Geraldine Walker, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Bromley

This is a claim for judicial review by Geraldine Walker. The Defendant is the London Borough of Bromley. In a claim form filed on 23 October 2025 the Claimant said that the decision she sought to have judicially reviewed was ‘the Defendant’s ongoing failure to comply with duties under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996, sections 189A, 193, and 210, and the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, including breach of section 11 of the Children Act 2004 and Article 8 ECHR (right to respect for private and family life).’

Section 3.2 of the claim form said the date of the decision was 5 September 2025. I think the Claimant meant, by that, that there had been an ongoing failure since 5 September 2025 to secure accommodation for her. 5 September 2025 was the date of the Defendant’s letter to the Claimant accepting she was eligible for homeless assistance.

The statement of grounds which accompanied the claim form identified the grounds as follows:

“Ground 1: Breach of statutory duty under s.188 and s.189B Housing Act 1996

• Bromley Council accepted on 5 September 2025 that Ms Walker was eligible, homeless, and in priority need, yet failed to provide interim accommodation or take reasonable steps to secure housing.

These grounds were drafted at a time when the Defendant had not offered the Claimant any accommodation at all. The target of the claim was the Defendant’s failure to offer accommodation.

On the same day that the claim form was filed, the Defendant offered the Claimant accommodation (which I describe below). The Defendant submits that this offer made the claim academic. Before I consider that submission, it is convenient to set out a summary of the factual and procedural background and the legal framework.

On 15 August 2025, the Claimant applied to the Defendant for homelessness assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 (“the Act”). She and her daughter had been living in a private tenancy but the landlady (an elderly lady) had given notice that she wished to sell the property.

The Claimant has several physical and mental health conditions. As this is a judgment which will be available to the public, I will not list them. However, I have considered them. The Claimant’s daughter, currently aged 12, is subject to a child in need plan.

On 4 September 2025, the Defendant assessed the Claimant’s needs.

On 5 September 2025, the Defendant decided that the Claimant was eligible for assistance and that she was homeless, and accepted that it had a duty to take reasonable steps over the following 56 days, to help her to secure accommodation.

On 7 October 2025, the Claimant sent a pre-action protocol letter to the Defendant. This letter complained about the fact that an employee of the Defendant had told the Claimant she would not be offered interim accommodation ‘by Friday’ as she was not going to be homeless ‘by Friday’. The letter asked for a response within 7 days.

The Defendant did not respond in the time requested. On 23 October 2025, the Claimant filed a claim for judicial review and made an application for interim relief.

On the same date, 23 October 2025, the Defendant undertook what it termed ‘a Suitability Checklist’ in respect of a property in Croydon. I will not include the address in this judgment. I will refer to it as “the Croydon flat”. The Croydon flat had two bedrooms and was on the first floor of the building. The form had several questions designed to make the author consider protected characteristics, including disability. However, not all the Claimant’s disabilities were recorded in the form. The Checklist recorded that there was a valid EPC, Gas Safety Certificate, and Electrical Safety Certificate for the Croydon flat. The bathroom and toilet were on the same floor as the bedrooms.

In a letter dated 23 October 2025, the Defendant offered the Croydon flat to the Claimant as temporary accommodation. Croydon is a neighbouring borough to Bromley. The Claimant was given until 5pm that day to accept the offer. The Claimant emailed to accept the offer. She attended the Croydon flat before the deadline and met a property manager there. The Claimant had concerns about the Croydon flat, which I will discuss below. One problem was that the heating was not on and the flat was cold. The Claimant did not believe that she and her daughter could live in this flat. The Claimant did not take the keys to the Croydon flat.

Correspondence passed between the parties on 23 and 24 October 2025. On 28 October 2025 the Defendant filed and served an Acknowledgment of Service and Summary Grounds.

