His Majesty's Attorney General for England and Wales v Alvida Harrold

The Attorney General applies for a civil proceedings order (CPO) pursuant to section 42 Senior Courts Act 1981 against the Respondent, Mrs Alvida Harrold. The following associated applications are also before the Court for determination:

Mrs Harrold was employed by the Trust as a nurse from 2001 until her dismissal in December 2005. After her dismissal, the Trust referred Mrs Harrold to the NMC, the regulator for the nursing and midwifery profession in the UK. The NMC struck Mrs Harrold off its register on 22 October 2009. She remains struck off the register, having failed in her appeal against the decision to the High Court in 2016.

Mrs Harrold has been litigating, or attempting to litigate, her dismissal and strike-off since at least 2006. Between 2006 – 2014 she brought fifteen claims in the Employment Tribunal. The vast majority of the claims were against the Trust and NMC and allege, in the main, victimisation, discrimination and unfair dismissal. During the same period, she has pursued appeals against decisions of the Employment Tribunal to the Employment Appeals Tribunal and the Court of Appeal as well as bringing claims in the County Court. She has been largely unsuccessful in her endeavours.

Since May 2016 she has been subject to a General Civil Restraint Order (GCRO) preventing her from issuing a claim or application in the Employment Tribunal, the Employment Appeals Tribunal, any County Court or the High Court without first obtaining the permission of a nominated High Court Judge. The GCRO remains in force having been extended on six occasions.

As well as litigation Mrs Harrold has made complaints to courts, tribunals and legal regulators, about the legal representatives of the NMC and the Trust. The complaints make wide-ranging allegations of dishonesty and discrimination. She has sought to initiate criminal proceedings against some of the individuals.

By its application the Attorney General contends that the criteria for a civil proceedings order are satisfied in that Mrs Harrold has pursued vexatious litigation habitually and persistently. Mrs Harrold opposes the application.

This judgment is in five parts as follows:

Section 42 Senior Courts Act 1981 provides, in relevant part as follows:

“42(1) If, on an application made by the Attorney General under this section, the High Court is satisfied that any person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground—

(a)

instituted vexatious civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or the family court or any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; or

(b)

made vexatious applications in any civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or the family court or any inferior court, and whether instituted by him or another; or

(c)

instituted vexatious prosecutions (whether against the same person or different persons), the court may, after hearing that person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, make a civil proceedings order, a criminal proceedings order or an all proceedings order.

(1A)

In this section—

“civil proceedings order” means an order that—

(a)

no civil proceedings shall without the leave of the High Court be instituted in any court by the person against whom the order is made;

(b)

any civil proceedings instituted by him in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the High Court; and

(c)

no application (other than one for leave under this section) shall be made by him, in any civil proceedings instituted in any court by any person, without the leave of the High Court;

…

(2)

An order under subsection (1) may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.”

It is clear from the terms of section 42 itself and the authorities which have considered it that being subject to a CPO is more restrictive than either a general or an extended restraint order. It is a draconian order and the tests for one to be made are, measured against the civil standard, understandably a high bar. The test required by section 42 can be broken down into three elements. Firstly, the need to establish that there have been vexatious legal proceedings. Secondly, that these have been instituted “habitually or persistently”. Thirdly, the proceedings must have been commenced in the High Court or any inferior court.

In Attorney General v Covey [2001] EWCA Civ 254 the Court of Appeal addressed the question of the relationship of orders under section 42 of the 1981 Act and article 6 of the ECHR. The correct approach to the submissions made in connection with article 6 was identified by Lord Woolf CJ in paragraphs 60 and 61 as follows:

“60.

In considering the validity of these submissions it is useful to refer to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Tolstoy Miloslavsky v United Kingdon (1999)20 EHRR 442. In that case the court said:

“59.

The Court reiterates that the right of access secured by Article 6(1) may be subject to limitations in the form of regulation by the State. In this respect the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation. However, the Court must be satisfied, firstly, that the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is being impaired. Secondly, a restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aims sought to be achieved.”

61.

Guided by what was said by the European Court in that case, I have no doubt that the Divisional Court was right to come to the decision which it did. By choosing different targets for his litigation, Dr Matthews caused a variety of different defendants to suffer some disadvantage by litigation. But in deciding whether the conditions set out in section 42 are met, it is necessary to look at the whole picture. It is the cumulative effect of Dr Matthews activities, both against the individuals who are drawn into the proceedings and on the administration of justice generally that has to be taken into account. When this is done, I have no doubt that to make an order against Dr Matthews does pursue a legitimate aim and that there is a reasonable relationship and proportionality between the means employed and the aims sought to be achieved. Furthermore, because of the ability of the court to give permission for the bringing of any proceedings which are justified, the limitation which is imposed does not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual to an extent that the very essence of the right of access to justice is removed.”

Dealing firstly with the requirement that the proceedings must have been vexatious, guidance was provided by Lord Bingham CJ in the case of Attorney-General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759 when he stated as follows:

“19.

… The hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is in my judgment that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process.”

