Cynthia Njoku v Nursing and Midwifery Council

The Appellant, Cynthia Njoku, is a registered nurse and was employed as a Band 6 nurse at St Mary’s Hospital, London. Between 27 October 2025 and 3 November 2025, she faced a five day disciplinary hearing before a Fitness to Practise Committee (the panel) of the Respondent, the Nursing and Midwifery Council (the NMC). On 29 October 2025 the panel handed down its decision on the facts, determining that three of the four charges against her, charges 1, 3 and 4, had been proved. On 3 November 2025 the panel imposed a period of suspension for 12 months.

By way of an Appellant’s Notice dated 3 November 2025, the Appellant appealed against the decision to impose the 12 month suspension order. However, both the Grounds of Appeal that she filed on 3 December 2025 and the written submissions that were filed on her behalf on 7 July 2026 made clear that she challenged only the findings of misconduct. She did not seek to pursue a self-standing appeal against the sanction alone, though, of course, if she succeeds in overturning the factual determinations in their entirety, the sanction necessarily falls away (subject to the matter being re-heard, if it is).

The Appellant was the Nurse in Charge at the Manvers Ward in St Mary’s Hospital, London, having first joined St Mary’s in February 2019. The Manvers Ward is a 33 bed respiratory ward with 12 out of 33 beds being level two patients and is primarily for acute services.

The Respondent opened a referral into the Appellant in February 2023 under Article 22(6) of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001, following a complaint from another registered nurse, Person A (her name has been anonymised to protect her privacy), that she had been subjected to xenophobic behaviour from colleagues including the Appellant at St Mary’s Hospital.

The charges that were preferred against the Appellant were as follows:

“That you, a registered nurse:

1.

On unknown dates, you called Person A words to the effect of:

a.

“Polish cow”; and/or

b.

“Polish idiot”; and/or

c.

“Swine nose”; and/or

d.

“A stupid old cow”; and/or

e.

“Old woman”

2.

On unknown dates, swore at Person A.

3.

Your words in Charge 1a and/or 1b discriminated against Person A on the grounds of their race.

4.

Your words in Charge 1 and/or Charge 2 amounted to bullying as it had the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating and/or hostile and/or offensive environment for Person A.

AND in light of the above, your fitness to practise is impaired by reason of your misconduct.”

In her ‘local statement’, the statement for the complainant’s employer that provides the first written account of the complaint, dated 22 March 2023, Person A stated:

“During my work on Manvers Ward there were often incidents of bullying and harassment between me and the three nurses:

….

India Njoku – there was a situation when swearing to me, she called me ‘a stupid, old cow’, when I said to her that such an approach is unprofessional, she answered that ‘I peased [sic] her off so she called me’. I reported verbally that incident to Cathy Gale – the Lead Nurse but I was not informed about outcomes.India Njoku often also was abusing me verbally calling ‘swine nose’, ‘Polish cow’ or ‘Polish idiot”. [emphasis here and below added in bold]

In her witness statement of 24 October 2025, prepared for the purposes of the disciplinary proceedings, Person A stated as follows:

“5.

When we initially met the problems were surely not as prevalent as they became later. As a newly qualified nurse, I would often go to Ms. Njoku to request for her help if I had questions or required assurance with my tasks. From the beginning I could tell that she was annoyed that I requested her help. I tried to do so when she was mostly not busy—playing with her phone for example—but she would often groan with annoyance when I requested her help or asked me to ask someone else. She was a band 6 ward Sister, and thus had sufficient experience to guide me in case I needed guidance.

6.

With time Ms. Njoku became increasingly aggressive towards me. It did not take long for Ms. Njoku to become explicitly insulting whenever I asked for help. Although I cannot recall specific dates of events, Ms. Njoku would often tell me that the reason why I needed so much help with my practice was because I was “an old cow”. She would also call me an “old woman” and “useless” whenever I did something wrong. She would also regularly call me “Polish idiot”, “swine-nosed” and “Polish cow”. I am really not sure why she would call me these things. I believe she was mad that I was Polish and had become a nurse in the UK. However, I am not sure why this would make her mad.

7.

These events would happen at the nurses’ station or the ward corridors, which were close enough to the patients’ bay that they were able to hear her insulting at me. I do not recall if she referred to patients or other staff members using these words.

8.

At a point I did try to address this situation with her. I recall telling her that the way she addressed me was problematic, and that because I was a newly qualified nurse I was going to require additional help doing my work. She did not, however, acknowledge that she was behaving in a problematic way. She stated that “[I] [would] piss [her] off”. I also came to the ward’s Matron, Natasha Delaney, about the concerns. She told me that I was “taking things too personally” and that “[I] [had] problems with communication”. It was true that I would get stressed when I had complicated patients, however I never started quarrels with people. I never started problems with anybody. The Matron did not intervene in the conflict whatsoever.”

In her witness statement Person A also dealt with an incident that had led to her being struck off:

“11.

Ms. Njoku was not the only person who would insult me. Conflicts with other staff members led to me being referred to the NMC and eventually being struck-off the registry. The events that led to my referral took place on 8 August 2021, involving other nurses. Ms. Njoku was not involved in this particular event whatsoever—she was not on shift this particular day. ….”

Person A gave evidence before the panel. She was called by the representative of the NMC, and affirmed that her witness statement, which she adopted, was true to the best of her knowledge and belief. The essential parts of her evidence relating to what the Appellant had said to her were as follows:

“Q: At paragraph five of your NMC statement, you say that from the beginning you could tell she was annoyed when you asked for help. Can you tell us more — how could you tell?

A: She was a Band 6 ward sister. She was leading the ward on the shift. She was sitting at the nursing station, sometimes playing on her mobile phone. When I came to ask for help, she was annoyed that I was disturbing her. When I did something wrong, she said “you are just an old cow, that’s why you are working like that.” I said that everybody makes mistakes — it is not because of my age. She said, “you piss me off, that is why I called you that.”

…..

At paragraph six of your NMC statement, you say Ms Njoku became increasingly aggressive towards you. How?

A: She was aggressive verbally with me and with other nurses. They called me “Polish idiot,” “Polish cow,” “swine nose.” It was not only harassment, it was bullying. My reaction on that day — when I reacted with racial abuse — it was the accumulation of everything that had happened on the ward. I did not want it. I do not mind if anyone is Black, yellow, green, or white — I really do not, but it was the accumulation of that bullying and harassment, and Ms Njoku took part in it.

…..

Did you ever address this with Ms Njoku at the time — ask why she was calling you those names?

A: Not only with Ms Njoku. I spoke with (inaudible), our matron. She said that it was my fault — that is why they were behaving that way towards me.