On 3 November 2025, the Defendant served on the Claimant a letter pursuant to s184 of the Act accepting that the ‘full housing duty’ was owed to her. This letter accepted that she was eligible for assistance, homeless, had a priority need and did not become homeless intentionally. The Croydon flat was still available to the Claimant. However, the Claimant and her daughter did not move there. At this time, they were still in private accommodation but the date when they would be evicted was imminent.

On 4 November 2025 the Claimant served a reply to the Acknowledgment of Service and a witness statement. The Claimant (who was a litigant in person) made no application to amend her claim form or statement of facts and grounds. However, it was clear from her reply and her statement that the Claimant wished to argue that the Croydon flat was not suitable.

On 26 November 2025 Mr Clayton KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, made an order for directions for the Defendant to reply to the Claimant’s witness statement. The judge said that the critical issue was whether the Croydon flat was suitable. He did not explain how that issue connected to the pleaded grounds.

On 2 December 2025 the Claimant was evicted from her private tenancy. She revisited the Croydon flat but the heating was still not working. She had other concerns about the Croydon flat, to which I will return. She refused to move in. She placed her daughter with her father and slept in her car.

On 5 December 2025 the Claimant filed an application for interim relief on the basis that she and her daughter were street homeless. The application claimed that the Defendant had refused to provide emergency accommodation ‘despite confirmed lack of heating and hot water at the only property offered’ and asserted an ‘immediate safeguarding risk to a child’.

On the very same day (5 December 2025), Mr Richard Eglinton, the Defendant’s Housing Management Team Manager, attended the Croydon flat and checked the boiler system. His evidence is that at the time of his arrival, the boiler was switched on and in working order, and there were no fault codes visible on the display. The hot tap was working, all the radiators were tested and were warm at the time of inspection. There was a valid Gas Safety Certificate and EICR. He observed a problem with the toilet handle, which he arranged to be fixed. He supplied an additional carbon monoxide monitor.

In a letter dated 5 December 2025, the Defendant made an offer of the Croydon flat to the Claimant pursuant to s193 of the Act. The letter gave the Claimant 21 days in which to request a review of the suitability of the Croydon flat in accordance with s202 of the Act. The Claimant has not, to date, applied for such a review.

On 12 December 2025, Ms Alegre sitting as a Judge of the High Court granted permission to apply for judicial review on all grounds, and ordered that interim accommodation be provided within 48 hours of the Order pursuant to s188(1) of the Act pending the final determination of the claim. In the brief reasons for granting the order she referred to the Claimant’s witness statement but not to any statement from the Defendant.

The Defendant had filed a witness statement that same day, 12 December 2025, from Richard Eglinton. This statement explained what Mr Eglinton saw when he visited the Croydon flat on 5 December – i.e. that the heating and hot water were working. It seems likely that Ms Alegre did not have that statement before her when she granted interim relief.

As a result of the grant of interim relief, the Claimant and her daughter have been accommodated by the Defendant in a hotel – the room has its own cooking facilities, and a private toilet and bathroom. It is within walking distance of the daughter’s school.

On 15 December 2025, the Defendant applied (i) to discharge or vary the interim relief order on the grounds that it was made on the wrong basis and without consideration of the Defendant’s evidence dated 12 December 2025, (ii) to dismiss the claim for judicial review on the basis that it had become academic, and (iii) costs.

On 16 January 2026 the Defendant filed and served Detailed Grounds of Resistance.

On or about 19 January 2026, the Claimant filed and served a Skeleton Argument. On 27 January 2026 the Defendant filed and served a skeleton argument. On 28 January 2026 the Claimant filed and served a reply to that skeleton argument.

Part 7 of the Act provides for the functions of a local housing authority in relation to homelessness.

S.188 of the Act provides for an interim duty to accommodate in case of apparent priority need. It provides, in material part, as follows:

“188.

— Interim duty to accommodate in case of apparent priority need.

(1)

If the local housing authority have reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless, eligible for assistance and have a priority need, they must secure that accommodation is available for the applicant's occupation.

