ZEDRA TRUST COMPANY (UK) LIMITED v GRAHAM DAVID TUSTAIN

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWHC 2576 (BP)

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ZEDRA TRUST COMPANY (UK) LIMITED v GRAHAM DAVID TUSTAIN

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWHC 2576 (BP)

Zedra v Tustain: section 61

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2576 (BP)
Case No: PT 2025 000308
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION

PROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE

Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building

Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL

Date: 09/10/2026

Before :

CHIEF MASTER SHUMAN

Between :

ZEDRA TRUST COMPANY (UK) LIMITED

Claimant

- and -

GRAHAM DAVID TUSTAIN

(acting through his litigation friend and Deputies, Douglas John Houghton and Donna Holmes)

Defendant

Mark Baxter (instructed by Forsters LLP) for the Claimant

Owen Curry (instructed by Anthony CollinsSolicitors) for the Defendant

Hearing dates: 30 September and 9 October 2026

JUDGMENT

CHIEF MASTER SHUMAN:

1.

At an earlier hearing I concluded that the six purported discretionary settlements established between November and December 2011 were void ab initio. I further concluded that the associated loan arrangements formed part of the same ineffective structures and were likewise void ab initio. The consequence was that the assets purportedly settled remained beneficially owned by Mr Tustain and are presently held by the Claimant upon bare resulting trust for him.

2.

I reserved a number of consequential issues for further consideration. Those issues comprise the Claimant's application for relief under section 61 of the Trustee Act 1925, its entitlement to remuneration in respect of the administration of the assets, its entitlement to future remuneration and expenses incurred in implementing the court's orders and bringing the administration of the assets to an orderly conclusion and the appropriate order as to costs.

3.

Those issues arise from the conclusions reached in the earlier judgment and require separate consideration. The Claimant and its predecessors administered substantial assets over a period of approximately fifteen years upon the footing that the trusts were valid. The court must determine the consequences of that administration now that the legal basis upon which it proceeded has been found to have been absent from the outset.

4.

The Claimant seeks relief under section 61 together with consequential orders concerning remuneration, indemnity and costs. The Defendant opposes those applications for the purposes of this hearing. The principal dispute concerns whether a professional trustee which administered the assets on the footing that the settlements were valid acted reasonably and ought fairly to be excused for the liabilities which now arise from their invalidity.

5.

At an early stage of the application I was concerned that the court should receive the benefit of full adversarial argument on all matters arising from the section 61 application. The court was being asked to relieve a professional trustee from personal liability arising from settlements subsequently held to have been void from the outset. In those circumstances I directed that the Defendant should advance the arguments opposed to the relief sought. Those arguments included the responsibilities of a professional trustee, the significance of the Court of Protection order dated 5 July 2011 and the extent to which Barclays Wealth ought itself to have examined the scope of the deputy's powers.

6.

The arguments advanced on behalf of the Defendant enabled the evidence and the Claimant's application to be fully tested. The conclusions which follow have been reached after detailed submissions on both sides of the issues before the court.

7.

I am very grateful to Mr Baxter and Mr Curry for their full and skilful arguments.

8.

There is no allegation that the Claimant acted dishonestly, and I am satisfied on the evidence that it acted honestly. The issues which require determination are whether the Claimant acted reasonably and whether, having regard to all the circumstances, it ought fairly to be excused. Those questions must be considered against the legal framework governing section 61.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

9.

Graham Tustain was born on 18 April 1963. He has lacked capacity to manage his property and affairs since sustaining a serious brain injury in a road traffic accident in 1984. His affairs have accordingly been managed through the court's protective jurisdiction for many years. In 2010 he won approximately £4.4 million on the National Lottery, substantially increasing the size of his estate under management.

10.