Q: Person A, just to clarify — you said you reported it at that time. Who exactly did you report it to?

A: I reported it to the matron. I spoke with her about their behaviour. It was (inaudible), our matron at that time.

Q: And do you recall where these incidents happened?

A: I do not remember exactly the day, but some of the staff on (inaudible) Ward were very abusive to me — because of my Polish origin and because of my age.

…..

Q: The comments you mentioned — “swine nose,” “Polish idiot” — can you confirm again who made those comments?

A: I remember that Ms Njoku took part in it as well.

Q: But did she say these words directly to you, Person A?

A: No, but I could hear that it was about me.

Q: And who was she making these comments to about you?

A: To other nurses who were chatting about me or making abusive comments — even some healthcare assistants.

Q: How far were you standing when you overheard Ms Njoku make these comments about you?

A: Two to three meters.

Q: Do you recall whether there were any other Polish nurses working there at the time?

A: Actually, no. I was the only one. There was another nurse on the COVID site, but I do not remember his name. He was also Polish, but I never spoke with him.

Q: So how did you know she was referring to you when she was making these comments to her colleague?

A: She was…

Q: Sorry, Person A, can you repeat that? I missed the last bit.

A: She was making comments about Polish people — so about me. That is how I understood it.

…..

In your local statement, you said there was a situation where she would swear at you. Can you tell us more — was there another occasion where she swore at you?

A: Yes. I remember that very well because it was significant. I did something wrong, and Ms Njoku said I was an old cow — that is why I was working like that. I told her everybody makes mistakes, and she should not call me that. She replied, “You (inaudible) me off, so I called you that.” Such language was normal on that ward — everybody was swearing. That was the culture there.

Q: Did you hear Ms Njoku ever swear at you on any other occasion? Was it just that one time, or did it happen many times?

A: I do not remember. It was four years ago. Her language was like that, so she did not even acknowledge she was saying something wrong to me.

Q: And my final question, Person A, was there ever an occasion where she swore at you directly — to your face?

A: No, I do not remember that.”

When cross-examined by the Appellant’s representative, she said this:

“Q: Thank you. I would like to begin with something you just said in response to Mr Malik’s questions. You were asked about comments such as “swine nose” and “Polish idiot,” and you were asked who said them. Your answer was that Ms Njoku took part in it. When asked if they were directed at you, you said no, but you felt they were about you. You said she said those things to other nurses about you. So, Person A — did Ms Njoku actually say to you words to the effect of “you are a swine nose,” “you are a Polish idiot”?

A: Yes.

…..

At paragraph six, you describe her becoming increasingly aggressive towards you and using ageist and racist language such as “old cow,” “old woman,” “useless,” “Polish idiot,” (inaudible). At paragraph eight, you say you challenged her — that you told her the way she addressed you was problematic. You also say you went to (inaudible), the ward matron, for help and were brushed off. Is that correct?

A: Yes, that is correct. In fact, I also spoke with the lead nurse, (inaudible), who was the lead nurse at that time, and she also did not intervene. It was addressed to senior staff.

Q: Person A, there is no mention in your witness statement or in your local statement that you spoke to a lead nurse, is there?

A: It was mentioned in the local statement — yes, in my local statement — that I spoke with both of them.

Q: No, Person A, let me rephrase that. There is no mention of you going to the lead nurse in your four-page witness statement dated this year, is there?

A: Yes. Yes, that is correct.

Q: And in your local statement dated 22 March 2023, there is no mention of you going to the lead nurse, is there?

A: Yes, I stated that I reported verbally to (inaudible), the lead nurse, but I was not informed of any outcome. That is in my local statement.

…..

Q: If I can take you to Exhibit KL1, your local statement, this was dated 22 March 2023, was it not — (inaudible) after the incident of August 2021. You say there was a situation where she was swearing at you. She called you a “stupid old cow.” When you said to her that this was unprofessional, she answered “I (inaudible) her off so she called you that.” She also verbally abused you, calling you “swine nose,” “Polish cow,” “Polish idiot.”

A: Yes, but that was on another occasion, not on this day.

Q: It was on other occasions, not on this day. In paragraph six of your witness statement, you mention that she called you “old woman,” “useless.” These terms do not appear in this document. Are you saying those words were used on other occasions?

A: Yes

…..

Q: You mentioned going to (inaudible). How did you do that? Did you do that by email, or did you approach her in person?

A: I came to (inaudible) and asked to speak with her about it.

Q: So it was an in-person approach?

A: Yes, I reported it verbally.

Q: You have not exhibited any contemporaneous records of those complaints or meetings, have you?

A: I do not have access to my NHS email, but I am sure I emailed her — I just do not have access now. She asked me to email her.

….”

She was then asked further questions on behalf of the NMC, and some further questions were asked by members of the panel:

“Q: Hello. I just wanted to clarify something you said in your evidence. There was an occasion when there was a group of nurses talking, and Ms Njoku was within that group, and you heard them saying some of the words such as “Polish idiot,” “swine nose,” “Polish cow.” Do you recall that?

A: Yes.

Q: And you said that the words were not directly said to you — is that correct?

A: Yes, it was about me.

Q: It was about you?

A: Yes, I was the only Polish on the ward.

Q: Okay. Where was Ms Njoku at this time? What was her position within the group?

A: She was in the group, with the other nurses.

Q: And in relation to where you were — because you said you were about two or three metres away — did she have her back to you, was she facing you, sideways? Could you see her face?

A: She was on the side.

Q: On the side — could you see her face?

A: I did not look at them.

Q: You were not looking at them?

A: I just… No, I did not look at them.

Q: Thank you. And second, in your statement you say these words were said quite regularly. In paragraph six you say Ms Njoku would often tell you that the reason you needed more help in your practice was because you were an “old cow,” and that this happened quite regularly. I would like to ask — do you have a copy of the charges?

….

Q: So, referring to Charge 1A — it says that on unknown dates you were called words to the effect of “Polish cow.” Can you identify when this was said to you?

A: It was said about me.

Q: Okay, it was not said directly to you?

A: No.

Q: And can you recall when it was said?

A: No, I do not remember, but I remember it was said by Ms. Njoku.

Q: And the same question for 1B, where it says “Polish idiot” — can you recall when this was said to you?

A: No, I do not remember as well, but they were calling me regularly like that.

Q: Who do you mean by “they”?

A: Other nurses who were friendly with Ms. Njoku.

Q: Did Ms. Njoku say any of these things — “Polish cow,” “Polish idiot,” “swine nose,”

“stupid old cow,” “old woman”? Did she say any of these directly to you?

