Ulas Mamuk v Malatya Chief Prosecutors Office, The Republic of Turkey

Subject to one point, to which I will return I have decided to refuse this renewed application for permission to appeal. On the grounds of appeal that have been renewed, I have decided – notwithstanding the very helpful points that have been advanced in writing and orally on behalf of the Appellant – that there is no realistic prospect of success at a substantive hearing. On all those points, I agree with the essence of the conclusions at which Johnson J arrived on the papers. The one point, to which I will need to return at the end of this judgment, which warrants a very limited expansion of the permission to appeal which Johnson J granted, will ensure this. It will mean that the issue which is already going head to a substantive hearing in this case can be characterised in all of the relevant alternative ways without it being said that one of those characterisations has been shut out. Including that additional characterisation is not an expansive step in relation to the appeal. It is just a recognition that there are different ways in which the same essential point can be analysed. And it may matter under which of the three heads that analysis is conducted.

The Appellant – and I am calling him that because he already has limited permission to appeal in this case – is wanted for extradition to Turkey. He was convicted in 2007 at a trial in Turkey at which he was present. The conviction was of an offence of aiding and abetting the PKK. The basis for the conviction was that items associated with bomb-making were found in a washing machine at his home, on a search by officers in June 2007. The conviction led to a custodial sentence of 6 years and 3 months. District Judge Robinson (“the Judge”), who dealt with the extradition hearing at Westminster Magistrates’ Court, identified 3 years 8 months 24 days to serve on the Extradition Arrest Warrant. The Judge said the 3 years 8 months 24 days was to be further reduced by 532 days (or 17½ months) of qualifying remand. The Judge considered a list of 9 issues as potential bases for resisting extradition. He rejected all of these, for the reasons set out in a detailed judgment. The judgment recorded clearly the oral evidence of all the witnesses and the analysis on all the issues. I have mentioned the remand position. I recognise that because the Appellant has been remanded in custody since his extradition arrest on 4 September 2023, his qualifying remand has continued to increase. It is now, I think, 2 years 5½ months. I think that he therefore currently has around 14½ months to serve of his sentence. I conscious that his appeal is going ahead to its substantive hearing. Having said all that about the increasing time on remand, and the reducing time to serve, I record that Mr Middleton KC and Mr Wotherspoon rightly recognised that that point could not feature as a freestanding ground, or for that matter a freestanding powerful Article 8 feature. Having recorded the position I need say no more about it.

The renewal of the application for permission to appeal was pursued on all five grounds which Johnson J had rejected. Those grounds of appeal – as is often the case – involved a degree of overlap. All five grounds were maintained in helpful skeleton argument on behalf of the Appellant dated 23 February 2026. In the event, however, Mr Middleton KC informed me today that the decision had been taken, on reflection today, not to seek to maintain two of the five grounds. The grounds not pursued are those based on Article 3 (Ground 3) and on extradition abuse of process (Ground 7). So far as Article 3 is concerned, I will simply record that this is a case where there are in place the ‘Yalvac-plus Assurances’, identified by the Divisional Court in the Demir cases as now being necessitated for the Article 3 compatibility of an extradition to Turkey: see Demir v Turkey [2024] EWHC 2351 (Admin) and [2024] EWHC 3055 (Admin). In light of the points which are still maintained, I record that Mr Middleton KC very fairly ensured that I was well aware at today’s hearing that the ‘Yalvac-plus Assurances’ in this case include a detailed identification by the Turkish authorities of the availability of psychiatry and other medical and mental health services in the custodial setting, including for those with PTSD. So far as extradition abuse of process is concerned, I simply record that the argument now abandoned but previously advanced was about pursuit of extradition in the UK and now, in light of the unsuccessful pursuit of extradition in 2017 and in Austria. That leaves three grounds which have been maintained at today’s hearing.