On 17 January 2011 Mr Yeadon, then acting as Mr Tustain’s deputy for property and affairs, made an application to the Court of Protection concerning gifts, property acquisition and the investment and estate-planning arrangements proposed for Mr Tustain. Trust-based planning formed part of those proposals, including a discounted gift trust. The application did not seek authority to establish the six settlements ultimately executed, and none of the resulting orders conferred such authority. During the same period Mr Yeadon engaged with Barclays Wealth concerning the investment and financial planning of Mr Tustain’s assets.

11.

Between 10 November 2011 and 1 December 2011 six trust structures were established and substantial sums were advanced to them under associated loan arrangements. The trustees were Mr Yeadon, Mr Waters, his colleague at Aplins, and Barclays Bank Trust Company Limited, now the Claimant.

12.

In my earlier judgment I concluded that the settlements and associated loan arrangements were void ab initio because the authority required for their creation had never been obtained from the Court of Protection. The assets therefore remained beneficially owned by Mr Tustain and are held by the Claimant upon resulting trust for him.

THE LAW

13.

Section 61 of the Trustee Act 1925 provides that,

“If it appears to the court that a trustee, whether appointed by the court or otherwise, is or may be personally liable for any breach of trust, whether the transaction alleged to be a breach of trust occurred before or after the commencement of this Act, but has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court in the matter in which he committed such breach, then the court may relieve him either wholly or partly from personal liability for the same.”

14.

This is a discretionary power and the jurisdiction proceeds upon the footing that liability either exists or may exist. The function of the section is to determine whether relief should nevertheless be granted.

15.

Parliament expressed honesty, reasonableness and fairness as separate requirements. Honesty concerns the trustee’s state of mind. Reasonableness requires an objective assessment of the course adopted. The requirement that the trustee ought fairly to be excused directs attention to the surrounding circumstances and the justice of imposing personal liability. Each requirement must therefore be considered.

16.

The purpose and operation of the jurisdiction were considered in Re Turner [1897] 1 Ch 536 and Re Grindey [1898] 2 Ch 593. In Re Turner, Byrne J said at page 542,

“I think that the section relied on is meant to be acted upon freely and fairly in the exercise of judicial discretion, but I think that the Court ought to be satisfied, before exercising the very large powers conferred upon it, by sufficient evidence, that the trustee acted reasonably.”

17.

At 542,

“I think that if he was — and he well may have been—a businesslike man, he would not, before lending his money, have been satisfied without some further inquiry as to the means of the mortgagor and as to the nature and value of the property upon which he was about to advance his money.”

The application failed.

18.

Re Grindey illustrates the application of the jurisdiction in different circumstances. The trustees had allowed a debt due to the testator to remain outstanding in circumstances where the debtor appeared to be in good credit. The Court of Appeal upheld the grant of relief. Lindley MR explained that the provision had been enacted for the protection of honest trustees who had acted reasonably, and Chitty LJ cautioned against a narrow construction which would deprive the jurisdiction of practical utility. The contrast between the two decisions demonstrates the factual nature of the assessment. The court examines the decision taken, the information available and the care which the trustee brought to the matter.

19.

The requirement of reasonableness introduces an objective standard. Re Turner expressed that standard by asking whether the trustee had acted with the care he would probably have exercised had the transaction concerned his own property.

20.

In Nationwide Building Society v Davisons Solicitors [2013] WTLR 393 the Court of Appeal emphasised that section 61 requires reasonableness rather than perfection. At page 411 para 48 the Chancellor said,

“The section only requires Mr Wilkes to have acted reasonably. That does not, in my view, predicate that he has necessarily complied with best practice in all respects. The relevant action must at least be connected with the loss for which relief is sought and the requisite standard is that of reasonableness not of perfection.”

21.

The same approach was adopted by Briggs LJ, as he then was, in Santander UK PLC v RA Legal Solicitors [2014] EWCA Civ 183 at para 30,

“ An important issue in the present case relates to the standard to be applied to conduct connected with the loss. I have referred to the former Chancellor’s summary in the Davisons case, at paragraph 48, as that of reasonableness not of perfection. It is well-established that the standard is likely to be higher for a paid than for an unpaid trustee: see Lewin on Trusts (18th ed.) at paragraph 39-145.”

