BUU1, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Defence

The Claimant, referred to as BUU1, was relocated to the United Kingdom, along with his wife and children, further to the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP). BUU1 has sought to relocate to the United Kingdom additional family members who are living in Afghanistan: his mother (BUU2), his three adult brothers (BUU4-6) and his three adult sisters (BUU7-9) (collectively “the AFMs”). An application for their relocation was refused by a Review Panel, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence, on 12 June 2025. BUU1 seeks to challenge that decision on grounds of irrationality.

The hearing of this application took place on 28 January 2026. Part of the hearing was conducted in closed session. My judgment in this matter is contained in one single, open, document.

BUU1 is a national of Afghanistan. He served as an interpreter with British military forces in Afghanistan between January 2010 and September 2012. He was deployed within Helmand Province and worked as a patrol interpreter, translating intercepted Taliban radio communications. He also translated for British Army officers during community meetings. He was well known within the local population and to the Taliban as a result of the latter work.

BUU1 was found to be eligible for relocation under ARAP, and was evacuated to the United Kingdom with his wife and children on 27 August 2021. BUU1 maintains contact with the AFMs in Afghanistan and sends money to support them on a regular basis. His brother BUU4 was a former officer in the Afghan Army, and he has gone into hiding in Afghanistan. His brother BUU5 previously worked for the Central Civil Registration Authority as a database officer. His brother BUU6 was a university student. His sister BUU7 had been a school teacher, and his sister BUU8 was a university lecturer. His sister BUU9 had no previous employment.

BUU1 applied for the AFMs to join him on 12 September 2023. This application was refused. A further application was made on 2 May 2024. This was refused on 31 March 2025. BUU1 requested a review, and provided further documentation in support. On 12 June 2025, the initial refusal was upheld on review.

The relevant rules of ARAP are as follows:

“13.1

The applicant must be an additional family member of an eligible Afghan citizen or their partner.

. . .

13.3

The additional family member must meet at least one of the following requirements:

(a)

As a result of the eligible Afghan citizen’s work for or with a UK Government department, the applicant must be at an elevated risk of targeted attacks, specific threats or intimidation; putting them at high risk of death or serious injury; or

(b)

The applicant must face specific vulnerabilities which have led to an exceptional level of family dependence, and would be unable, even with the practical and financial help of the eligible Afghan citizen or their partner, to obtain the required level of care or protection outside the UK either because it is not available, and there is no other person who can reasonably provide it, or because it is not affordable.”

The policy intention behind ARAP was explained in the guidance to ARAP as being to:

“honour the service of eligible Afghan citizens by providing support that properly reflects their work and the risks involved;

ensure that eligible Afghan citizens, their partner, dependent children and eligible additional family members, who relocate to the UK, can do so permanently to build their lives and their future in the UK”.

The guidance explains what is meant by “Elevated risk” as follows:

“Compelling reasons must be provided why the additional family members would be at an elevated level of risk due to the work of the eligible Afghan citizen for or with the UK government in Afghanistan. This must be beyond any existing risk levels present in the country and must be connected directly to the work the eligible Afghan citizen carried out for, or with, the UK government in Afghanistan.”

The guidance explains what is meant by “Vulnerability” as follows:

“Compelling reasons must be provided, along with any supporting documentation to confirm both the relationship between the eligible Afghan citizen and the additional family member or members and the nature and extent of any dependency. . . .

An assessment will be made . . . of whether the individual is sufficiently dependent on the eligible Afghan citizen in circumstances that are exceptional and compelling.

In particular, cases will be considered where there are specific vulnerabilities or specific circumstances faced by that additional family member which have led to an exceptional level of family dependence, and that the family member would be unable, even with the practical and financial help of the eligible Afghan citizen or their partner, to obtain the required level of care or protection in Afghanistan because it is not available and there is no person there who can reasonably provide it. The expectation is that the normal rules set out in Appendix FM will apply in all but the most exceptional and unusual circumstances which the relevant individual must be able to demonstrate.”

The initial decision to refuse the relocation of the AFMs was made by a caseworker. The application was considered under the two heads: elevated risk as a result of the ARAP principal’s work, and exceptional level of family dependency. BUU1 had contended that both of these heads were satisfied. With respect to the former head, BUU1 had referred to threats made to the AFMs. With respect to the family dependency head, one of the matters raised by BUU1 was that his mother had a number of medical issues, including severe depression, uncontrolled diabetes and uveitis which requires monthly injections.

