Ionut Bucur v Fifth District Court of Bucharest, Romania

This is a renewed application for permission to appeal, following refusal on the papers by Mr Justice Johnson by order dated 5 January 2026. The Applicant’s former solicitors have come off the record, and he presented his case in person with the assistance of an interpreter. At the outset of the hearing, he made an application to adjourn the case. I indicated in court that I would consider that application notwithstanding that it had not been made prior to the hearing.

The Respondent Judicial Authority is the Fifth District Court of Bucharest, Romania. By a Trade and Cooperation Agreement warrant dated 20 September 2024, certified by the National Crime Agency on 14 October 2024, the Judicial Authority seeks the surrender of the Applicant, Mr Ionut Bucur, a Romanian national born on 9 August 1988, for the purpose of serving the unexpired balance of a custodial sentence imposed following his conviction for drug trafficking.

The underlying offending occurred on 24 November 2016, when the Applicant, acting with others, sold 848 “RO LEX” stamped tablets containing methamphetamine to an undercover collaborator for €7,710. On 8 June 2017, the Bucharest Court convicted him of drug trafficking and imposed a sentence of five years and six months’ imprisonment. He began serving that sentence on 25 November 2016.

On 2 July 2019, the Applicant was conditionally released, with 871 days of the sentence remaining to be served. The conditions required him, among other things, to report to the probation service on dates set by it, to receive visits from the supervising officer, and to notify any change of residence and any travel exceeding five days. These obligations were drawn to his attention upon his release.

The Romanian court subsequently found that the Applicant had failed to comply with those obligations, by not attending at the probation service and failing to notify changes of residence or extended travel. On 17 February 2020, the Fifth District Court of Bucharest revoked his conditional release and ordered the execution of the outstanding 871 days. That revocation decision became final on 10 March 2020.

The Applicant has been in the United Kingdom since 2019. He holds pre‑settled status, has stable employment, resides with his family, and at the time of the extradition hearing was in a relationship of approximately two years’ duration with his then partner, Laura. He was arrested at his UK address on 6 January 2025. Upon arrest he said, “I think I know what this is about”. He has no recorded UK convictions.

The extradition proceedings came before District Judge Grego at Westminster Magistrates’ Court. The Judge concluded that the Part 1 warrant was valid within section 2 of the Extradition Act 2003, that the conduct would amount to a UK offence carrying a sentence well in excess of four months so that sections 10 and 65 were satisfied, and that no statutory bars under section 11 arose. It was accepted that the Applicant had been present at the original trial resulting in conviction; the later hearing revoking the conditional release was not the relevant “trial” for the purposes of section 20. The Judge found that there was no risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 were the Applicant to be surrendered.

The principal argument before the Judge was, under Article 8 ECHR, that the Applicant’s family life and private life in the UK represented genuine, subsisting relationships that would be severely disrupted by extradition. The Applicant relied upon his family life with his UK‑based parents and sister, his relationship with his then partner Laura, and his lawful residence and employment since 2019. The Judge accepted that these matters engaged Article 8, but concluded that the public interest in extradition was “constant and weighty” and that the interference with family life would not reach the threshold of “exceptionally severe” consequences applying the law as set out in Norris v Government of the USA (No 2) [2010] UKSC 9, and H(H) v Italy [2012] UKSC 25, and conducting a balancing exercise, as described in Celinski v Poland [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin). He found that the Applicant was a fugitive.

Having rejected the Article 3 challenge and found that the Article 8 challenge failed when weighed against the strong public interest in extradition and the fugitivity finding, the Judge ordered the Applicant’s extradition pursuant to section 21(3) and continued bail pending removal. His judgment is dated 18 June 2025.

The present appeal is brought under section 26 and 27 of the 2003 Act. The single ground pursued is under Article 8. The Applicant contends that the Judge’s finding of fugitivity was wrong in law and fact and was reached on a speculative basis; that the Judge did not conduct a structured balance‑sheet analysis of proportionality; and that insufficient weight was given to the Applicant’s established family and private life, including his role within his household and long‑standing lawful residence and employment. The Applicant submits that, absent the erroneous fugitivity finding, the cumulative consequences of surrender would be exceptionally severe, such that extradition would be disproportionate.

