Scott Halborg v Solicitors Regulation Authority

This is the hearing of two consolidated appeals by the Appellant, pursuant to the Solicitors Act 1974 (“SA 1974”), who was, at all material times, on the Roll of Solicitors and in practice as a partner at Deals and Disputes Solicitors LLP (“the Firm”).

The first appeal (AC-2025-LON-001761), which I shall refer to as “the interim condition appeal”, was filed on 23 April 2025 and issued on 2 June 2025, pursuant to section 13A(6) SA 1974. The Appellant challenged the decisions of the Respondent (“the SRA”), dated 8 January 2025 and 26 March 2025, to impose an interim condition upon the Appellant’s practising certificate for 2024/25 that he “shall not act in litigation work in any capacity or supervise others carrying on litigation work in connection with the provision of legal services”.

The second appeal (AC-2025-LON-002792), which I shall refer to as “the substantive appeal”, was filed on 12 August 2025 and issued on 21 August 2025, pursuant to sections 47 and 49 SA 1974. The Appellant challenged the decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), which was given orally at the end of the hearing on 8 April 2025 and in a written Judgment issued on 22 July 2025. The Tribunal found that the admitted facts amounted to a lack of integrity. It imposed a sanction of 12 months suspension from practice as a solicitor and ordered the Appellant to pay costs in the sum of £30,630 (Footnote: ¹). The Appellant appealed against all the orders made by the Tribunal.

It was common ground that the substantive appeal should be considered first. The suspension from practice took effect from 8 April 2025 and will expire on 7 April 2026. In effect, it superseded the interim condition order. The parties raised the issue of the future renewal of the Appellant’s practising certificate, but that issue is outside the scope of these appeals.

The allegations made by the SRA against the Appellant, and found proved, were as follows:

“Between January 2021 and November 2023, …. Mr Scott Halborg while in practice as a Partner at Deals and Disputes Solicitors LLP (“the Firm”):

1.1

Submitted proceedings and/or applications which were found to be totally without merit and/or an abuse of process;

1.2

Was made subject to two limited civil restraint orders and a general civil restraint order; and

1.3

Behaved in a manner which caused the court to express concern about his conduct.

By doing so, [the Appellant] breached any or all Principles 1, 2 and 5 of the SRA Principles (“the Principles”) and Paragraphs 2.4 and 2.6 of the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, RELs and RFLs (“the Code”).”

Extracts from the Principles and the Code are in Appendix 1 to this Judgment.

The Appellant admitted the facts of the allegations and signed an Agreed Statement of Facts (“ASF”). The Appellant also admitted that those facts amounted to professional misconduct and breaches of Principles 1 and 2 of the SRA Principles 2019 (“the Principles”), and Paragraphs 2.4 and 2.6 of the SRA Code of Conduct (“the Code”). The Appellant was represented by Mr Dermot Keating KC, who made written and oral submissions on his behalf.

The only matter in dispute at the hearing was whether the admitted matters breached the Appellant’s duty to act with integrity. The Tribunal found that they did.

The Appellant’s witness statement dated 7 March 2025 set out his account of the relevant litigation at paragraphs 16 – 24. This included the Savage Hayward claim and a claim brought by EMW Law.

The allegations in the disciplinary proceedings arose out of litigation between the Appellant and Halborg Limited (a company owned by him) against his parents, referred to as Persons A and B.

Claim 1, issued in March 2019, was a dispute regarding funds which the Appellant alleged that Persons A and B held on trust for him.

In Claim 2, issued on 18 December 2020, the Appellant and Halborg Limited issued proceedings against the solicitor, solicitor’s firm and barrister who were representing Persons A and B in Claim 1, namely Mr Gregory Hollingsworth, Hollingsworth Solicitors, and Mr Stephen Taylor. It was alleged that Persons A and B had paid the fees of their solicitors and counsel using the disputed funds in Claim 1.

The Appellant’s firm of solicitors acted on behalf of the Appellant in Claims 1 and 2. The Appellant was the fee-earner for both claims, as well as being the firm’s client and a party to the proceedings.

In the course of Claims 1 and 2, the Appellant made some 12 applications that were found to be totally without merit, one of which was regarded as an abuse of process. The Appellant was also made the subject of two limited civil restraint orders (“LCROs”) made by HH Judge Bloom on 6 July 2021 (sealed by the court on 12 July 2021), followed by a two-year general civil restraint order (“GCRO”) made by HH Judge Clark on 14 September 2021.

In addition to Claims 1 and 2, in 2021 the Appellant was engaged in other litigation, in his capacity as a property owner and landlord, in which he made applications which were found to be totally without merit.

Following reports from two firms of solicitors involved in litigation against him, the SRA initiated an investigation into the Appellant’s conduct. On 14 May 2024, the Authorised Decision Maker at the SRA decided to refer the Appellant to the Tribunal.

The Tribunal’s Executive Summary stated as follows:

“3.

The SRA alleged—and the Respondent admitted—that he had issued proceedings and applications found to be totally without merit and conducted litigation in a manner that drew judicial criticism. However, he denied that his conduct lacked integrity.

4.

The Tribunal found to the requisite standard that the Respondent, a solicitor of over 20 years’ standing, and designated as Compliance Officer for Legal Practice (“COLP”) and Compliance Officer for Finance and Administration (“COFA”), had engaged in sustained improper litigation conduct during proceedings arising from a family dispute.

His approach—marked by procedural attrition and repeated unmeritorious applications—represented a serious departure from the standards expected of the profession and breached the obligations of the overriding objective. The Tribunal determined on the balance of probabilities that his conduct lacked integrity.

5.

The Tribunal determined that his culpability was high. The harm caused was exacerbated by the exceptional strain on the courts during the COVID-19 pandemic and the heightened responsibilities that attached to his senior regulatory roles. His late-stage admissions did not demonstrate meaningful insight.

6.

The Tribunal rejected his submission that a reprimand or fine would suffice. It imposed a 12-month suspension, concluding that only this sanction could properly reflect the seriousness of the misconduct and uphold public confidence in the legal system.”

The Appellant has a statutory right of appeal to the High Court against the order of the Tribunal, pursuant to section 49 SA 1974. The High Court, on such an appeal, can make such order “as it may think fit” (section 49(4)).

The appeal is governed by CPR Pt 52 and PD 52D. Under CPR 52.21(3), the question for the Court is whether the decision of the Tribunal is “wrong” or “unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court”.

The appeal proceeds by way of review unless the Court considers that it would be in the interests of justice to hold a rehearing: see CPR 52.21(1), and Salsbury v Law Society [2009] 1 WLR 1286, at [30]. The scope of the court’s powers on a review in most cases renders it unnecessary to hold a re-hearing: Adesemowo v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2013] EWHC 2020 (Admin), at [9] - [12].

In Ali v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2021] EWHC 2709 (Admin), Morris J. summarised the authorities in this field on the meaning of “wrong”, as follows:

“94.

Fourthly, as regards the approach of the Court when considering whether the Tribunal was “wrong”, I refer in particular to Solicitors Regulation Authority v Day [2018] EWHC 2726 (Admin) at §§61-78, Solicitors Regulation Authority v Good [2019] EWHC 817 (Admin) at §§28-32, the Naqvi Judgment at §83, citing Solicitors Regulation Authority v Siaw [2019] EWHC 2737 (Admin) at §§32-35, and most recently, Martin v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2020] EWHC 3525 (Admin) at §§30-33. From these authorities, the following propositions can be stated:

(1)

A decision is wrong where there is an error of law, error of fact or an error in the exercise of discretion.

(2)

The Court should exercise particular caution and restraint before interfering with either the findings of fact or evaluative judgment of a first instance and specialist tribunal, such as the Tribunal, particularly where the findings have been reached after seeing and evaluating witnesses.

(3)

It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appellate court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge would have reached. That is a high threshold. That means it must either be possible to identify a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence. If there is no such identifiable error and the question is one of judgment about the weight to be given to the relevant evidence, the Court must be satisfied that the judge’s conclusion cannot reasonably be explained or justified.

(4)

Therefore the Court will only interfere with the findings of fact and a finding of dishonesty if it is satisfied that that the Tribunal committed an error of principle or its evaluation was wrong in the sense of falling outside the bounds of what the Tribunal could properly and reasonably decide.

(5)

The Tribunal is a specialist tribunal particularly equipped to appraise what is required of a solicitor in terms of professional judgment, and an appellate court will be cautious in interfering with such an appraisal.

Finally, as regards reasons, decisions of specialist tribunals are not expected to be the product of elaborate legal drafting. Their judgments should be read as a whole; and in assessing the reasons given, unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary, it is appropriate to take it that the Tribunal has fully taken into account all the evidence and submissions: Martin, supra, §33.”

In Wingate v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2018] 1 WLR 3969, Jackson LJ undertook an extensive review of the authorities on the term “integrity”. He concluded as follows:

“95.

Let me now turn to integrity. As a matter of common parlance and as a matter of law, integrity is a broader concept than honesty. In this regard, I agree with the observations of the Divisional Court in Williams and I disagree with the observations of Mostyn J in Malins.

96.

Integrity is a more nebulous concept than honesty. Hence it is less easy to define, as a number of judges have noted.

97.

In professional codes of conduct, the term “integrity” is a useful shorthand to express the higher standards which society expects from professional persons and which the professions expect from their own members. See the judgment of Sir Brian Leveson P in Williams at [130]. The underlying rationale is that the professions have a privileged and trusted role in society. In return they are required to live up to their own professional standards.