The decision notes record the conclusion as follows:

“A threat reason cannot be determined to relocate these individuals [BUU2, BUU4-BUU9] to the UK under ARAP. This is due to the limited documentary evidence available to substantiate any specific incidents and to make an explicit link between the PA’s previous role and his requested AFM’s insecurity.

The PA has reported other incidents since submitting his AFM application but has not been able to provide any documentary evidence to substantiate these. E.g. photos, medical records, etc.

His requested AFMs have their own risks due to their previous roles. E.g. in the ANA. Ministry of Internal Affairs and education sector.

It should be noted that the PA told us that his brothers have been able to attend their mosque on a daily basis. This would suggest a minimum level of insecurity for these individuals.

A dependency reason to relocate the requested AFMs can not be established because, the PA has demonstrated his ability to provide support remotely. He provided extensive documentary evidence of remote payments made to these individuals. The PA has also stated that he can support his mother’s expenses remotely. It should be noted that the PA’s mother and sisters are not without male guardians.”

In the decision notes, the caseworker referred to a letter dated 26 August 2023 -- in fact, the letter was dated 27 August 2023 -- addressed to BUU3 and BUU5 from a military commission, telling them to report for investigation and punishment. The caseworker stated that there was only a “vague reference” to BUU1’s previous role in this letter, and no mention of his sisters’ names. The letter was from the Pol-e Khomri Military Commission and was addressed to BUU5 and BUU6. It stated:

“You are hereby warned by the Islamic Emirate Military Commission of the Pul-e-Khumri district to report to the department of investigation and punishment, because of your two brothers BUU1 and BUU4.

Your brother BUU1 was involved in espionage and cooperation with foreign forces, i.e. the infidel British forces, and through him your brother BUU4 was also recruited in the National Army of the previous infidel government. Both of them were involved in many activities against the Islamic Emirate and now the time has come for you brothers to pay for their actions.

The Islamic Emirate warns you to come and fight alongside the ranks of Mujahidin of the Islamic Emirate and marry your sisters to the Mujahideen in accordance with the tradition of Jihad-u-Nikiah. If you disobey the order of the Islamic Emirate, the Islamic Emirate will issue a death sentence against you according to Sharia”.

The caseworker also stated that when BUU1’s father was alive the family had received other threat letters, but these were burnt by his father. Mention was made by the caseworker of the assertion that BUU1’s father had died of a heart attack whilst being interrogated by the Taliban.

The caseworker described the additional family members as follows: BUU4 was an officer in the ANA (Afghanistan National Army), BUU7 was a schoolteacher who was purportedly at risk of forced marriage, BUU5 was employed in the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs and had purportedly been interrogated and beaten on a number of dates, BUU8 was a university lecturer who was also at risk of forced marriage, and BUU6 was a university student who was at risk of being forcefully conscripted by the Taliban and executed if he refuses. It was said that BUU6 had been interrogated on numerous occasions when the Taliban had tried to gain information about BUU1 and his brother.

The caseworker also referred to an allegation that the Taliban had visited the family home to ask his mother when he would be returning to face justice and that they told her that they would cut off his leg, and an allegation that BUU5 had been beaten and was subject to a threat from the Taliban to cut off his leg unless BUU1 returned to Afghanistan.

On 15 April 2025, a request was made by BUU1’s legal representatives for a review of the decision with respect to the AFMs. Further evidence of escalation of the threat and risk was provided in the form of a photograph of a letter which had been pinned up on the wall outside the family’s house. The letter was headed “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Military Commission Notice”, was dated (the equivalent of) 19 December 2024, and stated:

“Notice to BUU5 BUU6 and you BUU4 the spy and informant of the infidel regime and all other family members.

We have received information that your entire family left your home under the pretext of illness and treatment and have not returned. You are hereby warned that if you do not return to your residence, your information will be handed over the intelligence and detection agencies. If our forces find you in any area, the death penalty (Qisas order) and the Sharia court summary verdict will be implemented on you.”