…

(1ZB)

In any other case, the duty under subsection (1) comes to an end upon the later of—

…

(b)

the authority notifying the applicant of their decision as to what other duty (if any) they owe to the applicant under the following provisions of this Part upon the duty under section 189B(2) coming to an end...”

Section 189 of the Act defines persons with a priority need for accommodation. They include a person with whom dependent children reside.

Section 189A imposes a duty to make an assessment where someone is homeless and eligible for assistance.

Section 189B provides:

“189B Initial duty owed to all eligible persons who are homeless

(1)

This section applies where the local housing authority are satisfied that an applicant is—

(a)

homeless, and

(b)

eligible for assistance.

(2)

Unless the authority refer the application to another local housing authority in England (see section 198(A1)), the authority must take reasonable steps to help the applicant to secure that suitable accommodation becomes available for the applicant's occupation for at least—

(a)

6 months, or

(b)

such longer period not exceeding 12 months as may be prescribed…”

Section 193 of the Act provides:

“193 Duty to persons with priority need who are not homeless intentionally.

(1)

This section applies where—

(a)

the local housing authority—

(i)

are satisfied that an applicant is homeless and eligible for assistance, and

(ii)

are not satisfied that the applicant became homeless intentionally,

(b)

the authority are also satisfied that the applicant has a priority need, and

(c)

the authority's duty to the applicant under section 189B(2) has come to an end.

(2)

Unless the authority refer the application to another local housing authority (see section 198), they shall secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant.

(3)

The authority are subject to the duty under this section until it ceases by virtue of any of the following provisions of this section.

…

(5)

The local housing authority shall cease to be subject to the duty under this section if—

(a)

the applicant, having been informed by the authority of the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance and of the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, refuses an offer of accommodation which the authority are satisfied is suitable for the applicant,

(b)

that offer of accommodation is not an offer of accommodation under Part 6 or a private rented sector offer, and

(c)

the authority notify the applicant that they regard themselves as ceasing to be subject to the duty under this section…”

An applicant has the right to a review of certain decisions taken by the authority, including any decision as to the suitability of accommodation offered to them in discharge of the duty under s189B to 193C and s195 of the Act: s202(1)(f) of the Act. An applicant who is dissatisfied with a review decision may appeal to the county court on any point of law arising from it: s204(1). This gives the county court, in substance, the same jurisdiction which the Administrative Court would have in a claim for judicial review: Begum (Nipa) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2000] 1 WLR 306, approved in Begum (Runa) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2003] A.C. 430 at 439G.

The Claimant appeared in person, although she was accompanied by someone who helped her. She presented her arguments succinctly and with courtesy, clarity and dignity. Reasonable adjustments were made to accommodate her health needs, including a few short breaks.

At the start, the Claimant explained her health conditions. She read out pre-prepared opening submissions.

The Claimant referred to there having been prolonged ‘gatekeeping’ by the Defendant. She approached the Defendant as early as June, as she knew then that the landlady wanted to sell the property. The Defendant made her wait for a possession order and then made her wait again.

She said that the offer of accommodation which the Defendant made was the product of an unlawful decision-making process. The Defendant failed to identify a particular medical need she had. The property was not fit for purpose as it had no heating or hot water. The suitability checklist was conducted in only 69 minutes.

She identified various problems with the Croydon flat:

I asked the Claimant if she had asked for a review under s.202 of the Act of the suitability of the Croydon flat. She did not at first answer that question but explained, instead, how little time she was given to decide whether to accept the Croydon flat and what the problems with it were. I asked the same question again and she said that she had not applied for a review because she had not taken up the property. Later, she explained that the s.202 review process would take too long. She did not know what the time frame would be. Her experience with waiting for the Defendant before led her to believe it could be months.

Mr Feldman, counsel for the Defendant, took me through the chronology. He explained that the Croydon flat still remains open. He said the Defendant had used a huge amount of resources providing the Claimant with hotel accommodation.

