National Crime Agency v GKC (No 1)

This is a case about an unexplained wealth order (“UWO”) and an interim freezing order (“IFO”), which were made in tandem by Bourne J on an application by the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) in the High Court on 18.7.25. The UWO was made pursuant to s.362A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The IFO was made pursuant to s.362J of the same Act. The Respondent (GL) was the subject of those two orders. The UWO requires her to provide information. The IFO prohibits her from dealing with certain identified assets. The orders were applied for and made without notice. That means the Respondent had no prior opportunity to be heard as to whether the orders were justified. The law gave her the legal entitlement to be heard after the event. She was entitled to make an application, asking the Court to reconsider afresh whether the orders were justified, including with fresh and updating evidence. She has exercised that right. The question which I have to decide is whether to allow that application and discharge the orders, or whether to refuse it and to leave the orders in place. In the meantime, the IFO has taken effect, but the duty to provide information under the UWO has been suspended. A helpful working illustration of a successful application to discharge an UWO and IFO is National Crime Agency v Baker [2020] EWHC 822 (Admin).

I wrote this judgment using terms followed by the annotation (GL). Here is why. A procedural issue arose about private hearings, anonymity and open justice. The Respondent initially requested that the hearing of her application be in private, as was the NCA’s application for the orders. She asked that I give judgment in private only, as Bourne J did as [2025] EWHC 1908 (Admin). I was not prepared to take that course. It would have meant the Court was acting entirely below the radar of open justice. Any interested member of the press or public would not even know that orders had been made and were in place, the nature of the orders, or the fact that an application was being made to discharge them. I decided instead that it was necessary, for the time being, to take a course which was a lesser derogation from open justice. I granted interim anonymity. I was able to hear the entirety of the application in open court, because no party needed to give the details which appear in the Glossary below. So, I wrote this judgment in draft, using open terms which appear in the Glossary below. The open terms are marked (GL) on the first occasion when they appear. The judgment was prepared in a way that the meanings of the open terms in the Glossary could remain confidential, but only if I was satisfied in light of the judgment itself that anonymity remained necessary. I will return to this issue at the end of the judgment.

Here is the glossary listing the annotated terms marked (GL), which were treated as confidential at least on an interim basis. Most were identified for interim redaction when this judgment was written and then circulated in draft. Some were suggested by Mr Owen KC on a protective, jigsaw-identification risk, basis in response to the draft judgment.

Part 8 of the 2002 Act is entitled “investigations”. An UWO is a species of court order contained within Part 8. Parliament has empowered a number of enforcement authorities, including the NCA, to make applications to the High Court for an UWO. The order arises out of an investigation. It relates to specified property. It requires the named recipient of the order – as the named respondent to the application – to provide information, in the form of a statement, about their interest in the specified property. The respondent must explain how they obtained the property, including how the costs of doing so were met. They must give such other information in connection with the property as is specified in the order. A failure or refusal to respond is not a crime. But it has this legal consequence: the property is presumed to be recoverable property in Part 5 civil recovery proceedings, unless the contrary is subsequently shown. To give a misleading response, on the other hand, can have criminal consequences (s.362E).

The High Court has a discretionary power as to whether or not to make an UWO. But the Court’s discretionary power only arises if certain statutory requirements are first satisfied. These are set out in s.362B. The Court must be satisfied that there is reasonable cause to believe, first that the respondent “holds the property” and second that the value of the property is greater than £50,000 (s.362B(2)). The Court must also be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting, either that the property has been obtained through unlawful conduct (s.362B(3)(b)), or that “the known sources of the respondent’s lawfully obtained income would have been insufficient for the purposes of enabling the respondent to obtain the property” (s.362B(3)(a)). Finally, the Court must be satisfied, either that the respondent is a politically exposed person (s.362B(4)(a)), or that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting relevant involvement in serious crime (s.362B(4)(b)). I will return to what is meant by relevant involvement in serious crime.

