JSC, R (on the application of) v Cambridgeshire County Council

The Claimant is an 11-year-old child residing in the Defendant's area. She has been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (‘ASD’) and extreme anxiety. Her primary school identified this Special Educational Need (‘SEN’) and requested an Education, Health and Care (‘EHC’) Needs Assessment on 2 April 2025. On 29 May 2025, the Defendant notified the Claimant’s litigation friend, who is her primary carer, that it would proceed with that assessment. Under the Special Educational Needs and Disability Regulations 2014 (‘SEND Regulations’), the Defendant had to decide whether to issue an EHC plan within 16 weeks of one being requested, and to finalise that plan within 20 weeks of that request.

In this Claimant’s case, it is accepted that the Defendant failed to meet either deadline. Indeed, it was not until after the Claimant, through her litigation friend, had applied for permission to challenge that failure by judicial review that, on 21 October 2025, the Defendant made the decision not to issue an EHC plan in this Claimant’s case. In other words, it made that decision 12 weeks and 6 days beyond the statutory deadline.

In consequence of that decision, the Claimant no longer pursues her original application for mandatory relief. However, she maintains her application for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that the Defendant acted unlawfully by failing to complete the EHC Needs Assessment, and to reach a decision as to whether to issue an EHC Plan within the statutory timescales. This judgment addresses that application, and applications ancillary to it.

On 28 October 2025, Benjamin Douglas-Jones KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, granted anonymity to the Claimant, in view of her age and expectation of privacy in relation to her medical information. I reaffirmed that order at the hearing of this matter. He adjourned the Claimant’s application for permission to a rolled-up hearing, which took place before me on 16 December 2025.

Other directions made by the Deputy High Court Judge also require consideration now, because there has been a failure of compliance with them by the Defendant. It was directed, at paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the Court’s Order of 28 October, that the Defendant serve any written evidence within 14 days. Further, it was directed, at paragraph 4(e) of the Order, that the Defendant serve their skeleton argument 5 days before the hearing.

In fact, the Defendant served the statement of Katy Blessett, on which they seek to rely, on 15 December 2025, which is also the date of the statement. It was not received by the Court until 16 December, the day of the hearing. A statement served with it, in support of an application for relief from sanctions, pursuant to CPR 3.8(1) and 3.9, from Michaela Sangster, seeks to explain this delay. She enumerates a series of issues that arose with the instruction of counsel. She says that “the Defendant required legal advice and support in order to fully prepare for the rolled-up hearing and was not able to secure and brief alternative Counsel until 12 December 2025.” As Ms Popal accepted on the Defendant’s behalf, the reasons advanced by Ms Sangster represented excuses for the Defendant’s failure of compliance rather than reasons.

Similarly, the skeleton argument of Ms Popal on behalf of the Defendant was not served until 16 December 2025, which is also the date of the document. It was received by the Court immediately before the hearing commenced. This delay is not addressed by the statement of Ms Sangster. However, Ms Popal explained, and I accept, that after she was instructed on 12 December 2025 she became unwell and unable, as a result, to provide the skeleton argument earlier than she did.

I have considered the criteria for relief from sanction in CPR 3.9, and the 3-stage test set out in Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906. This enjoins consideration of the seriousness of the breach, the reasons for it, and all circumstances of the case to determine how justly to deal with the application. The breach here, as the Defendant acknowledges, is a serious and significant one. It was the result of the Defendant wishing to have involvement from counsel in the decision as to what evidence to serve as well as to provide a skeleton argument, coupled with the difficulties in securing counsel for this purpose. It was a breach that created a real risk that the rolled up hearing fixed for 16 December 2025 would have to be delayed, and a real risk that the Claimant would be prejudiced in her preparation for the hearing. The deadlines imposed were designed to avoid exactly such risks.

However, Mr Small on the Claimant’s behalf takes no issue with the delay, and accepts that the Claimant is not prejudiced by it, so that the hearing can proceed despite the Defendant’s failure of compliance. In those circumstances, I am prepared to grant relief from sanction for this breach.

However, this is subject to one caveat. In her skeleton argument, Ms Popal takes issue with a body of material relied on by the Claimant and included in their hearing bundle which was served 14 days before the hearing, as directed by the Court’s order of 28 October 2025, and with the content of which the Defendant at that time took no issue. I will return to this issue when I consider the extent to which I should take account of that body of material, but I make clear at the outset that I consider it is not appropriate for the Claimant to be disadvantaged in the presentation of her case by reason of an objection arising on the day of the hearing as a consequence of the Defendant’s failure to comply with the Court’s order.

Under section 36(1) of the Children and Families Act 2014, a Local Authority must consider a request for an EHC Needs Assessment and determine whether such an assessment is necessary. As section 36(2) makes clear, an EHC needs assessment “…is an assessment of the educational, health care and social care needs of a child or young person.” If the Local Authority agrees to carry out an assessment, it must comply with the procedural and time requirements set out in the 2014 SEND Regulations. These regulations are required to give effect to section 36(11) and are required to include deadlines for the stages of the process that section 36 requires.