Two of the three grounds of appeal which are maintained really involve putting the same points about the risk of mental health deterioration, but under different headings. The different headings are (i) Article 8 disproportionality (Ground 5); and (ii) s.91 oppression (Ground 6). The points are really all about expert evidence which was before the Judge from Dr Cohen, who had given a medical report and gave oral evidence. She considered the Appellant’s mental health and the implications of extradition for his mental health. She identified PTSD and depression as mental health conditions. She explained how PTSD was consistent with his account of past ill-treatment and his physical scars. Dr Cohen expressed the view that his identified mental health conditions was continuing conditions in incarceration here. She expressed the view that mental health treatments in a custodial setting were not, in her view, mitigating the symptoms. She also expressed concern as to a likely deterioration in the Appellant’s mental health following extradition.

Pausing there, this is a scenario which links to an idea which has been encountered in previous extradition cases. The idea is about oppression arising from returning an individual who has suffered previous ill-treatment in custody overseas, as a result of which PTSD has arisen, to a custodial setting in the same country overseas. The idea is that the mental health condition may be exacerbated, with an unmitigated deterioration, such that the threshold of “oppression” (or Article 3 harm) can be crossed. Mr Middleton KC reminded me at the hearing that I had encountered that idea in the argument discussed in a recent judgment: see Colak v Turkey [2026] EWHC 234 (Admin) at §§33-34, citing XY v Netherlands [2019] EWHC 624 (Admin) at §51 and ZA v Romania [2025] EWHC 595 (Admin) at §§42 and 44.

The nub of the argument, in the end, in the present case is this. The Judge was arguably wrong – or, says Mr Middleton KC, “irrational” – to reach a conclusion rejecting s.91 oppression and/or Article 8 disproportionality, on the basis of being satisfied by the assurances as to the mental health services available in the custodial setting at Yalvac Prison in Turkey. That is because the Judge had accepted that some of the ill-treatment alleged by the Appellant had taken place, prior to his trial in Turkey; and the Judge had accepted the substance of Dr Cohen’s evidence about PTSD and depression, about likely deterioration on extradition, and about current symptoms not presently being mitigated in a custodial setting here in the UK. The Judge reached arguably wrong conclusions based on that evidence and that the reasoning. That is how it is put.

But, in my judgment, there is no realistic prospect that this Court would overturn the Judge’s conclusions, either on s.91 “oppression” with its very high threshold, or through the alternative route of mental health impacts featuring in the Article 8 proportionality analysis. The Judge considered and recorded all of the relevant evidence. In my judgment, and beyond reasonable argument, the Judge was entitled to treat as relevant the fact that the same mental health services in substance would be available at Yalvac Prison as would be available at a prison in this country, and that as being the answer in the present case to any question about the prospect of a deterioration in future in the Appellant’s mental health, bearing in mind the relevant threshold in order to meet the test of “oppression”. In my judgment, beyond reasonable argument, the Judge was entitled to rely on the same reasoning in deciding that the point could not succeed, or tip the balance, as a feature in the Article 8 context.

Notwithstanding the Appellant’s previous experiences of ill-treatment back in 2007 and 2008 in a Turkish custodial setting, and notwithstanding the PTSD symptoms and the prospect of a mental health deterioration, the Judge was entitled – beyond reasonable argument – to conclude as he did. That was, that extradition would not be s.91 oppressive or Article 8 disproportionate (or incompatible with Article 3), in circumstances where it would specifically be extradition to Yalvac as an identified prison, and where there would be the UK-equivalent range of mental health services. That conclusion, in my judgment, is not undermined by the fact that Dr Cohen was describing the current circumstances, in which current symptoms were not being mitigated in custody here. That could not be the focus so far as the future, and deterioration, were concerned. I cannot accept that the appeal becomes viable by reference to what is said to be “implicit” in Dr Cohen’s “concern”. The Judge had to evaluate the position, on the evidence, applying the relevant legal standards, and looking prospectively. That is exactly what he did.

Even if this Court had a substitutionary jurisdiction on an appeal, on the basis of the materials that I have seen, including the Judge’s careful note of all of the oral evidence, I would arrive at the same substantive conclusion, beyond reasonable argument, on mental health and “oppression”. And I cannot see how the same point can then become liable under the Article 8 rubric of the “private life” and “family life” of someone who came to the UK solo in August 2023, by September 2023 had been arrested, and has been on remand since then. This is not a case where Article 8 could achieve what s.91 fails to achieve, in terms of mental health impacts of extradition.