I have referred to the statutory precondition relating to insufficiency of known sources (s.362B(3)(a)). This is sometimes called the “income requirement” (Baker §21iii). It is concerned with identifying apparently unaffordable assets: property being held which is reasonably suspected to be beyond the respondent’s financial means. The income requirement makes obvious sense where an investigating enforcement authority is asking the Court for an UWO. The link between apparently unaffordable assets and “unexplained wealth” is obvious. But apparently unaffordable assets (s.362B(3)(a)) is not a sufficient precondition for an UWO. Parliament did not empower the NCA to obtain, or the High Court to make, UWOs simply because there are suspicions about assets being unaffordable by those persons who hold them. More is needed. The other statutory preconditions must also be satisfied.

I said I would return to what is meant by relevant involvement in serious crime. I have explained that, unless the respondent is a politically exposed person (s.362B(4)(a)), there must be reasonable grounds for suspecting relevant involvement in serious crime (s.362B(4)(b)). That is sometimes called the “serious crime requirement” (Baker §23iv). Here it is:

By virtue of s.362B(9)(b), the phrase “person connected” in s.362B(4)(b) takes the same meaning as ss.1122-1123 of the Corporation Tax Act 2010, including an “ancestor” or descendant”. It includes a parent, but not an uncle.

The meaning of “involved in serious crime … in a part of the United Kingdom or elsewhere” has the meaning (see s.362B(9)(a)) found within s.2(3)-(5) of the Serious Crime Act 2007, which provide as follows:

So, the serious crime requirement can be met by reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement – whether by the respondent or by a “person connected with” the respondent – in serious crime “elsewhere” than in the UK (2002 Act s.362B(4)(b)). But only if the dual criminality requirement of s.2(5)(a) of the 2007 Act (applicable by s.362B(9)(a) of the 2002 Act) is met. That means the reasonable grounds for suspicion must be of involvement in:

As can be seen above, s.2(5)(b)(i) of the 2007 Act provides for certain offences to be “serious”, for the purposes of the serious crime requirement, because they are “specified” offences in Schedule 1 Part 1 to the 2007 Act. Under §6 of Schedule 1 Part 1, the domestic criminal offences of money laundering have been so specified. These offences are found in Part 7 of the 2002 Act. Under ss.327-329 of the 2002 Act, money laundering involves the concealing etc of “criminal property” (s.327), facilitating the acquisition etc of “criminal property” (s.328), and the acquisition, use and possession of “criminal property” (s.329). Property is only “criminal property” if it is a benefit from “criminal conduct” (s.340(3)(a)). And “criminal conduct” is “conduct which — (a) constitutes an offence in any part of the United Kingdom, or (b) would constitute an offence in any part of the United Kingdom if it occurred there”.

Money laundering is a derivative offence. There must be an underlying “offence” which produces the “criminal property”, for the purposes of a money laundering offence. That underlying offence is known as the “predicate offence”. If I were to act to conceal money which is your proceeds of your drug dealing, your drug offence would be the “predicate offence”, and I can be guilty of the derivative offence of money laundering.

An IFO is another species of order contained within Part 8 of the 2002 Act which can be made by the High Court. I spoke at the outset of the UWO and the IFO in this case being orders which the Court made “in tandem”. It is a statutory precondition for the making of an IFO that the High Court makes an UWO: see s.362J(1) of the 2002 Act. Parliament empowered those same enforcement authorities who can apply to the High Court for an UWO – including the NCA – also to apply for an IFO. The IFO prohibits the respondent and any other person with an interest in the specified property from dealing with that property, subject to certain statutory exclusions. The High Court has a discretionary power as to whether to make an IFO. But it can only exercise that discretionary power if satisfied (see s.362J(2)), that the Court considers the making of the IFO is “necessary to do so for the purposes of avoiding the risk of any recovery order that might subsequently be obtained being frustrated”.

The function which the UWO and the IFO play is apparent from this scheme. These are tools made accessible in appropriate cases to those authorities charged with investigating, identifying and then forfeiting the proceeds of crime. Civil recovery action is the subject of Part 5 of the 2002 Act. The information from an UWO is being obtained in an investigation which may lead to civil recovery action. The UWO can be accompanied by an IFO, imposed to avoid frustrating any future civil recovery order.

