Shah Ali v General Medical Council

The Appellant qualified as a doctor in 2013. By a decision of 29^th April 2025 (“the Decision”) the Medical Practitioners Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) directed that the Appellant’s name be removed from the medical register. This is the Appellant’s appeal against that decision.

The Decision was made at the conclusion of a hearing which had lasted from 8^th April to 29^th April 2025. In the course of the hearing the Tribunal had been concerned with two matters. The first was the determination of a misconduct allegation. This arose out of a statement (“the Declaration”) which the Appellant had made as part of his application to the Bringing Back Staff programme in June 2020. That programme was concerned with the return of staff to the National Health Service to address the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. In the Declaration the Appellant had said that he was not subject to any current or new fitness to practise investigations or proceedings. An earlier tribunal had found that the Declaration had been untrue in that the Appellant was subject to a current fitness to practise investigation and that the Appellant had known that it was untrue. On that matter the issue for the Tribunal was whether the Appellant had made the Declaration dishonestly. The second matter was the review of the suspension which had been imposed on the Appellant as a consequence of his conviction for an offence of dangerous driving.

The Tribunal found that the Appellant had made the Declaration dishonestly. It then found that this dishonesty amounted to misconduct and that the Appellant’s fitness to practise was impaired. It concluded that erasure was the appropriate sanction both for the dishonesty and for the offence of dangerous driving.

The Appellant appeared in person before me. He has a long history of dealings with the Respondent. Those dealings have been marked by acrimony and the Appellant has a deep distrust of the Respondent. This was evident in his written and oral submissions to me and had been a consistent element in the various tribunal and court hearings to which I will refer below.

The Appellant’s written grounds and his skeleton argument were unfocused and difficult to follow. His oral submissions were more readily comprehensible but remained unfocused. I will set out below the grounds as advanced by the Appellant together with my understanding of the contentions which the Appellant was advancing in writing and orally. However, in light of the unfocused nature of the Appellant’s submissions I will address the Decision by reference to the exercise in which the Tribunal was engaged and will consider the soundness of the findings of dishonesty, misconduct, and impairment of the Appellant’s fitness to practise before turning to consider the appropriateness of the sanction of erasure. In the course of that analysis I will seek to address the grounds relating to the particular findings together with points which the Appellant raised and which cut across the written grounds. I will then consider the Appellant’s contention that the Decision was flawed because of bias on the part of the Tribunal; because of discrimination against the Appellant; or because of a failure to take account of his status as a whistleblower. Finally, I will consider the contention that the Decision was vitiated by a number of procedural failings on the part of the Tribunal.

In the course of his submissions the Appellant alleged that Peter Mant KC, who appeared for the Respondent, had been deliberately dishonest in his submissions to the court. The allegation was made in the most general of terms but the Appellant appeared to be saying that Mr Mant had deliberately misrepresented matters of law and/or fact to the court. I need not analyse the contention in any detail because it suffices to say that I am entirely satisfied that this allegation was misconceived and without any substance at all.

The April 2025 hearing was the culmination of a series of hearings which had been concerned with misconduct allegations against the Appellant arising out of his actions on two occasions. First, on 22^nd August 2018, when he engaged in the conduct subsequently found to have amounted to dangerous driving. That conduct resulted in the Appellant’s conviction for that offence on 12^th December 2019 and in the imposition of a suspended prison sentence with an unpaid work requirement on 23^rd April 2020. Second, on 7^th June 2020, when he made the Declaration.

The dangerous driving conviction had led to hearings before a tribunal with decisions made on 22^nd December 2022 and 18^th March 2023. The Appellant had appealed against those decisions. In September 2023 HH Judge Mithani KC, sitting as a judge of the High Court, dismissed those appeals in Ali v General Medical Council [2023] EWHC 2400 (KB). The allegation arising out of the Declaration had led to a tribunal decision made on 28^th February 2024. The Appellant appealed that decision, and I allowed that appeal in part in Ali v General Medical Council [2024] EWHC 2272 (Admin) (“the 2024 Judgment”).

The circumstances of the Appellant’s conduct on 22^nd August 2018 and of the subsequent dangerous driving conviction were summarized thus by Judge Mithani:

“5 Briefly stated, the circumstances of the offence were as follows: on 22 August 2018, the Appellant was behind the wheel of his vehicle in the car park of Highbury Park in Moseley, Birmingham. As he was about to leave the car park, the victim of the offence drove along the access road and was about to turn right into the car park. The Appellant’s vehicle approached the victim’s vehicle head-on. Both vehicles stopped ‘nose to nose’. The Appellant lost control of his temper when the victim’s vehicle did not move despite the Appellant gesturing that he should.

6 As the Appellant got out of his car, he shouted offensive language at the victim. The victim attempted to tell the Appellant that he was going to park in one of the two spaces available in the car park. However, the Appellant refused to listen and continued to shout, using offensive language. The Judge described the language used by the Appellant, which was heard by a member of the public, as ‘absolutely disgusting’.

7 The victim then got back into his vehicle and then out again to pacify his dog who was yelping in the back. The Appellant became angry again, revved his engine, reversed slightly and then drove in the direction of the victim who was standing by his open, front car door. The Appellant drove his vehicle in a curve as if to drive around the victim’s car and then changed angle so he could side-swipe the victim. The Crown Court Judge found that the Appellant drove his vehicle deliberately at the victim and intended to hit him.

8 The Appellant’s car wing mirror struck the victim and he fell to the ground. The victim, who was 83 or 84 years old at the time of the incident, suffered minor injuries, which included a cut to his wrist, bruising to his right hand and swelling of his wrist. The Appellant then left the scene.

9 The Appellant pleaded ‘not guilty’ before the Crown Court in Birmingham. However, he was found guilty of the offence. In his sentencing remarks, the Crown Court Judge described the incident as ‘a clear case of road rage’. He took the circumstances of the incident (including the injury to the victim) as aggravating the commission of the offence. Although there was no separate charge of violence or inflicting violence on the victim, it is plain that the Judge was perfectly entitled to find those matters proved and take them into account in sentencing the Appellant.”

The Appellant’s fitness to practise was found to be impaired as a result of that conduct and a suspension order was imposed and subsequently extended. The decisions of December 2022 and March 2023 extended the suspension order.

In the 2024 Judgment I explained the circumstances in which the Declaration was made as follows:

“3.

The allegations which led to the Determination arose out of a statement (‘the Declaration’) which the Appellant made in June 2020 in answer to a question on a Disclosure and Barring Service Declaration Form (‘the Form’). The Declaration was made as part of the Appellant’s application to the Bringing Back Staff programme. That was a programme which sought to return staff to the NHS to address the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. On 7th June 2020 the Appellant returned the Form to Natalie Burbidge who had been seconded to that programme.

The “ongoing GMC conditions” to which reference was made had been imposed by earlier tribunals as the result of findings of deficient professional performance (made in July 2018) and of misconduct taking the form of dishonesty (made in July 2019). They did not arise out of the Appellant’s conduct on 22^nd August 2018.

The Respondent contended that the Declaration was untrue because at the time it was made the Appellant was subject to an investigation arising out of the dangerous driving conviction and sentence. The Respondent said that the Appellant knew that the Declaration was untrue and that, having made it with that knowledge, he had been acting dishonestly.