A: Yes. Directly to me — no.

Q: So am I right in thinking it was when she was with other nurses?

A: But about me, yes. When she quarrelled with me, she said I was an old, stupid woman because I am old and that is why I am working like that.

Q: And she said that directly to you?

A: Yes.

Q: So what were the words again?

A: She called me “old stupid woman,” and I said to her it was unprofessional and she should not do that. She said, “You (inaudible) me off, (inaudible).”

Q: Just to clarify — “stupid woman” is not in the charges. Charge D says, “stupid old cow,” and Charge E says, “old woman.” Can you recall her saying any of those things to you?

A: Yes, yes — “old woman” and “Polish cow.”

Q: I am a little confused, because earlier you said she did not say them directly to you. Could you clarify?

A: When she was annoyed with me, she was complaining to other nurses about me and I heard it. I said to her, “You should not (inaudible) like that.” She said to me, “I called you because you (inaudible) me off.” She did not deny saying it.

MS SHAH: Thank you. My colleagues may have some other questions, but that is all the questions that I have. Thank you”.

The Appellant’s representative asked some further questions:

“Q: Just one point, Person A. I remember the first question I asked you earlier was about the expressions alleged in Charge 1A to E. I asked whether Ms Njoku said these things to your face or whether it was part of a group conversation, and you said “yes, she did.” Can I ask — are you changing your account now?

A: She was… She was sitting by the nursing station.

MR LO: I beg your pardon. Can you please repeat that? I cannot quite hear you.

PERSON A: She was sitting by the nursing station when I was talking to her.

Q: Yes, but my question to you at the start of cross-examination was, did she say those things to your face?

A: She was sitting by the nursing station and we were talking to each other. She said to me… She said that to me.

MR LO: She said what to you? I am sorry, you broke up again — the signal was very poor.

PERSON A: She said, “She is an old cow, that is why she is working in this way.” I said to her, “You should not call me this,” because it is unprofessional. She said to me…

….

PERSON A: She said, “She is an old cow, that is why she is working in this way.”

Q: She said “she is an old cow” — so she was not talking to you. She did not say “you are an old cow.” Did she say to you that you are an old cow?

A: She said… That is why she called… She did not deny that she was (inaudible) me.

Q: Okay. Did she say to you that you are an old cow?

A: Do you understand what I said?

Q: Yes, she said it to other people. Did she say to you that you are a Polish cow?

A: Yes, yes.

Q: She said to you that you are a Polish cow — or was this something she was saying?

A: How many times do I have to answer?

Q: Person A, the problem is that we are confused about what she said to you and what she said to other nurses. I am trying to clarify what she said directly to you and what she said about you to others. Do you understand?

A: Yes, I understand. I said to— she said it in this way, and she did not deny that she was (inaudible) me. She was (inaudible) and demeaning me. She did not deny that.

Q: She did not deny that she said it about you?

A: Correct.

Q: And did she say that you are a Polish idiot, or did she say, in conversation with other people, that you were a Polish idiot?

A: She said that to me.

Q: She said that to you — “you are a Polish idiot.” She did not say she was a Polish idiot?

A: Yes, she said that to me.

Q: What about swine nose? Did she say you are a swine nose, or did she say, in conversation with others, [Person A] was a (inaudible)?

A: Have you heard me?

Q: Was it to you or about you?

A: Yes.

Q: Which?

A: (Inaudible)

Q: Person A, I am sorry — I am going to try this again because your signal was breaking up. Did she say to you that you have a swine nose?

A: Yes. She said… She said that I have a nose — a swine nose.

Q: You heard “swine nose.” How did you know it was about you?

A: I do not remember… I said that she said I have a nose — a swine nose.

Q: So she said you are a (inaudible) — and you heard that being said about you?

A: Yes.

Q: Now, “stupid old cow” we have covered earlier, so I will not repeat that. How about “old woman”? Did she say you are an old woman, or was it something you heard said about you?

A: She said that I am an old woman — that is why I am working in this way. How many times do I have to repeat it? I am sorry.

Q: So you heard it about you, not to you? She did not say it directly to you?

A: Yes — (inaudible) directly to me. Direct to me.

Q: Directly to you?

A: Yes, 100%”.

The panel had before it a witness statement from the Appellant. In it the Appellant stated that she knew Person A on a professional level and had only interacted with her a couple of times while working together at St Mary’s. She said that, on the two occasions she had directly worked with Person A, it had been difficult as there had been issues with her communication with other members of staff. At some instances Health Care Assistants would come up to her and refuse to work with Person A due to her erratic mood, character and behaviour towards them.

The first time she had worked with Person A had been in 2021 when it was coming to the end of a night shift and she had approached Person A to remind her to administer medication to an intensive care patient. She did not recall Person A’s response to the direction, but, after explaining the matter to Person A, she had gone back to the nursing station to complete notes for a patient in her care on the shift.

As soon as she had sat down to use the computer, she had felt someone behind her, and turned to see Person A standing over her shoulder. Person A said “you are very wicked” or something along those lines. Following the handover to the day team, she had informed the Matron about the incident and she had said she would look into it.

The second time she had worked directly with Person A, she also experienced issues managing her. The second incident was on a long day shift and as the nurse in charge, she had allocated Person A to certain patient bays. Following a deterioration in the condition of one of the patients, she decided to remove this patient from Person A. A little later, she had had cause to correct Person A’s preparation of a medication for another patient.

After assisting Person A with the medication, the Appellant had returned to the nursing station and was updating the handover and discussing updates with other colleagues, when Person A had come up to her and said something like “Cynthia, you should not say that.” She responded and asked “say what? What did I say?”. However, Person A ignored her. She persisted and requested Person A to explain what she, the Appellant, had apparently said. She told the Appellant that she had said that old people should not be doing nursing. The Appellant denied she had said anything such thing.

Following her shift, she had emailed the ward matron regarding the incidents on the shift. To her witness statement was attached an email, dated 7 June 2021, in which she recounted to the ward matron, Natasha Delaney, the events concerning the preparation of the medication, and the conversation with Person A. She also referred to the past incident. In her email, the Appellant also said “Our job is already stress as it is, the last thing you need is your colleague adding to the stress level through making false accusations against which in turn make the work place an unpleasant setting to be in. Can the above and previous issue be address because every time I remember it still makes me very emotional.”

She asserted in the statement that these were the only incidents she recalled when she had interacted with Person A. She denied saying the things that Person A had claimed she had.

The Appellant gave evidence largely along the same lines as her statement, which she adopted and confirmed the truth of. She gave the following evidence in answer to questions from her legal representative:

“Q: And how frequently did you interact with Person A throughout her time there?

