Agnes Tolnai v District Court of Debrecen (Hungary)

This is an appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 [“the 2003 Act”] from the decision of District Judge McGarva dated 12 September 2024 ordering that the Appellant be extradited to Hungary to stand trial for an offence of supplying controlled drugs.

The Appellant is a Hungarian national born on 25 April 1980. She is 45 years old. Her return to Hungary is now sought under an arrest warrant issued by the Respondent judicial authority on 17 May 2023 [“the AW”] in accordance with the relevant provisions of the EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement. The AW was certified by the National Crime Agency on 31 August 2023.

Hungary is a category 1 territory for the purposes of the 2003 Act. The AW is an accusation warrant relating to an offence of supply of controlled drugs between January and May 2022. On conviction, the offence carries a sentence of between 5 and 20 years imprisonment.

The Appellant was arrested on 17 January 2024 and appeared at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on the following day. She did not consent to her extradition. She was remanded on conditional bail.

On 20 March 2024 the Ministry of Justice in Hungary wrote via email to the Crown Prosecution Service [“CPS”] enclosing an email dated 13 March 2024 from the Debrecen Regional Court. The Ministry of Justice reported that the Regional Court was to hold a hearing in the criminal proceedings against the Appellant on 16 May 2024. As recorded in the email from the Regional Court, that court was willing to conduct that hearing with the Appellant attending remotely via video conference, at her request. The email of 13 March 2024 stated –

“The authorised defence counsel indicated that the [Appellant] wishes to cooperate with the proceedings and to attend the trial. However, she would not like to travel to Hungary but, with the Court’s consent, to attend the procedural act via Skype, even with the help of the foreign authority that also summoned her to a hearing to May 2024 based on the arrest warrant. It is hereby communicated that, according to the court, there are no obstacles that the [Appellant] be interrogated via Skype after being summoned to the next trial date … on 16th May 2024 .... According to the authorised defence counsel, the [Appellant] wishes to waive her right to be present at the trial after being interrogated.

In the light of the above, for the purpose of conducting the criminal proceedings in due time, it became necessary to clarify in the scope of a request for legal assistance in criminal matters whether the conditions are met regarding the [Appellant], summoned to the foreign court referred to above, be interrogated online via Skype on 16 May 2024 in the preparatory hearing held in the criminal case referred to above by the Debrecen Regional Court”.

In their covering email of 20 March 2024, the Hungarian Ministry of Justice sought the preliminary opinion of the CPS as to whether the forthcoming hearing in the Regional Court could be carried out remotely via video conference.

On 20 March 2024 the Home Office responded to that request –

“Please note that the UK has a declaration under Article 9 of the Second Additional Protocol to the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. In accordance with this declaration the UK will not allow video conferencing to be used for an accused person or suspect at a hearing which is, or forms part, of their trial. We are therefore unable to accept your request”.

Article 9(1) of the Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (ETS No. 182) [“the Protocol”] permits the judicial authorities of a contracting party to request that a witness or expert in the territory of another contracting party give evidence in criminal proceedings being conducted in the requesting party by video conference. Article 9(8) of the Protocol allows contracting parties at their discretion to apply article 9(1) to hearings by video conference involving the accused person or the suspect. Article 9(9) of the Protocol, however, provides –

“Any Contracting State may, at any time, by means of a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, declared that it will not avail itself of the possibility provided in paragraph 8 above of also applying the provisions of this article to hearings by video conference involving the accused person or the suspect”.

On 2 July 2024 the Foreign Secretary made a declaration [“the declaration”] in the following terms –

“In accordance with Article 9, paragraph 9, of the Second Additional Protocol, the Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will not apply the provisions of this article to hearings by video conference involving the accused person or the suspect, where the hearings are, or form part of, the trial of that person. This position applies irrespective of whether or not the hearings involve oral or written evidence from the accused person or the suspect."

On 6 June 2024, the Hungarian Ministry of Justice wrote to the CPS reiterating the willingness of the Debrecen Regional Court to hold a hearing with the Appellant attending via video conference and stating –

“If the above-mentioned possibility is not feasible, and since a consular hearing is impracticable due to Hungarian law, we maintain the extradition request to avoid problems due to the lack of a personal hearing. Also, if the named person wishes to cooperate with the Hungarian court, we recommend that she voluntarily return home for the hearing”.

Prior to the extradition hearing, in his skeleton argument the Appellant’s Counsel very properly drew the District Judge’s attention to the declaration in the context of his submission that the Appellant had established the possibility of the Respondent accepting less coercive measures than her extradition to Hungary. Counsel submitted that the Respondent judicial authority had indicated in writing that they were amenable to the Appellant being permitted to attend hearings in the Debrecen Regional Court remotely by video link. There was a “strong probability” of her doing so, which was “only prevented” by the United Kingdom pursuant to the declaration.