Regulation 5(1) of the SEND Regulations requires a Local Authority to notify its decision on whether to conduct an EHC Needs Assessment within 6 weeks of receiving the request. In this case, the request was made on 2 April 2025, and the Local Authority notified its decision to conduct the assessment on 29 May 2025, within the required timeframe.

Regulation 6(1)(d) requires the Local Authority to seek advice from an Educational Psychologist as part of the EHC Needs Assessment (thereby reflecting the requirement in section 36(8), Children and Families Act 2014. It was the delay occasioned by this requirement that the Defendant submits resulted in their failure to comply with the deadlines in the SEND Regulations.

Regulation 10(1) mandates that, following an EHC Needs Assessment, the Local Authority must decide whether an EHC Plan is necessary and notify the child's parent or the young person of that decision within 16 weeks from the date the request for the assessment was received. That date in this case would have been 23 July 2025, the request having been made on 2 April 2025. The Regulation provides, at 10(4), the limited exceptions to the time limit. These include the missing by the child of an appointment for the assessment or their absence from the area of the relevant local authority’s responsibility. The reasons given by the Defendant here, in relation to the limited numbers of available child psychologists do not fall within any of the exceptions.

Regulation 13(2) provides:

That date in this case would have been 20 August 2025.

The Special Educational Needs and Disability Code of Practice 2015 (‘the Code of Practice’), issued under section 77 of the Children and Families Act 2014, provides statutory guidance. The Forward to Code of Practice addresses why such assessment is of importance, as follows: “For children and young people this means that their experiences will be of a system which is less confrontational and more efficient. Their special educational needs and disabilities will be picked up at the earliest point with support routinely put in place quickly, and their parents will know what services they can reasonably expect to be provided. Children and young people and their parents or carers will be fully involved in decisions about their support and what they want to achieve. Importantly, the aspirations for children and young people will be raised through an increased focus on life outcomes, including employment and greater independence.”

The Introduction to the Code makes clear that the requirements and timescales addressed therein are mandatory: “The bodies listed in paragraph iv. must have regard to the Code of Practice. This means that whenever they are taking decisions they must give consideration to what the Code says. They cannot ignore it. They must fulfil their statutory duties towards children and young people with SEN or disabilities in the light of the guidance set out in it. They must be able to demonstrate in their arrangements for children and young people with SEN or disabilities that they are fulfilling their statutory duty to have regard to the Code. So, where the text uses the word ‘should’ it means that the guidance contained in this Code must be considered and that those who must have regard to it will be expected to explain any departure from it.”

Paragraphs 9.39-9.42 of the Code emphasise that Local Authorities must adhere to the timescales in the 2014 Regulations to ensure timely support for children with SEN. For example, paragraph 9.39 says: “The process of EHC needs assessment and EHC plan development must be carried out in a timely manner. The time limits set out below are the maximum time allowed. However, steps must be completed as soon as practicable. Local authorities should ensure that they have planned sufficient time for each step of the process, so that wherever possible, any issues or disagreements can be resolved within the statutory timescales. Where the child’s parent or the young person agrees, it may be possible to carry out steps much more quickly and flexibly. For example, a child’s parent or the young person might be happy to agree changes to an EHC plan following a review while at the review meeting, where all parties are content. Under no circumstances should the child’s parent or the young person be put under pressure to agree things more quickly than they feel comfortable with, and where there is any doubt or the child’s parent or the young person requests more time, local authorities must follow the steps and timescales set out in this guidance.”

In H v East Sussex County Council [2009] EWCA Civ 249; [2009] ELR 161 Waller LJ said (at paragraph13) "…all I do say is that if the issue relates to the education of a child as at the beginning of a school year, at every stage speed must be of the essence."

More recently, in R (On the Application Of W) v Hertfordshire County Council [2023] EWHC 3138 (Admin) (08 December 2023) David Lock KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, observed (at paragraph 15): “The primary duty on the Local Authority is to complete a finalised EHC plan "as soon as possible". However, an outer limit is set for the period within which it has to be completed. That outer limit is set at 20 weeks from the date of the request being made, not the date when the Local Authority agrees to undertake the assessment and complete a finalised EHC plan”.

The Deputy High Court Judge further said (at paragraph 17): “Whilst I accept that the Regulations place onerous obligations on local authorities, these are not duties to use “best endeavours” to complete assessments within defined periods but are hard edged legal duties. Subject to not coming within any of the very limited exceptions under Regulation 10(4), none of which are relevant here, the Local Authority will be acting unlawfully each time that it fails to complete an assessment and prepare the EHC plan within the time period specified in the Regulations”.

