ACN, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

By his claim for judicial review, the Claimant challenges the failure by the Defendant to undertake statistical monitoring in respect of her policies and practices for the allocation of accommodation for asylum seekers with the protected characteristics of sexual orientation and gender reassignment at large sites and in shared rooms in hotels.

The Claimant is a bisexual man from Cameroon from where he fled following persecution on the basis of his sexual orientation. He sought asylum in the UK. He was granted support and housed in a hostel with three other men. On 30 September 2024 he was notified that he would be relocated to accommodation at a large site, Napier Barracks. The Claimant initially brought his claim on four grounds related to the provision of asylum accommodation but he was granted asylum and those grounds became academic. He was never relocated to Napier Barracks. Permission had been refused on all grounds by Choudhury J but at an oral renewal application Foster J gave permission on Ground 3, “the Court accepting that Ground 3 raises a systemic challenge and that there are exceptional reasons for the matter to be permitted to proceed.” Foster J gave leave to the Claimant to amend his statement of facts and grounds but ordered that, “Permission is limited to an amendment to the scope to Ground 3 to extend it from male mass accommodation to accommodation provided for asylum seekers both (i) at large sites and (ii) in shared rooms in hotels.”

Notwithstanding that this is a systemic challenge, to avoid the claim becoming a vehicle for an unstructured inquiry, it is important to be clear as to the case the Defendant has to meet and the Court has to decide. As amended (amendments underlined) Ground 3 reads:

“Ground 3: Breach of the PSED

47.

The Defendant is put to proof that she has had, and continues to have, due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, foster good relations and promote equality of opportunity for asylum seekers in respect of the protected characteristics of sexual orientation and gender reassignment in her allocation of asylum accommodation policies and practices.

48.

There are well-evidenced concerns regarding the wellbeing of LGBTQ+ asylum seekers in asylum accommodation: see, for example, the Women and Equalities Select Committee 2023 report. This is an issue that the Defendant is aware of and must monitor to understand whether LGBTQ+ asylum seekers are being placed at risk by being accommodated in mass all male asylum accommodation/ large accommodation sites and in shared rooms in hotels.

49.

By analogy to DXK, the Defendant must consider whether the suitability criteria in the Allocation of Asylum Accommodation Policy is “sufficient to achieve its s 149(1)(b) objective or whether she needs to change any practice or policy”.

50.

On the evidence disclosed so far by the Defendant, there is none pertaining to any monitoring having been carried at all. The Defendant refers in its EIA Assessments, dating back to 2021, to the need for instances of violence and harassment to be reported but there is no evidence as to whether this data is provided, whether it is monitored, reviewed or whether any steps have been taken in response. As these proceedings are at an early stage, with permission having only recently been granted on 5 June 2025, the Claimant reserves his position as to whether any further amendment is needed depending on the Defendant’s disclosure in line with her duty of candour and cooperation.

51.

As set out in DMA “236 The relevant aspect of the process in the present case is the failure to capture data properly and, using that data, to monitor properly, so that the Secretary of State can know whether she is acting lawfully and in accordance with her duty, and can act immediately if there is a sign that either is not the case.”

52.

In DXK [148] the Court further explained the importance of monitoring: “Moreover, in the absence of statistical data monitoring the SSHD lacks the means of knowing how vulnerable persons are affected by such delays, whether he is discharging his duties towards them or whether the HNPD Policy (and, now, the Vulnerability Log SOP) are operating as intended: above, para 35.”

53.

On the current evidence the Defendant is in breach and continues to act in breach of her duty under section 149 EA 2010.”

The PSED is the Public Sector Equality Duty (”PSED”). The EA is the Equality Act 2010 (”EA 2010”). EIA stands for Equality Impact Assessment. The references to DMA and DXK were respectively to the judgments in R(DMA) v SSHD [2020] EWHC 3416 (Admin), [2021] 1WLR 2374, and R(DXK) v SSHD [2024] EWHC 579 (Admin), [2024] 4WLR 46. No further amendment to Ground 3 has been sought or made.

The agreed issues for the Court to determine are:

“1.

Has the SSHD failed to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, foster good relations and promote equality of opportunity (“the PSED duty”) for asylum seekers with the protected characteristics of sexual orientation and gender reassignment in her allocation of asylum accommodation policies and practices for mass male accommodation, large sites and shared rooms in hotels? Specifically:

(i)

Is this an issue that requires statistical monitoring in order for the SSHD to comply with the PSED?

If so

ii)

Has the SSHD undertaken adequate monitoring?

2.

If the SSHD is found to have breached the PSED duty, and in considering s.31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act, should the Court grant any relief?”

In her opening oral submissions for the Claimant, Ms Braganza KC stated that her case could be summarised by using the headnote of the report of DXK in the Weekly Law Reports, with adaptations to cover the protected characteristics relevant to the present claim, so that it would read:

“The Secretary of State was in breach of the public sector equality duty under section 149(1)(b) of the Equality Act 2010 by the continuing failure to collect and monitor relevant statistical data on the allocation of accommodation to LGBT+ seekers, such monitoring being necessary to ensure the discharge of the Secretary of State’s duties to that vulnerable group.”

The term LGBT+ was used by the Claimant to apply to individuals with the protected characteristics of sexual orientation and/or gender reassignment as defined respectively by ss7 and 12 of the EA 2010. Adopting the Claimant’s approach I shall refer to LGBT+ as a shorthand for individuals with the said protected characteristics.

The terms “statistical monitoring” and “statistical data” were not precisely defined by the Claimant but I proceed on the basis that there is a distinction between (i) the general process of monitoring and (ii) statistical monitoring. Monitoring involves the observation and review of something over a period of time. Statistical monitoring involves, further, the collection and consideration of data. A car driver might monitor the mileage he covers in his car. To an extent he is reviewing data from his dashboard but he is not conducting statistical monitoring. On the other hand, if the Department of Transport collects and reviews data showing the annual mileage driven by all vehicles when using the M1 motorway, it is conducting statistical monitoring. The Claimant’s case is that the SSHD is required to collate and consider statistical data concerning the allocation of accommodation to LGBT+ asylum seekers, not merely to monitor information relevant to individual cases.

In this judgment I address:

The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“IAA 1999”), s95 confers a power on the Defendant to provide support for asylum seekers who appear to her to be destitute or likely to become destitute. By IAA 1999 s96:

“96.