Section 11 of the 2003 Act requires the judge at the extradition hearing to decide whether the requested person’s extradition to the category 1 territory is barred by reasons of certain specified factors. By virtue of subsection 11(5), if the judge decides that question in the negative and the requested person is accused of the commission of the extradition offence but not alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction of it, the judge must proceed under section 21A.

Section 21A of the 2003 Act provides (insofar as relevant to this appeal) –

“(1)

If the judge is required to proceed under this section (by virtue of section 11), the judge must decide both of the following questions in respect of the extradition of the person (“D”) –

..…

(b)

whether the extradition would be disproportionate.

(2)

In deciding whether the extradition would be disproportionate, the judge must take into account the specified matters relating to proportionality (so far as the judge thinks it appropriate to do so); but the judge must not take any other matters into account.

(3)

These are the specified matters relating to proportionality -

(a)

the seriousness of the conduct alleged to constitute the extradition offence;

(b)

the likely penalty that would be imposed if D was found guilty of the extradition offence;

(c)

the possibility of the relevant foreign authorities taking measures that would be less coercive than the extradition of D”.

(8)

In this section “relevant foreign authorities” means the authorities in the territory to which D would be extradited if the extradition went ahead.

At her extradition hearing on 29 August 2024 the Appellant was represented by Counsel. The Appellant gave evidence and was assisted by an interpreter.

The District Judge found there to be no bars to the Appellant’s extradition to Hungary pursuant to the AW. He concluded that her extradition would be compatible with her rights protected under article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights [“the ECHR”]. He found that her extradition would not be disproportionate and so ordered that she be extradited to Hungary pursuant to section 21A(5) of the 2003 Act.

In J[11], the District Judge referred to the email dated 20 March 2024 received from the Hungarian Ministry of Justice stating that the Debrecen Regional Court was willing to conduct the hearing on 16 May 2024 with the Appellant attending remotely via video link. The District Judge addressed the issue of proportionality under section 21A(1)(b) of the 2003 Act in J[23]-[24]. Having referred to the statutory provisions, at J[24] he said –

“In deciding proportionality I am of the view that the offending is serious, it involves supply of class A and class B drugs over a period of months, applying the most generous interpretation of the UK sentencing guideline gives the start point of 18 months’ prison. I have considered the possibility of less coercive measures being taken. The Hungarian court have indicated she can participate by video conference. However, the United Kingdom will not allow her to take part in her trial by such means and therefore less coercive measures are not available. Accordingly having regard to the 3 factors in section 21A Extradition Act 2003 extradition would be proportionate”.

The Appellant lodged a notice of appeal. In her perfected grounds dated 1 October 2024 the Appellant advanced two grounds of appeal –

On 17 February 2025, Morris J granted permission to appeal on ground (2) only. The appeal was listed for hearing on 15 May 2025. However, on 8 May 2025 the hearing of the appeal was adjourned by Turner J, who extended the Appellant’s legal representation to include Leading Counsel. In granting the adjournment, Turner J observed that it would provide the opportunity for the parties to consider the significance of email correspondence received from the Respondent judicial authority dated 7 May 2025.

The appeal was re-listed for substantive hearing on 20 November 2025.

On 12 November 2025 the Appellant’s solicitors emailed this court giving notice of the intention to withdraw the Appellant’s appeal and to provide a draft consent order for consideration by the court. However, on 17 November 2025 the Appellant’s solicitors emailed the court to say that although counsel previously instructed on behalf of the Appellant had withdrawn from the case, new counsel had now been instructed and the Appellant no longer sought to withdraw her appeal. On the same day, the Appellant’s solicitors filed an application notice seeking to vacate the hearing on 20 November 2025.

The application to vacate the hearing was opposed by the Respondent. In the event, the Appellant did not pursue that application with any real force and the substantive hearing of the appeal proceeded before me on 20 November 2025. At the hearing, the Appellant was represented by Mr Ben Joyes of Counsel and the Respondent by Ms Amanda Bostock of Counsel. I am very grateful to them both for their helpful written and oral submissions.

Further information received from the Respondent judicial authority on 8 October 2024 stated that the Debrecen Regional Court had held a preliminary hearing into the Appellant’s case on 10 September 2024, which the Appellant had attended via Skype video conference. The Appellant had denied the charges against her which would now need to go to a further hearing which had been fixed for 7 November 2024, which would be a fact-finding hearing during the course of which the Appellant would be examined and evidence taken.