Mr Feldman said that the Claimant had not sought a review, under s.202 of the Act, and would now be out of time to do so but there is a discretion to extend time. He said he could not give assurances and it would have to go through the usual channels. The Claimant would need to request a review and seek an extension of time in which to do so. There is a general discretion under s.202 to extend the time but there needs to be good reason. He explained that the Defendant contracts out such reviews to the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. He said the guidance says they should be done within 8 weeks.

Mr Feldman submitted that one of the purposes behind the Act was to take this very issue, of suitability of accommodation, out of the High Court and into the county court jurisdiction. The scheme indicates that the first port of call is to seek a review. If the review decision is unfavourable, there can be an appeal. He referred me to paragraphs 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 of the Administrative Court Guide.

I asked Mr Feldman for an authority where this court had refused judicial review on the basis of an alternative remedy. After the short adjournment, he returned with such an authority – R (AB) v Westminster City Council [2024] EWHC 266 (Admin) at [41]-[43]. In that judgment, Mr Squires KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) considered a claim for judicial review in which one of the grounds was a challenge to the suitability of the accommodation provided by the defendant local authority. Mr Squires KC declined to determine that challenge for various reasons, including the fact that it had not been properly pleaded and the fact that there was an adequate alternative remedy under ss.202 and 204 of the Act. Mr Squires said, at [42]: ‘As well as being the remedy Parliament has directed, that is significantly more likely to lead to the matter being resolved, or at least for any dispute to crystallise properly’. He explained that s.202 review followed a detailed process and even if the claimant was unsuccessful in that review, there would be reasoning which could form the basis of an appeal and the county court would be much better placed than this court to determine the lawfulness of the assessment of suitability.

Mr Feldman made clear that his primary case is that I should not determine suitability. However, he also explained the Defendant’s position on the issues raised by the Claimant as to the suitability of the property. He referred to the statement of Mr Eglinton, the last witness to visit the Croydon flat, who referred to the heating working and explained that the minor issue with the toilet was fixed etc.

In reply, the Claimant made submissions on when s.202 of the Act would not be an adequate alternative remedy: i.e. ‘not to cure historic breaches or compensate for periods of homelessness’; ‘it cannot erase a failure to comply with 188’; and ‘where the complaint is about gatekeeping, the correct forum is the High Court.’

I thought that the Claimant was reading from a textbook when she made these submissions. I asked which textbook she was referring to and she told me it was Chapter 18.4-18.55 of the 6th Edition of Housing Allocation and Homelessness Law and Practice, by HHJ Luba. She helpfully provided me with a copy of Chapters 16, 18 and 19 of that textbook.

It appears that the Claimant was not, in fact, reading from that textbook – her submissions were not contained or reflected in that chapter. On the contrary, 18.20 of that textbook said s.202(1)(f) review was ‘the remedy’ for a decision under s.193(2) that accommodation was suitable. Paragraph 18.195 gave this advice: ‘Given the serious consequences which may follow if an offer is refused but is later upheld as ‘suitable’, accepting the offer while also requesting a review of the decision that the accommodation offered was suitable must normally be the advisable course of action.’ Paragraph 19.346 has a section about when judicial review may be a ‘substitute’ for county court appeal. The summary was that, where an appeal was available, it was ‘only in really exceptional circumstances’ that the Administrative Court would give permission for a judicial review claim to be brought^. It was said that ‘missing the 21-day deadline for the county court appeal was not generally an exceptional circumstance.’ The textbook said there were no recent cases seeking to bring a judicial review claim where the HA 1996, s 204 or H(W)A 2014, s 88, appeal is available. However, it noted that the Administrative Court has a residual discretion to enter a claim for judicial review notwithstanding the existence of alternative remediesand cited one example where that had been done - R (Sambotin) v Brent London Borough Council [2017] EWHC 1190 (Admin), [2017] HLR 31, Admin Ct per Sir Wyn Williams (sitting as a High Court judge) at [16]–[20].

