Governing Body of Leighton Middle School, R (on the application of) v Independent Appeals Panel of Central Bedfordshire Council

This is an application for interim relief and for permission to apply for judicial review. An oral hearing took place on 19 February 2026. At the conclusion of that hearing, I indicated that I would grant permission to apply for judicial review with reasons to follow. As a result of that indication and for the reasons explained below, the application for interim relief was not pursued.

The Claimant in this matter is the Governing Body of Leighton Middle School. The Defendant is the Independent Appeals Panel of Central Bedfordshire Council.

I am extremely grateful to both counsel for their assistance during the course of the hearing and for the preparation of materials for the court to consider.

The Claimant seeks to challenge the decision made by the Defendant to admit a child to Leighton Middle School, communicated in a letter dated 14 October 2025.

Pursuant to the order of Mrs Justice Eady dated 15 January 2026, that child shall be referred to as C. C is an interested party in these proceedings.

On 2 February 2026, Andrew Kinnear KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, ordered that the Claimant’s applications for interim relief and permission matter should be determined after an oral hearing.

C’s family moved to the area which includes the Claimant school in June 2025, in the middle of the school summer term.

On 20 June 2025, C’s mother applied for a place at the Claimant’s primary school for Year 5.

C did not receive an offer from the Claimant’s school and instead was admitted to the Gilbert Inglefield Academy. The Gilbert Inglefield Academy is located approximately 1.8 miles from C’s home address. The Claimant’s school is located under a mile from C’s address.

C’s mother appealed the decision not to offer C a place at the Claimant school. Her grounds of appeal were as follows:

The admissions appeal was heard by the Defendant on 9 October 2025. I have been provided with typed and handwritten notes written by the clerk during the course of that hearing.

At the hearing, C’s mother amplified on the grounds of appeal to the Panel, explaining the difficulties that she faced in getting C to Gilbert Inglefield Academy.

The Claimant’s headteacher and a representative of the local authority were present at the appeal and made a number of representations. They set out key points in a PowerPoint presentation, which I have considered. It concluded with the following key observations:

The typed notes of the hearing record the following relevant features which were considered during the course of the hearing:

A typed note of the decision stage of the appeal appears at the end of the typed copy of the clerk’s notes. In the course of the oral hearing, the parties agreed that this must represent a note of matters discussed during the Panel’s deliberations:

“Decision stage

1.

Were the admissions arrangements correctly and lawfully applied? Yes – unanimous

2.

Would the admission of an additional pupil prejudice the efficient delivery of education or use of resources? No – unanimous

Stage 1 upheld reasons:

Stated verbally they would lose several children in year 5-always lose some for year 6-confident go down to 150. Current yr 6 at 148-under PAN so lost 7 children-all other year groups at PAN or under so historically confirm goes down from 155. High pupil turnover in year 5. SEN isn’t high compared to other local schools. 2 over overall capacity-year 5 only year over PAN and year 5 block separate and able to accommodate an additional child-bigger classrooms. Child can be accommodated in year 5 unl naturally numbers drop for year 6 as stated. Can’t see impact on an additional child in year 5 cohort.”

The figures referred to in these deliberations are not recorded as having been mentioned during the appeal hearing. The Defendant was unable to identify the evidential origin of the numbers given for the capacity in Year 6, or for the assertion that “SEN isn’t high compared to other local schools”.

No explicit reference was made to consideration of the criteria of the Admissions Code in any part of the typed note.

The decision letter was sent to C’s mother on 14 October 2025. It is this decision made in this letter that the Claimant seeks to challenge in these proceedings. The letter states as follows:

“Your appeal was successful. The decision was unanimous. The reasons for the decision are set out below.

The Panel’s decision making comprised of two stages. In the first stage, the Panel had to decide whether:

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the Admissions Arrangements complied with the mandatory requirements, of the School Admissions Code and Part 3 of the SSFA 1998;

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the Admissions Arrangements were correctly and impartially applied in C’s case;

-

the admission of an additional child would prejudice the provision of efficient education or the efficient use of resources.

