Ryan Halliday, R (on the application of) v The Parole Board for England and Wales

This is a substantive application for judicial review brought by Mr Ryan Halliday (“Mr Halliday”), against the Parole Board for England and Wales (“the Parole Board”). It is against the Parole Board’s decision not to direct his release from custody and the refusal to change that decision on reconsideration. Permission was granted by Her Honour Judge Carmel Wall on 30 December 2025.

Mr Halliday is currently a serving prisoner. He was sentenced on 30 November 2017 to a Discretionary Life Sentence with a minimum term of 8 years and 6 months for three offences of possession of a firearm and ammunition with intent to endanger life. That minimum term expired on 10 March 2025.

On 28 July 2025, the Parole Board reviewed Mr Halliday’s detention by way of oral hearing and declined to direct his release or recommend that he be transferred to open conditions (“the Decision”). On 19 August 2025, Mr Halliday applied for a reconsideration of that decision. The Parole Board issued its decision on reconsideration on 17 September 2025. The original decision was upheld (“the Reconsideration”).

Mr Halliday was represented by counsel Mr Buckley, who provided a very clear and helpful skeleton argument.

The grounds advanced and for which permission was granted are:

As is common in cases where its decisions are challenged, the Parole Board adopts a neutral position and has taken no active part in the proceedings. The Secretary of State for Justice is an interested party as one possible eventual outcome could be that the Parole Board directs that Mr Halliday be moved to an open prison. The Secretary of State has also taken no part in the proceedings.

The Parole Board provided the Decision in writing, and I refer to parts of it as necessary below, but it is appropriate to set out here the Conclusions stated at paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2:

“4.1

Having considered the entirety of the evidence, including the oral evidence heard at the parole hearing and the content of the written dossier, and the written submissions of Mr O’Connor, the panel is not satisfied that Mr Halliday’s risk can be safely managed in the community at this time. In making the decision, the panel placed particular weight on the following:

4.2

His offending includes multiple serious offences committed while on licence dating back to his youth. A significant concern for the panel is that Mr Halliday has demonstrated a poor response to treatment. Mr Halliday completed Identity Matters and following he did not demonstrate application of his learning, and he displayed concerning custodial behaviours, continuing to attract security information linked to risk. His explanations for his behaviour appear to reflect impression management rather than genuine insight. Too many aspects of his risk remain poorly understood, the panel does not consider that has sufficient insight into his risks or his use of violence and the panel considers that he cannot be relied upon to be upon and honest. …”

The Reconsideration

As I have already noted, Mr Halliday’s advisers applied for a reconsideration of the Decision and made representations on his behalf, supported by further representations made by Mr Halliday himself. A written Reconsideration dated 17 September 2025 was issued.

The following paragraphs from the Reconsideration are germane to this application:

“38.

The Applicant submits that the panel were wrong to conclude that he had committed serious offences whilst on licence and shown poor compliance. Having carefully considered the documents in the dossier including the Applicant’s antecedent record, I agree with him that the evidence does not show that he has committed offences whilst on licence and failed to comply with licence conditions.

39.

I have carefully considered whether this should be the basis for reconsideration but cannot conclude that should be the case. The panel’s decision is based on many other more compelling reasons which were not affected by this statement and which even without this statement would justify their decision not to release the Applicant. I am satisfied that none of the mistakes of fact affected the central finding which was a conclusion that the panel was entitled to reach.

40.

It is possible to argue that mistakes in findings of fact made by a decision maker result in the final decision being irrational, but the mistake of fact must be fundamental. The case of E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] QB 1044 sets out the preconditions for such a conclusion: “there must have been mistakes as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter; the fact or evidence must have been “established” in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable; the mistake must have played a material (though not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal’s reasoning.” I am satisfied that in this case the mistake of fact did not play a material or decisive part in the panel’s reasoning.”

Which Decision is to Be Reviewed?

Judicial Review is usually of the most recent decision, in this case, the Reconsideration. Mr Buckley submits that in this case both the Decision and the Reconsideration are inextricably linked and a judicial review of the Reconsideration necessarily involves a judicial review of the Decision. I agree that I need to consider and review both the Decision and the Reconsideration.

