Tomasz Sawicki v Circuit Law Court in Swidnica, Poland

THE HON. MR JUSTICE DEXTER DIAS

This is the judgment of the court.

To assist the parties and the public to follow the main lines of the court’s reasoning, the text is divided into nine sections and an annex, as set out in the table of contents above. The table is hyperlinked to aid swift navigation.

This is an appeal against an extradition order.

The appeal concerns the approach to extradition when individual penalties imposed in different criminal proceedings in the requesting state have not been aggregated and are subject to different arrest warrants, and particularly when the remand time credit accrued in this country exceeds some of the individual penalties.

The appeal is made under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the Act”) and is against an extradition order made by District Judge Leake (“the Judge”) sitting at the Westminster Magistrates’ Court (“the lower court”). The live evidence was heard at a substantive hearing on 9 August 2023; the extradition order was made on 13 November 2023; the judgment handed down by the Judge on 21 March 2024. The Judge ordered the appellant’s extradition to Poland. The sole basis of the appeal is article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).

The appellant (also “requested person”) is Tomasz Sawicki, a Polish national. He was born in Poland on 8 November 1980 and is aged 45. He is represented by Ms Westcott of counsel. The respondent is the Circuit Law Court in Swidnica, Poland (“the judicial authority”). The respondent is represented by Mr Squibbs of counsel. The court is grateful to both counsel for the quality of their submissions.

The respondent seeks the appellant’s return to Poland on three arrest warrants (“AWs”), two of which are conviction warrants and the third an accusation warrant. The crimes and allegations relate to events a significant time ago, between 2000 and 2005. They involve crimes and accusations of non-domestic burglary and other forms of dishonesty. The parties agree that the combined AW material penalties amount to 3 years 10 months and 14 days (46.5 months). From this must be deducted the time spent by the appellant on remand in the United Kingdom.

The appellant was arrested in Bristol on 18 April 2023 and has remained in custody ever since. Under the terms of the agreement between the United Kingdom and Poland, remand time awaiting trial counts towards the sentence in the requesting state. Therefore, as of the date of the appeal, the appellant has a custodial term of 16 months and 4 days still to serve in Poland. By the time of the final submissions from counsel on 13 February 2026, the parties agreed that the outstanding custodial term is 15 months and 17 days custody.

The appellant does not consent to his extradition.

Following refusal of permission to appeal by Collins Rice J on 25 October 2024, a renewal hearing was held on 6 February 2025 before Saini J. He refused permission to appeal on the first three grounds of four grounds. Permission to appeal was stayed on ground 4 (article 8) pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Andrysiewicz v Poland [2025] UKSC 23. Sweeting J granted permission to appeal on ground 4 on 24 October 2025.

There is a complicated factual and procedural background. I adopt the chronology annexed by the Judge to his judgment, and prepared essentially by Ms Westcott, to whom I am grateful. As a compressed summary, the appellant committed a range of dishonesty offences in Poland as a much younger man between May 2000, when he was aged 19, and June 2005, when he had reached the age of 24. He left Poland in September 2005 and has been found by the Judge to be a fugitive in his putting himself beyond the reach of Polish justice in respect of two of the three AWs. He committed further offences in the United Kingdom, more offences of dishonesty. He was ultimately arrested on the arrest warrants now before the court on 18 April 2023.

The appellant’s extradition is requested under three AWs:

The charges are helpfully set out in detail the Annex to this judgment, and were annexed to the lower court judgment in accordance with Biri v High Court in Miskolc, Hungary [2018] EWHC 50 (Admin). The court acknowledges the contribution of Mr Burton of counsel for preparation of the charges in the proceedings below.

For reasons that will become clear, the judgment below can at this point be dealt briefly. The extradition order was made pursuant to all three arrest warrants, which related to multiple theft-type offences, save for a short sentence imposed for taking a vehicle without consent (AW2, Decision 1). The extradition offences were committed between 20 and 26 years ago, between 31 May 2000 to 20 July 2006. The Judge found that the appellant was a fugitive in relation to conviction AW1 and AW2, but not the accusation warrant AW3.