Relevant factors raised as part of the school’s case and considered by the Panel included:

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Leighton Middle School is one of four middle schools in the town of Leighton Buzzard/Linslade. The school has a published admission number of 150, which means that there are 150 places available per year group. The School agreed to allocate up to 155 for the Year 5 intake and there are currently 155 students on roll in Year 5.

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Leighton Middle School is a community school, which means the Council is the admission authority for the school.

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The catchment school(s) for C’s home address is Leighton Middle School. The application was received by the School Admissions Team on the 20/06/25. C’s application was processed under criterion 4: Children living in the catchment area.

The straight-line distance between C’s home address and the designated measuring point of Leighton Middle School is 1520.53 metres.

The parent/carer stated the following preference(s) on their application:

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1st preference: Leighton Middle School.

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2nd preference: Brooklands School.

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3rd preference: Linslade School.

C could not be offered any of the preferred schools and was allocated a place at Gilbert Inglefield Academy as this was the next nearest school with places available in the required year group.

Stage 1 Decision

The Panel evaluated the case put by the Admission Authority in relation to your appeal very carefully. The Panel were satisfied that the admission arrangements complied with the mandatory requirements of the School Admission Code and Part 3 of the SSFA 1998.

However, the Panel found that the Admission Authority had not proven that prejudice would result from allowing an additional child to attend the school for the following reasons:

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The Panel took into consideration that it had been verbally stated that every year the school lose pupils from year 5 and have a lower number starting in year 6. The school were confident that they would be down to 150 PAN by the start of year 6.

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The Panel noted that none of the other year groups at the school were over PAN, and two of them were under PAN. This corresponded with historically losing pupils before year 6.

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The school were over their overall capacity by two pupils, but the Panel found that it was the year 5 cohort that was over their PAN and the Year 5 cohort had a purpose-built block made to the recommended DfE classroom sizes. This enabled the physical space to accommodate the additional pupils and did not impact on the space in the older main part of the school, which was used for year 6 upwards.

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The Panel acknowledged the high SEN requirements but reasoned that these were not dissimilar to other local schools, as there was a rising trend nationally.

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The Panel understood that the schools staffing, and budget has been set already, and that the school were an in-year deficit but determined that an additional classroom or teacher would not be required to accommodate an additional child in year 5.

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The Panel concluded that based on the evidence heard, admitting one pupil to Leighton Middle School in year 5 would not greatly impact on the quality of teaching and learning for each pupil and the existing resources at the school.

The Panel found that the Admission Authority had not demonstrated prejudice over and above the fact that the published admission number had already been reached and therefore concluded that the appeal should be upheld at this stage.”

The School Standards and Framework Act 1998 (“SSFA 1998”), Part III sets out the relevant legal framework for admission into maintained schools, together with the School Admissions (Admission Arrangements) (England) Regulations 2012 and the School Admissions (Appeal Arrangements) Regulation 2012.

Pursuant to section 84(1) and (2) of the SFFA 1998, the Secretary of State shall issue a code for school admissions which may impose requirements and guidelines setting out ‘aims, objectives and other matters in relation to the discharge of their functions under this Chapter by local authorities and such governing bodies’. The most recent version of the School Admissions Code [‘the Admissions Code’] was updated in 2021.

Every school has an admissions authority. For the Claimant, this is the local authority (s88(1) of the SSFA 1998). The local authority must decide relevant admissions arrangements, which includes deciding on the criteria to be applied if a school is oversubscribed and relevant admissions arrangements.

Pursuant to section 88D, the admission authority must also decide the number of pupils in each age group that are intended to be admitted to the school in any particular year. This is called the Published Admissions Number or PAN. This number is fixed by reason of relevant prescription of calculation (s88D(3))

Pursuant to section 86(5) of the Act, once this number has been set, the admissions authority must admit students up until this number. Once the number has been reached, the school may refuse admission of a child on the grounds of prejudice to the efficient education or the efficient use of resources of the school.