Those matters came before a tribunal (“the 2023/24 Tribunal”) which was to address the misconduct allegation arising out of the Appellant’s making of the Declaration and to review whether his fitness to practise continued to be impaired by reason of the dangerous driving conviction. As I explained in the 2024 Judgment at [9]:

“The hearing addressing the findings of fact and the issue of whether there was impairment of the Appellant’s fitness to practise lasted from 9^th to 31^st October 2023. On 24^th October 2023 at the conclusion of the first part of that hearing the Tribunal found that the Appellant’s answer to question 7 was untrue; that it had been made knowingly; and that his actions had been dishonest. On 31^st October 2023 it found that the Appellant’s fitness to practise was impaired by reason of the misconduct in the form of dishonesty. There was a further hearing lasting from 26^th to 28^th February 2024 at which the issue of sanction was considered. At the end of that hearing the Tribunal concluded that the only appropriate sanction was that of erasure of the Appellant’s name from the Register.”

The Appellant appealed the findings of the 2023/24 Tribunal and it was that appeal which I addressed in the 2024 Judgment. It is important to be clear as to the effect of that judgment and of the order made on 11^th September 2024 as a consequence of it.

The issues in relation to the Declaration before the 2023/24 Tribunal were:

The tribunal concluded that the Declaration was untrue; that the Appellant had known that it was untrue; that it had been made dishonestly; that the Appellant’s actions amounted to misconduct; that there was impairment of his fitness to practise; and that the appropriate sanction was erasure.

The Appellant and Miss Burbidge had given evidence before the 2023/24 Tribunal. The Appellant had maintained his position that Miss Burbidge had told him that the Bringing Back Staff team did not regard any GMC investigation into the Appellant as relevant. For her part, Miss Burbidge had denied making any such comment.

I explained the significance of that dispute of evidence in the 2024 Judgment at [57] thus:

“I agree with the Appellant that the dispute as to what had been said between him and Miss Burbidge was a significant issue and one which was material to the central questions in the proceedings below. If the Appellant’s account of that conversation was correct it would mean that he had been open about the prospect of a GMC investigation with the Bringing Back Staff team from the outset in March 2020 and, more significant, that he had been told that the team was not concerned about the potential for such an investigation flowing from the conviction. This would, in turn, throw light on the making of the Declaration in June 2020. That Declaration was made to the Bringing Back Staff team. Acceptance of the Appellant’s account of those matters would have been relevant to his assertion that the terms of the Declaration arose from his failure properly to check a draft he had prepared earlier. That, and the contention that he had told that any GMC investigation was irrelevant to the Bringing Back Staff team, would also be relevant to the issue of whether the Appellant had been dishonest. That is particularly so in circumstances where he attached details of his conviction and sentence and of the conditions arising from the earlier fitness to practise proceedings to the Form. There can be no suggestion that the Appellant was trying to conceal his conviction or sentence from the Bringing Back Staff team. In addition, it is relevant that question 7 was asking about matters ‘which may have a bearing on your suitability for the position you are applying for’. In those circumstances an assertion by Miss Burbidge that the Bringing Back Staff team was not concerned about GMC investigations was potentially relevant to the honesty of the answer. At the very least acceptance of the Appellant’s account of the March 2020 conversation would have meant that the terms of that conversation and the Appellant’s understanding as a result of that would need to be considered by the Tribunal when it was addressing whether he had been acting honestly or dishonestly. If the untrue Declaration related to a matter which the Appellant believed was irrelevant in circumstances where that belief was due to what the Appellant had been told by the body to whom the Declaration was being made there would be real scope for debate as to whether it could properly be found to have been made dishonestly. Even if there were found to have been dishonesty a finding that the Appellant’s version of the conversation was correct would be relevant to the consideration of the gravity of his conduct.”

I allowed the appeal on that occasion on the grounds that the 2023/24 Tribunal had failed to make a finding on a significant issue in dispute and that it had not been open to that tribunal to find that the Appellant was dishonest without resolving that issue saying, at [79], that:

“I am nonetheless driven to the conclusion that even on the most benevolent reading of the Determination and even when full account is taken of the context this ground is made out. The only realistic reading of the Determination is that the Tribunal failed to appreciate the potential significance of the Appellant’s case as to what had been said between him and Miss Burbidge and that it failed to make a finding on that issue. It follows that the Tribunal failed to address and to make a finding on a significant matter of dispute the resolution of which was material to the decision on the allegations. In those circumstances this ground of appeal succeeds. As a consequence, ground 1(iii) also succeeds in that it was not open to the Tribunal to make a finding that the Appellant was dishonest without having resolved this issue.”

I dismissed the other grounds of appeal including the Appellant's challenge to the findings that the Declaration was untrue and that he knew that it was untrue.

The order made on that appeal stated that the 2023/24 Tribunal’s findings in respect of allegations 1, 2, and 3 were upheld. Those were the allegations that the Appellant made the Declaration (allegation 1); that the Declaration was untrue (allegation 2); and that the Appellant knew that it was untrue (allegation 3). I ordered that the matter be remitted to a tribunal “to re-determine (1) allegation 4 (stage 1); (ii) misconduct and impairment (stage 2); and (subject to (ii)) sanction (stage 3)”. Allegation 4 was the allegation that the Appellant had made the Declaration dishonestly.

I upheld the 2023/24 Tribunal’s decision that the Appellant’s fitness to practise continued to be impaired by reason of the dangerous driving conviction. I continued the suspension which had been imposed as a consequence of that and directed that the review hearing in relation to that suspension was to be listed together with the remitted hearing of the dishonesty allegation.

The hearing in April 2025 was the hearing held pursuant to that order.

The Appellant represented himself for the bulk of the hearing before the Tribunal. However, the cross-examination of Miss Burbidge was conducted on the Appellant’s behalf by Mr Khonazad of counsel who also provided written closing submissions on the factual issue of whether the Appellant had made the Declaration dishonestly.

The Tribunal proceeded on the basis of the upheld findings that the Appellant had made the Declaration; that it was untrue; and that the Appellant had known that it was untrue. It did, however, allow the admission of further evidence which was taken into account in its consideration of the issue of dishonesty.

The Tribunal heard evidence and submissions from 8^th –11^th and on 14^th April 2025. It heard oral evidence from Miss Burbidge, Dr Sarah Marwick, and the Appellant. The Tribunal also considered a substantial volume of documents. It delivered its finding on the issue of whether the Declaration had been made dishonestly on 16^th April 2025. It reminded itself of the test for dishonesty set out by Lord Hughes in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2017] UKSC 67. It also took account of the passage of time between the making of the Declaration and the hearing before the Tribunal.

The Tribunal addressed separately the questions of whether the Appellant had been dishonest in declaring that he was not subject to any fitness to practise investigations and of whether he had been dishonest in declaring that his answers on the form were correct. However, the latter was dealt with only briefly and against the background of the consideration of the former.

At [33] the Tribunal summarized its assessment of Miss Burbidge’s evidence saying:

“The Tribunal was impressed that Ms Burbridge in oral evidence did her best to be fair in her recollections. Despite the passage of five years, the Tribunal was satisfied that on the significant matters she did remember Dr Ali's case. It considered her evidence to have been credible and noted that her witness statement supported her oral evidence. Asked about the first telephone call, she stated that she could not actually remember the sequence of the conversation but she described the format the conversations usually took. Of the hundreds of people who expressed an interest in the Programme, less than 10 presented with some difficulties and Dr Ali was one Ms Burbidge personally dealt with that was different.”

