MANCHESTER DISTRICT REGISTRY
Manchester Civil Justice Centre
1 Bridge Street West
Manchester
M60 9DJ
Before :
JASON BEER KC
(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)
Between :
RICHARD AKOS HARNOCZI | Appellant |
- and – | |
AMANDA HITCHINGS (LISTING OFFICER) |
Respondent
TheAppellant did not appear and was not represented
Jonathan Welch (instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 3rd February 2026
APPROVED JUDGMENT
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 22nd June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archive.
Jason Beer KC (Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court):
Introduction
The Appellant appeals against the decision of the Valuation Tribunal for England which, on 19th September 2025, dismissed his appeal against the Defendant Listing Officer’s decision to refuse the Appellant’s request that the entry in the Valuation List for 11 Daisy Street, Liverpool, L5 7RN (“the Property”) be deleted on the grounds that the Property was uninhabitable.
The Appellant did not attend the hearing of his appeal. He applied on 28th January 2026 for an adjournment of the hearing of the appeal. I dismissed this application at the outset of the hearing on 3rd February 2026: the perfected reasons for my decision are set out in the Coda to this judgment.
The Facts
The Property
The Property is a mid-terraced house, constructed before 1900, spread over two floors and comprising a main room, a bathroom and two bedrooms. It was listed in Band A for Council Tax purposes.
The Appellant’s Tenancy
The Appellant was a Joint Tenant of the Property from 30th June 2022 until an unspecified date in 2023. The Appellant initially occupied the Property under an assured shorthold tenancy agreement until 29th June 2023, having paid a year’s rent in advance of taking up occupation, prior to relocating to England from Hungary. After 29th June 2023 he occupied the Property on a rolling monthly tenancy agreement.
The Appellant’s proposal to the Listing Officer
On 16th May 2024 the Appellant proposed to the Listing Officer that the Property be deleted from the Valuation List on the grounds that the Property was uninhabitable (although it was not initially stated when it was said that the Property became uninhabitable, the Appellant later clarified that this was from the date of 30th June 2022).
On 19th August 2024 the Listing Officer issued a decision maintaining the Property in the Valuation List, materially noting in the decision letter as follows:
“[F]or a property to be removed from the Council Tax List it would need to have reached the state of being truly derelict. For example, if the roof or external walls were missing or where normal repairs would not bring it into a condition that would make it fit for occupation.
When the property is structurally intact and generally wind and watertight, then it will usually need to be assessed for Council Tax.”
The appeal to the Valuation Tribunal
On 10th October 2024 the Appellant appealed the Listing Officer’s decision to the Valuation Tribunal, pursuant to s16 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 (“the 1992 Act”).
The Appellant’s appeal was initially listed for 3rd March 2025, but was adjourned at the Appellant’s request. It was listed again on 30th May 2025, but that hearing was again adjourned at the Appellant’s request. The appeal was finally heard on 2nd September 2025.
In its reserved decision dated 19th September 2025, dismissing the appeal, the Valuation Tribunal materially held as follows:
[16] The correct approach in appeals of this nature is to consider whether or not a hereditament exists at the relevant date. If it does, then it must be valued on the statutory assumption that it is in a reasonable state of repair, even if, in reality it is in need of repair…
[20] In support of his application for the property to be deleted from the valuation list, the Appellant had provided internal photographs of the property, as well as copies of correspondence between himself and the letting agent.
[21] During the hearing, the Appellant provided further clarification regarding the photographs submitted. He stated that approximately one month after moving into the property, he had requested a refund from the landlord due to numerous faults and issues requiring repair. The Appellant stated that he was in receipt of Universal Credit and could not afford to commission a professional survey. He described several problems with the property, which, he claimed, exacerbated his existing health conditions. Although he did not wish to remain in the property, he felt he had no alternative. The Appellant referred to the following:
Damp issues, with mould on some of the walls.
The heating system needed to be upgraded.
Condensation in the window panels, unable to see out.
The wall was crumbling, and the radiator came off as a result. • Some of the walls needed replastering.
The roof needed to be fixed, as there was a leak.
The property was very cold due to the heating system and window.
