Migrants’ Rights Network, R (on the application of) v Secretary Of State for the Home Department

The Migrants’ Rights Network is a charity. By this judicial review claim, filed in February 2025 and subsequently amended with permission, it challenges:

“the defendant’s policy and practice, termed ‘Operation Tornado’ and proceeding through a sequence of ongoing iterations, of an elevated level of immigration raids that, in particular, target: car washes, nail bars and beauty salons (continuing from July 2024); supermarkets/convenience stores and construction sites (continuing from November or December 2024); and restaurants, takeaways and cafés (continuing from January 2025 – announced on 10 February 2025)”.

There is a further application to amend, for which permission has not yet been granted, in which the target of the challenge is described in this way:

“the defendant’s policy and practice, proceeding through a sequence of ongoing iterations and/or operations, of an elevated level of immigration raids that, in particular, target: car washes, nail bars and beauty salons (continuing from July 2024); supermarkets/convenience stores and construction sites (continuing from November or December 2024); restaurants, takeaways and cafés (continuing from January 2025 – announced on 10 February 2025; delivery riders (continuing from 20 July 2025 – announced on 9 August 2025); and fast food drivers (continuing from 28 October 2025)”.

The claimant says that the policy or practice described in the original and amended pleading is a “policy, criterion or practice” or “PCP” for the purposes of s. 19 of the Equality Act 2010 (“the 2010 Act”). It advances two grounds of challenge. Ground 1 is that the policy/practice has an indirectly discriminatory impact on individuals who share the protected characteristics of disability, race (colour) and sex, which the Secretary of State has not shown to be justified, and is therefore contrary to s. 29 of that Act. Ground 2 is that the Secretary of State has not complied with s. 149 of the 2010 Act.

The Secretary of State submits that the pleaded claim has no properly identified target and is in any event not arguable. Insofar as it is directed at the “elevated level” of immigration enforcement, it is not unlawful to devote additional resources to immigration enforcement. Insofar as it is directed at the approach of focussing enforcement on particular business sectors, this too is not unlawful. The targeting of particular sectors reflects the fact that illegal working is more prevalent in some sectors than others.

On 7 July 2025, Lang J adjourned the question of permission to apply for judicial review to be determined after an oral hearing. That hearing took place on 18 November 2025. I am grateful to Duran Seddon KC for the claimant and Lisa Giovannetti KC for the Secretary of State for their clear and helpful oral submissions.

Mr Seddon for the claimant submitted that the target of the claim had been and remained clear. It was the policy and practice of targeting particular business sectors for intensive immigration enforcement raids. This had commenced in July 2024 but was ongoing. The policy was called Operation Tornado initially, but that was just the label given to a more general PCP. The policy remained even if the name had changed.

Mr Seddon drew attention to the first letter sent by the claimant to the Secretary of State on 25 July 2024. This referred to comments by the Secretary of State on 20 July 2024 that 1,000 Home Office staff would be redeployed to work on a new returns and enforcement programme, that immigration raids would be increased and that nail bars, beauty salons and car washes would be targeted. The claimant’s letter requested internal policy documents, statistics and any equality impact assessment (“EIA”), under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”). The response to this letter, dated 5 November 2024, relied on FOIA exemptions but did not deny that there was a policy of the kind alleged. To the request for an EIA, the Secretary of State responded that she did not hold the documentation sought and added this:

“We are intelligence led and undertake enforcement visits across all employment sectors including the beauty and carwash sectors. We recognise that no two employment sectors are the same. They can have different employment practices, trade and regulatory bodies and partners with an interest.”

When she responded to the letter before claim, on 21 March 2025, the Secretary of State said that her first response may have been misunderstood. There was an Illegal Working Strategy issued by the previous administration in January 2024 (“the Strategy”), with an accompanying EIA dated 1 February 2024.

The Strategy set out an approach based on “the 4Es”: Engage, Encourage, Enable and Enforce. At para. 6.2, this was said:

“While we respond to illegal working irrespective of employment sector, we will assess the threat by sector to deliver focused action plans for priority sectors identified by the intelligence. These plans will reflect our 4E model, setting out our engagement and intelligence collection priorities, our approach to communications activity to encourage compliance, and inform our enforcement response.”

At para. 9.2, the Strategy continues as follows:

“The Windrush scandal highlighted how getting this wrong can have unintended, far reaching and often highly negative consequences. This strategy will be subject to an Equality Impact Assessment which will be reviewed each year. In addition, where appropriate, further assessment of equality impact will take place to cover any campaign, prolonged intensification, or other defined operational activity.”