Section 37(1) of the Children and Families Act 2014 makes provision for EHC Plans, “Where in the light of an EHC Needs assessment, it is necessary for special educational provision to be made for a child … in accordance with an EHC plan …” Section 37(2) explains what must be specified in an EHC Plan, as follows:

“(a)

the child's or young person's special educational needs;

(b)

the outcomes sought for him or her;

(c)

the special educational provision required by him or her;

(d)

any health care provision reasonably required by the learning difficulties and

disabilities which result in him or her having special educational needs;

(e)

in the case of a child or a young person aged under 18, any social care provision which must be made for him or her by the local authority as a result of section 2 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970...;

(f)

any social care provision reasonably required by the learning difficulties and disabilities which result in the child or young person having special educational needs, to the extent that the provision is not already specified in the plan under paragraph (e).”

The essential facts are set out in the statement of the Claimant’s litigation friend, and the correspondence included in the permission bundle. They are not in dispute.

The Claimant is an 11-year-old child residing in the Defendant's area. She has been diagnosed with ASD and suffers from extreme anxiety, which is described as manifesting in heightened sensitivity to new environments, meltdowns, withdrawal, difficulty concentrating, and challenges in social interactions and transitions. These needs, it is contended, require structured support, sensory accommodations, and one-to-one assistance to enable her to access education. Without such support, it is contended that the Claimant’s anxiety escalates, leading to emotional distress, reduced academic progress, and potential long-term harm.

This SEN was identified by the Claimant’s primary school, and, on 2 April 2025, the school submitted a request for an EHC Needs Assessment to the Defendant. That request was supported by the Claimant’s litigation friend, who is her primary carer. On 29 May 2025 (following a panel on 27 May 2025), the Defendant notified the Claimant’s litigation friend that it would proceed with the assessment. Under the SEND regulations, relevant time periods flow from the 2 April date of request. It is agreed that this meant:

On 21 June 2025, the SEN Casework Officer in the Defendant's Statutory Assessment Team, confirmed that the assessment was underway and that advice would be sought from professionals, including an Educational Psychologist. The Claimant’s litigation friend and the school provided all requested information promptly. However, the process stalled due to the Defendant's failure to secure an Educational Psychologist's report. This became apparent when, on 3 September 2025, an urgent update was requested on the Claimant’s behalf, noting her anxiety upon starting secondary school that day and the outstanding Educational Psychologist input.

The Defendant’s officer responded on 5 September 2025, apologising for delays attributed to high demand and workforce shortages, which were described as a "national difficulty". It was confirmed that the Claimant was awaiting allocation of an Educational Psychologist, and provided no timescale. In a later update, on 12 September 2025, the Defendant reported that Educational Psychologists were allocating cases from December 2024 (while the Claimant's was from May 2025), but again the Defendant provided no timescale for the assessment. As noted above, that assessment was already significantly outside the deadline imposed by the SEND Regulations.

According to the Claimant’s litigation friend’s statement, since starting secondary school without an EHCP, the Claimant's anxiety has intensified, resulting in panic attacks, difficulty attending classes, social isolation, absences (e.g., several days in the first two weeks), and reduced engagement.

On 11 September 2025, the Claimant’s litigation friend submitted a formal complaint to the Defendant, which remains under investigation but yielded no progress at the material time. On 16 September 2025, the Claimant's solicitors sent a Letter Before Action demanding completion of the assessment within 21 days. No response or action followed, and an application for permission to judicially review the Defendant’s failure to address the EHC Needs assessment it had undertaken to produce was submitted on 1 October 2025, and this application was sealed on 10 October 2025.

The Defendant complains that “in breach of the clear terms of the Judicial Review Pre-action Protocol”, the Claimant’s Letter Before Action was not sent to the Defendant’s legal department. In this regard, Ms Popal points to the fact that other correspondence from the Claimants’ solicitors, in relation to other similar complaints, had been addressed to the Defendant’s legal department. The Defendant submits that this precluded a reply being provided before the claim was issued. In fact, the email address for the Defendant used by the Claimant was one used in all formal correspondence on her behalf with the Defendant. I do not consider that the Claimant can be criticised for its use here. In any event, as Ms Blessett’s statement makes clear, the delay of a response from the Defendant was also the consequence of the failure of the department to which it was sent not itself forwarding it to the legal department “due to an oversight” for 2 weeks.

The Claimant provided its unsealed claim to the Defendant on 1 October 2025, and it follows that the Defendant was aware of the Claimant’s action thereafter.

On 13October 2025, the Claimant was assessed by an educational psychologist, who reported to the Defendant on 14 October. On 21 October 2025, the Defendant wrote to the Claimant’s litigation friend to advise that it had decided not to prepare an EHC Plan in her case. It was suggested on behalf of the Defendant that this sudden turn around from a lack of timescales for assessment and a lack of any psychologist to perform it in their September correspondence was independent of the threat of legal action by the Claimant. There is, however, no evidence to support that suggestion. In particular, it is not supported by the belatedly served statement from Ms Blessett. In contrast, the dateline of events strongly suggests that the assessment was undertaken as a direct result of the threatened application for judicial review, with the assessment undertaken on the Monday after the application was lodged on the Friday.

