Piotr Hodurek v Polish Judicial Authority

This is an appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 [“the 2003 Act”] from the decision of District Judge Cieciora dated 24 April 2023 ordering that the Appellant be extradited to Poland pursuant to section 21(3) of the 2003 Act.

The Appellant is a Polish national born on 12 July 1980. He is 45 years old. He arrived in the United Kingdom in 2006 and has remained in this country since his arrival. On 5 October 2021 the Appellant received a letter from the Home Office informing him that he had been granted indefinite leave to remain in the UK under the EU Settlement Scheme and now enjoyed settled status.

The Appellant’s return to Poland is now sought under an arrest warrant issued by the Respondent judicial authority on 20 June 2022 [“the AW”] and certified by the National Crime Agency on 30 November 2022.

Poland is a category 1 territory for the purposes of the 2003 Act. The AW relates to an enforceable judgment of the District Court in Krakow dated 25 October 2006. The Appellant was sentenced in his presence for 12 offences of theft which had been committed between 31 October 2001 and 18 February 2005. The Appellant received a prison sentence of 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, all of which remains to be served. Further information provided by the Respondent on 19 January 2022 stated that the Appellant’s counsel in Poland appealed against his sentence. The Appellant did not attend the hearing of his appeal but was represented at that hearing by his counsel. His sentence was upheld on appeal.

The Respondent also gave further information that the Appellant had received an order to surrender to prison on 15 December 2006 but had not done so. Accordingly, the Polish court made an order that he should be located. On 10 October 2007 a police notice was issued. The Appellant was not in fact located until 20 January 2022, when information was received by the Respondent which confirmed that the Appellant was in the United Kingdom. A request was made for his fingerprint card and a criminal record check. On 20 June 2022 the Respondent judicial authority authorised the issue of the AW in accordance with the relevant provisions of the EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement.

The Appellant was arrested on 19 December 2022 and appeared at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on the following day. He did not consent to his extradition. He was initially remanded into custody but since 28 December 2022 has been remanded on conditional bail. At his extradition hearing on 24 April 2023 the Appellant was represented by Ms Laura Herbert of Counsel. The Appellant gave evidence at the extradition hearing, as did his partner Ms Karolina Kepka.

At his extradition hearing before the District Judge, the Appellant resisted his return to Poland on two grounds: firstly, that under section 14 of the 2003 Act his extradition would be oppressive by reason of the passage of time; and secondly, that under section 21 of the 2003 Act his extradition would not be compatible with his right to family and private life protected under article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights [“ECHR”]. The District Judge found that the Appellant was a fugitive from justice in Poland and so not able to rely on section 14 of the 2003 Act as a bar to his extradition. She found that his extradition would be compatible with his rights under the ECHR since, although there would be some interference with his private and family life, individually or collectively, there were no very strong counter-balancing factors which would render his extradition to serve his sentence a disproportionate interference with his article 8 rights.

The Appellant lodged a notice of appeal contending that the District Judge had made key errors in her decision on section 21 of the 2003 Act and article 8 of the ECHR. On 4 December 2023, Julian Knowles J refused permission to appeal on the papers. On 17 January 2025 Eyre J granted the Appellant’s renewed application for permission to appeal. The hearing of the appeal was stayed pending the decision of the Supreme Court in Andrysiewicz v Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland [2025] UKSC 23; [2025] 1 WLR 1733 [“Andrysiewicz”].

Following the listing of the appeal for hearing, on 29 October 2025 the Appellant filed an application for permission to rely on fresh evidence. That fresh evidence consisted of a proof of evidence with exhibits signed by the Appellant on 21 October 2025. Among the exhibits is a witness statement signed by the Appellant’s partner, Karolina Kepka, also signed on 21 October 2025.

At the hearing of the appeal, the Appellant was represented by Ms Herbert and the Respondent by Mr Adam Squibbs of Counsel. I am very grateful to them both for their helpful written and oral submissions. The Respondent’s position was that I should dismiss the appeal with or without recourse to the fresh evidence. Mr Squibbs was content that I should consider the fresh evidence de bene esse, but ultimately refuse the Appellant’s application to admit it, as it is not decisive.

In evidence before the District Judge, the Appellant denied that he had left Poland as a fugitive from justice. He said that when he had left for the United Kingdom, there had been no restrictions on his travel. At that time his appeal was outstanding. He had notified his lawyer of his new address. He had not been instructed specifically to notify his new address to the Polish court. He had therefore complied with his obligations as he had understood them to be. He was not knowingly putting himself beyond the reach of the Polish authorities.

The District Judge did not accept the Appellant’s evidence on those matters. She accepted that there had been no particular restrictions requiring him to remain in Poland. She was nevertheless satisfied to the criminal standard that the Appellant had deliberately and knowingly placed himself beyond the reach of the legal process in Poland. Her reasons for that finding were as follows –

“The [Appellant] said that he left before he was notified of the outcome of the appeal, but I do not find this to be credible, given that his appeal was determined in October 2006, he was represented at the appeal, and he left Poland in November 2006.