In the most essential respects, the Judge held (paras 212-18):

“In relation to AW1 (III Kop 66/22), I am:

(a)

sure, for the purposes of section 2, that the TCA warrant is a valid Part 1 warrant;

(b)

sure, for the purposes of section 10(2), that the conduct specified in the warrant is an extradition offence as defined in section 65(3);

(c)

sure that the requested person is a fugitive from justice in Poland;

(d)

satisfied, for the purposes of section 11(5), that the requested person’s extradition is not barred by any of the reasons in section 11(1) and particularly the passage of time;

(e)

sure, for the purposes of section 20(3), that the requested person deliberately absented himself from his trial; and

(f)

satisfied, for the purposes of section 21(1), that extradition would be compatible with rights under article 8 of the Convention.

Accordingly, I ordered the requested person’s extradition to Poland under section 21(3) in relation to the offences in AW1.

In relation to each of Decisions 1-3 constituting AW2 (III Kop 78/07), I am:

(a)

sure, for the purposes of section 2, that the EAW is a valid Part 1 warrant;

(b)

sure, for the purposes of section 10(2), that the conduct specified in the warrant is an extradition offence as defined in section 65(3);

(c)

sure that the requested person is a fugitive from justice in Poland;

(d)

satisfied, for the purposes of section 11(5), that the requested person’s extradition is not barred by any of the reasons in section 11(1) and particularly the passage of time.

However, applying section 21 as modified by the Multiple Offences Order, I do not reach the same decision in relation to each of Decisions 1-3.

In relation to section 21, I am satisfied:

(e)

in relation to AW2 Decision 1 (II K 398/01), that extradition would not be compatible with rights under article 8 of the Convention because the requested person has been remanded in custody in these extradition proceedings for substantially longer than the period of time remaining to be served, and

(f)

in relation AW2 Decision 2 (II K 1133/01) and AW2 Decision 3 (II K 1191/02), that extradition would be compatible with rights under article 8 of the Convention.

Accordingly, I discharged the requested person under section 21(2) in relation to the offence in AW2 Decision 1; and I ordered his extradition to Poland under section 21(3) in relation to the offences in AW2 Decision 2 and AW2 Decision 3.

In relation to AW3 (III Kop 85/07), I am:

(a)

sure, for the purposes of section 2, that the EAW is a valid Part 1 warrant;

(b)

sure, for the purposes of section 10(2), that the conduct specified in the warrant is an extradition offence as defined in section 64(3);

(c)

not sure that the requested person is a fugitive;

(d)

satisfied, for the purposes of section 11(5), that the requested person’s extradition is not barred by any of the reasons in section 11(1) and particularly the passage of time;

(e)

satisfied for the purposes of section 21A(1), that extradition would be compatible with rights under article 8 of the Convention and not disproportionate.

Accordingly, I ordered the requested person’s extradition to Poland under section 21(3) in respect of the offences in AW3.”

The Judge (para 192) found that the balance of factors relevant to proportionality lay “decisively” in favour of extradition.

In his grounds of appeal, the requested person advanced four grounds. Permission was granted by Sweeting J only on article 8. In his order dated 24 October 2025, Sweeting J observed:

“1)

This is not a case where there is a combined or cumulative sentence as a result of consolidation such that the court does not need to consider the individual sentences: Pilecki v Poland [2008] UKHL 7; [2008] 1 WLR 325.

2)

I am persuaded that it is arguable there is no clear guidance on how the court should approach remand credit against a series of sentences which are to run consecutively particularly where:

a)

Extradition under one arrest warrant decision has already being refused by the District Judge on the basis of time served, because the short remaining penalty had been completed due to extradition remand.

b)

It is at least arguable that the same logic now applies to Decision 3 where conviction occurred in 2013 (indeed whichever penalty goes first, it will have been “completed” by now).”

The ground requires careful consideration and may usefully subdivided for the purposes of this appeal into two issues.

First, the appellant submits that the extended time now spent on remand has consequences for whether and which arrest warrants remain extant and capable of justifying extradition. The warrants have not been consolidated and the sentences not aggregated despite requests from the appellant through his Polish lawyer. The respondent’s reply (27 December 2024) to the request from the Crown Prosecution Service about its stance towards a cumulative penalty was that it is “awaiting the surrender of the said sentenced person by the British party”. While the appellant’s Polish lawyer provided further information that it is possible to aggregate penalties while the offender is out of Poland, the respondent has chosen not to. Whether and in what way a requesting state aggregates multiple sentences is a matter exclusively for it and the principle of comity applies, save conceivably in exceptional cases where the court perceives a manipulation of due process (in a different context see the case of R (USA) v Bow Street Magistrates’ Court [2007] 1 WLR, a judicial review claim frequently referred to as “Tollman” as the proposed extraditees were Mr and Mrs Tollman). While the appellant submits that the aggregated sentence is likely to be lower, that remains speculation. The court cannot proceed speculatively.