I turn now to the circumstances of the present case. The specified property in question comprises two apartments located in England, one with an associated parking space; and six bank accounts held in the UK with Barclays Bank. I am calling the first apartment the residential apartment (GL), because it has served as a home for the Respondent. I am calling the other apartment the tenanted apartment (GL), because it has throughout had a sitting tenant, producing rental income for the owner.

The NCA’s application to the High Court for the UWO and the IFO was made on 11 July 2025. In support of it there was a 24-page witness statement made by the financial investigator at the NCA, Veronica Fragassi. Ms Fragassi explained to the Court that she was leading a civil recovery investigation. She explained that she had issued two statutory information requests, on 9 June 2025 and 25 June 2025. These were sent to the two companies who were the residential apartment seller (GL) and the tenanted apartment seller (GL). They were requests for disclosure of information, issued by the NCA pursuant to s.7 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. A 296-page bundle of exhibits accompanied the Fragassi witness statement. It included the two sellers’ responses to the NCA’s s.7 requests, together with associated email communications. There were also official copy documents derived from the Land Register and email communications with HM Land Registry. There was information from the tenanted apartment letting agent (GL). There were three witness statements, with accompanying exhibits, from an executive officer employed by the Home Office called Phoebe Marsh. There were also three witness statements from an HMRC official called Ceri-Ann Rees. Finally, there were a series of what has been called “open source materials”, to which it will be necessary to return.

The questions which the NCA had posed in the two s.7 requests sent to the sellers of the apartments could be seen repeated in one of the responses. One question had asked each seller to confirm the identity of the solicitors who had received the completion funds for the purchase of each apartment including their contact details. Another question had asked each seller about the payments that were received in respect of the purchase, including amounts and dates. A further question asked who had been the point of contact in relation to dealings with the Respondent. The s.7 response from the seller of the residential apartment identified by name that seller’s solicitors (GL), the buyer’s solicitors (GL), and the buyer’s agent (GL). The s.7 response from the seller of the tenanted apartment identified by name that seller’s solicitors (GL), the buyer’s solicitors (GL), and the seller’s agent (GL).

The reason why Ms Fragassi obtained three witness statements from Ms Marsh at the Home Office, and three witness statements from Ms Rees at HMRC, was this. The civil recovery investigation, out of which the NCA’s application to the High Court arose, was looking into the position of the Respondent, her father (GL), and her mother (GL). The three Home Office witness statements and accompanying documents provided evidence as to the immigration position of each of the three of them: daughter, father and mother. It included various successful visa applications which each of them had made, for leave to enter or remain in the UK. The three HMRC witness statements and accompanying documents provided evidence as to the declared earnings in the UK of each of the three of them: daughter, father and mother.

The Home Office documents evidenced the following picture. The Respondent had first obtained a visa to come to the UK to attend a boarding school in England from January 2018 onwards, having just turned 16. In September 2022 aged 20 she obtained a student visa to attend university (GL) in England, on a three-year undergraduate course until May 2024. As to the mother, she had successfully applied in June 2023 for a skilled worker visa, to come to the UK as a marketing manager earning £40,000 a year. As to the father, he had successfully applied in July 2023 for a visa to come to the UK, as the partner of a skilled worker. The Home Office exhibits included the various visa applications made by all three of them. Those documents described the Singapore address, a property said to have been self-owned by the father (in his visa application) or self-owned by the mother (in her visa application and one of the Respondent’s visa applications). In her September 2022 university student visa application, the Respondent described having lived at the Singapore address from 11 months earlier (ie. around October 2021), having previously lived in Hong Kong.

I can pause there to identify a first central feature of the submissions made by Mr Owen KC on behalf of the Respondent in this case. Mr Owen KC says that the NCA should have pursued enquiries with the identified solicitors and agents, asking that they provide the NCA with information about purchase of each apartment, before making the application to the High Court for the orders. The solicitors, says Mr Owen KC, should have been asked for information about the steps that they had taken and the information they had obtained in relation to their duties of due diligence relating to potential money laundering, steps which have been described as “know your customer”. The NCA failed to undertake these obvious enquiries, notwithstanding asking for – and getting – information about the solicitors who acted in the transactions. They had not done so at the time of the July 2025 application to the High Court. Even now, in early 2026, they are still unable to place before this Court any information deriving from any due diligence by any solicitors. That is notwithstanding an updating witness statement from the new lead investigator. That is the argument.