The [Appellant] said that he notified his lawyer of his address in the UK, but then said that he received no communication from his lawyer, despite efforts to contact him. The sudden change in communication from the lawyer just at the time when it benefited the [Appellant] is a feature that reduced the credibility of the account.

Even if I were to accept that the [Appellant] somehow was not aware of the outcome of the appeal before he left to come to the UK, I do not accept the [Appellant's] account of his dealings with his representative. In circumstances where the [Appellant] knew that he was facing imprisonment for a substantial period of time and that (on his account) his appeal was pending, the suggestion that he received no communication from his lawyer is not plausible, nor is the suggestion that he assumed that the absence of any communication meant a decision in his favour.

…

In view of the timing of his visit to the UK, and the lack of information provided to the Polish authorities, I am sure that the [Appellant] came to the UK to avoid his sentence”.

In order to summarise the relevant legal principles to be applied for the purpose of deciding whether the Appellant’s extradition would be compatible with his rights protected under article 8 of the ECHR, the District Judge directed herself by reference to Norris v United States of America [2010] UKSC 9; [2010] 2 AC 487 [“Norris”], H(H) v Italy [2012] UKSC 25; [2013] 1 AC 338 [“HH”] and Polish Judicial Authority v Celinski [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin); [2016] 1 WLR 551 [“Celinski”]. The District Judge highlighted the following matters –

The District Judge summarised the approach to be taken as follows –

“The test to be applied is whether the interference with the private and family lives of the requested person and members of their family is outweighed by the public interest in extradition. The court must conduct a careful balancing exercise, taking into account the gravity of the offence, time to be served, health considerations, the requested person’s circumstances, delay and the effect of extradition on innocent members of the family”.

The District Judge then set out the evidence given by the Appellant. The Appellant said that he was in a relationship with Ms Kepka which had started three years previously. Ms Kepka suffered from multiple sclerosis (MS), a lifelong condition which can affect the brain and spinal cord and which has a wide range of symptoms. Ms Kepka had a number of those symptoms, which can both come and go in phases and worsen over time. The Appellant said that he was Ms Kepka’s carer, albeit not officially. He assisted her in her daily life, taking her to hospital appointments, collecting her from work, doing many of the household chores and helping her maintain her personal hygiene. He said that Ms Kepka had a medical support network, both her general practitioner and her neurologist, but that support network did not cover assistance at home.

The Appellant said that his partner had been badly affected by his arrest in December 2022. She had suffered stress which had resulted in a deterioration in her health. While he had been in custody, his partner had had to call on friends to help her, but her friends could not be there to help her at night.

The Appellant said that recently his partner had experienced difficulties walking upstairs, taking a bath and tying her shoelaces. Sometimes she completely lost sensation in her arms and legs. Her condition had worsened in recent months. On occasions, he had had to pick his partner up from her work.

The Appellant described himself as being generally fit and healthy. Throughout his time in the UK, he had been employed by a number of employers. He provided a positive reference from his current employer.

Ms Kepka gave evidence to the District Judge that she did not have family in the UK. Her elderly parents lived in Poland and could not assist her other than through providing emotional support on the telephone. Ms Kepka had suffered from MS for about 10 years. The Appellant helped her with everyday tasks, such as household chores and personal hygiene. He also helped Ms Kepka with her medication, her daily injections, and generally supported her.

Ms Kepka said that she had found the period of time when the Appellant was in custody to be extremely difficult. She had had to ask friends for help. Her symptoms had been getting worse. She was getting headaches and double vision, she had problems with her mobility and she was getting numbness in her hands. Her consultant had said that these aggravated symptoms were a response to stress.

Ms Kepka said that she had previously been refused benefits on means grounds. She had not applied since, and had not wanted to, but said that she would now have to as she was having to take more time off work due to her illness. She did not get sick pay, so her earnings were affected. She said that she was living in a house in her own name, but that without the Appellant’s financial assistance she would not be able to repay the mortgage.

The District Judge also referred to a statement from Amy White, a manager at the coffee shop where Ms Kepka worked. Ms White said that Ms Kepka was a very hard-working person who was dedicated to her job; and for whom taking time off work was always a last resort. Ms White said that although Ms Kepka had suffered from MS for as long as she had known her, it had never had the effect which it had now had in recent weeks and months. Since the beginning of 2023, Ms Kepka had been noticeably finding things more difficult. For example, she had been losing her grip, dropping things and feeling unsteady on her feet. Ms White said that the Appellant often dropped off and collected Ms Kepka from work, due to her feeling unwell and so that she did not have to use public transport.