At [37] the Tribunal said this about the Appellant’s evidence:

“The Tribunal took into consideration the submissions made on Dr Ali's behalf, by Mr Kohanzad, that being untruthful on one matter does not necessarily mean that a witness is untruthful on other matters. Dr Ali's oral and written evidence lacked clarity and was at times difficult to follow. He was respectful but also confused. He presented as a chaotic thinker, unable to prioritise the most significant issues. What seemed to be pivotal in Dr Ali's mind was that if anything, he had over-disclosed in the information he sent to Ms Burbidge on 7 June 2020. He had attached to the Form a list of his conditions and details of his criminal conviction and sentence for dangerous driving and other historical matters that he considered significant.”

Then, the Tribunal explained why it was rejecting the evidence of the Appellant and accepting that of Miss Burbidge saying, at [38] and [39]:

“38.

The Tribunal has had regard to the evidence given at the previous Tribunal hearing and this Tribunal's assessment of the oral evidence of Dr Ali and Ms Burbidge in this hearing. The Tribunal found that the assertion by Dr Ali that he told Ms Burbidge of the potential GMC investigation for the driving conviction in the 28 March 2020 telephone conversation was not true. The Tribunal found that the assertions by Dr Ali that Ms Burbidge said 'fuck the GMC' and that any potential GMC investigation would be irrelevant to the BBS Programme, were also untrue. The Tribunal did not accept Dr Ali's evidence that in the 28 March 2020 telephone conversation he had informed Ms Burbidge of all those matters set out in paragraph 30 above. If Dr Ali had alerted Ms Burbidge to all those matters, she would not have conducted a Google search, nor would she have sought the advice of Dr Marwick following Dr Ali's email and attachments of June 2020. The Tribunal found Dr Ali's evidence unreliable.

39.

Both Ms Burbidge and Dr Marwick's evidence indicated that Dr Ali had not declared any information about the GMC investigation. They were also both in agreement that Dr Ali's case was a difficult one. Where accounts of what happened differed between Ms Burbidge and Dr Ali, the Tribunal preferred the account of Ms Burbidge.”

Next, the Tribunal summarized a number of emails and an attendance note from Miss Carr before saying that it regarded these as providing support for Miss Burbidge’s evidence.

At [47] the Tribunal said:

“Bearing all the evidence in mind, the Tribunal took the view that Dr Ali genuinely knew he was subject to a GMC investigation but purposefully omitted this from the Form to improve his prospects of gaining employment through the BBS Programme as a doctor. He only included details of the conditions on his practice, his conviction and sentence, all of which were publicly available. The omission of the 'ongoing GMC investigation' was significant because it was the only matter he omitted, which was not publicly available.”

Against that background the Tribunal applied the Ivey v Genting Casinos test and concluded that the Appellant had been dishonest in stating that he was not subject to any current fitness to practise investigation. Having made that finding the Tribunal made the further finding that the Appellant had been dishonest in stating that he believed the information in the Declaration was true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

The Tribunal heard evidence and submissions on the question of whether the Appellant’s fitness to practise was impaired by reason of misconduct on 17^th April 2025. It delivered its decision on those questions on 24^th April 2025.

Having summarized the submissions and having set out the applicable legal principles in unimpeachable terms the Tribunal said, at [107], that the Appellant’s conduct in making the Declaration amounted to misconduct.

In considering impairment of the Appellant’s fitness to practise the Tribunal had regard to the professional standards set out in the Respondent’s “Good Medical Practice” document. It then explained that it had concluded that there was impairment of his fitness to practise. In doing so the Tribunal explained that the Appellant’s dishonesty was “at the lower end of the spectrum” (in this respect it had regard to the fact that the Appellant had disclosed his conviction and other matters). It also concluded that there was a low risk of repetition. The finding of impairment flowed, however, from the Tribunal’s conclusion as to the Appellant’s level of insight. The basis for that assessment appears thus at [115] – [117]:

“115.

The Tribunal were concerned about Dr Ali's references which sought to minimise the dishonesty. In spite of having his appeal dismissed regarding his assertion that there was no formal investigation proceeding at that time, and that his omission was irrelevant because he was applying for a non-clinical position, he persisted with those claims. He accentuated his disclosure of the facts of his criminal conviction, sentence and the conditions then placed upon his registration as illustrative of his 'over-disclosure.' Dr Ali has not to date shown how he has learned from his misconduct. His focus was on the malicious intent of the GMC, MPTS, and Dr Marwick, suggesting his misconduct arose from his being 'entrapped' are all indications that he continues to externalise the blame for his misconduct.

116.Although Dr Ali accepted that dishonesty is serious, he was found to have a low level of insight. The Tribunal found that his misconduct has not been remedied and will not be unless Dr Ali recognises the fundamental problem is his own unwillingness to accept responsibility for his conduct. Ordinarily a person found to be dishonest would learn from their mistake, make admissions and reflect upon it. Dr Ali retains a huge sense of injustice and grievance against the GMC, MPTS.

117.This Tribunal has read in excess of 1,000 pages of documents which Dr Ali has submitted. It included research documents and Case law much of which was irrelevant. Many of the documents are difficult to read. Each Shadow Appraisal has in excess of 100 pages each of which sets out in detail the GPO which Dr Ali has completed and his reflections upon it. The contents however demonstrate little focus on the issues before this Tribunal. Dr Ali's focus continues to be that the GMC is not fit for purpose. Dr Ali repeatedly records his opinion that he was blacklisted and a whistle blower which has prompted the Allegation against him.”

Then, the Tribunal turned to consider whether the Appellant’s fitness to practise continued to be impaired by misconduct in relation to the dangerous driving conviction. It summarized the circumstances of the offence and the findings of the earlier tribunals and concluded that there continued to be impairment having said:

“170.There appears to have been little change to Dr Ali's pre-occupation with perceiving himself as a victim of the GMC's deceitful behaviour towards him and it being unfit for purpose.

171.The Tribunal considered whether there was a risk of repetition. The first Tribunal found the risk to be low. The offence was committed seven years ago and there has been no subsequent serious driving offence reported. Although Dr Ali's account of the circumstances continue to differ markedly from those described by the sentencing Judge, there have been no reports of his loss of temper since December 2018. Dr Ali has never appealed either the conviction or sentence. The risk of repetition calculated by the 2021 Tribunal has not increased. This Tribunal finds the risk of repetition to be low, whilst still asserting Dr AM's poor insight, and failure to fully remediate.

172.The Tribunal noted the virtual courses attended and certificates which Dr Ali has acquired and his shadow appraisals continuing to the present time. He has fulfilled a considerable number of hours of CPD annually, 190 hours in his most recent Shadow Appraisal. They demonstrate that Dr Ali has done as much as he could under the circumstances to maintain his knowledge and keep it up to date.

173.The Tribunal determined that the greatest obstacle to Dr Ali moving on is his lack of insight. He continues to be pre-occupied with the faults he finds in the GMC, the MPTS, the Judges and HMCTS. He persists with references to the victim of his conviction as ‘the other road rage driver' or the 'drunk driver.' He continues to assert that he is suspended as a result of his whistle blowing and a weaponised GMC. In those assertions, Dr Ali is offering a counter truth and counter allegations. These matters collectively prevent him from focussing on the issues concerning the conviction, regarding which he still has a limited insight.”

The Tribunal heard submissions as to sanction on 25^th and 28^th April 2025 and issued its decision in that regard on 29^th April 2025. It again summarized the submissions which had been made and reminded itself that the purpose of the sanction was not punishment of the doctor in question but the protection of patients; the maintenance of proper professional standards; and the wider public interest.

