
PROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE
Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Before :
CHIEF MASTER SHUMAN
Between :
ZEDRA TRUST COMPANY (UK) LIMITED | Claimant |
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GRAHAM DAVID TUSTAIN (acting through his litigation friend and Deputies, Douglas John Houghton and Donna Holmes) | Defendant |
Mark Baxter (instructed by Forsters LLP) for the Claimant
Owen Curry (instructed by Anthony CollinsSolicitors) for the Defendant
WRITTEN REASONS
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CHIEF MASTER SHUMAN:
This claim concerns the validity of six discretionary settlements purportedly established between 10 November 2011 and 1 December 2011 in relation to the property of the Defendant, Graham David Tustain. The settlements comprise five arrangements described as "The Graham Tustain Gift and Loan Discretionary Settlements" and a sixth arrangement described as "The Graham Tustain Discretionary Settlement". The declarations sought in these proceedings concern the legal effectiveness of those instruments and the consequences which follow from their execution.
The Claimant, Zedra Trust Company (UK) Limited, is the sole remaining trustee of the purported settlements, and is a professional trust company. It was previously known as Barclays Bank Trust Company Limited.
The Defendant, Graham David Tustain, who has long lacked capacity to manage his property and affairs, is the purported settlor of the six settlements. He acts in these proceedings through his litigation friends and deputies, Douglas John Houghton and Donna Holmes.
By an amended Part 8 claim the Claimant seeks declarations that each of the six settlements was void ab initio, that associated loan arrangements entered into in connection with the settlements are void and of no effect, and that the property presently held by the Claimant is held on bare resulting trust for the Defendant. Further relief is also sought including section 61 relief.
The unusual feature of the present proceedings is that there is no substantive disagreement between the parties concerning the validity issue. The Claimant contends that the settlements were void from the outset. The Defendant supports that conclusion and similarly invites the Court to declare that the purported settlements never acquired legal effect. The Court must nevertheless reach its own conclusion upon the evidence and the applicable legal principles. The fact that the parties are agreed cannot dispense with the Court's obligation to be satisfied that the declarations sought accurately reflect the true legal position.
Having heard full argument I granted the declarations sought and gave a short oral judgment. I listed a further hearing to determine the remaining matters and directed disclosure against a non-party. In light of the further hearing it is helpful for the parties to have written reasons on the validity of the settlements.
The Evidence
The evidence before the Court comprised: the first witness statement of Stuart McLuckie, a director of the Claimant, dated 24 March 2025, together with exhibit SM1; the witness statement of Douglas John Houghton, the Defendant’s litigation friend and deputy, dated 22 August 2025, together with exhibit DJH1; and the second witness statement of Stuart McLuckie dated 31 October 2025, together with exhibit SM2. I have also had regard to the documentary material exhibited to those statements and contained in the hearing bundle.
Mr McLuckie’s first statement sets out the constitution and terms of the six purported settlements and the associated loan agreements, the history of Mr Tustain’s receivership and deputyship, the circumstances in which concerns arose as to the validity of the settlements, and the subsequent correspondence concerning their status. Mr Houghton’s evidence addresses Mr Tustain’s capacity and the history of the Court of Protection appointments and orders; it also sets out the position of the current deputies that the settlements were created outside Mr Yeadon’s authority and are void ab initio. Mr McLuckie’s second statement responds to that evidence and principally addresses the additional and consequential relief sought by the Claimant. The parties are agreed on the matters relevant to the validity of the settlements, including that Mr Yeadon lacked authority to create them and that they are void ab initio.
The Factual Background
The Defendant, Graham David Tustain, was born on 18 April 1963. In approximately 1984, when he was 21 years old, he was involved in a serious road traffic accident in which he sustained a traumatic brain injury together with multiple orthopaedic injuries. He required prolonged hospitalisation and rehabilitation and has since lived with cognitive impairment and physical disability.