When considering a prisoner’s application for release, the Parole Board must consider what is often referred to as the ‘codified public protection test’ contained in section 237A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (as amended). That section provides (so far as relevant here):

“237A Public protection decisions

(1)

This section applies for the purposes of any public protection decision made by a decision-maker about a prisoner under a relevant provision of this Chapter.

(2)

A "public protection decision”, in relation to a prisoner, is a decision as to whether the decision-maker is satisfied that it is not necessary, or no longer necessary, for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined.

(3)

The decision-maker must not be so satisfied unless the decision-maker considers that there is no more than a minimal risk that, were the prisoner no longer confined, the prisoner would commit a further offence the commission of which would cause serious harm.

(4)

In making that assessment, the decision-maker must consider the risk that the prisoner would engage in conduct which would (or, if carried out in any particular part of the United Kingdom, would) constitute an offence specified in Schedule 18B.

(5)

When making a public protection decision about a prisoner, the following matters must be taken into account by the decision-maker—

(a)

the nature and seriousness of the offence in respect of which the relevant sentence was imposed;

(b)

the nature and seriousness of any other offence for which the prisoner has at any time been convicted;

(c)

the conduct of the prisoner while serving the relevant sentence (whether in prison or on licence);

(d)

the risk that the prisoner would commit a further offence (whether or not specified in Schedule 18B) if no longer confined;

(e)

the risk that, if released on licence, the prisoner would fail to comply with one or more licence conditions;

(f)

any evidence of the effectiveness in reducing the risk the prisoner poses to the public of any treatment, education or training the prisoner has received or participated in while serving the relevant sentence;

(g)

any submissions made by or on behalf of the prisoner or the Secretary of State (whether or not on a matter mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (f)).

(6)

When making a public protection decision about a prisoner, the decision-maker must in particular have regard to the protection of any victim of the prisoner.”

Rule 28 of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended) applies to an application to reconsider a decision made by the Parole Board. It is unnecessary to set out that rule in this case.

In order for an appeal by way of judicial review to succeed on the ground of mistake of fact, the four factors identified by Carnwarth LJ (giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal) in E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49 must be present. Carnwarth LJ set out those factors at paragraph 66 of his judgment:

“First, there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter. Secondly, the fact or evidence must have been “established”, in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable. Thirdly, the appellant {or his advisers) must not have been responsible for the mistake. Fourthly, the mistake must have played a material (not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal’s reasoning.”

A little earlier, Owen J had applied essentially the same test in an appeal against a decision of the Parole Board in R (Kitto) v Parole Board [2003] EWHC 2774 (Admin), saying at paragraph 15:

“… I am satisfied that the decision is flawed. It means that in arriving at its conclusion of the balance of risk the Parole Board took account of a risk that did not in fact exist. That would be sufficient for the purposes of this application and must, in my judgment, inevitably lead to the decision of the Parole Board being quashed.”

As explained below, Mr Halliday says that is what the Parole Board did in his case.

As Mr Buckley readily accepts, the hurdle which Mr Halliday must overcome to establish that the Parole Board’s decision in his case was irrational is a very high one. Mr Buckley directed me to the judgment of Saini J in R (Wells) v The Parole Board [2019] EWHC 2710 at paragraphs 30 to 35:

“30.

As is obvious, a rationality challenge in public law is always a substantial challenge for a Claimant; and particularly so, when dealing with a specialist quasi-judicial body which will have developed experience in assessments of risk in an area where caution is required.

31.

A modern approach to the Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 K.B. 223 (CA) test is not to simply ask the crude and unhelpful question: was the decision irrational?

32.

A more nuanced approach in modern public law is to test the decision-maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the Panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied.

33.

I emphasise that this approach is simply another way of applying Lord Greene MR's famous dictum in Wednesbury (at 230: "no reasonable body could have come to [the decision]") but it is preferable in my view to approach the test in more practical and structured terms on the following lines: does the conclusion follow from the evidence or is there an unexplained evidential gap or leap in reasoning which fails to justify the conclusion?

34.