The evidenced picture placed by Ms Fragassi before the High Court in July 2025 was as follows. First, as to the residential apartment. In September 2021, the residential apartment and its associated parking space were documented as having been purchased by the Respondent, for a combined price of £4m, at a time when she was aged 19 years 9 months. No lender was involved. The apartment and parking space had no charge against the title. They were unencumbered. The purchase price of the apartment was £3.8595m and for the parking space was £150k. The apartment and parking space were purchased from the same seller, a property developer. The Respondent as buyer was represented by named solicitors. The seller was represented by named solicitors. The reservation payment was received in May 2021, a subsequent payment at the date of exchange in July 2021, and the balance on completion in September 2021. Later, in the parents’ visa applications of June and July 2023, the Respondent was described as living at the residential apartment with her brother, and the Home Office was told that the mother and father were going to live with them at the same address.

Then, as to the tenanted apartment. In November 2023, just into the second year of the Respondent’s undergraduate course at the university, and now aged 21 years and 11 months, the tenanted apartment is documented as having been purchased by the Respondent, for a purchase price of £1.173m. There was a named tenant (GL), with a letting managed by the letting agent. The tenanted apartment was purchased from the seller, a named asset management company. The Respondent as purchaser was represented by a named firm of solicitors, the same firm of solicitors who had acted for the Respondent’s parents in their June and July 2023 visa applications, and the same firm which subsequently acted for both transferor and transferee (GL) of the tenanted apartment. The seller was represented by named firm of seller’s solicitors. And a named agencyhad acted as seller’s agent. No lender was involved. There was no charge or other encumbrance, apart from the sitting tenant. The tenanted apartment generated rental income, which the letting agent paid over to the Respondent as owner.

Next, as to the six Barclays bank accounts. Ms Fragassi’s witness statement explained that the NCA had identified the 6 Barclays accounts, in the name of the Respondent. The aggregate sum held in those 6 identified accounts in the Respondent’s name was £799.3k.

The Home Office documents stated that the Respondent’s student visa restricted her ability to work in the UK. The HMRC evidence was that the Respondent had no declared income or earning records in the UK as at July 2025. There was the evidence of the rental income after November 2023 in respect of the tenanted apartment. The HMRC evidence was that the father had no declared income in the UK. The mother had declared earnings in respect of the marketing manager role for the named employer at a level of £40k a year for a complete year and lesser sums for incomplete years. When Bourne J came to make the UWO he was satisfied as to the income requirement. He found that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the known sources of the Respondent’s lawfully obtain income would have been insufficient for the purposes of enabling her to obtain: the £4m residential apartment and parking space purchased in September 2021; the £1.173m tenanted apartment in November 2023; and the £799.3k aggregate balance in the six bank accounts.

There was one important further feature in the run up to the NCA’s decision to apply to the High Court for the UWO and accompanying IFO. What happened was this. Ms Fragassi had obtained from HM Land Registry the official copy documents for the purchase and ownership of the residential apartment and parking space; and for the purchase and ownership of the tenanted apartment. She had also made specific contact with HM Land Registry in Durham, with questions specifically about the tenanted apartment. HM Land Registry in Durham had responded in April 2025 with information. But then, on 16 June 2025, an application was received by HM Land Registry in respect of a transfer of the tenanted apartment, from the Respondent as transferor to a named individual as transferee. The transfer was expressed to be dated 15 May 2025. HM Land Registry noticed that it was a transfer for “no value”. Knowing that the NCA had expressed a specific interest in the tenanted apartment, HM Land Registry at Durham promptly alerted Ms Fragassi on 16 June 2025 to the new information about the “no value” property transfer. As she described in her witness statement in support of the application to the High Court, Ms Fragassi was concerned about this new “no value” transfer. She elicited information that the same firm acted as transferor’s solicitors (GL) and transferee’s solicitors (GL). She elicited information that the rental income was still being paid by the letting agent to the Respondent. The concerns expressed by Ms Fragassi and the NCA to the High Court included concerns at the prospect that these unencumbered properties could readily be transferred to third parties.