Thus, by operation of the Extradition Act 2003 (Multiple Offences) Order 2003 (“MO Order 2003”) there must be separate consideration of each offence and penalty. The appellant has entirely completed some of the “live” penalties. Therefore, the court is invited to consider whether the appellant should be discharged on any arrest warrant (“Issue 1”).

Second, it is submitted that the knock-on effect for article 8 is that should any warrant or warrants be “extinguished”, the court should step back and revisit the balancing exercise. The Judge’s article 8 conclusion was wrong in its own terms, but particularly so in light of the changed circumstances (“Issue 2”).

Therefore, the following issues fall to be determined:

The appellant submits that the Judge was wrong overall on article 8: the impact of extradition on the appellant and his long-term partner is disproportionate. The appellant submits:

The respondent replies as follows:

I intend to amplify the law relevant to specific issues as it arises in the course of the judgment text. However, the cardinal legal foundation is established and uncontroversial. The appeal is brought under section 26 of the Act. Section 27 provides the relevant appeal test:

The proper approach to the application of the appeal test was considered by the Divisional Court in Love v USA [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin) (“Love”). The court said at para 26:

“26.

The true approach is more simply expressed by requiring the appellate court to decide whether the decision of the district judge was wrong. What was said in Celinski and Re B (A Child) are apposite, even if decided in the context of article 8. In effect, the test is the same here. The appellate court is entitled to stand back and say that a question ought to have been decided differently because the overall evaluation was wrong: crucial factors should have been weighed so significantly differently as to make the decision wrong, such that the appeal in consequence should be allowed.”

The court must consider the ECHR compatibility of a proposed extradition order, particularly in respect of article 8 and the associated proportionality question. In addition to the recent Supreme Court case of Andrysiewicz v Poland [2025] UKSC 23 (“Andrysiewicz”) (see particularly paras 31-43), I have considered the seminal cases of Norris v United States of America [2010] UKSC 9 (“Norris”), HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25 (“HH”), and Celinski v Poland [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin) (“Celinski”). In Celinski, Lord Thomas CJ said in the Divisional Court (para 13):

“13.

Sixth in relation to conviction warrants:

a.

The judge at the extradition hearing will seldom have the detailed knowledge of the proceedings or of the background or previous offending history of the offender which the sentencing judge had before him.

b.

Each member state is entitled to set its own sentencing regime and levels of sentence. Provided it is in accordance with the Convention, it is not for a UK judge to second guess that policy. The prevalence and significance of certain types of offending are matters for the requesting state and judiciary to decide; currency conversions may tell little of the real monetary value of items stolen or of sums defrauded. For example, if a state has a sentencing regime under which suspended sentences are passed on conditions such as regular reporting and such a regime results in such sentences being passed much more readily than the UK, then a court in the UK should respect the importance to courts in that state of seeking to enforce non-compliance with the terms of a suspended sentence.

c.

It will therefore rarely be appropriate for the court in the UK to consider whether the sentence was very significantly different from what a UK court would have imposed, let alone to approach extradition issues by substituting its own view of what the appropriate sentence should have been. As Lord Hope of Craighead DPSC said in HH [2013] 1 AC 338, para 95 in relation to the appeal in the case of PH, a conviction warrant:

“But I have concluded that it is not open to us, as the requested court, to question the decision of the requesting authorities to issue an arrest warrant at this stage. This is their case, not ours. Our duty is to give effect to the procedure which they have decided to invoke and the proper place for leniency to be exercised, if there are grounds for leniency, is Italy.”

Reduced to its bare minimum, the article 8 issue is that identified by Lady Hale in HH at para 8(3):

“The question is always whether the interference with the private and family lives of the extraditee and other members is outweighed by the public interest in extradition.”

Key to the submission on this issue is the operation and effect of the MO Order 2003. Allied to this, section 21 of the Act provides:

“Person unlawfully at large: human rights

(1)

If the judge is required to proceed under this section he must decide whether the person’s extradition would be compatible with the Convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998.