22.

At [34], Briggs LJ added:

“Relief under section 61 is often described as an exercise of mercy by the court. In my judgment the requirement to balance fairness to the trustee with a proper appreciation of the consequences of the exercise of the discretion for the beneficiaries means that this old-fashioned description of the nature of the section 61 jurisdiction should be abandoned. In this context mercy lies not in the free gift of the court. It comes at a price.”

23.

The nature of the breach also informs this assessment. In Perrins v Bellamy [1899] 1 Ch 797 the difficulty arose from the absence of a power which the trustee believed was available. They assumed they had a power of sale and sold leaseholds comprised in the settlement, thereby reducing the income of the plaintiff who was tenant for life. The Court of Appeal accepted, on the facts of that case, that trustees could have acted reasonably where the breach arose from the absence of a power which they justifiably believed themselves to possess.

24.

Honesty and reasonableness remain cumulative requirements. The trustee bears the burden of establishing both. Section 61 then requires the court to decide whether the trustee ought fairly to be excused. In National Trustees Company of Australasia Ltd v General Finance Company of Australasia Ltd [1905] AC 373, the Privy Council treated that language as an additional statutory condition. The source and character of the breach, the trustee’s part in the events, the consequences for the trust property and beneficiaries, and the justice of imposing personal liability are all relevant to that assessment.

25.

The wider circumstances may include the quality of the administration and the consequences of the breach. In Daniel v Tee [2016] 4 WLR 115 the court considered the trustees’ efforts in administering the estate, the benefit which their work had produced and the harm attributable to the breaches. Those matters assist the court in applying the statutory conditions to the facts before it.

PROFESSIONAL TRUSTEES

26.

The Claimant is a professional trust corporation which acted for remuneration. Its conduct falls to be assessed by reference to the skill and care reasonably expected of a professional trustee performing the functions which it undertook. Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd [1980] 2 WLR 430, which Mr Curry emphasised to me in his submissions, arose in a different factual setting but illustrates the standard applicable where a trust corporation offers professional expertise. The character and limits of the engagement remain part of the section 61 assessment.

27.

Lewin on Trusts at 41-154 observes that where a trustee acts for reward a stronger case for relief will generally be required. The observation reflects the degree of scrutiny that may properly be applied to the conduct of a professional trustee. The statutory requirements remain those contained in section 61.

THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 61

28.

Barclays Wealth participated in the financial planning, recommended trust-based arrangements and offered professional trustee services. Its role extended into the development and implementation of the arrangements. The legal defect identified in the earlier judgment concerned the statutory powers of Mr Tustain’s deputy. The assessment of Barclays Wealth’s conduct therefore requires consideration both of its own involvement and of the functions undertaken by Mr Yeadon as deputy and solicitor.

Reasonableness

29.

The Defendant’s case focuses upon the part played by Barclays Wealth in the events of 2010 and 2011. The documentary record shows that it discussed the restrictions contained in the existing Court order, made enquiries concerning investment powers, recommended trust-based arrangements and offered professional trustee services. The Wealth Advisory Report recognised that the Court of Protection might restrict the financial solutions available to Mr Tustain. Barclays Wealth therefore understood that the planning depended upon the powers available under the Court of Protection regime.

30.

The same record identifies the functions undertaken by Mr Yeadon. He was Mr Tustain’s deputy and the solicitor conducting the Court of Protection proceedings. He determined the form of the application, supplied the material requested by the court and obtained the order of 5 July 2011. Mr Yeadon and Mr Waters subsequently communicated the decision to proceed with the arrangements in October 2011. The identification and procurement of the judicial authority required for dispositions of Mr Tustain’s property fell within the work undertaken by Mr Yeadon.

31.