A: As I said in my witness statement, I have supervised her directly on two occasions. Most of the time, if she was on shift, I would be over on the other side of the ward on the acute side. When you are walking around, you see who is on shift, but I did not regularly interact with her.

Q: How frequently did she come to you for advice?

A: Not often. If I was the nurse in charge, I am usually on the other side of the ward, so I rarely have interaction with her.

Q: In your view, how good were her communication skills and how well did she work with colleagues?

A: Working with her is sometimes difficult. It can be hard to know if she is listening. You have to repeat yourself, and then she gets defensive. As nurse in charge, I have to ensure she knows what is going on and what is expected, but sometimes she does not like being told what to do.

Q: And how well did she get on with other members of staff?

A: From what my manager discussed with me, other colleagues were having similar issues with her. HCAs and some nurses would complain because I am the person they escalate to. You try to talk to her, but she does not always listen.

Q: And how willing were the HCAs to work with her?

A: Most HCAs were not very happy. HCAs like nurses who help them and work as a team. Sometimes she just focused on her medications and did not communicate with the HCAs about what needed doing. They would escalate that she was not helpful, and when they tried to speak to her, they felt brushed off”

In relation to the first of the two incidents to which she referred, she said:

“Next, I was in the nursing station updating the handover, because I have to update the handover before 7:30 and print it out. She walked past me and she said, “Cynthia, very wicked.” I was shocked. I asked her, “What do you mean?” She said, “Why are you telling me to do medication at this time in the morning? (Inaudible)?” I said, “Because I thought you knew — it was only 7. It was a reminder. It is my first time working on the night shift, so I do not know whether you have worked with other nurses. It was just a reminder.” I said again, “It was just a reminder.” Then I continued what I was doing.”

In relation to the second incident, she stated:

“She had prepared a medication called Furosemide. Sometimes the prescription says to add sodium chloride; sometimes it says “neat,” meaning no additive. She brought it to me to sign, so I checked the chart and saw the prescription was for a neat dose — but she had added sodium chloride. I told her we would need to prepare it again. We went back to the treatment room, prepared it correctly, I signed it, and then we administered it to the patient together.

Q: After assisting her with the medication, what did you do?

A: I followed her to make sure the medication was administered correctly. After that, I went back to the nurses’ station to continue updating my handover.

Q: And what did Person A do?

A: She did not do anything unusual — she just continued working on her bay.

Q: You went to the nurses’ station and sat down. What did she do after that?

A: After some time — things had calmed down by then — she came up to me at the nurses’ station while I was updating my handover and said, “Cynthia, you should not be saying that.” I was shocked and asked her what she meant. She said, “I know what you said.”

Q: How many people were present in the area when she said that?

A: There was one nurse right behind me and another about a metre or two away doing medication. The nurses’ station is central in the ward, so there were people around — at least two very close by.

Q: What did you say in response?

A: I asked her what she meant and what she thought I had said. She told me had said, “Old people should not be doing nursing.” I told her I did not say that. She insisted I did and that I was talking about her. I said no — I was updating my handover and was not discussing her at all. I told her she should not assume people are talking about her from across the ward. I told her I would never say something like that — my mum is a nurse. I became emotional, started crying, and went to the staff room.”

The Appellant denied swearing at Person A, and denied brushing her off when she came for advice or telling her that she was irritating. Under cross-examination, she stated that the only times that Person A had asked for help were the two times she had directly supervised her. She denied being frustrated with her, and denied calling her the things of which she had been accused. She said:

“Q: Well, I suggest to you, Ms Njoku, that you did not like Person A and you did call her a Polish cow, Polish idiot, a swine nose, a stupid old cow, and an old woman.

A: I never called her that. I did not know she was even Polish. Those are words I would never use. Any of the things she is accusing me of, I have never said them — they have never left my mouth.

Q: Do you accept that the comments “Polish cow” and “Polish idiot” are racist comments, Ms Njoku?

A: Those are racist comments, yes — but I never said anything like that

…..

Q: We have her statement from the 22nd of March 2023, and she says the same thing she told us today, that you made these comments.

A: I never made any comments. I have never said any of the things she is accusing me of.

Q: We heard from Person A that she was two to three metres away when the comments were made, and she even told us where—near the nurses’ station and the ward corridors.

A: That is her version. All I can speak to is what happened when I worked with her. As my witness statement says, I supervised her twice. Whatever she is talking about — sitting in a group or corridors — I do not know. I have never worked with her directly other than those two occasions, and I never made those comments.

Q: What reason does she have to lie?

A: I have no idea. I do not know.”

In response to a question from the panel, she stated:

“Q: Yes, and what was the banter like on the ward between the nurses?

A: It was a positive environment. We asked each other questions. Even me — I do not know everything — so I asked senior colleagues for help. We all got along, and it was easy for anyone to ask for help if they needed it. That was the culture on the ward.

Q: Thank you. Was it accepted and normal to have that sort of banter where maybe you are calling somebody a silly cow because they have done something, or general swearing banter or anything like that going on?

A: No, we never had that. We never had that conversation, we never had that banter because that is not professional. (Inaudible) from professionalism, we do not have that banter on the ward. No, we do not — because it is (inaudible) to call someone that. We do not have that kind of banter or conversation. No, we do not.”

Before the panel were also a significant number of character references on the Appellant’s behalf. Two of the referees stated that they were surprised that such allegations had been made against the Appellant, and questioned their truth.

Following the conclusion of the Appellant’s evidence, the Chair of the panel announced to the parties that:

“As will probably have been explained to you during the lunch break, the panel members had a discussion about whether we had sufficient information to be able to reach our conclusions on the facts, and came to the conclusion that actually we do not, or we risk not having sufficiently good information to produce safe conclusions”

The Chair explained that the panel had taken legal advice as to what the panel’s powers were in relation to requiring further investigations to be carried out, and as to the ability to adduce further material. Natalie Byrne, the legal assessor, then reiterated to the parties the advice that she had given, which was to the effect that the panel could direct the NMC to carry out further investigations in certain circumstances, which included, but was not limited to, where information before the panel was obviously incomplete and did not cover all of the areas of concern, or where further information was essential to clarify or expand upon evidence which had already been obtained.

The legal representative for the NMC told the panel that his instructions were that there was no other evidence that the NMC could provide, and nothing in the unused material that would assist. He invited the panel to decide the charges in the evidence before it.

The Appellant’s legal representative also queried how any further evidence would assist. He submitted that he did not believe that introducing additional evidence would aid the panel in its decision. He argued that any further evidence would require the Appellant to be recalled to give evidence and that, given how much time had elapsed since the she had first been referred to a hearing, any further delay would be disproportionate and unfair.