As to the renewal grounds it was said that Mr Justice Johnson was wrong to refuse permission for the same reasons, as set out in the perfected grounds, with regard to District Judge Grego’s decision to order extradition. When looked at as a whole the balancing exercise was arguably wrong.

In finding that the Applicant was a fugitive the Judge relied on the Applicant’s acceptance in evidence that he had been conditionally released and knew there were conditions; his departure from Romania without notifying the authorities contrary to those conditions; his remarks when arrested and the fact that whilst he disclosed the Romanian conviction in his 2020 EU Settlement Scheme application, he did not disclose it in 2021, which the Judge regarded as giving rise to an “irresistible inference” of an attempt to conceal the conviction to secure status in the UK.

In Makowska v Poland [2020] 4 WLR 161, Fordham J considered the issue of fugitive status:

"27.

The principle as to whether the person is a “fugitive” having “knowingly placed [herself] beyond the reach of a legal process” is one of contextual application and falls to be applied “on a case by case basis” (Wisniewski para 59). This is in law a distinct question from whether, and requires more than that, the person has been “unlawfully at large” (as to which see Wisniewski, paras 51–57). The function and purpose of the principle is that any lapse of time or consequences of lapse of time so far as extradition is concerned is a consequence of the persons “own choice and making” (see Kakis at p 783B), so that any delay “in the commencement or conduct of extradition proceedings” can be said to have been “brought about by” the person themselves (see Kakis at p 783A). Lord Diplock’s exposition (in Kakis at p 783A, endorsed in Gomes) spoke of the conduct of a person “by fleeing the country, concealing his whereabouts or evading arrest”. The description of a person having “knowingly placed [herself] beyond the reach of a legal process” (Wisniewski at para 59) includes a person who breaches the obligations of a suspended sentence (a) by a voluntary act of leaving the jurisdiction in question thereby knowingly preventing themselves from performing those obligations (see Wisniewski para 60) or (b) by a voluntary act of ceasing to keep in contact with the authorities thereby becoming a "person whose whereabouts are unknown to the authority which is entitled to know of them, putting it beyond that authority’s power to deal with the person (see Wisniewski para 62).

28.

In grappling with the idea of fugitivity, expressed in the authorities which were cited and to which I have referred, I have found it helpful to think in particular about the following three linked themes: (i) locational dynamism; (ii) informational deficit; and (iii) intended consequential elusiveness. That is not to say that these are elements of a litmus test; nor that all three themes can be expected to be present. A person whose location changes, with a lack of information, becoming elusiveness can be seen as a paradigm case of a fugitive. These themes, or some of them at least, can be seen to be met by each of the following situations: a person who flees the country; a person who conceals their whereabouts; a person who evades arrest; a person whose act of leaving a country knowingly prevents themselves from performing obligations; a person who ceases contact with authorities so as to become a person whose whereabouts are unknown to those authorities and cannot be dealt with by those authorities; a person whose actions are the cause of any delays in their pursuit by the authorities. These themes, as it seems to me, reflect the ordinary and natural meaning of the word “fugitive”. They link directly to the underlying idea of extradition delays being consequential upon the individual’s own choices, with what are, in effect, penalising consequences for the individual in an analysis of the extradition circumstances, under the law.”

The Judge adopted the approach in Makowska considering the features of locational dynamism, informational deficit, and intended consequential elusiveness which arose in the Applicant’s case. He held that the Applicant had removed himself from the reach of the Romanian authorities and was properly to be regarded as a fugitive. In consequence, very strong counterbalancing factors would be required to make extradition disproportionate, and the Applicant’s circumstances did not, he concluded, meet that standard.

The Court’s task under section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003 is not to undertake a fresh balancing exercise, nor to substitute its own evaluation of proportionality in place of that reached below. The question is whether the District Judge was wrong in concluding that extradition was compatible with Article 8 ECHR. That approach is firmly established in the authorities, including Celinski.