98.

I agree with Davis LJ in Chan that it is not possible to formulate an all-purpose, comprehensive definition of integrity. On the other hand, it is a counsel of despair to say: “Well you can always recognise it, but you can never describe it.”

99.

The broad contours of what integrity means, at least in the context of professional conduct, are now becoming clearer. The observations of the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal in Hoodless have met with general approbation.

100.

Integrity connotes adherence to the ethical standards of one’s own profession. That involves more than mere honesty. To take one example, a solicitor conducting negotiations or a barrister making submissions to a judge or arbitrator will take particular care not to mislead. Such a professional person is expected to be even more scrupulous about accuracy than a member of the general public in daily discourse.

101.

The duty to act with integrity applies not only to what professional persons say, but also to what they do. It is possible to give many illustrations of what constitutes acting without integrity. For example, in the case of solicitors:

i)

A sole practice giving the appearance of being a partnership and deliberately flouting the conduct rules (Emeana);

ii)

Recklessly, but not dishonestly, allowing a court to be misled (Brett);

iii)

Subordinating the interests of the clients to the solicitors’ own financial interests (Chan);

iv)

Making improper payments out of the client account (Scott);

v)

Allowing the firm to become involved in conveyancing transactions which bear the hallmarks of mortgage fraud (Newell-Austin);

vi)

Making false representations on behalf of the client (Williams).

102.

Obviously, neither courts nor professional tribunals must set unrealistically high standards ….The duty of integrity does not require professional people to be paragons of virtue …”

Jackson LJ observed, at [103], that a professional disciplinary tribunal has specialist knowledge of the profession and its ethical standards. Accordingly it is well placed to identify want of integrity and the decisions of such a body on that issue must be respected, unless it has erred in law.

The Appellant referred to the observations of Collins Rice J. on the issue of integrity in Hurst v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2026] EWHC 85 (Admin), at [61] and [122]:

“61.

A failure to act with integrity is an imputation of unethical conduct. As such, it is more than a portmanteau reference to a corpus of professional standards. It connotes an element of personal substandard ethical behaviour or untrustworthiness – a degree of what lawyers sometimes refer to as moral turpitude.”

“122….. These, and the finding of lack of professional integrity, are findings of bad faith, to put it no higher than that. As such, they import an elevated standard of proof and of reasoning ….”

In my view, the observations of Collins Rice J. that a failure to act with integrity connotes “moral turpitude” and “bad faith”, which require an elevated standard of proof and reasoning, are not supported by the authorities. Instead, I follow the guidance of the Court of Appeal in Wingate.

I also note that, by rule 5 of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2019 (“the 2019 Disciplinary Rules”), the allegations had to be proved to the standard applicable in civil proceedings (the balance of probabilities), and the Tribunal expressly applied this standard.

The SRA relied upon the case of Vay Sulip v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2018] EWHC 957 (Admin) where the Divisional Court, per Lane J., held:

“161.

At paragraph 162.13 of the decision, the SDT found the appellant’s bringing of judicial review proceedings showed he had failed to uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice. The appellant’s actions lacked integrity.

……

164.

Paragraph 10 of the grounds submits that the SDT incorrectly adopted an approach at paragraph 144 of its decision, which involved assessing the morality of the appellant rather than whether he was a person of integrity. At paragraph 144, the SDT assessed the appellant –

“… as someone who lacked a steady adherence to a moral code; that it did not appear to have occurred to him that he should act as a “filter” to ensure that the system would not be clogged up with hopeless, urgent applications which neither the court nor the Home Office will consider favourably with knowledge of the true facts and circumstances; and that he demonstrated a belief that his duties were to his client, but he was blind to his duties to the court and in the wider context of the administration of justice.”

165.

Read as a whole, there is nothing remotely troubling with paragraph 144. On the contrary, the SDT’s approach to integrity is entirely compatible with the judgment of Jackson LJ in Wingate and Another v Solicitors Regulation Authority; Solicitors Regulation Authority v Malins [2018] EWCA Civ 366:- …”

In Nowak v Nursing and Midwifery Council & Anor [2013] EWHC 1932 (QB), Leggatt J. helpfully summarised the scope, purpose and effect of civil restraint orders, as follows.

“Power of the court to make a civil restraint order

53.

A civil restraint order is defined by rule 2.3(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules as:

“an order restraining a party –

(a)

from making any further applications in current proceedings (a limited civil restraint order);

(b)

from issuing certain claims or making certain applications in specified courts (an extended civil restraint order); or

(c)

from issuing any claim or making any application in specified courts (a general civil restraint order).”

54.

Pursuant to CPR rule 3.11, the circumstances in which the court has power to make a civil restraint order against a party to proceedings and the consequences of making such an order are set out in Practice Direction 3C.

55.

The practice direction states that a limited civil restraint order may be made by a judge of any court where a party has made 2 or more applications which are totally without merit (para 2.1) ; an extended civil restraint order may be made by (amongst others) a judge of the High Court “where a party has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit” (para 3.1); and a general civil restraint order may be made, again by (amongst others) a judge of the High Court, “where the party against whom the order is made persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit, in circumstances where an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate” (para 4.1).

56.

Where a civil restraint order is made by a High Court judge, the party against whom the order is made will be restrained: in the case of a limited order, from making any further applications in the proceedings in which the order is made; in the case of an extended order, from issuing claims or making applications in the High Court or any county court concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order is made; and in the case of a general order, from issuing any claim or making any application in the High Court or any county court – in each case without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order (paras 2.2, 3.2 and 4.2). These consequences of an extended or general civil restraint order are clearly not intended to be invariable, as the relevant provision is in each case prefaced by the words “unless the court otherwise orders”. The effect of the practice direction, as I see it, is to establish default rules, which may be modified as appropriate in any particular case.

The rationale for civil restraint orders

58.

As explained by the Court of Appeal in the leading case of Bhamjee v Forsdick [2004] 1 WLR 88, the rationale for the regime of civil restraint orders is that a litigant who makes claims or applications which have absolutely no merit harms the administration of justice by wasting the limited time and resources of the courts.

Such claims and applications consume public funds and divert the courts from dealing with cases which have real merit. Litigants who repeatedly make hopeless claims or applications impose costs on others for no good purpose and usually at little or no cost to themselves. Typically such litigants have time on their hands and no means of paying any costs of litigation – so they are entitled to remission of court fees and the prospect of an order for costs against them is no deterrent. In these circumstances there is a strong public interest in protecting the court system from abuse by imposing an additional restraint on their use of the court’s resources.

59.

It is important to note that a civil restraint order does not prohibit access to the courts. It merely requires a person who has repeatedly made wholly unmeritorious claims or applications to have any new claim or application which falls within the scope of the order reviewed by a judge at the outset to determine whether it should be permitted to proceed. The purpose of a civil restraint order is simply to protect the court’s process from abuse, and not to shut out claims or applications which are properly arguable.”

The Appellant’s grounds of appeal were pleaded in his Appellant’s Notice, and supported by a detailed skeleton argument. Both documents were dated 12 August 2025. The Appellant declined to file a consolidated skeleton argument, in accordance with HH Judge Birt’s direction, and on 2 January 2026 he informed the Administrative Court that he would be relying on the pleadings already filed in both appeals. However, on 26 January 2026 (the day before the hearing) he filed a 45 page “Speaking Note” in which he raised a number of new issues, without any prior notice to the SRA’s Counsel. I allowed him to address me on all the issues, by way of background, but I made it clear to him that I would be deciding the appeal on the basis of the pleaded grounds only. There was no application to amend his grounds.

The Appellant summarised his Grounds of Appeal in the Appellant’s Notice and his skeleton argument as follows:

“Pursuant to sections 47 and 49 Solicitors Act 1974, the Appellant seeks to set aside the Tribunal’s findings and order on the basis, amongst other matters, that the Tribunal made errors of law and misinterpreted its statutory powers (in particular that it incorrectly applied or interpreted the Solicitors Act and associated legislation and common law), that there was an unreasonable exercise of discretion (in particular that the decision was unreasonable and/or disproportionate in the circumstances), that there was procedural irregularity (regarding the evidence taken into account, and the delay in producing written reasons etc), and that there was insufficient evidence to support the findings of fact. The Appellant seeks that this learned Court sets aside the Tribunal’s decision and substitutes its own decision in the terms set out herein.”

On Ground 1, the Appellant submitted that the Tribunal improperly relied on extraneous material going beyond the ASF. The Tribunal was not entitled to take into account any of the other material before the Tribunal, in particular, not the evidence of Mr Hollingsworth.

In my judgment, Ground 1 is misconceived. Rule 27 of the 2019 Disciplinary Rules, which make provision for agreed facts in tribunal proceedings, does not state that, where the parties agree a statement of facts, a tribunal is thereby prohibited from considering the other evidence in the case. It is the practice of courts and tribunals to consider all the evidence before them unless it has been found to be inadmissible or irrelevant. It is common for courts to consider statements of agreed facts on specific issues, whilst other issues remain in dispute, and must be determined on the evidence.

In this case, the issue of integrity was in dispute, and the Tribunal was entitled to have regard to all the evidence in determining it, and when determining sanction. The ASF expressly recorded that the Tribunal “has had sight of a bundle of documents, marked “Exhibit TW1””. In its Judgment, the Tribunal confirmed that it read and reviewed all the material before it (Judgment/15.1 - 15.2).