Without giving any ruling on this issue at that stage (the “decision on facts” contained a section dealing with this issue), the panel then proceeded to the fact determination stage. It received legal advice from its legal assessor, and then heard closing submissions on behalf of the NMC and the Appellant.

The following day it handed down its “decision on facts”. It found charges 1, 3 and 4 to be proved, and charge 2 to be not proved.

In essence, the written ruling stated that:

Following the receipt of submissions on misconduct and on impairment, and having received and accepted legal advice from the legal assessor, the panel concluded that the Appellant’s actions “..did fall seriously short of the conduct and standards expected of a nurse and amounted to misconduct”.

It determined that “…a finding of impairment on the basis of public interest grounds is required to mark the seriousness of the misconduct and the importance of maintaining public confidence in the nursing profession. Having regard to all of the above, the panel was satisfied that your fitness to practise is currently impaired on public interest grounds.” It then proceeded to make a suspension order for a period of 12 months.

In her draft Grounds of Appeal of 3 December 2025 the Appellant raised nine grounds:

Shortly before the hearing, however, written submissions were filed on behalf of the Appellant, in which following issues were identified:

It is not necessary to consider all the grounds seriatim. There were only two witnesses before the panel. The grounds all revolve around the same essential issues, namely whether the panel properly assessed the credibility and reliability of Person A’s evidence in reaching its conclusion that it accepted her evidence, and not that of the Appellant’s, and whether it sufficiently explained why. Putting it another way, this appeal challenges the panel’s primary findings of fact and the sufficiency of its reasoning.

In his oral submissions, Mr Nwokedi, who appeared for the Appellant, argued that the panel’s determination had failed to demonstrate a lawful and reasoned evaluative process by which the Respondent had discharged the burden of proving allegations of exceptional seriousness against the Appellant.

Mr Nwokedi made clear that he was not inviting the Court to ask whether it would have reached the same conclusion as the panel. He accepted that the case law emphasised judicial restraint in relation to findings of primary fact. However, the findings rested almost entirely on the uncorroborated evidence of Person A and the panel had failed to engage with or provide adequate reasoning for several material credibility concerns, including that Person A had since been struck off herself for racism and that significant inconsistencies existed within her written statements and oral evidence. 

He submitted that the panel failed to resolve or acknowledge key contradictions in her account including conflicting statements about whether Person A was the only Polish nurse on the ward, whether Person A was singled out or whether other Polish nurses were also subject to alleged comments, and inconsistencies in her narrative about when and where events occurred. 

He argued that the tribunal’s evaluative process had not been clear. Firstly, the panel departed from the factual basis upon which the allegation had been advanced without adequately explaining the inferential reasoning which permitted that departure. Although Person A initially claimed in her statement that the offensive language had been said directly to her by the Appellant, in her evidence she stated that she had overheard the Appellant saying those words to others about her.

Secondly, the credibility and reliability of Person A lay at the heart of the dispute, and the panel had failed to demonstrate through reasoning how it had evaluated her evidence against the contemporaneous material, in particular the email from the Appellant to Ms Delaney of 7 June 2021, or explained why it preferred her account to that of the Appellant.

Thirdly, it was not clear how it could have concluded that the burden of proof had been discharged, when it had openly questioned “whether we had sufficient information to be able to reach our conclusions on the facts, and came to the conclusion that actually we do not, or we risk not having sufficiently good information to produce safe conclusions”.

In the case of Davies v Nursing Midwifery Council [2026] EWHC 1139 Admin, Collins Rice J had approved the legal assessor’s directions to the Panel and the NMC’s Guidance on the assessment of evidence. The court had endorsed the proposition that before embarking upon charge-by-charge fact finding, it is vital that a panel undertake a broad and reasoned assessment of each witness and their evidence. It further stated that the tribunal should not approach the case on an “all or nothing basis” or as a contest been truth and lying, and that it must keep the burden of proof firmly in mind throughout the evaluative exercise. The panel had failed to undertake such an assessment in the present case.

Moreover, it was clear that the panel’s finding on Charge 1 had provided the foundation upon which the findings of fact in relation to Charges 3 and 4 were based. In determining the charge of discrimination on the grounds of race in Charge 3, the panel stated that that it had taken into account all of the evidence before it. After noting, in summary, what Person A had said in evidence, and observing that the Appellant had denied using racist language, the panel referred to the NMC Code and NMC Guidance for the meaning of discrimination and then concluded without more that it “found Person A’s evidence in respect of these charges to be consistent and therefore found on the balance of probabilities that you had discriminated against Person A on the grounds of their race”.

The heart of the panel’s reasoning on the bullying charge, Charge 4, was its conclusion that the Appellant had become frustrated by Person A, and that there was no evidence that her complaints to the ward matron Ms Delany had been followed up on or rectified. On the evidence of both parties, a positive picture of the management culture and environment in the ward had not been painted and, accordingly, “it was more likely than not that the language used in Charge 1 was used to create a hostile and intimidating environment for Person A”.

For the NMC, Assad Badruddin, who appeared on its behalf, argued that the determination of the panel was neither wrong nor unjust. The panel had carried out a careful and thorough forensic analysis when deciding whether the burden of proof was satisfied, given that the allegations were based on conflicting factual accounts.

The Fitness to Practise panel is trained to assess evidence in imperfect clinical environments, where events occur quickly, informally and sometimes without contemporaneous record keeping. These panels include a professional registrant panel member who can provide context regarding these types of circumstances. The contextual matters in this case were not complex and fell plainly within the professional expertise of the panel. An appropriate level of deference must be granted to regulatory panels in this regard.

There is no rule in NMC proceedings that allegations of racism, bullying or inappropriate conduct of any kind, must be supported by independent witnesses, documentary evidence or contemporaneous complaints before findings can be properly made. The panel was entitled to make its findings on the balance of probabilities based upon the direct evidence of Person A as a sole witness.

The Appellant’s challenge to the reliability and credibility of Person A amounted to a disagreement with the panel’s factual consideration, rather than an identification of any procedural or legal error. The panel was best placed to hear the oral evidence and assess credibility first hand, and therefore entitled to accept Person A’s account.

The panel conducted a careful examination of her credibility, whilst demonstrating a meaningful analysis of the limited wider evidence concerning the involvement of senior management. It undertook a careful assessment of Person A’s evidence, asked her relevant questions following her cross examination and specifically addressed the issue of her credibility in its determination.

Person A’s account of where and when the incidents occurred remained consistent throughout the proceedings. Her inability to recall specific dates was not fatal to the outcome of the panel’s decision, and nor did it amount to an error in law, procedural irregularity or render the decision unfair.