It is clear on the evidence that this development, regarding news of the “no value” transfer of the tenanted apartment, was a significant feature in the decision by the NCA to proceed to make the application to the High Court. The seller of the tenanted apartment confirmed to the NCA on 3 July 2025 that it could give no further information about the named transferee. The Home Office witness statements were obtained on 4 July 2025, and the HMRC witness statements on 11 July 2025, and the application to the High Court was issued that same day.

Pausing there, a second key feature of the arguments made by Mr Owen KC is this. Even if there was some feature of the case which meant there was urgency when the NCA’s application was made, that urgency has disappeared by the time of this hearing of the Respondent’s application to discharge the UWO and IFO. The Court’s jurisdiction is fully dynamic. The Court must apply the legal criteria afresh. It must do so on the updated position. It is like a return date, at which the NCA were applying for the UWO and IFO all over again. Whether or not an absence of further enquiry could be excused when the application was made, that cannot be the case now. The NCA has to show ongoing and updating reasonable enquiries if it is going to succeed in maintaining the orders and resist their being set aside. That is the argument.

Everything that I have said so far relates to the evidenced picture regarding the properties in England. But to understand the nature of the NCA’s application, it is necessary now to turn to the picture which was found within the open source materials which Ms Fragassi exhibited. Prominent within the open source materials are a series of online newspaper articles. There was a BBC News online article dated 12 April 2024 entitled: “The $2bn dirty-money case that rocked Singapore”. There was a Straits Times online news article dated 14 May 2024 entitled: “Extradition worries grow for convicted money launderer after deportation to Cambodia”. There was a Straits Times online news article dated 6 June 2024 entitled: “$3b money laundering probe widens: 17 other foreigners linked to bulk of cash, assets seized”. There is a Straits Times online news article dated 18 November 2024 entitled: “$3b money laundering case: $1.85b in assets surrendered by 15 suspects on the run”. There is another article (GL) from Straits Times online news.

Other open source material was placed before the High Court. There was an online news item dated 7 June 2023 on the Interpol website entitled: “Interpol issues global warning on human trafficking-fueled fraud”. There was a quarterly bulletin (GL). There was a report described as a technical policy brief dated October 2024 issued by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Southeast Asia and the Pacific) entitled: “Transnational Organised Crime and the Convergence of Cyber-Enabled Fraud, Underground Banking and Technological Innovation in Southeast Asia: A Shifting Threat Landscape”. Finally, there was information from Opencorporates, an Open Database of the Corporate World, identifying information about a company (GL).

The picture which emerges from the contents of these open source materials included the following reported points:

The NCA’s position, based on that picture as reported in the open source materials, was and remains as follows:

Pausing there, a third central feature of the submissions made by Mr Owen KC is this. The NCA should have pursued enquiries with foreign enforcement authorities, especially in Singapore, to see if there was independent support and further detail to put alongside the contents of the open source materials. The NCA has approached the serious crime requirement, from first to last, by placing sole and decisive reliance on open source materials. The NCA’s position rests on nothing more than a series of online news stories. That means the NCA has failed to take the obvious and elementary step of seeking to obtain information from state authorities. The law enforcement authorities of Singapore would be in the best position to confirm whether the open source materials are accurate. They would be in the best position to fill in details and gaps in that information. There would be able to provide authoritative information. They would be able to provide corroboration. The NCA inexplicably failed to undertake enquiries from the law enforcement authorities of Singapore. They had not done so at the time of the July 2025 application to the High Court. Even now, in early 2026, the NCA is still unable to place before this court any information deriving from any foreign law enforcement authority. That is important because of the dynamism of the Court’s function in considering the position afresh (§42 below). The cupboard is bare. The NCA has put before the Court an updating witness statement of the new lead investigator, Chloe Rudd. It is dated 20 November 2025. It says this: “the NCA is in the process of corroborating details relating to the Singaporean investigation with the relevant authorities. Unfortunately, this is a lengthy process and the information was therefore unavailable at the time of the UWO application and remains outstanding”. That is an insufficient basis for the NCA to have obtained, and to maintain, the UWO and IFO. That is the argument.