The hearing bundle included the two statements of Mr Hollingsworth to which the Appellant objected. On 10 March 2025, the Appellant objected to the admission of Mr Hollingsworth’s evidence. At a hearing on 31 March 2025, the Tribunal recorded the basis of that objection as follows:

“Mr Hollingsworth was on the other side of what were adversarial proceedings and so was not impartial. The key point is that his evidence is not relevant to the charge as it would be the judicial comments on which it will be determined as opposed to Mr Hollingsworth’s evidence. Mr Keating KC submitted that as Mr Hollingsworth provides only unnecessary commentary, his evidence is not relevant and risks elongating the hearing without good reason.”

On 3 April 2025, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s application to exclude the evidence of Mr Hollingsworth. Issues such as the relevance and credibility of, and the weight to be attached to, the evidence of Mr Hollingsworth were matters for the panel hearing the substantive case.

At the hearing, Mr Keating KC submitted that the Tribunal was not permitted to consider the evidence of Mr Hollingsworth because the parties had agreed not to call him as a witness, as his evidence was partially disputed, and the parties considered it disproportionate to litigate the matters in dispute (Transcript/545).

Mr Walker, for the SRA, agreed that the focus should be on the ASF, but submitted that the background and the context of Mr Hollingsworth’s evidence could not be ignored. Mr Walker referred to text messages and emails from the Appellant about costs which were exhibited to Mr Hollingsworth’s statements, and should not be disregarded. Other parts of Mr Hollingsworth’s statements should be treated with caution because they were disputed by the Appellant, and the SRA did not seek to rely upon them, as it was not necessary to do so in order to establish its case (Transcript/545, 546).

Mr Walker explained to the Tribunal that Exhibit TW1 included the Appellant’s representations and evidence which the Tribunal was entitled to consider as his “observations” on matters in dispute between the parties and “contextual submissions”. I note that this material went well beyond the scope of the ASF and its inclusion demonstrates that the Tribunal was not confined to consideration of the ASF.

In my view, the existence of the ASF did not prevent either party from making submissions about Mr Hollingsworth’s evidence, and there was no agreement nor any legitimate expectation that the Appellant, the SRA or the Tribunal would refrain from consideration of his evidence.

In the event, the Tribunal did not refer to Mr Hollingsworth’s evidence in its Judgment. In his skeleton argument, at paragraphs 10 and 12, the Appellant submits that the Tribunal did rely on Mr Hollingsworth’s evidence, in its findings as to the motivation behind Claims 1 and 2 and its reference to the Appellant not having discharged the adverse costs order in Claim 1.

On the issue of motivation, I agree with the SRA’s submission that it appears from the Judgment that the Tribunal drew its own inferences about the Appellant’s conduct and state of mind, having regard to the court judgments and orders made against the Appellant. There is nothing to suggest that it based their views on Mr Hollingsworth’s evidence.

On the issue of costs, the Tribunal recorded the SRA’s submission at Judgment/15.4(e), to the effect that the underlying costs in Claim 1 remained unresolved with recent correspondence indicating an ongoing dispute. The Tribunal found at Judgment/15.13(f) that the underlying costs in Claim 1 remained unresolved, reinforcing the ongoing consequences of the Appellant’s conduct and the lack of finality in the litigation which he initiated.

It is apparent from the transcript that both parties made submissions to the Tribunal on costs, including Mr Walker at Transcript/519, 520, 521, 544, 546 and Mr Keating KC at Transcript/543, 544, 545, 551. In these submissions, there were references to the emails that the Appellant sent to Mr Hollingsworth, which referred to the non-payment of costs, as well as other information relevant to costs, for example, the Appellant’s statement of means, dated 18 March 2025, which referred to the costs as an outstanding liability. The Tribunal Chair said, at Transcript/544, that the panel had read emails from the Appellant to Mr Hollingsworth, exhibited to Mr Hollingsworth’s witness statement, saying he was never going to pay the costs. Mr Keating KC asked the panel to ignore those emails, but Mr Walker submitted that they should not be disregarded. Mr Walker said, at Transcript/546:

“No. I think the focus should be on the agreed statement of facts, because that reflects the current position. But the, the statement, for example, of Mr Hollingsworth reflected an earlier stage in proceedings when a number of matters were an issue, including some of the allegations. That situation has changed and on that basis the Applicant has taken the view there's no need to call Mr Hollingsworth to litigate everything. So we would agree that some caution is required before reviewing his, all Mr Hollingsworth’s evidence, all Mr Hollingsworth’s evidence and taking that as accepted, because clearly it's not accepted by the Respondent. So we're not, but we're not praying in aid everything that he says, but what we are saying as, as, as something that is of importance in framing this case. And I’m not saying that that the focus should not be the agreed statement of facts that in terms of context one has to have regard to the written documents that the Respondent wrote. It could well have been in the heat of the moment during contentious Litigation. All of these contextual submissions can be made, but the simple point is text messages were sent to the directly to the Defendants a few days before the case settled. And, and emails were also sent about costs to his opponent. And as a matter of fact, this Tribunal needs to be aware of the … and, and would be aware because the cost schedule, as I mentioned, the cost schedule submitted by the Respondent says it refers to the outstanding cost issues and it says subject to appeals. So this Tribunal just needs to be aware of the point that an intention was expressed at an earlier stage by the Respondent that he would not pay costs. Other intentions were expressed. That's again a matter of …..fact and as at the eighteenth of March, when that cost schedule was submitted to this Tribunal, there's an intimation that there were further appeals. It may well be, and one would hope this to be the case, that there has been progression and, and, and, and, and refinement of the Respondent’s position. Such that my learned friend can very safely and sensibly say to you now that that these, some of these points about extent appeals and so on and so forth can be disregarded as can some of the attachments that Mr Hollingsworth has referred to because the situation has progressed and move on, moved on. And sorry, that's a very long winded way of saying the focus should be the agreed statement of facts, but the background context can't be ignored. But the focus of this case of the Applicant is not to point you to some of the contentious issues referred to in Mr Hollingsworth’s statement and say all of that should be taken into account for current purposes. But there are key things, namely documents created by the Respondent himself, that cannot be disregarded when considering where we are. Where we are today, and of course that they are of general relevance, we would say to integrity, but also potentially to take into account in relation to sanction, I hope that assists.”

In my judgment, the Tribunal was entitled to have regard to the emails sent by the Appellant, which were exhibited to Mr Hollingsworth’s witness statement. They were included in the evidence which was before the Tribunal. They did not attract privilege in the context of disciplinary proceedings. The Tribunal was aware that the SRA’s pleaded case on integrity did not include a reference to non-payment of costs (Transcript/547) but the SRA did rely upon it at the hearing, for the reasons given. In the exercise of its discretion, the Tribunal was entitled to take it into account, as part of the history of the litigation. It was a matter of undisputed fact that the adverse costs order had not yet been discharged. The Appellant referred to the outstanding costs as a liability in his statement of means on 18 March 2025.

Mr Keating KC submitted that the hearing on the outstanding issues was analogous to a Newton hearing in criminal proceedings, but there is nothing in the Tribunal’s Judgment to suggest that the Tribunal adopted this approach. As the ‘Guidance Note on Sanction’ (Footnote: ²) advises, a Newton hearing may be appropriate as part of a determination on sanction where a respondent admits misconduct, but disputes the facts upon which the sanction should be based. That was not the position here. The Tribunal was determining liability on a contested allegation, namely, breach of Principle 5 by failing to act with integrity. It then proceeded to impose a sanction on the basis of its findings, which included but were not limited to the ASF. I do not consider that this was “analogous” to a Newton procedure.

For these reasons, Ground 1 does not succeed.

Under Ground 2, the Appellant submitted that there was a procedural irregularity because, although the Tribunal announced its decision at the hearing on 8 April 2025, it did not provide its written reasons until 15 weeks later, on 22 July 2025. The Appellant inferred from this that the reasons were wrongly tailored to the sanction already imposed.

The procedure adopted by the Tribunal was in accordance with rule 40 of the 2019 Disciplinary Rules which provides:

“Decisions

40.

(1) The Tribunal may announce its decision at the conclusion of the hearing or may reserve its decision for announcement at a later date. In either case the announcement must be made in public unless rule 35(8) applies.

(2)

As soon as reasonably practicable after making a decision which finally disposes of all issues in the proceedings, the Tribunal must provide to each party a judgment containing written reasons for its decision, signed by a member of the Tribunal.”

I accept that it is the universal and longstanding practice of the Tribunal to hand down its decision immediately, sometimes with summary reasons for its decision, and then to provide more detailed written reasons at a later date.

In my view, reserving the judgment was not a procedural irregularity. It is commonplace because drafting a judgment takes a considerable amount of time, particularly where the draft has to be agreed by a panel. At the oral hearing, the Tribunal gave its summary conclusions, on liability, sanction and costs. The Tribunal Chair explained that their full reasons would be available in due course. As I have explained, this procedure was in accordance with standard practice.

As to the length of time taken to complete the judgment, in my experience, that is likely to vary depending upon extraneous matters, such as the other commitments of Tribunal members, and their availability to complete the work. It cannot be assumed that delay in producing a judgment has anything to do with the particular case. Work overload is a likely explanation. The suggestion that the Tribunal delayed issuing its Judgment deliberately to make it less likely that there would be an appeal is fanciful in my view.

In my judgment, there is no foundation for the submission that the Tribunal had not decided its reasons when it gave its summary conclusions at the oral hearing. If the Tribunal was undecided on any of the main issues, it could simply have postponed announcement of its conclusions until it had a chance to deliberate further.