The third ground of appeal which has been maintained at today’s renewal hearing (Ground 2) involves an invited expansion of the issue identified by Johnson J as viable in the Appellant’s case. The argument is that the Judge was arguably wrong in his conclusion that extradition was not barred in this case by s.81(b) of the Extradition Act 2003. That bar is – for present purposes – where it appears that, if extradited, the requested person might be punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty “by reason of his race, religion or political opinion”.

This third ground is based, like the first two grounds, on expert evidence which the Judge identified and discussed. This time it was the evidence of Professor Bowring who, in writing and orally, described the position in Turkey of Alevi Kurds, and Alevi Kurds associated with the PKK, looking both historically at the Appellant’s case but also looking prospectively. The Judge recorded that he accepted Professor Bowring’s evidence about the past and present situation treatment and attitudes towards the Kurds and those of the Alevi faith in Turkey. The Judge had earlier recorded Professor Bowring’s oral evidence about the risk of the Appellant receiving ill-treatment in prison. Professor Bowring was recorded by the Judge as saying that he would be very surprised if Turkey was not interested in the Appellant; that he would be a person of interest; that he would not say “whether they would take it out on him”; but that he considered that the Appellant is at risk.

The Judge had to evaluate that and all the other evidence in the case. The Judge did so with care, considering the context and circumstances, and considering the consequences and implications of extradition and incarceration with the Yalvac-plus Assurances. Having conducted that evaluation, the Judge said this: “there is, in my view, no reason to believe the authorities would believe [the Appellant] now has relevant information to give and/or would be of use as an informant”. The Judge then went on to consider the position of ill-treatment at the hands of the staff at the prison. He concluded that there were no reasonable grounds for thinking – no serious possibility – that the Appellant would now be targeted at the prison, on account of his ethnicity, political opinions or faith, in a way which would serve to punish, detain or restricted him in his personal liberty.

I do not accept that it is reasonably arguable, as Mr Middleton KC and Mr Wotherspoon have submitted, that the Judge’s reasoned conclusion was “irrational” (as they say) or wrong (as I would prefer to say on an extradition appeal). Having considered the Judge’s judgment in the context of the evidence, including the evidence which has been emphasised to me, and including the passages being relied on from the Judge’s own judgment, I can identity no realistic prospect that this Court would overturn the conclusions arrived at by the Judge on this part of the case.

It is at that point that I will finally return to what I said at the start. There is an issue which is already in play on the substantive appeal. Johnson J considered that it was arguable. He granted permission to appeal. The issue which he identified is based on what is said to have been a discriminatory unfairness in the Appellant’s original trial in Turkey in 2007. The essential point being made by the Appellant was that the items found in the washing machine at his home were planted there by the officers conducting the search. Indeed, he said his brother had seen the searching officers plant those items. The Judge pointed out that that issue of planted evidence was considered at the trial in Turkey. The Appellant’s position is that the issue was not, and could not have been, fairly considered in circumstances where is there was no opportunity to cross-examine any of the officers, because they did not attend the trial hearing. That is said to have been a discriminatory unfairness in the original trial, from which the conviction and sentence arose. It is said to be capable of barring extradition.

One way in which that essential point is put in the appeal is as an Article 5 or Article 6 ground of appeal, based on what is said to have been a flagrantly unfair trial (Ground 4). Johnson J granted permission to appeal on that ground. But he also decided to allow within the scope of the permission to appeal a different way of putting the same point, namely s.81(a) (Ground 1). This s.81(a) characterisation, as I see it, is what the Judge had encapsulated when he spoke (judgment Annex B at the end of §2) of a “background” based on which a conclusion can be drawn that the Appellant was “convicted on the basis of planted evidence”, so that “it follows” that his extradition is sought for the purposes of punishing him on account of his race, religion or political opinion. That is s.81(a). In other words, if it was a flagrantly unfair discriminatory conviction in 2007, then that infects – for the purposes of s.81(a) – the Extradition Request made all those years later in September 2023. That is how it is put. The legal merits of all of this remains to be seen, when this case is heard at its substantive hearing. Nothing that I have said is intended in any way to influence the way in which the issue is characterised at that hearing or considered at the hearing. But the point is that the further or alternative analysis of s.81(a) has been permitted to fall within the scope of the present appeal, as a possible way of looking at the consequences of discriminatory unfairness in the Appellant’s original trial.