[22] The Listing Officer had referred to the leading cases on repair and identification of the hereditament. The starting point for the Listing Officer was Willson v Coll, in which the judge outlined the stages to follow when considering a dwelling in poor repair. The Listing Officer must consider if a dwelling exists. If it does, then the Listing Officer must assume reasonable repair. Unlike properties in the non-domestic rating list, there was no economic test on this repair assumption. When considering whether a hereditament exists, the Listing Officer must ask “Having regard to the character of the property and a reasonable amount of repair works being undertaken could the premises be occupied as a dwelling?” The panel found the High Court decision to be relevant, and it provided binding guidance. Mr Justice Singh had held that if a property could be repaired its entry had to stay in the valuation list…
[24] Having regard to the above, the tests were whether properties could be rendered suitable for occupation with a reasonable amount of repair works, or whether there was a scheme of works being undertaken. Although what amounted to a reasonable amount was dependent on the facts in each specific case. In this case, the panel had to determine whether the property could be rendered capable of use following a reasonable amount of work, or whether a scheme of works had commenced.
[25] The panel noted that whilst it was clear that the property was in a state of disrepair, no evidence had been provided from an independent professional to demonstrate that on the relevant date, the property was incapable of being repaired and that it had reached the stage that it could be considered as derelict, or that a scheme of works had commenced on 30 June 2022. Whilst the conditions were poor, the property had been occupied as a dwelling, and the Appellant had stated that following minor repair works by the landlord, another tenant was in occupation. On that basis, the appeal property remained a hereditament.
[26] The panel was aware that for the purposes of valuation under regulation 6(2) of the Council Tax (Situation and Valuation of Dwellings) Regulations 1992 one of the statutory assumptions was that the dwelling was in a reasonable state of repair. On that basis, having regard to the legislation and case law, the property was a dwelling and must remain in the valuation list. Determination
[27] In view of the above findings and conclusions, the Tribunal panel was unable to find anything erroneous with the Listing Officer’s decision to refuse to delete the appeal property’s entry from the valuation list, and on that basis the appeal was dismissed.
On 29th November 2025 (with the Notice being sealed on 1st December 2025), by filing an Appellant’s Notice with this Court, the Appellant appealed against the decision of the Valuation Tribunal, pursuant to regulation 43(1) of the Valuation Tribunal for England (Council Tax and Rating Appeals) (Procedure) Rules 2009 (“the 2009 Regulations”).
The Law
Sections 1 – 6 of the 1992 Act make provision for the payment of Council Tax. In order for Council Tax to be payable, it is inter alia necessary that a property is a “dwelling”: see s1(1) of the 1992 Act.
A “dwelling” is defined by s3(2) of the 1992 Act as meaning (a) any property which by virtue of s115 of the General Rate Act 1967 would have been a hereditament for the purposes of that Act; and (b) is not shown as a non-domestic hereditament on any list.
By regulation 6(1)(e) of the Council Tax (Situation and Valuation of Dwellings) Regulations 1992, once a dwelling has been identified by a billing authority, it must be valued on the assumption that “it was in a reasonable state of repair.”
Regulation 43 of the 2009 Regulations materially provides as follows:
An appeal shall lie to the High Court on a question of law arising out of a decision or order which is given or made by the VTE on an appeal under section 16 of the 1992 Act or the CT Regulations or an appeal against a completion notice under paragraph 1 of Schedule 4A to the 1988 Act as it applies for the purposes of Part 1 of the 1992 Act (council tax; England and Wales).
Subject to paragraph (3), an appeal under paragraph (1) may be dismissed if it is not made within four weeks of the date on which notice is given of the decision or order that is the subject of the appeal.
Where—
the appeal is made by a person whose application under regulation 40(1) for the review of the decision relied (whether in whole or part) on satisfaction of the condition mentioned in regulation 40(5)(c); and
the VTE gave notice—
that it would not undertake a review; or
having reviewed the decision or part, that it would not set aside the decision or part,
the appeal may be dismissed if it is not made within four weeks of the date of the VTE’s notice.
The High Court may confirm, vary, set aside, revoke or remit the decision or order, and may make any order the VTE could have made.
Analysis, Findings and Conclusions
The Issues
It seems to me that the following issues require to be determined on this appeal:
First, whether regulation 43(2) of the 2009 Regulations, which requires an appeal to be made within 4 weeks of the date of the decision of the Valuation Tribunal (here, the decision was made on 19th September 2025 and the appeal was filed with this Court on 1st December 2025), presents an absolute bar to the hearing of this appeal.
Second, if there is jurisdiction to determine the appeal, whether that jurisdiction ought to be exercised in circumstances where the appeal was filed with the Court out of time.