Pursuant to section 86 of the Act, a local authority is under a mandatory duty to enable the parent of a child as to express a preference as to the school at which he wishes education to be provided for his child and to give reasons for that preference. Parents can express a preference for at least three schools, and an admissions authority does not have to offer admission in one school if the child is admitted to a different school for which a preference has always been expressed.

A school is under a duty to comply with parental preference and admit the child unless: compliance with the preference would prejudice the provision of efficient education or the efficient use of resources.

If a child is refused admission to a school, their parent may appeal by virtue of section 94. The decision of an appeal panel is binding on the local authority and governing body of the school, pursuant to section 95(4) of the Act.

The School Admissions Appeal Code [‘the Appeal Code’] has been issued under section 84 of the Act. This Appeal Code, last revised in September 2022, applies to all admission appeals. As indicated in paragraph 4 of the Code, it imposes mandatory requirements and includes guidelines setting out aims, objectives and other matters in relation to the discharge of functions by bodies including admission authorities and Admission Appeal Panels. The Appeal Code notes that these bodies have a statutory duty to act in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code. The mandatory nature of parts of the Code was emphasised in R (Douania Gassa) v Richmond IAP [2020] EHWC 957 [2020] ELR 479) at §98.

Pursuant to paragraph 2.24 of the Appeal Code, in determining appeals, panels must operate according to the principles of natural justice, including by ensuring that written material and evidence have been seen by all parties.

Pursuant to paragraphs 2.27 and 2.28 of the Appeal Code, the Appeal Panel must communicate the decision of each appeal, including the reason for that decision, in writing to the appellant, the admission authority and the local authority. The Panel must ensure that the decision is easily comprehensible so that the parties can understand the basis on which the decision was made. The decision letter must contain a summary of relevant factors that were raised by the parties and considered by the panel. It must also give clear reasons for the panel’s decision, including how, and why, any issues of fact or law were decided by the panel during the hearing. These are all mandatory requirements under the Appeal Code.

Pursuant to paragraph 2.29, the clerk must ensure that an accurate record is taken of the points raised at the hearing, including the proceedings, attendance, voting and reasons for decisions.

In Section 3, the Appeal Code sets out that the Appeal Panel must follow a what is described in the Appeal Code as a ‘two-stage test’ in determining the appeal. In reality, however, those two overarching stages have other interim stages within them.

At para 3.2, under Stage 1, the Appeal Panel must consider the following matters in relation to each child that is the subject matter of an appeal:

Next, at paragraph 3.3. the Appeal Panel must then decide whether the admission of additional children would prejudice the provision of effective education or the efficient use of resources. Here, a footnote indicates that at this stage the Panel is not required to take into account the characteristics and circumstances of the particular child in question.

At paragraph 3.5 (a), the Appeals Panel must uphold an appeal at this first stage if it finds that the admissions arrangements did not comply with admissions law or had not been correctly and impartially applied, and the child would have been offered a place if the arrangements had complied or had been correctly and impartially applied.

It follows that if the admissions arrangements did not comply with the correct law or were not applied appropriately, an Appeal Panel must arrive at a decision based on the position of a particular child in considering whether that child would have been offered a place if the arrangements had been complied with.

At paragraph 3.5(b), alternatively the Appeals Panel must uphold the appeal at the first stage if it finds that the admission of the children would not prejudice the provision of efficient education or efficient use of resources.

Stage 1 is the gateway to considering Stage 2. Stage 2 will arise if the conditions in paragraph 3.7 are met as follows:

“3.7

The panel must proceed to the second stage where:

a)

it finds that the admission arrangements did comply with admissions law and that they were correctly and impartially applied to the child; or

b)

it finds that the admission arrangements did not comply with admissions law or were not correctly and impartially applied but that, if they had complied and had been correctly and impartially applied, the child would not have been offered a place; and it finds that the admission of additional children would prejudice the provision of efficient education or efficient use of resources.”