On 31 October 2024 the Appellant filed an application in the present appeal proceedings seeking permission to rely on fresh evidence in support of her appeal. One of the documents which she sought to admit was a witness statement dated 21 October 2024 and signed by Dr Vincze Tamas, her defence counsel in the criminal proceedings against her in the Debrecen Regional Court. Dr Tamas confirmed that a preliminary video hearing had taken place on 10 September 2024. Dr Tamas said that the Hungarian court had set a further hearing on 7 November 2024. At that hearing the Appellant would be required to provide a detailed statement in response to the criminal charges against her. Dr Tamas stated that the Appellant had been permitted also to attend that forthcoming hearing via video link. Following that hearing, a further hearing would be arranged, at which any evidence would be sought by the responsible judge and further discussed, and any witness statements would be brought before the court. The court’s final judgment would then be given on the charges against the Appellant. The court process could take up to two years to complete, during which time the Appellant would be at liberty and not subject to reporting conditions. Dr Tamas then said –

“[The Appellant] is now required to provide proof of her residence in the UK. Once these documents are provided, the judge in Hungary has agreed to withdraw the warrant. I would expect this process to take 2 - 3 weeks once the documents are provided to the Hungarian court. Once the documents have been provided the Hungarian court will notice the English authorities and I believe the English case will conclude”.

When granting permission to appeal on 17 February 2025, Morris J made the following observations –

“As regards ground (2), it is contended that the District Judge erred in his findings of fact (at [24]) that the UK will not allow the Appellant to participate in the Hungarian proceedings by video and thus erred in finding less coercive measures are not available. The Appellant now seeks to rely on the “fresh evidence” of the fact that a video hearing before the Hungarian court in fact took place on 10 September 2024 (after the hearing before the District Judge) with the Appellant in the UK and further that there was to be a further hearing before the Hungarian court on 7 November 2024 at which the Appellant was to be allowed to attend by video. It appears that the Hungarian court may allow the Appellant to attend the substantive trial by video link. There is also the suggestion in the witness statement of Dr Tamas that the Hungarian judge might withdraw the warrant. In the light of this fresh evidence (if admitted) it is arguable that the District Judge’s finding of fact was wrong and thus his consideration of the balance of factors was in error. On the other hand, it is equally arguable that whatever less coercive measure is available, it does not tip the proportionality balance in favour of the Appellant, taking account of the seriousness of the offence and the likely penalty.

The admissibility of the fresh evidence will be decided at the substantive hearing.

In the meantime, the Appellant should update the Court of relevant developments in the case since 1 November 2024 … and in particular of relevant events in the Hungarian Court”.

On 10 April 2025 the Appellant made a further application to admit fresh evidence in the form of a second signed witness statement of Dr Tamas dated 7 April 2025. Dr Tamas stated that further hearings had now taken place in the Hungarian court on 7 November 2024 and 25 February 2025. The Hungarian court had heard oral evidence and would hear further oral evidence, from the Appellant’s daughter, at a further hearing which had been set to take place on 8 April 2025. Dr Tamas said –

“I do not expect a decision will be made during the hearing on 8th April 2025. I believe the Judge will require time to consider all the evidence, before making a verdict. I would expect a verdict in early summer of this year.

[The Appellant] is entitled to continue attending proceedings via video - this is a legitimate option in Hungary. As she has formally identified herself in proceedings, she is permitted attendance via video, throughout. I have written authority which enables me to represent her in her absence. However, the preference of all parties is that she attend by video. There is presently no intention for this to change. The Court has [the Appellant’s] UK address on record and have sent her relevant correspondence by post.

The Judge in Hungary is not looking to withdraw the warrant at this stage. However, I am entitled to apply for this, at a later stage”.

On 25 April 2025 the Appellant applied to admit a further signed witness statement from Dr Tamas, dated 22 April 2025. In that statement, Dr Tamas confirmed that the hearing set for 8 April 2025 had taken place in the Hungarian court. The Appellant had attended that hearing via video link from her solicitor’s office in London. Her daughter gave oral evidence in person in the Hungarian court. Dr Tamas said –

“The case is now adjourned until 3rd June 2025. During this hearing the Prosecutor will make their closing statement, as will I. The Judge will then make a decision on the day, regarding guilt or acquittal. If [the Appellant] is found guilty, the Judge will have to consider sentence. The sentencing hearing will be on a separate occasion, but [the Appellant] will also be permitted to attend via video. The Judge’s decision at the first instance will be final, unless an appeal is made to the Higher Court”.

On 7 May 2025, the Ministry of Justice in Hungary emailed a further statement from the Debrecen Regional Court which explained the Respondent judicial authority’s current position in relation to the AW. Having referred to the court proceedings that had taken place thus far in relation to the prosecution of the Appellant in the Hungarian court, the Respondent judicial authority said –

“… [T]he Regional Court of Debrecen is of the opinion that the procedural steps taken in the case so far cannot affect the legality, validity and effectiveness of the ongoing extradition procedure against the [Appellant]. In the court's view, the issue of the [AW] was based on the fact that the [Appellant] tried to remove herself from the scope of the ongoing criminal proceedings against her by leaving for an unknown destination abroad and no longer cooperating with the authorities conducting proceedings against her, she refused to take receipt of the official documents and summonses sent to her in a verifiable form, and did not appear at the procedural acts.