The Appellant complained that the delay in issuing the Judgment made it impossible to renew professional indemnity insurance and led to the forced closure of the firm. I am puzzled by this submission as the Appellant would have been able to provide the insurers with details of the facts as set out in the ASF; the allegations proved; and the sanction imposed. The Judgment would not have made any difference to the assessment of risk. In any event, the delay did not amount to an error of law which rendered the decision “wrong” for the purposes of CPR 52.21(3).

Under Ground 6, the Appellant criticised the Tribunal for failing to indicate that it was considering any sanction other than a reprimand or a fine. As a result, he submitted that Mr Keating KC did not make any submissions on the sanction of suspension in his plea of mitigation, and was taken by surprise.

Mr Keating KC made a lengthy plea in mitigation and sanction was also addressed in his written submissions. He referred to the ‘Guidance Note on Sanction’. In his oral submissions, he said that any sort of restriction on his practice would be disproportionate and this was not a case which reached the high threshold for suspension. He did not suggest that, if a suspension order was made, it should be suspended and a restriction order imposed.

There was no obligation on the Tribunal to invite submissions on suspension, particularly when the Appellant was represented by experienced senior counsel who was familiar with the ‘Guidance Note on Sanction’. The SRA was not entitled to make any submissions on sanction.

The purpose of the ‘Guidance Note on Sanction’ is to assist parties, the public and the legal profession in understanding the Tribunal’s decision-making process. Applying the ‘Guidance Note on Sanction’, suspension was a realistic possibility, given the seriousness of and harm caused by the admitted conduct, and the finding of a lack of integrity. In my view, Mr Keating KC was well aware of the available sanctions, and should have been aware of the possibility of an order of suspension.

For these reasons, Grounds 2 and 6 do not succeed.

Under Ground 3, the Appellant submitted that the mere existence of civil restraint orders (“CROs”) and negative judicial comment did not amount to serious professional misconduct, let alone a breach of integrity. CROs are procedural in nature, not a penalty or sanction imposed by the court. They are a minor procedural hurdle to issuing applications and claims.

A judge’s decision that a claim is totally without merit is inherently subjective and another judge may take a different view. Therefore CROs cannot constitute evidence of wrongdoing.

The Tribunal improperly proceeded on the understanding that the CROs were imposed in the nature of a penalty or sanction or proof of wrongdoing (Judgment/4).

The Tribunal erred in stating that the multiple restraint orders made by different judges was a reflection of the seriousness and persistence of the alleged misconduct (Judgment/15.13(d)). It was wrong and perverse to assume that the mere existence of CROs was demonstrative of serious misconduct, and that multiple orders mean more serious misconduct.

The CROs had a ratcheting effect, in that the Appellant’s challenge to the LCROs led to a GCRO.

The Tribunal should have examined the precise detail and procedural history of the litigation and applications as against the judgments and orders actually made, before reaching a conclusion that there had been serious improper conduct by the Appellant in litigation.

The Tribunal wrongly applied the law or failed to exercise its own discretion in assuming that the CROs proved the existence of procedural tactics and unethical behaviour by the Appellant.

The Appellant denied that the CROs were correctly imposed or correctly upheld on appeal.

The Appellant contended that HH Judge Walden-Smith used various procedural devices in conjunction with the CROs to shut down Claims 1 and 2 and unfairly prevent him from properly litigating the matters and obtaining damages and costs to which he was entitled.

It was wrong, unfair and perverse for the Tribunal to determine that his criticism of judicial findings was improper behaviour on his part (Judgment/28).

Finally, the Appellant submitted that the SRA and the Tribunal wrongly conflated his status as a solicitor with him and his company as litigants in a private capacity. There was a fundamental difference between acting as a litigant and acting as a solicitor. The CROs were imposed upon him in his capacity as a litigant, not as a solicitor. The only acts that he undertook as a solicitor were signing statements of truth. The professional nexus relied upon by the SRA was not made out. Following Beckwith v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2020] EWHC 3231 (Admin), the regulator’s remit only extends over conduct in private life which touches on the practice of the profession or the standing of the profession. It must, in a way that is relevant, engage standards of behaviour which are set out or implied in the SRA Handbook (“the Handbook”). None of these requirements were satisfied in this case. Furthermore, the Tribunal and the SRA were wrong not to take account of the fact that the Appellant and his company had instructed counsel who approved and supported most of the applications.

At Judgment/15.9, the Tribunal accepted the Appellant’s admissions as proper and unequivocal, and accordingly found Allegations 1, 2 and 3 proved on the balance of probabilities, in accordance with the ASF.

The admitted allegations set out at Judgment/1 were that the Appellant, whilst in practice as a partner at the Firm:

The orders and judgments made against the Appellant were listed in the ASF as follows:

“Orders

12.

The following orders were made in relation to the Respondent in 2021:

12.1

On 29 January 2021, Deputy District Judge Willink sitting at Luton County Court, dismissed applications made by the Respondent in Claim 1 to vacate a CCMC which had been listed for 29 January 2021 as totally without merit.

12.2

On 18 February 2021, Deputy District Judge Brown sitting in Nuneaton County Court, dismissed an application made by the Respondent in case reference G5QZ82K7 as totally without merit.

12.3

On 10 May 2021, Deputy District Judge Fowler sitting in Nuneaton County Court, dismissed an application made by the Respondent in case reference F7QZ3D82 as totally without merit.

12.4

On 6 and 7 July 2021, HHJ Bloom considered eleven written applications and one oral application made by the Respondent in Claims 1 and 2, and one other related claim, between February and July 2021. Seven applications were dismissed as totally without merit .

12.5

On 7 July 2021, HHJ Bloom handed down judgment on two applications made by the Respondent to set aside the order of Deputy District Judge Willink dated 28 January 2021.

12.6

HHJ Bloom's orders of 7 July 2021 [TW1, 30-39] record her decisions on all of the applications referred to …. above and states

'AND UPON it appearing to the Court that the Claimants have made 2 or more applications that are totally without merit, the Court made a LCRO'.

12.7

On 12 July 2021, the court issued LCROs against the Respondent and the Company in Claims 1 and 2. The LCROs had been made by HHJ Bloom on 6 July 2021.

12.8

On 4 August 2021, HHJ Mithani sitting in Nuneaton County Court, dismissed an application made by the Respondent in case reference F7QZ3D82 as totally without merit and an abuse of process.

12.9

On 9 September 2021, HHJ Bloom sitting in Luton County Court refused the Respondent permission to appeal the LCROs and marked the applications as totally without merit.

12.10

On 14 September 2021, HHJ Clark issued a GCRO against the Respondent in respect of Claims 1 and 2 and case reference F7QZ3D82. The GCRO was to remain in force until 14 September 2023.

12.11

On 22 October 2021, HHJ Clarke dismissed the Respondent's application to set aside or stay the GCRO.

12.12

On 6 December 2021, HHJ Bloom dismissed the Respondent's application to have HHJ Bloom recuse herself from Claim 1.

Judgments

13.

In her judgment of 7 July 2021 dealing with the applications made by the Respondent to set aside Deputy District Judge Willink's order of 28 January 2021, HHJ Bloom made various comments regarding the Respondent's conduct, including, but not limited to:

13.1

At paragraphs 17-18: 'What … .[the Respondent] is saying to this court is if he writes to the court and says "I cannot make this hearing" this court is to adjourn it without testing …. .it is an incredibly arrogant position ...to take'.

13.2

At paragraph 25: 'I am quite satisfied that the judge was entirely right to take the view that the applications were totally without merit and dismiss them'.

13.3

At paragraph 30: 'Frankly, the fact that a solicitor has put himself in that position when he is on the record is deplorable. He knew perfectly well what was required and he chose not to attend'.

13.4

At paragraph 50: 'I am quite satisfied that, in a case such as this where there have been at least seven applications that are marked totally without merit, the conduct of [the Respondent] is such that it has reached a point where one has to mark the behaviour.

13.5

At paragraph 51: 'Had [the Respondent], who is a solicitor, an officer of the court, behaved with the barest decency and respect for the court, this [indemnity costs] would never have arisen ...' .

13.6

At paragraph 52: 'We are in this situation entirely and utterly because of the arrogance that [the Respondent] has shown towards the orders of this court, the directions of this court and his view that he is entitled to ignore what this court is directing and decide for himself when and where he will come to court. That is simply not acceptable'.

14.

On 23 June 2022, Mr Justice Cotter handed down judgment in relation to 24 applications for permission to appeal lodged by the Respondent against case management decisions in Claims 1 and 2.

15.

In his judgment, Mr Justice Cotter made various comments regarding the Respondent's conduct, including, but not limited to:

15.1

At paragraph 5: The applications for permission to appeal ... are out of all possible proportion to the issues in the claims ... the taking of a wide range of points accompanied by a large amount of documentation is ... undoubtedly part of an established pattern of behaviour of [the Respondent]. Over the last three years the parties and the Court have faced multiple applications with prolix statements accompanied by voluminous documentation'.

15.2

At paragraph 7: 'something has gone very badly wrong with the conduct of the litigation ...I have been driven to the conclusion that [the Respondent], a solicitor, indeed a solicitor advocate, has long forgotten the requirement on all parties to litigation to help the Court further the overriding objective'.