— Ways in which support may be provided.

(1)

Support may be provided under section 95—

(a)

by providing accommodation appearing to the Secretary of State to be adequate for the needs of the supported person and his dependants (if any);”

By IAA 1999 s97:

“97.

— Supplemental.

(1)

When exercising his power under section 95 to provide accommodation, the Secretary of State must have regard to—

(a)

the fact that the accommodation is to be temporary pending determination of the asylum-seeker's claim;

(b)

the desirability, in general, of providing accommodation in areas in which there is a ready supply of accommodation;

and

(c)

such other matters (if any) as may be prescribed.

(2)

But he may not have regard to—

(a)

any preference that the supported person or his dependants (if any) may have as to the locality in which the accommodation is to be provided; or

(b)

such other matters (if any) as may be prescribed.”

By the Asylum Seekers (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2005/7 (“AS(RC) Regs 2005”) r4:

“4.

— Provisions for persons with special needs

(1)

This regulation applies to an asylum seeker or the family member of an asylum seeker who is a vulnerable person.

(2)

When the Secretary of State is providing support or considering whether to provide support under section 95 or 98 of the 1999 Act to an asylum seeker or his family member who is a vulnerable person, he shall take into account the special needs of that asylum seeker or his family member.

(3)

A vulnerable person is–

(a)

a minor;

(b)

a disabled person;

(c)

an elderly person;

(d)

a pregnant woman;

(e)

a lone parent with a minor child; or

(f)

a person who has been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence;

who has had an individual evaluation of his situation that confirms he has special needs.

(4)

Nothing in this regulation obliges the Secretary of State to carry out or arrange for the carrying out of an individual evaluation of a vulnerable person's situation to determine whether he has special needs.”

Hence, the function that the Defendant is performing, as relevant to the present claim, is to provide support to an asylum seeker who appears to the Secretary of State to be destitute or likely to be destitute, by providing accommodation appearing to the Secretary of State to be adequate for the needs of the supported person and their dependants (if any) and, when doing so, the Defendant must take into account the special needs of the asylum seeker or their family member if any of them is a vulnerable person as defined by the AS(RC) Regs 2005.

EA 2010 s149 provides:

“(1)

A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to—

(a)

eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act;

(b)

advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it;

(c)

foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.”

It is convenient to refer to this as the PSED. Sub-sections 149(3) and (5) require a public authority to have due regard to particular matters when having due regard to advance equality of opportunity and to foster good relations.

The Defendant must comply with the PSED when exercising her function to provide accommodation to asylum seekers as set out above.

The Defendant’s policy regarding the allocation of accommodation for asylum seekers is found in the Home Office’s “Allocation of Asylum Accommodation Policy” (“AAA Policy”). The version applicable to the allocation decision in the Claimant’s individual case was Version 12.0 published on 27 March 2024. There is now a Version 13.0 but it was agreed by the parties that it was materially the same as Version 12.0 and it is to Version 12.0 that I should have regard.

The AAA Policy v12.0 begins:

“This guidance advises caseworkers on how to consider requests from people who are receiving asylum support and express particular needs or preferences as to where they are to be accommodated. This could, for example, include a request for accommodation in a particular area. It contains the suitability criteria for accommodating those receiving asylum support at non-detained accommodation sites: this includes ex-Ministry of Defence (MoD) sites (including, but not limited to Scampton and Wethersfield), vessels (including, but not limited to the Bibby Stockholm vessel at Portland Port) and the former barracks at Napier. It also includes guidance for room sharing in all forms of accommodation.”

The AAA Policy sets out some of the fundamental principles at page 5:

“In general, all types of asylum accommodation are suitable for most individuals receiving asylum support, except those with the most serious physical and mental health needs.

The overriding principle when allocating accommodation is that it is offered on a ‘no choice basis’. Accommodation is intended for those who would otherwise be destitute and have no other viable accommodation open to them for example through friends or family.”

Under the heading “Suitability Criteria” the AAA Policy states:

“Suitability criteria

The overriding principle when allocating accommodation is that it is offered on a ‘no choice basis’.

When allocating accommodation to individuals receiving asylum support, the Home Office may take into account the characteristics and status of the individual’s asylum claim, for example whether or not the claim is admissible and / or the stage it has reached within the asylum process. The allocation of accommodation does not impact on the status of the individual’s asylum claim.

Each case should be individually assessed and a decision made about suitability for accommodation based on the individual’s needs.”

The AAA Policy then considers the criteria which may make individuals unsuitable for certain sites or room sharing. The large sites include the Napier Barracks, ex-MOD sites, and vessels. Individuals referred into the National Referral Mechanism (“NRM”) as a potential victim of modern slavery who have received a positive reasonable grounds decision, or cases being dealt with by the Foreign National Offenders – Returns Command - arenot suitable for such sites and/or room sharing. Other individuals who meet certain criteria and provide evidence that they have had an individual evaluation of their situation that confirms they have special needs, may not be suitable for such sites and/or room sharing. These individuals include those who would be defined as vulnerable under the AS(RC) Regs 2005 r4(3), such as those who are disabled as defined by the EA 2010, elderly persons (where room sharing is in question), an individual who has been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence, and those with relevant complex health needs. The policy provides that:

“Each case should be individually assessed and a decision made by caseworkers or Home Office Accommodation Providers about suitability for accommodation based on the individual’s needs as set out in evidence an individual provides.”

Detailed guidance is given within the AAA Policy as to how considerations relevant to the assessment of evidence on evaluation of the special needs of an individual and “all evidence provided” is to be considered. Furthermore:

“Monitoring of suitability is an ongoing process and an individual’s suitability may change over time. There may be circumstances in which new information is identified or provided on an individual’s suitability to be accommodated or remain at an ex-MoD site, vessel or Napier, and/or room sharing. The information may suggest that an individual’s circumstances or needs may make them unsuitable for these sites and/or room sharing. In these circumstances, the case should be reviewed, and suitability reassessed as soon as practicable and in timelines proportionate to the seriousness of the issue raised. Depending on the information raised or provided, alternative accommodation may be allocated.”