Those responsibilities carried particular weight in the present case. Mr Yeadon acted under an appointment made for the protection of a person who lacked capacity to manage his own property and affairs. The statutory limitations upon his authority formed part of the framework within which that office was exercised. He was also the solicitor conducting the proceedings through which the necessary authority was to be obtained. The proposed settlements involved substantial dispositions of Mr Tustain’s property for the benefit of members of his family and excluded Mr Tustain from the beneficial class. Responsibility for identifying the approval required for transactions of that nature, placing the proposals before the Court of Protection and ensuring that the resulting order authorised their implementation rested principally with Mr Yeadon.

32.

Some of the earlier correspondence records Barclays Wealth making enquiries about investment powers and expressing views about the operation of the existing order. That involvement forms part of the assessment. It demonstrates familiarity with the existence of restrictions and with the need for authority. The enquiries recorded in December 2010 were directed to the power to invest Mr Tustain’s funds. The legal point which later determined the validity of the settlements concerned the separate statutory treatment of a settlement of property.

33.

The evidence distinguishes between the investment and Court of Protection services provided through Barclays Wealth and the corporate trustee which accepted appointment. Financial advice, trust-based planning and professional trustee services nevertheless formed parts of the arrangements presented to those responsible for Mr Tustain’s affairs. The knowledge recorded in the contemporaneous documents forms part of the assessment of the corporate trustee’s conduct, while the allocation of functions bears upon the responsibility which it assumed.

34.

The order of 5 July 2011 was sent to Barclays Wealth. It arose from an application in which trust-based planning had been placed before the Court of Protection and referred to a discounted gift trust. The order gave no express authority for the creation of the six settlements eventually executed. The order must be read in the setting in which it was received. It followed an application made by the deputy and solicitor responsible for obtaining authority, and trust-based planning had formed part of the proposals placed before the Court of Protection. The order contained no direction requiring a further application before trust arrangements could be implemented and no indication that an element of the proposed planning remained to be approved. That combination of the order’s terms, its provenance and the professional responsibilities undertaken by Mr Yeadon was capable of supporting the understanding that the Court of Protection process had supplied the authority required for implementation.

35.

The chronology following the July 2011 order is also relevant. The order reflected the application that had been placed before the Court of Protection and the proposals considered by it. The trust structures ultimately implemented between November and December 2011 emerged later. They formed no part of the authority granted by the order. The arrangements eventually adopted therefore extended beyond the matters which the Court of Protection had been asked to consider. No further application was made before the settlements were executed.

36.

The deficiency identified in the earlier judgment emerges from sections 18 and 20 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Section 18(1)(h) identifies settlement of property as a transaction within the powers of the Court of Protection. Section 20(3)(a) prevented that power from being delegated to a deputy. The validity of the settlements therefore depended upon the court itself having granted the requisite authority.

37.

The contemporaneous documents reveal that those involved approached the settlements as part of the investment and estate-planning arrangements for Mr Tustain. They did not identify the separate statutory treatment of the settlement of property. That common approach explains why the reference to a discounted gift trust within the July order was understood as consistent with implementation of trust-based planning, although the order contained no authority for the six settlements eventually selected.

38.

Barclays Wealth had received the July order, knew that Mr Tustain’s incapacity engaged the Court of Protection regime and understood that the available powers affected the financial arrangements which could be implemented. It also had access to specialist advice if further consideration of the statutory position was required. Those matters formed part of the information available when the settlements were established.

39.

The course adopted must be assessed in the professional setting in which those matters arose. The deputy and solicitor responsible for obtaining authority had made the application, obtained the order and supplied it within a process which included trust-based planning. The order raised no express requirement for a further application. Mr Yeadon instructed implementation and executed the instruments without communicating that approval for the settlements had not been obtained.

40.

The evidence therefore shows consideration of the Court of Protection restrictions and a mistaken understanding of the effect of the authority obtained. The statutory distinction which later proved decisive was missed by Barclays Wealth, Mr Yeadon and the other professionals involved. The mistake occurred within an allocation of functions under which Mr Yeadon was responsible for the Court of Protection process and Barclays Wealth provided financial planning and trustee services.