(2)

If the judge decides the question in subsection (1) in the negative he must order the person’s discharge.

(3)

If the judge decides that question in the affirmative he must order the person to be extradited to the category 1 territory in which the warrant was issued.

(4)

If the judge makes an order under subsection (3) he must remand the person in custody or on bail to wait for his extradition to the category 1 territory.”

The appellant recognises that this issue does not apply to the accusation warrant AW3 as there is no imposed sentence for remand time to accrue against. Therefore, the focus is on the two conviction warrants AW1 and AW2 (to the extent AW2 remains). The respondent’s further information (29 May 2024) states that the sentences will be served consecutively and in order of issue.

It is common ground that qualifying remand is deductible in the present case by operation of article 26(1) of the Framework Decision, as authoritatively discussed by the Luxembourg court (Court of Justice of the European Union) in the case of JZ v Prokuratura Rejonowa Lodz-Srodmiescie (Case C-294/16PPU) EU:C:2016:610 (“JZ”).Article 26 provides:

“(1)

The issuing member state shall deduct all periods of detention arising from the execution of a European arrest warrant from the total period of detention to be served in the issuing member state as a result of a custodial sentence or detention order being passed.

(2)

To that end, all information concerning the duration of the detention of the requested person on the basis of the European arrest warrant shall be transmitted by the executing judicial authority or the central authority designated under article 7 to the issuing judicial authority at the time of surrender.”

In JZ, the Luxembourg Court said of article 26 at paras 42-43:

“42 … the obligation under that article to deduct the period of detention arising from the execution of the European arrest warrant from the total period of detention which the person concerned would be required to serve in the issuing Member State is designed to meet the general objective of respecting fundamental rights, as referred to in recital 12, and recalled in Article 1(3), of Framework Decision 2002/584, by preserving the right to liberty of the person concerned, enshrined in Article 6 of the Charter, and the practical effect of the principle of proportionality in the application of penalties, as provided for in Article 49(3) of the Charter.

43 In so far as it requires account to be taken of any period during which the person sentenced was detained in the executing Member State, Article 26(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 ensures that that person is not required to serve a period of detention the total length of which — both in the executing Member State and in the issuing Member State — would ultimately exceed the length of the custodial sentence imposed on him in the issuing Member State.”

A number of points immediately arise of direct relevance to the determination of Issue 1:

I have identified what seem to me to be uncontroversial propositions as the foundation for the next step. The question is how the MO Order 2003 interacts with these propositions in cases where there are multiple warrants. Here the dispute between the parties is sharp.

The appellant supplied a further authority at the outset of the hearing. It was the judgment of Fordham J in Orsos v Pecs District Court, Hungary [2021] EWHC 3097 (Admin) (“Orsos”). It is submitted that Fordham J “grappled” with the effects of remand time. Indeed he did. However, the facts were materially different.

In Orsos, there was broad agreement between the parties and the dispute was a classic article 8 proportionality dispute. This is because for one warrant (EAW3), it was agreed that it was “extinguished” because of remand time. The warrant had been revoked. For another, an accusation warrant (EAW1), a subsequent custodial sentence had been imposed in Hungary in the requested person’s absence. The warrant was withdrawn, revoked and discharged. For yet another arrest warrant, the requesting state agreed to withdraw it due to remand time in the United Kingdom and so, in the words of Fordham J (para 14), it “came and has gone”. That left an accusation warrant (EAW2), an assault and affray allegation, with a balance of 198 days’ qualifying remand time (para 32). Fordham J dismissed the appeal against extradition. Therefore, Orsos is not authority for the relevance of the MO Order 2003 (not cited in the judgment) or how to approach a balance of remand time with multiple outstanding custodial sentences that have not be aggregated (the issue not arising). Nevertheless, these are the questions in dispute between the parties in the instant case. However, and as evident, Fordham J did “grapple” with how to deal with remand time in a multiple-warrant case.

The respondent disputes whether the MO Order 2003 has any applicability or effect in the circumstances of this case. It seems to me that answer is clear. The Explanatory Notes emphasise in the usual way that they are not part of the order. They state:

“Explanatory Note

(This note is not part of the Order)

This Order provides for the Extradition Act 2003 to have effect with the modifications specified in the Schedule to the Order in relation to the following cases. Those cases are where a Part 1 warrant is issued in respect of more than one offence or where a request for extradition is made in respect of more than one offence.