This letter was referred to in the notes of the Review Panel, as follows:

“Taliban Letter (2024) . . .

Warning letter (2024) from Taliban to BUU5, BUU6, and BUU4 (all on LOTR application) and ‘other family members. Letter states family left their home under the pretext of ‘illness’ and now the Taliban have ordered for the family to return to their home immediately. Not complying will result in the death penalty.”

The Review Panel upheld the decision of the caseworker, finding that the AFMs were not eligible for relocation to the United Kingdom. Their decision was set out in a letter sent to BUU1 on 12 June 2025. It was explained that:

“7.

When assessing the elevated risk of targeted attacks, the decision maker has considered the following:

The decision maker noted that your additional family members carried their own risk of threats due to their previous roles. In particular, the following roles were considered significant in accessing the individuals risks they may face:

Your brother BUU4 previously served in the Afghan National Army as an officer.

Your brother BUU5 previously served as a Civil Servant for the Ministry of Interior Affairs.

Also, when the decision maker reviewed the letters, it indicated that the Taliban are not only seeking to apprehend you, but are also targeting your brothers due [to] their former association with the previous regime. This supports the view that your brothers face a distinct and credible threat because of their past roles.

Regarding the X-Ray of your brother BUU6, although it demonstrates an injury, there is no supporting evidence to confirm that this injury was caused by the Taliban. A such, the injury on it’s own cannot be directly linked to the Taliban-related harm or persecution.

Therefore, based on the lack of evidence provided to demonstrate your family members are at elevated risk as result of your role for or with a UK Government department, it has been assessed that this requirement has not been met.

8.

When assessing vulnerabilities which have led to an exceptional level of family dependence, the decision maker has considered the following:

The decision maker reviewed the documentary evidence submitted to demonstrate the dependency of all AFMs. In doing so, they considered the financial support you provided remotely (for AFMs including your mothers medical expenses), and noted that all AMFs are adults, with the female AFMs also having the presence of an adult male relative(s) within the household.

Therefore, based on the lack of evidence provided to demonstrate your family members have an exceptional level of dependency on you, it has been assessed that this requirement has not been met.”

The notes of the Review Panel’s decision-making process have been disclosed. They describe their meeting on 4 June 2025: the caseworker presented the case, and the Review Panel then assessed the level of threat to the AFMs and the question of dependency based on the evidence in the application, the statements in support of the review request and the new evidence submitted.

“The panel moved to assessing the level of threat and dependency on the AFMs based on the evidence in the application. Panel also gave careful consideration to the statements supporting the review request. The panel further considered the new evidence submitted by the EP.

The panel discussed the documentary evidence provided by the EP and their legal representatives to demonstrate threat to the AFMs. The panel discussed who the threats were intended for and clarifying EP threats and AFM threats. The panel noted that the brother AFMs could run their own risk of threats due to their previous roles.

The panel acknowledged the threat letters, the timing of such letters and injuries to AFM. The panel agreed that there was difficulty in separating who the threats were aimed at due to AFMs previous roles. After further discussion the panel agreed the evidence and information available is not sufficient to prove that the AFMs are at elevated risks of targeted attacks, specific threats or intimidation, or putting the AFMs at a high risk of death or serious injury due to the EP’s role with HMG.

The panel discussed the documentary evidence provided by the EP to demonstrate dependency of the AFMs. The panel discussed the financial support being provided remotely by the EP and noted that all AFM’s were adult.

After discussions the panel agreed the evidence and information available is not sufficient to prove that the AFMs face specific vulnerabilities which have led to an exceptional level of family dependence.

The panel felt there is not compelling evidence of dependency.

The panel considered the information and evidence provided by the EP as well as the information available in the non [February 2022 data incident] and agreed that the AFMs do not meet condition 13.3(a) or (b).

[Feb 2022 DI] assessment made at a higher classification does not impact on the decision made by the panel.

Based on the information above, the panel unanimously agreed to uphold the initial ineligible decision and rule out all 7 AFMs.”

(Emphasis in the original).

The reference in the decision notes to the “February 2022 data incident” is to the inadvertent leak of data concerning applications under ARAP discussed by Chamberlain J in Ministry of Defence v Global Media and Entertainment Ltd [2025] EWHC 1806 (Admin).