At Stage 2, an appeal panel then considers the balancing exercise. At para 3.8, the panel must consider the prejudice to the school balanced against the appellant’s case for the child to be admitted to the school. This balancing exercise involves considering a parent’s reason for wanting admission and their preference for the school, including what the school can offer the child that other schools cannot. If a panel considers that the appellant’s case outweighs the prejudice to the school, it must allow the appeal. When deciding upon prejudice, a panel must be satisfied that there is prejudice over and above the fact that the published admissions number has been reached. The panel must not reassess the capacity of the school. They have to consider the impact on the school of admitting additional children.

Paragraph 3.10 indicates that in conducting this balancing exercise, whilst a panel must take into account the PAN, the admissions authority must be able to demonstrate prejudice over and above the fact that the PAN number has been reached. The panel should not reassess the capacity of the school, but it must consider the impact on the school of admitting additional children. In conducting the balancing exercise, paragraph 3.10 identifies four factors which the panel may wish to consider:

This ground is pleaded in the following manner in the Statement of Facts and Grounds §2(a):

“The Defendant failed to apply the School Admission Appeals Code 2022 (‘the Code’). This is a mandatory Code issued by Parliament and failure to follow the Code is unlawful.”

At §§27-28 of the Statement of Facts and Grounds it is submitted:

“The Defendant was obligated to adhere to the Code, which is issued pursuant to section 84 of the of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998. Paragraph 3.2 of the Code states…Both the letter conveying the Decision and the clerk’s notes demonstrate that the test applied by the Defendant was not that set out in paragraph 3.2 of the Code. Although there is an assertion to this effect in the letter, there is no indication in the clerk’s contemporaneous notes that any consideration was given to whether C’s admission complied with the School Admissions Code and Part 3 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998. There is no indication at all that the Defendant turned its mind to this issue. The consequence of this failure is that the Decision cannot stand”.

In oral submissions, Mr Laird on behalf of the Claimant submitted that the notes of the hearing, including those relating to the deliberations, make no reference to the Appeals Code being considered or applied. The decision letter does not explain how the Panel arrived at its decision in relation to each aspect of paragraphs 3.2 to 3.5 of the Appeals Code. He added that the absence of an accurate note and the failure to provide clear reasons were further breaches of the Appeals Code which made it impossible to identify whether or not the requirements of paragraphs 3.2 to 3.5 of the Appeals Code had been considered.

In response to Ground 1, Mr Hitchens on behalf of the Defendant has submitted that the ground is unarguable.

In written submissions, he argued that the correct test in the Appeals Code was expressly stated and addressed in the decision letter dated 14.10.25. He submitted that paragraph 3.2 of the Appeals Code required consideration of whether the local authority’s admission arrangements as applied to all admissions comply with the Admissions Code, not whether the specific admission in question would comply with the Admissions Code. In oral submissions, he accepted that effect of paragraph 3.2(a) and (b) of the Appeals Code must be to require considering of whether the local authority’s admission arrangements complied with the Admissions Code generally, but also whether they had been correctly and impartially applied in relation to the particular child who was the subject matter of the appeal.

Mr Hitchens submitted that, given there was no issue in the case as to whether the local authority’s admission requirements comply with the Admissions Code generally, it was unsurprising that the Panel had focused on whether those arrangements have been correctly and impartially applied in the case in question. He submitted that the Panel had concluded that they had. However, he was bound to accept that there was no clear articulation of the Panel’s reasoning in relation to paragraphs 3.2 (a) or (b) in its decision letter.

It was accepted that the letter must be read as indicating that the Panel did not proceed to Stage 2 of the Appeals Code, on the basis that it had concluded that the appeal must be upheld under paragraph 3.3 and paragraph 3.5(b), because it had concluded that the admission of the child would not prejudice the provision of efficient education or the efficient use of resources.