This may in certain respects also be seen as an aspect of the duty to give reasons which engage with the evidence before the decision-maker. An unreasonable decision is also often a decision which fails to provide reasons justifying the conclusion.

35.

I should also emphasise that under the modern context-specific approach to rationality and reasons challenges, the area with which I am concerned (detention and liberty) requires me to adopt an anxious scrutiny of the Decision: see Judicial Review (Sixth Edition), Supperstone, Goudie and Walker at para.8.12.”

That passage was referred to and applied by HHJ Keyser KC (sitting as a High Court Judge) in R (Williams) v Parole Board [2025] EWHC 3183 who added:

“The slight gloss I would, respectfully, place upon it is that the example question in [33] – “does the conclusion follow from the evidence …?” – would be a little strong if it were thought to imply a requirement of entailment. The issue is whether the conclusion was reasonably available to the decision-maker in the light of the evidence.”

I find that slight gloss provided by HHJ Keyser KC helpful and I adopt it in this case.

Mr Buckley submits that in this case, the court should review the decision of the Parole Board with particular care as the principle of “anxious scrutiny” is engaged by reason of Mr Halliday’s liberty being in issue. He relies upon the statement of Coulson LJ in his judgment in R (Browne) v The Parole Board [2018] EWCA Civ 204, at paragraph 54 that “…in cases involving fundamental rights, the reviewing court is required to consider the rationality of the original decision with “the utmost scrutiny”.”

I agree with Mr Buckley that the principle of “utmost scrutiny” applies in this case.

Since in my judgment, conclusions reached in respect of the alleged mistakes of fact by the Parole Board may be relevant to the question of irrationality, I consider that first.

Mr Buckley drew to my attention a number of mistakes which he said could be characterised as mistakes of fact made by the Parole Board in reaching its decision. Some were in my judgment inconsistent statements about the facts than actual mistakes of fact but there were two clear mistakes of fact.

First, in reaching the Decision the Parole Board found and proceeded on the basis that Mr Halliday had committed a serious offence or offences when on licence. That is incorrect. In fact, Mr Halliday has never committed any offences while on licence.

Secondly, in reaching the Decision the Parole Board referred to Mr Halliday’s behaviour in prison and an adjudication that he had misbehaved so that he had displayed concerning custodial behaviour and continued to attract security information linked to risk. It is clear from the Decision as a whole that this is a reference to one or both of the facts that Mr Halliday had been the subject of an adjudication that he had obstructed a prison officer and that there was intelligence from West Yorkshire Police that Mr Halliday had been involved in the distribution of controlled drugs. In fact, Mr Halliday had appealed against that adjudication and his appeal had been allowed. Further, as the Decision itself made clear in its opening paragraphs, there was no police intelligence to support the allegation of involvement in dealing drugs and the Decision recited that the panel placed no weight on those allegations.

Considering these mistakes of fact against the four-part test set out by Saini J in Wells, each was a mistake of fact; each was a fact that had been “established” in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable; and neither Mr Halliday nor his advisers was responsible for them. It is notable that each of these was accepted in the Reconsideration.

The fourth part is slightly less straightforward and contentious in that the Reconsideration stated, in a passage which I have already set out above, that the mistake of fact referred to there as to offences committed while on licence did not play a material part in the panel’s reasoning.

In my judgment, these mistakes of fact did play a material part in the panel’s reasoning. This is not a difficult conclusion to reach because the panel itself set out the matters on which it placed particular weight in paragraph 4.2 of the decision, which I have set out above. Those factors include both the commission of “multiple serious offences while on licence” and “concerning custodial behaviours continuing to attract security information linked to risk.”

That the panel expressly states that they were among the matters upon which it placed particular weight means that it is, in my judgment, beyond doubt that they played a material part in the panel’s reasoning.

Even if the panel had not expressly said so, in my judgment it would have been clear that those matters played a material part in the panel’s reasoning as they are matters that the panel is required to take into account pursuant to section 237A (5) (c), (d) and (e) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The statutory test which the panel was required to apply in reaching its decision mandated that such matters be taken into account and there is no reason to believe that the panel did not do so (indeed, it would have been a separate ground of challenge if it had failed to do so).