41.

Professional status required Barclays Wealth to consider the legal basis upon which the arrangements could proceed. The evidence establishes that it did so by reference to the order and the Court of Protection process conducted by Mr Yeadon. The order appeared to form part of a process in which trust-based planning had already been considered by the Court of Protection. Its terms and provenance, the responsibilities undertaken by Mr Yeadon and the shared understanding of the professionals involved satisfy me that the conduct of Barclays Wealth remained within the range reasonably open to a professional trustee.

42.

I am therefore satisfied that the Claimant acted reasonably within section 61. The finding relates to the error concerning the legal basis upon which the settlements and subsequent administration proceeded.

Whether the Claimant ought fairly to be excused

43.

The fairness requirement directs attention to the origin of the liability, the Claimant’s involvement in the events which produced it, the administration undertaken thereafter and the consequences for Mr Tustain’s property.

44.

The liability derives from the absence of Court of Protection approval when the settlements were executed. The instruments were professionally prepared and executed in accordance with the intentions of those involved. The trustees then administered the assets upon the understanding that the instruments governed their powers and the beneficial ownership of the property.

45.

The Claimant participated in creating and implementing that structure. Its involvement has been reflected in the scrutiny applied to the reasonableness of its conduct. Mr Yeadon’s position also remains relevant. He held the office from which the relevant authority was expected to derive, conducted the Court of Protection application and executed the instruments on Mr Tustain’s behalf.

46.

The administration continued for many years upon the shared understanding that valid settlements existed. Investments were managed, accounts and records maintained, taxation liabilities addressed and distributions made. The legal defect existed at the inception of the arrangements. The later acts of administration reflected the powers and duties which the Claimant believed followed from the instruments.

47.

The consequences of those acts differ. Expenditure incurred in managing, preserving and administering Mr Tustain’s property provided services to assets which required professional stewardship. The distributions of £133,000 to Mr Tustain’s siblings transferred value to persons who possessed no beneficial entitlement under the resulting trust. Liabilities discharged from the assets may also require examination by reference to whether they represented liabilities properly attributable to Mr Tustain’s property. Those differences affect the potential content of any claim but arose from the same underlying mistake concerning the legal basis of the administration.

48.

The quality and consequences of the administration bear upon the exercise of the discretion. Daniel v Tee confirms the relevance of the trustee’s efforts in administering the property, the benefit provided and the harm attributable to the breach. The evidence here shows continuing management and preservation of substantial assets. The distributions had the practical effect of transferring value from Mr Tustain’s property, although they were made honestly and reasonably in the purported exercise of powers which the trustees believed to be valid.

49.

The Claimant’s conduct after the defect emerged also forms part of the assessment. Concerns arose during consideration of trustee retirement and restructuring. The Claimant investigated the position, obtained advice and ultimately brought the legal status of the arrangements before the court. These proceedings identified the defect and established the basis upon which the assets are now held.

50.

The section 61 application covers potential liabilities arising from remuneration and expenses charged to the assets, liabilities discharged and distributions made to the recipient beneficiaries. Each category was affected by the invalidity of the settlements. The evidence satisfies me that the Claimant undertook those acts upon the same honestly and reasonably held understanding of its powers.

51.

The order should define the relief by reference to those identified categories of administration. It should relieve the Claimant from personal liability arising from the invalidity of the settlements in respect of acts undertaken in their purported administration up to the date specified in the order. The relief will be confined to the conduct and potential liabilities addressed by the evidence and this judgment.

52.

The liability arose from transactions undertaken by a deputy on behalf of a person who lacked capacity and without the approval which the statutory framework required. The responsibility resting upon Mr Yeadon as deputy and solicitor, the Claimant’s own involvement, the allocation of functions between the professionals, the quality of the subsequent administration and the steps taken once the defect emerged all bear upon the fairness of imposing personal liability. Taken together, those matters satisfy me that the Claimant ought fairly to be excused. Relief under section 61 will therefore be granted within the scope identified above.