Third, whether the Appellant has established that the Valuation Tribunal made an error of law in its decision.
First Issue: Is the late filing of the Appellant’s Notice an absolute bar to the hearing of the appeal?
The Respondent contends that the appeal should be “struck out” because the Appellant’s Notice was filed outside the four-week period set out in regulation 43(2) of the 2009 Regulations: the decision of the Valuation Tribunal was 19th September 2025 and the Appellant’s Notice ought therefore to have been filed by 19th October 2025, whereas it was in fact filed on 29th November 2025.
The Respondent contended in its Skeleton Argument prepared for the purposes of the hearing of this appeal that “…the four-week limitation period is absolute.”
If, by that submission, the Respondent sought to argue that the Court has no jurisdiction to consider an appeal if the Appellant’s Notice was filed outside the period of four weeks provided for by regulation 43(2) of the 2029 Regulations, then I reject it.
The relevant words of regulation 43(2) are: “an appeal…may be dismissed if it is not made within four weeks of the date on which notice is given of the decision …that is the subject of the appeal” (emphasis added). This permits a Court to dismiss an appeal that was made outside of the relevant period. It does not require it. This is made clear by the use of the phrase “may be dismissed”. This gives the Court the facility to hear an appeal, rather than dismiss it, even if it was brought outside the period set out in regulation 43(2). The formulation used by the drafter is, in the scheme of the drafting of provisions as to time limits, a relatively weak one: at the summit one might put clauses which say that any appeal brought after the expiry of the relevant period are a nullity; then one might consider provisions which set out the relevant time period by which an act must be undertaken, but then provide the court with the power to grant an extension of time (sometimes in carefully drawn, and quite limited, circumstances); and then one might find a clause such as this, which simply gives the court a power to dismiss.
I note in this regard that courts have, in the past, approached this provision in the way that I have described above – i.e. that there is a power to hear an appeal brought out of time, and in deciding whether to hear the appeal one must look at the circumstances in which it was brought out of time, including whether there was a good reason for the appeal not being brought in time and whether prejudice would be caused to the respondent: see e.g. Turner v South Cambridgeshire District Council [2016] EWHC 1017 (Admin) per Warby J at [24]; Jagoo v Bristol City Council [2017] EWHC 926 (Admin) per Holroyde J at [4]; Humphrey v Fenland District Council [2018] EWHC 2195 (Admin) per HHJ Cooke at [8] – [11] and Tarbuc v Bunyan (List Officer) [2024] EWHC 897 (Admin) per Julian Knowles J at [16] – [26].
Second Issue: Ought the Court to dismiss the appeal because it was filed out of time?
It follows from my conclusion in relation to Issue 1 that the Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal filed outside of the period set out in regulation 43(2) of the 2009 Regulations.
As to the principles that I ought to apply in deciding whether to do so, I propose to follow the approach described by Warby J in Turner at [24]:
The Regulation can be analysed as imposing a time limit which may be extended only if the court in its discretion agrees; or an automatic sanction from which relief must be sought; or as a ground on which the court may in its discretion dismiss an appeal. I do not believe it matters. The general rule is that appeal courts treat an application to extend time for appealing, when brought after the time limit has expired, as equivalent to an application for relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9; the court applies what have become known as the Mitchell/Denton principles. Sayers v Clarke Walker (A firm) [2002] EWCA Civ 645, [2002] 1 WLR 3095; R (Hysaj) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1633; [2015] 1 WLR 2472. It is common ground that in this case I should adopt that approach, and I agree that is appropriate.
The first stage is therefore to identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the failure to bring the appeal within four weeks of 19th September 2025, and instead only doing so on 29th November 2025. I regard that failure as serious and significant: the appeal was brought some 6 weeks out of time, over double the time permitted by regulation 43(2). Finality in litigation it important, and particularly so in appellate proceedings. I note in this regard that the court in Turner treated an appeal lodged 2 weeks and 1 day outside the period permitted by regulation 43(2) as serious and significant.
