

168.

Fifthly, in disagreement with Mr Weekes, who argued that covenants for quiet enjoyment should reflect the law of nuisance, I do not think it is appropriate to read across all the principles applicable to the law of nuisance so that they apply to covenants for quiet enjoyment. In cases of nuisance, the law has to intervene to regulate the conduct of neighbours, because, in those cases, as neighbours the parties are not otherwise in a legal relationship. The position of landlords and tenants is different. They are, as such, in a legal relationship; a contractual one which is governed, at least in the case of a written lease, by that lease. I have already explained why I am doubtful that the qualification to the covenant for quiet enjoyment Mr Weekes contended for is necessary. I also think that it would be inappropriate to qualify the covenant in that way in every case because that would interfere with the parties’ bargain, unnecessarily as I have said. Further, as Lord Millett said in Southwark, at page 23E:

“…Nor, in my opinion, is it a necessary precondition of liability on the covenant that the acts alleged to constitute the breach would support an action in nuisance. I do not doubt that this will usually be a sufficient condition of liability, but there is nothing in the language of the conventional form of the covenant that would justify holding it to be a necessary one.”

169.

Sixthly, I do not understand Pearson LJ in Kenny to have meant by the emphasised words I have quoted that there is a category of landlord’s conduct, such as letter writing, which, at law, can never breach the covenant for quiet enjoyment unless done with an improper motive. He did not say that. Rather, his observation, that a landlord’s assertion that a tenancy has come to an end can be made frequently, emphatically and rudely, at least if that is what the landlord believes, can be equally understood as expressing, in emphatic terms, the common sense view that a landlord making repeated assertions to a tenant is unlikely, just by that conduct, to substantially interfere with a tenant’s ordinary use of their demised premises. The observation might also have been an acknowledgement that, under a lease, a landlord is likely to have the right to terminate their tenant’s tenancy, so that, on the proper construction of their covenant for quiet enjoyment, that termination right is capable of qualifying the covenant. Further, for present purposes, Pearson LJ did not decide that the landlord in Kenny was in breach of his covenant for quiet enjoyment because he acted with an improper motive. Rather, he focused on what the landlord actually did, and asked himself whether that conduct objectively substantially interfered with the tenant’s use of the demised premises. As he said: “In my view that course of conduct by the landlord seriously interfered with the tenant’s proper freedom of action in exercising her right of possession, and tended to deprive her of the full benefit of it”.

170.

Seventhly, Edge v. Boileau (1885) 16 QBD 117 is an example of a landlord making an assertion, by letter, apparently without an improper motive but, which nevertheless, resulted in the landlord being in breach of covenant. The report’s headnote says:

“A lease contained a covenant by the lessors for quiet enjoyment by the lessee in the usual terms, viz., that the lessee paying his rent and performing his covenants should quietly enjoy the premises without interruption from the lessors or any one claiming under them. There were also covenants by the lessee to pay rent and keep the premises in repair. The rent being in arrear and the premises out of repair, the lessors caused notices to be served on the lessee’s sub-tenants requiring them not to pay rent to the lessee but to themselves, and threatening legal proceedings in default of compliance with the notice. The lessors though requested to withdraw the notice by the lessee refused to do so for a period of several weeks, and in the meantime, in consequence of the notice, one of the lessee’s sub-tenants paid rent to the lessors :-

Held, that there was evidence of a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, and that, that covenant and the covenants by the lessee to pay rent and repair being independent covenants, an action was maintainable by the lessee.”

Pollock B (with whom Manisty J concurred) said, at pages 119-120:

The covenant is in the usual terms. The facts are these. During the plaintiff’s term, there being some rent in arrear, the agent for the defendants, the plaintiff’s lessors, by their authority sends to the tenants of the plaintiff a notice desiring them not to pay their rents to the plaintiff, but to pay them to the defendants, and threatening them with legal proceedings in default of compliance with the notice. It is obvious what the probable results of such a notice would be. It is impossible, as it seems to me, to hold that, under the circumstances of this case, and having regard to what actually followed, this notice can be treated as no more than a mere false and idle claim or threat of which no notice might be taken. To my mind there is evidence of a substantial disturbance of the plaintiff’s quiet enjoyment of the property demised. The case of Whichcot v. Nine is the only authority to which we were referred on this subject. When the report of that case is looked at, it is very short and simply comes to this, that the mere telling a tenant not to pay his rent is not necessarily a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. There is nothing said as to the circumstances under which the man was told not to pay his rent, and it appears that he did pay his rent notwithstanding the notice. I can understand that there might be circumstances under which such a notice might be treated as a mere idle threat and as not amounting to a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment because there was no substantial interference with the enjoyment. Here I think that there is a substantial interference with the rights of the plaintiff, and one which might very well seriously affect the value of his property.”

It is perhaps notable that Pearson LJ approved of Edge in Kenny at page 510.

171.