Turning to the question of whether a claimant may have instituted proceedings “habitually or persistently”, the following features of the conduct of litigation may well be indications that this condition has been met. The repeated suing of a party for the same cause of action arising out of the same or similar factual matrix after the essential complaint has already been ruled upon may be an example of this behaviour. The repetitive bringing of proceedings is likely to impose an unreasonable burden arising out of the need to continually revisit the claim. Pursuing the same cause of action repetitively, save with minor variations, against successive parties when the claims ought to have all been joined in the same claim may also evidence this behaviour. Persistently appealing each adverse decision which is reached in litigation without reference to the potential merits of any appeal is a further potential example of behaviour which could support a finding that proceedings have been engaged with “habitually or persistently”. A further feature of this behaviour could be a refusal to take notice of or give effect to the orders of the court during a protracted campaign of litigation. In considering this condition of making a CPO the court will take account of the cumulative effect of the claimant’s conduct of the cases in question as well as having regard to the impact of that conduct on the administration of justice.

The final condition requires the court to be satisfied that the vexatious proceedings have been brought in the High Court “or any other inferior court”.

The factual background is extensive, spanning twenty years of litigation by Mrs Harrold. It may be most conveniently summarised by reference to previous judgments of the High Court which are concerned, in the main, with the successive GCRO applications. The first of these judgments was in 2016 by Laing J (as she then was) ([2016] EWHC 1078 (QB)). In her judgment Laing J addresses the litigation by Mrs Harrold from 2006 – 2014 in the Employment Tribunal. The second of theses judgments is that of Jay J in 2016 ([2016] EWHC 3027 (Admin)) deals with Mrs Harrold’s appeal against being struck off the nursing register and explains the background to her dismissal by the Trust and subsequent strike off from the register.

The first substantive consideration of the GCRO was by Laing J in a judgment handed down in 2016. The judgment is at [2016] EWHC 1078 (QB). The essential facts found by Laing J were as follows.

Mrs Harrold had brought a series of fifteen claims against the NMC, the Trust and others, mostly in the Employment Tribunal, including for discrimination, victimisation and unfair dismissal. The 14^th and 15^th claims had been stayed pending determination of the application before Laing J for a GCRO. Mrs Harrold had also brought appeals and sought review of some decisions and the resulting costs orders. The proceedings had for the most part been determined against Mrs Harrold. Laing J found that many of Mrs Harrold’s claims against the NMC and the Trust, had been totally without merit. The 14^th and 15^th claims either sought to revive grievances in respect of which decisions had already been made or made claims which were not remotely likely to succeed. Laing J considered they were also totally without merit. Laing J concluded that the test for the making of a GCRO was met. A 2-year GCRO was made.

Mrs Harrold applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal against Laing J’s decision. This was itself refused as totally without merit by Sales LJ (as he then was) in September 2017.

Following Laing J’s findings in relation to the 14^th and 15^th employment claims as being totally without merit, the Trust and NMC applied to the Employment Tribunal to list the 14^th and 15^th claims for dismissal. Mrs Harrold resisted the application. Employment Judge Livesey dismissed the claims and ordered Mrs Harrold to pay a contribution towards the costs of the Trust and the NMC.

Mrs Harrold’s appeal against her striking off by the NMC was dismissed by Jay J following a hearing at which she was represented by counsel. The judgement is at R(Harrold) v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2016] EWHC 3027 (Admin).

Jay J sets out the background to (and reasons for) her striking off as follows.

“5.

[The appellant] had written an open letter dated 31 August 2004 to “all the patients on the dialysis unit.”

6.

The letter complained of the conduct of the appellant’s unit manager who … had subjected her to “harassment and victimisation”. … At the end of the letter … the appellant stated “please ensure that everyone see [sic] this letter.”

15.

… In my judgment, the CC found that the appellant was in breach of three provisions of the NMC Code … in four overlapping respects: namely, (1) putting her own concerns before considerations of the health and welfare of patients; (2) taking actions which had the potential to cause significant distress to patients; (3) failing to observe professional boundaries and, (4) failing to cooperate with colleagues.

16.

The CCC further found on the same occasion that the appellant’s fitness to practise was impaired. There was no evidence of remorse, contrition, apology or willingness to learn from past mistakes. Instead, the appellant had embarked on a course of extensive litigation against the Trust …

17.

… “the Registrant’s misconduct [is] fundamentally incompatible with continuing to be registered on the NCM.”

In the course of his judgment Jay J referred to the “plethora of litigation” brought by Mrs Harrold as “betokening a continuing lack of insight” and being a factor relevant to her strike off.

Mrs Harrold sought permission to appeal against Jay J’s dismissal, which was refused by Sales LJ.

On 4 May 2018, Foskett J granted an extension of the GCRO for an initial period of 6 months after which he directed it would continue for a further period of 18 months unless Mrs Harrold had by a particular date set out in writing why it was no longer required.

In the course of his judgment Foskett J found that:

“23.

It is quite plain … that [the Respondent] wishes to revisit the making of the GCRO by Laing J and at least some of the previous decisions of other tribunals that she examined in her judgment”

He concluded that an extension of the GCRO was appropriate because:

“29.

… Without the filter that such an order provides the Applicants (who have not recovered any of the costs awarded in their favour against the Respondent) will be vexed with further applications and proceedings in relation to issues that have previously been concluded and determined and the court and the ET will be wasting time and resources on maters that should not be ventilated”.