That is not the end of the matter, however: The second stage is to consider why the default occurred. Here, there is scant information before the Court, principally because the Appellant did not apply for any extension of time within which to bring his appeal (instead incorrectly stating in the Appellant’s Notice that it was being brought in time). More than that: in correspondence, the Respondent drew the Appellant’s attention to the fact that the appeal was brought out of time, but even then the Appellant did not seek to take any remedial or corrective action by making a formal application to extend time, filing witness evidence, or placing primary material before the Court to explain his default. The only information that the Appellant has placed before the Court is an email in which he relies on the following:
The suggestion that the Respondent failed to respond to his queries as to how he should appeal the Valuation Tribunal’s decision. Whether this is correct or not, it is irrelevant: (i) it is not for the Respondent to advise the Appellant as to his route of appeal; and (ii) as I say, the correct route of appeal, and the time limit for doing so, was set out on the face of the Valuation Tribunal’s decision.
The suggestion that the Appellant was “misdirected” by the Court when he sought to lodge his appeal. I have no evidence of this, and in any event the duty rests on an appellant to file his appeal documents within the prescribed time limit.
The suggestion that, as the Court has sealed the Appellant’s Notice, it has determined that “…the appeal is valid and listed for hearing.” But in my judgment the sealing of the Appellant's Notice had no such effect: it recorded the date in which the Appellant’s Notice was sealed, but was not a judicial decision that the appeal was brought in time.
The suggestion that the Appellant’s personal circumstances, including his housing situation and his health, affected his ability to file his appeal in time. But there is no medical evidence or other evidence to support this suggestion.
The third stage is to evaluate all of the circumstances of the case, so as to enable the court to deal justly with the application. In this case I have regard to the circumstances set out above, but additionally to the substantive merits of the appeal. I address the merits from paragraph 27 below. In short, I consider the appeal to be without merit.
For these reasons - a serious and significant failure to bring the appeal within time; the absence of any good reason for the failure to bring the appeal within time; and the absence of substantive merit in the appeal itself, pursuant to regulation 43(2) of the 2009 Regulations I dismiss the appeal.
Third Issue: Did the Valuation Tribunal make an error of law in its decision?
I nonetheless go on to consider the merits of the appeal.
The Appellant’s principal complaint is that the Valuation Tribunal “applied the wrong legal test by relying on my physical occupation instead of determining whether the property was capable of occupation after only ‘normal repair’, as required by the statutory test in council tax valuation law.” I am afraid that there is no substance in this complaint. A plain reading of the Valuation Tribunal’s decision shows that it simply did not make the error that the Appellant alleges. Instead, in my judgement, it is clear from its written reasons that the Valuation Tribunal (i) identified the correct legal approach in determining the appeal before it; and (ii) having done so, applied that correct legal approach by reference to the facts and evidence before it.
As to the former matter – the identification of the correct legal approach by the Valuation Tribunal – the Valuation Tribunal:
Correctly identified in [13] of its decision that the property could only be deleted from the valuation list if it ceased to be a “dwelling”; and that a “dwelling” is defined by s3(2) of the 1992 Act as meaning (a) any property which by virtue of s115 of the General Rate Act 1967 would have been a hereditament for the purposes of that Act; and (b) is not shown as a non-domestic hereditament on any list.
Correctly identified in [15] of its decision that, by regulation 6(1)(e) of the Council Tax (Situation and Valuation of Dwellings) Regulations 1992, once a dwelling has been identified by a billing authority, it must be valued on the assumption that “it was in a reasonable state of repair.”
Rightly found in [22] of its decision that the approach taken by Singh J (as he then was) in Wilson v Coll (Listing Officer) [2011] EWHC 2824 (Admin) was to be followed. Singh J held (in summary): (i) that the crucial factor is determining whether the dwelling exists for these purposes (see [38]); (ii) in order to determine that issue, the question to be addressed is: “…having regard to the character of the property and a reasonable amount of repair being undertaken, could the be premises be occupied as a dwelling?” (see [39]); and (iii) the crucial distinction for the purposes of deciding whether there is, or continues to be, a dwelling should focus upon whether it is capable of being rendered suitable for occupation as a dwelling by undertaking a reasonable amount of repair works: “The distinction…is between a truly derelict property, which is incapable of being repaired to make it suitable for its intended purpose, and repair which would render it capable again of being occupied for the purposes for which it is intended” (see [40]).
As to the latter matter – the application of the correct legal approach by the Valuation Tribunal to the facts and evidence before it – in my judgement it is clear that the Valuation Tribunal went on directly to apply the correct legal approach that it had identified to the facts and evidence before it. It thus turned – in [24] - [25] of its judgment to the question of “…whether the property could be rendered capable of use following a reasonable amount of work…” and found that “…whilst it was clear that the property was in a state of disrepair, no evidence had been provided from an independent professional to demonstrate that on the relevant date the property was incapable of being repaired and that it had reached the stage that that it could be considered as derelict…” I detect no error in that approach – it properly reflected the facts and evidence that was before the Valuation Tribunal and was a determination reasonably open to the Valuation Tribunal.