In particular, the modifications are such as to allow for the partial execution of the Part 1 warrant or the request for extradition in cases where the judge and or the Secretary of State must consider more than one offence for which extradition is sought. It is possible that extradition will be refused in relation to some offences but not all, allowing for extradition to take place in relation to some offences only.”

Here a request for extradition is made in respect of more than one offence. I cannot see why the MO Order 2003 is inapplicable. The real question is what is its effect. Therefore, in extradition proceedings, a judge must apply the relevant statutory provisions in respect of each of the offences in a Part 1 warrant. I agree with Ms Westcott that it would be unfair not to have regard to the effect of the MO Order 2003 and extensive time the appellant has spent on remand in the United Kingdom. The parties agree about the effect of MO Order 2003, if the remand time counts:

“The Judicial Authority information suggests that the first penalties to be completed are those within AW 2, followed by the AW 1 penalty.

On a strict calculation of remand credit, avoiding any double counting including against the penalty the District Judge discharged, then the AW 2 penalties are now complete.

As of today (13 February) the remainder of the AW 1 penalty is 1 year 3 months and 17 days.”

Therefore, it should be noted that as at the joint submission of counsel on 13 February 2026, a further two weeks or so has passed. That noted, I concur with the analysis of counsel. I also agree with the appellant that given the efforts made on his behalf to seek an aggregated sentence in Poland, it would be unfair to ignore the reality of the credit situation (Marosan v Romania [2022] 1 WLR 1759, para 22), without purporting to re-sentence the offender. I find no reason to depart from the general approach of the Judge at first instance to the question of credit.

Accordingly, I judge that in light of and the remand time and the effect of the MO Order 2003, the appellant must be discharged on the remaining decisions under AW2, that is, Decision 2 and Decision 3. I trace such implications of this conclusion as it may have for the article 8 balancing exercise, to which I now turn.

First, I set out the rival submissions on article 8, before providing the court’s analysis in the Discussion.

Appellant. The Judge was wrong in his assessment of the significance of what should be viewed as “stark and egregious delays”. Notwithstanding the finding that the appellant was a fugitive in relation to AW1 and AW2, some of these periods were clearly due to failures by the state. The appellant had been living and working in openly Bristol since 2010, and resident in the United Kingdom since 2005. The statement from the NCA confirming a “UK link” dates back to 10 April 2014. The Judge also accepted the Appellant applied for and obtained a new passport in 2021 (posted to him at his home address in Bristol). The Judge also had clear evidence that the NCA explicitly provided the local police with the appellant’s address on 10 March 2021. Nor is this a case of a single person with limited family life. The appellant’s long-term partner (since 2005) and her adult son require consideration. That family life was developed due to the delays. The AW2 offending in particular was committed when the appellant was a young adult and still maturing; he is now 45 years old. The Judge agreed that after settling in the United Kingdom, the appellant lived a “productive and law-abiding life” and is rehabilitated, last offending some 14 years ago.

The Judge also found that the life built with his long-term partner and the financial and emotional impact on her of extradition “is a weighty factor”. There is a real sense in which the appellant has been punished by virtue of the extradition proceedings; thus, there is no risk of impunity if extradition is refused. Poland appears to have set upon a mechanistic pursuit of extradition instead of imposing a cumulative penalty which, given the overall credit of 2 years 9 months, would have been completed entirely.

Respondent. The Judge was correct about the balancing exercise and the article 8 conclusion. He directed himself accurately on the law and conducted the balancing exercise impeccably. He followed the principles established in the cases of Norris, HH and Celinski and cited all three cases at para 159 of his judgment. The appellant has been found to be a fugitive. The sufficiency of punishment submission is misconceived. The private and family life factors fall far short of outweighing the very strong public interest in extradition.

In the changing circumstances of this case, I adopt the “stepping back” approach outlined in Love by Lord Burnett CJ (para 26):

“The true approach is more simply expressed by requiring the appellate court to decide whether the decision of the district judge was wrong. What was said in Celinski and Re B (A Child) are apposite, even if decided in the context of article 8. In effect, the test is the same here. The appellate court is entitled to stand back and say that a question ought to have been decided differently because the overall evaluation was wrong: crucial factors should have been weighed so significantly differently as to make the decision wrong, such that the appeal in consequence should be allowed.”