The policy then expressly excludes women and children from being considered for accommodation at Napier, ex-MOD accommodation, and in vessels. The policy also specifies that the suitability criteria must be considered to determine whether room sharing is appropriate.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission (“EHRC”) has published Technical Guidance on the PSED. The guidance includes the following:

“5.3

The requirement to have sufficient evidence does not imply that a body subject to the duty needs, in every instance, to have hard statistical data. A relevant body can also use more qualitative sources such as service user feedback. Where a body subject to the duty does not have sufficient information in-house it can also use external sources, for example information available from the Commission; local or national representative groups etc.

5.15

In order to give proper consideration to the aims set out in the general duty, a relevant body will need to have sufficient evidence of the impact its policies and practices are having, or are likely to have, on people with different protected characteristics. Such information is referred to in this guidance as equality evidence.

5.16

The courts have made clear the need to collate relevant information in order to have evidence-based decision making and a body subject to the duty will need to be able to show that it had adequate evidence to enable it to have due regard.

5.17

Adequate and accurate equality evidence, properly understood and analysed, is at the root of effective compliance with the general equality duty. Without it, a body subject to the duty would be unlikely to be able to have due regard to its aims.

5.19

Monitoring the progress of policies and decisions will enable the body subject to the duty to address the continuing nature of the general equality duty. It will need to decide how to review progress proportionately so it is aware of circumstances which could require it to consider reviewing a current policy or decision. For example, equality evidence could show that the community it serves has changed; the context in which the body operates has changed; or that the policy is having a potentially discriminatory effect in practice.”

The legal framework for the provision of accommodation for asylum seekers was succinctly described by Fordham J in R(SA) v SSHD [2023] EWHC 1787 (Admin):

“[5] …. The required Home Office response to an asylum seeker and dependants facing destitution (s.95(1) of the 1999 Act) is the provision of accommodation adequate for their needs (s.96(1)(a)), alongside provision for other essential living needs (s.96(1)(b)). Evaluative judgment is needed, reflected in the language “who appear to the Secretary of State to be destitute” (s.95(1)), “appearing to the Secretary of State to be adequate” (s.96(1)(a)) and “what appear to the Secretary of State to be essential living needs”). Although expressed as a power, the response is a duty, in the case of children (s.122(3)(4)) and more generally (reg.5 of the 2005 Regulations). In discharging the function of providing adequate accommodation, regard must be had to the fact that the accommodation is temporary pending determination of the application for asylum (s.97(1)(a)). Although the duty can be delivered through private third-party contractors – service providers – the statutorily-required adequate accommodation and essential living needs remains the inalienable duty of the Home Secretary who is answerable for its discharge or breach: R (DMA) v SSHD [2020] EWHC 3416 (Admin) [2021] 1 WLR 2374 at §100. The Home Secretary therefore has an important duty to monitor provision of accommodation (see DMA) and it is for the Home Secretary to ensure that individual cases receive the diligent attention that they deserve, if necessary, by ‘putting her foot down’ in relation to private providers (see the interim relief judgment in R (K) v SSHD [2020] EWHC 3639 (Admin) at §35).

6.

In making the required provision, the Home Secretary is duty-bound to take into account the special needs of any asylum seeker who is a pregnant woman, or a lone parent with a minor child, those being among the categories of “vulnerable person” as statutorily defined (reg.4(2)(3)).

7.

The legislation uses the idea of accommodation being “adequate” at two distinct stages (A §52) [R (A) v NASS [2003] EWCA Civ 1473 [2004] 1 WLR 752 (23.10.03, CA)]. The first stage asks whether there is an absence of “adequate” existing accommodation, in testing whether there is destitution (s.95(3)(a), (5), (6)). The second stage requires the provision of “adequate” accommodation as the response to destitution (s.96(1)(a)). The word “adequate” means the same thing at both stages. But the context is important (A §52). It must be the context which prevents the test for “adequate” at the second stage from being: ‘would this accommodation, provided by the Secretary of State, constitute being destitute’. No decided case says that is the second stage test and Ms Brown did not advocate such a test.

8.

There is a twin-track test for deciding whether the Home Secretary’s duty has been discharged. This was well-established in relation to essential living needs (NB §§145-153) [ R (NB) v SSHD [2021] EWHC 1489 (Admin) [2021] 4 WLR 92]. It is now recognised in relation to adequate accommodation (NB §§154-155, 161). This matches “housing” being a “material reception condition” in the foundational EU Directive (NB §154), with its continuing impact (NB §§157-158). Under the twin-track test, a first question is whether the Home Secretary’s response meets an ‘objective minimum standard’, whose delineation is a hard-edged question for the judicial review court. A second question is whether the response involves an evaluative judgment which is reasonable, another objective standard but one involving the familiar secondary judgment, which respects the latitude afforded to the primary decision-maker.”

The key principles of the PSED have been explained in cases such as R(Baker) v Sec of State for Communities and Local Government [2008] EWCA Civ 131 (“Baker”), R(Bracking) v Sec of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 1345 (“Bracking”), Hotak v Southwark London Borough Council [2015] UKSC 30. [2016] AC 811 (“Hotak”), R(Bridges) v Ch Constable of South Wales Police [2020] EWCA Civ 1058, [2020] 1WLR 5037 (“Bridges”) amongst others. The parties are not in dispute about those principles:

In the recent decision in R(RR) v LB of Enfield [2025] EWCA Civ 1390, Lewis LJ held that:

“73.

Section 149 of the 2010 Act imposes a duty on public bodies, often referred to as the public sector equality duty. It is important, however, to consider the terms of section 149 in order to determine the scope or content of that duty. It is an obligation on a public authority (1) “to have due regard” (2) “in the exercise of its functions” (3) to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation or other prohibited conduct, and to advance equality of opportunity, and to foster good relations, between persons who share a protected characteristic and those who do not.

74.

The starting point, therefore, is to identify the particular functions that the public body is exercising. The next step is to assess whether, on the evidence, the authority did have due regard to the specified equality considerations when exercising those functions.

75.

In the present case, the respondent was exercising a function when it adopted its housing allocation scheme. It carried out an equality impact assessment prior to adopting its allocation scheme. There is no suggestion that the allocation scheme is unlawful or that the respondent failed to have due regard to the relevant equality considerations when adopting that scheme.”