Mr Buckley submitted that this case is analogous to R (Kitto) v Parole Board [2003] EWHC 2774 (Admin) referred to above, as like in that case, the panel took account of a risk that did not in fact exist.

I accept Mr Buckley’s submission. In Mr Halliday’s case, in my judgment, the Parole Board took account of risks that did not exist when arriving at its conclusion that (at paragraph 4.3) that: “… there remains more than a minimal risk of Mr Halliday causing serious harm if released The panel is not satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public from serious harm that Mr Halliday is confined, and accordingly makes no direction for release.”

It follows from my conclusion on this ground that the Decision must be quashed.

This ground is now usually (and more accurately in my view) referred to as the unreasonableness principle. It involves a finding that a public authority acted in a way which, on appropriate scrutiny, was not reasonably open to it. This may be because the outcome is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have reached it, or because the route was unreasonable so that there is a demonstrable flaw in the reasoning. This second part is an important part of the principle. It extends to a decision which was reached by a demonstrable flaw in the reasoning, such as placing significant reliance on an irrelevant consideration or where the reasoning involved a serious logical or methodological error, as explained by Carr J in R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2018] EWHC 2094 (Admin) at [98].

Mr Buckley submits that there were a number of features of the panel’s reasoning in this case which were so flawed. First, he points to the factual errors to which I have already referred and the placing by the panel of significant reliance on irrelevant matters.

As I have already noted, it is stated on the face of the Decision that there were among the matters upon which the panel placed “particular weight”. In my judgment, as a result, the panel’s reasoning contained a demonstrable flaw which made it unreasonable or irrational.

Mr Buckley also drew my attention to other features of the Decision, which he says demonstrate a flaw in the reasoning. He pointed out that at paragraph 2.12 of the Decision, the panel do not accept that conclusions reached by Ms Cabera in her psychological report on Mr Halliday for reasons which include that she acknowledged that she had not had sight of security information or intelligence and the additional police intelligence from West Yorkshire police.

However, as I have already observed, at the beginning of the Decision, the panel note that there is no such evidence or intelligence which supports any allegations against Mr Halliday and the panel would therefore place no weight on this information. As Mr Buckley submits, it is illogical and an example of flawed reasoning to criticise the evidence of Ms Cabera and give as a reason for rejecting her conclusion that Mr Halliday could safely be released from custody a matter which the panel itself has concluded is not supported by evidence and to which no weight should be attached.

In my judgment, the Decision demonstrates an unreasonable or irrational process to arrive at its conclusion for this reason too.

Finally, the most recent decision is the Reconsideration. In the passage quoted above, it is stated that whilst it is acknowledged that the Decision contained the mistake of fact as to the commission of offences whilst on licence which I have found to be present, the test in E was not satisfied because the mistake of fact did not play a material part in the panel’s reasoning.

As I have already indicated above, this is clearly incorrect. The panel itself stated that in paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 of the decision that it was a matter upon which the panel placed particular weight. Further, as I have also noted above, it was a matter which the panel was required by section 237A (5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to consider when reaching its conclusion.

In my judgment it follows that the conclusion of the Reconsideration that the Decision should stand and that it contained no error of law and was not irrational was itself an unreasonable one. It was unreasonable as to outcome because the conclusion that the error of fact was not material was directly contrary to what the panel itself stated in the Decision. It is was also unreasonable due to a flaw in its reasoning as it also contained an error of fact. Namely that the mistake of fact which the Reconsideration acknowledged that the panel had made in the form of proceeding on the basis that factual error was not a material part of the panel’s reasoning in reaching its conclusion when it is clear on the face of the Decision itself that it was a material factor.

For these reasons, the decision contained in the Reconsideration must also be quashed.

In his Judicial Review Claim Form (N461), Mr Halliday seeks an order that the Decision is quashed and that his Parole Review is referred back to the Parole Board for a new review, with an order that the new review is carried out by way or oral hearing and is expedited within the Parole Board’s existing framework.

I agree that that Mr Halliday should be granted that relief. For the sake of completeness, the original claim also sought an order for costs, but as the Parole Board adopted a neutral stance on the claim, as Mr Buckley accepted, it would not be appropriate for a costs order to be made against it.