As the Claimant accepts, her remedy against the decision on 21 October not to prepare an EHC Plan lies in an appeal to the First Tier Tribunal. She has therefore abandoned her original grounds 2-4, by which she sought mandatory relief to require the making of a decision as to her request for EHC Needs assessment. It follows that this Court is only required to resolve her ground 1, by which she seeks declaratory relief for the Defendant’s breach of its statutory duty to undertake the EHC assessment within the periods mandated.

The Claimant here seeks declaratory relief. The Defendant submits that such relief should not be given when the claim has been rendered academic by the Defendant’s decision, communicated on 21 October 2025, not to provide an EHC plan to the Claimant.

The starting point for considering whether a court should permit a party to pursue an academic point in a public law case is the classic statement of Lord Slynn of Hadley in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Salem [1999] I AC 450 (at p.456):

“… I accept, …, that in case where there is an issue involving a public authority as to questions of public law, your Lordships have a discretion to hear the appeal, even if by the time the appeal reaches the House, there is no longer a lis to be decided which will directly affect the rights and obligations of the parties inter se … The discretion to hear disputes, even in the area of public law, must be exercised with caution and appeals which are academic between the parties should not be heard unless there is good reason in the public interest for doing so as for example (but only by way of example) where a discrete point of statutory construction which does not involve detailed consideration of the facts, and where large number of similar cases exist or are anticipated so that the issue will most likely need to be resolved in the near future”

That dicta was relied on by Silber LJ in R (Zoolife International Ltd.) v Secretary of State for the Environment [2007] EWHC 2995 (Admin), when he concluded (at paragraph 36):

“…academic issues cannot and should not be determined by courts unless there are exceptional circumstances such as where two conditions are satisfied in the type of application now before the court. The first condition is in the words of Lord Slynn in Salem (supra) that “ a large number of similar cases exist or anticipated” or at least other similar cases exist or are anticipated and the second condition is that the decision in the academic case will not be fact-sensitive. If the courts entertained academic disputes in the type of application now before the court but which did not satisfy each of these two conditions, the consequence would be a regrettable waste of valuable court time and the incurring by one or more parties of unnecessary costs.”

Against that background, it is appropriate to consider the circumstances in which it has been deemed appropriate to grant declaratory relief.

In R (ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2013] UKSC 25, [2013] 3 CMLR 29, Lord Carnwath said (at paragraph 37): “The fact that the breach has been conceded is not, in the court's view, a sufficient reason for declining to grant a declaration, where there are no other discretionary bars to the grant of relief. Such an order is appropriate both as a formal statement of the legal position, and also to make clear that, regardless of arguments about the effect of arts. 22 and 23, the way is open to immediate enforcement action at national or European level."

In R (Hunt) v North Somerset Council [2015] 1 WLR 3375, Lord Toulson (at paragraph 12) observed:

Having reviewed those decisions, in R (Good Law Project) v Secretary of State for Health [2001] EWHC 346 (Admin) Chamberlain J concluded (at paragraph 152): “These decisions establish that a claimant who establishes that a public body has acted unlawfully will normally be entitled to a declaration to mark the illegality in cases where no other relief is appropriate.” Chamberlain J went on to make clear that there were exceptions to this normal position, such as where there had been “a single, historic public law breach in an individual case”. He added: “Another circumstance in which it might be appropriate to withhold relief is where the proceedings were unnecessary because the breach was admitted at the outset: it is no part of the court’s function to rub a defendant’s nose in his admitted breach.”

R(on the application of W) v Hertfordshire County Council [2023] EWHC 3138 (Admin) (08 December 2023) related to a challenge by way of judicial review to the failure of that local authority to complete EHC assessments and plans within the timescales mandated by the SEND Regulations. David Lock KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, considered the claimant’s grounds and observed (at paragraph 22):

“the Claimant wishes to argue that there is a larger problem with unlawfulness than the Local Authority’s response to his daughter's case. I explored the precise nature of the case he wishes to bring during the course of the hearing and it became clear that he wishes to assert that the Local Authority is acting in a systematically unlawful manner. The Claimant is acting in person and the I accept that full extent of his case was not wholly clear on the papers, although the basic structure of that case was present. It is not a claim to which the Local Authority have responded and, to be fair to the Local Authority, it is not a claim which was totally clear from the way in which this case was initially drafted.”

Against that background, the Deputy High Court concluded (at paragraph 34):

“There is no dispute, that the Local Authority acted unlawfully in that it acted in breach of its statutory duty to complete a “finalised EHC plan” within 20 weeks. For the reasons set out above, that period of time ran from the date when the request was made by the Claimant on 30 December 2022, not from when the Local Authority agreed to do the assessment on 5 Aril 2023. The assessment and EHC plan has now been completed and so I do not have to consider whether I would have been prepared to make a mandatory order but I am prepared to make a Declaration that the Local Authority has acted unlawfully in failing to complete the finalised EHC plan within the statutory period.”

There is no question here but that the Defendant acted unlawfully by failing to comply with the mandatory deadlines set out in the SEND Regulations.