The Defendant submits that the Court should conclude that section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 is engaged and that the Court must refuse to grant relief on the application for judicial review on the basis that it is highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred. Mr Hitchens submitted that even if there had been a failure to comply with the Appeals Code, the only effect of that failure to consider whether the arrangements complied with the Admissions Code would have been to deprive C and C’s mother of a further ground upon which they may have succeeded in their appeal.

The Claimant submits that the Defendant reached a number of conclusions about the impact of C’s admission to the school which appear to have been based on evidence that was not addressed at the appeal hearing including: the wider capacity of the school; the PAN numbers across the school; the capacity in Years 5 and 6; the particular demands presented by those with special educational needs; the special educational needs position of other schools in the area. From this, it is submitted that the decision was irrational and unlawful as reliance was placed on evidence of unknown provenance, that the Defendant took into account irrelevant considerations, and that it failed to take into account relevant considerations.

In oral submissions, Mr Laird indicated that the issues which arose under this ground were compounded by the effect of the additional breaches of the Appeals Code in failing to keep an accurate note of the hearing and in failing to keep an accurate note of the hearing; the failure to communicate the decision in a manner that allowed the parties to understand the basis on which the decision was made and how the issues of fact and law were decided by the panel.

The Claimant submits that a public authority must “act reasonably, taking into account relevant considerations and excluding any irrelevant matters”: R (Boskovic) v Chief Constable of Staffordshire [2019] ICR 1315, at §59.

Reliance was placed on CreedNZ v Governor General [1981] 1 NZLR 172. at §182 (approved by House of Lords in Re Findlay [1985] AC 318):

“If, in the statute conferring the discretion there is to be found expressly or by implication matters which the authority exercising the discretion ought to have regard to, then in exercising the discretion it must have regard to those matters…. What has to be emphasised is that it is only when the statute expressly or impliedly identifies considerations required to be taken into account by the authority as a matter of legal obligation that the court holds a decision invalid on the ground not invoked. It is not enough that it is one that may properly be taken into account, nor even that it is one which many people, including the court itself, would have taken into account if they had to make the decision”.

The Claimant submits that the Defendant failed to take into account relevant considerations that had been presented to the Panel by the Head Teacher during the course of the hearing and it took into account irrelevant matters which were not supported by evidence, such as the comparative SEN demands of other schools in the area. As a result, the Claimant submits that the Defendant acted unlawfully, by failing to act reasonably or rationally.

The Defendant submitted that Ground 2 was really a wide-ranging claim for irrationality. It was for the Panel to determine what considerations were relevant or irrelevant to its determination and what weight should be attached to the evidence that it received. It was further submitted that the Panel was entitled to take into account matters within its broader experience of the admissions position generally, such as the SEN demands placed on all schools, regardless of whether evidence had been presented on that issue during the course of the appeal hearing.

The Defendant submitted that the Panel received evidence relating to the current number of pupils and the expected reduction in numbers between year 5 and year 6. The Panel had specifically heard the school’s representations on the extent of its SEN provision and demands and heard directly from the Head Teacher on the question of the school’s SEN demand. It was submitted that the Claimant was incorrect to assert that the Panel did not consider the fact Year 5 was already over PAN as this was expressly referred to in the note of the hearing. Further, the Panel received information from the local authority’s admission’s manager and the school's headteacher about the current number of pupils and the expected reduction in numbers between year 5 and year 6. The Panel then took this into account when assessing prejudice.

The Defendant submitted that if the suggested failure to take into account relevant conditions amounted to a submission that there was a lack of enquiry made by the Panel, for example in relation to the demands presented by pupils with special education needs in other schools, then the Defendant relied upon the principles on the Tameside Duty set out at in Balajigari v SSHD (2019) EWCA Civ 673 at §70 as follows:

Applying these principles, the Defendant submits that it cannot be said that no reasonable authority could have been satisfied without the further enquiries identified by the Claimant.