Information relating to BUU1 was referred to on the dataset. The data was BUU1’s ARAP reference number, the number of his “LSU” (that is, the Labour Support Unit: the department that hired him as a military interpreter), his full name, his email address, his Afghanistan phone number, as well as his “Case Status” which was marked as “Complete”, and his “Category” which was marked as “Cat 2 (Eligible)”.

The reference to “Cat 2 (Eligible)” means that BUU1 satisfied the eligibility criteria for ARAP as a “Category 2” individual. In the Ministry of Defence guidance, “Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy: further information on eligibility criteria, offer details and how to apply”, Category 2 was stated to be a cohort who were “Eligible for relocation by default”, and were offered “Routine relocation”. The cohort was defined as:

“those who were directly employed by the UK Government in Afghanistan, or those who were contracted to provide linguistic services to or for the benefit of the UK’s Armed Forces in Afghanistan, on or after 1 October 20021.

The nature of the applicant’s role must have been such that the UK’s operations in Afghanistan would have been materially less efficient or materially less successful if a role of that nature had not been performed. Furthermore, the applicant’s role must have exposed them to being publicly recognised as having performed that role and, as a result of that public recognition, their safety is now at risk.

Examples of such roles are patrol interpreters . . . among others.”

The dataset breach was considered by the caseworker when making his decision. The “CLOSED case notes”, which were disclosed to BUU1 and his legal representatives, contain the following:

“High-risk role?

This case could be high-risk but, this has not been confirmed by policy.

Proximity?

The PA’s previous address in Afghanistan was [redacted] . . . His requested AFMs (apart from his BUU4 who is hiding in Kabul) are living at . . .

Since 07/12/2024 all his requested AFMs are purportedly hiding in multiple locations in the Kabul area.

Direct family members?

The PA applied for 7 AFMs All 7 AFMs are direct family members. (1 mother, 3 brothers and 3 sisters).

OUTCOME

The information on the dataset causes minimal additional risk. The PA provided very limited documentary evidence to substantiate any threats or incidents experienced by his requested AFMs. Consequently an explicit link could not be made between any insecurity and the PA’s previous role. It was noted that his brothers were regularly visiting a mosque where the Taliban confiscate their phones. This would suggest there is minimal risk as the PA told us they visit every day.

Additionally, the requested AFMs have their risks due to their own roles in the ANA, Ministry of Internal Affairs and the education sector.

A dependency reason was not established because, the PA has provided extensive documentary evidence which demonstrates his ability to provide financial support remotely. This includes being able to support his mother’s medical expenses. It was also noted that the PA’s mother and sisters are not without a male guardian.”

The leaked dataset was also considered by the Review Panel. In notes that were disclosed to BUU1 and his legal representatives, it was stated that:

“This case has been considered having conducted a full caseworker assessment of all the evidence provided and information available in P-files, DACS and litigation documents. For the purpose of this review, the AFMs named in this case have been assessed against the [DI Assessment Sept 24]. The assessment has been reviewed and endorsed by AFM Reviews Team AH.

The AFM Review Panel confirmed, based on the evidence assessed the 7 AFM’s listed below will be Ruled Out under ARAP due to not meeting the threshold for risk or dependency in the [Earlier DI Assessment], . . . ARAP . . . and APAP policy by HO Version 5.0 used to assess all ARAP AFM Reviews.

. . .

The information held on the dataset on the principle applicant included the following

-

Applicants name

-

Phone number

-

Email address

The information on the dataset does not contain information directly relating to the AFM’s requested for relocation.

The applicant’s job role was not listed on the dataset therefore AFM’s not likely to be systematically targeted by the Taleban in accordance with the caseworker guidance V1.

AFM [Feb 22 Data Incident] further risk assessment is a recommendation to rule out AFMs as due to the information contained on the dataset there is no elevated risk to safety.”

Following the data breach, the United Kingdom Government introduced a policy to relocate certain individuals who were assessed to be adversely affected: the Afghan Response Route (“the ARR”). A Public Policy Statement with respect to the ARR was published by the Home Office and Ministry of Defence in October 2025. This explained that on 19 December 2023, the UK Government agreed to establish “a new route to the UK for a cohort of high-profile individuals and their dependants and who had also held existing and confirmed links to the UK Government” (emphasis in the original). This was expanded in April 2024 to offer relocation for the remaining highest-risk cohort and for those eligible under the new route to apply for relocation of their AFMs. The ARR was not open to applications but invitations were sent to those found eligible.