Eighthly, as the parties’ approach to this case has shown, there is a danger that focusing on whether or not a landlord’s conduct is improperly motivated diverts parties from answering the key question, where a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment is alleged; namely, has the tenant’s ordinary use of their demised premises objectively been substantially interfered with in a way which, on the proper construction of the particular covenant for quiet enjoyment in their lease, is not permitted?

172.

There is, however, a limitation to the protection afforded to a tenant by their landlord’s covenant for quiet enjoyment which I need to set out and which I have already alluded to.

173.

In Southwark, Lord Millett noted, at pages 23H-24B:

“The second feature that the implied obligation [not to derogate from grant] and the covenant for quiet enjoyment have in common is that the grantor’s obligations are confined to the subject matter of the grant. Where the covenant is contained in a lease, its subject matter is usually expressed to be the demised premises. In an oft quoted passage in Leech v. Schweder (1874) LR 9 ChApp 463, 474 Mellish LJ said:

“It is perfectly true that the lessee is ‘to hold and enjoy without any suit, let, or hindrance’. But what is he to hold and enjoy? ‘The premises.’ What are the premises? The things previously demised and granted. The covenant does not enlarge what is previously granted, but an additional remedy is given, namely, an action for damages if the lessee cannot get, or is deprived of that which has been previously professed to be granted. Nothing, I apprehend, can be plainer than that at law it would not, in the least degree, enlarge what was granted.”

At page 14A-E of the report, Lord Hoffmann referred to Duke of Westminster v. Guild [1985] QB 688, and continued:

“…In that case, the question was whether a landlord was obliged to repair a drain serving the demised premises which passed under the landlord’s retained land. The Court of Appeal held that no such obligation could be implied and that it did not fall within the scope of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. Slade LJ said, at page 703:

“The express covenant for quiet enjoyment and implied covenant against derogation from grant cannot in our opinion be invoked so as to impose on [the plaintiffs] positive obligations to perform acts of repair which they would not otherwise be under any obligation to perform.”

…[T]he drain in Duke of Westminster v. Guild [1985] QB 688 was on the landlord’s land and he was not using it. Nor was anyone claiming under him. The tenant wanted it repaired for his own benefit. This the landlord was not obliged to do. It is a general principle that the grantor of an easement of way or drainage is not obliged to keep the way or drain in repair. In my opinion, therefore, Mantell LJ [in the Court of Appeal in this case] was quite right to apply the principle stated by Slade LJ in Duke of Westminster v. Guild…That principle seems to me to apply a fortiori to the present appeals. The appellants are attempting to use the covenant for quiet enjoyment to create not an obligation to repair but a more onerous obligation to improve the demised premises” (emphasis added).

174.

Lord Millett also commented on Guild, in Southwark at page 26B, as follows:

“…There the claim was made by the lessee of the dominant tenement. His land was flooded because a drain which passed under adjoining land belonging to his landlord became blocked. He sought to use the covenant for quiet enjoyment in his lease to transfer to his landlord his own obligation as occupier of the dominant tenement to maintain the drain. This would enlarge the grant, and the claim rightly failed.”

In short, a landlord’s covenant for quiet enjoyment cannot be resorted to to indirectly impose an obligation on a landlord which they do not otherwise have.

175.

Where, therefore, a landlord does not have an obligation to consent to a tenant’s proposed alterations, which, without the landlord’s consent, a tenant cannot carry out, the tenant cannot complain that their landlord has breached the covenant for quiet enjoyment because the tenant has not been able to develop their premises and so has been unable to use those premises in its developed state. If it was otherwise, the tenant’s demise would be “enlarged”.

176.

Although I do not understand it to be disputed that, in a case such as this one (where a tenant covenants not to alter their demised premises without their landlord’s consent, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld), a landlord has no obligation to consent to a tenant’s proposed alterations, I should refer, for completeness, to Treloar v. Bigge (1873-74) LR 9 Ex 151, which concerned the analogous case of a tenant being prohibited from assigning their lease without their landlord’s consent not to be arbitrarily withheld. The headnote of the report says:

“A lessee covenanted with the lessor not to assign the demised premises without the consent in writing of the lessor, “such consent not being arbitrarily withheld;” and it was provided by the lease that if the lessee should assign the premises without the consent in writing of the lessor, “but such consent is not to be arbitrarily withheld,” the lessor might re-enter:-

Held, that there was no covenant by the lessor, either express or implied, not to refuse his consent arbitrarily, but that an arbitrary refusal would leave the lessee at liberty to assign without the lessor’s consent.”

Amphlett B explained, at page 156:

“The first question in this case is whether the lessee has any right of action on the covenant declared upon, and I am of opinion that he has not. It may be that the words themselves might, if it were necessary to carry out the intention of the parties, be sufficient to raise a covenant by implication in the lessor. But no such obligation ought to be implied if the true intention of the parties can be carried out by adopting a literal and natural construction. Now, looking at the place in which the words relied on occur, I think they ought to be construed as a qualification on the covenant of the lessee. That covenant is in derogation of his common law rights, and it is more convenient and reasonable to hold that the words were introduced to limit the generality of the covenant than to hold them to impose an obligation on the lessor.”