15.3

At paragraph 8: 'It is not without very good reason that the overriding objective of dealing with claims justly and at proportionate cost (that second element having been long since lost in the progress of this litigation as has the requirement to progress expeditiously) requires ensuring ... that a claim has allotted to it an appropriate share of the Court's resources ... this litigation has already taken very far more of the Court's valuable and finite resources than it was properly entitled to take ... ’

15.4

At paragraph 35, Mr Justice Cotter quotes from the judgment of HHJ Bloom of 6 July 2021 [judgment not available]: 'I do not think that I have ever come across a claimant, particularly a claimant who is a lawyer, making eight applications, all of which are withdrawn or not proceeded with on the day of the hearing'.

15.5

At paragraph 37, Mr Justice Cotter again quotes from the judgment of HHJ Bloom of 6 July 2021: '[The Respondent] is also a solicitor of the court and he knows the pressure that courts are under, particularly during the Covid pandemic ... there is an element of abuse of process here and it is extremely concerning to see a solicitor doing this ... This is the sort of behaviour that one sees from litigants in person. [The Respondent] is an officer of the court ... '.

15.6

At paragraph 60: 'the Judge properly considered a pattern of conduct in which [the Respondent] had issued a plethora of applications and then pursued them even when he knew they were devoid of merit ... the Judge was considering the least onerous of civil restraint orders [the LCRO] and was unarguably correct in viewing the legitimate aims of the protection of the rights of others from unfounded applications and ensure that the courts unlimited and valuable resources were not wasted'.

15.7

At paragraph 105: 'this is a most unfortunate and worrying history of unmeritorious applications in four separate cases ... that they were made by a solicitor is all the more remarkable. There are no arguable grounds that these orders did not fully justify the making of a GCRO.'

Conclusion of Claim 2

16.

On 30 March 2023, the Respondent discontinued Claim 2 in respect of Mr Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth Solicitors.

17.

On 31 March 2023, HHJ Walden-Smith handed down judgment in Claim 2 respect of the surviving claim against Mr Taylor . As set out in paragraph 73 of the judgment, the claim against Mr Taylor was struck out as 'a matter of law, disclosing no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim .. . if I were wrong about that ... this claim would nonetheless be struck out as an abuse of process' .

18.

In her judgment, HHJ Walden-Smith various comments about the Respondent's conduct, including, but not limited to:

18.1

At paragraph 3: 'This litigation, sadly, has the most tortured of histories. No part of the litigation has been conducted by [the Respondent] in a matter which is appropriate for an officer of the court'.

18.2

At paragraph 13: '[LCROs] were made in July and then in September 2021 those were converted to be [GCROs], the [LCROs] having limited effect ... there are, on my reckoning, in excess of fifty orders made in this case ... that, in my judgement, is an extraordinary use of the court's resources for what ...is a relatively modest claim'.

18.3

At paragraph 69: 'Continuing this litigation against [Mr Taylor] having settled against [Persons A and BJ is, again, all part of the same course of conduct which has led to this wholly disproportionate litigation and the multitude of orders that have been made, including a multitude of costs orders made against [the Respondent] and the civil restraint orders that have been made'.

18.4

At paragraph 70: "Mr Halborg himself, in various witness statements, says that he has perfectly justified motives for bringing these claims. I do not deny that he does so but looking at the matter as a whole, the bringing of the claim at the time that it was does suggest that this was a thinly veiled attempt to disrupt Mr and Mrs Halborg having representation during the substantive proceedings. Mr Halborg himself may not recall even why he started this litigation, but by standing back, in the way that the court can, it is apparent that there were motivations which were not relevant to the litigation itself."

18.5

At paragraph 71: "There was a failure which, again, is not dissimilar to various other failures that have taken place in this litigation, to comply with pre-action protocol. That is of significance given the nature of this matter and given that the claim has been brought against professionals, the lawyers engaged. A letter was sent to the first and second defendants, not to the third defendant, and even within that letter which does not comply with the pre-action protocols, there is an interesting line which could be seen as some sort of threat, or some sort of design to agitate, where it is pointed out to Mr Hollingsworth that all the other solicitors have left his firm. In my judgment, this litigation was issued for the purpose of disrupting the ability of the defendants in the underlying action to proceed appropriately in their own defence. It is therefore for ulterior purposes and, on that basis, is appropriate to be struck out as an abuse."

Conclusion of Claim 1

19.

On 6-9 November 2023, HHJ Walden-Smith heard Claim 1.

20.

In the course of the hearing on 9 November 2023, HHJ Walden-Smith made various comments regarding the Respondent's conduct, including, but not limited to:

20.1

'I am staying [sic] on record that you seek to bully this Court'.

20.2

'I have never seen behaviour like this...from a litigant whatsoever, particularly from a solicitor-advocate ...'.

20.3

'I have asked you repeatedly to provide the evidence upon which you rely, and you are unable to do so. I do not understand why other than you are being difficult and awkward as you have proven yourself in the past, you are continuing to be. Your behaviour in this Court today has been bullying to me. I am withstanding your bullying. I will not bend to the way that you want me to bend. As soon as I say I will not be bend by your behaviour, your immediate response is you must recuse yourself Fine. I am not going to recuse myself'

21.

On 9 November 2023, HHJ Walden-Smith granted judgment to Persons A and B on their counterclaim against the Respondent and dismissed the Respondent's claim.”

The Appellant confirmed that, in the proceedings before HH Judge Walden-Smith, he was acting as a solicitor advocate.

I accept the SRA’s submission that it was not its case, nor the Tribunal’s decision, that being the subject of a CRO was per se the same thing as professional misconduct. It was recognised that they are different concepts. The focus of the SRA and the Tribunal was the seriousness of the Appellant’s underlying conduct which led to the CROs. As the Tribunal rightly stated, at Judgment/15.13(d), the fact that the Appellant was made the subject of multiple restraint orders by different judges was a reflection of the seriousness and persistence of his conduct.

The Appellant sought to downplay the inherent gravity of a GCRO, which can only be made where a party has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit or where an extended CRO would not suffice (see Nowak above at [58]).

It was not open to the Appellant to seek to go behind the CROs and contend that they were wrongly made when he had not successfully appealed against them. Cotter J. observed that “this is a most unfortunate and worrying history of unmeritorious applications in four separate cases …. That they were made by a solicitor is all the more remarkable. There are no arguable grounds that these orders did not fully justifying the making of a GCRO.” (paragraph 15.7 of the ASF).

The Appellant admitted that the matters listed in the ASF breached the following professional requirements:

Therefore, the Tribunal’s consideration of the disputed issue – whether the Appellant acted with integrity, in accordance with Principle 6 – began with an admission of numerous breaches of professional conduct.

The ASF, in the section headed “Admissions to breaches of the Principles and the Code” described the breaches, in the following terms:

“28.

A solicitor is first and foremost an officer of the court. A solicitor fails in their duty to uphold the proper administration of justice if they abuse the court system. The judicial comments reference the Respondent's failure to act appropriately as an officer of the court or have due regard to the rules of court procedure and scarcity of court resources.

29.

The Respondent's roles in Claims 1 and 2 were as Claimant and solicitor/solicitor­advocate. All Claimants have a duty to help assist the court to further the overriding objective set out in the Civil Procedure Rules. A Claimant, who is also a solicitor, also has a duty to uphold principles 1 and 2, and paragraphs 2.4 and 2.6 of the Code.

30.

A solicitor who was only making assertions or putting forward statements, representations or submissions to the court or others which were properly arguable in accordance with paragraph 2.4 of the Code would not make numerous applications which were certified as totally without merit and which led to that solicitor being made subject to two LCROs and a GCRO.

31.

The number of orders made against the Respondent and the repeated references by the judiciary about the multiplicity of applications, the volume of documentation and impact on the court's resources demonstrate that the Respondent wasted the court's time.

32.

Public confidence in the Respondent, in solicitors and in the provision of legal services is likely to be undermined by the knowledge that the Respondent's conduct in making numerous applications judged to be totally without merit led to sanctions having to be imposed by the court and significant judicial criticism. The public would expect a solicitor to conduct litigation in an appropriate manner.

33.

Public confidence is likely to be further undermined by the fact that the Respondent did not amend his conduct.”

Under the heading “Respondent’s representations”, the Appellant acknowledged and averred:

“22.

The Respondent recognises that the making of these kinds of orders against a solicitor is something that ought to attract the attention of the regulator….”

“23.

It is important that the Respondent was a claimant in his personal capacity and the substance of the Allegation is directed at him as such. He and the Company possibly should have instructed a different firm to conduct the litigation.”

“24…..it was the Respondent’s firm on the record at Court as opposed to him personally.”

“25.

In general the opprobrium directed towards the Respondent by the judiciary was in his capacity as the Claimant in the case as opposed to his conduct as a solicitor in the case. In this regard, there is a distinction, albeit one which is blurred by the standards expected of a solicitor in his private life.”

“26.

Throughout the proceedings the Respondent was advised and represented by Counsel and hence he was not solely responsible for the application(s) and grounds of appeal.”

At times during the appeal hearing, the Appellant submitted that the SRA and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction because he was acting in a personal capacity as a litigant. In my judgment, that was an unarguable submission in the light of his admissions of the formal allegations and the passages in the ASF set out above. It was not the way in which the Appellant’s representative argued his case before the Tribunal. Mr Keating KC’s skeleton argument stated:

“3.

He admits the three charges and accept that this amounts to misconduct, recognising the higher standards the public expect of a solicitor in how they conduct themselves, be that as a claimant or as an advocate….”

“49.

It is submitted that on examination of those particularised matters …., these do not reach the high threshold for a breach of integrity. They do amount to admitted misconduct in breach of Principles 1 and 2 and conduct rules 2.4 and 2.6.”