Despite the disputes at the appeal hearing about the length of outstanding sentence, the parties now agree that as of 13 February 2026, the remaining term is 15 months and 17 days’ custody. The respondent submits that it does not matter “which warrant goes”, the appellant will still have a 15-month-plus sentence to serve in Poland. I bear in mind that the threshold for an extradition offence is 4 months’ custody. The custodial term the appellant is still obliged to serve in Poland is comfortably in excess of 300 per cent of the statutory minimum for a valid extradition offence. I judge that to be a material consideration. I judge the outstanding sentence to be substantial on any view. Given that the appellant has been a fugitive, these are important factors affecting and supporting the public interest in favour of extradition. The question is whether this weight of public interest, including the important comity, mutuality, deterrence of safe haven and rule of law considerations, is outweighed by the nature and extent of article 8 interference. The appellant submits that the court should that find that “this is one of the rare cases where it is necessary to allow the Article 8 ground for all of the remaining matters.”

I accept that the appellant is now rehabilitated, not having reoffended from December 2011 (his shoplifting offence at the Bristol Magistrates’ Court) until his arrest in April 2023. The Judge (para 186, 189) afforded the rehabilitation “significant weight”. I am prepared to proceed on the same basis. While the appellant committed offences in this country on his arrival and then until 2011, that has stopped and he has developed a stable and prolonged relationship with his partner. She and her adult son are completely innocent of the Polish offending.

I have found that warrant AW2 should be discharged in its entirety. I do not regard this as a purely “academic exercise” as the respondent submits. It is the result of the proper application of the legal framework. Nevertheless, there remains an outstanding sentence of over 15 months’ custody. There has been substantial delay. However, the appellant’s evading of Polish criminal proceedings was a calculated act to place himself beyond Polish justice. The objective degree of delay, while extensive, is culpably attributed in significant part to the appellant’s fugitivity. As Lady Hale explained at para 8(6) of HH, delay is relevant to article 8 in two senses:

“The delay since the crimes were committed may both diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest and increase the impact upon private and family life.”

I do regard institutional delay in the United Kingdom as reducing in part the weight of the public interest, but that reduction is limited due to the appellant’s undoubted fugitivity. To assess the level of public interest, it is necessary to understand in more detail the sequence of events.

The AW1 offences took place between May to June 2005. They are approaching 21 years old and at that point of this criminality the appellant was aged 24. This was no longer very youthful offending as it plausibly maintained that the AW2 offending was. Due to his fugitivity, he was only finally convicted in his absence in 2016. The AW1 offences were four non-domestic burglaries. He stole inter alia a motorcycle and two mopeds. The offences were committed while he was serving an 18-month suspended sentence for the AW2 offences and granted conditional release on them. Despite being offered this chance by the Polish court, he reoffended repeatedly. Two days after the fourth AW1 burglary offence, the appellant was instructed by the respondent to notify any changes of address. This was on 20 June 2005. By August 2005, he was not traceable at his Polish addresses. The next month, September 2005, he relocated to the United Kingdom and failed to inform the Polish authorities of his change of address as he was obliged to. In November and December 2005, he was committing dishonesty offences in the United Kingdom. In February 2006, the appellant’s case on AW1 was severed from that of his co-defendants in Poland. Also in February 2006, the suspended sentence for the AW1 offences was activated in Poland. He did not repay the damage as he was required to do and failed to comply with supervision, thus breaching the order of the Polish court. In April 2006, the proceedings against the appellant on AW1 were stayed in Poland as his whereabouts were unknown. In May 2006, he committed a further dishonesty offence in the United Kingdom in breach of the English court’s conditional discharge order, thus now breaching court orders in both England and Poland. In October 2006, a search for the appellant was ordered on AW2. In November 2006, the AW2 proceedings were also stayed due to the appellant not being traced. In October 2007, AW3 was issued.