Thus, what happened in July 2024 was, at the very least, an intensification of this strategy. He pointed to a statement made by the then Home Secretary, writing in The Sun on 20 July 2024, in these terms:

“We have directed Immigration Enforcement to intensify their operations over the summer, with a focus on employers who are fuelling the trade of criminal gangs by exploiting and facilitating illegal working here in the UK—including in car washes and in the beauty sector.”

In July 2024 the Secretary of State announced her new approach as a means of “cracking down” on illegal immigration by “smashing the criminal gangs”, by contrast to what she described as the “gimmick” of the previous administration’s policy of removing illegal migrants to Rwanda. At least in public-facing communications, the Secretary of State was clear that this involved a significant change of approach. Mr Seddon relies on an operational note dated 2 December 2024 and to public announcements on 2 and 23 December 2024 and on 10 February and 30 March 2025. A more recent announcement, on 28 October 2025 refers to the activity over the previous year as the “largest enforcement crackdown on illegal working since records began”.

The focus throughout has been on low-wage, precarious, short-term, flexible working arrangements (sometimes termed the “gig economy”). The expansion of the policy after issue of the claim to cover delivery riders and fast-food drivers is in keeping with this.

As to ground 1, Mr Seddon relies on academic evidence from the US, and on expert evidence which he seeks permission to adduce, to show that:

The policy/practice challenged is a policy, criterion or practice within the meaning of s. 19(1) and (2)(b) because it “puts or would put persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage”. This test is met if the policy/practice itself targets groups of people among whom there is a disproportionate number of persons sharing a protected characteristic and a detriment is inherent in the policy/practice.

Once it is shown that the policy/practice meets the test in s. 19(2)(b), it is for the Secretary of State to show that it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim within s. 19(2)(d). To do this, it would be necessary to take on board and assess the extent of the disadvantage. She has not done this, nor provided the disclosure necessary to enable the court to undertake a proper proportionality analysis. In any event, Mr Seddon relies on evidence that the raids are relatively ineffective.

Under ground 2, Mr Seddon submitted that the policy/practice challenged raises significant equalities issues. The policy materials relied on by the Secretary of State note specifically that enforcement “visits” (i.e. raids) must be authorised by a Chief Immigration Officer “who must be satisfied that an Equality and Community Impact Assessment (ECIA) has been conducted to the appropriate level of detail”, that “all enforcement visits are subject to an Enforcement Planning Assessment” (“EPA”) and that “the EPA also encompasses all issues identified in relation to Equality Act 2010 protected characteristics”.

The January 2024 Strategy and the EIA relating to it also clearly identify the equalities issues which may arise in respect of protected characteristics in the context of enforcement activity. However, all these materials pre-date the policy/practice in issue here (July 2024 onwards) and are wholly unsatisfactory as a means of showing the necessary “due regard” or inquiry.

These materials fail to engage with or assess the forms of disadvantage induced by the raids, which include evidence of detriment contained in published academic (and other) material in the public domain. The Secretary of State’s response to the claimant’s FOIA request make it clear that no EIA was conducted in relation to the July 2024 policy/practice.

Ms Giovannetti for the Secretary of State submits that what happened in July 2024 was indeed an intensification of activity, specifically an intensification of the already extant “Operation Tornado”, but that operation came to an end in November 2024. Insofar as it challenges Operation Tornado, the claim is academic. Insofar as it challenges the general practice of targeting specific sectors by intensified immigration visits, this was all envisaged in the Strategy. That is not the target of the claimant’s challenge—and any such challenge would be well out of time.

Ms Giovannetti opposed the application to amend the grounds to challenge the focus (from 20 July 2025) on delivery drivers and (from October 2025) on fast food drivers. Inadequate notice was given of the application, which is in any event late.

Insofar as the challenge is to the decision (announced in July 2024) to devote more resources to immigration enforcement (using the sectoral approach outlined in the Strategy), Miss Giovannetti submits that it is unarguable. The adoption or implementation of a sectoral approach to immigration enforcement is not unlawfully indirectly discriminatory.

It is not disputed that persons who have a disability may be more adversely affected by an immigration enforcement visit than persons who do not. If information suggests that a person with a disability may be present at an enforcement visit, that is taken into account in planning the visit and in deciding what action will be taken against them (see the overarching Immigration and Enforcement Equalities and Community Impact Assessment, January 2024). But it is plainly justified to undertake enforcement visits notwithstanding the possibility that a person with a disability may be encountered.