177.

What I have just explained has a significant impact on this case, because Developing has not had any obligation to consent to any of Hughes’ proposed alterations, so that Developing cannot have been in breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment by not consenting, or by withholding consent, to those proposals, whatever its motive (as I say, as I understood Mr Weekes to acknowledge in his closing submissions).

178.

I turn now to Hughes’ case.

179.

Mr Hancock explained, at length, in his witness statement how Hughes claims that Developing’s conduct has affected Hughes’ business. Save in relation to his complaint that Hughes has incurred unnecessary legal costs responding to Developing’s conduct, Mr Hancock’s complaint is that Hughes has, by Developing’s conduct, been made less competitive than it might have been, because, before March 2024, Developing did not consent to the alterations Hughes wished to make at Jerusalem Farm. Mr Hancock did not suggest, in his witness statement, that Hughes’ competitiveness has been affected by the manner in which Developing responded to Hughes’ applications for consent. Nor did his witness statement address in any detail Developing’s solicitors’ 2024 conduct. He did say:

“…Milners [(Developing’s solicitors)] made so many allegations that it was difficult to keep up. It seemed that whenever our solicitors provided information, Milners simply requested more (or different) information. Their responses were aggressive and unhelpful and they seemed to be treating the requests for information as a game (as opposed to genuine requests from our landlord). My impression was that Danny [Sawrij] and Andrew Price [(a solicitor)] were making as many allegations as they could think of.”

180.

On the question of costs, Mr Hancock claims that Hughes has incurred £250,000 of unnecessary legal costs, in dealing, over nine years, with:

i)

“hostile correspondence from Milners involving unreasonable and inappropriate (a) allegations of trespass; (b) allegations of breach of covenant; and (c) demands for information and documents”;

ii)

“unreasonable and unnecessary court proceedings concerning [Developing’s] right of access to enable them to undertake surveys in connection with their planning applications”;

iii)

“unreasonable threats of further unnecessary proceedings”; and

iv)

“various applications to [Developing] for consent under our lease…”

181.

Mr Asker said that dealing with the eight 2024 letters from Developing’s solicitors to Hughes’ solicitors which are a basis for Hughes’ counterclaim that Developing has breached the covenant for quiet enjoyment, was “exhausting and time consuming[,] regularly added to [his] working day…[and] became a major distraction”.

182.

That Hughes’ complaint about Developing’s conduct in the present context principally relates, in reality, to Developing’s “failure” to consent to alterations at Jerusalem Farm, was reinforced by Mr Hancock’s cross-examination. Mr Harper asked him to quantify the loss Hughes claims it has sustained by what it claims to have been Developing’s breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. Mr Hancock quantified that loss at £30 million, made up of the extra fuel costs Hughes has incurred because there is no mains gas supply to the Plant (£10 million) and the cost of purchasing Inztec and developing its plant near York (£20 million).

183.

Considering then Mr Hancock’s and Mr Asker’s evidence, first, as I have explained, Developing has not breached its covenant for quiet enjoyment by not consenting to Hughes’ proposed alterations.

184.

Secondly, there are a number of difficulties with Mr Hancock’s claim that Hughes has incurred £250,000 of “unnecessary legal costs”:

i)

he provided no details about those costs, and I was not referred to any evidence to support his calculation;

ii)

he assumed that everything Hughes’ solicitors have done has been unnecessary. I cannot conclude that. I know nothing about the previous, I understand multiple, legal proceedings between the parties, or what costs orders, if any, were made, and I cannot conclude that those proceedings were unreasonable or unnecessary;

iii)

he assumed that every item of correspondence from Developing’s solicitors was inappropriate, which is not the case. As I show when I consider Hughes’ requests for Developing’s consent to Hughes’ proposed alterations, at least sometimes Developing’s solicitors’ response to those requests was not inappropriate, so that not all their correspondence can be said to have been inappropriate;

iv)

Hughes does not rely, for its counterclaim, on every item of correspondence from Developing over nine years.

185.

None of this matters, however, because it does not follow from the fact that Hughes has incurred legal costs, even unnecessarily, that Hughes’ use of Jerusalem Farm has been substantially interfered with, which, as I have explained, is what Hughes has to prove for Developing to have been in breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment.

186.

Thirdly, I am prepared to accept, having read the eight 2024 letters, that responding to them was a burden for Mr Hancock and Mr Asker. However, they had the support of Hughes’ solicitors and their function was likely to have been to give instructions to the solicitors. I am also prepared to accept that responding to the letters added to Mr Asker’s working day in particular. However, Hughes has not established that Mr Hancock or Mr Asker were diverted from its business when they dealt with the letters. It is just as possible that Mr Hancock and Mr Asker were diverted from their work for Inztec, or, in Mr Asker’s case, his work for GH By Products (Derby) Ltd. It is also just as possible that they continued to fulfil their duties for Hughes but had to work longer hours to do so.