Before the District Judge the Appellant advanced the following factors as indicating that his extradition to Poland pursuant to the AW would not be compatible with his rights under the ECHR –

It was the Appellant’s case to the District Judge that, in the light of these factors, his extradition pursuant to the AW would have an exceptionally severe impact on both the Appellant and Ms Kepka. The interference with his private and family life would be disproportionate and incompatible with his rights protected under article 8 of the ECHR.

In response, the judicial authority advanced the following factors as indicative of the compatibility of the Appellant’s extradition with his rights protected under article 8 of the ECHR –

The District Judge accepted the Appellant’s evidence of his personal circumstances. She accepted the evidence of the Appellant, Ms Kepka and Ms White which I have set out in paragraphs 15 to 22 above. The District Judge said that she accepted that the Appellant was in a relationship with Ms Kepka, that Ms Kepka suffered from MS and the symptoms of her condition. She also accepted that Ms Kepka’s symptoms were aggravated by stress, including the stress of the proceedings for extradition of the Appellant to Poland pursuant to the AW. The District Judge accepted that the Appellant has had no convictions since 2010, that he was in employment and well thought of by his employer.

On the basis of that evidence, the District Judge found that the Appellant has a private and family life in the United Kingdom with which his extradition would interfere. That interference would be both lawful and necessary in a democratic society in order for the United Kingdom to honour its international treaty obligations. She then said –

“The test is whether the interference is outweighed by the public interest in extradition. As per Celinski, where a Requested Person is a fugitive from justice, very strong and balanced counter-balancing factors would need to exist before extradition could be regarded as disproportionate. I have that in principle in mind when considering the [Appellant's] family and private life”.

The District Judge then considered the specific factors advanced on behalf of the Appellant in support of his contention that the interference with his private and family life would be disproportionate.

In relation to the Appellant’s argument that there had been significant delay in issuing the AW, the District Judge said –

“Dealing with delay, the offences were committed in 2001-2005. Clearly, a significant period of time has passed. However, that has to be viewed in context. As per my findings above, the [Appellant] left the country with a view to avoid serving the prison sentence imposed following his trial, and failed to provide his addresses, as required. I accept the evidence from the [Respondent] in the AW and Further Information that efforts were made to locate the [Appellant], but these were not successful until 2022, following which efforts were made to issue the AW with very little delay.

In all the circumstances, the delay is largely due to the [Appellant's] actions and, as such, carries relatively little weight. It is certainly not as such as would render extradition incompatible with the [Appellant’s] Convention rights”.

Turning to the argument that the offences and the remaining sentence to be served pursuant to the AW were “not the most serious”, the District Judge gave the following reasons –

“Dealing with the offences and sentence, I accept that the offending is relatively old, but even accepting that the [Appellant] has no convictions since 2010, looking at the nature of the offending and the sentence imposed, it cannot be said to be so trivial or so old that the balance could tip in the [Appellant's] favour, particularly given his fugitive status”.

In relation to the impact of extradition on the Appellant’s relationship with his partner and upon Ms Kepka, the District Judge’s assessment was as follows –

“The strongest factor against extradition is the [Appellant’s] relationship with, and caring responsibilities for, Ms Kepka. Extradition would have a significant impact on her, as the [Appellant] clearly plays a role in her care. The weight to be attached to the factor is diminished by virtue of the fact that Ms Kepka is able, to some degree, to work and care for herself. Whilst friends may not be able to provide round-the-clock care, they were able to assist when she was in need. She has access to medical support for her condition, and if her current care arrangements were no longer to be in place, or her finances changed, she would be entitled to benefits, which would include some provision for care”.

The District Judge then stated her overall conclusion –

“The public interest in ensuring that extradition arrangements are honoured is high, as is the public interest in discouraging the perception of the UK as a State willing to accept fugitives from justice. The [Appellant] is a fugitive. For the reasons set out above, although there will be some interference with the [Appellant's] private and family life, individually or collectively, there are no very strong counter-balancing factors which would render extradition disproportionate”.

In her witness statement of 21 October 2025, Ms Kepka says that her health has declined to such a degree that she is no longer able to function independently without the Appellant’s help. She says that she often struggles to move from one room to another and simple household tasks are beyond her. The Appellant cooks, cleans, shops and takes care of all the household tasks that Ms Kepka is no longer physically able to undertake herself. He reminds her to take her medication and administers her MS injections three times a week.