Without the issue of an arrest warrant, it would not have been possible to bring the [Appellant] to trial with the assistance of the British authorities, and failing this, the proceedings would still have to be conducted against an absent defendant in an unknown location.

On the basis of the information available, it can be chronologically confirmed that it was only thanks to the assistance and effectiveness of the British authorities acting on the basis of a legally issued arrest warrant that the [Appellant] contacted the Regional Court of Debrecen in Hungary through a lawyer authorised by her relative. It is clear, however, that in the absence of the arrest and the commencement of extradition proceedings by the Westminster Magistrates’ Court, the [Appellant] would have continued to effectively remove herself from the scope of the criminal proceedings and to frustrate the effective conduct of the criminal proceedings by leaving the country for an unknown destination abroad.

… [T]he disproportionality of the extradition of the [Appellant] cannot arise, since in the absence of the initiation of the extradition procedure and the possible outcome thereof, the [Appellant] and her lawyers acting in the extradition procedure would not have ensured their cooperation with the Hungarian authorities joining the hearing by videoconference. However, the only reason to this, as it can be seen, was to be used later for the argument in favour of the withdrawal of the [AW].

However, it is necessary to state that the legal ground for issuing the [AW] was not that the [Appellant] could not have been subjected to procedural measures by means of remote hearing under the Hungarian law, but because in the absence of any coercive measures connected with the extradition procedure and any possible extradition, the [Appellant] would have completely removed herself from the scope of the criminal proceedings, would not have cooperated with the authorities in any way throughout the criminal proceedings, but, aware of the fact that her presence at the procedural steps was mandatory, she effectively sought to avoid it”.

The Respondent judicial authority concluded as follows –

“On the basis of the above, the Regional Court of Debrecen do express the hope, contrary to the arguments of the [Appellant] and her lawyers, that the procedural acts conducted by means of remote hearing in accordance with the Hungarian legislation cannot be connected in any way with the assessment of the extradition request, and in particular cannot have a negative impact on the assessment or delay it”.

It was that email of 7 May 2025 to which Turner J referred in the Order of 8 May 2025 vacating the substantive hearing of the appeal, observing that the adjournment of that hearing from 15 May 2025 to a date after 16 June 2025 would provide the parties with the opportunity to consider the significance of the contents of the email from the Hungarian Ministry of Justice.

On 6 November 2025 the Respondent judicial authority provided further information by email which included the following statement –

“The Debrecen Tribunal Court has issued a guilty verdict against the subject on 18.06.2025 in its decision no. 9.B.332/2023/116. At the moment there is a second instance proceeding pending against her due to an appeal in front of Debrecen Superior Court under the case no. Bf.III.520/2025 and the next session of the judges’ board will take place on 12.02.2026. During the procedure the Debrecen District Court did not withdraw/cancel the European Arrest Warrant and the Tribunal Court has no information about any cancellation of the EAW”.

On 17 November 2025, the Appellant made a further application to admit fresh evidence. That evidence included a further, undated and unsigned witness statement in the name of Dr Tamas, which included the following –

“At the hearing on 18 June 2025, the Judge gave his decision in relation to the case. He found that [the Appellant] was guilty of the alleged offence. He then proceeded to sentence. [The Appellant] was given a sentence of 3 years and 2 months imprisonment. On that date, an application to appeal was made by myself, on behalf of [the Appellant]. The appeal was allowed. The case is now listed for an appeal hearing at the High Court on 12 February 2026. This is an administrative decision in which the Judge will decide whether to uphold the ruling made by the Lower Court. [The Appellant] is not required to be present at the appeal hearing. The decision made by the High Court is final. [The Appellant] is required to engage with her lawyers during this process, or she will forfeit the opportunity to appeal”.

This court’s powers on an appeal against an extradition order are set out in section 27 of the 2003 Act. This court may allow the appeal only on being satisfied of one or other of the conditions stated in subsections (3) and (4) of section 27 –

In her perfected grounds of appeal signed on 1 October 2024, the Appellant’s argument in support of ground (2) is focused on the District Judge’s consideration in J[24] of the possibility of the Respondent judicial authority in Hungary taking less coercive measures than extradition. Reference is made to the District Judge’s reasoning that “The Hungarian Court have indicated that [the Appellant] can participate by videoconference. However, the United Kingdom will not allow her to take part in her trial by such means and therefore less coercive measures are not available”. However, it was submitted, following the extradition hearing the Appellant had taken part in a video hearing with the Respondent judicial authority in relation to the criminal proceedings brought against her in Hungary and had “provided her account in relation to the index offences”. In the light of this, it was contended that less coercive measures than her extradition pursuant to the AW were available and had been shown to be so. This was argued to change the proportionality balance under section 21A(2) and (3) of the 2003 Act in the Appellant’s favour.