Following the accident, damages were recovered on his behalf. Because of his inability to manage his own financial affairs, the Court's protective jurisdiction was engaged at an early stage. By order dated 16 August 1991, David Stuart Millard of Aplins was appointed as receiver. Upon Mr Millard's retirement, Nigel John Yeadon, also of Aplins, was appointed receiver by order dated 26 August 1993.
Mr Yeadon's powers as receiver were subsequently expanded by an Extended General Order made on 14 March 2006. That order authorised him to manage Mr Tustain's affairs generally for the purposes of the then Mental Health Act regime. The order contained express limitations. Amongst the matters reserved to the Court was the execution of any settlement on Mr Tustain's behalf. The order specifically provided that the receiver was not authorised to execute a settlement for the patient unless expressly authorised by further order of the Court.
Upon the coming into force of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Mr Yeadon became Mr Tustain's deputy for property and affairs by operation of Schedule 5. Thereafter, in January 2011, against the background of a substantial change in Mr Tustain's financial position, Mr Yeadon made a fresh application to the Court of Protection seeking additional authority.
In 2010, Mr Tustain won approximately £4.4 million on the National Lottery. As a result, the scale of his estate altered dramatically. Documentation prepared for the Court of Protection showed available assets of approximately £4.7 million and contemplated a range of investment and estate-planning arrangements.
The material lodged in support of the 2011 application included proposals for gifts to family members, the purchase of residential property for Mr Tustain and extensive investment planning. Advice was obtained from Barclays Wealth. Their recommendations included investments through AIM and EIS structures, an offshore investment bond and a discounted gift trust intended to mitigate inheritance tax exposure.
The application proceeded through a number of stages. Orders were made on 4 February 2011 and 6 May 2011 requiring further information. Mr Yeadon filed witness statements addressing those requirements. Medical evidence was also provided by Dr Kumar, who confirmed that Mr Tustain's cognitive condition was permanent and that no medical treatment could restore his mental functioning.
Ultimately, on 5 July 2011, the Court of Protection appointed Mr Yeadon as deputy for property and affairs. The order granted general authority in relation to Mr Tustain’s property and affairs, authorised the purchase of a bungalow and permitted certain limited gifts and the appointment of investment managers. The authority conferred by the order related to those matters.
On 7 October 2011, the Court of Protection made a further order authorising gifts of £50,000 to each of Mr Tustain’s seven siblings. The authority granted by that order was confined to those gifts.
Against that background, six trust instruments were executed between November and December 2011. Five were established as gift and loan discretionary settlements. The sixth was established as a discretionary settlement. In each case the settlement instrument identified Mr Tustain, acting through Mr Yeadon as Court of Protection deputy, as the settlor. The original trustees were Barclays Bank Trust Company Limited, Mr Yeadon and a colleague at his firm, Philip James Waters.
The beneficiary structure adopted by each settlement was substantially identical. The primary beneficiaries were Mr Tustain's siblings and their children. The secondary beneficiaries were the remoter issue of those family members. Mr Tustain himself was expressly excluded from the beneficial class. The settlements were therefore designed to benefit members of Mr Tustain's wider family and not Mr Tustain personally.
The financial arrangements implemented through the settlements were substantial. Loan agreements were entered into between Mr Tustain, acting by Mr Yeadon, and the trustees. Pursuant to those agreements, the trustees borrowed £523,000, £524,000, £525,000, £528,000 and £675,000 respectively in relation to the five gift and loan settlements. The loans were unsecured and interest-free. The total originally advanced exceeded £2.7 million.
For the next several years the Trusts were administered upon the assumption that they had been validly constituted. Assets were invested, trustee remuneration was paid, tax returns were filed and distributions were made to beneficiaries. In February 2019 distributions of £10,000 were made to each of Mr Tustain's seven siblings. Further distributions of £9,000 were made to each sibling in February 2020. The total distributions amounted to £133,000.
The evidence demonstrates that the trustees did not appreciate, at the time the settlements were created, that there might be any issue concerning Mr Yeadon's authority. According to Mr McLuckie's evidence, Barclays understood that Mr Yeadon was approaching the Court of Protection for approval and there was nothing in the records available to the Claimant suggesting that Barclays was ever informed that the necessary approval had not been obtained. Given that Mr Yeadon was both a practising solicitor and the Court-appointed deputy, Barclays appears to have proceeded on the assumption that he possessed the requisite authority.