Here, there is no challenge to the lawfulness of the accommodation allocation policy. The challenge is that the failure to conduct statistical monitoring is in breach of the Defendant’s duties under the PSED. In contending that the PSED requires statistical monitoring in this case, the Claimant relies heavily on DMA and DXK (both above).

DMA concerned the Secretary of State’s duty under the IAA 1999 s4(2) to provide accommodation to five asylum seekers who were destitute and all of whom were vulnerable, one being severely disabled. The Secretary of State’s guidance stated that accommodation should be provided within a matter of days of the duty to provide it being accepted. It was found that provision of accommodation was not being provided within the timescales set out in the guidance. Robin Knowles J held at para. 238:

“Without proper monitoring the system is without a key means by which to identify and correct failure and to inform change to enable it to meet its purpose, to be found in section 4(2). It is a systemic issue that puts all those entitled to the “safety net” of section 4(2) accommodation at unnecessary risk. In the present case there is evidence of a real risk of a breach of the Secretary of State’s statutory duty in a significant number of cases.”

And at para.239:

“Given the context of (present or imminent) inhuman or degrading treatment, and the real risks involved (of unlawful breach of duty), there is no lawful system that does not capture data properly and, using that data, monitor properly.”

And at paras. 323 to 325:

“In oral argument, Mr Tam said that if one looked at all the evidence, here including the wealth of Parliamentary documentation (cf paras 32—33 above), it is clear that proper regard has been had to the need to eliminate discrimination and to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share the protected characteristic of disability and persons who do not share it. The system was, he argued, capable of working properly and if there are problems they are practical ones arising for various reasons which have created bottlenecks. He argued these problems can be readily detected, even without a formal equality impact assessment.

The difficulty with this argument is that the problems, and their impact on those with a disability, cannot in fact be readily detected because there is no monitoring (including collection of data and evaluation) that would enable that.

As things stand, I have no alternative but to find that the Secretary of State is in breach of the public sector equality duty in failing, once she has reached a decision that she has a duty to accommodate under section 4(2) of the 1999Act, to monitor the provision of that section 4(2) accommodation to individuals who have a disability. In this respect the Secretary of State has not, in the exercise of her functions, had due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share the protected characteristic of disability and persons who do not share it.”

In DXK the court found that the Secretary of State was in breach of the PSED by the continuing failure to collect and monitor relevant statistical data on the allocation of dispersal accommodation to pregnant and new mother asylum seekers (“PNMAS”). The court held that once eligibility for accommodation provision was established, there was a duty to make provision within a reasonable time and that what is “reasonable” is context specific [para. 81]. The court noted that there had been a significant increase in delays in dispersal and the provision of dispersal accommodation (“DA”) and that PNMAS had been disproportionately adversely affected by the delays compared to other asylum seekers. It was held that “given this evidence, and in the light of the judgment of Knowles J in DMA, the SSHD was obliged proactively to consider whether the HNPD [Healthcare Needs and Pregnancy Dispersal] Policy was sufficient to achieve its section 149(1)(b) objective and whether he needs to change any practice or policy …” [para. 150]. Importantly, Mr Bowen KC held at paras. 145 and 146 that:

““Pregnancy and maternity” and “age” are protected characteristics under section 149(7). As the HNPD Policy explicitly acknowledges, PNMAS and their infants have a need for DA that is not shared by, and suffer greater disadvantage as a result of delays in dispersal than, other asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers who do not share either protected characteristic. In order to discharge his duty “to have due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it” under section 149(1)(b) the SSHD needs to have due regard to the need to take steps to meet the differing needs of PNMAS for DA (section 149(3)(a)) and how to minimise or remove the particular disadvantages that delays in dispersal cause them (section 149(3)(a)). This may include treating PNMAS more favourably than other asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers (section 149(3)(a)) by, for example, prioritising them for dispersal: above, para 133(iii).

The HNPD Policy represents the primary means by which the SSHD seeks to achieve that objective.”

In R (TTT) v Michaela Community Schools Trust [2024] EWHC 834 (Admin) Linden J held at paras. 240 to 242:

“240 Relying on R (DMA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] 1 WLR 2374, para 312 Ms Hannett also submitted that the PSED includes a requirement to monitor. I do not agree. DMA and the relevant authorities, do not establish a rule to this effect. The true position is that what “due regard” entails is fact-specific: depending on the context and the evidence, the PSED may require monitoring. The possibility of a need to monitor the impact of a measure or system is a function of the fact that the PSED is a continuing duty (Bridges Principle (4)) and the need to be properly informed before taking decisions.

241 In DMA, Robin Knowles J was applying the following passage from para 85 of the judgment given by Aikens LJ in R (Brown) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2009] PTSR 1506 in the particular factual and statutory context of the DMA case, which concerned the duty to provide accommodation under section 4(2) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and the impact of delays in doing so on failed asylum seekers who were disabled. Aikens LJ said, para 85:

“85.

… the public authority concerned will, in our view, have to have due regard to the need to take steps to gather relevant information in order that it and properly take steps to take into account disabled persons’ disabilities in the context of the particular function under consideration …” (Emphasis in the original.)

242 Robin Knowles J accepted a submission that, on the facts of the DMA case, the failure of the Secretary of State to undertake monitoring meant that there was a fundamental obstacle—the lack of information as to the impact of the delays on people with disabilities—which prevented the Secretary of State from having “due regard” to the matters required by section 149: see paras 311 and 324 of his judgment. (See, further, R (SA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 1787 (Admin) and R (DXK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] 4 WLR 46 which consider DMA in a materially similar statutory context but by reference to impacts on pregnant and new mother asylum seekers.)”

In R(RR)v LB Enfield (above) Lewis LJ said at para. 81:

“The decisions in DXK and DMA were both concerned with the situation that arose where the Secretary of State had a duty to provide accommodation to a group of people (failed asylum-seekers) and discharged that duty through independent contractors. The Secretary of State needed to have a system in place that ensured that the contractors did provide the accommodation within the relevant timescale and did not take longer to provide accommodation to disabled failed-asylum seekers as compared with non-disabled failed asylum- seekers. The reference to gathering information and a duty to monitor need to be understood in that context. The courts were recognising that the necessary information had to be obtained to enable the Secretary of State to discharge the functions under section 4(2) of the 1999 Act to provide accommodation. The courts were not deciding that there was some free standing duty to monitor, derived from section 149 of the 2010 Act, and, still less, were they indicating that a decision reached in accordance with a lawful policy, such as the housing allocation scheme in the present case, would be unlawful in the absence of monitoring of the effects of the policy.”