Ms Kepka says that throughout 2025, her health has deteriorated sharply. She has constant lower back pain and increasing difficulty walking. Since March 2025, she has only been able to walk short distances using crutches. She says that in April 2025 her GP advised that she limit all physical activity and work duties to the absolute minimum, as even light tasks caused her exhaustion and pain. At a neurology appointment in May 2025, it was noted that she could barely walk 20 metres even with assistance. She was prescribed Gabapentin for nerve pain and referred for an MRI scan. The results confirmed the progression of a spinal disc bulge since her previous scan. As her pain continued to worsen the dosage of Gabapentin was increased in September 2025. She was signed off work for 30 days. By the end of September 2025, she had become unable to move without assistance and had developed urinary incontinence. Further hospital tests confirmed ongoing spinal issues. She was prescribed Morphine, Naproxen and Lansoprazole and referred for physiotherapy. She was signed off work completely. On 15th October 2025 her GP adjusted her medication again including a prescription for Co-codamol as well as her prescription for Naproxen and Gabapentin. Despite these measures she says that her condition continues to cause severe pain, fatigue and loss of mobility. She says –

“If the [Appellant] is extradited, I will be left completely alone with no one to care for me. I would have to rely entirely on social services or professional carers. The idea of being looked after by strangers for only short, scheduled visits fills me with deep fear. I need constant, compassionate and familiar care, the kind only the [Appellant] provides.

The thought of his removal causes me overwhelming anxiety, panic and distress. I fear that without him, my condition will rapidly worsen not only physically but mentally. I depend on him not just for my basic care but also for emotional stability. He knows how to manage my symptoms, when to help me move, when to remind me of my medication, and how to calm me when pain or fatigue becomes unbearable.

I have no close family in the United Kingdom who can take over these responsibilities, and no one else is available to provide the level of care I require. If the [Appellant] is forced to leave, I will lose my only source of support and security.

I am deeply frightened of what will happen if he is extradited. I will not be able to cope alone. I am already struggling with daily life even with his constant help. Without him, I fear I will deteriorate to the point where I may need emergency intervention or full-time institutional care”.

In his proof of evidence dated 21 October 2025 the Appellant makes essentially the same points. A short, undated statement from Amy White states that since 28 September 2025 Ms Kepka has been unable to come to work and is currently on a four-week medical leave, which may be extended as her medical condition has not improved.

A letter of 24 July 2025 from a consultant neurologist to Ms Kepka’s GP reported the results of a spinal scan as showing some progressive disc bulge since an earlier scan in 2020. The writer said that Ms Kepka was experiencing symptoms of lower back pain which had worsened during the months leading up to the scan appointment. The GP was asked to consider a referral to Pain Services should Ms Kepka continue to struggle.

Hospital notes from Nottingham University Hospital record that on 30 September 2025 Ms Kepka attended the accident and emergency department complaining of worsening and acute back pain and struggling with her mobility. The notes record that following an urgent consultation she was discharged from the emergency spinal pathway with a course of short-term analgesia, to continue with Gabapentin and a referral for physiotherapy. A physiotherapy appointment was arranged by the Hospital for 8 October 2025. A letter from Physio First Clinic in Leicester states that Ms Kepka had attended a series of physiotherapy sessions due to severe pain in the lumbar spine region. Neurological tests had revealed irritation of the sciatic nerve roots resulting in a limited range of motion and radiating pain. The functional assessment stated that Ms Kepka was unable to move independently without the aid of a crutch and required help to stand up. She had adjusted her seated position to compensate for the pain she suffers in her back. Physiotherapeutic intervention had not resulted in any significant improvement in Ms Kepka’s condition. The physiotherapist’s stated professional opinion was that Ms Kepka’s condition was severe and significantly affected by her MS. She requires daily assistance from another person for activities of daily living and support with mobility.

A statement of fitness for work signed by a general practitioner on 23 September 2025 refers to an assessment carried out on that day, following which the writer’s advice was that during the period to 22 December 2025 Ms Kepka may be fit for work, if her employer was willing to make workplace adjustments and adaptations, altering her working hours and amending her duties to give her support. However, a further such statement signed on 30 September 2025 assessed Ms Kepka as being unfit for work for a period of 30 days to 29 October 2025, due to worsening back pain which was under investigation. Also exhibited to the Appellant’s proof of evidence dated 21 October 2025 was a letter to Ms Kepka from the Department for Work and Pensions dated 27 August 2025, which confirmed the award to her of weekly personal independence payments (PIP) to help both with her daily living and mobility needs. Both payments have been awarded at the standard rate for the period up to 14 May 2030.

This court’s powers on an appeal against an extradition order are set out in section 27 of the 2003 Act. This court may allow the appeal only on being satisfied of one or other of the conditions stated in subsections (3) and (4) of section 27 –

The Appellant’s case is that each of those two conditions is satisfied in the present appeal.

In Celinski at [24], the Divisional Court gave the following guidance as to the approach which this court should follow in determining appeals against extradition orders which raise issues of proportionality under article 8 of the ECHR –

“The single question therefore for the appellate court is whether or not the district judge made the wrong decision. It is only if the court concludes that the decision was wrong … that the appeal can be allowed. Findings of fact, especially if evidence has been heard, must ordinarily be respected. In answering the question whether the district judge, in the light of those findings of fact, was wrong to decide that extradition was or was not proportionate, the focus must be on the outcome, that is on the decision itself. Although the district judge’s reasons for the proportionality decision must be considered with care, errors and omissions do not of themselves necessarily show that the decision on proportionality itself was wrong”.

