Artur Pawel Michalak v Regional Court in Lublin, Poland

Having considered the bail merits afresh, with the assistance of the written submissions of Mr Hepburne Scott for the Applicant and Mr Squibbs for the Respondent and in circumstances where each of them adopted what they had said comprehensively in writing but did not need to elaborate through oral submissions, I have decided to refuse this extradition bail application. In my assessment, there are substantial grounds for believing that, if released on bail and notwithstanding the proposed bail conditions or any which could sensibly be imposed, the Applicant would fail to surrender. Nothing in this case has turned on the absence, this being a conviction extradition arrest warrant case, of a presumption in favour of the grant of bail. Although my appraisal of bail is independent and afresh, I record that the outcome is in line with the refusals of bail in this case on 8 and 18 June 2024, 23 December 2024 and 11 June 2025, by what I understand were four different judges at the Westminster Magistrates’ Court.

The Applicant is facing extradition to Poland to serve what is still a substantial prison sentence, originally 4 years. As a consequence of the qualifying remand arising since his extradition arrest on 7 June 2024, still some 28 months to serve. I am satisfied that that prospect stands as a very real incentive for the Applicant to avoid those penal consequences. I have taken into account that he has no convictions, cautions or reprimands in the UK in the 10 years that he says he has been here. I also take into account that he was compliant and did not attempt any deception when he was encountered by the police and arrested in June 2024. I take into account that he protests his innocence in relation to the criminal offending in Poland, out of which arises the conviction extradition arrest warrant which the Polish requesting authorities issued in October 2023. But I have to put all of that against the fact that he stands convicted of a series of serious fraud offences committed in Poland, in his late thirties, between 2010 and 2013. The documents describe these as involving elaborate group criminal activity in obtaining, by a series of frauds, using a series of forged documents, a number of loans. The actual loss to the Polish banks and companies was the equivalent of £714,000 together with failed attempts to obtain a further £366,000, putting the overall aggregate actual and attempted benefit from the frauds at a sum in excess of £1m equivalent. I am quite satisfied that it is appropriate for this Court, in assessing the bail risks, to approach the case on the basis that the Applicant is a person who has been found to have committed multiple and sophisticated acts of serious dishonesty. There is no basis for going behind that, for bail purposes. It weighs heavily in the balance, in my judgment, when considering whether he can be relied on to act compliantly, or whether he presents an abscond risk.

I take into account that District Judge Creciora who ordered the Applicant’s extradition on 11 April 2025 after an oral hearing the previous month, did not find to the criminal standard that he was a fugitive from Polish justice in relation to the extradition matters. But the Judge did find that he was fully aware of the charges against him, having been charged in person in Poland on 26 September 2019, and that he was aware that he would stand trial in respect of these offences and that the trial could proceed in his absence. The Judge also found that the Applicant has lived in the UK in the knowledge that he was charged with serious offences which would carry a prison sentence if convicted. It is, in my judgment, appropriate that the assessment of risk should be approached on the basis that the Applicant has conducted himself, in the past and indeed throughout, in a way which was knowingly avoiding facing responsibility in relation to these same matters.

I take into account that the Applicant has a wife who is present in the UK, together with two adult children, respectively aged in their early and their late twenties, who are also present here. I accept that he has an extant appeal to this Court, and that there is a proper incentive for him to participate and cooperate in the pursuit of that appeal. But, set against that, there is the fact that he has unsuccessfully resisted extradition at the frontline hearing in the Westminster Magistrates’ Court, and that he is likely in my assessment to perceive that he nearing the end of a process – one way or the other – in which he is seeking to resist extradition. I have been given visibility of his Perfected Grounds of Appeal and the points raised in response by the Respondent. It is sufficient, in my judgment, to recognise this: that the Applicant may very well perceive that he is nearing the end of that process of resistance, which so far has been unsuccessful; and may very well perceive that he has a slim prospect of resisting extradition to Poland by continuing to fight his appeal. There is, on the face of it, a fragility in his current position. I would have reached that conclusion in any event, but Mr Hepburne Scott has candidly disclosed the recent paper refusal of permission to appeal by Jay J on 24 February 2026. That means the Applicant’s position may very well be perceived by him as hanging by a thread, being reliant on the prospect of a successful renewal at an oral hearing.

I emphasise that in saying all of this, I am very conscious that I am not hearing an oral renewal. It is not my task to evaluate the prospects of success, and whether the appeal is reasonably arguable. The Applicant is entitled to an evaluation of his prospects, afresh, at an oral hearing. What I am doing today is different. I am arriving at an informed assessment of risk. Nothing that I have said or would have said, one way or the other, should in any way influence the way in which the merits of the appeal are independently assessed afresh by the Judge who has that function. I was able to put this point to both Counsel at this oral hearing and they each unhesitatingly embraced it. I am sure that they are both right.

Having considered all the materials and circumstances in this case, I am not satisfied that there are sufficiently strong anchoring features, so far as abscond-risk is concerned. I do recognise that there may be some considerable difficulty in the Applicant achieving successfully any failure to surrender and any ongoing evasion of the UK or Polish authorities, in light of residence and reporting restrictions, an electronically monitored curfew, the retention of a passport and the restriction on attending travel hubs or applying for travel documents. All of these would be appropriate bail conditions for the Court to impose. I recognise that there may also be some considerable lack of wisdom on the Applicant’s part from seeking to evade the authorities, and the longer term consequences, when put alongside returning to Poland to serve what is now 2 years and 4 months of remaining custody. I recognise the implications for his wife and two adult children were he to abscond, and what that would mean for him. And I am prepared to accept what I am told in the documents about the degree sacrifice undergone by his mother who has sold her car and his brother who is using wedding savings to put together the £5,000 pre-release security which is being offered. I have also taken full account of the positive report of the Applicant’s conduct while in prison. And the medical position relating to a back condition diagnosed in 2022 following an MRI in July 2021, together with the ongoing difficulties which that presents for him. But, in the end, I have come to the clear conclusion that there are in this case substantial grounds to believe that the Applicant would fail to surrender to custody if I were to direct his release on bail, notwithstanding the bail conditions that I could impose. Those bail conditions are insufficient to allay the Court’s concerns. And so the bail application will be refused.