The Appellant suggests that the Valuation Tribunal “applied the wrong legal test by relying on [his] physical occupation instead of determining whether the property was capable of occupation after only ‘normal repair’, as required by the statutory test in council tax valuation law…The Tribunal…treated [his] presence as proof of habitability, which is legally incorrect…” In my judgement this submission fails for the reasons I have identified above. In particular: (i) firstly, the Valuation Tribunal identified, as I have said, the correct legal test on the basis of the authorities – this is not a case where a tribunal went awry in identifying the correct approach in law to take to the issue before it (indeed, I do not understand the Appellant to suggest otherwise – his complaint is more about how that approach was applied in his case); (ii) secondly, having identified correctly the approach to be taken, the Valuation Tribunal went on to apply it directly, in the manner that I have identified above – in particular it made a clear and explicit finding in [25] of its decision about the absence of evidence that the property was incapable of being repaired and that it has reached the stage where it could be considered derelict; and (iii) thirdly, the Valuation Tribunal was perfectly entitled to note – as it did in [25] of its decision – that “…the property had been occupied as a dwelling and the Appellant had stated that, following minor repair works by the landlord, another tenant was in occupation…” There is no error in such an approach – the Valuation Tribunal did not regard such occupancy as in any way determinative of the issue before it (as the Appellant seems to suggest); instead, it properly considered such occupancy as relevant evidence to bring into account when determining the ultimate issue before it: the fact that a dwelling was occupied at the relevant date (and has been consistently so occupied) is plainly material to the argument that the dwelling was incapable of beneficial occupation.
Overall, therefore, this principal ground of appeal fails.
The Appellant additionally submits that the Valuation Tribunal erred in its approach to the evidence before it – essentially arguing that it made mistakes in its evaluation of the evidence, or failed to take into account evidence, which was relevant to his submission that the property required substantial renovation and was therefore not a dwelling in law at any time. There are a diverse range of such complaints in this regard.
There is a general point that disposes of this ground of appeal, namely that appeals of this nature are limited by regulation 43(1) of the 2009 Regulations to questions of law and absent a patent error of law or findings of fact which simply cannot be justified on the evidence, this court will not interfere: see Ramdhun v VTE [2014] EWHC 946 (Admin) per Haddon-Cave J (as he then was) at [19]. In explaining this approach, Haddon-Cave J applied the principles in Okolo v Revenue & Customs Commissioner [2012] UKUT 416 (TCC) at [48], namely:
“(1) If the case contains anything which on its face is an error of law and which bears upon the determination, that is an error of law (Edwards v Bairstow and another [1956] AC 14, per Lord Radcliffe at p 3).
(2) A pure finding of fact may be set aside as an error of law if it is found without any evidence or upon a view of the facts which could not reasonably be entertained (Edwards v Bairstow, per Viscount Simonds at p 29).
(3) An error of law may arise if the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination under appeal (Edwards v Bairstow, per Lord Radcliffe, op cit.)
(4) It is all too easy for a so-called question of law to become no more than a disguised attack on findings of fact which must be accepted by the courts. The nature of the factual enquiry which an appellate court can undertake is different from that undertaken by the Tribunal of fact. The question is: was there evidence before the Tribunal which was sufficient to support the finding which it made? In other words, was the finding one which the Tribunal was entitled to make? (Georgiou v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1996] STC 463, per Evans LJ at p 476).
(5) For a question of law to arise in those circumstances, the appellant must first identify the finding which is challenged; secondly, show that it is significant in relation to the conclusion; thirdly, identify the evidence, if any, which was relevant to that finding; and fourthly, show that finding, on the basis of that evidence, was one which the Tribunal was not entitled to make. What is not permitted is a roving selection of the evidence coupled with a general assertion that the tribunal's conclusion was against the weight of the evidence and was therefore wrong (Georgiou, Per Evans LJ, op cit.)