In my judgment, it is appropriate to focus on the substantive claim, rather than the Defendant’s application to discharge the order for interim relief. No doubt the Defendant hoped that that application might be heard very expeditiously, before the substantive hearing. It has not happened that way – both the application to discharge the order for interim relief and the substantive hearing of the claim have come before me at the same time. In those circumstances, the application to discharge the order for interim relief does not serve any purpose – the order for interim relief will, in any event, lapse when I hand down my judgment on the substantive claim.

I begin with the Claimant’s pleaded claim, which is set out in a statement of facts and grounds which accompanied the claim form. I acknowledge the Claimant is a litigant in person but, even so, there must be procedural rigour in litigation. Defendants are entitled to know what case they have to meet – the grounds of claim must be set out in the claim form or in a statement of grounds accompanying the claim form (see CPR PD54, para. 4.2). Legal certainty and the interests of justice require me to focus on the pleaded grounds (see R (Bibi) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 622).

The pleaded grounds challenge what were described in the claim form as ‘ongoing failures’ to secure accommodation. The grounds focus on two statutory provisions which impose a duty on housing authorities to ‘secure that accommodation is available’. The first is s.188 of the Act which imposes an interim duty to ‘secure that accommodation is available’ pending a s.189B decision. The second is s.189B which imposes a duty to ‘secure that suitable accommodation is available for occupation’ for at least 6 months to eligible persons who are homeless.

The pleaded claim is academic. The grounds of claim were drafted on the basis that the Defendant had not offered any accommodation (suitable or otherwise). On the very day when the claim was filed, the Defendant offered accommodation to the Claimant (the Croydon flat), at that stage on an interim basis. Matters moved on yet further when, by letter of 3 November 2025, the Defendant accepted the ‘full housing duty’ under s.193 of the Act. By letter of 5 December 2025 the Defendant offered the Croydon flat again, this time pursuant to that s.193 duty.

It follows that the complaints set out in the statement of facts and grounds are historic. They have been overtaken by events. The duties relied on (the s.188 and s.189B duties) lapsed when the Defendant accepted a full housing duty.

That is not, in itself, determinative. This court has a discretion to hear academic claims. However, that is a discretion to be exercised with caution – the court should not determine academic matters unless there was a good reason in the public interest for doing so (see R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Salem [1999] 1 A.C. 450 at 456G-457B). In my judgment, there is no such reason for doing so in this case.

The Claimant argues that the claim is not ‘entirely’ academic and/or that I should resolve it for three reasons: (a) there is a live dispute about whether the Croydon flat is suitable, (b) the relief sought is not limited to a ‘roof today’, and (c) the dispute raises recurring public-law issues.

In my judgment, none of these matters is a reason to adjudicate upon the pleaded claim.

First, although there is, in one sense, a ‘live’ dispute about whether the Croydon flat is suitable (which I will address below) that dispute is not part of the pleaded claim. The pleaded claim makes no mention of the Croydon flat.

Secondly, it is true that the Claimant has sought more than just a mandatory order that the Defendant provide a roof over her head. She has sought a declaration too. However, a declaration as to the situation on 23 October 2025 (when the claim was filed) would make no practical difference to the parties now. Applying the principles in Salem, this court should not generally determine claims where the only possible relief is a declaration that would make no practical difference to the parties,

Thirdly, the dispute does not raise issues of broader principle but is specific to the Claimant’s factual history.

For those reasons, I do not think this is one of those exceptional claims which I should consider even though it is academic.

I turn to the un-pleaded issues. The Claimant’s written submissions (her reply, her skeleton argument etc.) and her oral submissions before me all focussed on the suitability (or, as she would put it, unsuitability) of the Croydon flat. The Claimant does not consider that the Defendant conducted an adequate assessment of her needs or those of her daughter before offering the Croydon flat.

There are two obstacles to my considering such a complaint.