Matters changed in late 2020. During internal consideration of trustee retirement and restructuring arrangements, concerns emerged regarding the circumstances in which the Trusts had originally been created. Investigation revealed that no Court of Protection order approving the settlements had ever been obtained. That discovery gave rise to the present proceedings.
The ensuing correspondence lasted several years. The Claimant asserted from the outset that the settlements were likely void ab initio. Aplins eventually accepted that Mr Yeadon had not possessed sufficient authority to create the Trusts and that the 2011 Court of Protection order did not confer such authority. Although different proposals were advanced as to how the matter should be regularised, the central premise that the settlements had been created without authority ultimately ceased to be controversial.
In the meantime, Mr Yeadon was replaced as deputy by Robert Henshaw in 2019. In 2025, Mr Henshaw was in turn replaced by Douglas Houghton and Donna Holmes, who remain Mr Tustain's deputies. Independent psychiatric evidence obtained from Dr Sachdev in October 2022 confirmed that Mr Tustain lacked capacity to manage his property and financial affairs and that there was no prospect of him regaining that capacity. Mr Houghton's evidence confirms that nothing observed by him since his appointment causes him to doubt that conclusion.
The Law
The validity of the six settlements falls to be determined against the framework established by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (“the MCA 2005”). The Act prescribes the mechanisms through which decisions may be taken on behalf of adults who lack capacity and defines the authority conferred upon those entrusted with responsibility for their affairs. The settlements were purportedly created on behalf of a person who lacked capacity by an individual acting as his deputy. Whether those settlements acquired legal effect therefore depends upon the allocation of authority effected by the statute.
The MCA 2005 replaced the earlier statutory regime which had operated under the Mental Health Act 1983 and integrated the Court of Protection's protective jurisdiction into a new statutory framework. Whilst the legislative machinery changed, the underlying objective remained the same. The property and affairs of a person unable to manage them personally are placed under a regime of legal protection designed to ensure that significant decisions affecting that person's welfare and property are taken lawfully and in that person’s best interests.
Section 16 of the MCA 2005 provides that,
“16(1) This section applies if a person (“P”) lacks capacity in relation to a matter or matters concerning—”
(a) P's personal welfare, or
(b) P's property and affairs.
(2)The court may—
(a) by making an order, make the decision or decisions on P's behalf in relation to the matter or matters, or
(b) appoint a person (a “deputy”) to make decisions on P's behalf in relation to the matter or matters.
The jurisdiction conferred by s 16 may be exercised by the Court making the relevant decision on P’s behalf or by appointing a deputy to make decisions on P’s behalf. In the latter case, the deputy derives their authority from the Act and the order of appointment, which together define its scope.
The appointment of a deputy leaves P’s legal capacity distinct from the authority vested in the deputy. That authority is to make decisions on P’s behalf within the scope of the appointment, while jurisdiction remains with the Court of Protection. The nature and extent of the deputy’s powers therefore fall to be determined by reference to the statutory scheme and the terms of the order.
Section 18 of the MCA 2005 provides that,
“18(1) The powers under section 16 as respects P's property and affairs extend in particular to—”
(a) the control and management of P's property;
(b) the sale, exchange, charging, gift or other disposition of P's property;
(c) the acquisition of property in P's name or on P's behalf;
…
(h) the settlement of any of P's property, whether for P's benefit or for the benefit of others;”
Section 18 defines the scope of the powers available under s 16 in relation to P’s property and affairs. Those powers extend to the management, acquisition and disposition of property and, expressly by s 18(1)(h), to the settlement of any of P’s property, whether for P’s benefit or for the benefit of others. A settlement may alter the beneficial interests in P’s property and confer benefits upon persons other than P, both of which are expressly contemplated by s 18(1)(h). The power to effect such a settlement forms part of the statutory jurisdiction conferred upon the Court.