187.

Again, none of this matters, because it does not follow from the fact that Mr Hancock and Mr Asker were burdened by having to deal with the eight 2024 letters that Hughes’ use of Jerusalem Farm was substantially interfered with. The same is true of Hughes’ claim that its requests for Developing’s consent to its proposed alterations were met with “bogus questions and requests”. Dealing with such responses probably did add to Mr Asker’s workload (and, perhaps, to Mr Hancock’s workload too) but it does not follow, from that heavier workload, that Hughes’ use of Jerusalem Farm was thereby substantially interfered with.

188.

I now consider, finally, the remaining grounds for Hughes’ counterclaim that Developing has breached its covenant for quiet enjoyment.

189.

In respect of those grounds, first, Hughes was not impacted by Developing’s solicitors’ 5 March 2024 letter to the council, because, although Mr Rogers’ and Mr Glossop’s 4 April 2024 inspection followed, Mr Rogers explained that the inspection was probably an annual inspection he had already planned to carry out anyway, and about which Hughes may have had prior notice.

190.

Secondly, nothing came of Developing’s solicitors’ complaints to the EA and APHA. So they could not have had any impact on Hughes.

191.

Thirdly, I consider Developing’s solicitors’ further letters to the council. They did result in Mr Rogers’ 24 April 2024 inspection. Mr Rogers said that Hughes probably did not know in advance about it but, he added, he has made many unannounced visits to Jerusalem Farm since he began working for the council in 2022. Whilst Mr Asker had to escort Mr Rogers during the inspection, there is no evidence that the inspection diverted Mr Asker from other work for Hughes or, more importantly, that Hughes’ use of Jerusalem Farm was thereby substantially interfered with.

192.

Fourthly, it was, I understand, Mr Asker who was called to Jerusalem Farm when Mr Sawrij’s son visited on Easter Sundary 2024, to fish he claimed. It is likely that this did inconvenience Mr Asker, the visit being on Easter Sunday. However, the visit was a short one on a day when the Plant was unlikely to be operational. The use Hughes has made of Jerusalem Farm was not substantially interfered with by the visit.

193.

For all these reasons, I have concluded that Developing has not breached its covenant for quiet enjoyment. As I have explained, that is because Developing’s conduct on which Hughes can (or might be able to) rely in support of its claim has not substantially interfered with its use of Jerusalem Farm (as demised by the lease).

Consents - introduction

194.

The parties helpfully agreed a bundle of contemporaneous correspondence for each of the alteration-related consent applications Hughes pleads in the Amended Defence & Counterclaim, which reveals the following.

Completion of work to enclose the effluent treatment plant

195.

Planning permission for the work was given in 2002, before the lease, and the work began after the lease was granted, but before Developing became Hughes’ landlord. At the time planning permission was given and the work began, although Jerusalem Farm was occupied by Hughes, Hughes was the Hughes’ family corporate vehicle and the Hughes family also owned Jerusalem Farm.

196.

Hughes, by its solicitors, sought consent from Developing, also by its solicitors, to complete the work on 17 February 2017. Under cover of that request, Hughes’ solicitors provided a copy of the planning permission and the planning permission plans (which contain only limited information). Developing’s solicitors sought a costs undertaking, which Hughes’ solicitors did not give. Correspondence continued between the solicitors until 17 May 2017, concluding with a letter from Hughes’ solicitors explaining that the further information sought by Developing’s solicitors would not be provided.

Demolition of Building J

197.

Hughes’ solicitors wrote to Developing’s solicitors on 10 May 2017 explaining that Building J was dilapidated and that its asbestos roof created a risk of injury. On Hughes’ behalf, they sought Developing’s consent to the demolition of Building J. Developing’s solicitors did not respond. So, on 3 August 2017, Hughes’ solicitors wrote again asking for Developing’s consent to the demolition. On 9 August 2017, Developing’s solicitors asked for a copy of “the risk assessment together with plans for the demolition”. These documents were never provided.

198.

Hughes’ solicitors did not respond to the 9 August 2017 letter until 14 December 2017. Developing’s solicitors responded on the same day demanding a costs undertaking relating to all the Building J consents sought, the proposed terms of which were varied on 4 January 2018 and which Hughes’ solicitors gave the following day, and which was extended, to cover surveyor’s costs, on 1 February 2018. Then, between April and June 2018, the parties were in dispute, and their attention was largely diverted from the various Building J consent applications, because Hughes made an application for planning permission without Developing’s consent, which application was withdrawn in due course.

199.

On 31 July 2019, Hughes’ solicitors sought Developing’s consent again for the demolition of Building J. Developing’s solicitors did not respond to this letter. So, on 17 July 2023, Hughes’ solicitors again requested Developing’s consent to the demolition of Building J.

200.