(6) An appeal court should be slow to interfere with a multi-factorial assessment based on a number of primary facts, or a value judgment. Where the application of a legal standard involves no question of principle, but is simply a matter of degree, an appellate court should be very cautious in differing from the judge's evaluation. Where a decision involves the application of a not altogether precise legal standard to a combination of features of varying importance, this will fall within the class of case in which an appellate court should not reverse a judge's decision unless he has erred in principle (Proctor & Gamble UK v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2009] STC 1990 , per Jacobs LJ at [9]-[10]; Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 2416, per Lord Hoffman at p 2423).
(7) Where the case is concerned with an appeal from a specialist Tribunal, particular deference is to be given to such tribunals, for Parliament has entrusted them, with all their specialist experience, to be the primary decision maker. Those tribunals are alone the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear they have misdirected themselves in law. Appellate courts should not rush to find such misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently (AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] AC 678, per Baroness Hale at [30]).”
Looking at the matter in the round, this is not a case where the Valuation Tribunal’s decision as to whether the property was a dwelling was made without there being evidence to support such a finding (there was abundant evidence in support of such a finding) or one which was based on a view of the facts which could not reasonably be entertained (by contrast, the evidence plainly supported such a finding). More than that, it is clear that the Valuation Tribunal conscientiously had regard to the evidence and submissions placed before it by the Appellant (which evidence and submissions he now seeks to rehearse before me) – by way of example only:
The Valuation Tribunal had regard to the decision of the First Tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) of 10th April 2024 refusing the Appellant’s application for a Rent Repayment Order under s41 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (but which found that the property was “…in no better than fair condition”): see [19] of the Valuation Tribunal’s decision.
The Valuation Tribunal expressly had regard to the points that the Appellant made that (i) he had requested a refund from the landlord because of the disrepair at the property; (ii) the Appellant’s general sense of dissatisfaction with the property; (iii) the Appellant’s financial position; (iv) the Appellant’s allegation that his health conditions were exacerbated by the state of the property; and (v) the Appellant’s suggestion that he did not want to remain at the property, but felt that he had no choice: see [21] of the Valuation Tribunal’s decision.
The Valuation Tribunal expressly had regard to the material which the Appellant placed before it (including extensive photographs of the interior and exterior of the property) as to its state of disrepair: see [21] of the Valuation Tribunal’s decision.
For all of these reasons, this secondary limb of appeal fails.
Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, if I had granted relief against sanctions and an extension of time I would have affirmed the Tribunal's decision.
Outcome
The appeal is dismissed. I shall set a timetable for the making of written submissions in relation to consequential matters, including costs, if such matters cannot be agreed. I will then determine such matters on the papers.
Coda
By an Application Notice dated 27th January 2026 the Appellant seeks a “review”, and a stay, of the Order of Christopher Kennedy KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge (“the Deputy Judge”), dated 23rd January 2026 (but sealed on 26th January 2026), dismissing the Appellant’s application for an adjournment of today’s hearing and refusing the Appellant’s application for an interpreter to be appointed, at the Court’s expense, for the purpose of today’s hearing.
The Deputy Judge gave the following reasons for his decision (which I set out in full as they give the essential background to the present application):
“(1) By a notice filed on 20 November 2025 the Appellant seeks to appeal a decision of the Valuation Tribunal for England which, on 19 September 2025, dismissed his appeal against the council tax valuation for a property, 11 Daisy Street, Liverpool L5 7RN.
(2) On 4 December 2025 the court sought details of availability for a one-day oral hearing and offered dates in January 2026. None of the dates offered in January were convenient to the Appellant and further dates, including 3 February 2026, were offered. Both parties indicated that they could manage that date and the case was accordingly listed.
(3) On 16 December 2025 the Appellant wrote to the court indicating that he might not be able to attend but would confirm definitively by no later than 20 January 2026. He cited (i) a significant risk to his health in travelling from Liverpool to Manchester and attending at a hearing for a full day and (ii) his current housing circumstances – he was in temporary accommodation. He enclosed two letters from his general practitioner one supporting his application for re-housing on the basis of his health and the second, dated 20 November 2025, setting out the opinion of his general practitioner that he was not managing well and would be unable to attend his court hearings or court proceedings “in these times”. The 20 November 2025 GP letter predated the Appellant’s decision to accept the February oral hearing date.
(4) In his 16 December 2025 letter, the Claimant also requested an interpreter and asked the court to arrange one. He had already explained that his English was generally adequate for the hearing and having a Hungarian interpreter available by phone was strictly required as a safety measure in case he did not fully understand a crucial legal point or procedural instruction. For the purposes of this order I am treating that request and his subsequent correspondence on the subject dated 14 January 2026 as an application that the court provide an interpreter to him free of charge.