Although Foskett J was ‘strongly inclined’ to make the order for a further two years he drew back from doing so as Mrs Harrold was said to be unfit to attend the hearing. He made the order for 6 months.

By an order dated 6 November 2018, Warby J (as he then was) directed that the GCRO remained in place until 6 May 2020. His reasons for the Order include the following:

“3.

… The thrust of the Respondent’s submission is that the original GCRO of 2016 was obtained fraudulently. The arguments and evidence in support of that submission have all the flavour of the kind of vexatious conduct that must have been the foundation of the GCROs against this Respondent. But I do not need to determine whether those arguments have any merit. They are backward-looking arguments. As such they are not reasons why a GCRO should not be imposed or ‘is not required’ for the future.”

Following the Order dated 6 November 2018 Mrs Harrold made representations to the Court contending the Order was wrong. Further similar submissions were made by her in February 2019 and were addressed to both Warby and Laing JJ.

An application by Mrs Harrold to discharge the GCRO and applications by the Trust/NMC to extend the GCRO were considered by Chamberlain J in 2020. His judgment is at [2020] EWHC 1108 (QB). In the course of his judgment Chamberlain J observed as follows:

“48.

Having heard Mrs Harrold's submissions, I have no doubt that she honestly believes herself to be the victim of a campaign of persecution by the NMC, the Trust and their legal teams. There is no foundation to this belief, but it has nonetheless hardened into an obsession, which has been fuelled rather than dampened by the application for a GCRO. Mrs Harrold has been undeterred by the GCRO from seeking to find ways of relitigating matters that have been conclusively determined against her. The history of this litigation suggests that her vexatious tendencies become manifest particularly, though by no means exclusively, when it is necessary to consider renewal of the GCRO. On each occasion, the NMC and the Trust have to devote substantial resources to the application, as does the court. Costs orders have been made against Mrs Harrold on many occasions, but she has never satisfied any of them; and they have not deterred her from further vexatious litigation. I will therefore direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to the Attorney General, so that she can consider whether it is appropriate to apply to the court under s. 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 for an "all proceedings" order without limit of time.”

Chamberlain J made an order extending the GCRO for a further two years.

Mrs Harrold sought permission to appeal the order of Chamberlain J. Permission was refused by Lewison LJ. In his reasons the judge commented that Mrs Harrold was seeking to reopen the merits of the decision of Laing J which amounted to a collateral attack on a previous refusal of her appeal by Sales LJ and constituted an abuse of the process of the courts. He went on to state that

“5.

So far as a reference to the Attorney-General is concerned it is clear that the Respondents have been put to considerable expenses by the need to renew the GCRO from time to time. The reference to the Attorney-General was an entire proper exercise of the judge’s discretion. I agree with it and I direct that this order also be referred to the Attorney-General for consideration whether an application should be made under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981”

In 2022, Saini J extended the GCRO for a further two years. The judgment is at [2022] EWHC 1048 (QB). Saini J set out the history of Mrs Harrold’s past conduct up to and including the judgment of Chamberlain J. He set out the conduct of Mrs Harrold upon circulation of the draft judgment by Chamberlain J including ongoing correspondence with the judge and suggestions of bias on his part before stating:

“25.

This letter demonstrates a clear link between Mrs Harrold’s inability to accept the judgment of the Court with her ongoing desire to re-litigate historic matters (aligned to the allegations against the Applicants’ legal teams).

…

30.

Mrs Harrold’s conduct reflects an attitude of refusing to accept the finality of decisions. As Mrs Harrold said herself, she will not accept the judgment of Chamberlain J. The evidence amply demonstrates that she will continue to exploit any opportunities to challenge previous decisions made against her. This has been and continues to be, a drain on the resources of the Court and has significant time and cost implications for the Trust and the NMC. Substantial cost order remains unpaid”.

Saini J concluded as follows:

“47.

Applying the test in CPR 3C PD §4.10, in my judgment it is “appropriate” to extend the GCRO. Like Chamberlain J, I have concluded that given the number of courts and tribunals in which Mrs Harrold has sought to litigate, a GCRO (as opposed to a different form of order) is as necessary now as it was when made by Laing J and extended by a number of High Court judges. Given the length of time for which Mrs Harrold has been litigating and her enthusiasm for litigating the points already decided against her, an order for the maximum duration of 2 years is justified. Since the bulk of her claims have been brought in the Employment Tribunal, it is also necessary to make an order pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction, preventing her from litigating in that forum or in the Employment Appeal Tribunal without the permission of the High Court. That is in addition to the usual order pursuant to CPR 3C PD, which requires the permission of the High Court for any claim in a county court or the High Court. I will direct that the GCRO makes provision for her to apply to vary or to set it aside given that she did not attend the hearing.”

On 30 April 2024, the GCRO was extended by Eyre J until 29 April 2027. We have seen the order of Eyre J but not the accompanying ex tempore judgment explaining his reasons for the extension.

Mrs Harrold subsequently applied to the Court of Appeal for an extension of time to appeal the decision to grant the GCRO and for permission to appeal. In refusing permission to appeal and certifying the appeal as totally without merit Warby LJ referred to two of the grounds of appeal as:

“3.