Section 19 of the MCA 2005 provides that,
“(6) A deputy is to be treated as P's agent in relation to anything done or decided by him within the scope of his appointment and in accordance with this Part.”
The subsection gives the deputy the status of P’s agent in respect of acts and decisions falling within the scope of the appointment and made in accordance with the Act. The terms of the appointment accordingly define the authority which the deputy may exercise on P’s behalf.
Section 20 of the MCA 2005 provides that,
“(3) A deputy may not be given powers with respect to—
(a) the settlement of any of P's property, whether for P's benefit or for the benefit of others,
(b) the execution for P of a will, or
(c) the exercise of any power (including a power to consent) vested in P whether beneficially or as trustee or otherwise.”
Section 20(3) defines the boundary between the powers exercisable by the Court and those capable of being conferred upon a deputy. The settlement of any of P’s property falls within the former category. Read with s 18(1)(h), the statutory scheme places the exercise of the power to settle P’s property within the jurisdiction of the Court.
The effect of ss 18 to 20 is to allocate authority between the Court and a deputy in relation to P’s property and affairs. A deputy may exercise the powers conferred by the order of appointment within the limits prescribed by the Act. The settlement of P’s property, whether for P’s benefit or for the benefit of others, is reserved by s 20(3)(a) to the Court.
Application of the MCA 2005 to the Factual Matrix
At the time the six settlements were executed, Mr Tustain lacked capacity to manage his property and affairs, as he had for many years. His property and affairs were being administered by Mr Yeadon as his deputy. The settlements involved the transfer of substantial assets into discretionary trust structures for the benefit of members of Mr Tustain’s family. Their validity depended upon the existence of the authority required by the statutory scheme.
The relevant authority falls to be considered against the course of the proceedings before the Court of Protection during 2011. The application made by Mr Yeadon concerned a range of proposals arising from the substantial increase in Mr Tustain’s assets following his lottery win. They included gifts to members of his family, the acquisition of property and investment and estate-planning arrangements. Trust-based planning formed part of those proposals, including a discounted gift trust.
The Court of Protection made its order on 5 July 2011. It appointed Mr Yeadon as deputy for Mr Tustain’s property and affairs and conferred general authority upon him in that capacity, together with authority in relation to specified matters, including the appointment of investment managers. The order referred to a discounted gift trust. The authority conferred by the order is to be understood in the context of the proposals which had by then been placed before the Court.
The investment planning subsequently developed in a different form. The arrangements ultimately implemented comprised five gift-and-loan discretionary settlements and a sixth discretionary settlement. A discounted gift trust and a gift-and-loan trust are materially different structures. The latter involved Mr Tustain settling property upon trusts from which he was excluded as a beneficiary, followed in five cases by substantial loans to the trustees. The beneficiaries were members of Mr Tustain’s family.
The revised arrangements engaged the Court’s jurisdiction under s 18(1)(h). The authority to settle Mr Tustain’s property lay with the Court and was reserved to it by s 20(3)(a). Implementation of the discretionary settlements therefore required a further application to the Court for the exercise of that jurisdiction.
Mr Yeadon proceeded with the revised arrangements without making that application. The six settlement deeds were executed between 10 November and 1 December 2011 without an order of the Court authorising their creation.
The order made on 7 October 2011 forms part of the same chronology. The Court expressly authorised gifts of £50,000 to each of Mr Tustain’s seven siblings. That order was followed within weeks by the execution of the six settlements. The settlements required the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction under s 18(1)(h), and no further order exercising that jurisdiction was obtained.
The six settlements were accordingly created without the authority required by ss 18 and 20 of the MCA 2005. Mr Tustain lacked capacity to establish them personally; the statutory power to settle his property lay with the Court; and the Court made no order authorising the settlements ultimately executed.
Mr McLuckie's evidence indicates that Barclays proceeded on the understanding that Court approval would be obtained. Mr Yeadon was both a practising solicitor and the Court-appointed deputy responsible for making the application.