In considering this application for permission to apply for judicial review, I am required to determine whether or not I am satisfied that there is an arguable ground for judicial review in this case which has a realistic prospect of success.

It is common ground that under the Appeals Code, the Defendant was required to consider whether the admission arrangements complied with the Admission Code and Part 3 of the SSFA 1998. It is also common ground that the Appeals Code establishes mandatory requirements as to how the appeal process should be conducted, recorded and communicated.

The decision letter dated 14 October 2025 indicates that the Panel understood that it was required to consider the matters set out in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 of the Code at the first stage of the appeal determination.

In my judgment, there are clear indications that the mandatory requirements of the Appeals Code were not complied with by the Defendant. The typed notes of the hearing are not complete and cannot be described as an ‘accurate record’. The deliberation note suggests that the Panel may have had regard to information which was not presented in evidence for the parties to consider. The decision letter is not presented in a manner that is easily comprehensible and which allows the parties to understand the basis upon which the decision was made.

The consequence of the decision letter not being easily comprehensible is that it is unclear how the Panel approached its consideration of the Admissions Code. It is a mandatory requirement of the Appeals Code that the Panel followed the framework set out in paragraphs 3.2 to 3.7 at Stage 1 of its decision-making. The decision letter asserts that consideration was given to the features set out in these paragraphs, but the letter does not explain how the Panel arrived at its decision in relation to each step of the Code. Further, the letter suggests that in arriving at its determination at Stage 1, the Panel may have taken into account features particular to the child that would only be relevant in the balancing exercise at Stage 2.

The overall effect is that it is not possible to know whether or how the Panel approached these essential steps in the Appeals Code:

In my judgment, it is arguable that this demonstrates that the Defendant acted unlawfully and there is a realistic prospect of success on this ground.

I have considered the submissions advanced by the Defendant that the claim on this ground should be refused on the basis that it appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred, pursuant to section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. I do not accept this submission.

In my judgment, the submission highlights the absence of clarity in the decision letter. The Defendant submits that the Panel acted lawfully because it applied the Appeals Code as it should have done. However, there is no clear evidence in support of this submission in light of the way that the letter is expressed. It is not clear how the Panel approached the paragraphs of the Appeals Code and what evidence was taken into account at the different steps within Stage 1. If the Panel did not adhere to the Appeals Code, it did not act lawfully. If the conduct complained of had not occurred, and the Panel had considered and applied the Code correctly, it may well have focused its determinations on the matters in issue at Stage 1, without reference to Stage 2 features. In particular, if it had applied the Appeals Code paragraph 3.3 correctly, the Panel’s attention would have been focused solely on evidence relating to the provision of efficient education or the efficient use of resources within the Claimant school and not with any evidence relating to C’s circumstances. This may have led to a different outcome.

In light of my conclusions in relation to Ground 1, I have then considered whether permission should also be granted on Ground 2. I have concluded that it should.

The Claimant relies on the well-established principle that a public authority must act reasonably, by taking in account relevant considerations and excluding any irrelevant matter (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223, 229 per Lord Greene MR; Secretary of State for Education v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014, 1065 per Lord Diplock).

I accept that the weight to be attached to a particular factor is a matter for the public body (Wednesbury; Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759, 764 per Lord Keith, 780 per Lord Hoffmann) and I accept the Defendant’s submissions in relation to the exercise of its discretion.

However, in my judgment, the decision letter does not provide a clear explanation as to what evidence the Panel took into consideration at each stage of the Appeals Code. As I have observed, it appears that when approaching the decision at Stage 1, the Panel may have taken into consideration factors that only apply at the point of the balancing exercise in Stage 2. This alone indicates that the Panel may have taken into account irrelevant considerations in its decision at Stage 1.