As to “migrant communities”, this is not a protected characteristic. If it is being used as a proxy for “non-white”, it is a poor proxy, since migrant communities encompass white as well as non-white communities. Although the proportion of non-white persons in some sectors may be disproportionately high, this is recognised in the January 2024 EIA, but the Secretary of State is entitled to deploy her resources in those sectors in which illegal working is assessed to be particularly prevalent, as that is a proportionate means of immigration control. Any disparate impact by reference to sex is justified for the same reason.

As to ground 2, in any challenge based on an alleged failure to comply with s. 149 of the 2010 Act, it is necessary to identify the “function”. Insofar as it focusses on the approach of targeting immigration enforcement on a sectoral basis, the claim is not arguable because the EIA accompanying the Strategy shows that the Secretary of State did have due regard to the specified equality matters.

The Secretary of State’s guidance document “Enforcement Planning Assessments” has a whole section devoted to equality and community impact assessment, which recognises that there are circumstances in which a further EIA may be required.

Insofar as the claimant focusses on the activity of July 2024 in particular, with respect the claim is academic: the relevant operation has ceased. In any event the relevant operation effectively comprised the periodic intensification of business as usual enforcement activity. If in relation to any particular enforcement visit it were claimed there were particular equalities considerations that would be a matter for consideration of the particular facts, but there are no such facts before the Court in this case.

In any event, the Secretary of State has recently updated the EIA which accompanied the Strategy. The general EIA on Immigration Enforcement has also been updated (in August 2025). These documents show that the Secretary of State has had due regard to the relevant equality considerations

I can deal relatively briefly with the Secretary of State’s objections to the claim as academic. The sectoral approach to immigration enforcement stemmed from the issuing of the Strategy in January 2024. The claimant does not seek to challenge that policy and would be out of time to do so on any view. In my judgment, however, it is arguable that the various press articles relied upon by the claimant from July and August 2024 show that, when the present government came into office, it adopted a new policy/practice of intensifying immigration enforcement visits (or raids) and identified a number of specific sectors, which then became the targets of the already extant Operation Tornado. Insofar as it seeks to challenge this policy—that is to say, the intensification of enforcement activity and the identification of car washes, nail bars and beauty salons as sectoral targets for such enforcement—the claim has a sufficiently defined target.

Subject to the question of arguability, I would also grant the application to amend. It seeks to challenge the identification in July and October 2025 of new sectors. If the decision to identify these sectors as new targets for enforcement activity were arguably unlawful, there would be obvious sense in having the challenge to this decision heard at the same time as the challenge to the initial “intensification” decision in July 2024.

The claimant prays in aid the alleged failure properly to assess the equality impacts of the challenged decisions (ground 2) as a reason why, if an arguable case of indirect discrimination can be made out, permission should be granted so that the question of proportionality can be considered at a substantive hearing (ground 1). I have accordingly started with ground 2.

Before assessing whether there was any arguable failure to comply with the obligations imposed by s. 149 of the 2010 Act, it is important to identify the steps the Secretary of State in fact took to assess the equality impacts of immigration enforcement activity in general.

In around 2020 (oddly, the exact date is not known), the Secretary of State undertook an overarching Immigration Enforcement Equalities and Community Impact Assessment, which made reference to disability, race and sex.

In relation to disability, it pointed out that the Home Office does not collect quantitative data regarding disability, so it was not possible to say how many of those arrested or removed are disabled. It added this:

“Where information suggests that a person with a disability might be present at premises to be visited this is assessed as part of the Enforcement Planning Assessment, (See: General Instructions: Operational Planning). It is not possible to identify all such instances in advance of a visit. Separate guidance provides policy guidance on those encountered or who, when encountered, are considered for detention.”

Reference is then made to two other Home Office policies: “Identifying People at Risk” and “Adults at Risk in Detention”, which deal with how persons with particular disabilities are to be treated in the context of immigration enforcement.

As to race, the document explains:

“There is an inherent risk in IE operations that, although the activity has an intelligence basis, the practical necessity to eliminate individuals unconnected with the enquiry may give rise to the appearance or perception that the investigating officers are profiling particular ethnic or cultural groups or otherwise targeting individuals without a legitimate basis to do so…

Although there is no racial basis to whether a premises or wider location is targeted for an enforcement operation it is likely that certain national groups are more represented in some geographic areas or in certain commercial activities. Visits and operations targeting these areas may reasonably be expected to result in the encounter of a greater proportion of those national groups. On a wider level, the existence of a large population with shared heritage makes it more likely that nationals from that group will feature more prominently among detected offenders and the numbers detected must be seen in the context of the proportion of the population that includes that group.”