The present challenge is systemic. It is not a challenge to the operation of the policy and practices in any individual case. In R(Marouf) v SSD [2003] UKSC 23, [2023] 3 WLR 228, Lady Rose said at para. 62:

“The PSED is primarily directed at policy decisions not at the application of policy to individual cases. The duty on an official not to discriminate unlawfully against a particular individual at all stages of the grant of entry clearance is imposed by the substantive obligations imposed by the EqA 2010, rather than by the PSED. There is no need to impose on that official in addition the duty under section 149(1)(a).”

In R (NB and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] 4 WLR 92, Linden J held that when allocating accommodation at the Napier Barracks for asylum seekers, the system which the defendant operated in that case for the purposes of applying the policy criteria was unlawful because, contrary to the Tameside principle, the system did not gather the information that was reasonably necessary for those purposes. In TG v SSHD [2025] EWHC 596 (Admin) Mould J dismissed a very similar claim, there having been a change in the system for gathering information since NB, but he held that the SSHD had failed to comply with the PSED when introducing version 11 of what I have called the AAA Policy:

“The Policy EIA [Equality Impact Assessment] makes no attempt to assess the equalities implications of the change in policy which was then proposed, the effect of which was that asylum seekers who were disabled or had serious mental health issues may henceforth be judged to be suitable for accommodation at Wethersfield provided that their special needs were able to be met at the site.”

In the present case the Claimant does not contend that the system for gathering information for the purpose of applying the AAA Policy was unlawful, nor that there has been no attempt to assess the equalities implications of the AAA policy. The claim before me is that the PSED requires statistical monitoring in relation to the AAA Policy as far as it concerns LGBT+ asylum seekers and that no statistical monitoring has taken place.

The Claimant initially sought to rely extensively on a report of the Home Affairs Select Committee. The Defendant objected that this breached Parliamentary Privilege, relying on the recent decision in R(D1914) v SSHD [2025] EWHC 1853 (Admin), and the Claimant withdrew his reliance on the report.

The Claimant relies on written witness evidence from Leila Zadeh of Rainbow Migration, Heike Langbein of Migrants Organise, Elizabeth Hughes of Outcome, Islington Mind’s LGBTIQ+ specialist project, Adeniyi Balogun of African Rainbow Family, Niki Hadjivasiliou and Lizan Ghafoor, solicitors for the Claimant, and the Claimant himself. Evidence adduced includes reports of surveys of whether BAME LGBTIQ+ asylum seekers felt safe in Home Office accommodation and their experience of discrimination, violence, racism, homophobia and transphobia from within their accommodation. This survey did not specifically relate to male asylum seekers being allocated accommodation in large sites and/or shared rooms. Evidence includes references to individual asylum seekers feeling they had to hide their sexuality or being subjected to homophobic abuse by other residents or staff, and assaults by other residents. Much of the evidence concerns men and women housed in sites other than large sites and in single rooms.

The Defendant’s witnesses are Rik Walls, Head of Operational Delivery-Compliance within Asylum Support, Daniel Milner, Operational Safeguarding Lead of the Asylum Safeguarding Hub, Jason Büültjens, Deputy Director of the Asylum and Protection Unit, and Jennifer Hancock, Head of Customer Experience within Adult and Family Support, all of the Home Office.

Mr Walls describes how incidents involving asylum seekers are reported. Any incident or concern may be referred in the first place to Migrant Help who may then report it to the accommodation provider who is obliged to take steps to manage the behaviours of residents including in relation to anti-social or aggressive behaviour. The provider is also obliged to report certain incidents, including “violence or aggressive incidents involving a service user” to the Home Office. Incident reports are dealt with as follows:

“All incident reports across the asylum support estate are sent to the Compliance Unit as well as the Home Office Safeguarding Team and Operational Command Centre. Once an incident report is received by the Compliance Unit, a triage is conducted to determine whether an investigation should be raised as a result of the incident. This is based on the judgment of the Compliance Unit officer, but matters that may be considered include the nature and seriousness of the complaint and whether this is a repeated incident/offence.”

Mr Milner addresses the operation of the Safeguarding Hub:

“We adopt a multi-agency approach to safeguarding to protect and support vulnerable children and adults at risk. We receive referrals on behalf of individuals from various sources, including from Migrant Help, incident reports or referrals from the accommodation providers and external agencies such as NGOs, as well as internally from other teams in the Home Office, including asylum decisions makers and Asylum Support colleagues. It is important to note that the Safeguarding Hub’s primary role is to signpost to support vulnerable children and adults at risk by ensuring that all stakeholders are aware of an individual’s situation. The Safeguarding Hub works on a referral basis and therefore can only act on any disclosures or referrals that are made to us.

When a safeguarding referral is received, the Safeguarding Hub will assess the level of risk disclosed in the referral. Depending on the risk level there will be different standard processes to follow. All referrals that are received are assessed and prioritised on a risk basis. During our assessment, we would consider what has been reported and look at any other safeguarding vulnerabilities the specific individual may have (such as any presenting mental health or physical health concerns or relevant history for example, if they are a victim of sexual assault or domestic violence, etc.).

The various actions that the Safeguarding Hub may take include asking the accommodation provider for robust welfare checks to be completed to support the individual, referring an individual to medical services or other support services, or referring cases to local authorities, the NHS or police.”

The Safeguarding Hub is used to address individual incidents not to collate statistical data.

Mr Büültjens states that v 12 of the AAA Policy is materially the same as version 11 which introduced a system of allocation that ensured that accommodation needs of all individuals are assessed on a case-by-case basis, meaning that accommodation is allocated according to an individual’s specific needs. The suitability criteria apply to LGBT+ individuals in exactly the same way as they apply to “heterosexual or cisgender individuals”, reflecting the position that in general:

“all types of asylum accommodation are suitable for most individuals receiving asylum support, that LGBT individuals are not inherently or automatically vulnerable by virtue of this protected characteristic alone (in the same way that being a woman or of a different race or religion does not make someone inherently vulnerable for the purposes of asylum accommodation), and that most LGBT individuals will be suitable to be accommodated in this way. It is recognised that some LGBT individuals may have special accommodation needs however this is dependent on their individual circumstances and needs.”