… Attempts to relitigate issues on which the court had previously adjudicated…these grounds of appeal serve as further illustrations of the problem which this order was designed to address, namely Mrs Harrold’s obsession with a perceived injustice in the past. These grounds represent an abuse of the court’s process and are totally without merit”.

By application dated 26 March 2025 Mrs Harrold applied for permission to set aside the order of Warby LJ. She contended that a sentence in the order of Warby LJ that “Mrs Harrold remains struck off but is applying for restoration” was a false misrepresentation of facts and fraudulent. The matter was said to require criminal investigation. The application was preceded by an email to the Civil Appeals Office referring to this being an ‘offensive’ comment and to demonstrate injustice being perpetuated against Mrs Harrold not just by the Trust and NMC but the Courts. There was said to have been a clear cover up of dishonest conduct and the court had failed to properly and fairly deal with the continuing unlawful 13 year strike off and mismanagement of applications. The result was a continuing injustice by the courts and the judicial system.

The hearing of the Attorney General’s application was listed for hearing on 19 November 2025. By an email timed at 17.46 on 18 November, Mrs Harrold emailed the Administrative Court Office to request an adjournment on the basis she had secured legal representation, but her barrister needed time to prepare for the hearing.

The application was considered at the start of the hearing on 19 November.

In oral submissions, Mrs Harrold explained to the Court that she had been trying unsuccessfully for many months to identify legal representation to assist her at the hearing. The proceedings are complex and stressful and have been ongoing for sixteen years. The proceedings are affecting her mental health. She had identified a barrister that could help her. She needed the help to get herself restored to the nursing register and the barrister in question was a regulatory specialist who could approach the NMC on her behalf.

In submissions on behalf of the Attorney-General opposing the application Mr Carey submitted that Mrs Harrold’s focus in securing legal representation was on restoration to the nursing register which was not central to this Court’s consideration of the statutory criteria for the imposition of the order sought pursuant to section 42 Senior Courts Act. A civil proceedings order would not prevent her from returning to court, albeit it would require permission from the Court to do so.

Having risen to reflect on the submissions we informed the parties of our decision to refuse the application for an adjournment. We gave brief reasons with full reasons to follow in our judgment which are as follows.

The overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules is to enable the Court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost (CPR1.1). It has taken a considerable period of time for the Attorney-General’s application, which was issued in March 2022, to come to court, albeit through no fault of the parties. Mrs Harrold has had plenty of notice the hearing date. The application had previously been listed for hearing on 2 July 2025 before being vacated due to lack of judicial availability and re-listed for 19 November 2025. The correspondence from counsel exhibited by Mrs Harrold merely indicates that the barrister will accept instructions by direct access. No signed terms have been provided to indicate he has been engaged. Moreover, it is apparent from her submissions that the thrust of her reasons for seeking legal advice is in relation to her attempts to get herself restored to the nursing register. This is not central to the criteria which the Court is obliged to determine for the purposes of the Attorney-General’s application. In any event, any imposition of a civil proceedings order will not prevent Mrs Harrold from returning to Court. It will require her to seek leave from the Court to do so.

The application is part of a longstanding pattern of conduct on the part of Mrs Harrold. The judgments of Foskett J in 2018 and Saini J in 2022 both record applications to adjourn the hearings before them ([2018] EWHC 1042 (QB) and ([2022] EWHC 1048 (QB)). Between 25 June – 8 November this year, Mrs Harrold made three applications to adjourn a hearing date before making the application of 18 November 2025, considered above. In the circumstances we concluded that the balance of considerations fell decisively in favour of refusing the application to adjourn and continuing to hear the application which had been ready for listing for some considerable time.

During the course of submissions by Mr Carey, who appeared on behalf of the applicant, in relation to the application to intervene (which we consider further below), Mrs Harrold rose to say that she required an adjournment before leaving court to make a phone call. Mr Carey informed the Court that Mrs Harrold had told him she was calling her lawyer. On her return to Court, she made submissions in support of a second application to adjourn explaining that her lawyer had suggested she do so. Having risen to consider the application we refused it on the basis that no new reasons had been advanced in support of the application.

On being invited by the Court to make submissions in relation to her application for disclosure and other matters (considered further below), Mrs Harrold made a third application for an adjournment on the basis she had not come prepared to argue her case and was stressed. Having risen to consider her application we refused it on the basis it was, in all material respects, the same as the previous application and the outcome of the application must be the same.

On return to court after the luncheon adjournment, Mrs Harrold was not in court. We were informed by court staff that Mrs Harrold was outside court saying she felt unwell and had chest pains. At our request Mrs Harrold was attended to by qualified first aiders. Having assessed Mrs Harrold, they did not consider treatment was necessary. On her return to court Mrs Harrold made a further application to adjourn the proceedings on the basis she was experiencing chest pains and felt unwell. Mrs Harrold took the court to a letter from a GP at the Bradford on Avon and Melksham Health Partnership dated 24 June 2025. The author of the letter suggests it would be beneficial for Mrs Harrold’s health to postpone the hearing scheduled for 3 July 2025 due to her cardiac history and physical symptoms of stress (palpitations and nausea) which Mrs Harrold had reported to the surgery. The Attorney General objected to the application directing the Court to caselaw about the evidence necessary to support an application on grounds of ill health.