In December 2012, the stayed proceedings for AW1 were resumed. A “wanted” warrant was withdrawn and a preventative measure in the form of provisional arrest was revoked due to a change in the regulation that offered the possibility of conducting proceedings in the appellant’s absence. An appropriate change was made to the previously issued arrest warrant. In March 2013, the proceedings were stayed again as the appellant remained in hiding and it was concluded that there was no legal basis for the simplified procedure. In May 2014, AW2 and AW3 were received by the NCA, and certified in June 2014. In November 2015, the stayed AW1 proceedings were resumed. The provisional arrest was revoked and the wanted warrant withdrawn. This was because the presence of the appellant was no longer mandatory pursuant to the regulations in force. In December 2015, the trial notification for the AW1 offences was deemed served under Polish law. On 26 January 2016, the District Court of Klodsko imposed a sentence of 18-months’ custody for the AW1 offences.

The appellant submits that the “fugitive finding only applies to AW1 and is less weighty given the culpable state delays and the settled life in the UK, with [his partner] who was innocent.” I agree that his partner is innocent. But the appellant accepts that his fugitivity attaches to the outstanding conviction warrant AW1. As to “culpable state delays”, it seems to me significant that the link to the United Kingdom was established, as stated by the NCA, in April 2014. Following the sentence imposed for AW1 in January 2016, a search for the appellant was made under a wanted warrant for him to serve the 18 months’ sentence. A first version of AW1 was issued in December 2016. In June 2019, enforcement proceedings were stayed due to the appellant hiding from the administration of justice. In March 2021, the earlier version of AW1 was received by the NCA and certified. In July 2022, AW1 was reissued due to the change in legal basis and certified in November 2022. In April 2023, the appellant was arrested on all three arrest warrants and has remained in custody since.

One sees from the procedural account just provided the intensity of the institutional and procedural activity by the respondent. It did not sit on its hands in respect of AW1. Immense difficulties were directly caused by the appellant’s calculated choice to become a fugitive from Polish justice. There is little doubt about this. He is significantly culpable. While one must carefully examine the extent of the “global delay”, as the appellant terms it, the context, causes and nuances of the delay must be clearly understood. The Judge found (paras 136-39) no culpable delay on the part of the respondent in issuing the warrants. I accept the respondent’s submission that this evidences the seriousness with which the respondent viewed the appellant’s offending. Further, the Judge drew on the much-cited observation in T v Circuit Court in Tarnobrzeg, Poland [2017] EWHC 1978 (Admin), para 140, that authorities cannot be expected “to explore the byways and alleyways of British officialdom to discover whether someone is in this country”. The fact that the appellant was living and working “openly”, as is submitted on his behalf, does not remove the critical fact that the Judge has made an unimpeachable finding of fugitivity in respect of AW1 (and AW2).

The appellant complains of “stark delays” by the United Kingdom authorities in processing each arrest warrant, and in particular between issue and certification. I am perfectly prepared to hold that there has been institutional delay by the requested state. There is little by way of valid explanation or justification. I approach that void by drawing on Chamberlain J in Pabian v Poland [2024] EWHC 2431 (Admin) (“Pabian”). Chamberlain J said (para 50) that if no explanation for delay is forthcoming from the authorities, “the court may assume there is none” (ibid.). That is my conclusion.

However, while relevant to overall delay, such “failures by the state”, as the appellant puts them, cannot affect the seriousness with which the respondent has treated its extradition request, a distinct matter. I add that while there have been substantial delays in respect of AW3, the accusation warrant, I place little store on this alleged offending for the article 8 balance.

To my mind, there is no question but that the appellant significantly contributed to the overall delay due to his fugitivity. His fugitive status on AW1 does not eradicate the significance of the United Kingdom’s failures, but the appellant’s fugitivity is a material factor reducing the significance of delay. One does not examine fugitivity as a factually insensitive concept. The significance of fugitivity varies with each set of facts. I judge that the nature of the appellant’s fugitivity here along with the substantial outstanding sentence result in a very powerful public interest in extradition.

I return to the question of whether the public interest is outweighed. I recognise that there is an unmistakable and substantial interference with the appellant’s private and family life. However, there are no children common to the relationship between the appellant and his partner. Her son is an adult, aged 30 at the time of the extradition hearing (para 92). As at the hearing, she was living with her adult son and he was providing her with “a little” financial support to supplement her own employment income. As she told the Judge, she had been working in a Bristol hotel with the appellant. She found his remand in custody very difficult emotionally and “mentally”. There is no medical assessment of the nature and extent of the impact. She changed jobs shortly after his arrest. As the Judge put it:

“Initially she had reduced her hours of work to 24 per week, but she decided to leave in July 2023 and she has now found a new cleaning job at an airport. The new job will be full time hours, working in shifts that are three days on and three days off. She said that she would find this new job easier, because she had worked in housekeeping in hotels for 13 years and now suffers back pain from lifting mattresses.”