As to sex, the proportion of removals who were female was given and attention was drawn to the fact that searches performed by an officer of the opposite gender may be intimidating or culturally unacceptable.

As to indirect discrimination on the ground of race, sex, age, disability, pregnancy and maternity, the document said this:

“The Equality Act 2010 says discrimination can be justified if it can be demonstrated that the action or policy is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. In this case, the intended action can be objectively justified. The operation seeks to achieve a legitimate aim, namely, the enforcement of immigration laws. The action to be taken is proportionate, namely to effect the arrest of and commence removal of those found to be in breach of immigration laws. Care will be taken to ensure that all people encountered will be dealt with respectfully by trained officers. We are satisfied, therefore, that the anticipated indirect discrimination is lawful.

Can the potential discrimination be avoided?

No. Targets are selected because they are believed to have breached immigration laws. They have, therefore, been selected for reasons entirely unconnected with the protected characteristics.”

The Immigration enforcement EIA was updated on 6 August 2025.

In addition, there is detailed guidance on Enforcement Planning Assessments. The current version was published in May 2024. It indicates when an Equality and Community Impact Assessment is required, including when “the visit, operation or other activity presents a significant equalities risk or community impact that requires detailed assessment above and beyond the scope of existing protocols contained in IE general instructions and other operating protocols”, when “a programme of operations or activities is planned that has a disproportionate effect on community groups or locations” and when there is “a proposed policy change: a major policy change or initiative is planned that presents a material change to published policy and practice”.

Separately, on 1 February 2024, an EIA was issued in relation to the Strategy. In relation to disability, it noted:

“7.

There is no anticipated correlation between disability status and undertaking illegal working activity. IE do not request information about a person’s disability status when developing illegal working activity although known information may influence the enforcement teams’ approach to that activity.

8.

Any indirect impact based on this protected characteristic is justified as being proportionate to maintain the integrity of the immigration control with any operational activity resulting from the strategy being appropriately considered against the requirements of the Immigration Rules.”

In relation to race, it said this:

“19.

Indirect Discrimination – There is potential for indirect discrimination based on a person’s nationality. Certain nationalities have been more associated with some employment sectors more than others.

20.

Any such differential impact based on race is indirect and is justified as being proportionate to maintain the integrity of the immigration control with any operational activity resulting from the Illegal Working Strategy being appropriately considered against the requirements of the Immigration Rules. Our illegal working activity is undertaken irrespective of employment sector. However, employment sectors have different employment models and practices, trade and regulatory bodies and partners with an interest. They will also be faced with varying labour market changes and pressures. As such we will assess the threat by sector to develop and deliver focused action plans. These plans will; direct our engagement activity with partners (including law enforcement partners, regulatory and governing bodies, employer groups and employers); encouraging and enabling compliance (through educations and provision of simple tool that enable employer and workers to establish a right to work); and our approach to enforcement activity.”

In relation to sex, it said this:

“25.

Indirect Discrimination – There is potential for indirect discrimination based on a person’s sex. Certain sexes can be more prevalent in some sectors and job roles than others.

26.

Any indirect discrimination based on this protected status is justified as being proportionate to maintain the integrity of the immigration control with any operational activity resulting from the Illegal Working Strategy being appropriately considered against the requirements of the Immigration Rules.”

An updated version of this EIA was issued on 13 November 2025.

There is a great deal of case law interpreting s. 149 of the 2010 Act. Mr Seddon referred in oral argument to [27] of the judgment of McCombe LJ in R (Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 1345, [2014] EqLR 60. I have borne in mind the summary set out there and the propositions drawn from later authorities referred to at para. 41 of the claimant’s skeleton argument.

The central submission advanced by Mr Seddon is that the Secretary of State’s own guidance (as set out in [39] above) shows that an Equality and Community Impact Assessment was required for the policy/practice announced in July 2024. It presented “a significant equalities risk or community impact”, had “a disproportionate effect on community groups or locations” and amounted to “a major policy change or initiative”. Yet, the documents show that no such assessment was carried out.

As I have said, I accept that the intensification of enforcement activity and the identification of particular sectors in July 2024 was a policy or practice that can in principle be challenged. Whether it required further separate consideration of equality impacts, however, needs to be considered by reference to the EIAs which had already been undertaken and the extent to which the July 2024 policy/practice heralded a change of approach that was material or potentially material to equality impacts.