Linked to the foreign authorities enquiry argument, there was a fourth central feature of the arguments advanced by Mr Owen KC. I am calling it “double dual criminality”. It relates to the derivative offence of money laundering, with its predicate criminal offence. Mr Owen KC says both the derivative and the predicate offence have to satisfy dual criminality (§10 above), in order for the serious crime requirement to be met. If I were to act to conceal money which is your proceeds of your selling of prescription drugs illegally in Singapore, your offence would be the “predicate offence”, and I can be guilty of the derivative offence of money laundering. But only if selling those prescription drugs would be an offence here. Double dual criminality – of predicate offence and derivative offence – is needed. That is the argument.

Here is how the point is said to matter in the present case. Based on the open source material, there are clear indications that the predicate offences which produced the criminal property for the Singapore crime of money laundering were offences of providing facilities for illegal online gambling. The indications from the open source material, supported by the Singapore legislation which has been placed before this Court, are that in Singapore it would be a crime for any person to provide online gambling facilities to a gambler who is located in China. But that is not the case so far as concerns the law of England and Wales. A person in England and Wales providing facilities for online gambling accessible by a gambler located in China would commit no crime if the person were licensed here and acted in accordance with the licence. It is not sufficient for dual criminality for the serious crime requirement – see §10 above – that the derivative crime of money laundering is a crime known to both the law of England and Wales and Singapore. The predicate offence must also be a crime under the law of England and Wales as well as Singapore. Otherwise the requirement of dual criminality – since it needs double dual criminality – is not satisfied. And here is the rub. In the light of all of this, it was essential that the NCA should have obtained clarity from the law enforcement authorities of Singapore, as to the precise nature of the allegations of money laundering against the uncle and the father and each of them. That enquiry was necessary, because without it the dual criminality aspect of the serious crime requirement was not satisfied. That was the argument.

The argument had an important end-note. Mr Owen KC argued in post-hearing submissions that the NCA’s approach involved a material error of law, because the NCA has erroneously reasoned that the predicate offence need not satisfy the dual criminality test. He asked for post-hearing permission to advance this as a distinct ground for setting aside the UWO and IFO.

Before proceeding further to analyse the arguments in the case, I need to identify four further features of the legal landscape. The first feature concerns full and frank disclosure. The NCA’s application for the UWO and IFO was made without notice. That placed the NCA under an important obligation to make full and frank disclosure. It means that the Respondent is entitled to ask this court to discharge the order if she could point to a material non-disclosure. As to the duty, I was shown SSHD v Mohamed [2014] 1 WLR 4240 at §32, where Maurice Kay LJ agreed with an exposition from the then Lloyd Jones LJ at [2013] 1 WLR 2171 §161, based on authorities such as In re Stanford International Bank Ltd [2011] Ch 33 at §191 (Hughes LJ) and R v Crown Court at Lewes, ex p Hill (1990) 93 Crim App R 60, 69 (Bingham LJ): “It is well established that a party seeking relief from the court on a ‘without notice’ application is under a duty to make a full, fair and accurate disclosure of all material information to the court and to draw the courts attention to significant factual, legal and procedural aspects of the case. Furthermore, the applicant must act with the utmost good faith and is obliged to give full and frank disclosure of all matters which the absent parties could be expected to make had they been present”. Also cited to me was Director of the Serious Fraud Office v A [2007] EWCA Crim 1927 at §6, where Hughes LJ said: “Because the initial application is commonly made without notice, the court will not at that stage hear argument on both sides. For this reason, as with other without notice applications, the court insists on full and complete disclosure by the applicant of everything which might affect the decision whether or not to grant the order. There is a high obligation upon such an applicant to put everything relevant before the Judge, whether it may help or hinder his cause”.

The second feature of the legal landscape is this. A consequence of the duty of full and frank disclosure is that material non-disclosure at the without notice stage can be a basis for allowing a respondent’s application to set aside the order made. I was shown A at §18, where Hughes LJ said this: “in order to provide any ground for discharging the initial order which has been obtained without notice …, any non-disclosure must be material, that is to say it must be of something which would have affected the Judge’s decision on the application. If there has been a material failure of disclosure, that may justify discharging the order, but it need not do so. The proper approach is to consider whether the public interest does or does not call for the order to stand, now that the true position is known, and taking into account the previous failure of disclosure. Whether the non-disclosure was deliberate or accidental will be a material factor, although not necessarily determinative… Whilst it is appropriate to insist on strict compliance with the rule of disclosure, discharge of the order does not necessarily follow as a means of disciplining the applicant, at least absent … ‘so appalling a failure’ that that ultimate sanction should be applied”.