Consideration of the ARR was discussed by Paul Rimmer, an official of the Ministry of Defence, in the report that was annexed to the judgment in Global Media. As explained by Chamberlain J in Global Media at [25], the report:

“includes the conclusion, with respect to individuals whose data is included in the dataset, that acquisition of the dataset by the Taliban is “unlikely to substantially change an individual’s existing exposure given the volume of data already available”. It also includes the conclusions that “it appears unlikely that merely being on the dataset would be grounds for targeting” and it is “therefore also unlikely that family members – immediate or more distant – will be targeted simply because the ‘Principal’ appears in the . . . dataset”.”

The Caseworker Guidance for the ARR makes provision for assessing the eligibility of AFMs of ARAP Principals (such as BUU1) who were impacted by the data breach incident.

“14.

When assessing the AFM’s level of threat [redacted] as a result of the principal’s work for or with HMG (ARAP) or eligibility under [data incident] (ARR) caseworkers are to consider all the indicators set out in the table below. An AFM is likely to reach the threshold to be eligible where the principal held (or claimed to hold) a high profile role and where the familial relationship criteria and/or location criteria are met (see table below).”

The table provided that for AFMs of ARAP Principals, the question as to whether the principal undertook a high profile role was met where:

“Upon gaining access to the [data incident] dataset, the Taleban will highly likely prioritise targeting the close family members of high profile individuals.

High profile roles (not in order of priority) include [redacted]

(f)

Any other role not covered in the non-exhaustive list above, which puts the individual at equivalent risk to those in the identified roles. For further guidance, please see “High-profile individuals at equivalent highest risk” caseworker guidance.”

The caseworker guidance also referred to familial relationship and location. For location, this included “Proximity to the principal: is the AFM linked to the principal’s address(es)? . . .” and “Highest risk countries”.

My understanding of the Caseworker Guidance for the ARR is that the caseworker is required not only to look at what information is contained in the dataset, but also to consider whether the role held by the ARAP principal was “high profile.”

Caseworker Guidance for the ARR explains that the risk to individuals is determined by whether they held, or claimed to hold, “high profile roles”. Paragraph 3 of the Caseworker Guidance states that:

“Where an entry on the dataset contains information that indicates the individual held a high profile job role, irrespective of whether they held it or not, caseworkers are to determine that individual has met Condition B of the eligibility requirements of the Afghan Response Route (ARR) set out in the ARR Policy Statement. Where there is no information on the dataset to indicate what job role the affected person held, and caseworkers are also not satisfied the applicant held the high profile role claimed (i.e. in their ARAP application), they will not meet Condition B of the ARR. Post-break-glass, individuals will be able to provide further evidence to support their claims.”

The reference to “break-glass” is to when the data incident became public knowledge: 15 July 2025.

At paragraph 4 it was provided that:

“It was most likely that the information associating the individual with a high profile will be in the free text [redacted] of the dataset. However, caseworkers must ensure that they have checked all fields pertaining to the affected person and their family members (where applicable). Examples of information that may associate an individual with a high profile job role include but are not limited to

At paragraph 6, it was provided that “Roles considered high profile are set out at Addendum A and B of the Policy Statement.” At paragraph 7, it was provided that “Where a caseworker is unsure whether a job is high profile [redacted] please raise to your TL in the first instance”.

The Caseworker Guidance also dealt with “Assessing equivalent highest risk to those relocating under the ARR”. At paragraph 8, it was provided that “Where an individual did not hold or claim to hold a role listed in Addendum A [redacted] or Addendum B to the Policy Statement, a caseworker should consider whether there is evidence to suggest that the applicant held a high profile role which puts him at equivalent risk to those in a listed high-profile role.”