Mr Büültjens notes that the Asylum Accommodation Support Contract (“AASC”) at Annex G, G2.5, recognises that being an LGBT+ individual may be a potential indicator of an adult at risk or with specific needs. The AASC requires contractors providing accommodation to be proactive in monitoring and identifying individuals at risk or with specific needs in their care and to respond appropriately to their needs. The AAA Policy, he points out, includes a section on monitoring suitability as an ongoing process. He also refers to Equality Impact Assessments (“EIA”) which are conducted on policies to ensure that the Home Office has complied with its PSED. When a new policy is developed, an EIA is completed focusing on the impact of the policy on those with protected characteristics. EIAs have been produced on the AAA policy. They are sent to Ministers to be considered as part of their decision making about policy and if an EIA identifies potential discrimination arising from the policy, this is addressed within the Home Office. He attests to AAA policy EIAs completed on 10 January 2024 and 12 December 2024, which expressly addressed the impact of the policy on individuals with the protected characteristics of sexual orientation and gender reassignment. There were further EIAs completed on 31 March 2025, and 22 July 2025. In addition there were site specific EIAs for Wethersfield and Napier in 2023-2025.

Mr Büültjens refers to specific consideration having been given by the SSHD to whether to change the allocation policy in relation to transgender asylum seekers. Advice was given to Ministers in an Information to Note document in February 2024. Policy options were drafted and a further Note given to Ministers in March 2024. A decision was made to continue the policy in relation to transgender asylum seekers.

Ms Hancock informed the court of customer surveys for asylum seekers which “went live” in 2020 but which were given an impetus in 2021 as a result of which response rates doubled in 2022 and then increased ten-fold in 2023. The surveys are collated quarterly. She stated that the surveys are designed to provide a holistic view of how individuals feel about the service from a subjective viewpoint and they include questions about LGBT identity and living accommodation, including whether it is shared. In quarter 3 of 2025, 92% of respondents said they felt safe in their asylum accommodation.

Towards the close of the hearing before me, in the course of his submissions, Mr Manknell KC made a correction to the evidence from Ms Hancock, informing the court that the survey did not, as she had implied in her statement, cover asylum seekers accommodated at large sites, namely Napier and Wethersfield. He was right, of course, to have informed the court of this correction to Ms Hancock’s written evidence and, in submissions in reply, Mr Persey for the Claimant understandably seized on the concession. However, in the days after the hearing the Defendant sought to adduce a further statement from Ms Hancock correcting the correction. In her second statement, dated 1 December 2025, she says that the survey is made available to residents at Wethersfield and has been in use since the summer of 2024 but it is not actively promoted as it has been elsewhere. It is not provided to residents at Napier. Ms Hancock explained the reasons why errors had been made in relation to her previous evidence and Mr Manknell’s oral correction.

There followed formal exchanges of correspondence between the parties to which the court was copied in. The Defendant seeks to rely on the second statement of Ms Hancock. The Claimant contends that the Defendant is guilty of a serious breach of the duty of candour. I accept that it was proper for Mr Manknell KC to seek to correct the statement once he had been informed, on the day of the hearing, that the surveys did not cover the two large sites. When it was subsequently discovered that that correction went too far, then it was proper to make a further correction otherwise the court would be left with evidence or assertion known to be wrong. Greater care should have been taken to ensure the accuracy of the first statement but I am quite satisfied that no-one has acted in bad faith. I would not categorise the errors as breaches of the duty of candour but they do give the court reason to treat the final version of the evidence with considerable caution. I admit Ms Hancock’s second statement in evidence but I cannot give it much weight in the light of the changes in her evidence that have occurred over time.

The Defendant’s evidence established that in February and March 2024 the SSHD gave specific consideration to the equalities impact of the allocation policy on transgender asylum seekers.

In her submissions, Ms Braganza KC said that the “crux” of the claim was the question whether there was “sufficient evidence of concerns facing LGBT+ asylum seekers in the allocation of asylum accommodation in shared rooms and ex-MOD sites such that ongoing equalities monitoring is required?” As I have sought to make clear the claim is more specific than that, focusing as it does on the absence of statistical monitoring. She relied upon the statements from those working for organisations working with LGBT+ asylum seekers to establish that there are “systemic issues” for LGBT+ asylum seekers within the Defendant’s system for allocating accommodation, with LGBT+ asylum seekers facing abuse and harassment in “unsuitable accommodation” causing them mental health problems. It was claimed that re-allocation following reported difficulties often does not take place unless legal action is threatened. She submitted further that the Defendant was not undertaking any or any adequate monitoring, the Defendant having accepted that there is no recording of statistics on safeguarding referrals featuring LGBT+ individuals. The decisions in DMA and DXK apply with equal force to the current case. Eliminating discriminatory treatment such as occurs when there is homophobic and transphobic abuse is one of the objectives the PSED is designed to serve.

Ms Braganza KC submitted that the EHRC guidance makes it clear that equality evidence is a necessary component of the PSED and that failure to follow the guidance will be relevant in demonstrating compliance with the PSED.

For the Defendant, Ms Manknell KC submitted that the equalities implications of the SSHD’s policy and approach to the allocation of accommodation to LGBT+ asylum seekers are considered through the EIAs as well as specific consideration having been given to transgender asylum seekers in February and March 2024. The EIAs and the 2024 review conclude that whilst, as a generality, LGBT+ asylum seekers do not require a materially different form of support from others, some LGBT+ asylum seekers might require a different form of support. Depending on particular factors, an individual might not be suitable for room-sharing, for example. Whether there are such special needs will be considered on a case by case basis. He submitted that the PSED requires that due regard must be had to all of the specified equalities objectives including the need to foster good relations between those who do and those who do not have a particular characteristic. A system of segregated accommodation might well be contrary to the need to help foster good relations.