Having risen to consider the application we informed the parties of our decision to refuse the application. We gave brief reasons with fuller reasons to follow in this judgment which are set out below. Having given our ruling, Mrs Harrold informed the Court that she did not wish to remain and left.

In our view the GP letter is an inadequate basis for acceding to the adjournment (Levy (Trustee in bankruptcy of Ellis Carr v Ellis Carr and others) [2012] EWHC 63 (Ch) at para 37 approved in General Medical Council v Hayat [2018] EWCA Civ 2796 at 37-38).

The letter was produced five months prior to the hearing and for the purposes of a different hearing. It did not constitute evidence about Mrs Harrold’s inability to participate in the hearing before us. It did not say that Mrs Harrold cannot participate in a hearing but expresses the view that she needs legal representation. This is not a judgment a medical practitioner is qualified to make. Mrs Harrold did not mention the letter at the start of the hearing and made no mention of her ill health during the course of the morning, during which time she made eloquent submissions.

The basis of the application must therefore be that Mrs Harrold was taken unwell over lunch. However, in this respect she was seen by two qualified first aiders outside Court who did not consider any treatment was necessary.

The decision to adjourn is always one for the Court to make and not one that can be forced upon it (Decker v Hopcraft [2015] EWCH 1170 (QB) at 23. Mrs Harrold’s repeated oral submissions to the Court that she will have a heart attack and die in Court should the Court not grant her adjournment was an attempt to force our hand in this respect. There is a pattern of Mrs Harrold seeking adjournments on grounds of ill-health. The reasons for the order of Warby J dated 6 November 2018 refers to Mrs Harrold maintaining that she was unable to attend a previous hearing due to ill health. In his 2018 judgment Foskett J refers as follows:

“11.

On the morning of the hearing, I was provided with copies of a lengthy email sent by the Respondent to Mr Neil Johnston of Field Fisher which indicated that she was not “well enough to attend the hearing …and my GP has advised that due to my ill-health I should not attend.” [2018] EWHC 1042 (QB)”

The question of whether effective participation is possible depends not only on the medical condition of the applicant for an adjournment but also, and perhaps critically, on the nature of the hearing: the nature of the issues before the court, and what role the party concerned is called on to undertake (Decker v Hopcraft [2015] EWCH 1170 (QB) at 28. During the course of the morning, Mrs Harrold had been able to make her applications for an adjournment and to respond to the joinder application by the intervener. She was not present in Court for the Attorney General’s application for a civil proceedings order (having chosen to leave Court after we refused her application to adjourn). However, this application requires, in the main, an assessment of the history of the litigation to date to assess whether Mrs Harrold has engaged in vexatious litigation habitually and persistently. Previous judgments of the High Court set out above provide an evidential basis for our assessment in this regard. The Court has a witness statement from Mrs Harrold which we have considered in coming to our decision on the application. In addition, in oral representations during the course of the morning Mrs Harrold had explained the basis of her objections to the Attorney General’s application which is that the imposition of a civil proceedings order will make it harder for her to obtain legal representation to assist with restoring her to the Nursing Register. Taken together the statement and oral submissions have provided us with a good understanding of Mrs Harrold’s case and have been taken into account in our decision making. For these reasons we concluded that it would not, in the circumstances and balancing all the relevant considerations, be appropriate to adjourn the proceedings.

By application dated 2 September 2025 Mrs Harrold applied for the following:

In written submissions Mrs Harrold submitted that the applications were necessary due to a cover up; a lack of proper consideration of her Employment Tribunal claims and failure to deal with her application for restoration to the NMC Register. The Courts had been misled over the GCRO applications and there should be a criminal investigation into those responsible. The Attorney General objected to the application on the basis they were seeking to relitigate earlier proceedings and had no relevance to the present application.

Having risen to consider the application, we informed the parties of our decision to dismiss the application. We gave brief reasons will fuller reasons to follow in this judgment.

We have no hesitation in refusing the applications. Mrs Harrold seeks eight directions. Save for the application to discharge the GCRO, the directions seek to re-open litigation before the Employment Tribunal between 2006 and 2014, which was comprehensively considered by Laing J in her judgment of 2016, or to re-open previous court orders or ask for this Court to consider matters beyond its jurisdiction, as with the request to institute a criminal investigation. The directions will not assist us determine the specific issues before us, namely whether Mrs Harrold has persistently and habitually engaged in vexatious litigation. None of the directions sought are necessary to enable Mrs Harrold to prepare her defence to these proceedings. The Directions are onerous and oppressive and cast unjustified aspersions on legal professionals without any proper evidential basis. They amount to a continuation of what Saini J said in his 2022 judgment could fairly be described as a ‘campaign’ against the legal representatives of the Trust/NMC.