The Tribunal summarised the Appellant’s case at Judgment/15.6 saying that he acknowledged his failings as a solicitor, a claimant and an Officer of the Court but submitted that the admitted conduct did not amount to a lack of integrity.

It is well-established that misconduct in a personal capacity may breach the Principles and the Code. In Beckwith v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2020] EWHC 3231 (Admin), the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal found that a partner in a firm of solicitors engaged in consensual sexual activity, outside working hours, with a junior colleague, who was intoxicated, had behaved in a manner that was inappropriate and breached the requirements in Principles 2 and 6 of the Principles then in force. It rejected the allegation that he had abused his position of authority over her.

The Divisional Court allowed his appeal. In regard to Principle 2 (act with integrity), the material obligation in the Handbook was the obligation not to take unfair advantage of others. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’s finding that he did not abuse his position of authority meant that there was no breach of the requirements in the Handbook, and so a lack of integrity was not established. In regard to Principle 6 (behave in a way that maintains the public trust in solicitors and the provision of legal services), the Handbook reflected the public’s expectation that junior members of the profession would be treated with respect; seriously abusive conduct by a senior colleague could damage public trust in the profession. On the facts, the solicitor’s conduct affected his personal reputation, but not his reputation as a solicitor or that of the profession generally.

The Divisional Court cited the guidance on integrity in Wingate and commented as follows:

“30.

Three points of principle can be drawn from this summary. The first is that in the context of the regulation of a profession there is an association between the notion of having integrity and adherence to the ethical standards of the profession. This is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word, namely adherence to moral and ethical principles. The second is that on matters touching on their professional standing there is an expectation that professionals may be held to a higher standard than those that would apply to those outside the profession. The third is that a regulatory obligation to act with integrity “does not require professional people to be paragons of virtue”.”

In the context of Article 8 ECHR, the Court accepted that “the requirements to act with integrity and to act so as to maintain public trust in the provision of legal services, are requirements which will, on occasions, require the SRA or the Tribunal to adjudicate on a professional person’s private life” (at [50]).

The Court went on to hold, at [54]:

“There can be no hard and fast rule either that regulation under the Handbook may never be directed to the regulated person’s private life, or that any/every aspect of her private life is liable to scrutiny. But Principle 2 or Principle 6 may reach into private life only when conduct that is part of a person’s private life realistically touches on her practise of the profession (Principle 2) or the standing of the profession (Principle 6). Any such conduct must be qualitatively relevant. It must, in a way that is demonstrably relevant, engage one or other of the standards of behaviour which are set out in or necessarily implicit from the Handbook. In this way, the required fair balance is properly struck between the right to respect to private life and the public interest in the regulation of the solicitor’s profession.”

In this case, the Appellant’s conduct plainly did touch on his practise of the profession, and the standing of the profession, because it arose from the manner in which he was conducting litigation, and it engaged SRA standards of behaviour, which led to admitted breaches of Principles 1 and 2 of the Principles and paragraphs 2.4 and 2.6 of the Code. The Beckwith test was satisfied and the Tribunal had jurisdiction.

At all material times, the Appellant was a Partner and majority shareholder at the Firm. He was the designated Compliance Officer for Legal Practice (“COLP”) and Compliance Officer for Finance and Administration (“COFA”) at the Firm.

In Claim 1, the Appellant and his company Halborg Limited were the claimants in a claim against the Appellant’s parents. The Appellant instructed the Firm to act for them in the claim, and the Appellant acted as the Firm’s fee-earner. The Appellant effectively had conduct of the claim for both claimants, both in his capacity as the client who was giving instructions, and the fee-earner for the Firm, who was conducting the litigation. He also instructed counsel, who presumably took instructions from the Appellant, in his capacities as client and as solicitor, on the conduct of the litigation, as well as giving advice to them. The Appellant also acted as solicitor-advocate in the proceedings before HH Judge Walden-Smith.

In Claim 2, the Appellant and his company Halborg Limited were the claimants in a claim against the legal team acting for his parents (their solicitor, Mr Hollingsworth; the solicitor’s firm; and Mr Taylor of counsel). As with Claim 1, the Appellant instructed the Firm to act for him and for Halborg Limited in his capacity as client. The Appellant then acted as the fee-earner for the Firm, and instructed counsel. The Appellant’s role was as described for Claim 1 above. The Appellant also acted as solicitor-advocate in the proceedings before HH Judge Walden-Smith.

Paragraph 10 of the ASF quoted from the judgment of Cotter J. where he stated:

“10.

The Appellants are Mr Halborg (who is a solicitor) the son of Mr and Mrs Halborg (the Defendants in the Trust Claim), and his company, Halborg Limited. They are represented by Deals & Disputes Solicitors, of which Mr Halborg is a partner and majority owner. In an email of 14th of May 2020 sent by Deals & Disputes Solicitors to the County Court at Luton Mr. Halborg is described as “our fee earner (who is also the principal witness and instructing client)”. Mr Halborg also acted as the advocate at certain of the hearings, the orders made at which are the subject of some of the applications for permission to appeal.”

Cotter J. considered the significance of the Appellant’s status as a solicitor in his judgment which is summarised in the ASF. For example, at paragraph 15.2, he said that the Appellant “has long forgotten the requirement on all parties to litigation to help the Court further the overriding objective”. At paragraph 15.5, he said that the Appellant is an officer of the court, there is an element of abuse of process here and it is extremely concerning to see a solicitor doing this, as this is the sort of behaviour one sees from litigants in person. HH Judge Walden-Smith commented that no part of the litigation had been conducted by the Appellant in a manner which is appropriate for an officer of the court (paragraph 18.1).

In the Tribunal proceedings, the SRA submitted that the Appellant repeatedly signed pleadings and statements of truth in his capacity as a solicitor and partner, thereby embedding his professional status in the litigation and subjecting his conduct to professional scrutiny (Judgment/15.4(d)).

The SRA submitted to the Tribunal that the Appellant’s conduct went beyond the admitted professional misconduct and demonstrated a lack of integrity (Judgment/15.4 – 15.5):

The Tribunal was satisfied to the requisite standard that the Appellant’s pattern of conduct, which persisted despite judicial warnings, amounted to a breach of the standard of integrity required of a solicitor (Judgment/15.12). The Tribunal was directed to the guidance in Wingate by the SRA, and applied it.

The Tribunal summarised the factors that led to this conclusion at Judgment/15.13:

“(a)

The Respondent’s actions were not inadvertent, or attributable to a misunderstanding of process. The repeated and persistent nature of the conduct demonstrated a disregard for the procedural rules and for the authority of the Court.

(b)

The Respondent’s actions had the effect of undermining the efficient administration of justice, burdening Court resources and his opposing parties through unnecessary applications and inappropriate correspondence.

(c)

The Respondent’s status as a solicitor—and therefore as an Officer of the Court—was not suspended by the private nature of the proceedings, nor by the fact that he had instructed Counsel to advise at various junctures. The Respondent remained subject to professional obligations, particularly those relating to the proper administration of justice.

(d)

The fact that the Respondent was made the subject of multiple restraint Orders by different judges was a clear reflection of the seriousness and persistence of his conduct. It marked the judiciary’s repeated concern at his behaviour across multiple stages of the proceedings.

(e)

The Respondent’s conduct could not be compartmentalised into or explained away as isolated incidents. The pattern of behaviour had to be assessed in its totality in order to reach a proper regulatory conclusion.

(f)

The underlying costs in the Trust Claim still remain unresolved, reinforcing the ongoing consequences of the Respondent’s conduct and the lack of finality in the litigation which he initiated.”

The Tribunal had express regard to the Appellant’s point that he had instructed counsel who approved and supported most of the application (Judgment/15.13(c)). The Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the involvement of counsel did not justify or explain his conduct, and he remained subject to his own professional obligations as an officer of the court.

The Appellant disputed the Tribunal’s finding that his conduct undermined the efficient administration of justice and burdened court resources and opponents. However, in paragraph 31 of the ASF, the Appellant admitted that the “number of orders made against the Respondent and the repeated references by the judiciary about the multiplicity of applications, the volume of documentation and impact on the court’s resources demonstrate that the Respondent wasted the court’s time”. In my view, the Tribunal did not err in finding that the Appellant wasted the court’s time. Avoiding time wasting is part of the rationale for the regime of CROs. Further, the judges presiding over the Appellant’s cases made observations to that effect. Cotter J. said, at [107], these “unmeritorious applications were leading to a huge waste of court time and expense”. It is also a matter of fact that much of the litigation took place during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the courts were struggling to process cases effectively and control the backlog. Contrary to the Appellant’s assertions, the adverse effects of the pandemic on the legal system lasted for years after the first lockdown in 2020.

The Appellant contended that it was “perverse” and “wrong” for the Tribunal to find that public confidence in the legal system would be undermined by the conduct in question. However, the Appellant admitted that public confidence was likely be undermined by the course of conduct which was the subject of the allegations: see paragraph 32 of the ASF.

On appeal, this Court will only interfere with the findings of a Tribunal if it is satisfied that the Tribunal’s evaluation was wrong, in the sense of falling outside the bounds of what the Tribunal could properly and reasonable decide. I remind myself that the Tribunal is a specialist tribunal particularly equipped to appraise what is required of a solicitor in terms of professional judgment, and an appellate court will be cautious in interfering with such an appraisal (see Ali above). In my judgment, the Appellant has failed to establish that the Tribunal’s findings on integrity were wrong. In my view, the findings were fully justified on the evidence.