It was submitted that:

“The District Judge failed to properly consider: (a) The circumstances of the Appellant's departure from Romania in 2019; (b) Whether the Appellant was aware of any obligation to notify authorities of his change of address; (c) The fact that the Appellant has been living openly in the UK under his true identity; (d) The fact that the Appellant made applications for settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme.”

The evidence before the District Judge was capable of supporting a conclusion that the Applicant was aware that he remained liable to serve the outstanding portion of his sentence; that he took no steps to keep the Romanian authorities informed of his whereabouts; and that he sought, through the 2021 EUSS application, to present himself to UK authorities as a person without convictions. The circumstances of the Applicant's departure from Romania and his awareness of his obligations as a result of his conditional release were therefore matters which were the subject of factual findings by the Judge which were plainly open to him and with which this court should not interfere.

In respect of the suggestion that the Applicant has been living openly, I remind myself of the observation made in RT v Poland [2017] EWHC 1978 (Admin) at [62]:

“It is a frequent submission that someone has been living in the United Kingdom openly, often having had contact with various official bodies here. But neither the foreign judicial authority nor the NCA can be expected to explore the byways and alleyways of British officialdom to discover whether someone is in this country”. Furthermore, in Krok v Poland [2017] EWHC 1800 (Admin) at [16] Dove J stated that neither paying tax to HMRC, the local authority, having a bank account nor having an employer issue payslips to an RP ‘of themselves create an expectation or a constructive knowledge on the part of the UK authorities that there was a European arrest warrant against him’’

As far as the overall Article 8 assessment is concerned the Judge correctly applied the appropriate test; that the consequences of interference with private and family life must be exceptionally severe before they can outweigh the “constant and weighty” public interest in surrender. He identified the relevant Article 8 factors and weighed them against the public interest, applying the elevated standard required in conviction cases and in cases involving fugitivity. The weight to be attributed to each factor is a matter for a specialist judge of first instance, and an appellate court must be cautious not to interfere merely because the balance could have been struck differently. The District Judge’s reasoning was rational, coherent, and in line with established authority. Once fugitivity is upheld, the public interest in extradition carries even greater weight, and only the most compelling circumstances could justify a finding of disproportionality. The Judge concluded that the interference with the Applicant’s family life, while genuine and significant, did not meet the threshold of “exceptionally severe” consequences required by the authorities. It is not reasonably arguable that that conclusion was wrong.

Equally it cannot be said that the finding of fugitivity was not open to the Judge on the material before him. The finding was based in part on the Applicant’s own evidence as well as the contemporaneous documentation.

It was also argued that there is a change in circumstances in that the Applicant now has a new partner, Maryna, who is pregnant and due to give birth on 29 April 2026. There is a statement from her which sets out the effect on her and their child if the Applicant is extradited. They married in March 2025, shortly before the extradition hearing, and she became pregnant during these proceedings. The Applicant's mother’s medical condition has also deteriorated as supported by medical evidence. She has had one hip operation and will need another. I was told at the hearing that the Applicant’s wife is Ukrainian and, it is said, could not go back to Ukraine.

Since there is a change of circumstances I have considered afresh whether the Applicant's relationship with a new partner and her pregnancy would arguably have altered the position before the Judge. I am satisfied that it would not. Whilst his mother may presently be unwell, the Applicant’s stepfather and sister both live with him in this country and will doubtless be able to provide family support to his wife and newborn child. Even taking into account the additional matters place before the court for the purpose of the renewal application the conclusion that the consequences for the Applicant and his family did not cross the “exceptionally severe” would inevitably have been the same.

The Applicant’s request from adjournment was made on the basis that even if he were to be extradited, he was seeking a brief respite to enable him to be present at the birth and to make such arrangements as he could for his wife to be supported. Whilst I understand those sentiments, and they are to his credit, the effect on him of extradition in this respect is one of the normal consequences of the extradition process and again not one that can be regarded as exceptionally severe. In those circumstances I refuse the application to adjourn.

Accordingly, the Applicant has not demonstrated any arguable case that the Judge erred in principle or reached a conclusion outside the range reasonably available to him in reaching that conclusion or that his new circumstances would arguably have altered the result.

The Article 8 ground does not arguably reach the threshold for allowing an appeal under section 27. The renewed application is therefore refused.