In Andrysiewicz at [33] to [43] the Supreme Court has recently reviewed the role of article 8 of the ECHR in extradition cases in the light of the principles stated in Norris, HH and Celinski. At [47] the Supreme Court gave the following guidance –

“We have set out above relevant passages in Norris, H(H) and Celinski at some length because it is clear that there is a need to reiterate the essential points they make. Cases in which a submission founded on article 8 ECHR may defeat the public interest in extradition will be rare. It is most unlikely that extradition will be held to be disproportionate on the ground of interference with private life. Even in cases where interference with family life is relied upon, it will only be in cases of exceptionally severe impact on family life that an article 8 ECHR “defence” will have any prospect of success”.

In Pabian v Circuit Court in Warsawa, Poland [2024] EWHC 2431 (Admin) [“Pabian”], Chamberlain J identified the principles which emerge from the case law in relation to the relevance of delay in extradition proceedings to the balancing exercise to be undertaken under article 8 of the ECHR. At [51] he said this –

“Delay may be relevant to the Article 8 balance in one or both of two ways. As Lady Hale said in HH, inadequately explained delay on the part of the issuing state may cast light on the seriousness attached by that state to the offending in respect of which extradition is sought. Inadequately explained delay on the part of the executing state is unlikely to bear on that issue, but may still be relevant when assessing the weight to be given to any interference with private and/or family life to which extradition gives rise. This is likely to be of particular importance in cases where extradition would disrupt family relationships which have started or significantly developed during the period of delay, but it may also be relevant where the requested person has built up a private life in this country during that period. The weight to be given to the interference is attenuated, but not extinguished, by the fact that the requested person came to this country as a fugitive from justice”.

The approach to be followed by this court when faced with an application to admit fresh evidence in support of an appeal against an extradition order is stated in the familiar case of Szombathely City Court v Fenyvesi [2009] EWHC 231 (Admin); [2009] 4 All ER 324 [“Fenyvesi”] at [32]. In Polom v Poland [2024] EWHC 2708 (Admin) at [19], Collins Rice J provided a helpful summary of the Fenyvesi test –

“The Fenyvesi test (set out at [32] of the Divisional Court's judgment) for the admission of fresh evidence into an extradition appeal is in two parts. First, admissibility is restricted to evidence which either did not exist at the time of the extradition hearing or was not at the disposal of the party wishing to adduce it and which they could not with reasonable diligence have obtained. And second, the court must be satisfied that if the evidence had been adduced, the result would have been different and resulted in the appellant's discharge. It is a 'strict test', consonant with the Parliamentary intention underlying the 2003 Extradition Act, that extradition cases should be dealt with speedily and not generally held up by attempts to introduce equivocal subsequent evidence”.

At [24] – [25], Collins Rice J said that in a case where an appellant seeks to rely on fresh evidence to show that circumstances have changed significantly since the extradition hearing before the district judge, such as a case in which the appellant’s medical condition is said to have materially changed, it would be artificial for this court on appeal to try to determine what the district judge should have decided had he or she had the benefit of the later material. Instead, the appellate court should reach its own conclusions. For that purpose, Collins Rice J’s approach was as follows –

“25.

Nor, however, does it require the equally artificial exercise of proceeding as if the extradition hearing had never taken place. The extradition hearing was an opportunity to receive and test oral evidence, and an appeal hearing is not. In these circumstances, an appellate court must (a) evaluate for itself the evidence postdating the extradition hearing, (b) consider that evidence together with the evidence before the District Judge, (c) identify the factors for and against extradition in all the circumstances and reach a view on the overall weight to be given those factors, and (d) balance those factors to evaluate the proportionality of [the appellant’s] extradition in the context of his protected Art.8 rights”.

Ms Herbert submitted that the District Judge was wrong to conclude that the interference with the Appellant’s private and family life resulting from his extradition to Poland pursuant to the AW would not be disproportionate. In the circumstances of this case, particularly in the light of the fresh evidence now available to this court which demonstrated the progressive and severe deterioration in Ms Kepka’s physical and mental health subsequent to the extradition hearing in April 2023, the impact of the Appellant’s extradition to Poland to serve his prison sentence on his and Ms Kepka’s family life would indeed be exceptionally severe. In the light of all the evidence now before this court, the conclusion of the District Judge that the Appellant’s extradition would be compatible with his rights protected under article 8 of the ECHR must be found to have been wrong and the Appellant should be discharged.

Ms Herbert submitted that this court should now evaluate the article 8 balance in the light both of the evidence before the District Judge and the fresh evidence. In particular, the recent evidence of the deterioration in Ms Kepka’s physical and mental health, her greatly increased care needs and her reliance on the Appellant to meet those needs, shows that the District Judge’s evaluation of the limited weight to be given to those matters in drawing the article 8 balance is no longer sustainable.