On 11 March 2024, Developing’s solicitors asked what Hughes intended to do “with regard to Building J”. On 19 March 2024, Hughes’ solicitors responded to the effect that this information had already been provided. On 24 March 2024, Developing’s solicitors confirmed that their client “has no issue in principle with the demolition”.

Application for planning permission to demolish Building J

201.

Hughes’ solicitors sought Developing’s consent for Hughes to make an application for planning permission to demolish Building J in their 3 August 2017 letter. In Hughes’ solicitors’ 14 December 2017 letter, they asserted that, in fact, planning permission for the demolition of Building J was not required. Nevertheless, by their 31 July 2019 letter, Hughes’ solicitors again sought Developing’s consent for a planning permission application to be made. As I have said, Developing’s solicitors did not respond to the letter. Hughes’ solicitors’ 17 July 2023 letter made a further request for this consent. By their 24 March 2024 letter, Developing’s solicitors asked for confirmation when Hughes would be “re-submitting a planning application” for the demolition of Building J. On 18 June 2024, Hughes’ solicitors said, for a second time, albeit for different reasons, that, in fact, planning permission for the demolition of Building J is not required, which is the position Hughes maintains in its Further Submissions, as I have said.

Portacabin

202.

On 24 November 2017, Hughes’ solicitors sought Developing’s consent for Hughes to instal the portacabin. Their letter was accompanied by a location, and a floor, plan for it. They also sought Developing’s consent for them to make an application for planning permission for the portacabin. Developing’s solicitors sought, and Hughes’ solicitors gave, a costs undertaking in early 2018. Since then, Developing has not responded to the request for consent.

Airlock

203.

By their 14 December 2017 letter, Hughes’ solicitors also sought Developing’s consent for the construction of the airlock. The costs undertaking to which I have already referred was sought in relation, and extended, to this matter as well. Since Hughes’ solicitors gave the undertaking, there has been no response to the application for consent.

Mains gas supply

204.

On 6 March 2018, Hughes’ solicitors sought Developing’s consent for a mains gas supply with related equipment to be installed at Jerusalem Farm. They also sought Developing’s consent for an application for planning permission to be made. The costs undertaking Developing’s solicitors sought was given on 20 March 2018. There matters rested, more or less, until Mr Asker wrote to Developing on 28 February 2023 again seeking consent for Hughes to have the work done. Mr Asker then sent a further letter, to Developing’s solicitors, responding to questions they had asked (the relevance, or importance, of which to the application for consent no-one explained to me). Developing consented, in principle, to the work on 22 September 2023. Developing’s solicitors sent Hughes’ solicitors a draft licence on 22 December 2023 and, on 12 February 2024, Hughes’ solicitors returned the draft licence amended. The draft licence does not expressly record Developing’s consent, if any, for Hughes to apply for planning permission for the work (although Developing now acknowledges that, if planning permission is needed, it has consented to Hughes making an application for permission). Developing’s solicitors have not commented on the amendments to the draft licence, despite promising, on 24 March 2024, to respond. Nor has any licence been signed by Developing. It is likely that progressing the finalisation, and signing, of the licence has been overtaken by Mr Sawrij’s 20 February 2024 visit to Jerusalem Farm, the service of the section 146 notice and the claim.

Trailer garage

205.

Hughes’ solicitors requested Developing’s consent for an application for planning permission for the trailer garage on 19 March 2024, when they also provided a description of the proposed building. Developing’s solicitors asked for initial scheme drawings on 24 March 2024. There matters have rested. They are likely to have been overtaken by the service of the section 146 notice and the claim. The parties have agreed that Hughes’ solicitors’ request was also for Developing’s consent to the construction of the trailer garage, even though the 19 March 2024 letter did not make that request in terms.

Buildings for which Developing has obtained planning permission

206.

By their 19 March 2024 letter, Hughes’ solicitors also sought Developing’s consent for Hughes to construct the buildings in respect of which Developing had obtained planning permission under reference PL/0033/20. Mr Asker said that this consent was sought “to test the water” and that, only if Developing gave consent, would Hughes decide which buildings to construct. By their 24 March 2024 response, Developing’s solicitors asked what Hughes intended to store in the proposed buildings. There matters have also rested, again most likely having been overtaken by the service of the section 146 notice and the claim. No-one has explained to me what is the relevance, or importance, for the purposes of the application for consent, of what Hughes intends to store in the buildings.

Withholding consent

207.

Clause 4.11(a) of the lease provides:

“The tenant covenants with the landlord not at any time during the term without the written consent of the landlord not to be unreasonably withheld or delayed to carry out any development to the premises nor put up erect make or maintain on the premises or any part any new building structure or erection…nor make any change alteration addition or excavation whatsoever in or to the premises or the buildings at the time erected on the premises or on any part…provided always and without prejudice to the foregoing provisions…that if the landlord grants any licence…the licence shall include:

(i)

a covenant by the tenant that upon the expiration or sooner determination of the term the tenant shall if required by the landlord…reinstate and restore the premises to their former state and condition in all respects to the reasonable satisfaction of the landlord and

(ii)

any other covenants and indemnities on the part of the tenant…as the landlord may reasonably deem necessary or desirable from the point of view of the landlord in the circumstances…”

208.