The fact that Person A had been removed from the register for discriminatory conduct did not provide a proper basis for assuming dishonesty, a general lack of integrity, or unreliability, and there were no material inconsistencies within her evidence. The panel was entitled to conclude that her evidence was credible. At the same time, the panel was entitled to consider the Appellant not to be a credible witness.

The Appellant’s submission that Person A’s account was contradicted by senior management was unfounded. There was no witness statement or documentary evidence from senior management asserting that concerns had never been raised by Person A, and nor was there any evidence demonstrating that formal or informal complaints had not been escalated.

Neither the legal framework nor the relevant legal principles are in dispute. The principal legislation governing the disciplinary functions of the NMC and its Fitness to Practise Committee is the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001. Article 3(4) of the 2001 Order sets out that the over-arching objective of the NMC in exercising its functions is the protection of the public. The proceedings of the Fitness to Practise Committee are governed by the Nursery and Midwifery Council (Fitness to Practise) Rules 2004.

Article 38 of the 2001 Order allow a registrant to appeal against an order made by a panel of the Fitness to Practise Committee. Article 38(3) provides as follows:

“(3)

The Court or sheriff may—

(a)

dismiss the appeal;

(b)

allow the appeal and quash the decision appealed against;

(c)

substitute for the decision appealed against any other decision the Fitness to Practise Committee or the Council, as the case may be, could have made; or

(d)

remit the case to the Fitness to Practise Committee or Council, as the case may be, to be disposed of in accordance with the directions of the court or sheriff, and may make such order as to costs (or, in Scotland, expenses) as it, or he, as the case may be, thinks fit.”

In R (Rice) v HPC (2011) EWHC 1649 , Lindblom J held that an appeal of this kind falls within the provisions of CPR Rule 52.11(3), which states:

“(3)

The appeal court will allow the appeal where the decision of the lower court was: –

(a)

wrong; or

(b)

unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the lower court.”

In General Medical Council v Jagjivan [2017] 1 WLR 4438, the High Court gave guidance on the approach to be taken by the court on appeals brought under section 40A of the Medical Act 1983 against findings of fact made by the Medical Practitioners Tribunal. A similar approach is to be taken on appeals under Article 38 of the 2001 Order: Laura Hindle v The Nursing and Midwifery Council [2025] EWHC 373 (Admin) at [40]-[42]. The High Court held in Jagivan, at [40]:

“40.

In summary:

(i)

Proceedings under section 40A of the 1983 Act are appeals and are governed by CPR Pt 52. A court will allow an appeal under CPR Pt 52.21(3) if it is “wrong” or “unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court”.

(ii)

It is not appropriate to add any qualification to the test in CPR Pt 52 that decisions are “clearly wrong”: see Raschid's case at para 21 and Meadow's case at paras 125–128.

(iii)

The court will correct material errors of fact and of law: see Raschid's case at para 20. Any appeal court must however be extremely cautious about upsetting a conclusion of primary fact, particularly where the findings depend upon the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, who the Tribunal, unlike the appellate court, has had the advantage of seeing and hearing: see Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group (Practice Note) [2003] 1 WLR 577, paras 15–17, cited with approval in Datec Electronics Holdings Ltd v United Parcels Service Ltd [2007] 1 WLR 1325, para 46, and Southall's case at para 47.

(iv)

When the question is what inferences are to be drawn from specific facts, an appellate court is under less of a disadvantage. The court may draw any inferences of fact which it considers are justified on the evidence: see CPR Pt 52.11(4) .

(v)

In regulatory proceedings the appellate court will not have the professional expertise of the Tribunal of fact. As a consequence, the appellate court will approach Tribunal determinations about whether conduct is serious misconduct or impairs a person's fitness to practise, and what is necessary to maintain public confidence and proper standards in the profession and sanctions, with diffidence: see Raschid's case at para 16; and Khan v General Pharmaceutical Council [2017] 1 WLR 169, para 36.

(vi)

However there may be matters, such as dishonesty or sexual misconduct, where the court “is likely to feel that it can assess what is needed to protect the public or maintain the reputation of the profession more easily for itself and thus attach less weight to the expertise of the Tribunal …”: see Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals v General Medical Council and Southall [2005] EWHC 579 (Admin) at [11], and Khan's case at para 36. As Lord Millett observed in Ghosh v General Medical Council [2001] 1 WLR 1915, para 34, the appellate court “will accord an appropriate measure of respect to the judgment of the committee … But the [appellate court] will not defer to the committee's judgment more than is warranted by the circumstances”.

(vii)

Matters of mitigation are likely to be of considerably less significance in regulatory proceedings than to a court imposing retributive justice, because the overarching concern of the professional regulator is the protection of the public.

(viii)

A failure to provide adequate reasons may constitute a serious procedural irregularity which renders the Tribunal's decision unjust: see Southall's case at paras 55–56.”

The degree of caution that an appellate court must exercise when reviewing matters of primary fact has long been recognised. In Southall v General Medical Council [2010] EWCA Civ 407, the Court of Appeal observed, at [47]:

“47.

How is this submission to be approached? First, as a matter of general law, it is very well established that findings of primary fact, particularly if founded upon an assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are virtually unassailable (see Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] AC 370); more recently, the test has been put that an appellant must establish that the fact-finder was plainly wrong (per Stuart-Smith LJ in National Justice Cia Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The Ikarian Reefer) [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 455 at 458). Further, the court should only reverse a finding on the facts if it “can be shown that the findings … were sufficiently out of tune with the evidence to indicate with reasonable certainty that the evidence had been misread” (per Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone LC in Libman v General Medical Council [1972] AC 217 at 221F more recently confirmed in R(Campbell) v General Medical Council [2005] 1 WLR 3488 at [23] per Judge LJ). Finally, in Gupta v General Medical Council [2002] 1 WLR 1691, Lord Rodger put the matter in this way (at [10] page 1697D):

“In all such cases the appeal court readily acknowledges that the first instance body enjoys an advantage which the appeal court does not have, precisely because that body is in a better position to judge the credibility and reliability of the evidence given by the witnesses. In some appeals that advantage may not be significant since the witnesses' credibility and reliability are not in issue. But in many cases the advantage is very significant and the appeal court recognises that it should accordingly be slow to interfere with the decisions on matters of fact taken by the first instance body. This reluctance to interfere is not due to any lack of jurisdiction to do so. Rather, in exercising its full jurisdiction, the appeal court acknowledges that, if the first instance body has observed the witnesses and weighed their evidence, its decision on such matters is more likely to be correct than any decision of a court which cannot deploy those factors when assessing the position…””

Further guidance was provided by the Court of Appeal in Sastry v General Medical Council [2021] EWCA Civ 623, at [102]-[103] on the proper approach to be applied on appeals under section 40 and 40A of the Medical Act 1983 and, by extension, Article 38 appeals. Giving the judgment of the court, Nicola Davies LJ stated:

“104.