Ms Herbert further submitted that the District Judge had been in error in giving little weight to the delay by the Respondent judicial authority in seeking the Appellant’s return to Poland to serve his remaining prison sentence for offences committed by him as a young man over 20 years ago. It was submitted that the District Judge had exaggerated the role which the Appellant’s fugitivity had played in contributing to that delay but undervalued the clear lack of urgency and dilatory approach of the Polish judicial and police authorities. It was properly to be inferred that those authorities had not been serious in their efforts to locate the Appellant and to bring him to justice. It was to be noted that the AW states that the limitation period for the Appellant’s offences is 15 years and that the Appellant’s sentence would ordinarily have become unenforceable on 25 October 2021. On 10 August 2017 the Respondent judicial authority had decided to suspend enforcement as a result of which the sentence can now be enforced until 25 October 2031.

Counsel submitted that there had not been proper consideration of the consequences of delay on the part of the Respondent judicial authority. By virtue of that lengthy period of delay between 2005 and 2022, the Appellant had built a life both for himself and, in more recent years, with his partner. He had been of good character in the United Kingdom, living openly in this country, working hard and paying his taxes. He was well regarded by his current employer. He now enjoyed settled status in the UK. The offences for which, belatedly, the Respondent now sought his return to Poland to serve his sentence had been committed over twenty years ago. The Appellant had transformed himself in the intervening period. He is a much older man now and fully rehabilitated.

Ms Herbert argued that the District Judge had failed to make a finding as to the relatively trivial nature of the offending. The total value of the proceeds of his thefts between 2001 and 2005 had been the equivalent of about £7,800 in 2001. a factor which should have been found to attenuate the public interest in the Appellant being returned to Poland to serve his remaining sentence.

It was submitted that taken together and properly evaluated, these factors clearly outweigh the public interest in the Appellant’s extradition to Poland to serve his remaining prison sentence, the principal countervailing factor being the exceptionally severe impact on the Appellant’s partner, Ms Kepka. If, however, the court found the article 8 balance to be marginal, the balance was to be tipped in favour of the Appellant’s discharge by virtue of his time spent subject to a nighttime, electronically tagged curfew since his release on conditional bail on 28 December 2022.

The issue in this appeal is whether the District Judge was wrong to conclude that the Appellant's extradition was proportionate to and compatible with his and his family's right protected under article 8 of the ECHR. The district judge directed herself in accordance with the principles established in Norris, HH and Celinski. In those cases, the courts have emphasised the public interest in those convicted of crimes being required to serve their sentences and that the United Kingdom should not be seen as a safe haven for fugitive offenders.

In Andrysiewicz the Supreme Court has recently re-affirmed that in extradition cases where interference with family life is relied upon in support of the contention that the impact of extradition would be disproportionate, it is only in cases of exceptional severity that the argument for discharge under section 21 of the 2003 Act will enjoy any real prospect of success. In my view, the District Judge’s approach of asking herself whether the factors relied upon by the Appellant amounted to strong counter-balancing factors in this case is properly consistent with those established principles.

Understandably, Ms Herbert places the impact of the Appellant’s extradition to Poland on his partner, Ms Kepka, at the forefront of her submissions. Ms Kepka suffers from MS. It is well known that MS is a chronic neurological condition for which there is currently no known cure. The orthodox approach to treatment is both to manage the condition and to seek to slow its progression. It appears that Ms Kepka’s medical team have been following that approach. There is relatively little medical evidence to attest to the degree to which Ms Kepka’s condition may have progressed or worsened in the period since she gave evidence at the Appellant’s extradition hearing. Nevertheless, I see no reason to doubt Ms Kepka’s evidence that she has experienced a progressive worsening in her chronic symptoms since April 2023, as she states in her recent witness statement. Evidence that her mobility is becoming more limited and that she finds day-to-day tasks both at home and at work more challenging would also seem consistent with some progression in her symptoms arising from MS.

Ms Kepka is also clearly suffering from back problems which have recently been causing her considerable pain and discomfort. It is not clear to me whether her back condition is associated with her MS, but it is clear from the medical documents that I have seen that her back pain has exacerbated her mobility issues and further limited her ability to cope both at home and at work.

The hospital record following Ms Kepka’s emergency admission at the end of September 2025 indicates that her back condition was judged to be manageable with medication for pain relief and a course of physiotherapy. I note that she was discharged from the spinal emergency pathway on that basis. That judgment appears consistent with the consultant neurologist’s report to her GP in relation to the results of her MRI scan in late July 2025. I also note that on 20 May 2025 the consultant neurologist reported to Ms Kepka’s GP that if there was a dramatic change in her back pain, particularly with bladder symptoms, she would need urgent attention.