At [214] the Tribunal set out a number of mitigating factors and then said:

“215.The Tribunal considered the gravity relating to each matter. The conviction was serious and the sentence reflected that. In the subsequent seven years, Dr Ali has attended before four different tribunals between 2021 and 2025. At each tribunal his insight has been identified as the reason why he has not remediated. The misconduct involving dishonesty was a matter which until today, 28 April 2025. Dr Ali had not accepted, but had provided a number of alternative explanations, locating responsibility elsewhere than himself

216.The Tribunal has accepted throughout that Dr Ali is fully entitled to maintain his innocence. What is more troubling are the counter allegations made by Dr Ali to explain the findings made against him, in particular when it included accusations against institutions such as the GMC and MPTS.

217.The Tribunal accepts Dr Ali's oral evidence that as an elected representative to the BMA, he receives frequent complaints against the GMC, from other doctors. This may have exacerbated his own mistrust of the GMC.

218.The 'application' for Public Interest Disclosure, in reliance on PIDA 1998, is an example of Dr Ali's misdirection. He sought at the start of Stage 3 to apply to the Tribunal to offer him protection from negative treatment or unfair dismissal, such as might occur to a 'whistle-blower' in the context of an employer, and/or before an employment tribunal. Dr Ali submitted before submissions at the sanction stage, that whistleblowing is central to the 'dishonesty' finding. Neither of the two matters which are the subject of this Tribunal's consideration, involve whistle-blowing. Dr Ali himself acknowledges that it is not relevant to the driving conviction. On 28 April Dr Ali submitted that he accepted that he was dishonest in completing a form for the GMC, which is the basis of the misconduct finding. Neither concern whistle-blowing nor employment in a work context where he has either lost his employment or his employer is taking punitive action against him. Both matters concern his voluntary acts, and neither took place in the context of employment. Accordingly, as asserted by Mr Brook on behalf of the GMC, it is not an application relevant to these proceedings.”

The Tribunal analysed the various possible sanctions.

In explaining why suspension was not appropriate the Tribunal said:

“226.The Tribunal considered a suspension to be appropriate if there was an acknowledgement of fault from the doctor and if the behaviours were unlikely to be repeated. it took the view that Dr Ali has found it impossible to move on from his perception that he was victimised by the GMC. The Tribunal delivered its determination on impairment at 09:34 on 24 April 2025. When asked by the LQC at the Sanction stage, whether he had read the Tribunal's Determination on Impairment, having adjourned the previous day at his request, save for two hours, Dr Ali said he'd only been able to skim read it. Offered more time to read it, he declined.

227.

The strategies to which Dr Ali refers do not include an account of empathy for anyone else affected by his conviction and/or his dishonesty but focus upon himself…

228.In a single strategy (Dr Ali submitted seven, each covering an A4 page of paper), Dr Ali referred to the GMC as, spiteful (twice), negligent; racist, and deceitful. The 'strategy to minimise the risk of recurrence' which should have focussed on ways for himself to minimise a recurrence of his criminal conviction, were presented as a critique of what he had done and would do to highlight the unfair, unjust and spiteful processes of the GMC. It appeared to the Tribunal to demonstrate Dr Ali's all-consuming fight with the GMC. Dr Ali repeatedly asserted that he had asked for a definition of 'insight' from the GMC but they had chosen not to give him one.”

At [230] the Tribunal concluded that the Appellant had not provided adequate evidence to demonstrate that there was no risk of a repetition of either the “road rage” behaviour or the dishonesty. At [231] it explained that a further suspension would “serve no purpose … given Dr Ali’s lack of insight and inability to move on”. The Tribunal noted the Appellant’s repeated failure to demonstrate insight before saying:

“233.

The Tribunal concluded from the history and evidence that remediation is unlikely to be successful, because of previous unsuccessful attempts to engage Dr Ali in developing insight. This Tribunal found that a further suspension would serve no useful purpose.

234.The Tribunal concluded that a sanction of suspension would undermine the overarching objective because Dr Ali has not demonstrated true insight nor has he convinced the Tribunal that he is capable of addressing the underlying causes for his misconduct.”

After that exercise the Tribunal concluded that erasure was “the only appropriate and proportionate sanction” saying:

“237.The Tribunal considered Dr Ali's conviction and dishonesty to be serious and reckless departures from GMP. It noted that his conviction involved violence by using his vehicle as a weapon. Despite successive tribunals finding that the conviction was remediable and providing Dr Ali with the time whilst suspended to demonstrate remediation, his insight remains limited and therefore he has not remediated. This Tribunal found that his dishonesty in the misconduct was similarly remediable. However, even during this fact finding, Dr Ali resorted to highlighting causative factors previously argued and dismissed by the previous Tribunal and on appeal to the High Court. Whereas Dr Ali is entitled to continue to deny the allegation, it is his counter allegations against others, notably Ms Burbidge and Dr Marwick, as well as the GMC, which displays his inability to develop the necessary insight. Without the necessary insight, the public confidence.in the profession will continue to be eroded. Without the necessary insight, it would not be in the public interest for Dr Ali's registration to continue.

238.It is with some reluctance that the Tribunal has reached this conclusion. Dr Ali is clearly highly regarded in his current work in a GP's practice. Patients need good doctors and it is in the public interest to restore doctors to practice wherever possible. Nonetheless the issue of Dr Ali's insight has been at the forefront of successive tribunal decisions, since he was suspended on 5 July 2022. Sadly, during those intervening years, his recognition of his responsibility, his failings, and his need to demonstrate how he plans to ensure there is no repetition of such dishonesty and aggression, has not been foremost in his presentation to tribunals. This is the insight that is still absent. The Tribunal was not persuaded that Dr Ali had developed sufficient insight whilst his primary focus was to persistently locate blame elsewhere for the events which have brought him before the MPT.”

The Appellant put forward six grounds of appeal.

Ground 1 was headed “GMC Procedural Irregularities and Lack of Transparency”. It had the following elements, although underlying the whole ground was the contention that the procedure adopted by the Tribunal had been unfair and had caused prejudice to the Appellant by depriving him of a fair hearing.

Ground 2 was “Error of Law – use of assumption and failure to properly reassess the existence and status of formal Investigations or preliminary enquiries in June 2020”. Here the Appellant was contending that the Tribunal should have considered whether he was in fact subject to investigation at the time he made the Declaration and whether he believed that he was subject to an investigation. This amounted to a contention that the Tribunal should have re-opened the questions of whether the statement that he was not subject to such investigation was untrue and of his knowledge of that despite the finding of the 2023/24 Tribunal and the order I made on the appeal against that decision. The Appellant contended that it was necessary to do this in order for the Tribunal properly to determine dishonesty. That was because in order to determine dishonesty the Tribunal had to apply the test laid down in Ivey v Genting Casinos which required it to ascertain the state of his knowledge and belief and that involved consideration, he said, of whether the statement was untrue and whether he knew it was untrue.

Ground 3 was said to be “misapplication of legal tests and exclusion of Defence evidence”. The contentions underlying this ground related to three distinct matters. First, the Appellant was criticizing the Tribunal’s failure to reopen the earlier findings as to the falsity of the declaration and the Appellant’s knowledge that it was untrue. In that respect it is a duplication of the argument being advanced in support of ground 2. Second, the Appellant said that in considering whether he had been dishonest the Tribunal failed properly to take account of the matters which he had disclosed in his email of 7^th June 2020. The Appellant said that there had been “over-disclosure” and that the Tribunal should have regarded this as a powerful indication that he was not dishonest. Third, the Appellant said that in considering his level of insight for the purposes of determining whether his fitness to practise was impaired and also when considering the appropriate sanction the Tribunal had failed to have proper regard to the material he had provided showing the courses he had undertaken and his level of insight.