In Khan [2017] 1 WLR 169 at para 36 Lord Wilson JSC, having accepted that an appellate court must approach a challenge to the sanction imposed by a professional disciplinary committee with diffidence, approved the approach and test identified by Lord Millett at para 34 of Ghosh.

105.

It follows from the above that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ghosh, approved by the Supreme Court in Khan, had identified the test on section 40 appeals as being whether the sanction was “wrong” and the approach at the hearing, which was appellate and not supervisory, as being whether the sanction imposed was appropriate and necessary in the public interest or was excessive and disproportionate.

106.

In Jagjivan [2017] 1 WLR 4438 the court considered the correct approach to appeals under section 40A. At para 39 Sharp LJ accepted that the “well-settled principles” developed in relation to section 40 appeals “as appropriately modified, can be applied to section 40A appeals”. At para 40, Sharp LJ acknowledged that the appellate court will approach tribunals’ determinations as to misconduct or impairment and what is necessary to maintain public confidence and proper standards in the profession and sanctions with diffidence. However, at para 40(vi), citing para 36 of Khan and the observations of Lord Millett at para 34 of Ghosh, she identified matters such as dishonesty or sexual misconduct as being matters where the court is likely to feel that it can assess what is needed to protect the public or maintain the reputation of the profession more easily for itself and thus attach less weight to the expertise of the tribunal.

107.

The court in Bawa-Garba [2019] 1 WLR 1929 (a section 40A appeal) at para 60 identified the task of the High Court on an appeal pursuant to section 40 or section 40A as being whether the decision of the MPT is “wrong”. At para 67 the court identified the approach of the appellate court as being supervisory in nature, in particular in respect of an evaluative decision, whether it fell “outside the bounds of what the adjudicative body could properly and reasonably decide”. It was this approach which was followed by the judge in the appeal of Dr Sastry and which led to the ground of appeal upon which Leggatt LJ granted permission. In so granting, Leggatt LJ stated that there was a real issue as to whether the judge deferred unduly to the panel's view by approaching the appeal, in effect, as a challenge to the exercise of a discretion when arguably the judge was required to exercise her own judgment as to whether the sanction imposed was excessive and disproportionate. The words and reasoning of Leggatt LJ reflect the approach of the court to section 40 appeals identified in Ghosh and approved in Khan.

108.

We endorse the approach of the court in Bawa-Garba , as appropriate to the review jurisdiction applicable in section 40A appeals. We regard the approach of the court in section 40 appeals, as identified in Ghosh and approved in Khan , as appropriate in section 40 appeals which are by way of a rehearing.”

In Shabir v General Medical Council [2023] EWHC 1772 (admin), Mrs Justice Hill observed:

“12.

The degree of deference shown to the court below will differ depending on the nature of the issue below, namely whether the issue is one of primary fact, of secondary fact, or rather an evaluative judgment of many factors. The governing principle remains that set out in Gupta at [10], such that the starting point is that the appeal court will be very slow to interfere with findings of primary fact of the court below: Byrne at [12] and [13].

13.

Findings of fact, particularly if founded on an assessment of the credibility of witnesses, were described by Leveson LJ in Southall v General Medical Council [2010] 2 FLR 1550 at [47] as "virtually unassailable", but this is not to be read as meaning that it is "practically impossible" to challenge them: Byrne at [14], citing R (Dutta) v General Medical Council [2020] EWHC 1974 (Admin) at [22].

14.

As Morris J explained in Byrne at [15], the circumstances in which the appeal court will interfere with primary findings of fact have been formulated in a number of different ways:

(i)

Where "any advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial judge's conclusions": per Lord Thankerton in Thomas v Thomas [1947] AC 484 approved in Gupta;

(ii)

Findings "sufficiently out of the tune with the evidence to indicate with reasonable certainty that the evidence had been misread" per Lord Hailsham in Libman v General Medical Council [1972] AC 217;

(iii)

Findings "plainly wrong or so out of tune with the evidence properly read as to be unreasonable": per Girvan LJ in Casey v General Medical Council [2011]NIQB 95 at [6] and Warby J (as he then was) in Dutta at [21](7); and

(iv)

Where there is "no evidence to support a…finding of fact or the trial judge's finding was one which no reasonable judge could have reached": per Lord Briggs in Perry v Raleys Solicitors [2019] UKSC 5.

15.

Morris J considered that the distinction between the last two of these formulations was a "fine" one. To the extent that there was a difference, he adopted, in the Appellant's favour, the former: Byrne at [15].

16.

Having reviewed the authorities, he distilled the following principles in relation to the credibility and reliability of witnesses:

"17.

First, the credibility of witnesses must take account of the unreliability of memory and should be considered and tested by reference to objective facts, and in particular as shown in contemporaneous documents. Where possible, factual findings should be based on objective facts as shown by contemporaneous documents: Dutta §§39 to 42 citing, in particular, Gestmin and Lachaux .

18.

Secondly, nevertheless, in assessing the reliability and credibility of witnesses, whilst there are different schools of thought, I consider that, if relevant, demeanour might in an appropriate case be a significant factor and the lower court is best placed to assess demeanour: Despite the doubts expressed in Dutta §42 and Khan §110, the balance of authority supports this view: Gupta §18 and Southall at §59.

19.

Thirdly, corroborating documentary evidence is not always required or indeed available. There may not be much or any such documentary evidence. In a case where the evidence consists of conflicting oral accounts, the court may properly place substantial reliance upon the oral evidence of the complainant (in preference to that of the defendant/appellant): Chyc at §23. There is no rule that corroboration of a patient complainant's evidence is required: see Muscat §83 and Mubarak §20.

20.

Fourthly, in a case where the complainant provides an oral account, and there is a flat denial from the other person concerned, and little or no independent evidence, it is commonplace for there to be inconsistency and confusion in some of the detail. Nevertheless the task of the court below is to consider whether the core allegations are true: Mubarak at §20".

17.

He also observed that where an allegation is met with a "simple denial", the "credibility of the denial can only be assessed by reference to the credibility of the evidence supporting the allegation which is denied": Byrne at [113].”

As for the duty to give reasons, Mrs Justice Hill further observed:

“18.