By an application dated 9 July 2025, the Trust and NMC applied to be added as parties to the proceedings pursuant to CPR 19.2. In submissions on their behalf Mr Davis submitted that his clients can assist the court in the resolution of proceedings as they have primary knowledge of the underlying proceedings and the wider context. The Attorney General relies upon the statements of their witnesses. They can ensure that all the relevant evidence is presented and can deal with any queries the court has. They can also speak through Counsel directly to the impact of Mrs Harrold’s campaign over the years on individuals, courts resources and their own resources. Their assistance is particularly valuable as there will be no oral evidence. Their rights are affected by the proceedings notably their right not to be subject to vexatious proceedings and the outcome of the proceedings will directly impact on the burden that will befall them in the event the application is dismissed because further GCROs will be necessary. Mr Davis placed reliance on the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Somani Hotels Ltd v Epping Forest District Council and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1134 and the ‘wide interpretation’ to be given to CPR 19.2(2) confirmed by the Court of Appeal.

Mrs Harrold objected to the application, submitting by way of written representations that the NMC has over the last 16 years failed to explain why she was struck off the register or to deal with any of her applications to be restored to the register and it would be unfair for them to be joined whilst she remains without legal representation.

The Attorney General was neutral on the application. However, with scrupulous fairness, Mr Carey assisted the Court by identifying the points which Mrs Harrold would be likely to have argued had she been represented.  He submitted in this respect that the Attorney General sits above the fray and assists the Court to arrive at the correct decision rather than a particular decision. An application by the Attorney General does not rely on the support of an aggrieved party who has been the target of vexatious litigation. The underlying rationale for an application under section 42 is to protect the resources of the Court yet those resources may be stretched further if intervention became a common feature of this category of litigation.

Having heard submissions, we reserved our decision on the application.

The relevant legal principles which operate in relation to an application under CPR 19.2 to join a party to existing proceedings were recently identified by the Court of Appeal in the case of Somani Hotels v Epping Forest District Council at paragraphs 64 to 71. The court drew on the observation of Males LJ in his judgment in Betta Oceanway Company & SC Tomini Trading SRL v Georgios Vatistas [2025] EWCA Civ 595 (“Betta Oceanway”) in paragraphs 67 and 68 of their judgment as follows:

“67.

At [37] of Betta Oceanway, Males LJ drew the threads together in this way:

“…a third party will not be joined unless it is ‘desirable’ that he should be. The need for this condition to be satisfied operates as a control mechanism to ensure that a third party is not permitted to gatecrash proceedings in which he had no legitimate business, where his presence would unduly complicate or add to the cost of the proceedings or where his presence would add nothing because the relevant issues are being contested by the existing parties.”

68.

In relation to the court’s residual discretionary approach, Males LJ added this at [41]:

“It is hard to envisage circumstances in which the court would conclude that it was desirable to add the new party in order to resolve all the matters in dispute but would nevertheless decline to do so.”

Applying these principles to the present case we have reached the conclusion that it would not be appropriate to exercise our discretion to permit the interveners to be joined to this application as a party. The first point to note is that whilst the interveners contended that they were able to make a contribution to an understanding of the facts in this case and the impact of Mrs Harrold’s conduct of litigation upon them, the reality of this case is that most of the factual material that is relevant to the narrow issues which fall to be decided in this case are already in evidence through the earlier judgments in the case or the evidence which has been lodged by the applicant. This is a case in which, in very large measure, the relevant issues have already been litigated by the pre-existing parties to the litigation.

It is, of course, not possible to say that the intervener does not have any legitimate interest in these proceedings. The intervener has been the main recipient of the proceedings which have been initiated over the years, and which form the basis of the application which we are considering. The impact on the intervener in terms of cost, time and impacts on wellbeing are matters which are material to our evaluation of the merits of the application and indeed they are urged upon the court by the applicant. However, in our judgment it is not necessary for the intervener to be a party to the proceedings for these points to be advocated effectively. To the extent necessary they have been appropriately articulated by the applicant.

This is related to the point which was raised in the submissions of the applicant and which in our view is a significant and weighty consideration in our evaluation of the application to join these proceedings and that is the unusual nature of an application under section 42 of the 1981 Act. It is an application which is taken out by the Attorney General in the public interest. In presenting the application the Attorney General stands aside from the cut and thrust of the party-to-party proceedings and acts solely in the public interest rather than advocating on behalf of any party who was the subject of the cases which form evidence in the application. We accept the point made by Mr Carey that the danger of permitting parties who have been the subject of cases forming part of the application is that the section 42 proceedings become invested with an adversarial or partisan influence which may not be in the best interests of having an effective hearing and doing justice to the application. The significant weight we afford to the unusual nature of these proceedings is no disrespect to Mr Davis, who advanced the interests of his client through the submissions he made appropriately. It is simply that given the statutory context of the application the court is best assisted by the submissions of the Attorney General which, whilst obviously supportive of the application, are also subject to the duty to draw the court’s attention to all points which could be made by an unrepresented respondent and further not made on behalf of a party with a direct interest in the litigation which has given rise to the application.