Ground 4 was “GMC structural unfairness, GMC Institutional Racism, and Protected Interest Disclosure Act 2014 (PIDA) misuse for predetermined outcome is wrong”. I take the reference to an Act of 2014 to be intended to be a reference to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. This ground covered a number of contentions. The Appellant said that the GMC’s bringing of the misconduct proceedings against him was motivated by a personal animus against him. He was, he contended, being punished for his actions in seeking to expose the failings of the GMC and, in particular, of its disciplinary structures. In this regard he said that he was being punished for his actions as a whistleblower contrary to the protection given by the 1998 Act. That animus directed at the Appellant himself was, he said, combined with institutional racism on the part of the GMC which involved those from ethnic minorities being treated more harshly than those who are white. The Appellant contended that these failings not only tainted the bringing of the proceedings by the GMC but also affected the approach of the Tribunal and caused the Tribunal to adopt an unfair and biased approach in determining the case.

In ground 5 the Appellant referred to “Procedural Error with conflation of new and separate review matters at Stage 3 for predetermined GMC erasure sanction with non-medical matters is wrong”. The Appellant’s argument in relation to this ground was particularly difficult to follow. The Appellant appeared to be saying that the new matter of the allegations relating to the Declaration should not have been addressed at the same hearing as the review of the suspension imposed following the dangerous driving conviction. In addition, the Appellant also seemed to be arguing that the Tribunal should not have had regard to both the dangerous driving conviction and the making of the Declaration when considering sanction.

Ground 6 contended that there had been “abuse of immediate suspension orders and tactical prejudice”. The Appellant said that an immediate suspension order should not have been made in circumstances where there was no risk to patient safety and no challenge to the Appellant’s clinical competence. The Appellant said that the making of such an order was an abuse. He also submitted that it had the effect (and was intended to have the effect) that if an appeal were to be successful the court would be more likely to remit the matter for a further hearing rather than simply allowing the appeal. To the extent that this was a criticism of the making of an immediate suspension order by the Tribunal the point has become academic in light of the conclusion I have reached on this appeal.

As I explained in the 2024 Judgment, the appeal is brought as of right under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 and is subject to the rules in CPR Pt 52. The starting point for the approach to be taken is to be found in Sastry v General Medical Council [2021] EWCA Civ 623, [2021] 1 WLR 5029 where Nicola Davies LJ delivered the judgment of the court. At [102] Nicola Davies LJ said:

“Derived from Ghosh are the following points as to the nature and extent of the section 40 appeal and the approach of the appellate court: (i) an unqualified statutory right of appeal by medical practitioners pursuant to section 40 of the 1983 Act; (ii) the jurisdiction of the court is appellate, not supervisory; (iii) the appeal is by way of a rehearing in which the court is fully entitled to substitute its own decision for that of the tribunal; (iv) the appellate court will not defer to the judgment of the tribunal more than is warranted by the circumstances; (v) the appellate court must decide whether the sanction imposed was appropriate and necessary in the public interest or was excessive and disproportionate; (vi) in the latter event, the appellate court should substitute some other penalty or remit the case to the tribunal for reconsideration.”

In Nurrish v Nursing & Midwifery Council [2026] EWHC 2 (Admin) at [44] I explained my understanding of the position thus, (see also per Hill J in Shabir v General Medical Council [2023] EWHC 1772 (Admin) at [12]):

“The court must exercise its own judgement as to whether the decision was wrong and “it is not sufficient for intervention to turn on the more confined grounds of public law such as rationality” (Cheatle v General Medical Council [2009] EWHC 645 (Admin) at [15]). Although appropriate deference must be paid to the determination of the professional panel the court must not abandon its duty to determine whether the decision was wrong and the degree of deference which is appropriate will depend on the particular circumstances and the particular issue under consideration”

One of the themes pervading the Appellant’s arguments and underlying a number of the grounds was the argument that the Tribunal should not have proceeded on the basis that it was untrue for the Appellant to state in June 2020 that he was not subject to any current or new fitness to practise investigation, alternatively it should not have proceeded on the basis that he knew that statement was untrue. The Appellant said that in order to apply the test in Ivey v Genting Casinos and so decide whether he had been dishonest the Tribunal had to ascertain his state of knowledge and belief and that this included his knowledge and belief as to whether the statement was untrue. That contention is misconceived when proper regard is had to the exercise in which the Tribunal was engaged.

The key exercise which the Tribunal was to undertake was to determine the issue of whether the Appellant made the Declaration dishonestly. In light of the finding on that issue it was then to consider the questions of misconduct; impairment of the Appellant’s fitness to practise; and sanction. It was also to review the suspension arising from the dangerous driving conviction. The Tribunal was to undertake the former exercise in light of the upheld findings of the 2023/24 Tribunal, namely that the Appellant had made the Declaration; that it was untrue; and that the Appellant had known that it was untrue when he made it. That was the consequence of my 2024 Judgment and the order made giving effect to it. The Appellant’s knowledge that the statement was untrue was an important part of the determination of whether he was dishonest but that issue had already been resolved. As I explained in the 2024 Judgment at [57] (see at [19] above), determining the question of dishonesty also required determination of the question of whether the Appellant had been told by Miss Burbidge that the Bringing Back Staff team were not concerned about whether the Appellant was facing a GMC investigation. The latter question was relevant to the issue of dishonesty because of the scope for an argument that if the Appellant had been told that the investigation was irrelevant then he had not been dishonest in failing to disclose it. However, as a consequence of the 2024 Judgment both questions were to be approached against the background of the conclusions that the Appellant was in fact subject to such an investigation and that he knew that he was so subject.

The fact that the issue of dishonesty was to be resolved by applying the Ivey v Genting Casinos test which required ascertainment of the Appellant’s state of knowledge and belief does not alter matters. The Appellant’s knowledge of the falsity of the statement was already established. What remained to be established was whether he had been told and believed that the Bringing Back Staff team regarded the fact of the investigation as irrelevant.

It follows that determination of the issue of whether the Appellant had made the Declaration dishonestly required the Tribunal to do two things. First, it was to address and to resolve the conflict between the evidence of the Appellant and Miss Burbidge. Second, it was to consider whether the Appellant had acted dishonestly in light of the conclusion on that question but on the footing that he was subject to a GMC investigation and that he knew that he was.

It was not, therefore, open to the Tribunal to re-visit the questions of whether the Appellant was subject to a GMC investigation or of whether he knew that he was and that the statement that he was not was untrue. Accordingly, the fact that the Tribunal did not re-open those findings and proceeded on the basis of them is not a valid criticism either of the Tribunal’s approach nor of the Decision.

The Appellant’s challenge to this finding was principally contained in grounds 1a, 1e, 2, and 3.

The Tribunal’s finding that the Appellant had made the Declaration dishonestly was a finding of fact made after hearing contested evidence; considering the documents; and receiving submissions. Although not inviolable such a finding of fact is to be accorded a high degree of deference (see Nurrish at [45] – [49]).

I have to consider whether the Tribunal was (a) wrong to accept the evidence of Miss Burbidge and reject that of the Appellant in relation to the conversation between them or (b) having reached that conclusion, then to find that the Appellant had made the Declaration dishonestly.