As to the duty to give reasons:

(i)

The purpose of a duty to give reasons is to enable the losing party to know why they have lost and to allow them to consider whether to appeal: English v Emery Reimbold & Strick [2002] 1 WLR 2409 at [16] and Byrne at [24].

(ii)

It will be satisfied if, having regard to the issues and the nature and content of the evidence, reasons for the decision are apparent, either because they are set out in terms or because they can readily be inferred from the overall form and content of the decision: English at [26] and Byrne at [24];

(iii)

There is no duty on a tribunal, in giving reasons, to deal with every argument made in submissions: English at [17]-[18];

(iv)

In a straightforward case, setting out the facts to be proved and finding them proved or not will generally be sufficient both to demonstrate to the parties why they have won or lost and to explain to any appellate tribunal the facts found: Southall at [56] and Gupta at [13];

(v)

Where the case is not straightforward and can properly be described as "exceptional", the position will be different: a few sentences dealing with "salient issues" may be essential: Southall at [56];

(vi)

Specific reasons for disbelieving a practitioner are not required in every case that is not straightforward: Byrne at [119]; and

(vii)

Where a Tribunal's stated reasons are not clear, the court should look at the underlying materials to seek to understand its reasoning and to identify reasons which cogently justify the decision. An appeal should not be allowed on grounds of inadequacy of reasons unless, even with the benefit of knowledge of the evidence and submissions made below, it is not possible for the appeal court to understand why the tribunal reach the decision it did: English at [89] and [118] Byrne at [27].”

Given that the panel was confronted by two witnesses who gave diametrically opposed accounts, it needed to carry out a careful and thorough assessment of the reliability and credibility of Person A’s account, both internally and by reference to any external evidence, such as the June 2021 email and the Appellant’s evidence, in order to decide whether the burden of proof was satisfied on the core allegation concerning the Appellant’s alleged use of offensive language. The need for the burden of proof to be discharged is particularly important where the evidence in support of the allegation consists of uncorroborated assertions by a single witness. It then needed to set out its analysis.

Such an approach would have been consistent with the NMC’s Guidance to its Fitness to Practise panels on assessing evidence (DMA-6), which enjoins panels in the following way:

“The objective and reliable approach is to focus on the content of a person’s evidence. A panel will need to carefully consider issues such as:

• whether the evidence is consistent with contemporaneous evidence;

• whether it’s consistent with admitted or incontrovertible facts;

• whether the evidence is internally consistent;

• whether it’s consistent with previous accounts;

• whether it’s supported by other evidence;

• how probable or plausible it is;

• the possible motive of the person giving evidence;

• the potential for mistake or unconscious bias.

Panels should consider whether evidence is plausible and consistent with objectively verifiable evidence (including evidence of what the witness has said on other occasions) and with known or probable facts. They should start with the objective facts as shown by authentic, contemporaneous documents, independent of the person giving evidence, and use oral evidence to test it”

In my judgment, the reasoning of the panel failed to demonstrate that it had carried out a careful and thorough assessment of the reliability and credibility of Person A’s account, both internally and by reference to the other evidence. The Appellant was entitled to the benefit of any proper doubt that flowed from a thorough and comprehensive weighing up of the evidence. It was not enough for the panel to state that it regarded Person A’s evidence as credible and consistent and that it therefore accepted her evidence.

The panel failed to set out a sufficient analysis of what it made of:

I am also very troubled by how the panel could have concluded that the burden of proof was discharged, when it had openly stated its “conclusion”, after hearing the oral evidence, that it did not have sufficient information to be able to reach its conclusions on the facts, and that it risked not having sufficiently good information to produce safe conclusions.

I bear in mind the limited appellate role of the court, and the fact that the Panel had the considerable benefit, which I have not had, of seeing the witnesses give live evidence. It was therefore better placed, on the face of it, than I am to assess their credibility and reliability. Had the reasoning demonstrated a proper assessment of their credibility and reliability, I would have been very slow to set aside its findings.

However, public confidence in this process is, in part, maintained by ensuring that disciplinary findings are reached through a demonstrably fair, transparent and legally coherent process. In the particular circumstances of this case, I am driven to the conclusion that the panel’s determination was based on a legally unsustainable approach and did not fairly explain why it found the core allegations in Charge 1 proved.

I further accept the submission from Mr Nwokedi that the panel’s findings on Charge 1 provided the foundation upon which the findings of fact in relation to Charges 3 and 4 were based, and that, therefore, if the determination on Charge 1 is to be quashed, so must those on Charges 3 and 4.

For all these reasons, I am satisfied that each of the panel’s findings of fact on Charges 1, 3 and 4 were “wrong” within the meaning of CPR 52.21(3). The appeal is allowed, and the decision of the Fitness to Practise Committee is quashed, along with the sanction.

The issue arises as to whether this matter should be remitted for a re-hearing in front of a differently constituted panel. At the conclusion of the oral argument, I invited Mr Nwokedi to indicate what disposal he was seeking in the event that the court were to allow the appeal. He submitted of course that the matter should not be remitted.

Mr Badruddin submits for the NMC that the matters alleged against the Appellant are serious, given that they concern the abuse, discrimination and bullying of a nursing colleague. He argues that the public interest in the determination of allegations, in the maintenance of high professional standards and in the proper regulation of healthcare professionals requires that the allegations against the Appellant are subject to determination and therefore that the allegations must be remitted for hearing (other than the matter which formed the basis of charge 2).

The court has a discretion as to whether to order that the matters be remitted. That discretion has to be exercised having regard both to the purpose of the regulatory regime and to the interests of fairness and justice.

In order to maintain high professional standards and to uphold the public interest in the proper regulation of healthcare professionals, allegations against such professionals ought generally to be determined once investigated. Those complaining of misconduct have an important interest in their allegations being determined before a panel. For their part, those accused of misconduct also have an interest in a proper determination which not only provides for the upholding of allegations against those properly accused but also for the definitive dismissal of allegations against those wrongly accused.

However, a further factor is the public interest in finality of proceedings and in the prompt determination of allegations against healthcare professionals. The events in question may have taken place even longer ago than June 2021, judging by the email sent to Ms Delaney, and the referral into the Appellant was not opened until February 2023. A considerable amount of time has therefore elapsed, and it is not likely that a fresh panel will be quickly convened. Moreover, the Appellant has been suspended for over 8 months.

I acknowledge that the body primarily charged with determining what the public interest requires is the body to which Parliament has given the role of regulating the profession in question, namely the NMC. However, it would not be right, given the requirements of fairness and of justice, to remit this matter back for a fresh hearing. In allowing the appeal I therefore further order that the matter not be remitted back to a Fitness to Practise Committee for a re-hearing.