Equally, there is no suggestion that the trustees acted otherwise than in good faith. For many years they administered the settlements upon the basis that they had been validly established. They received professional advice, filed tax returns, managed investments and made distributions to beneficiaries in accordance with the terms of the trust instruments.
The settlements nevertheless identified Mr Tustain, acting by Mr Yeadon as deputy, as the settlor. The legal effectiveness of that designation depends upon the existence of lawful authority enabling Mr Yeadon to bring the settlements into existence on Mr Tustain's behalf.
The statutory scheme identifies the Court as the source of the authority required to settle Mr Tustain’s property. Section 18(1)(h) conferred the relevant jurisdiction upon the Court and s 20(3)(a) reserved its exercise to the Court. No order exercised that jurisdiction in relation to the six settlements. Mr Yeadon’s appointment as deputy supplied no authority to establish them.
The same reasoning applies to each of the six settlements. Although their financial structure differed in certain respects, the legal foundation upon which they were created was identical. In each case the purported settlor was Mr Tustain acting through Mr Yeadon as deputy. In each case the validity of the disposition depended upon authority derived from the Court of Protection. In each case no such authority existed.
Having concluded that the six settlements were created without the authority required by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, it is necessary to determine the legal consequence of that defect. The parties submit that the settlements were void ab initio. In my judgment that submission is correct.
The conclusion is reached by analysing the nature of the authority required for the creation of the settlements and the role played by that authority within the statutory scheme. The distinction between void and voidable transactions is ultimately directed to the legal effect of the defect affecting the transaction. Some defects arise after a valid source of authority has been established and affect the manner in which a power has been exercised. Other defects concern the existence of the authority itself. The present case lies within the latter category.
The statutory framework examined in the preceding section identifies settlements of the property of a protected person as a matter reserved to the Court of Protection. Parliament recognised that such transactions may properly be undertaken on behalf of a person lacking capacity, but it identified the Court as the body responsible for determining whether such a disposition should occur and, if so, upon what terms.
The Court's involvement is therefore not merely supervisory. The Court's approval supplies the authority which permits the disposition to occur. The statutory scheme contemplates that the settlement derives its legal foundation from that approval.
In the present case the six trust deeds purported to effect immediate dispositions of substantial assets. Their efficacy depended upon the existence of authority enabling those dispositions to be made on behalf of Mr Tustain. The evidence establishes that such authority never existed.
The authorities support that analysis. In Re Beaney [1978] 1 WLR 770, Martin Nourse QC held that a person whose property was subject to the Court of Protection regime could not make a valid inter vivos disposition of that property, observing at 772G that “a patient cannot, even during a lucid interval, make a valid disposition of his property inter vivos, since that would raise a conflict with the court’s control of his affairs.” The disposition was therefore ineffective because the authority required to make it was absent.
The same approach is reflected in Williams v Williams [2003] EWHC 742 (Ch) at [55], upon which the Claimant relies, and in Lewin on Trusts, 20th ed., para 2-008. Lewin treats a lifetime settlement made by a person whose property is subject to the Court’s control as void where the disposition is inconsistent with that control. The principle concerns the authority by which the disposition is made and therefore its legal foundation.
Each of the six deeds nevertheless purported to effect an immediate disposition of Mr Tustain’s property through Mr Yeadon acting as deputy. The legal efficacy of those dispositions depended upon the existence of the authority prescribed by the MCA 2005. That authority was reserved to the Court and had not been exercised in relation to the six settlements.
The trustees acted for many years upon the assumption that the settlements were effective. Professional advisers appear to have proceeded on the same basis.
Those activities assumed the existence of valid trusts. They did not create the authority which the statutory scheme required at the outset. The validity of a trust must be assessed at the point of its creation. The subsequent conduct of trustees and beneficiaries cannot retrospectively supply authority which did not exist when the settlement was executed.
The same conclusion follows from the structure of the trust instruments themselves. Each deed purported to create immediate proprietary consequences. Each proceeded upon the footing that assets had been effectively settled by a person acting with lawful authority. The proprietary consequences contemplated by the instruments depended upon the existence of that authority.