On behalf of the Attorney General, Mr Carey submits that there have been an extraordinary number of vexatious legal proceedings brought by Mrs Harrold spanning nearly two decades. The subject matter has remained similar or so closely related so as to be capable of being characterised as variants on a theme. Her success has been extremely limited. The NMC and the Trust have been subjected to repeated claims, and applications that have been struck out, or properly characterised as an abuse. In 2020 Chamberlain J, and in 2021 Lewison LJ both referred their decisions to the Attorney General for consideration of an application under section 42 Senior Courts Act, with both judges noting the tenacity with which Mrs Harrold continues to bring litigation. The criteria for a civil proceedings order are satisfied.

Mrs Harrold had chosen to leave Court by the time Counsel for the Attorney General made his submissions on the application. Nonetheless, Mrs Harrold had explained her objection to the application in oral submissions earlier in the day. Mrs Harrold wishes to be restored to the nursing register but cannot find legal representation to assist her in what are said to be complex and long running proceedings against NMC. She considers the GCRO to be responsible for her inability to pursue matters and considers the section 42 order will make it harder for her to obtain representation to assist her in seeking restoration to the nursing register.

We have reached the conclusion that the strict conditions required for the imposition of a Civil Proceedings Order under section 42 of the 1981 Act have been met. Our reasons for that decision are as follows.

Firstly, it is necessary to consider whether or not Mrs Harrold has been responsible for instituting vexatious civil proceedings or making vexatious applications in civil proceedings. In doing so, we are entitled to consider the totality of the history of litigation which has been brought before courts and tribunals by Mrs Harrold. We accept the submission made by Mr Carey that we are not bound by the earlier decisions of various judges set out above in which they concluded that a GCRO was required to be put in place or extended. Nevertheless, those earlier decisions, and the factual conclusions which were reached, are in our view significant and weighty evidence for us to consider and take account of in reaching our conclusions. In those decisions there is persistent evidence of not simply numerous sets of proceedings or applications being issued but very many proceedings being found to be totally without merit and attempts to revive or relitigate issues in connection with the disputes that Mrs Harrold has with the Trust and the NMC over and over again. These decisions demonstrate that no less than six High Court Judges have concluded that over the course of time it has been necessary to grant or extend the GCRO in Mrs Harrold’s case. Furthermore, those High Court decisions have on most occasions been the subject of a totally unmeritorious appeal to seek to go behind them. Notwithstanding clear and unequivocal findings being made against her in relation to these issues, Mrs Harrold has, undaunted, pursued applications to appeal against those decisions which were, bluntly, hopeless. This pattern of behaviour has persisted across very many years, including most recently in the spring of 2025 when, following Warby LJ finding that her appeal against the decision of Eyre J to extend the GCRO was totally without merit she nonetheless sought to make an application for permission to set that Order aside on grounds which can only be described as spurious.

In our judgment it is clear from the observations of Lord Bingham CJ in Barker that the focus on applications such as this is essentially objective. That is to say that the focus is not on the motive of the respondent, or whether the respondent is acting in bad faith or maliciously, but rather mainly an objective inquiry as to the merits of the litigation in which the respondent has engaged, and the consequences to the party being sued and the wider civil justice system and whether it amounts to an abuse of process. We have no doubt that Mrs Harrold has an honest and deep-seated belief that she has been the victim of injustice both in relation to her initial dismissal from the Trust’s employment but also her subsequent striking off by the NMC. However, it is clear from the findings of very many judges over the course of the history of Mrs Harrold’s involvement in legal proceedings that she has regularly pursued proceedings or applications which are without merit and misconceived and demonstrate a persistent desire to relitigate issues without any prospect of achieving any alternative outcome. This approach to litigation, reflected and seen most recently in the appeal against Eyre J’s decision and the subsequent application when that application for permission to appeal was dismissed, clearly establish, in our judgment, that Mrs Harrold has regularly brought proceedings which are vexatious. There can be no doubt that the campaign of litigation which has been waged against the Trust and the NCM will have caused not simply inconvenience but considerable expense, in particular in the form of unsatisfied costs orders which have a speculative prospect of being satisfied. It is obvious that being the recipient of proceedings and applications of this kind, along with the correspondence, which is inevitably generated by them, will impose a significant burden on those who have to respond to those applications and proceedings. The nature of this is illustrated in the extensive correspondence produced to the court by the applicant. Additionally, it is clear that the extent of the unmeritorious litigation which has been brought by Mrs Harrold will have placed a significant burden on the court which has had to administer and furnish judicial resources to deal with this litigation. In short, we are left in no doubt that the history of litigation brought by Mrs Harrold when regarded overall bears the clear characteristics of vexatious proceedings and, akin to earlier judges who have considered this series of proceedings at earlier junctures, we are satisfied that the requirement of the proceedings being vexatious has been satisfied.

The second question which arises is whether or not the proceedings have been instituted “habitually or persistently”. Again, we are satisfied that this criterion is clearly met. It will be apparent from the history illustrated by the earlier decisions of this court that the principal targets of Mrs Harrold’s claims have been the Trust and the NMC. Some of the claims and fruitless applications for permission to appeal have involved the repetitive pursuit of the same complaint. This approach is redolent of a refusal to take notice of or give effect to orders of the court and indeed it is clear that Mrs Harrold has, in essence, never been prepared to accept the conclusions of the court in particular in respect of the applications and extensions of the GCRO. As is clear from the judgment of Laing J, the initial source of Mrs Harrold’s complaints against the Trust and the NMC originated from events in 2002 which culminated in a decision from the Employment Tribunal in 2006. The claims comprising this litigation have therefore persisted for a period of around 20 years. It is clear to us that the criteria of the proceedings being pursued “habitually or persistently” is made out.