Mr Manknell cautioned that the Claimant does not contend that the policy is unlawful but that the collection of statistical data is a necessary requirement for the lawful promulgation and maintenance of the policy. He submitted that the Defendant does not have a free-standing duty to collect statistical data. The decisions in DMA and DXK were specific to the particular contexts in which the PSED in each case arose. Thus, data monitoring was required in DMA to prevent systemic breaches of Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In DXK there was evidence that PNMAS were disproportionately adversely impacted by delays compared to other asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers and therefore the SSHD was obliged proactively to consider whether her policy was sufficient to meet the s149(1)(b) objective. In that case, the SSHD had accepted the need to reconsider the policy in the light of delays. In the present case the SSHD does not need statistical monitoring to assess her own performance in applying the AAA Policy. DMA and DXK did not concern policy choices. Statistical monitoring is not required to ensure compliance with the case by case approach set out in the AAA Policy.

Mr Manknell submitted that paragraph 5.3 of the EHRC guidance demonstrates that the gathering and monitoring of statistical data – which is the form of monitoring that the Claimant contends is necessary – is not necessary for compliance with the PSED in every instance. He submits that insofar as the Judge decided in DXK that the EHRC guidance was a mandatory consideration which a public authority is legally required to take into account and from which any departure must be justified, he was in error.

It is important to consider the precise nature of the claim under consideration. The claim is that the SSHD has breached her PSED in respect of her allocation of asylum accommodation policy and practices affecting asylum seekers with the protected characteristics of sexual orientation and gender reassignment housed in mass male accommodation, large sites and shared rooms, by failing to carry out statistical monitoring. Applying the Court of Appeal’s decision in R (RR) (above), the starting point is to identify the function that the SSHD is exercising. Here, the relevant function is the provision to asylum seekers of accommodation as asylum support under IA 1999 ss 95-97. In exercising that function the SSHD has a duty to have due regard to the specified equality considerations (the PSED). In the present claim, the primary question for the court is whether the PSED that is imposed when the SSHD is exercising the relevant function in relation to LGBT+ asylum seekers, requires statistical monitoring. If so, has the SSHD carried out statistical monitoring so as to comply with her duty in that context?

The present claim is not a challenge to the current policy adopted by the Defendant. That policy includes the “no choice” policy (pursuant to IA 1999 s97(2)) and is predicated on the principle that in general all types of accommodation are suitable for most individuals receiving asylum support except for those with “the most serious physical and mental health needs.” It also includes approaches dependent upon whether or not an individual is “vulnerable”.

The Claimant does not contend that the accommodation provided at large sites and/or shared accommodation is inadequate. Nor is the present claim a challenge to the process of allocation or the gathering of information sufficient to inform individual allocation decisions, such as was considered in R(NB) v SSHD [2021] 4WLR 92, and TG and others v SSHD [2025] EWHC 596 (Admin).

LGBT+ asylum seekers may have intersecting special needs or other protected characteristics. I am concerned in this case with asylum seekers as LGBT+ individuals, not as LGBT+ individuals who are also vulnerable persons (as defined by the AS(RC) Regs) for some other reason, or who have one or more other protected characteristic under the EA 2010. LGBT+ asylum seekers are not “vulnerable persons” as defined by the AS(RC) Regs by reason of being LGBT+. The policy and practices as apply to them can be summarised as follows:

Hence, under the policy, there is no requirement that LGBT+ asylum seekers must be allocated certain kinds of accommodation nor is there a bar on them being allocated any kind of accommodation. Like all other male asylum seekers save for the two categories identified (NRM referrals and Foreign National Offenders) male LGBT+ asylum seekers may or may not be allocated to Napier, ex-MOD sites, vessels and/or room sharing accommodation. The allocation of asylum accommodation with which I am concerned is determined on a case by case basis not by the application of blanket rules.

In DMA and DXK, the context was delay in provision of accommodation to vulnerable groups – disabled individuals and PNMAS. They were vulnerable persons as defined by the AS(RC) Regs 2005. There was evidence of a disproportionate adverse impact of delay on those groups, and therefore of the SSHD’s own policy not being applied. Here, there is no evidence at all of delay in implementation of the policy as it affects LGBT+ asylum seekers. The Claimant’s case is that the SSHD is required to carry out statistical monitoring in order to comply with the PSED in relation to her policy and practices regarding the allocation of large site and shared room asylum accommodation to individuals with the protected characteristics of sexual orientation and gender reassignment. In DMA and DXK the asylum seekers concerned had very particular requirements in terms of accommodation. The SSHD could not know whether the policy to provide suitable accommodation within a reasonable time was being complied with or was effective in preventing destitution without sufficient monitoring. The absence of monitoring was in those cases a fundamental obstacle to compliance with the PSED. Here, the position is quite different:

In the circumstances, I have struggled to understand what information would be garnered by statistical monitoring with regard to the allocation of accommodation to LGBT+ asylum seekers, that would be relevant, let alone, essential, to “identify and correct failure and to inform change” (Robin Knowles J in DMA) or to enable the policy to meet its purpose and the SSHD to meet her obligations. The AS(RC) Regs 2025 determine which groups of asylum seekers are “vulnerable” persons. The AAA Policy reflects those Regulations. It is not for the SSHD to change the policy so as to treat LGBT+ asylum seekers as vulnerable persons under the Regulations. Individual LGBT+ asylum seekers may be vulnerable persons under the Regulations if they meet the criteria there set out but statistical data would not be relevant to those individual assessments.

Arguments about whether LGBT+ asylum seekers ought all to be treated as vulnerable persons with special needs for the purpose of allocation of accommodation are not for this court to determine.

Statistical evidence as to whether, say, 20% or 80% of LGBT+ asylum seekers meet the criteria for being “vulnerable persons”, or feel at risk in shared large site and/or shared accommodation, would not make any difference to the policy or its implementation and therefore the achievement of the quality objectives under the PSED.

This is a systemic challenge brought on a narrow basis that statistical monitoring is required for the SSHD to comply with the PSED in respect of the allocation of accommodation to LGBT+ asylum seekers. It is not sufficient for the Claimant to establish that statistical monitoring would be preferable because, for example, it might promote better training of those who make allocation decisions. He must establish that it is a necessary requirement for compliance with the PSED.