In support of the ground of appeal for which the Appellant has permission, Mr Joyes submitted that in the light of developments subsequent to the extradition hearing, it was now beyond question that the Appellant’s attendance at the criminal proceedings against her in Hungary may be secured by less coercive means than her extradition pursuant to the AW. It was no longer necessary for this court to assess the likelihood that the Hungarian judicial authority will pursue less coercive measures, because that is what the Hungarian court has in fact done. The Debrecen Regional Court has permitted the Appellant to attend remotely the criminal proceedings brought against her via a video link from her solicitors’ office in London. That arrangement has been acceptable to the Hungarian judicial authority both in relation to procedural hearings and to the substantive hearings which resulted in her being convicted on 18 June 2025 of the offence specified the AW and sentenced to three years and two months’ imprisonment. The AW is an accusation warrant which was issued for the purpose of securing the Appellant’s attendance at her trial in Hungary. That purpose had now been achieved without the need to enforce the AW. Although the Appellant had now appealed against her conviction, it remained the case that less coercive measures to secure her attendance remotely by video link both existed and have in fact been accepted and pursued by the Respondent judicial authority.

In Miraszewski v Poland [2014] EWHC 4261 (Admin); [2015] 1 WLR 3929 at [31], a Divisional Court (Pitchford LJ and Collins J) said that, subject only to the boundaries set by the factors identified in section 21A(2) and (3) of the 2003 Act, the scope for judgment as to the proportionality of extradition in the given case was –

“….comparatively broad. The judgment will be made against a background of mutual respect between the UK court and the issuing authority…. The court may, depending on its evaluation of factors, conclude that “extradition would be disproportionate” if (i) the conduct is not serious and/or (ii) a custodial penalty is unlikely and/or (iii) less coercive measures to ensure attendance are reasonably available to the requesting state in the circumstances”.

In [40]-[41] the Divisional Court gave the following analysis of section 21A(3)(c) of the 2003 Act –

“40.

… Section 21A(3)(c) is concerned with an examination whether less coercive measures of securing the requested person's attendance in the court of the requesting state may be available and appropriate. His attendance may be needed in pre-trial proceedings that could be conducted through a video link, the telephone or mutual legal assistance. The requested person may undertake to attend on issue of a summons or on bail under the Euro Bail scheme (if and when the scheme is in force) or the judge may be satisfied that the requested person will attend voluntarily and that extradition is not required.

41.

It would be a reasonable assumption in most cases that the requesting state has, pursuant to its obligation under Article 5(3) ECHR, already considered the taking of less coercive measures. I accept the submission made by Mr Summers QC that there is an evidential burden on the requested person to identify less coercive measures that would be appropriate in the circumstances…”.

In Vascenkovs v Latvian Judicial Authority [2023] EWHC 2830 (Admin) at [10], Swift J said –

“The proportionality assessment required is an overall appreciation of a situation rather than an exercise of precise calibration. While information offered by a requesting judicial authority may be considered, the court is under no obligation to request information and such requests will be relatively rare. In most instances a court will apply this proportionality requirement using domestic practice as a measure. Resort to domestic practice is inevitable since even if an English court were to be equipped with information from the requesting judicial authority it would, from the perspective of the principle of mutual recognition, ill-behove it to subject that information to anything approaching penetrating analysis. Moreover, the same principle of mutual recognition requires, so far as this proportionality analysis rests on consideration of domestic practice, the court should allow a significant margin before concluding extradition would be disproportionate, since reaching such a conclusion too readily could call into question the requesting authority's decision to issue the warrant (as a disproportionate use of that court's power). A conclusion that extradition would be disproportionate would not necessarily be at odds with the notion of mutual recognition. For example, it might rest on information not available to the requesting authority when it made its decision to issue the warrant. However, the principle of mutual recognition means that a conclusion that extradition is disproportionate in this sense will be an occurrence more rare than common, likely to arise only in unusual circumstances.

The sole ground of appeal for which the Appellant has permission is founded on the contention that the District Judge fell into error in his assessment of the proportionality of her being extradited to Hungary pursuant to the AW, in accordance with the duty placed upon the District Judge by virtue of section 21A(1)(b) of the 2003 Act.

As was made clear in both Miraszewski and Vascenkovs, section 21A(1)(b) of the 2003 Act required the District Judge to form a broad judgment on the question of proportionality, albeit within the boundaries set by sections 21A(2) and (3).