According to the ARR Policy Statement, an eligible principal was someone who the decision-maker assessed as being “at highest risk by meeting all eligibility requirements in A, B, C & D”. Requirement A is an affected individual: an individual who had previously applied to ARAP as a principal applicant and was impacted by the data breach. Requirement B is that they must have been “positively assessed” by the decision-maker in accordance with the caseworker guidance “to have held, or claimed to have held [redacted]”:

“i.

one or more of the roles in Addendum A;

ii.

one or more of the roles in Addendum B and where it has been determined by the “decision maker” that the person’s role puts them at equivalent risk to an individual with one or more of the roles in Addendum A; or

iii.

a different high-profile role not listed in Addendum A or Addendum B, but where it has been determined by the “decision maker” that they held a role which puts them at equivalent risk to those in the identified roles.”

Requirement C is that they have not previously been found eligible under ARAP or some other route; and requirement D is that they are considered to be in a “high-risk” country, which includes Afghanistan.

BUU1 seeks to challenge the decision to refusal of the ARAP application by the Review Panel on the sole ground that it involved an illogical and irrational reasoning process. This applies both to the decision with respect to “elevated risk” and also to “vulnerability/dependency”.

Ms Naik KC, who appeared with Ms Daykin on behalf of BUU1, contended that the application for relocation of the AFMs had to be considered against BUU1’s background role – to provide linguistic services to the British Armed Forces in Afghanistan – and the fact that it was accepted that the role exposed him to being publicly recognised as having performed that role, and as a result his safety was at risk. That was the reason why BUU1 had been accepted as an ARAP principal.

With respect to “elevated risk”, it was contended by Ms Naik KC that the question was whether the AFMs were at elevated risk as a result of BUU1’s work from whatever baseline starting point was identified. Given that the threats and interrogations to the AFMs refer to BUU1, it cannot rationally or logically be concluded that risk to the AFMs was not elevated as a result of BUU1’s work, even if there was a risk to the AFMs as a result of BUU1’s brothers’ activities (BUU4 and BUU5) and even if there was a risk to BUU7 and BUU8 (the sisters) as females having worked in education.

What the Review Panel had done in this case was to say that they could not disentangle the risk arising from BUU1 and the risk arising from his brothers and so it could not be said that the risk to the AFMs was elevated, and that was irrational. In this regard, Ms Naik KC referred to the warning letter of 19 December 2024, and contended that this letter was not referred to by the Review Panel in their decision when it should have been. Furthermore, proper consideration of this letter would have informed the Review Panel’s approach to the first warning letter of 27 August 2023.

Further, Ms Naik KC submitted that there was an error in concluding that the injury to BUU6 could not be directly linked to the Taliban. The evidence as to what had happened to BUU6 had to be seen in the context of all the evidence that had been presented.

With respect to “vulnerabilities”, the Review Panel had imposed a requirement for “compelling evidence of dependency” which was not called for by the rules. Further, given that it was accepted that the male AFMs were at risk of targeted attacks, it was irrational to point to those same male AFMs as a source of protection for the female AFMs. Further, it was said that the AFMs were specifically vulnerable or faced specific circumstances due to the distinct and credible targeting by the Taliban of BUU1’s brothers.

Ms Naik KC submitted that the AFMs were all completely dependent on BUU1 for financial support for their everyday and medical expenses, and this constituted an “exceptional level of family dependence”. Protection was simply not available. This was particularly the case for BUU1’s mother who suffered from poorly controlled diabetes which impacted her health even though she had access to some private medical care. The decision maker had also failed to consider that BUU6 required surgery that was not available in Afghanistan.

Ms Naik KC submitted that the decision that the data breach had no impact on the assessment was also irrational. The data breach was obviously an additional factor relevant to the assessment of risk for those who were already vulnerable. The dataset definitively confirmed BUU1’s connection with the British armed forces. The dataset included the reference to BUU1 as having been found eligible as “Cat 2”, and this identified BUU1 as someone who had provided linguistic services and was eligible for relocation under ARAP. This acceptance of his eligibility meant that BUU1 was, by definition, a high profile individual, and this had not been factored into the decision-making on elevated risk. The review panel should have appreciated that the categories of high profile persons was not closed (see R (CX1) v Secretary of State for Defence [2024] EWHC 892 (Admin) at [60]), and so a review of the role that BUU1 performed should have been undertaken. That was not done. Moreover, the finding of the review panel that BUU1’s role was not listed on the dataset, and so the AFMs were not likely to be systematically targeted, was an error of fact.