The first is that it is not pleaded in the claim form or statement of grounds and the Claimant has not applied to amend her claim. There would be no prejudice to the Defendant in any such application - counsel for the Defendant fairly accepted that the Defendant is on notice, from the Claimant’s written submissions, that the Claimant takes issue with the suitability of the Croydon flat. However, the Claimant has not applied to amend. Further and in any event, there is an even greater obstacle to my considering this complaint: a reason that would have made me refuse permission to amend if it had been applied for.

The second and even greater obstacle is that there is an adequate alternative remedy to judicial review for this complaint – i.e. an application for review under s.202 of the Act and, if unsuccessful, an appeal to the county court under s.204 of the Act. I have not received detailed submissions on the legislative history of the Act but Mr Feldman’s submissions on the purpose of ss.202 and 204 of the Act appear to have force – it seems likely that, by enacting ss.202 and 204 of the Act, Parliament intended to take away from the High Court complaints such as the Claimant wishes to bring: about the suitability of accommodation offered under s.193 of the Act. Although, this court has a discretion to consider judicial review, even when there is an alternative statutory remedy, it is only in exceptional circumstances that it would be appropriate to exercise that discretion. To allow claims to be heard in the Administrative Court, when Parliament provided for a statutory appeal process to another court, risks undermining the will of Parliament (see R (Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of Britain) v Charity Commission [2016] EWCA Civ 154 at [19]). If this court were to determine a complaint, about the suitability of accommodation offered under s.193 of the Act, that would risk undermining the will of Parliament that such complaints should be determined through the ss. 202 and 204 process. I can see no exceptional circumstances in this case. I agree with Mr Squires KC in R (AB) v Westminster City Council that the s.202 and 204 process is a better process for resolving such complaints than this court. It is also the process which Parliament intended should be used.

I asked the Claimant at the hearing why she did not apply for a review of the suitability of the accommodation under s.202 of the Act. She said that she was concerned that the review would take too long. In my judgment, that is not an exceptional factor which would justify this court considering an issue Parliament intended should be resolved by other means. On the contrary, it is a common factor for anyone in the Claimant’s situation. The guidance expects s.202 reviews to take eight weeks. That is quicker than it normally takes to get a substantive hearing in this court. Of course, the review may not be successful and then it may be necessary to appeal. I heard no evidence or submissions on how long county court appeals take to be heard. However, as a matter of principle, it should be for the county court to ensure they are heard within a reasonable period of time. In my judgment, it would undermine Parliament’s intentions, and risk overburdening this court, if this court were to hear challenges to the suitability of accommodation simply because a claimant is concerned that the s.202 and/or 204 process may take too long.

I understand that the Claimant does not trust the Defendant to conduct a s.202 review fairly or adequately. She has already explained her reasons for considering the Croydon flat to be unsuitable and she does not believe that the Defendant has considered those complaints adequately. However, if the Claimant is unhappy with the outcome of any review she can appeal to the county court. Besides, the Defendant clarified that the review would be conducted by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, not by the Defendant itself.

The Claimant is now out of time to apply for a review under s.202 of the Act. However, Mr Feldman has acknowledged that the Defendant has a discretion to consider such an application out of time. I express the hope that, if the Claimant does now apply for such a review, the Defendant will exercise that discretion. It seems to me that there are issues as to the suitability of the Croydon flat which may not have been properly considered by the Defendant. The suitability checklist did not record all the Claimant’s disabilities. An independent review of the suitability of the Croydon flat by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea may help both parties resolve the issues between them and save time and public money in the long run.

Nonetheless, for the reasons given above the claim falls to be dismissed. The consequence of this is that, on the day when judgment is handed down, the interim relief order will lapse and the Defendant will not be under any obligation to continue to provide the Claimant with the hotel room where she currently lives. Mr Feldman made clear at the hearing that the Croydon flat was still available. I hope that the Claimant will reconsider moving into the Croydon flat, at least while she attempts to pursue a s.202 review. However, ultimately, that is the Claimant’s choice.