Ms Popal, on behalf of the Defendant, asserts that the Defendant has made that clear from the outset. However, that is not correct.

A review of the correspondence sent from the Defendant to the Claimant’s litigation friend on 5 and 12 September 2025 does not include any acknowledgement of her assertion that the Defendant was in breach of the SEND Regulations and therefore acting unlawfully. There was no response to the Claimant’s Letter before Action, in circumstances I have addressed above. The Defendant did not communicate with the Claimant or those acting for her in relation to her application when it communicated its decision not to issue an EHC Plan on 21 October 2025, and did not respond to the receipt of the unsealed application for judicial review that was issued on 1 October.

When the Defendant did respond to the Claimant’s application, in Detailed Grounds of Resistance, dated 11 November 2025, it stated in relation to the application for declaratory relief (the Claimant’s Ground 1) as follows: “The Defendant accepts that it did not complete the EHC Needs Assessment within the statutory timescales. The reasons for this are set out above and were outside the Defendant’s control. The Claimant’s EHC Needs Assessment has now been completed and the outcome (that no EHC Plan will be prepared for her) communicated to her parents. Accordingly, this ground is academic and permission should be refused, or, alternatively the claim should be dismissed”. I agree with Mr Small’s submission on behalf of the Claimant that even this acceptance by the Defendant falls short of an acknowledgement that the failure it accepted meant that the Defendant had acted unlawfully.

Ms Popal further submits that the Claimant’s approach now to Ground 1, and the application for declaratory relief, has been an evolving one, which has put the Defendant at a disadvantage and should not be permitted. She points to the fact that the Claimants Statement of Facts and Grounds, as sealed on 10 October 2025, at paragraph 35 addressed Ground 1 in the following terms: “The Defendant is in breach of its statutory duty under section 36(8) of the CFA 2014and regulation 10 of the SEND Regulations 2014 to complete the EHC Needs Assessment and notify the Claimant's parent (or litigation friend) whether it will issue an EHCP within 16 weeks of receiving the request (i.e. by 23 July 2025).” On this basis, Ms Popal submits that the declaratory relief sought related solely to the Claimant, and not to any wider illegality by the Defendant.

Ms Popal went on to refer me to the Claimant’s Response to the Defendant’s Detailed Grounds of Resistance, dated 17 November 2025, which she submits first, but she says ambiguously, referred to the wider implications of and justification for declaratory relief at paragraph 8 in the following terms: “The Claimant’s case is not academic, notwithstanding the Defendant’s belated completion of the EHC Needs Assessment on 21st October 2025. As established in W v Hertfordshire County Council [2023] EWHC 3138 (Admin), judicial review remains appropriate where a local authority’s breach of statutory duties has caused prejudice, including distress, costs, and lost educational opportunities, even if the substantive process has since concluded. Here, the Defendant’s delay has caused significant prejudice to the Claimant (a vulnerable child with special educational needs), her family, and has broader public interest implications given the systemic issues in Cambridgeshire.” (emphasis added).

Ms Popal submits that even there the Claimant did not identify the material included by the Claimant in the hearing bundle, also served on 17 November 2025, and did not address the basis on which the Claimant justified her contention that she was still entitled to declaratory relief. This justification, Ms Popal submits, only arose in the Claimant’s skeleton argument, which was served on 4December 2025.

I do not accept that analysis.

As Mr Small submits, it was made clear at paragraph 3 of the Statement of Facts and Grounds that one element of the relief then sought was “A declaration that the Defendant is in breach of its statutory duties under the CFA 2014 and SEND Regulations 2014”, and this remains the relief sought under this Ground. Contrary to Ms Popal’s submission, this is not a declaration only in relation to this Claimant. Rather, it is a declaration as to the compliance by this Defendant with what David Lock KC rightly described, in R(W) v Hertfordshire County Council (at paragraph 17), as “hard edged legal duties”.

In the Claimant’s Response to the Detailed Grounds for Resistance, whilst she abandoned her application for mandatory relief (at paragraph 3), the Claimant repeated, at paragraph 4, that she continued to seek: “A declaration that the Defendant acted unlawfully by failing to complete the Education, Health and Care (“EHC”) Needs Assessment and decide whether to issue an EHC Plan within the statutory 16-week timescale under Regulation 6 of the Special Educational Needs and Disability Regulations 2014 (“SEND Regulations 2014”).” The Response went on, specifically, to refer to the observations of Lord Slynn in ex parte Salem, Silber LJ in Zoolife and Chamberlain J in Good Law Project as providing a basis for that declaratory relief. It was, therefore, clear that such relief was sought on a public interest basis. It follows that there was nothing ambiguous about the way in which this was expressed at paragraph 8 of the Response, quoted above.

Moreover, at paragraph 24 of the Response, the Claimant justified the need for declaratory relief further in the following terms: “The Claimant’s representatives have been involved in 24 separate legal challenges against the lawfulness of the Defendant’s administration of the EHC Needs Assessment process since July 2025. It is clearly in the public interest that the issues raised in this claim are determined, as they will reinforce the Defendant’s duties under the CFA 2014 and potentially assist other families.”