Given that position, it is in my judgment appropriate that the Appellant should be able to put what in substance is exactly the same point but under the alternative characterisation of s.81(b). This, as I emphasised at the start, is not the wider s.81(b) expansion to the appeal’s scope, that has been advanced at this hearing. The wider s.81(b) point was concerned with the Professor Bowring’s evidence, including whether the Appellant would be a person of interest for the purposes of future ill-treatment at the prison. What I am discussing here is the narrower issue about the consequences of discriminatory unfairness in the Appellant’s original trial. The logic of this narrower s.81(b) logic would be that the Appellant is being extradited in circumstances where he might be punished or detained by reason of race, religion or political opinions. In other words, if it was a flagrantly unfair discriminatory conviction in 2007, then that infects – for the purposes of s.81(b) – the punishment for which extradition is being sought. The focus is on the implementation of the sentence imposed after conviction at what is said to have been the discriminatorily unfair trial. The Judge identified this point (judgment Annex B at the end of §4).

It seemed to me that if the s.81(a) characterisation is to be before the Court – as it will be – when this single issue about discriminatory unfairness in the Appellant’s original trial is ventilated, then it really ought also to be open to the Appellant to put the s.81(b) characterisation as an alternative. This does not achieve any of the expanded grounds which had been advanced before me today. But Mr Middleton KC has embraced this narrower point and has invited this modest expansion of the existing scope of permission to appeal, even if I were against him on his other points as I am. I am satisfied that this narrow alternative s.81(b) characterisation is a reasonably arguable ground of appeal, in light of the points already recognised as reasonably arguable. To that very limited extent, I will grant permission to appeal on this particular aspect of section 81(b), while rejecting the broader section 81(b) ground of appeal and the other two grounds that have been maintained. I have explained all of that, in the interests of clarity. Clarity as to what I have done, but also as to what I have not done.

Subject to that point, the renewed application for permission to appeal is dismissed I will say no order as to costs so that there be a detailed assessment of the Appellant’s publicly funded costs. I add this by way of an endnote. In approaching the issue with which I have just dealt, I have been acutely aware that the Respondent instructed Counsel in this case (Mr Evans), who prepared a skeleton argument which assisted me in considering the viability of the points which were being advanced by the Appellant. In the event, I have rejected those points. In drafting his skeleton argument, Mr Evans would not have foreseen that I would raise the narrow s.81(b) point. I record that I thought about whether, in the circumstances, I ought to do something provisional or invite any step. But I was and remained quite satisfied that the course I have adopted is an appropriate one, and involves no unfairness. One of the reasons for having oral hearing is that there is a dynamic engagement, so that points can arise. The parties know that when they make their decisions as to whether to attend or instruct Counsel (or alternative Counsel) to attend. I do not see that there is any potential for unfairness. All I have done is ensure that the point, which everybody already knows is alive in the ongoing appeal, can be characterised in a different way. If Mr Evans for the Respondent has a clean knockout blow in relation to that alternative characterisation, he will be able to identify it in his skeleton argument for the substantive appeal, and the Court at that hearing will be assisted in that way by him. That is a sufficient protection in the circumstances, in the context of an appeal which is going ahead in any event. There is no need for me to take any other course other than the one that I have described.

I made this Order. (1) Permission to appeal is granted on Ground 2 (s.81(b)), limited in scope to being an alternative analysis for the same issue on which Johnson J granted permission to appeal. (2) The renewed application for permission to appeal on Ground 2 (more widely) and Grounds 5 and 6 is refused. (3) No order as to costs save that there be a detailed assessment of the Appellant’s publicly funded costs.