In his addendum witness statement, the appellant explains that he has daily telephone contact with his partner despite his remand, and has a life with her to return to. However, there is no further evidence either from him or his partner that she has not coped for the period since the extradition hearing in November 2023 and during which he has remained in custody.

The matters the appellant advances in mitigation such as growing up with his grandmother, military service, homelessness and unemployment, are all matters for the Polish state to consider when deciding how to approach his outstanding sentence on any return to Poland. It is not for this court to re-sentence the appellant contrary to the sentences lawfully imposed by a competent Polish court. It may be that the appellant’s submission is correct that the sentence on the accusation warrant AW3 is likely to be non-custodial. That is a matter for the Polish court. I make it plain that I have placed very little weight on the accusation warrant for balancing exercise purposes. My focus is primarily on AW1 and the length of the outstanding custodial sentence.

The appellant submits that “Poland cannot be assumed to have considered the competing public interest arising from the time served, delay and impact on family points.” However, it cannot be assumed that Poland has failed to consider the opposite. This is a speculative submission that carries limited weight. The principle of comity is relevant: Poland is a signatory Convention state. I remind myself that there is no exceptionality test; the term being used as a “prediction” of the level of Convention rights interference that might outweigh the public interest in extradition (HH, para 32, per Lady Hale). Here the consequences for the appellant, his partner and her adult son fail to approach the exceptionally severe. I borrow that term from the Supreme Court in Andrysiewicz (paras 42-43):

“42.

… It seems that an article 8 “defence” is raised almost as a matter of course in virtually every extradition case.

43.

… Cases in which a submission founded on article 8 ECHR may defeat the public interest in extradition will be rare. … Even in cases where interference with family life is relied upon, it will only be in cases of exceptionally severe impact on family life that an article 8 ECHR “defence” will have any prospect of success.”

The private and family life interference does not approach the level of article 8 interference that outweighs the constant and weighty public interest in extradition. I agree with the Judge (para 191) that the impact on the appellant’s partner is akin to “what Lord Mance described in Norris as the adverse consequences which extradition has by its nature.” I cannot accept the appellant’s submission that he has already been sufficiently punished. It is not for the executing state to second-guess or countermand the sovereign decision of the Polish court. The English court must determine the legal significance in extradition terms of the extent of the outstanding custodial term. In this, I draw on what Fordham J said in Dobrowolski v Poland [2023] EWHC 763 (Admin) (“Dobrowolski”) at paras 5 and 23:

“There are further basic warnings. It is not for this Court to ask or answer the question whether someone should have early release. Nor to ask or answer the question whether they have served sufficient of their term of imprisonment or whether they have sufficiently been punished. These are all questions for the Polish authorities, not for the United Kingdom authorities, and not for this Court. The statutory human rights question that Parliament has identified through the Extradition Act 2003 section 21(1) is a very particular one. It focuses on the interference with family life or private life which extradition constitutes, and asks whether that interference for the purposes of extradition is justified as proportionate.

…

It is not my function to ask whether the Appellant has been punished enough, by serving so substantial a proportion of his prison sentence at a time of serious mental health and suicide risk concerns, and during the additional punitive effects of the pandemic.”

Article 8 judgments are intensely fact-specific (Andrysiewicz, para 33(v); Dobrowolski, para 23). The Celinski “balance sheet” exercise is not a tick-box formality and certainly not a matter of mere mathematics (“three factors for beats two against”). I have considered the substance of the granular facts in detail and with care weighed all the factors to their cumulative effect and balance. I have no hesitation in determining that the balance falls decisively in favour of extradition. Therefore, an extradition order in the instant case is not disproportionate, nor incompatible with the appellant’s article 8 rights and those of his partner and her son, viewed in the round. The Judge’s ultimate article 8 conclusion was not wrong.

The extradition order in respect of AW2 is quashed. The appellant is discharged in relation to AW2 (Decisions 2 and 3).

Save in this respect, the appeal is dismissed. The appellant must be extradited to Poland under section 21(3) of the Act.