The AW gives the following particulars of the alleged offence-

“Tolnai Agnes Piroska can be reasonably suspected with that between January and May 2022, several times (once or twice a month), in the Prater utca, City District 8, Budapest, Hungary, received various amounts of cash from Istvak Janos, resident of Polgar, Hungary, and as an exchange, within 10-30 minutes, she handed over various narcotic drug types (speed, cocaine and marijuana) to Istvak Janos who sold the drugs received in the way above mostly to Vigh Vendel, resident of Polgar, Hungary. She acquired the narcotic drugs which she sold to Istvak Janos from a person named “Arpi”. She sold narcotic drugs to Istvak Janos for several hundred thousand Hungarian Forints. Tolnai Agnes Piroska sold 1 gram of speed for HUF 2000 and 1 gram of cocaine for HUF 20,000”.

The District Judge was of the view that the conduct alleged against the Appellant in those stated particulars constituted serious offending. Although Mr Joyes questioned that view, I consider that the District Judge was correct. The conduct alleged against the Appellant is undoubtedly serious offending. It would be considered to be so if committed in the United Kingdom.

The AW stated that the alleged offence, if proven, carries a prison sentence of between five and twenty years’ imprisonment. Comparing the likely outcome following conviction for similar offending in the United Kingdom, the District Judge said that, on the most generous approach, the sentencing guidelines would indicate a starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment. At the time of the extradition hearing before the District Judge, it was clear that the Appellant faced the likely prospect, if convicted, of a significant term of immediate imprisonment. The District Judge was correct in his view that the penalty likely to be imposed in this case gave no grounds to question the proportionality of her extradition.

The District Judge was well aware that the Respondent judicial authority had communicated its willingness to conduct hearings in the criminal proceedings in Hungary against the Appellant by video conference. He had seen and considered the letter from the Debrecen Regional Court of 13 March 2024 which had been enclosed with the email dated 20 March 2024 from the Ministry of Justice in Hungary. As the District Judge made clear in his reasons in J[24], he had the terms of the declaration well in mind when he formed his judgment that less coercive measures than extradition were not available in the Appellant’s case. He concluded that there was no possibility of the Hungarian judicial authority taking measures than would be less coercive than the extradition of the Appellant. That was consistent with the position stated by the Hungarian Ministry of Justice in their letter of 6 June 2024 maintaining the request that the Appellant be extradited.

As is clear from her perfected grounds of appeal, the Appellant’s case on ground (2) is that in the light of events subsequent to the extradition hearing, the District Judge’s conclusion in J[24] has been shown to have been factually wrong. The stated basis for the appeal on ground (2) is the fact that, subsequent to the extradition hearing before the District Judge, the Appellant “had taken part in a video hearing with the Respondent in relation to the index offences and provided her account in relation to the index offences”. It was this subsequent event which, the Appellant argues, establishes that less coercive measures than extradition were in fact available –

“Consequently, it is reasonably arguable that this changes the balance of the proportionality exercise in favour of the [Appellant] such as to warrant her discharge”.

In other words, the Appellant’s appeal on ground (2) proceeds under section 27(4) of the 2003 Act. That was how Morris J understood the Appellant to advance her case under ground (2), as is evident from the reasons he gave on 17 February 2025 for granting her permission to appeal. In seeking permission to appeal, the Appellant did not seek to advance ground (2) on the basis that the District Judge had been in error in taking account of the declaration.

At the time of his decision, Morris J had before him the evidence of Dr Tamas in his witness statement of 21 October 2024, in which Dr Tamas asserted that once the Appellant had provided proof of her residence in the UK “the judge in Hungary has agreed to withdraw the warrant”. Dr Tamas’ assertion, however, has proved to be unfounded. In his witness statement of 7 April 2025, he stated that the Hungarian judge was “not looking to withdraw the warrant at this stage”. The position of the Respondent was recorded in the statement from the Debrecen Regional Court provided on 7 May 2025, by the Ministry of Justice in Hungary. In that statement, the Respondent made it clear that its willingness to allow the Appellant to appear remotely by video link at the criminal proceedings against her was not to be taken as any indication that it was content to rely on that informal arrangement as a less coercive measure and to acquiesce in the withdrawal or discharge of the AW, for the purpose of securing the Appellant’s attendance at her trial. The Respondent judicial authority said that the coercive effect of the AW remained necessary, in order to avoid the situation in which the Appellant “removed herself from the scope of” the criminal proceedings in Hungary and failed to co-operate with the Hungarian judicial authority in relation to those proceedings. That is consistent with the stated position of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice in their letter of 6 June 2024.

Unsurprisingly, on 8 May 2025 Turner J thought it appropriate to offer the opportunity to the parties to consider the significance of the correspondence from the Respondent judicial authority received on 7 May 2025.

In the event, the Appellant subsequently appeared remotely via video link at her trial in Hungary and was convicted and sentenced on 18 June 2025. She has appealed against her conviction. In his witness statement of 22 April 2025, Dr Tamas said that the Hungarian judge’s decision at first instance will be final “unless an appeal is made to the Higher Court”. In providing further information on 6 November 2025 of the outcome of the criminal proceedings in Hungary, the Respondent stated that the Debrecen District Court has not withdrawn the AW.