Examining the matter as a whole, the defect affecting these transactions lies at their foundation. The settlements depended upon authority reserved by statute to the Court of Protection. The Court never conferred that authority. The deputy possessed no authority of his own to effect the dispositions. The trust deeds therefore lacked the legal foundation necessary to bring the settlements into existence.
I therefore conclude that the six settlements did not acquire legal effect when executed. The dispositions which they purported to record were ineffective from the outset. The settlements were void ab initio and not merely voidable.
It follows that the property purportedly transferred into the settlements never became subject to valid trust structures constituted by those deeds.
The consequences for the property purportedly transferred into the settlements remain to be considered. The declarations sought by the Claimant proceed upon the basis that the trust property is held upon bare resulting trust for Mr Tustain. In my judgment that conclusion follows from orthodox principles of trust law.
The settlements purported to transfer substantial assets into discretionary trust structures. Those dispositions were intended to alter the beneficial ownership of the property and place it under the trusts declared by the settlement deeds. The efficacy of those dispositions depended upon the validity of the settlements themselves.
Since the settlements never acquired legal effect, the beneficial consequences contemplated by the trust instruments never arose. The trusts were incapable of governing the equitable ownership of the property because the transactions upon which they depended were ineffective from the outset.
Equity therefore examines the position of the property independently of the invalid settlements and asks where beneficial ownership lies.
Where an intended disposition of property is ineffective, beneficial ownership remains with the transferor or the person otherwise beneficially entitled to the property. The recipient accordingly holds the property upon resulting trust for that person.
In the present case the assets originated from property beneficially owned by Mr Tustain. The settlement instruments were intended to transfer beneficial ownership into discretionary trust structures. Those structures never acquired legal effect. Beneficial ownership accordingly remained with Mr Tustain.
During the years which followed execution of the trust instruments, the trustees acquired powers over assets which they believed constituted trust property. Legal title was vested in them and they administered the property upon that footing. Those facts do not determine beneficial ownership. The equitable analysis depends upon the effectiveness of the transactions by which beneficial ownership was said to have been transferred.
Since those transactions were void ab initio, the beneficial interest remained where it had always been. The trustees therefore held the assets which came into their hands upon resulting trust for Mr Tustain.
The resulting trust arose by operation of law. It did not depend upon any intention of the parties and did not require any election by Mr Tustain, his deputies or the Court.
In my judgment the declarations sought in paragraph 2 of the order accurately reflect that analysis. The assets purportedly settled upon the six trusts are now held by the Claimant upon bare resulting trust for Mr Tustain.
The conclusion reached in relation to the settlements also requires consideration of the associated loan agreements.
Five of the six settlements were accompanied by loan arrangements under which substantial sums were advanced by Mr Tustain, acting through Mr Yeadon, to the trustees of the relevant settlements. The loans were unsecured and interest-free and formed part of the estate-planning arrangements implemented in late 2011.
The validity of the loan agreements depended upon the authority conferred upon Mr Yeadon as deputy. The loans fell outside the investment powers conferred upon him and the authority granted by the Court in relation to gifts. They transferred substantial sums for the purposes of settlements from which Mr Tustain was excluded as a beneficiary. The Court made no order authorising those transactions.
The loan agreements were accordingly entered into without authority on Mr Tustain’s behalf and were void ab initio.
Conclusions
For the reasons given above, I conclude that the six settlements executed between 10 November and 1 December 2011 were created without the authority required by the MCA 2005. The power to settle Mr Tustain’s property lay with the Court of Protection and no order was made authorising the settlements. They therefore lacked the legal foundation required for their creation and were void ab initio.
The associated loan agreements formed part of the same arrangements and were likewise void ab initio. The purported dispositions under the settlements were ineffective, with the result that beneficial ownership of the property remained with Mr Tustain. The Claimant accordingly holds the property upon bare resulting trust for Mr Tustain.
The declarations were made as sought as to the settlements, the loan agreements and the beneficial ownership of the property.