REMUNERATION

53.

The Claimant seeks authority to retain the remuneration already received in respect of its administration of the assets. The Defendant’s written submissions relied upon the absence of written agreement by the other trustees for the purpose of section 29(2) of the Trustee Act 2000. During the hearing Mr Curry accepted that the subsection has no application because the Claimant is a trust corporation. The requirement for written agreement applies to a professional trustee which does not fall within that category. The remuneration issue was therefore argued by reference to section 29(1), the effect of the settlements having been void from the outset and the court’s inherent jurisdiction.

54.

Section 29(1) provides that a trust corporation which is not the trustee of a charitable trust is entitled to receive reasonable remuneration from the trust funds for services provided to or on behalf of the trust. The Claimant is a trust corporation. The statutory entitlement remains confined to reasonable remuneration and requires identification of the trust to which, or on behalf of which, the services were provided.

55.

The earlier judgment established that the express settlements never acquired legal effect and that the assets were held upon resulting trust for Mr Tustain. The Claimant nevertheless held legal title to and administered property subject to that trust throughout the relevant period. Its misunderstanding concerned the terms upon which the beneficial interest was held. The services were provided in the management and administration of trust property and accordingly fall within section 29(1).

56.

The purported settlements contained charging provisions upon which the trustees proceeded during the administration. Those provisions never became operative because the instruments in which they appeared acquired no legal effect. They created no entitlement capable of displacing section 29(1) under subsection (5). The resulting trust arose by operation of law and contained no separate provision concerning remuneration.

57.

The remuneration relates principally to administration after the settlements had been executed. It covers investment management, accounts, taxation matters, record keeping and distributions over approximately fifteen years. No discrete claim is made for work attributable solely to creating the settlements.

58.

The property required management throughout the relevant period. Mr Tustain remained beneficially entitled to it, while the Claimant and the other trustees held legal title and exercised control over its administration. The work undertaken by the Claimant was directed towards the management and preservation of those assets. Its value can therefore be assessed by reference to the services provided to Mr Tustain’s property throughout the period in question.

59.

The Claimant also relies upon the court’s inherent jurisdiction to authorise remuneration. In Duke of Norfolk’s Settlement Trusts [1982] Ch 61, Fox LJ identified the good administration of trusts as the foundation of that jurisdiction. He explained that the court must balance the protection of beneficiaries against claims upon the fund with the importance of competent administration. The nature of the trust, the experience and skill of the trustee, the amount sought, comparable charges and the circumstances of the case inform that exercise. The jurisdiction is exercised with restraint.

60.

Foster v Spencer [1996] 2 All ER 672 confirms that remuneration may be allowed for services already performed. The jurisdiction is therefore capable of addressing past work by reference to its character, value and contribution to the administration of the property. Its exercise does not depend upon the continuing services of the trustee being required in the future.

61.

The findings under section 61 bear upon the assessment. The Claimant undertook the administration honestly and reasonably upon the understanding that valid settlements existed. The work reflected the functions which it believed it had assumed and involved the continuing investment, management and preservation of the assets.

62.

The amount charged has not been challenged by reference to the applicable rates, the time spent, comparable charges or the necessity of particular items of work. The objection concerns the Claimant’s involvement in the creation of the settlements and the legal consequences of their invalidity. The section 61 findings and the nature of the services provided support payment of the remuneration claimed.

63.

I am satisfied that the remuneration already received represents reasonable remuneration for services provided to or on behalf of the resulting trust within section 29(1). The same conclusion follows from the application of the principles governing the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The Claimant may retain those sums. The order should identify the remuneration covered by this determination and preserve any necessary mechanism for resolving a properly particularised dispute as to calculation.

FUTURE REMUNERATION, EXPENSES AND INDEMNITY

64.