The final criteria related to proceedings having been brought in either the High Court or any other inferior court, which incorporates the Employment Tribunal, is clearly made out on the basis of the material before us.

The imposition of an Order under section 42 of the 1981 Act will, as noted above, have an impact upon Mrs Harrold’s Article 6 rights. The legitimacy of that impact has to be gauged against whether or not the restrictions that a CPO would impose would be such as to remove the very essence of the right under Article 6. Secondly, any restriction through the imposition of a CPO must be in pursuit of a legitimate aim and proportionate.

So far as the first of those considerations is concerned, it is important to appreciate that the effect of the CPO is not to prevent Mrs Harrold bringing proceedings but rather to require the grant of leave of this court before proceedings can be instituted by her. Thus, in the event that Mrs Harrold has appropriate grounds which justify the grant of leave to enable her to institute proceedings to vindicate her rights, she will still have the opportunity to do so. The purpose of the CPO is not to prevent her from seeking access to justice but, in the light of the criteria for making the order being satisfied, to require a demonstration that there is an appropriate justification for proceedings being commenced. Similar considerations would apply to applications in those proceedings. Thus, the imposition of the CPO would not lead to the extinguishment of Mrs Harrold’s Article 6 rights or to the preclusion of her being able to exercise her Article 6 rights. The CPO imposes conditions but does not exclude her from seeking judicial remedies. We are satisfied that the imposition of such a restriction is legitimate in the present circumstances, bearing in the mind the harm which arises from the instituting of vexatious proceedings and the taking out of vexatious applications. That harm, as has been set out above, is amply evident in the material which is before us, and which has previously been before numerous judges of this court. The response represented by the imposition of a CPO is one which is in our view proportionate to the circumstances of this case in an effort to restrict or avoid the behaviour which has given rise to the need for the CPO in the first place. We are thus satisfied that the imposition of the CPO is consistent with Mrs Harrold’s Article 6 rights and would not give rise to a breach of them.

Finally, we have considered whether overall we should exercise our discretion to make the CPO in this case. We are in no doubt that this is a case in which it is appropriate for a CPO to be made. The criteria have been met, and Mrs Harrold’s Article 6 rights have been taken into account. We have therefore concluded that the application must be granted.

On 19 December 2025 a draft of our judgment was provided to the parties for the purpose of their assistance with the correction of typographical errors. Ms Harrold had left the hearing on 19 November 2025 part way through and had not been present to hear an explanation of the process of handing down a judgment. Therefore, the Court asked the Attorney-General to provide a copy of the draft to Ms Harrold and ensure she understood the process.

On 29 December 2025 the Court received submissions from Ms Harrold. Her submissions explained that her ability to participate properly in the hearing on 19 November had been adversely affected by her ill health and should not have taken place. She should have been permitted an adjournment to obtain the legal representation she had identified. The Court’s decision to refuse to adjourn had caused her an increased level of stress exacerbating an underlying long term mental health condition. She has remained unwell since. Her submissions were accompanied by a letter dated 18 December 2025 from Wiltshire Talking Therapies explaining that she had been referred for counselling for depression. Ms Harrold submitted that the Court is required to make reasonable adjustments to ensure she is provided with legal advice and representation because her mental health difficulties amount to a disability. These proceedings should be stayed until the completion of her treatment and the previous decisions made by this Court should be set aside. Further correspondence was received by the Court from Ms Harrold on 12 and 14 January 2026 which were materially similar in tone and content to the submissions of 29 December 2025.

The purposes of circulating a judgment in draft are to enable the parties to identify typographical and other obvious errors and to prepare an agreed order or submissions on consequential matters. The authorities make clear that this is not to be treated as an opportunity to advance further arguments (George v Cannell [2022] EWCA Civ 1067 at [24].

We have considered whether we should reconsider the decisions recorded in our draft judgment and communicated to the parties. We are not however persuaded that the evidence merits this course of action.

The letter from Wiltshire Talking Therapies, dated 18 December 2025, is an administrative referral letter for counselling for depression. We do not consider it demonstrates that Ms Harrold was unable to participate in the hearing almost a month earlier on 19th November 2025. Ms Harrold’s application at the hearing to adjourn on grounds of ill health was based on her feeling unwell. She was seen outside court by qualified first aiders who did not consider treatment was necessary. On her return to Court Ms Harrold explained that she had chest pains and took the Court to an outdated letter from her GP about her cardiac history. The main body of this judgment contains our reasons for refusing that application. It was Ms Harrold’s decision to decline to participate any further in the hearing and to leave Court. She did so in the knowledge that we intended to proceed to hear the application.

Accordingly, we refuse to set aside our previous decisions and to stay these proceedings or the handing down of this judgment. However, in light of her submissions about her health and the letter from Wiltshire Talking Therapies, we have not required Ms Harrold to assist the Court with the identification of typographical errors as would usually be expected of parties.