In Iqbal v. Thakrar [2004] EWCA Civ 592, Peter Gibson LJ said, at [26]-[27]:

“…let me set out what I believe to be the relevant considerations to be taken into account by the court when considering the question whether a landlord’s refusal of consent to proposed structural alterations or additions is unreasonable. I should make clear that no case has been drawn to our attention which deals with that type of consent. But the principles laid down in other cases, such as cases relating to consent by the landlord to an assignment of the tenant’s lease, such as International Drilling Fluids Ltd v. Louisville Investments (Uxbridge) Ltd [1986] Ch 513 , can be applied with necessary changes.

…

(3)

It is for the tenant to show that the landlord has unreasonably withheld his consent to the proposals which the tenant has put forward. Implicit in that is the necessity for the tenant to make sufficiently clear what his proposals are, so that the landlord knows whether he should refuse or give consent to the alterations or additions.

(4)

It is not necessary for the landlord to prove that the conclusions which led him to refuse consent were justified, if they were conclusions which might be reached by a reasonable landlord in the particular circumstances.

…

(8)

In each case it is a question of fact depending on all the circumstances whether the landlord, having regard to the actual reasons which impelled him to refuse consent, acted unreasonably.

It is also clear from the authorities and in particular from the judgment of May LJ in Tollbench Ltd v. Plymouth City Council [1988] 1 EGLR 79, 81F, that the court considers two questions. First, what was the actual reason for refusing consent which, May LJ pointed out, is a subjective enquiry to find out what was in the mind of the landlord at the time of the refusal of consent. The second question is an objective enquiry whether the reason in the landlord’s mind was reasonable or unreasonable.”

209.

Although the legal burden is on the tenant to establish that a landlord has unreasonably withheld consent in any particular case, as Slesser LJ (with whom Mackinnon LJ concurred) said in Lambert v. FW Woolworth & Co Ltd (No.2) [1938] Ch 883 at page 906:

“I accept the view, which I think was unanimously expressed in this Court on the last appeal, that the onus of proving that the withholding is unreasonable is on the tenant, but if the landlord gives no reason but merely refuses, that, in itself, I think, puts upon him the duty of showing that his action was reasonable.”

Further, as McCombe J explained in Kalford Ltd v. City Council of Peterborough [2001] EGCS 42, at [38]-[40], developing Peter Gibson LJ’s eighth point and what he said immediately afterwards, which I have also quoted:

“…much of the law in this area relating to the reasonableness or otherwise of a landlord’s refusal of consent in relation to a tenant’s proposals for demised premises has been with regard to proposed alienations. At common law, the question of the reasonableness of a landlord’s attitude, at the time of refusal of consent, fell to be determined upon all the evidence at trial, whether previously advanced in correspondence or other communication with the tenant or otherwise. The landlord was not confined to reasons for his refusal as communicated to the tenant, but it did have to be shown that the reasons advanced for the refusal did actually influence the landlord’s mind at the relevant time: see…Bromley Park Garden Estates v. Moss [1982] 1 WLR 1019, 1034.

Mr Brock for Kalford submits that the law has “moved on” with regard to such matters, since those cases were decided, and that now a landlord, in refusing consent to a tenant’s proposals, can only rely on reasons identified to the tenant at the time of refusal. For that proposition he relies upon the decision of Sir Richard Scott V-C (as he then was) in Norwich Union Life Insurance Society Ltd v. Shopmoor Ltd [1998] 2 EGLR 167. He relies in particular on passages at page 171 of the report.

The Vice-Chancellor referred to Bromley Garden Estates v. Moss and commented that the law had indeed moved on since that case. However, to my mind, his comments to that effect were based entirely upon the effect of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988, which changed the law with regard to applications to landlords for consent to assignments, under-lettings and parting with possession of demised premises. Parliament did not change the law in any other respect in this area and, in my view, it has remained as it was set out in the cases which I have already mentioned.”

It follows therefore that, in any case where a landlord withholds consent to a proposed tenant’s alteration without giving reasons, they have to establish what their reasons were for withholding consent at the time they did so and it is by reference to those reasons that they also have to establish that their decision was reasonable.

210.

In the light of Treloar v. Bigge, particularly because a landlord does not have an obligation to consent to any alteration where the tenant’s covenant not to alter is conventional, as in this case, it is not enough, in my view, for a court to declare that a landlord has unreasonably withheld consent for any alteration, for a tenant to establish that their landlord has merely not given consent to the proposed alteration. They must establish that their landlord has, in fact, positively withheld consent and that, subject to what I have just said, that conduct is unreasonable.

211.