Insofar as the prognosis is concerned, the physiotherapist’s opinion supports the view that Ms Kepka will continue to suffer from significantly limited mobility and require assistance and care in order to cope with day-to-day living. Her consultant neurologist’s opinion of the progress of her MS in his letter of 20 May 2025 was as follows –

“In terms of the MS, I think she is doing well. Currently, she is walking 20 yards or so at a time before having to pause due to back to the back pain. She has been using a crutch for three months again due to back pain. There is no suggestion of relapses. It is difficult to know if she is benefiting from the Copaxone but she tolerates it fine so we will continue for now”.

Doing the best I can on the basis of limited medical evidence, I consider that the following conclusions may fairly be drawn –

In the event that the Appellant is extradited to Poland to serve his remaining prison sentence, I consider that Ms Kepka’s position will be as follows –

My conclusion is that Ms Kepka will suffer considerable hardship as a result of the extradition of the Appellant pursuant to the AW. Her current care and living arrangements to which she has become habituated and provide her with reassurance in coping with her medical conditions will be heavily disrupted for a substantial period of time. She will require alternative care arrangements to enable her to cope with daily living. She will need an alternative source of financial support to help with her housing costs. Her MS may progress further. She may continue to suffer from debilitating back pain. Her ability to continue to work is at least open to substantial doubt. The absence of her partner upon whom she has come to rely for day-to-day care and support will cause her considerable emotional distress and is likely to challenge her mental well-being as she adjusts to his absence.

Ms Kepka will, however, continue to receive financial support due to her PIP entitlement. She has settled status and may confidently expect to continue to receive appropriate care and support from the National Health Service for her medical needs. She will be able to apply for an appropriate care and support package to meet her assessed needs as an MS patient. There are very well-established sources of specialised care for persons affected by MS, including financial support both in the public sector via the social services authority and in the charitable sector. She will also be able to apply for enhanced welfare support and will be likely to be in priority need should she require housing assistance. Finally and importantly, she will continue to have the support of her friends.

On balance, for these reasons I am unable to find that the impact on Ms Kepka of the Appellant’s extradition and absence in Poland will be exceptionally severe. She is vulnerable due to her medical condition. It is beyond argument that she will experience considerable hardship and disruption to her family life. She is, however, in a position to call on the medical and social care and support agencies to which I have referred. She will be able to call on her friends and her parents for emotional support. I am satisfied that she will be in a position to and able to cope with the Appellant’s absence to an acceptable degree.

In paragraph 62 of her judgment, the District Judge found the strongest factor against the Appellant’s extradition to be his relationship and caring responsibilities for Ms Kepka. His extradition would have a significant impact on Ms Kepka, given the important role which the Appellant plays in her care. As I have explained, I agree with that finding. The District Judge went on to say that the weight to be attached to that factor was diminished by the following matters: firstly, that Ms Kepka was able, to some degree, to work and care for herself; secondly, that her friends were able to provide some support when she was in need; thirdly, that Ms Kepka had access to medical support for her MS; and fourthly, that if there was a change in her current care arrangements or her finances, Ms Kepka would be entitled to benefits, including provision for her care.

In the light of the fresh evidence upon which the Appellant seeks to rely, the first of those matters requires review. I am satisfied that Ms Kepka’s ability to work and to care for herself has reduced since April 2023. It is likely to reduce further over the course of the coming few years. However, the remaining matters relied upon by the District Judge as diminishing the weight to be attached to the significant, harmful impact of the Appellant’s extradition on Ms Kepka continue to apply. She continues to and will continue to have access to appropriate medical support for her condition. She is entitled to benefits. As an MS patient living alone and in need of daily care and support, I have no doubt that she will be able to secure an appropriate care and support package from the range of specialist providers in the public and charitable sector. She will continue to have the emotional support of her friends.

I now turn to the other matters relied upon by Ms Herbert.

In relation to the question of delay, the District Judge acknowledged that a significant period of time had elapsed since the Appellant’s offending, which took place between 2001 and 2005. However, she said, that needed to be viewed in the context of the fact that the Appellant had left Poland in 2006 as a fugitive from justice seeking to evade his pending term of imprisonment.

The District Judge was clearly correct in her approach. As Chamberlain J observed in Pabian at [48], when an issuing state seeks an individual who has fled its borders to evade its justice system, without indicating which country he has fled to, that state is under no obligation to devote resources to making enquiries about his whereabouts. The Appellant sought to place some reliance on Gomulka v Poland [2024] EWHC 460 (Admin). However, at [22] in that case Fordham J followed the same approach as Chamberlain J in Pabian. In fact, the evidence of the Respondent judicial authority was that steps were taken to try to locate the Appellant. The fact that the process of finding him took many years does not weight significantly in his favour, given that it was his own actions as a fugitive which gave rise to the need for that process in the first place.