The witness evidence relied upon by the Claimant is of very limited assistance to the court. I do not doubt that a number of LGBT+ asylum seekers feel unhappy or unsafe in accommodation provided to them and would feel happier or safer in single rooms or on smaller sites. I do not doubt that a number of LGBT+ asylum seekers suffer from homophobic or transphobic discrimination, harassment, and abuse. But the evidence provided does not establish that it arises from the AAA policy or its implementation nor that statistical monitoring is required for the SSHD to comply with the PSED. There is no evidence before me that the case by case approach disproportionately adversely affects LGBT+ asylum seekers. A case by case approach is designed to identify when particular circumstances might require an LGBT+ asylum seeker to be allocated accommodation other than at a large site or in a shared room. There might be any number of reasons why that might be so. But statistical monitoring will not have any relevance to whether those decisions should be or are being made in individual cases.

Statistical monitoring is not required in order for the PSED to be met in relation to making policy choices. The case by case approach applies to LGBT+ and non-LGBT+ asylum seekers alike, just as it applies regardless of race or religion. The current policy does not segregate asylum seekers according to the protected characteristics of race, religion, or sexual orientation. An alternative policy involving some form of segregation could be adopted but that is not a question to be determined on this application. The PSED requires due regard to be had to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment and abuse, to advance equality of opportunity, and to foster good relations. Those considerations are therefore engaged when a decision is made whether to allocate accommodation to asylum seekers on a case by case basis or on the basis of a protected characteristic. A policy decision might be made to exclude the allocation of shared rooms to all asylum seekers who were of a particular religion, or race or who were LGBT+. But the PSED would require due regard to be had to all three of the objectives set out at s149(1). There would be tensions between the different objectives and many considerations would have to be weighed by those devising and drafting the policy. These are important choices but they would not be informed by statistical monitoring. The formulation of the policy engages all manner of considerations which pertain to the three equality objectives, but due regard may be had to those objectives without collating and considering statistical data.

Nor would statistical monitoring be required in order to comply with the PSED in relation to the implementation of the policy. Whilst the AAA policy requires ongoing consideration of an individual’s circumstances, statistical monitoring would not be relevant to that process. It would not be relevant to a decision whether to allocate particular accommodation to a particular asylum seeker or to move him to alternative accommodation because those decisions depend on the particular circumstances of the individual asylum seeker not on what statistics might demonstrate. In contrast, in DMA and DXK, all asylum seekers with the relevant protected characteristics would suffer harm were the applicable policies not implemented. In the present case the Claimant is not suggesting, nor could he realistically do so, that all LGBT+ asylum seekers suffer harassment or abuse whilst at large sites or in shared rooms and none do when at small sites or in single rooms. It is accepted by the SSHD that some LGBT+ asylum seeker will suffer from harassment or abuse from a roommate or from other residents at a large site. They, or a perpetrator of the harassment or abuse, may have to be moved elsewhere. The policy itself requires a degree of monitoring of individual cases in the sense that evidence that allocated accommodation is not suitable for an individual’s needs should be reviewed. But statistical data has no relevance to that process of review of monitoring.

The Claimant submits that statistical monitoring is required to assess “whether an exclusively case by case assessment of suitability for mass all male accommodation and/or room sharing is working for LGBT+ asylum seekers”; whether “assessing suitability for accommodation through a combination of the AAA policy and the AASC contracts is functioning in relation to LGBT+ asylum seekers”; whether “subcontracting responsibility for the identification of risk is functioning to discharge the Defendant’s duty to allocate LGBT+ asylum seekers accommodation adequate to ensure dignity and safety”; and whether the “drive to increase room sharing under Project Maximise and/or increasing the capacity of Wethersfield by over 50% has a particular impact on LGBT+ asylum seekers.” These and other submissions concerning the necessity of statistical monitoring disregard the Baker, Bracking, and Bridges line of authorities (above). The PSED does not require a particular outcome but only that due regard is had to the equality objectives. There is no single means by which the SSHD may have “due regard”. As the EHRC guidance makes clear, the Defendant is not obliged to rely on “hard statistical data”. The Claimant may have a case that statistical monitoring would be desirable, but he has not identified why the SSHD cannot have had due regard to the need to achieve the quality objectives without statistical monitoring. In any event, some of the objectives identified by the Claimant - whether the policy is “functioning” or “works for” LGBT+ asylum seekers - are not the PSED equality objectives.

Given the function which the Defendant is performing, the PSED does not require statistical monitoring of the allocation of accommodation to LGBT+ asylum seekers. The Claimant has not made out his case in that respect.

The Defendant submits that regardless of whether she is legally obliged to do so, pursuant to the PSED she does in fact collect data in relation to the experience of LGBT+ asylum seekers in accommodation which she provides, by gathering survey data. In 2024 alone some 46,500 responses to surveys were received. The surveys allow individuals to report how they feel about their safety. The SSHD accepts that survey data is not used when developing policy or when undertaking EIAs but confirms that such data will be taken into account in the future.

Information from the Safety Hub is also used, says the SSHD, although no statistical data is extracted from the incident reports.

The SSHD submits that the claim for a mandatory order requiring the SSHD to undertake statistical equalities monitoring in respect of the protected characteristics of sexual orientation and gender reassignment in how it allocates asylum accommodation to LGBT+ asylum seekers in relevant accommodation should be dismissed but that, in any event, and without prejudice to her primary case, the court should refuse to grant relief under Senior Courts Act 1981 s31(2A). The SSHD has undertaken and continues to undertake the relevant statistical monitoring.

The Claimant takes issues with the form and content of the surveys: the sample sizes are low, the identification of people to complete the survey is inadequate, and the questioning designed to identify gender is inappropriate. However, the primary attack on the survey data is that, ultimately, after a number of changes in evidence adduced by the SSHD, the court cannot find that the surveys extended to the relevant large site accommodation.

The evidence adduced by the SSHD does not persuade me that statistical monitoring is in fact carried out in relation to the allocation of large site accommodation to LGBT+ asylum seekers. Ms Hancock’s evidence, with the changes to it that are described above, has left the court unpersuaded that the collation of data is in fact undertaken at all those sites in a way that could amount to (or allow for) statistical monitoring Hence, had I found that there was a duty to carry out such statistical monitoring, I would not have been persuaded that the duty has been satisfied or that I should refuse relief under SCA 1981 s31(2A) for that reason.

For the reasons given, I reject the claim that the PSED requires the Defendant to undertake statistical monitoring of the allocation of accommodation at large sites and/or in shared rooms to LGBT+ asylum seekers. Accordingly, I dismiss the claim for judicial review on Ground three, as amended.