I acknowledge, however, that it is possible for a tenant to establish, by inference, that their landlord has withheld consent, so that, if the other circumstances justify it, where a landlord has not given consent for a long time following a tenant’s request, for example by ignoring the request, a tenant can thereby establish that their landlord has withheld consent.

Demolition of Building J

212.

Developing’s solicitors’ 24 March 2024 letter is, on its proper construction, Developing’s written consent to the demolition of Building J (see, on this subject, Crabb, Seitler & Seitler: Leases – Covenants and Consents (3rd ed), Ch.11, to which Mr Weekes referred me). Although the letter said that Developing’s consent was given in principle, it did not suggest that any further steps needed to be taken before Hughes could demolish the building, such as the parties’ entry into a formal written licence. Since then, no-one has specified any such further steps. The demolition of Building J is a single act, and is, comparatively, a straightforward operation, unlike, say, the construction of a new building.

213.

In these circumstances, I am satisfied that Developing has consented, without any qualification, to the demolition of Building J. It is therefore not appropriate for me to declare that Developing’s consent to the demolition has been withheld.

Application for planning permission to demolish Building J

214.

As Hughes’s case is now that planning permission for the demolition of Building J is not required, whether or not Developing has withheld its consent to an application by Hughes for planning permission is neither here nor there. In any event, I am satisfied that the unqualified assertion in Developing’s Further Submissions that it has consented to any necessary application itself amounts to a consent. For both these reasons, it is not appropriate for me to declare that Developing’s consent to Hughes making an application for planning permission to demolish Building J is not appropriate.

Portacabin

215.

Almost nine years, a long time, has elapsed since Hughes sought Developing’s consent for the installation of the portacabin. Developing was provided with sufficient information to make a decision in relation to that request, because its solicitors were sent a location, and a floor, plan for the portacabin when the consent request was made. Yet Developing has not responded substantively to Hughes’ request.

216.

In the circumstances, the proper inference to draw in this case is that Developing has withheld consent to the portacabin’s installation. No reason has ever been offered for that decision. Now that Developing accepts that it has no good reason for not consenting to the installation of the portacabin, on the available evidence I am bound to, and do, conclude that (i) Developing did not make a reasoned decision at the time to withhold consent and (ii) there was no good reason at the time for it to withhold consent, so that (iii) Developing has unreasonably withheld consent to the installation of the portacabin.

Airlock

217.

Hughes’s solicitors’ 14 December 2017 letter contained sufficient information about the proposal for the addition of the airlock for Developing to decide whether or not to consent to it. In any event, it has not been suggested that Developing did not have sufficient information to make that decision.

218.

As in the case of the consent request for the portacabin, almost nine years has elapsed without a substantive response from Developing.

219.

In the circumstances, the proper inference to draw in this case is that Developing has withheld consent for the addition of the airlock. No reason has ever been offered for that decision. Now that Developing accepts that it has no good reason for not consenting to the request, on the available evidence I am bound to, and do, conclude that (i) Developing did not make a reasoned decision at the time to withhold consent and (ii) there was no good reason at the time for it to withhold consent, so that (iii) Developing has unreasonably withheld consent the addition of the airlock.

Mains gas supply

220.

In its Further Submissions, Hughes suggests that Developing has unreasonably withheld consent to the mains gas supply installation because it has not agreed to licence terms which go beyond what even it proposed in the amended draft licence. This submission was beyond the scope of my request for further submissions. In the course of this submission, Hughes suggested that a licence for the mains gas supply installation would need to include a term requiring Developing to grant an easement (presumably over its retained land to accommodate the mains supply pipe). That may be so, but, if it is, Developing’s solicitors asked Hughes’ solicitors for “a copy of the draft easement” on 22 December 2023 and, as far as I can establish, it has not yet been provided to them.

221.

At trial, at least at one point, Mr Sawrij said that consent had been given for the mains gas supply installation. He did not suggest that that consent was qualified in any way, and he was not cross-examined about any qualification to the consent. In fairness to Hughes, however, Developing’s case throughout the trial was that it had given consent “in principle” to a mains gas supply installation.

222.

The parties did not make submissions before the end of the trial about (i) the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the terms of the draft licence initially prepared by Developing’s solicitors (on which there was no evidence, particularly on the apparently disputed licence terms, in any event), (ii) whether or not Developing has always been ready and willing to enter into a licence on those terms (which was also not the subject of cross-examination) or (iii) whether, taking into account all the evidence including the terms of that draft licence, Developing should be taken to have consented to the mains gas supply installation even though Developing’s solicitors had previously indicated that Developing consented “in principle” to the work and had corresponded “subject to licence”.

223.