(5) On 12 January 2026 the Appellant was again in touch with the court. He stated that he was moving into a new property and that along with his health conditions was taking up all his time and that he was feeling harassed by correspondence from the Respondent. He requested an adjournment as he had no access to a computer. The Appellant was asked to make a formal application and renewed his request by email the following day. It is not clear what access to a computer he had to send that email.
(6) In response the Respondent indicated that it was in a position to prepare the hearing bundle.
(7) The Appellant repeated his request for an adjournment, essentially on the same grounds, by further emails dated 14 January 2026, where he raised the argument that the hearing might be rendered ineffective or procedurally unfair. Finally on 21 January 2026 he argued that the denial of an interpreter compromised his right to a fair trial and the court’s duties under the Equality Act 2010 and its own policy. His access to justice was he contended being denied.
(8) In considering the application for an adjournment I must exercise a discretion bearing in mind the requirements of the over-riding objective that cases are dealt with justly and at proportionate cost. I have to ensure that a case has an appropriate share of the court’s resources while taking into account the need for other cases to have resources allotted to them. As the Administrative Court Guide points out (Annex 4 para 28) the policy of the court is not to adjourn cases unless there is good reason to do so. The parties are required to proceed on the basis that the case will stay in the list until they are advised otherwise (para 30). This case was allocated a hearing date which the Appellant confirmed was convenient to him. To adjourn now will waste court resources. The reasons he has advanced to adjourn it are not in my judgment sufficient. He is able articulately to correspond with the court and, whilst I sympathise with the fact that he has the disruption of a move, that is not a good reason to adjourn the case and he needs to accord the fact of the hearing greater priority.
(9) I have a power to arrange for an interpreter free of charge if I am satisfied that a party cannot address the court. That is not the case here. The Appellant has engaged in coherent correspondence with the court and I am entirely confident that he is capable of managing the hearing with such adjustments as the experienced judge who will hear his case deems necessary. His acknowledgment that the need was contingent and could be addressed by having someone on the telephone demonstrates that.”
On 26th January 2026 at 1.01pm, on receipt of these written reasons, the Appellant immediately sent an email to the Court seeking a “review” of the decision of the Deputy Judge (and therefore re-iterating his request for an adjournment of the hearing and the provision of an interpreter).
On 27th January 2026 at 3.07pm, the Appellant filed an Application Notice with the Court. The Application Notice makes clear that the application is made pursuant to CPR 3.3(5) (as did the covering email): see Box 3. The Application Notice states: “I seek a review and stay of the order dated 26 Jan 2026 under CPR 3.3(5). I request an urgent adjournment of the hearing on 3 Feb 2026 and a Hungarian interpreter. I am unfit to attend due to acute illness (Fit Note attached) and uninhabitable housing (Evidence attached)."
The evidence relied upon in the Application Notice was as follows:
“1. Administrative Error & Evidence of Prior Notice: I submitted formal review and adjournment requests via email on 26 Jan 2026 (13:01) and 27 Jan 2026 (13:06). I formally dispute the claim that the court has no record of these. Any failure to place these before Judge Kennedy KC is a serious administrative error.
2. Medical Impossibility & Disability: I am a disabled person with LCWRA status. I am currently bedbound with acute influenza, causing physical and nervous exhaustion. My GP has confirmed I am "unfit to travel or attend court" (Fit Note attached). Forcing my attendance violates the Equality Act 2010 and the court’s duty to provide Reasonable Adjustments.
3. Housing Emergency: My property is currently uninhabitable with no flooring or heating. Emergency repairs and inspections by Torus Housing are ongoing. I have no stable housing at the moment heating problems, and currently money problems too and i cannot leave the property during these essential works.
4. Right to Fair Trial (Article 6 ECHR): I am a Hungarian citizen. My written correspondence is AI-assisted. I cannot participate in a High Court hearing without a professional interpreter. Proceeding in my absence, given my documented illness and disability, is a direct violation of my right to a fair hearing.
5. Physical and Financial Impossibility: I do not have the physical strength or financial means to travel from Liverpool to Manchester for a 10:00 AM hearing in my current state. Forcing a patient with influenza onto public transport is a risk to public health.