Linked to the first two features – the duty of full and frank disclosure, and discharge for material non-disclosure – is the third feature of the legal landscape: the relevance of prior enquiry. This is especially important given the solicitors’ enquiry argument and the foreign authorities enquiry argument being advanced by Mr Owen KC.

I was shown R (Virdee) v NCA [2018] EWHC 1119 (Admin) [2018] 1 WLR 5073 at §31, where Holroyde LJ said:

The Baker working illustration case illustrates orders being discharged for want of prior enquiry. Mr Owen KC submitted as follows. In Baker, the respondent successfully applied to discharge an UWO and IFO on the ground, among other things, that there was inadequate inquiry by the NCA (see §58(ii)). Lang J accepted that the NCA’s case presented at the without notice hearing was flawed by inadequate investigation into some obvious lines of enquiry (see §217); for example, the failure to conduct a thorough investigation despite the presentation of clearly contradictory material (§§68-70 and 178). That was Mr Owen KC’s encapsulation of Baker, and I accept its accuracy.

What I am unable to accept is this further submission. Mr Owen KC argued that Baker establishes that an UWO “should not be used to short-circuit ordinary investigation” and it establishes that the NCA “must be able to show that it was/is genuinely impeded from investigating the provenance of property without resorting to compulsory disclosure”. I have been unable to derive these propositions from Baker. The question is whether the Court can be satisfied that proper enquiries have been made before making the application; and whether a material failure to do so justifies discharging the orders.

The fourth feature of the legal landscape is this. When the respondent exercises her rights to discharge the order, it is recognised that it is open to each party to seek to choose fresh and updating evidence to place before the court. It is also recognised that, in considering the application for discharge, the court is not exercising a review jurisdiction over the evaluative judgment of the judge who made the original orders. Rather, the High Court is examining afresh the application of the statutory conditions. It is asking itself whether it is satisfied that those conditions are met on the evidence. I was shown NCA v Hao [2024] EWHC 2240 (Admin), which was an application to discharge a Disclosure Order under s.357 of the 2002 Act, made by the High Court on a without notice application. In Hao, Murray J said this at §§54-56: “Relevant principles were set out by Edis J (as he then was) in National Crime Agency v Simkus [2016] EWHC 255 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 3481 (QBD). I am not bound by the reasons given by Johnson J for making the Disclosure Order, although it is appropriate for me to have regard to them. I review the matter afresh in light of the statutory conditions set out in sections 357 and 358 of the 2002 Act: Simkus at [48]. I must exercise my own discretion to ensure that the appropriate order is made.” That means there is a dynamism in the High Court’s function. It is this dynamism which underpins Mr Owen KC’s argument about updating enquiries (§27 above).

I can now turn to an analysis of the case which has been put forward for discharging the UWO and IFO. I have already identified key elements within the Respondent’s arguments (§§20, 27, 32-33). Her case as a whole really came to this:

I have not been persuaded by these arguments. Here are my reasons:

For these reasons, and accepting the submissions from these points advanced by Mr Sutcliffe KC and Ms Jackson for the NCA, I reach the following conclusion. There was no material non-disclosure in the application made in July 2025 and granted by this court. There has been no material failure of enquiry which undermines the granting and maintaining of these orders. The objective criteria of the income requirement and the serious crime requirement, with their reasonable grounds for suspicion standards, were met when the application was granted and the orders made, and they are still met today. There was and is no proper basis in those circumstances for refusing to exercise the statutory discretion in favour of making and maintaining the orders.

For the reasons I have given, the Respondent’s application to discharge the UWO and IFO is dismissed.