If the terms of Developing’s draft licence were reasonable and ones on which Developing has always been ready and willing to permit the mains gas supply installation, and, if that draft licence has not been entered because its terms are not acceptable to Hughes (as it is reasonable to suppose they are not, because Hughes’ solicitors prepared an amended draft licence), I would not be persuaded that Developing has unreasonably withheld consent unless it was also established that the terms of Hughes’ amended draft licence are reasonable and that it is proper to conclude that Developing has unreasonably refused to enter into that licence. One of Hughes’ amendments was to the period of time before the installation had to begin. Hughes proposed an extended period of two years from the date the licence was entered into, when Developing had proposed a six month period. A second amendment Hughes proposed related to the period during which the installation had to be completed. Hughes proposed an extended period of eighteen months from the start of the work, when Developing had proposed a period of twelve months from the date the licence was entered into. As I have just alluded to, there is no evidence about how long the work will actually take to begin and to be completed and the parties did not make submissions before the end of the trial about the reasonableness of the proposed amendments or about whether or not it would be unreasonable for Developing not to agree to them. A third amendment Hughes proposed was:

“[Developing] grants [Hughes] and any anyone required by [Hughes] for the works access to the land contained in title LL368723 which is not part of the lease for the purpose of carrying out the works.”

Title number LL368723 may be land adjacent to Jerusalem Farm at its entrance. The parties did not make any submissions about the reasonableness of this provision or about whether or not it would be unreasonable for Developing not to agree to it as a term of the licence.

224.

As I have explained, the burden has been on Hughes to establish that Developing has unreasonably withheld consent to the mains gas supply installation. In the circumstances as I have just set out, Hughes has not established that Developing has unreasonably withheld consent to the installation.

Trailer garage

225.

When Hughes’ solicitors made their request for Developing’s consent for Hughes to construct the trailer garage, they only told Developing’s solicitors (i) the dimensions of the proposed building, (ii) its approximate location, (iii) that it will be “steel portal framed”, under a dual-pitch roof and (iv) that it will be a “high odour control store”.

226.

It was not unreasonable for Developing’s solicitors to ask, in response, for initial scheme drawings, providing a visual representation of the proposal, which Hughes could reasonably be supposed to have had. Nor has it been unreasonable for Developing not to make a decision in relation to Hughes’ request before there has been a response to its solicitors’ request for drawings. Neither Hughes, nor its solicitors, have ever responded to Developing’s solicitors’ request for drawings.

227.

I am therefore not satisfied that Developing has in fact withheld its consent to the construction of the trailer garage.

Buildings for which Developing has obtained planning permission

228.

All Hughes’ solicitors have ever said in relation to this application for Developing’s consent is:

“Our client requests your client’s permission to erect the buildings in the northwest of the site which were granted under your client’s planning permission PL/0033/20 in order to provide for extra storage.”

I have not seen that permission notice. I do not know whether it is an outline, or a full, permission. I do not know what, if any, detail is shown on any accompanying plans. Any accompanying plan may have been no more than a site layout plan.

229.

As far as I can deduce, the planning permission granted was for:

“…the demolition of the existing animal by-products processing plant and all associated installations and the construction of a new animal by-products processing plant, comprised of: raw material reception and processing buildings; engineers building; boiler house; oxidiser building and flue; DAF plant; effluent treatment plant; bio filter bed; general office; weighbridge and weighbridge office; hardstanding areas for accessing the processing plant and for parking of cars, commercial vehicles and trailers used in connection with the operation; alterations to the existing site access from Jerusalem Road; and all associated development, including landscaping

Jerusalem Farm, Jerusalem Road, Skellingthorpe”.

However, I cannot deduce from this what is the construction which Hughes might carry out. Neither can Hughes say what it proposes to do, because, as Mr Asker admitted, it does not know.

230.

I am therefore not satisfied that Hughes has made sufficiently clear what it proposes to do. In these circumstances, I cannot conclude that Developing has withheld consent to Hughes’ proposal.

231.

As it happens, Developing’s planning permission may have lapsed by now, but no-one addressed me on this point. So I have not considered it.

Disposal

232.

For the reasons I have given, I declare that:

i)

Developing has unreasonably withheld consent to the installation, by Hughes, of the portacabin;

ii)

Developing has unreasonably withheld consent to the addition of the airlock.

233.

Otherwise, the claim and the counterclaim are dismissed.

234.

It may be appropriate for me also to declare that Developing has consented to (i) the demolition of Building J and (ii) any necessary application for planning permission in relation to that demolition.

235.

I feel compelled to make a final point.

236.

Because of my decision in relation to the mains gas supply installation, I doubt that this judgment will be the last word on the matter. It would be very unfortunate indeed if the parties have further litigation in relation to it. Developing has consented, in principle, to the installation of a mains gas supply at Jerusalem Farm and Mr Sawrij agreed in cross-examination that such an installation would be a significant improvement to the property. I cannot think of a good reason, therefore, why Developing would not want to finalise a licence for the work, particularly because the installation will be paid for by Hughes. All that the parties now need to agree are a few outstanding licence terms. At the trial, I urged the parties to reach agreement on this matter (as well as other matters). They have not done so. I hope that they do so soon, and realise that there is good sense in doing so.

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