The Tribunal was entirely justified in making the finding it did on both of those matters. The Tribunal heard the evidence of Miss Burbidge and the Appellant and accepted the evidence of the former while rejecting that of the latter. That conclusion was based on the Tribunal’s assessment of the oral evidence and the fact that the contemporaneous documents supported Miss Burbidge’s account. It is also relevant to note that the Appellant’s version of events was inherently unlikely. The form which applicants to the Bringing Back Staff team were to complete expressly asked whether the applicant was subject to “a fitness to practise investigation and/or proceedings of any nature by a regulatory or licensing body, which may have a bearing on your suitability for the position you are applying for”. In those circumstances it was inherently unlikely that a person in Miss Burbidge’s position would tell a potential applicant that the team was not concerned about the existence of a GMC fitness to practise investigation let alone that such a person would do so in the robust terms which the Appellant said that Miss Burbidge had used. That inherent unlikelihood is reinforced by the fact that, as I explained in the 2024 Judgment at [78], the Appellant had put the word “doctor” in the box for “job applied for”: a factor which undermines the Appellant’s suggestion that he was told that dealings with the GMC were irrelevant because he would not be given a medical post.

Once the Tribunal had found that Miss Burbidge’s account of the key conversation was correct the conclusion that the Appellant was dishonest when he made the Declaration follows almost inevitably. The Tribunal was, as I have explained above, to proceed on the basis that the statement made by the Appellant was untrue and that he knew that it was untrue. The position, therefore, is that the Appellant made a statement which he knew was untrue and which related to the existence of a GMC fitness to practise investigation and did so in the context of an application form where he stated that he was applying for a post as a doctor. The conclusion that such behaviour was dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people cannot be faulted.

The Appellant placed considerable emphasis before me and before the Tribunal on what he described as “over-disclosure”. This was the fact that he sent with his application details of the conditions on his registration (arising from the earlier disciplinary proceedings); his dangerous driving conviction; and the sentence which had been imposed on him. He had, moreover, been in correspondence with Miss Carr of the GMC’s fitness to practise team giving her details of the criminal proceedings. I summarized this material in the 2024 Judgment at [19] – [29]. The Tribunal described the Appellant’s invocation of this “over-disclosure” as being “pivotal” in his mind and it retained that position in his submissions to me. The Appellant’s argument was that the fact that he had disclosed these matters which he had not been required to disclose showed that he was being open with the Bringing Back Staff team and was incompatible with a finding that he had been dishonest in making the Declaration.

The Tribunal considered this argument. It explained, at [47], that the “over-disclosure” related to matters of public record and which could be discovered easily. It contrasted those with the GMC investigation which was not public knowledge and regarded the fact that the only matter which was omitted was the matter which was not public knowledge as being significant.

I accept that the “over-disclosure” has a potential relevance but it simply does not bear the weight which the Appellant sought to place on it and it is very far from being fatal to the conclusion that the Declaration was made dishonestly. The force of the “over-disclosure” is as a forensic argument to the effect that the disclosure of a quantity of adverse material should be regarded as indicating openness on the part of the Appellant. It might then be said to support the arguments, first, that the Appellant honestly believed that he was not subject to an investigation and, second, that he believed that the fact of an investigation was regarded as irrelevant by the Bringing Back Staff team. The former of those arguments is precluded by the 2024 Judgment. As to the latter argument it might have had some force if seen in isolation but it can carry little weight when the evidence is considered as a whole. The Tribunal considered the argument at [37] and explained at [47] why it did not regard it as assisting the Appellant. That assessment is also to be seen in the light of the Tribunal’s finding about the conflict between the Appellant’s evidence and that of Miss Burbidge. Having rejected the Appellant’s account of the conversation and having accepted Miss Burbidge’s the Tribunal was fully entitled to conclude that the “over-disclosure” did not change the position and did not exclude a finding that the Appellant had made the Declaration dishonestly.

It follows that the challenge to this aspect of the Tribunal’s decision fails.

The degree of deference to be accorded to a specialist regulatory tribunal’s finding that behaviour amounted to misconduct is less when that behaviour occurred outside a clinical setting than when it relates to a matter of clinical practice or professional etiquette. Where the allegation is one of dishonesty or of other behaviour outside such a setting the court will be more easily able to assess for itself the gravity and consequences of such behaviour and the deference to be accorded to the view of the regulatory tribunal will be less (see General Medical Council v Jagjivan [2017] EWHC 1247 (Admin); [2017] 1 WLR 4438 at [40] per Sharp LJ as she then was).

Here, there can be no credible dispute that both of the matters before the Tribunal amounted to misconduct and this aspect of the Decision was not a particular focus of the Appellant’s challenge. The particular circumstances of the dangerous driving offence were clearly such as to bring the medical profession into disrepute. Similarly, for a doctor dishonestly to make a false statement in which he failed to disclose the existence of fitness to practise proceedings when applying for a position under the Bringing Back Staff scheme is necessarily misconduct.

The issue of whether the misconduct impaired the Appellant’s fitness to practise turned in very large part on the assessment of his level of insight. The challenge to this aspect of the Decision appears in grounds 1a, 1e, 2, 3, and 5.

Here, the Tribunal heard the Appellant’s evidence and oral submissions over a number of days and read the voluminous material he had submitted. In those circumstances a particular degree of deference is to be accorded to its assessment of the Appellant’s level of insight (see Professional Standards Authority v Health & Care Professions Council & Doree [2017] EWCA Civ 319 at [38] per Lindblom LJ).

The Appellant is not to be penalized for having denied the allegations against him. It was nonetheless open to the Tribunal to take account of the fact that the Appellant gave evidence of a conversation with Miss Burbidge which, in the light of the Tribunal’s findings, was untrue. Regarding matters in the light most favourable to the Appellant the position was that he had convinced himself that Miss Burbidge had said things which she had not. That, of itself, would be indicative of an absence of insight. An alternative analysis would be that the Appellant had given deliberately false evidence and had made up the terms of a conversation in order to attempt to escape responsibility for his dishonesty. Such behaviour would go beyond merely denying the allegation and would been an even greater indication that insight was lacking.

The Appellant criticized the Tribunal for failing to set out and apply a definition of insight and went so far as to contend that it was not open to the Tribunal to find that he lacked insight without a professional assessment. In the context of that argument he made reference to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. That line of argument was wholly misconceived. For the purposes of assessing whether there is impairment of a professional’s fitness to practise insight is not a medical concept, still less is it one which depends on a psychological assessment. The references to the 2005 Act were similarly misconceived. A person can be wholly capacitious but lacking in insight. For these purposes insight is an omnibus term covering a person’s understanding of the gravity of the actions in question; of how the behaviour came about; of the need to avoid a repetition of such actions; and of what is needed to minimise the risk of repetition. Assessing whether a particular professional has insight and the extent to which any absence or inadequacy of insight creates a risk of repetition of the behaviour in question are matters of judgment turning on questions of fact and degree.

The Appellant contends that the Tribunal failed to take account of material he had put forward showing that he had insight. However, the Decision shows that the Tribunal did consider with care the voluminous material which the Appellant provided: see the Decision at [117], [146], [172], and [226] – [228].

In addition, the Appellant said that the determination of the allegation arising out of the Declaration and the review of his suspension for the dangerous driving conviction should not have been conducted at the same hearing and that the Tribunal improperly allowed its approach on each of those matters to be influenced by its approach on the other. I reject those contentions for the following reasons.

The argument that the two matters should not have been heard together can be addressed shortly. As Mr Mant pointed out, the Fitness to Practise Rules make express provision, at rule 21A, for new allegations to be addressed at the same hearing as a review of an existing suspension. Moreover, paragraph 3(c) of the 11^th September 2024 order expressly directed that the review of the suspension be listed to be heard together with the remitted determination of the allegation arising out of the Declaration.