For these reasons, Ground 3 does not succeed.

Under Ground 4, the Appellant submitted that the Tribunal’s reasons for its finding of a lack of integrity were insufficient.

The Appellant relied on Hurst in which Collins Rice J. found that, in her capacity as the appellate court, she could not follow and understand at a basic level the route by which the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal had reached its conclusions, and its reasons were insufficient and unintelligible. She also observed that the delay of 5 months in issuing its decision may have played a part in that (at [119], [120]).

The established approach was set out in Ali (cited above):

“Finally, as regards reasons, decisions of specialist tribunals are not expected to be the product of elaborate legal drafting. Their judgments should be read as a whole; and in assessing the reasons given, unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary, it is appropriate to take it that the Tribunal has fully taken into account all the evidence and submissions: Martin, supra, §33.”

In my view, the findings of Collins Rice J. were made in regard to the reasoning of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in that particular case. Similar defects do not appear in the Judgment of this Tribunal. The Tribunal directed itself correctly on the meaning of integrity, by reference to Wingate (Judgment/15.3). It summarised the respective cases of the parties at Judgment/15.4 - 15.8. It then set out its findings and gave reasons which were both adequate and intelligible. The Appellant cannot have been in any real, as opposed to forensic, doubt about the reasons for the Tribunal’s conclusions on lack of integrity, particularly in the light of the evidence referred to in the ASF and the SRA’s submissions. The style and format of the Judgment was consistent with other judgments of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. Unlike Hurst, there was nothing to suggest that the delay in issuing the Judgment had adversely affected its content.

For these reasons, Ground 4 does not succeed.

Under Ground 5, the Appellant submitted that the sanction of 12 months suspension was manifestly excessive, unreasonable and disproportionate, and could not be justified. The Tribunal failed to take into account the submissions made on behalf of the Appellant. At most, a reprimand or a fine was the appropriate sanction.

In the seminal case of Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 (cited in the ‘Guidance Note on Sanction’), Sir Thomas Bingham MR explained the fundamental importance of integrity in a solicitor, at 518A – 519B:

“It is required of lawyers practising in this country that they should discharge their professional duties with integrity, probity and complete trustworthiness.

…..

Any solicitor who is shown to have discharged his professional duties with anything less than complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness must expect severe sanctions to be imposed upon him by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal.

….

If a solicitor is not shown to have acted dishonestly, but is shown to have fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, his lapse is less serious but it remains very serious indeed in a member of a profession whose reputation depends upon trust.

…..

The decision whether to strike off or suspend will often involve a fine and difficult exercise of judgment, to be made by the tribunal as an informed and expert body on all the facts of the case. Only in a very unusual and venial case of this kind would the tribunal be likely to regard as appropriate any order less severe than one of suspension.

It is important that there should be full understanding of the reasons why the tribunal makes orders which might otherwise seem harsh. There is, in some of these orders, a punitive element: a penalty may be visited on a solicitor who has fallen below the standards required of his profession in order to punish him for what he has done and to deter any other solicitor tempted to behave in the same way. Those are traditional objects of punishment. But often the order is not punitive in intention. Particularly is this so where a criminal penalty has been imposed and satisfied. The solicitor has paid his debt to society. There is no need, and it would be unjust, to punish him again. In most cases the order of the tribunal will be primarily directed to one or other or both of two other purposes. One is to be sure that the offender does not have the opportunity to repeat the offence. This purpose is achieved for a limited period by an order of suspension; plainly it is hoped that experience of suspension will make the offender meticulous in his future compliance with the required standards……The second purpose is the most fundamental of all: to maintain the reputation of the solicitors' profession as one in which every member, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth. To maintain this reputation and sustain public confidence in the integrity of the profession it is often necessary that those guilty of serious lapses are not only expelled but denied re-admission.

…..

A profession's most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence which that inspires.”

In Law Society v Salsbury [2008] EWCA Civ 1285, [2009] 1 WLR 1286, Jackson LJ said, at [30]:

“…the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal comprises an expert and informed tribunal, which is particularly well placed in any case to assess what measures are required to deal with defaulting solicitors and to protect the public interest. Absent any error of law, the High Court must pay considerable respect to the sentencing decisions of the tribunal. Nevertheless if the High Court, despite paying such respect, is satisfied that the sentencing decision was clearly inappropriate, then the court will interfere.”

In SRA v James [2018] EWHC 3058 (Admin),[2018] 4 WLR 163, Flaux LJ (with whom Jeremy Baker J. agreed) made clear at [53] - [55] that the court could interfere with a decision on sanction only if the tribunal committed an error of principle, or its evaluation was wrong in the sense that it fell outside the bounds of what the tribunal could properly and reasonably decide.

At Judgment/22 - 23, the Tribunal referred to and applied its ‘Guidance Note on Sanction’. It applied the “bottom up” approach, but considered that a reprimand or fine would not be sufficient. It concluded that the proportionate and most appropriate sanction was a fixed period of suspension. In my judgment, it was entitled to do so and its assessment cannot be characterised as wrong.

In line with the ‘Guidance Note on Sanction’, the Tribunal first assessed the Appellant’s culpability, at Judgment/24 - 26. It assessed this to be “high”, taking into account the harm caused. The Appellant had pursued a “combative and attritional” approach marked by “unmeritorious” applications and “procedural tactics that were designed to, and did, frustrate the efficient progression of the litigation”. The conduct “fell short” of the standards to be expected of a solicitor, and “contravened the cooperative and restrained ethos embedded in the overriding objective”.

The Tribunal “rejected his assertion that the underlying motivation for his conduct was noble – particularly in relation to the settlement of the Trust Claim. The manner in which he pursued the Lawyer Claim stood in stark contrast to that narrative”. The Appellant submitted on appeal that the Tribunal misunderstood the submission made, which was that he was “noble” because he intervened in the claim by EMW Law LLP to replace his parents as defendants. That seems to me to be unlikely. However, the Tribunal was aware that his initial intervention was only one small part of the history, and it was not the conduct which was the subject of the complaints against him. In my view, the “nobility” submission was a highly selective plea by way of mitigation, which portrayed the Appellant in a way which was so strikingly at odds with his self-serving and combative behaviour towards his parents and their legal representatives as to be misleading. Therefore I consider that the Tribunal was entitled to reject any characterisation of the Appellant as “noble”.

The Tribunal took into account the Appellant’s “unblemished regulatory record” at Judgment/16 and 18. His mitigation was summarised at Judgment/17 - 21, including his successful career and his co-operation with the SRA. Following the ‘Guidance Note on Sanction’, the Tribunal was right to identify as a significant aggravating factor that the Appellant would have known that his conduct was a material breach of his regulatory obligations, because of his considerable professional experience and standing, in particular his roles as COLP and COFA at the Firm (see the penultimate bullet point in paragraph 25 of the ‘Guidance Note on Sanction’).

The Tribunal acknowledged, at Judgment/28, that the Appellant ceased to contest the majority of the allegations against him, and made admissions at a late stage, shortly before the hearing. This was factually correct. The Appellant could have admitted the allegations at a much earlier stage. The Tribunal was entitled to find that the admissions “demonstrated some movement” in the Appellant’s position, but “any insight was limited in nature and did not materially mitigate the seriousness of the misconduct”.

At Judgment/29, the Tribunal explained that it did not regard the Appellant’s compliance with the CROs as a mitigating factor since compliance with court orders was the minimum expected of solicitors. The Tribunal did not consider that the Appellant’s compliance constituted evidence of insight or remorse.

The Tribunal’s conclusion was set out at Judgment/30:

“In all the circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that a suspension of twelve months was the appropriate and proportionate sanction. Only a suspension from practice could adequately reflect the seriousness of the misconduct, the sustained departure from the standards expected of solicitors, and the need to uphold public confidence in the profession and the legal system more broadly.”

In my judgment, the Tribunal was entitled to reach this conclusion and its reasoning was sound. It properly reflected the principles in the ‘Guidance Note on Sanction’, and the evidence and submissions placed before it. As a specialist Tribunal, it was best placed to make the necessary evaluation, and it could not be characterised as wrong.

For these reasons, Ground 5 does not succeed.

Under Ground 7, the Appellant submitted that the Tribunal erred in awarding costs on the basis of fixed costs as they do not represent the SRA’s actual costs. Rather, fixed costs subsidise the costs of cases lost by the SRA. Fixed costs are generally set at an excessive level. The SRA’s costs should have been reviewed in detail by the Tribunal.

The Appellant submitted that the costs were not proportionate or reasonable, given the findings and the agreed facts. The Appellant also submitted that the Tribunal erred in concluding, on the basis of the statement of means, that his income was significantly above the national average and that he was ultimately capable of meeting a costs order at a time when he was prevented from working. The Tribunal did not give clear or proper reasons for the costs award.

Under Ground 8, the Appellant submitted that the Tribunal rushed the costs hearing, in order to finish on day 1, although the hearing was listed for 2 days.

The Appellant also submitted that the Tribunal erred in failing to include in its costs order a stay for 12 months, even though this was expressly agreed orally by the SRA’s representative.

The Tribunal made the following ruling on costs:

“Costs

31.

Mr Walker, on behalf of the Applicant, applied for costs in the sum of £30, 630.00, as set out in the costs schedule dated 2 April 2025. The Applicant instructed Blake Morgan LLP under a fixed-fee arrangement totalling £29, 280.00. It was submitted that any time savings achieved by the hearing concluding in one day were offset by the substantial preparatory work involved in reaching the Agreed Statement of Facts and Breaches. With the addition of investigative costs of £1,350.00, it was asserted that the total sum claimed was both proportionate and reasonable, given the nature of the case and the work undertaken.