There is a remaining issue as to whether the provisional anonymity which I ordered at the hearing is to be maintained, at and after the time of hand down of this judgment, as constituting a necessary derogation from open justice. Mr Owen KC relies on cases like NCA v Hussain [2020] EWHC 432 (Admin) and ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2022] UKSC 5 [2022] AC 1158 in support of anonymity. Mr Sutcliffe KC and Ms Jackson resist anonymity and rely on cases like R (Javadov) v Westminster Magistrates Court [[2021] EWHC 2751 (Admin) [2022] 1 WLR 1953 (see §§47-48); DPP v Briedis [2021] EWHC 3155 (Admin) and NCA v Hao [2024] EWHC 2240 (Admin). I decided to invite further submissions, in circulating this judgment in draft. They cited Simms-Davies v Southwark Crown Court [2026] EWHC 337 (Admin) and R (Marandi) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2023] EWHC 587 (Admin).

At the time of the hearing I was satisfied of two things. First, that for the purposes of reconciling open justice with the legitimate interests of the Respondent and the due administration of justice, it was necessary protectively to order anonymity. In doing so, I had regard to Hussain especially at §88. I also acknowledged that Mr Owen KC was seeking to maintain the ZXC reasonable expectation of privacy. Second, that it would be appropriate to revisit the question of ongoing anonymity in light of the provision of a confidential draft judgment. That would enable the parties to see what the Court was deciding on why on the substance. Mr Owen KC fairly accepted that different considerations might arise if the application for discharge were to be refused. I considered in all the circumstances that it was important not to foreclose on any view as to the ultimate position at the time of handing down of judgment. I took a precautionary approach, on a provisional basis.

Having received helpful further written submissions, I have decided to accede to Mr Owen KC’s suggestion, as follows. I will have a further hearing, with notification to the press, at which the issue of maintaining or discharging the anonymity will be argued and then determined. After that hearing, I will give a second short judgment (No.2) to explain what I decided and why. If anonymity is discharged, I will name the claimant in the title to the judgment and I will repeat the Glossary (§3 above), but this time including the meanings redacted from the right hand column. If I decide it is necessary to maintain anonymity, I will consider whether any meanings and information can nevertheless be given.

The parties were agreed as to the other consequential matters. My Order was as follows. The recitals were: UPON the Respondent’s application by notice dated 17 September 2025 (the Application) to discharge the unexplained wealth order (the UWO) and the interim freezing order (the IFO) both dated 18 July 2025. AND UPON the Court having made an Order for anonymity and reporting restrictions, announced on 10 February 2026 and embodied in an Order sealed on 16 February 2026 (the Anonymity Order). AND UPON hearing Leading Counsel for the Respondent and Leading and Junior Counsel for the Applicant (NCA) at a hearing on 10 February 2026 and by written submissions dated 16 February 2026 (dual criminality) and 9-12 March 2026 (anonymity). AND UPON the Court giving judgment [2026] EWHC 573 (Admin).

The operative provisions are as follows. IT IS ORDERED THAT: (1) The Application is dismissed. (2) The Respondent do comply with the UWO by 4pm on 10 April 2026 (the response period). (3) The IFO shall remain in force until the expiry of the response period, determination period and applicable 48 hour period as defined in Chapter 2 of Part 8 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. (4) The Respondent do pay the NCA’s costs of the Application, summarily assessed by consent in the sum of £76,862.87. (5) The Respondent shall have until 4pm on Friday 20 March 2026 to make any application for (a) permission to appeal against paragraph 1 of this Order (b) any stay of paragraph (2) of this Order. (6) Until further Order of this Court, the Anonymity Order continues in force and effect. (7) There shall be an oral hearing to be fixed before Fordham J (time estimate half a day) to consider continuation of the Anonymity Order. (8) The parties are to liaise as to appropriate steps for notification of the press and promptly notify the Judge’s clerk no later than 4pm on Friday 20 March 2026 as to the steps they have identified for them and the Court to take. (9) The parties are to liaise as to an agreed paginated Anonymity Hearing Bundle containing relevant documents, written submissions and authorities, to be supplied to the Judge’s clerk as soon as possible and no later than 4pm on Friday 20 March 2026, then filed in the usual way, and available to be provided to any participating accredited member of the Press. (10) Liberty to apply in writing on notice to vary paragraphs (2), (3), (5)-(9) of this Order.