In my judgment, the evidence before this court does not show that the District Judge was wrong in deciding that extradition of the Appellant pursuant to the AW would not be disproportionate. The AW is an accusation warrant which seeks the return of the Appellant to Hungary to face trial for the offence of which particulars are alleged in the AW. The offending conduct alleged against the Appellant is serious. The penalty likely to be imposed following conviction would be a significant term of immediate imprisonment.

The stated position of the Respondent judicial authority as communicated on 7 May 2025 was that it declined to withdraw the AW. The Appellant has since been convicted at first instance in Hungary of the offence for which her extradition is sought pursuant to the AW. She has received a sentence of three years and two months’ imprisonment. The Appellant has appealed against her conviction to the Debrecen Superior Court. The effect of her having done so is that her conviction is not final. There has been no change in the Respondent’s position, pending the outcome of her appeal against that conviction.

Although the Appellant has been permitted by the Respondent judicial authority to attend hearings in the Debrecen Regional Court by video conference, the United Kingdom has acted throughout these proceedings in accordance with the declaration pursuant to article 9(9) of the Protocol. It has been made clear in its correspondence with the Respondent that it does not sanction an accused person attending hearings by video conference which are, or form part of, their trial. The Respondent’s requests for formal arrangements to be made in the UK for the Appellant to attend and participate in her trial in Hungary remotely via video link have been declined. That being the United Kingdom’s position, the Respondent has maintained their request for the Appellant’s extradition pursuant to the AW.

As the Divisional Court observed at [31] in Miraszewski, the District Judge was required to make his judgment against the background of mutual respect between the UK court and the Respondent judicial authority. The evidence before the court shows that in the light of the declaration, the Respondent maintained the need for the AW in order to secure the Appellant’s participation in those proceedings. The Respondent did so notwithstanding the fact that subsequent to the extradition hearing, the Debrecen Regional Court was willing to allow her to attend her trial by video link from her solicitors’ office in London. It is understandable that the Respondent should maintain that position, given the declared position of the United Kingdom that it will not apply the provisions of article 9 of the Protocol to hearings by video conference forming part of the trial of the requested person on an accusation warrant. It is a position that reflects mutual respect, recognition and understanding between requesting and executing states.

The District Judge cannot be criticised for taking the declaration as an essential element of the context in which he should evaluate the reasonable availability of less coercive measures for the purpose of forming his judgment on proportionality under section 21A(1)(b) of the 2003 Act. In her perfected grounds of appeal, the Appellant did not seek to argue that the District Judge had been wrong to do so. For these reasons, I accept Ms Bostock’s submission that the District Judge’s judgment on the issue of proportionality in J[24] was correct and has not in fact been undermined by subsequent events.

In his written submissions in support of the application to vacate the hearing before me, Mr Joyes said that the withdrawal of previous counsel from the appeal had followed service of the further information by the Respondent on 6 November 2025 and the judgment of Foxton J in Beraru v Romania [2025] EWHC 2770 (Admin) which was handed down on 29 October 2025. I need say no more about the further information provided by the Respondent on 6 November 2025. However, I should briefly address the Appellant’s argument in relation to Beraru.

In Beraru, the requested person also argued that his willingness to participate in his trial remotely from the UK demonstrated that less coercive measures than extradition were available in his case which rendered his extradition disproportionate. Having referred to Miraszewski and Vascenkovs, Foxton J rejected that argument on the facts: see Beraru at [53]-[57]. I have followed essentially the same approach in rejecting ground (2) on the facts of the present case.

In [59]ff. in Beraru, Foxton J briefly addressed a further issue which had been raised before him in argument in relation to the Protocol and the declaration. The question was whether an extradition judge could properly hold that the requirements of proportionality under section 21A of the 2003 Act were not satisfied because the requesting state could conduct the requested person’s criminal proceedings remotely in the UK, notwithstanding that consistently with the declaration, the United Kingdom would never have consented to such a process if asked. At [73] in Beraru, Foxton J expressed the view that an extradition judge could not properly do so, since the “less coercive” alternative referred to in section 21A of the 2003 Act must be one which is compatible with UK sovereignty and policy. At [67], Foxton J said –

“I have a very real difficulty with the suggestion that an extradition court should treat an informal arrangement of this kind which involved the accused participating in a criminal trial in another jurisdiction from the UK on a remote basis and without the sanction of the UK authorities as a less coercive measure for s.21A purposes”.

I respectfully agree.