The Tribunal took care to treat the two matters separately for the purposes of assessing whether the misconduct in each case had resulted in the impairment of the Appellant’s fitness to practise. The analysis of the impairment in respect of the dishonesty was set out at [108] – [120]. It was only after having made that determination that the Tribunal turned to consider the impairment resulting from the dangerous driving conviction, doing so at [121] – [174].

The Tribunal did take account of both matters together for the purpose of considering sanction but that was a wholly appropriate course to take in circumstances where the crucial consideration was the effect of a lack of insight which affected both matters.

In respect of both matters the Tribunal’s conclusion that the Appellant lacked insight was correct for the detailed and careful reasons given by the Tribunal. Both matters were affected by the same underlying consideration which was that the Appellant was, and is, completely focused on his criticisms of the GMC and of those, other than the Appellant, involved in the incidents rather than on his own responsibility. He saw himself as the victim in respect of both matters rather than recognising that he had responsibility for his actions. The dangerous driving conviction arose out of behaviour in which the Appellant indulged when angry. Nonetheless, he continued to criticize the victim of his dangerous driving and the judge who sentenced him. Similarly, in relation to the Declaration the Appellant focused on his criticism of others.

A significant factor is the degree to which the Appellant’s position and his attitude to these matters have become entrenched. This was demonstrated at the tribunal hearings in 2022 and 2023 arising out of the dangerous driving conviction. Judge Mithani summarized the Appellant’s stance at those hearings thus:

“31.

Having read the transcripts and other relevant documents in the appeal, I agree with the Respondent that the following summary contained in the ‘Determination Impairment’ dated 22 December 2022 correctly represents the position advanced orally by the Appellant to the Tribunal:

(a)

the victim’s complaint against the Appellant was malicious and motivated by a claim for compensation to get rich;

(b)

the victim was a ‘crazy drunk’ who chased after the Appellant in his car;

(c)

some of the witnesses were not independent but were friends of the victim;

(d)

one of the witnesses gave evidence at the criminal trial behind a screen because she was frightened of one of the police officers;

(e)

the Crown Court Judge had misrepresented the facts in his sentencing remarks;

(f)

the Judge was racist;

(h)

in pursuing various allegations against him, the Respondent had failed to follow due process, was motivated by racism and lacked insight;

(i)

the Original Tribunal’s decision to adjourn after going part heard was motivated by malice;

(j)

the chair of the Original Tribunal did not understand the nature of a dangerous driving conviction; and

(k)

a number of witnesses against the Appellant were drug dealers.

32.

At the subsequent sanction hearing, the Appellant filed further submissions in which he continued to make wide-ranging criticisms of the Respondent and its processes, including alleging that the proceedings taken against him had been motivated by deceit and bad faith.”

At the end of his judgment Judge Mithani gave the Appellant the following sensible and helpful advice:

“96.

I mention one additional matter: rather than raise issues of the type he raised before the Original and Review Tribunals and this court, summarised above, the Appellant might use the time between now and the next review date to demonstrate real insight into his offending and persuade the Review Tribunal that, even though he denies the offence: (a) he accepts that the circumstances relating to his misconduct that were found proved in the Crown Court were serious; (b) he accepts that he and the Review Tribunal are bound by those findings despite the fact that he denies them; (c) he agrees that the Original and Review Tribunals were right in treating them seriously; (d) through insight, application, education, supervision or by other means, he has sufficiently addressed the concerns of the Respondent and the Review Tribunal; (e) he has put in place the necessary strategies to avoid conduct of that type if it arises in the future and to respond in a way that is reasonable and proportionate; and (f) he can demonstrate what those strategies are. If he can do this, it should be possible for the suspension to be lifted, though, of course, this will ultimately be a matter for the Review Tribunal to determine on the material before it and on the oral submissions of the parties.”

That advice was not heeded. Instead, the Appellant’s stance has remained the same. As the Tribunal pointed out, although the Appellant produced a quantity of material this showed the persistence of the same state of mind. The Tribunal were entitled to describe it, at [228], as demonstrating the Appellant’s “all-consuming fight with the GMC”. The Appellant manifested the same attitude in his written and oral submissions to me and it was reflected in his allegations of racism and bias against the GMC and the Tribunal to which I will turn below.

A further aspect of the Appellant’s criticism of the Tribunal’s approach to these matters was to say that it was wrong to take account of the findings of the earlier tribunals. He contends that this was contrary to the position that past matters were not to be reopened. That contention is wholly misconceived. Those findings of the 2023/24 Tribunal which were upheld in the 2024 Judgment remained in force and could not be reopened. That, however, does not in any way preclude the approach of taking account of the findings of the earlier tribunals as an indication of the Appellant’s state of mind (and in particular of his attitude and insight) at the time of the hearings before those tribunals. That latter approach was entirely appropriate.

In those circumstances the Tribunal’s findings that the Appellant lacked insight; that there remained a risk of repetition; and that the Appellant’s fitness to practise was impaired in respect of both matters were amply justified.

The Appellant’s challenge to the sanction of erasure was set out in grounds 3, 4, and 5.

The sanction of erasure is a grave step which is not to be taken lightly. I am conscious, as was the Tribunal, that there were no concerns as to the Appellant’s clinical competence nor any suggestion that he is anything other than an effective doctor. I also accept the Tribunal’s characterization of the Appellant as being “passionate” in his desire to practise as a doctor – a desire flowing from his wish to serve his patients.

It is clear that the Tribunal moved to impose erasure with reluctance and only did so because it had concluded that nothing was to be gained by a further period of suspension.

However, for a doctor to be dishonest is a grave matter and where there is a continuing lack of insight then erasure may be inevitable: see the analysis by Lewis J, as he then was, in GMC v Theodoropoulos [2017] EWHC 1984 (Admin), [2017] 1 WLR 4794 at [35] – [40]. In this case, moreover, the dishonesty took the form of falsely declaring that the Appellant was not subject to a GMC investigation and doing so to a body charged with recruiting doctors and related professionals.

Similarly, for a doctor to engage in behaviour of the kind which led to the Appellant’s conviction for dangerous driving is also a grave matter. It is to be remembered that those actions involved driving at an elderly man in anger and then leaving the scene after that man had fallen injured to the ground.

In respect of both matters the crucial factor is the Appellant’s entrenched lack of insight amounting to a failure to accept responsibility for his actions and a belief that he is, in some way, a victim of persecution. There is no prospect of that entrenched stance changing and a real prospect that behaviour of a similar kind will recur. The Tribunal was right to conclude that there was nothing to be gained by a further period of suspension. In those circumstances the Tribunal was right to conclude that the sanction of erasure was appropriate and proportionate in relation to both matters. The appeal against the sanction imposed must, therefore, fail.

The contention that the Appellant had been the victim of “structural unfairness”, “institutional racism”, and of bias was set out expressly in ground 4 but pervaded much of the Appellant’s written and oral submissions. The argument was advanced in very general terms. The essence, however, was that the Respondent’s disciplinary structures were inherently unfair and tainted by structural racism with doctors of Black or Asian heritage being treated more harshly than those who were white. The Appellant contended that not only was he being treated more harshly (both through being investigated and by way of the sanction imposed) than a white doctor who had engaged in similar conduct would have been but that there was also a personal animus against him. His position was that he was being singled out for harsher treatment because of his past actions in speaking out against the structural unfairness and racism of the Respondent’s disciplinary system.