The declarations made by the court require the administration to be placed upon its correct legal footing. Assets must be transferred or re-designated, records and accounts adjusted, taxation consequences addressed and the property placed under the control of Mr Tustain’s deputies or otherwise dealt with in accordance with the resulting trust.

65.

Those functions form part of the administration required to give effect to the court’s orders. Section 29(1) and the principles identified in Duke of Norfolk’s Settlement Trusts support payment of reasonable remuneration for that work. The Claimant may charge its ordinary reasonable professional rates for work properly undertaken in completing the transition.

66.

Section 31 of the Trustee Act 2000 also entitles a trustee to reimbursement from the trust funds for expenses properly incurred when acting on behalf of the trust. The Claimant’s indemnity will extend to liabilities, costs and expenses incurred in implementing the court’s orders and bringing the present administration to an orderly conclusion.

COSTS

67.

A trustee is ordinarily entitled to an indemnity from the trust fund for costs and expenses properly incurred in the performance of its duties. That principle extends to the costs of trust proceedings. CPR 46.3 and paragraph 1 of Practice Direction 46 give procedural effect to the court’s consideration of whether the trustee acted in the interests of the fund and acted reasonably in bringing and conducting the proceedings.

68.

Re Buckton [1907] 2 Ch 406 distinguishes proceedings brought by trustees to determine questions concerning construction or administration, disputes between beneficiaries and hostile litigation. The present proceedings were brought to determine the legal basis upon which the Claimant held substantial property and to establish the basis of its future administration. The validity issue required judicial determination and falls within the first category.

69.

The applications under section 61 and concerning remuneration also engaged the Claimant’s own financial position. They remained closely connected with the accounts between trustee and beneficiary and with the basis upon which the administration should be concluded. The Defendant was directed to advance the opposing case so that the evidence and the Claimant’s entitlement to relief could be tested.

70.

The Claimant acted properly in bringing the proceedings once the validity problem emerged. The proceedings established that Mr Tustain remained beneficially entitled to the assets, determined the legal position of the Claimant and provided the foundation for the work now required to conclude the administration. The costs were therefore properly incurred in securing the administration of the property upon its correct legal basis.

71.

The Defendant’s participation followed directions made by the court and assisted in determining the disputed applications. The costs incurred through that participation should be paid from the assets.

72.

I shall direct that the parties' costs be assessed on the indemnity basis and paid from the assets held upon resulting trust for Mr Tustain. The proceedings determined the ownership of those assets, the basis upon which they were held and the administration required following the court's declarations. The costs therefore fall within the trustee's indemnity for costs properly incurred in trust proceedings.

73.

Reasonable future legal costs incurred in implementing the orders may also be paid from the assets, subject to the requirement that they be properly incurred and directed to the work authorised by this judgment.

CONCLUSIONS

74.

The present application concerns the consequences of an administration carried out for many years upon the footing that valid discretionary settlements existed. The earlier decision established that the authority required to create those settlements had never been obtained.

75.

Barclays Wealth played an active part in developing and implementing the arrangements. The documentary record also establishes that Mr Yeadon controlled the Court of Protection process and obtained and supplied the order upon which implementation proceeded. Those involved did not identify the statutory distinction between powers of investment and the court’s power to settle property. For the reasons given, the Claimant acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused.

76.

Relief under section 61 will extend to the identified acts undertaken in the purported administration of the six settlements and arising from their invalidity. The order will define those categories and the relevant period.

77.

The Claimant provided professional services in managing and preserving property beneficially owned by Mr Tustain. Section 29(1) of the Trustee Act 2000 and the court’s inherent jurisdiction support remuneration for those services and for the further work required to implement the declarations and conclude the administration.

78.

The proceedings determined the ownership and future administration of the assets and enabled the parties’ respective positions to be established. The costs of both parties will be paid from the assets upon the basis identified above.

79.

I shall grant relief under section 61 and make consequential orders concerning past and future remuneration, expenses, indemnity and costs. I will hear counsel on the precise terms required to give effect to this judgment.

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