Therein lies the clear distinction between this case and the circumstances in Lysiak v Poland [2015] EWHC 3098 (Admin) and Rybak v Poland [2021] EWHC 712 (Admin). Mr Lysiak initially left Poland prior to his trial with permission of the judicial authorities: see Lysiak at [8] and [38]. It was during that initial period of his absence that the material period of delay in prosecuting him occurred: see Lysiak at [30]-[31]. The circumstances of Mr Rybak’s case were essentially similar to those in Lysiak: see Rybak at [32]. Whereas in the present case, the Appellant left Poland following his conviction and sentence with the intention of evading arrest and his prison sentence.

In those circumstances, little weight can be given to the impact of extradition now on the private life which the Appellant has built up in the United Kingdom since his arrival here in 2006. Given his fugitivity, his private life in this country has always been tenuous.

For these reasons, I am satisfied that the District Judge did not fall into any error in her consideration of the question of delay. As the District Judge said, after the Appellant had been detected in the United Kingdom, the Respondent moved reasonably quickly to the process of securing his extradition to serve his sentence. She was entitled to give the factor of delay relatively little weight in the overall article 8 balance.

Ms Herbert criticised the District Judge for failing to make an explicit finding on the Appellant’s argument as to the seriousness of his offending between 2001 and 2005. That criticism is unjustified. The District Judge addressed that issue quite properly and adequately in paragraph 60 of her judgment. Albeit that the offences were committed between 2001 and 2005, they constituted a persistent course of offences of dishonesty which can hardly be characterised as trivial in nature. The District Judge was correct to find that the Appellant’s offending had been neither so trivial nor so old as to weigh significantly in the balance against the strong public interest in enabling a fugitive offender to be returned to serve what is, on any reasonable view, a substantial term of imprisonment.

Turning to the overall article 8 balance, the factors which weigh heavily in favour of the Appellant’s extradition are those identified by the District Judge in paragraph 63 of her judgment. There is a weighty public interest in ensuring that extradition arrangements are respected and honoured. The Appellant is a fugitive from justice whose return is requested to serve a substantial prison sentence imposed upon him for a persistent series of offences of dishonesty committed over a period of four years between 2001 and 2005. There is a weighty public interest in discouraging the perception that the UK is a state which gives a safe haven to such persons.

The Appellant’s offences were committed over twenty years ago, when he was a much younger man. Since arriving in the UK he has lived a respectable life, working hard and in more recent years developing a family life with his partner. However, his life in this country has always been tenuous by virtue of his being a fugitive from justice in Poland. For that reason, only limited weight may justifiably be given to the admittedly lengthy period of time which has elapsed since his conviction and sentence in Poland in 2006.

The Appellant will be returning to the country of his birth, where his son lives with whom he has maintained contact. The Appellant is in satisfactory physical and mental health. He is in a position to re-integrate into Polish society, if necessary. Conversely, the Appellant has settled status in the UK. It was not suggested to me that he would not be re-admitted to the UK on having served his sentence in Poland.

The most weighty factor against the Appellant’s extradition is the impact on his partner, Ms Kepka. For the reasons I have given that impact will be considerable and harmful. It must be given significant weight in the article 8 balance. Moreover, there is evidence that the impact of extradition on Ms Kepka has worsened since the extradition hearing in April 2023, as her medical and care needs have grown and the loss of the Appellant as her day-to-day carer will be more keenly felt by her.

The question is whether the undoubtedly considerable and harmful impact of extradition upon Ms Kepka is a counter-balancing factor of sufficient strength to outweigh the matters to which I have referred in paragraph 72 above. In the light of Andrysiewicz, I am required to judge whether that impact will be exceptionally severe. In the light of my analysis in paragraphs 63 and 64 above, I am unable to draw that conclusion. In my judgment, for the reasons I have given the overall conclusion of the District Judge remains sound. In this case, there will be interference with the Appellant’s private and family life. The interference with his family life will be considerable and harmful. That degree of interference will, however, not be so great as to render his extradition a disproportionate interference with his rights protected under article 8 of the ECHR.

In reaching that overall judgment, I have borne in mind Ms Herbert’s reliance on the Appellant’s time spent subject to an electronically monitored nighttime curfew of 3 hours since 28 December 2022. I do not consider that the article 8 balance is marginal in this case. Following the approach stated by Morris J in Leszczynski v Poland [2025] EWHC 1024 (Admin) at [47], I do not find this to be a factor that materially affects my overall judgment in this case.

I have not found the Appellant’s criticisms of the District Judge’s determination of the proportionality balance in this case to be justified. I have taken the fresh evidence carefully into consideration. In the light of that evidence, I am satisfied that the changes since April 2023 in Ms Kepka’s medical condition and care needs do not justify the finding that the District Judge’s conclusion, that extradition would not constitute a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s private and family life, was wrong. For the reasons I have given, this appeal must be dismissed.