Mr Joyes submitted, correctly, that Foxton J’s analysis of that question was obiter, given the conclusions stated in [57]-[58] in Beraru. Counsel also argued that Beraru was distinguishable on its facts from the present case. In both his written and oral submissions, Mr Joyes argued that the United Kingdom’s reliance on the declaration to refuse to permit the Appellant to participate in her trial in Hungary by mutual legal assistance was not determinative of the question whether less coercive measures than extradition were available in this case. He said that there were two issues arising from the discussion in [59]ff. in Beraru: firstly, whether it was inconsistent with the state parties’ treaty obligations to conduct proceedings in Hungary which lacked the sanction of mutual legal assistance; and secondly, whether the declaration operates as a diplomatic objection that prevents the court recognising such proceedings in Hungary as a less coercive measure for the purposes of section 21A(1)(b) of the 2003 Act.

Mr Joyes submitted that there is no statutory prohibition on alternative arrangements being offered by a requested person and accepted by a judicial authority in a requesting state. He contended that contrary to Beraru (and Zilinskas v Lithuania [2025] 1068(Admin)) and notwithstanding the declaration, remote trials conducted without mutual legal assistance are not contrary to the Protocol. It was with a view to developing these arguments as the basis for her appeal in relation to the District Judge’s conclusions in J[24] that the Appellant applied on 17 November 2025 for the hearing of her appeal to be postponed.

As I have already explained, the appeal on ground (2) was founded on the contention that the Appellant’s remote participation in the criminal proceedings in Hungary, in the months following the extradition hearing before the District Judge, indicated that the District Judge’s conclusion in J[24] on the possibility of less coercive measures being available was factually wrong. Neither before the District Judge nor in her perfected grounds of appeal did the Appellant seek to argue that informal voluntary arrangements which lack the sanction of mutual legal assistance can properly be regarded as less coercive measures for the purposes of section 21A of the 2003 Act, notwithstanding the Protocol and the clear terms of the United Kingdom’s declaration. In other words, the issues which were briefly considered, obiter, by Foxton J, at [59]ff. in Beraru did not form any part of the Appellant’s case on appeal until 17 November 2025, three days prior to the adjourned hearing of the substantive appeal. Understandably, given the very late stage at which these complex issues were raised only a very few days prior to the hearing of the appeal, Ms Bostock did not feel able to respond to them. I reached the clear view that I should not allow a further adjournment of the substantive hearing at a very late stage, to enable the Appellant to pursue her case – and the Respondent to have a fair opportunity to respond - on a significantly different basis to that which had been pleaded in her perfected grounds upon which she had been granted permission to appeal.

For the reasons I have given, the Appellant has not succeeded in establishing that the District Judge’s conclusion was factually wrong. The United Kingdom has acted in accordance with the declaration in declining to sanction the Appellant’s remote participation in her trial proceedings in Hungary. The Respondent has maintained the request for the Appellant’s extradition, notwithstanding that the Debrecen Regional Court has been willing to proceed with the criminal case against the Appellant on the basis of her voluntary, remote attendance. The Respondent’s consistently stated position has been that it was the coercive effect of the AW which has resulted in the Appellant’s willingness to participate in those proceedings. In the absence of the AW, no other measures have been reasonably available to the Respondent to ensure the Appellant’s attendance at her trial. That explains why, contrary to the suggestion by the Appellant’s defence lawyer which was before Morris J, the Respondent has consistently declined to withdraw the AW.

The offence is a serious one and carries the likelihood of a substantial term of imprisonment. The judgment to be made under section 21A(1)(b) of the 2003 Act is a comparatively broad one. In the present case, the District Judge’s judgment that extradition would not be disproportionate was and remains justified and correct.

In his written submissions filed on behalf of the Appellant on 17 November 2025, Mr Joyes submitted that the extradition proceedings should be stayed as an abuse of process. That submission was advanced in the alternative to the ground of appeal for which the Appellant had been granted permission in relation to the District Judge’s conclusion under section 21A(1)(b) of the 2003 Act. The stated basis for the argument that the extradition proceedings were abusive was that the Appellant was now a finally convicted person subject to an enforceable prison sentence. In summary, the argument was that the AW, as an accusation warrant, had now been overtaken by events in Hungary and, following her conviction and sentence for the offence stated in the AW, was no longer properly enforceable in accordance with its terms.

The short answer to this argument is that on the evidence before this court, the Appellant’s conviction in the Hungarian court on 18 June 2025 is not final. In his witness statement of 22 April 2024, Dr Tamas stated that the judge’s decision at first instance will be final “unless an appeal is made to the Higher Court”. In their subsequent communications on 7 May 2025 and 6 November 2025, the Respondent judicial authority has not contradicted Dr Tamas’ evidence on that point. As the Respondent stated in their email of 6 November 2025, the Appellant had appealed to the Debrecen Superior Court. The AW had not been withdrawn. In the light of this evidence, there is no proper basis upon which to conclude that the Appellant’s conviction on 18 June 2025 was a final conviction. On the contrary, the evidence clearly points to that conviction being at least contingent on the outcome of her pending appeal before the Debrecen Superior Court.

The appeal must be dismissed.