The application was opposed by Lord Murray, who appeared with Ms Kassamali on behalf of the Secretary of State. Lord Murray contended that the decision of the Review Panel was not illogical, irrational or otherwise unlawful. The Review Panel considered all of the relevant evidence and made findings that were reasonably open to them with respect to the question of “elevated risk”, as well as “vulnerabilities”.

Lord Murray explained that an “elevated risk” was a risk that was beyond any existing risk levels for the AFMs and must be connected directly to the work that the ARAP eligible principal had performed. The Review Panel was entitled to conclude that the evidence did not demonstrate that there was such a connection. It was not sufficient that there had been a threat to the AFMs.

Lord Murray submitted that the Review Panel was entitled to conclude that the data breach had not elevated the risk to the safety of the AFMs. The information contained in the dataset did not list BUU1’s job, and it was entirely reasonable to decide that the AFMs were not likely to be systematically targeted by the Taleban. The dataset referred to the categorisation under ARAP – category 2 – but this encompassed a range of roles. In any event, the role carried out by BUU1 was rationally regarded as not being a “high risk role”: this was a finding which was reasonably open to the Review Panel.

Given the significance of the decision for BUU1 and the potential impact of a negative decision, I consider that anxious scrutiny should be applied to the decision-making process. I bear in mind, however, that whilst applying anxious scrutiny, the process is reasonably expedited and the reasoning can be quite brief. The reasons provided cannot be examined as if they were the product of judicial drafting to which an overly forensic analysis should be applied.

If the process of reasoning contains “a logical error or critical gap” then this will mean that it was irrational for a “process” reason: see R (KP) v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] EWHC 370 (Admin) at [56]. As Saini J observed in R (Wells) v Parole Board [2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin) at [33], the Court should ask “does the conclusion follow from the evidence or is there an unexplained evidential gap or leap in reasoning which fails to justify the conclusion?”

In considering the question of elevated risk, the Review Panel identified that “the brother AFMs could run their own risk of threats due to their previous roles”. That was an entirely reasonable conclusion for the Review Panel to arrive at given the work that two of the brothers (BUU4 and BUU5) had previously performed.

The Review Panel also formed the view that “there was difficulty in separating who the threats were aimed at due to AFMs previous roles”, and concluded that “the evidence and information available is not sufficient to prove that the AFMs are at elevated risks of targeted attacks, specific threats or intimidation, or putting the AFMs at a high risk of death or serious injury due to [BUU1’s] role with HMG”. This conclusion was an entirely reasonable one for the Review Panel to reach.

The letter of 27 August 2023 contained a warning to BUU5 and BUU6 “because of your two brothers BUU1 and BUU4”, and then went on to describe their previous roles. From this letter, it was plainly open to the Review Panel to conclude that it was not possible to disentangle the source of the risks for the AFMs; and that it could not be demonstrated that the risks were “elevated” as a result of BUU1’s former activities.

For the purposes of ARAP, a risk is “elevated” if, as a result of the principal’s previous activities or role, it is greater, or higher, or increased from whatever baseline risk applies to the relevant AFMs. That makes sense as ARAP is intended to honour the contribution made by the principal and provide support as a result of the risks that result from that contribution, rather than any risk that may otherwise apply to family members of the principal. In many cases, the baseline risk will be the risk that applies generally to persons living in Afghanistan, or generally to persons living in Afghanistan with the particular characteristics of the AFMs. In some cases, the baseline risk may be higher than for the generality as a result of the previous activities or role of family members other than the principal.

From the letter of 27 August 2023 taken on its own, the Review Panel could reasonably form the view that it could not discern any additional – that is, an “elevated” – risk to the AFMs as a result of BUU1’s former activities or role given that both he and BUU4 were referred to in that letter. In other words, the Review Panel could not tell whether the risk to AFMs would be any different if BUU1 had not carried out his former activities.

The reasonableness of this view is not affected by the letter of 19 December 2024. Contrary to Ms Naik KC’s contention, the letter of 19 December 2024 was before the Review Panel and they had regard to it. The letter referred to BUU4 as “the spy and informant of the infidel regime”. The letter did not refer to BUU1 specifically and did not describe him in the kind of hostile language used for BUU4. From this letter, therefore, there was no basis for the Review Panel to infer that there was an additional (or elevated) risk to BUU1’s family as a result of BUU1’s former activities. If anything, the proper inference would have been that the risk to the AFMs arose from BUU4’s activities.