It follows that it was again made clear that the need for declaratory relief was wider than just the Claimant herself, and that other cases relating to other applicants for EHC Plans from the Defendant were relied on. There was, therefore, notice in the Response for reliance on the material relating to those other applicants that was included in the hearing bundle served at the same time. The Defendant had been directed to address that hearing bundle in the Court’s Order of 28 October 2025, but as with those other aspects of that Order that related to them, the Defendant failed to do so.

The Defendant submits that the Claimant could only rely on the wider public interest, by reference to the complaints made by others, if those others were joined as claimants or at least interested parties to the present claim and/or if the Claimant had amended the claim to encompass them. Ms Popal, in this regard, points to the observations of David Lock KC in R(W) v Hertfordshire County Council (at paragraph 22) as to the evolving nature of the case advanced by the Claimant in that case. She submits that this was permitted for a litigant in person, but should not be permitted for a legally represented claimant.

It is right to note that the evolving nature of the claim in the Hertfordshire case was considered by the Deputy High Court Judge to place the defendant in that case at a disadvantage, and yet he did grant the declaratory relief sought. In this case, I am not persuaded that there is such a disadvantage to this Defendant, on the above analysis, because the declaratory relief now sought has always been part of the claim and the Claimant’s case has not evolved in a comparable way. Moreover, the approach in the Hertfordshire case (and indeed in others of the cases cited above) demonstrates that there is no requirement for there to be multiple claimants, or interested parties joined to a claim, before the Court can consider declaratory relief in the public interest.

Those other cases, rather, show that declaratory relief remains available where mandatory relief is no longer required, where there is, to quote Lord Slyn in ex parte Salem, “good reason in the public interest for doing so”, which may arise where there are  a “large number of similar cases exist or are anticipated so that the issue will most likely need to be resolved in the near future”. The Claimant submits that here such relief was always sought, and the fact that other relief is no longer necessary is not a reason to prevent such relief being obtained because that public interest criteria is met. The Claimant advances this contention on the basis that the illegality of the Defendant’s conduct in this Claimant’s case is mirrored in a large number of cases, and may arise in those other cases in the near future. This involves not an evolution of claim, Mr Small submits on the Claimant’s behalf, but a way of demonstrating that the existing claim remains valid. The question, therefore, is whether the claimant can demonstrate by reference to evidence that such a large number of other cases exist.

It is therefore necessary to consider what the material relied on by the Claimant is, whether it can be relied on by her, and to the extent that she can rely on it, what it demonstrates as to the public interest in the declaratory relief sought.

The evidence on which the Claimant seeks to rely can be divided into a number of categories, as follows:

In the first category, the Claimant has included in the bundle 7 letters sent on the Defendant’s behalf in response to complaints made as to the progress of requests for EHC assessment and/or the issuing of EHC Plans. These range in date from June 2020 to November 2025. In each case there is an acknowledgement of a failure by the Defendant to meet the timescales mandated in the SEND Regulations. Various reasons are offered for why this has happened, mirroring reasons given in this Claimant’s case, such as workforce shortages and staff sickness, a lack of child psychologists, and an unprecedented level of demand.

In the second category, the Claimant has included in the bundle 20 letters before action issued by those representing the present Claimant against the Defendant in relation to cases in which the timescales in the SEND Regulations have not been met. They dated from April 2024-November 2024, and includes occasions when the Defendant has exceeded the deadlines by between 6 and 52 weeks, with the majority nearer the upper end of that range.

The Claimant submits that this correspondence supports her contention that declaratory relief would be in the public interest, because the same issues raised by this Claimant have also arisen in a number of other cases. Litigation in those other cases could arise on the same basis as the application was originally made in this Claimant’s case, and those involved would be assisted by the clarity a declaration would provide.

The Defendant submits that the Court should not have regard to this material because the Claimant’s reliance involves a breach of privacy relating to the individuals in question by the producing of documents marked “Private and Confidential” without evidence of those individuals’ consent.

Moreover, she submits that the Claimant is in breach of CPR 31.22. This states, in so far as is relevant:

Ms Popal submits that these documents were not disclosed to the Claimant for the purposes of these proceedings and therefore CPR 31.22 prevents reliance on them, and, again, there is no evidence of the consent of the individual concerned.

The Defendant seeks to rely on DVP v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWHC 606 (Admin) to support its interpretation of CPR 31.22, but that case does not address that rule, but rather the misuse in that case of the urgent application route to judicial review. In that case, the Court was critical of the claimant’s solicitors seeking to obtain mandatory relief for persons who they did not represent. That is not what the Claimant here is seeking to do. Rather, she is seeking a declaration which she contends to be in the public interest because it also affects other children in the Defendant’s area of responsibility.