I must emphasize that I previously notified the Court that my participation was conditional upon my health and housing stability. This prior notification was ignored. Currently, I am in a state of physical and mental collapse. I have just moved into a new property where I must manage all utility setups and essential services alone; I have no internet access. I urgently require a period of rest and undisturbed sleep to regain the mental capacity needed for these proceedings. Until my health and basic living conditions are stabilized, I am physically and practically unable to function or represent myself."
I urgently require a period of rest and undisturbed sleep to regain the mental capacity needed for these proceedings. I have just moved into a new property where I must personally manage all utility setups and essential services; I currently have no internet access (ordered, but weeks away). Please understand that until my health and basic living conditions are stabilized, I am physically and practically unable to function or represent myself and can do anything for the hearing.
I am a victim of a serious crime and past trauma, which led to my eviction and long-term housing crisis. I am highly vulnerable. Proceeding in my absence while I am ill and stabilizing a new home would be a fundamental injustice. I want my voice to be heard, but I am physically and mentally unable to attend now. Please see the attached Witness Statement for full details."
Before turning to the substance of the application, I should note in relation to paragraph 1 of the evidence relied on that: (i) it is difficult to see how it could be an “administrative error” to fail to place before the Deputy Judge two emails which post-dated his decision (his decision was made on 23rd January 2026, and the emails relied on are dated 26th and 27th January 2026); but (ii) in any event, I am now considering the application for a “review” (including by reference to those emails).
As I have said, the application is made pursuant to CPR 3.3(5). The relevant parts of CPR 3.3 provide as follows:
“Court’s power to make order of its own initiative
(4) The court may make an order of its own initiative, without hearing the parties or giving them an opportunity to make representations.
(5) Where the court has made an order under paragraph (4) –
(a) a party affected by the order may apply to have it set aside, varied or stayed; and
(b) the order must contain a statement of the right to make such an application.”
The Deputy Judge’s Order dated 23rd January 2026, sealed on 26th January 2026, was not an order made of the Court’s own initiative pursuant to CPR 3.3(4) – instead, it was an order made in response to an application made by the Appellant himself. It follows that there is no jurisdiction under CPR 3.3(5) for the Court to set aside, vary or stay the Deputy Judge’s Order. The Appellant’s remedy, if he was dissatisfied with the Deputy Judge’s Order, was to seek to appeal it. He did not do so. Instead, he seeks by an impermissible route, for that Order to be “reviewed” under a jurisdiction which does not in these circumstances exist. For these reasons, the application is dismissed.
I nonetheless go on to consider the merits of the application (in particular because I consider it important to establish if there is within it any new evidence sufficient to ground an application to adjourn the hearing).
The Appellant advances two matters which he says constitute grounds for an adjournment of the hearing.
First, his health. He says that he is “…currently bedbound with acute influenza, causing physical and nervous exhaustion…” and “…My GP has confirmed I am ‘unfit to travel or attend court’ (Fit Note attached).” Attached to the Application Notice is a letter from Dr Samuel Green of the Vauxhall Medical Practice dated 27th January 2026 (it therefore post-dates the Deputy Judge’s decision). I shall not rehearse the contents of that letter in this judgment (in particular because it contains sensitive information about the Appellant’s health). It suffices to say that (i) the letter does not mention from start to finish that the Appellant was or had been bedbound; (ii) the letter does not mention from start to finish that the Appellant was or had suffered from influenza, acute or otherwise; (iii) the letter makes no mention of any physical or nervous exhaustion; and (iv) the letter certainly does not state (contrary to the Appellant’s claim) that the Appellant was “unfit to travel or to attend court.” All in all, this letter constitutes no evidence upon which to found an adjournment of this hearing.
Second, his recent move into new accommodation. The Appellant states that he has just moved into a new property and is in the process of stabilizing there – he says that he needs a period of rest and undisturbed sleep to be able to have the mental capacity to conduct these proceedings. However, this is not a new matter at all – it was a point made in the Appellant’s previous application to adjourn this hearing and was expressly considered by the Deputy Judge: he addressed it in paragraph (8) of his reasons:”[The Appellant] is able articulately to correspond with the court and, whilst I sympathise with the fact that he has the disruption of a move, that is not a good reason to adjourn the case and he needs to accord the fact of the hearing greater priority.” No new or additional information has been provided to the Court which causes me to take any different view on the merits than was taken by the Deputy Judge.
For these reasons, the application for an adjournment of the hearing is refused. In the circumstances, the request for the appointment of an interpreter does not arise.