The existing EIAs made clear that the Secretary of State did not consider that those targeted by immigration enforcement activity were disproportionately likely to be disabled persons. The claimant does not take issue with this. Taking the claimant’s case at its highest, and even assuming that the US academic materials can be read across to enforcement activity in the UK, these materials show that enforcement activity may have a greater adverse impact on those with certain mental disabilities. The EIA which accompanied the Strategy, however, noted at para. 8 that any disparate impact would be “justified as being proportionate to maintain the integrity of the immigration control”. Furthermore, those planning individual visits were required to take into account any information suggesting that a person with a disability might be present at premises to be visited and make arrangements to deal sensitively with any such persons (as was made clear in the Immigration Enforcement EIA).

The Secretary of State accepted that immigration enforcement in particular sectors may have a disproportionate impact on persons sharing particular nationalities, and on women or men, but concluded that these disparate impacts were “justified as being proportionate to maintain the integrity of the immigration control”. Again, this shows that the impacts on race and sex were considered, but were judged proportionate and acceptable, in advance of the July 2024 intensification.

The intensification involved an increase in the resources allocated to enforcement activity, but did not fundamentally change the nature of the impacts on disabled persons or on those sharing a particular nationality/race or sex. All that happened in July 2024 was that increased resources were allocated to enforcement activity. Although particular sectors were identified, this was done on the same basis as identified in the Strategy, i.e. on the basis of intelligence that these sectors attracted large numbers of persons who did not have the right to work. In those circumstances, I do not consider it arguable that the policy or practice adopted in July 2024, or the focus on new sectors in July and October 2025, raised new equality considerations that called for separate assessment.

For these reasons permission is refused on ground 2.

As to ground 1, there was a dispute about whether the claimant could show that a policy or practice gave rise to a “particular disadvantage” for the purposes of s. 19(2) of the 2010 Act simply by showing that women, or persons of particular nationalities or races were disproportionately represented among the workforce in some of the sectors targeted. The Secretary of State submitted, by reference to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Salvato v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2021] EWCA Civ 1482, [2022] PTSR 366, that this was not enough.

It seems to me likely that the approach in Salvato (an Article 14 ECHR case) applies to claims under s. 19 of the 2010 Act, but I do not need to determine that point, because, even accepting that women or persons of particular nationalities/races were disproportionately represented in some of the sectors identified, the policy or practice announced in July 2024 was in my view justified as proportionate and so was the additional adverse impact of the policy on those suffering from mental disabilities.

I accept that it is for the Secretary of State to justify any disparate impact of her policy, as s. 19(2)(d) makes clear. I also accept that the question whether a policy or practice is proportionate to a legitimate aim is for the court, rather than the Secretary of State, to determine. That does not mean that the court must give no weight to the Secretary of State’s own assessment of the proportionality of her approach. On the contrary, it must still accord “a measure of respect to the balance of rights and rights and interests struck by the primary decision-maker”: see e.g. Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2025] UKSC 30, [2025] 3 WLR 346, [122].

In this field, the court is bound to accord a significant measure of respect to the Secretary of State’s judgment in July 2024 that an intensification of enforcement activity was required in the interests of maintaining the integrity of immigration control and to her earlier conclusion (expressed in the February 2024 EIA accompanying the Strategy) that any adverse impacts of the intelligence-led approach to immigration enforcement on groups defined by reference to disability, race or sex was justified by reference to this aim. That aim was, in my view, a plainly sufficient basis for any discrimination involved in identifying (on the basis of intelligence) sectors prone to illegal working, even if some of these sectors attract disproportionate numbers of women or persons of particular nationalities or races.

Mr Seddon’s reference to what he says are the relatively modest results of the enforcement visits do not, in my judgment, significantly improve his case. As Ms Giovannetti submitted, the fact that not every workplace visit results in identification of illegal working does not demonstrate that such operations are ineffective. One legitimate effect of enforcement visits is to signal to others who may be working illegally that checks are being made. In any event, the figures set out at para. 34(5) of the Amended Statement of Facts and Grounds do not indicate that the enforcement visits are in general ineffective at uncovering illegal working.

In my judgment, even at this early stage, it is sufficiently clear that the Secretary of State will be able to justify the July 2024 intensification and the selection of sectors as proportionate to the legitimate aim of maintaining the integrity of immigration control. The contrary is not realistically arguable.

For these reasons, permission to apply for judicial review is refused.