The first difficulty facing this aspect of the Appellant’s case is that the findings of misconduct are the consequences of findings of fact based on the Appellant’s own actions. He was convicted of dangerous driving after a trial before a judge and jury. Although the Appellant has sought to criticize the judge hearing that case it cannot credibly be said that the judge and jury were prejudiced against the Appellant because of his ethnicity and still less that they were adversely influenced against him by his position as a critic of the Respondent’s disciplinary procedures. The findings that the Declaration was false and that the Appellant made it dishonestly were findings of fact which I upheld in the 2024 Judgment (in respect of the finding of falsity) and earlier in this judgment (in respect of the finding of dishonesty). There is no basis for saying that the Tribunal’s acceptance of Miss Burbidge’s account of her conversation with the Appellant was motivated by racism or by a particular animus against the Appellant personally. As I have already noted the Appellant’s contention that Miss Burbidge said that the Bringing Back Staff team was not concerned about GMC investigations let alone that she did so in the terms asserted by the Appellant was inherently unlikely. It is apparent from the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal and from the Decision that the Appellant was given ample opportunity to present his case and that the Tribunal strove to ensure that it understood that case.

In terms of the sanction imposed I have already explained why I am satisfied that the sanction of erasure was appropriate and proportionate. I have done so uninfluenced by any considerations related to the Appellant’s ethnicity or his criticism of the Respondent’s systems. The central point in relation to sanction is that the Appellant’s misconduct was established in two separate matters each of which was of real gravity and in relation to which there was a deep-seated absence of insight. The Appellant does not provide any evidence in support of his contention that a white doctor in a similar position would have received any different sanction from that imposed on him.

Accordingly, I reject the assertion that the Tribunal’s procedure or conclusions were tainted by racism or bias against the Appellant either because of his ethnicity or because of his past criticism of the Respondent.

It is significant that the Appellant’s entrenched stance is that almost any person or body making a finding adverse to him has done so because of some form of bias against him personally or because of his ethnicity. I have quoted at [80] above Judge Mithani’s summary of the stance which the Appellant had adopted at the December 2022 tribunal hearing. The Appellant adopted a similar approach before Judge Mithani in September 2023 and at [60] and [61] that judge summarized the Appellant’s contention and explained why it had no substance saying:

“60.

A significant amount of the emphasis of the Appellant, both in his appeal papers, and in his oral submissions before me, was about how the proceedings against him brought by the Respondent were motivated by spite and ill will. He describes the Respondent as ‘institutionally racist’ and states that he and other doctors from ethnic minority backgrounds are regularly targeted or unfairly picked on by the Respondent for disciplinary action for their conduct when their counterparts, who are not from the same background, are not subject to any action for the same or similar conduct. The Appellant says that while this was a matter of concern to him in the past, and that ‘one of the original factors for the standoff and significant caution that led to the Dangerous Driving incident was [his] fear of the GMC’, he is ‘no longer afraid of the GMC and [has] developed strategies to act against the GMC as part of [his] national-elected doctors’ representative role, on the basis the GMC is unfit for purpose. This removes the circumstances of that freak incident’. His position is stated in various places in the documents which he has filed in these proceedings. Paragraph 8 of his undated witness (p. 294 of the Appeal Bundle) is illustrative of what he says:

‘… after 5 years, I am increasingly aware of bad GMC and MPTS practices for which I have become more vocal as is my right as a citizen of the United Kingdom. In particular I am upset at the GMC’s persistent misrepresentation of my past, racism in practice, the GMC/MPTS persistent lack of fairness with me and others. This has led the medical profession to ‘fear’ the GMC and elect me as a national representative on the mandate, the GMC continues to be ‘unfit for purpose’ since 2018, [SSA9]. Additionally, my utter annoyance with the suicide-inducing GMC by-line by prosecution-only investigators that they are ‘working flexibly with doctors’ which may be the case depending on race but it is deceitful’.

61.I am aware that the position advanced by the Appellant is that there is a not insignificant body of public opinion (entirely disputed by the Respondent) to the effect that the Respondent is institutionally racist and not fit for purpose. However, the investigation of generic allegations of this nature is beyond the remit of this court. So far as these appeals are concerned, I am satisfied, on the basis of the papers I have seen and the submissions I have heard, that the Appellant cannot be said to be the victim of any racism, or that the approach of the Respondent is motivated by spite or ill will.”

The Appellant’s stance before me was essentially the same as it had been before Judge Mithani. It may well be that there can be some scope for criticism of the GMC’s disciplinary structures in general terms. As Judge Mithani pointed out that is not a matter for the court in these proceedings. That is because the proceedings against the Appellant and the sanction imposed are the proper consequence of the Appellant’s own actions. Having read the Appellant’s written material and heard his oral submissions I am satisfied that he genuinely believes that he is being victimized by the Respondent. There is, however, no proper basis for that belief. As I have noted above the persistence of the Appellant’s criticisms of the findings against him and of the disciplinary proceedings together with the vehemence with which they are expressed are significant. When combined with the Appellant’s failure to accept responsibility for his own actions they indicate an entrenched lack of insight and give every indication that this will persist.

The Appellant said that he was a whistleblower; that he was being penalized for having made protected disclosures; and that this was contrary to the 1998 Act. The Tribunal analysed and rejected this contention at [218] in the following unimpeachable terms and there is simply no substance in the argument advanced by the Appellant:

“The 'application' for Public Interest Disclosure, in reliance on PIDA 1998, is an example of Dr All's misdirection. He sought at the start of Stage 3 to apply to the Tribunal to offer him protection from negative treatment or unfair dismissal, such as might occur to a 'whistle-blower' in the context of an employer, and/or before an employment tribunal. Dr Ali submitted before submissions at the sanction stage, that whistleblowing is central to the 'dishonesty' finding. Neither of the two matters which are the subject of this Tribunal's consideration, involve whistle-blowing. Dr Ali himself acknowledges that it is not relevant to the driving conviction. On 28 April Dr Ali submitted that he accepted that he was dishonest in completing a form for the GMC, which is the basis of the misconduct finding. Neither concern whistle-blowing nor employment in a work context where he has either lost his employment or his employer is taking punitive action against him. Both matters concern his voluntary acts, and neither took place in the context of employment. Accordingly, as asserted by Mr Brook on behalf of the GMC, it is not an application relevant to these proceedings.”

The Appellant’s criticisms of the procedure before the Tribunal appear particularly in grounds 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1f, 5, and 6. I have explained above why a number of the criticisms of the procedure adopted by the Tribunal were misconceived. I accept that at some points there were glitches and delays of the kind which can arise in many hearings. The diffuse nature of the Appellant’s approach and the difficulty of identifying the points he was raising did not assist with this.

There is, however, an insuperable difficulty facing this aspect of the Appellant’s case. In order for procedural failings to be a ground for allowing the appeal they have to amount to serious procedural or other failings which had the effect of making the Decision unjust. To the extent that there were procedural failings in this case they cannot be regarded as having been serious and still less as having rendered the Decision unjust. The issues for the Tribunal were the narrow but important ones of resolving the conflict between the evidence of the Appellant and of Miss Burbidge; assessing, in light of that resolution, whether the Appellant had made the Declaration dishonestly; and then addressing the questions of misconduct, impairment of the Appellant’s fitness to practise; and sanction. In relation to those issues the Appellant knew the case against him; he was able to challenge the evidence of Miss Burbidge and Dr Marwick; and to make full submissions on all the relevant issues. In light of that there is no basis for saying that there were procedural irregularities which rendered the Decision unjust.

The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the sanction of erasure remains in force.