Similarly, the Defendant seeks to rely on Tchenguiz v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2015] EWCA Civ 1129, but that addresses the consequences of inadvertent disclosure of material attracting public interest immunity, and equally does not assist as to the proper interpretation of CPR 31.22. In my view, CPR 31.22 does not operate here to prevent reliance by the Claimant on the material in these two categories. The rule is designed to prevent collateral use of material disclosed for the purposes of legal proceedings. However, the material here was disclosed to the Claimant for the purposes of these legal proceedings, and it is in these legal proceedings that she seeks to rely on them.

There is, however, more force in Ms Popal’s other contention that the material in these two categories contained private and personal information relating to a number of children, and reliance upon it can only properly occur where there is consent from the parents or guardians of the children in question to its use. As she rightly points out, there have been inadvertent failures of effective redaction to the correspondence, which includes details of the assessment of the SEN of the children in question, with details as to their schools, and those who have had dealings with them. The hearing bundle does not include any evidence of consent to the use of this material. I accept Mr Small’s submission that had the Defendant complied with the Court’s Order of 28 October 2025, this issue would have been raised at a time when the Claimant would have had the opportunity to remedy this omission. However, given the extremely sensitive and confidential nature of this material, in my view it is essential that there is absolute clarity as to the fact and nature of consent to its use. The need for such consent should have been clear to the Claimant, without the necessity for the issue to be raised by the Defendant.

For this reason, I do not take the material in these two categories into account in determining whether there it would be in the public interest to grant the declaratory relief sought.

The position is different in relation to the third category. This relates to the Defendant’s response to a request made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 which asked, in relation to the period 2024-2025, for “the number of children currently awaiting an Education Health and Care Needs Assessment? How many EHC Needs assessments have exceeded the 16-week deadline? How many EHC Needs assessments have exceeded the 20-week deadline.” The answers given by the Defendant, as at 21 November 2025, were as follows:

Ms Popal submits that the above numbers are ambiguous as the number waiting more than 20 weeks appears to exceed the number waiting for more than 16. The figures are not altogether clear. However, as Mr Small points out, these are the figures the Defendant provided and it would be unfair for the Defendant to take advantage of their own ambiguity. Moreover, as Mr Small submits, the figures show that the Claimant was very far from alone in having the assessment process in her case take longer than the mandatory timescales. On the contrary, the figures demonstrate this to be a substantial and systematic issue.

There is nothing in the belatedly served statement of Ms Blessett to undermine or otherwise qualify these figures. Indeed, in contrast to the position in R(W) v Hertfordshire County Council (at paragraph 36), there is only limited evidence in that statement to explain why the Defendant has breached the timescales in so many cases, and not evidence as to what steps it has taken to address this issue. What that statement does include is the following (at paragraphs 4-5): “Between January 2025 – November 2025, we have received a total of 1,709 requests for Education, Health and Care Needs Assessment, averaging at 155 request per month. So far in 2025, we have received 274 complaints relating to delays in completing the Education, Health and Care Needs Assessment. Of those 85 complaints were pursued to Stage 3.” Ms Blessett therefore gives further information as to the scale of the issue with the statistics she provides.

The final category of material relied on is the evidence of the Defendant’s own correspondence in this case.

In the email from the Defendant’s SEN Casework Officer to the Claimant’s litigation friend, dated 5 September 2025, the Defendant stated: “I am very sorry that A ’s needs assessment is taking far longer than it should. This is because the County Council is receiving many more requests for assessment than our Educational Psychology (EP) workforce and the Statutory Assessment Team are able to manage in a timely way”.

That accords with what Ms Blessett says at paragraph 8 of her witness statement: “The Defendant has an Educational Psychology Service, part of whose function is to carry out assessments for EHC Needs Assessments. Demand for EHC Needs Assessments is exceptionally high within the Defendant’s area, and this service is currently struggling to meet that demand, particularly given that there is currently a national shortage of educational psychologists. Regrettably, it was not possible for the Claimant to be assessed by an educational psychologist within the statutory timeframe.”

In the further email from the Casework Officer on 12 September 2025, the Defendant stated: “…the LA are receiving many more requests for EHC needs assessments than the workforce is able to manage in a timely way. This is part of a wider national difficulty. In Cambridgeshire, we are trying to address this situation by seeking to expand our educational psychology workforce as well as by working with locum educational psychologists to carry out more EHC Needs assessments as quickly as we are able to.” The Defendant went on to say that it was not possible to say when the assessment would take place. The following was said in this context: “What I can see is that the Educational Psychologists are currently allocating cases from panel on the 19th of December and [JSC] was at panel on of 27th May.”

Mr Small submits that this shows that the Defendant was running 9 months behind in relation to the undertaking of assessments, which demonstrates the scale of the Defendant’s failure to meet mandatory deadlines. This is disputed by Ms Popal, who points to the fact that the Defendant was able to undertake the assessment on the Claimant in less than a 9 month period. As I have already identified, the assessment in this Claimant’s case appears to have been the result of the application for judicial review, and not, therefore, an indicator of whether or not the Defendant was running with a 9 month backlog on assessments. That is, however, the clear interpretation of what the Defendant’s Casework Officer said on 12 September.