Further, there are disputed issues between the parties as to whether there was an evidential basis for the Defendant to arrive at a number of factual conclusions. In this application for permission, I do not need to resolve those disputed issues. I consider that this ground is arguable and has a realistic prospect of success.

The Defendant submits that there has been undue delay in making this claim. Whilst it was accepted in oral submissions that the claim was made within three months of the relevant decision, it was submitted that the Claimant did not start the claim promptly. The Defendant has emphasised the importance of promptitude in a case of this type, involving a child’s education, in circumstances where the Defendant asserts that it has acted lawfully and that the Claimant now acts unlawfully by its failure to comply with the decision that has been made, namely, to admit the child to the Claimant’s school.

The decision letter communicating the outcome of the appeal is dated 14 October 2025. Three days later, on 17 October 2025, the Claimant’s Head Teacher sent the clerk to the Independent Appeal Panel a pre-action protocol letter in her own name. This was a prompt response to the decision.

This letter was not responded to by the Defendant for over three weeks. On 10 October 2025, the Defendant responded asserting that the Head Teacher did not have standing to bring or threaten a judicial review in her own name. Further, the Defendant reminded the Head Teacher that the decision of the panel was final and binding.

On 20 November 2025, solicitors then acting for the Claimant wrote to the Defendant seeking the notes of the hearing and reminding the Defendant of the duty of candour.

A letter before claim was sent by the Claimant on 1 December 2025 inviting a response within 7 days. The Defendant requested further time to respond. The notes of the appeal hearing were disclosed on 9 December 2025 and the Defendant responded to the Pre Action Protocol letter on 10 December 2025. There was then additional correspondence relating to the possibility of mediation in this period.

The claim for judicial review was made on 14 January 2026.

It has been submitted by the Defendant that the claim was brought exactly 3 months after the impugned decision and on the day that the long-stop limitation period expired. It is submitted that if the school wished to challenge the Panel’s decision by way of judicial review, it was incumbent on it to do so promptly.

In oral submissions, Mr Hitchens submitted that the Claimant did not need to wait for receipt of the notes of the hearing before making the claim, given that the basis for any claim was revealed in the decision letter dated 14 October 2025. He referred to the judgment in R v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council, ex parte B, C and K [2000] Ed CR 117, another case concerning school admissions, in which David Pannick KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge at page 120F, recognised the need for judicial review proceedings to be brought as quickly as possible and before the start of a school term.

Mr Hitchens also relied upon R (on the application of BC) v Surrey County Council [2025] EWCA Civ 719, in which the Court observed (§42) that:

“An applicant in judicial review proceedings is not entitled to try and justify his or her delay on the basis that further information was or might be available from the respondent which would improve or affect their grounds of challenge”.

I do not consider that there has been undue delay in bringing this claim. The Claimant sought to engage with the Defendant at a very early stage following the decision being made. The Defendant did not engage in a timely manner in responding to the correspondence sent by the Claimant. Given that the claim arises because of the lack of clarity in the Defendant’s decision letter, it was inevitable that the Claimant would wish to consider whether the notes of the appeal hearing, including notes of the Defendant’s deliberations, provided greater clarity or reasoning before embarking upon a claim for judicial review affecting the position of a child.

In a claim of this type, the need for expedition is paramount, given that it surrounds the educational circumstances of a child. However, I do not consider that the Claimant has acted in a manner that has led to undue delay in bringing this claim.

The Claimant applied for interim relief by way of an injunction to restrain the local authority from exercising the power conferred on it by section 96 of the Act, namely that the local authority has the power to compel the School to admit C pursuant to section 96 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998.

In light of my indication that I would grant permission to the Claimant to apply for judicial review, the Defendant has indicated that it will not now seek to compel the school to admit C, pursuant to section 96. In light of this clear indication, the Claimant did not pursue the application for interim relief.

The date of 10 March 2026 has been identified for the substantive hearing of this matter, with an estimate of 1 day.

I have invited the parties to provide me with proposed directions to arrive at an effective hearing on that date.