As for the Review Panel’s determination on “vulnerabilities”, the decision letter of 12 June 2025 refers to the financial support provided by BUU1 which is used for, among things, his mother’s medical expenses. The decision letter refers to the fact that each of the AFMs are adults, which means that they would ordinarily be expected to be able to care for themselves. The decision letter refers to the fact that the female AFMs have the presence of an adult male relative within the household which means that they will be able to enter public spaces, as they will have an adult male relative who can accompany them.

No mention was made, however, of the threats faced by the AFMs that were not connected with BUU1. No consideration was given to whether those threats gave rise to a vulnerability leading to an exceptional level of family dependence on BUU1. Both in the decision letter, and in the notes of the Review Panel’s decision-making, the threats to the AFMs were treated as relevant to the issue of “elevated risk” only, and entirely independently from the issue of vulnerability.

Lord Murray, for the Secretary of State, accepted that risks to the AFMs could fall within the assessment of vulnerability. In my judgment he was right to do so. There is nothing in the definition of vulnerability within the policy framework for AFMs that excludes the specific risks faced by family members living in Afghanistan that are not the result of the principal’s former activities. Those risks might affect the assessment of vulnerability as they may impact on the level of dependence that the family members have on the principal and the ability of the principal to provide care and protection from outside of Afghanistan.

The failure to give consideration to this matter means that the Review Panel’s decision on vulnerability is irrational. There was a failure to take into account an obviously material consideration. Alternatively, the reasoning contains an evidential gap.

As for the impact of the data breach, the reasoning of the Review Panel was that (i) there was no information on the dataset directly relating to the request for relocation with respect to the AFMs; (ii) the principal’s job role was not listed on the dataset, therefore the AFMs are “not likely to be systematically targeted by the Taleban in accordance with the caseworker guidance V1”; and (iii) based on the further risk assessment associated with the data incident, given the information on the dataset there is no elevated risk to safety.

I consider that this reasoning was irrational for process reasons, using Chamberlain J’s taxonomy in KP. The Caseworker guidance for the ARR provides that the assessment of the level of threat to an AFM for the purposes of determining eligibility under ARR requires caseworkers to consider whether the principal was a high profile individual, assessing that question against a list of roles and the more general description of “Any other role . . . which puts the individual at equivalent risk to those in the identified roles”.

The analysis carried out by the Review Panel did not include consideration of whether BUU1, whose name appears on the dataset, carried out a role which was high profile, either because it was a specifically identified role or was a role which put him “at equivalent risk”. The Review Panel appears to have confined itself to looking merely at whether or not BUU1’s role was listed on the dataset, and having found that it was not listed they went on to decide that the AFMs are “not likely to be systematically targeted by the Taleban in accordance with the caseworker guidance”.

Lord Murray submitted that the Review Panel must be taken to have concluded that BUU1’s role was not a “high profile” one, and that this was a finding open to them given that all that was said about BUU1 in the dataset was that he had been found ARAP eligible under Category 2. However, it is not possible for the Court to be satisfied that the Review Panel reached the conclusion that BUU1 had not been in a high profile role, or that any such conclusion was rational, given that there is no reference in the decision letter or in the notes of the Review Panel to any consideration of that question.

I do not consider that this error is saved by reliance on the caseworker’s decision-making. The caseworker’s notes state that BUU1’s case “could be high-risk, but this has not been confirmed by policy”. It is not indicated in the Review Panel’s decision notes whether they agreed or disagreed with the caseworker’s assessment. In any event, even if they did agree with the caseworker, the caseworker’s statement is somewhat enigmatic, and there is no evidence before the Court as to what the caseworker meant by it: did it mean, for instance, that the caseworker had assessed BUU1’s case against the “policy”? If so, the basis for that conclusion was not explained by the caseworker, and so it is not possible to understand why the caseworker reached the decision that he did.

For the foregoing reasons, therefore, I consider that the decision of the Review Panel upholding the conclusion that the AFMs of BUU1 were not eligible for relocation was unlawful. The application for judicial review is, therefore, allowed.