Again, therefore, this material demonstrates there to be systemic issues resulting in the risk at least of unlawful failures of compliance with the mandatory timescales relating to EHC assessments and the issuance of EHC Plans by the Defendant.

I am satisfied that the Claimant has an arguable ground for judicial review, and I grant permission.

I have concluded that it is appropriate to grant the declaratory relief sought in this Claimant’s case. This is for the following reasons.

First, it is clear that the Defendant has acted unlawfully by failing to complete the Claimant’s EHC Needs Assessment and to decide whether to issue an EHC plan within the timescales mandated by the SEND Regulations. As was made clear, for example in R(W) v Hertfordshire County Council, the requirements as to deadlines were not just that the Defendant should use their best endeavours, but that they should complete the process at the latest by the deadlines mandated. They did not do so. As Mr Small submitted in his skeleton argument: “In SEN cases, time is critical. The very reason an EHCP needs assessment is triggered is that a child or young person is already struggling to cope in a mainstream setting, despite the support their school is providing. The primary goal of the assessment is to act promptly: to identify the child’s needs clearly and to recommend the additional provision that may be required — provision that, in many cases, can only be secured and funded by the Local Authority through an Education, Health and Care Plan.”

In accordance with the conclusions of Chamberlain J in R (Good Law Project) v Secretary of State for Health “… a claimant who establishes that a public body has acted unlawfully will normally be entitled to a declaration to mark the illegality in cases where no other relief is appropriate.” I am satisfied that there is no good reason not to follow that normal course.

By reference to the approach of Lord Toulson in Hunt “simply to dismiss the claim when there has been a finding of illegality is likely to convey a misleading impression and to leave the claimant with an understandable sense of injustice.” Such a sense of injustice would be heightened in this case by the fact that the unlawful conduct of the Defendant did cause the Claimant significant prejudice. As the statement of the Claimant’s litigation friend (at paragraph 16) illustrates this: “The Defendant's failure has had a profound impact on JSC. Since starting at Cromwell Community College in September 2025 without an EHCP, her anxiety has intensified significantly. She has experienced panic attacks, difficulty transitioning between classes, and social isolation, leading to absences and reduced engagement in learning. For instance, in the first two weeks of term, JSC missed several days due to overwhelming anxiety, and the school has reported challenges in supporting her without formal guidance from an EHCP. This is causing long-term harm to her education, mental health, and development.” The fact that the unlawful conduct was a direct cause of harm, as thus described, shows the declaration sought to be other than academic.

Moreover, in terms of the practical effect of the declaration in this Claimant’s case, it will provide a clear context for the handling of any renewed application for a further such assessment in the future. Pursuant to section 36(6), Children and Families Act 2014, she is entitled to make such an application 6 months after the decision reached on 21October 2025, and any doubt that the Defendant had as to the legality of its position if it fails to meet the timescales has been removed.

Contrary to Ms Popal’s submissions, the fact that the Claimant can apply again does not mean that she has alternative remedies for the unlawfulness already perpetrated by the Defendant. The fact that she can appeal the decision belatedly reached, in breach of the mandated timescales, and the fact that she can apply again, does not alter the fact that she has been prejudiced by unlawful conduct, and that she has been the subject of that unlawful conduct.

In any event, in accordance with the approach identified by Lord Slyn in ex parte Salem, there is here “good reason in the public interest”, for granting declaratory relief because there are  a “large number of similar cases exist or are anticipated so that the issue will most likely need to be resolved in the near future”. The evidence provided by the Defendant’s correspondence, the statement of Ms Blessett and the statistics included in its response to the Claimant’s Freedom of Information Act request, provide a proper basis for the conclusion that there were systemic issues which meant that the Defendant regularly failed to meet the mandated timescales set out in the SEND Regulations, and therefore acted unlawfully on a significant number of occasions. Such systemic illegality, in contrast to a one off breach, is not something that should go unmarked.

This is not, as Ms Popal submitted, to “rub a defendant’s nose in his admitted breach”. It is, rather, to make clear that the Defendant was acting unlawfully when serious prejudice was occasioned to a vulnerable 11 year old girl, and when it has acted in the same way in a large number of similar cases also relating to vulnerable young people. The declaration therefore both identifies past unlawful conduct, deters such conduct in the future and vindicates the Claimant’s rights.

Accordingly, I do make the declaration sought by the Claimant, namely: “The Defendant acted unlawfully by failing to complete the Claimant’s EHC Needs Assessment and decide whether to issue an EHC Plan within 16 weeks of the request, contrary to Regulation 10 of the SEND Regulations 2014”.

The Claimant also makes an application for her costs, and has served a schedule in which those costs are set out. She is clearly entitled to costs reasonably incurred. However, as there is dispute about the quantum of those costs, I direct that the figure of costs is to be subject of detailed assessment unless it can be agreed.