32.

The Tribunal recognised that pursuant to Rule 43(1) of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2019, it is empowered to make such order as to costs as it considers appropriate. This includes directing any party to bear the whole or a proportion of the costs in an amount (if any) deemed reasonable. The costs in question relate to those incurred in connection with, or ancillary to, the proceedings before the Tribunal.

33.

Pursuant to Rule 43(4) of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2019, the Tribunal, when deciding whether to make an order for costs, must consider all relevant matters, including:

(a)

the parties’ conduct;

(b)

compliance with directions;

(c)

whether the time spent, charging rates and disbursements were proportionate and reasonable; and

(d)

the paying party’s means.

34.

The Tribunal found that the case had been properly brought by the Applicant. While both parties ultimately conducted themselves appropriately at the hearing, the Tribunal recalled the earlier non-compliance with directions by both sides, which had been pointed out at the outset. Notwithstanding this, the Tribunal took into account the substantial volume of documentation and preparatory work involved, as well as the fact that the contested matters were ultimately found proven.

35.

It concluded that any reduction in time resulting from the late admissions made did not materially lessen the preparation required by the Applicant, particularly given the volume and complexity of the documentation.

36.

The Tribunal considered the Respondent’s financial circumstances, including submissions drawing attention to his limited liquidity. While it acknowledged the impact of the suspension on his short-term earning capacity and the financial losses arising from the underlying matters, it noted that the Respondent was asset-rich, enjoyed an income significantly above the national average, and was ultimately capable of meeting the Order. It therefore did not consider that his means justified any reduction in the sum claimed.

37.

Taking all these matters into account, the Tribunal concluded that the costs claimed by the Applicant were reasonable and proportionate. It accordingly ordered the Respondent to pay the sum of £30,630.00 as costs arising from and incidental to the proceedings.

Statement of Full Order

38.

The Tribunal ORDERED that the Respondent, SCOTT HALBORG, solicitor, be SUSPENDED from practice as a solicitor for the period of 12 months to commence on the 8th day of April 2025 and it further Ordered that he do pay the costs of and incidental to this application and enquiry fixed in the sum of £30,630.00.”

In my view, the Appellant’s complaints about the fixed fee agreed between the SRA and its external solicitors were unfounded. I accept the SRA’s submission that it does not cross-subsidise the costs of losing cases with the costs of winning cases. Costs are claimed according to the costs incurred on the case in question. The costs are paid to the external solicitors, not to the SRA, so there is no scope for cross-subsidising. The SRA produced a schedule of costs which was signed by a statement of truth that the costs sought did not breach the indemnity principle.

It is customary for the Tribunal to make a summary assessment of costs. This was a straightforward application and there was no need for the Tribunal to conduct a detailed assessment, which neither party applied for. It was a matter for the Tribunal to decide, a matter of case management, whether to deal with costs at the end of day 1, or to adjourn to a second day. The Chair asked both counsel, at 4.37 pm, whether they wanted to deal with costs on day 1 or to adjourn to day 2. Both counsel said that they would prefer to deal with it on day 1. It was reasonable for the Tribunal to decide that there was sufficient time on day 1 for the parties to make their submissions and the Tribunal to make its ruling.

According to the costs schedule, the SRA’s external solicitors spent 1,359 units on the matter (135.9 hours). That gives a notional, blended, hourly rate of £29,280/135.9 = £215.45. The Guideline hourly rates for solicitors in Cardiff are £288 for Grade A, £242 for Grade B, £197 for Grade C, and £139 for Grade D. This fixed fee thus worked out less than it would have done had the work been conducted on an hourly rate basis.

I accept Mr Tankel’s helpful summary of the Appellant’s statement of means. It showed that the Appellant had two sources of income: as a partner in his law practice and as the landlord of three investment properties in Germany. The Appellant claimed to have “negative income” of -£108,924 per year but his statement of means did not account for whether this was because his law business is loss-making, whether his landlord business was loss-making, or whether he was including loan repayments on his investment properties within the loss. The Appellant supplied no evidence in support of this, which might have shed further light. The Appellant’s statement of means also showed that he owned his own home valued at approximately £250,000, and that he owned three investment properties in Germany, valued at approximately £2.5million financed by approximately £1.3million of secured loans. He also owed approximately £500,000 of judgment debts and legal fees. He had personal monthly expenditure of £7,739.11, and almost no money in the bank.

At Judgment/36, the Tribunal confirmed that it had considered the Appellant’s financial circumstances, including his “limited liquidity”, the impact of his suspension on his earning capacity, and the financial losses from the underlying matters. In my view, the Tribunal was entitled to find that his income was significantly above the national average. The fact that, in a given year, the notional costs of running both of the Appellant’s businesses may have exceeded his income, did not change this. He was asset-rich and that informed the Tribunal’s conclusion that he would ultimately be capable of meeting the order.

In my view, the Tribunal directed itself correctly in law. In the exercise of its discretionary judgment, it made a costs order that was reasonable and proportionate, bearing in mind the amount of work required. Its reasons were adequate and intelligible.

Mr Keating KC asked for 12 months’ time to pay, to enable the Appellant to sell some properties. The SRA informed the Tribunal that they did not object to this application. In the light of the SRA’s agreement, the Tribunal decided it was not necessary to specify a time to pay in the order. That was a matter within the discretion of the Tribunal and the Tribunal adopted a permissible approach. The SRA has not sought to enforce the order for costs and at the appeal hearing there was no suggestion that it intended to do so prior to the expiry of the 12 month period.

For these reasons, Grounds 7 and 8 do not succeed.

The substantive appeal is dismissed, for the reasons set out above.

The Appellant challenged the decisions of the SRA, dated 8 January 2025 and 26 March 2025, to impose an interim condition upon the Appellant’s practising certificate for 2024/25 that he “shall not act in litigation work in any capacity or supervise others carrying on litigation work in connection with the provision of legal services”. The Appellant’s practising certificate for the year 2024/2025 would ordinarily have expired on 31 October 2025. The interim order was superseded on 8 April 2025 by his suspension from practice for 12 months.

The Appellant’s summary grounds of appeal were as follows:

In his Speaking Note, the Appellant complained that the condition was imposed on 8 January 2025 without prior notice or giving the Appellant an opportunity to make representations. It had draconian effects as it effectively shut down the Firm (whose business is mainly litigation), without regard for solicitors and clients.

The Appellant pointed out that the ASF was not in place when the interim condition order was made. There was no need for the SRA to “manage risk” of the Appellant practising as there was zero risk. He was practising in litigation without complaints or concerns by anyone. The CROs had expired. The condition was totally unnecessary and imposed without proper grounds.

On 21 September 2021, the SRA received a report from Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP, advising them of the CROs. On 31 May 2022, the SRA received a report from Mr Hollingsworth, complaining about the Appellant’s conduct.

Following an investigation, on 10 April 2024, a Notice recommending referral to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal was issued. On 15 May 2024, a referral decision was made.

On 8 January 2025, Ms Harris of the SRA issued a “Decision of an Authorised Officer” imposing the condition without notice, pursuant to the power in regulation 7.6 of the SRA Authorisation of Individuals Regulations 2019, which permits the SRA to dispense with the 28 days’ notice period under regulation 7.5. She was satisfied it was in the public interest to dispense with notice because of the serious nature of the conduct issues.

The Decision was flawed because Ms Harris relied upon allegations which the SRA had since withdrawn. The Appellant made her aware of this, and applied for a review. The SRA also instigated a review of its own initiative.

On 26 March 2025, Mr Andronov of the SRA, issued a Review Decision. He upheld the imposition of the condition. However, he overturned the reasons given by Ms Harris, as they were based on incorrect facts, and substituted new reasons. He correctly directed himself in respect of the legal and regulatory framework and the tests to be applied. He considered the allegations and supporting information in detail, and considered the representations made by the Appellant. He was satisfied that, pending a determination by the Tribunal, that the Appellant was “unsuitable to undertake litigation and, if he does so, he may put at risk the interests of his clients, third parties, or the public”. Therefore the requirements of regulation 7.2(a) and (b) and 7.3(b) of the SRA Authorisation of Individuals Regulations 2019 were met (see paragraphs 6.12 – 6.14 of the Review Decision).

Mr Andronov correctly directed himself that, before imposing conditions, he had to be satisfied that they were in the public interest, were reasonable and proportionate. He was so satisfied (see paragraphs 6.15 – 6.16 of the Review Decision).

Mr Andronov acknowledged, at paragraph 6.16 of the Review Decision, that Ms Harris’ decision to impose the condition without notice was arguably disproportionate when considering the impact on his clients. However, the Appellant had now had essentially two months’ notice which was sufficient time to consider alternative arrangements for his clients. I agree with Mr Andronov’s assessment. I see from the Speaking Note that the effective date of Ms Harris’ decision was suspended pending review. As Ms Harris’ decision was set aside and replaced by the Review Decision, the appeal could not be allowed on grounds of lack of notice.

The Appellant made extensive submissions to the SRA in the letters referred to above. I have carefully considered those submissions, together with the matters raised in the Appellant’s Speaking Note. However, I am unable to accept them. In my view, the Review Decision was a lawful and proper exercise of the SRA’s discretionary judgment, based upon the information available to it at the time.

For these reasons, the interim condition appeal is dismissed.