Jack Ambrose, R (on the application of) v Chester Magistrates Court

By a claim form sealed on 3 December 2025 the Claimant seeks judicial review of the decision of Deputy District Judge Munir (“the Judge”), sitting at Chester Magistrates Court on 30 September 2025, to refuse to find special reasons not to disqualify him from driving. He proceeds with permission granted by order dated 12 March 2026.

The Defendant lodged an Acknowledgment of Service indicating that as a court or tribunal it did not intend to contest the claim or file any submissions. The Judge’s reasons were given orally in court on 30 September 2025. This claim has proceeded based on an agreed note of those reasons prepared by the Claimant’s solicitor, supplemented to some degree by the prosecutor’s note. By an email dated 30 October 2025 the Judge declined to provide any further written reasons for the decision on the basis that the Magistrates Court is not a court of record.

The Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) as Interested Party did not file an Acknowledgment of Service but after the grant of permission was permitted to file Detailed Grounds and participate in the hearing. It appears that the claim form and grounds were not properly served on the CPS Appeals and Review Unit, such that the CPS did not receive or have sight of the relevant documents until after the permission decision had been made.

I am grateful for the realistic and focussed written and oral submissions from Mr Rosser for the Claimant and Ms Squire for the Interested Party. Ms Squire adopted the contents of the Detailed Grounds drafted by Alexander Slater, another Specialist Prosecutor within the CPS Appeals and Review Unit, which were of considerable assistance to the court.

At the end of the hearing, I indicated that I had decided to allow the Claimant’s claim for judicial review and would quash the Judge’s decision, remitting the case back to a differently constituted Magistrates Court to determine the special reasons issue afresh, on the basis of the Judge’s unchallenged findings of fact. These are my reasons for those decisions.

On Saturday 1 February 2025 the Claimant was driving his black Audi with registration FL67 KJF on Hoole Way in Chester. At around 00.30 am he was stopped by PC Downes who required him to provide a specimen of breath at the roadside due to the manner of his driving.

PC Downes asked the Claimant whether he had had anything to drink in the last 20 minutes. He said that he had had a glass of red wine, but probably more than 20 minutes previously.

The Claimant provided a specimen of breath with a roadside reading of 41 µg (microgrammes) of alcohol per 100 ml (millilitres) of breath. This was above the prescribed limit for alcohol which is 35 µg per 100 ml of breath.

It is significant that the reading was above 40 µg alcohol per 100 ml of breath, because there is a practice of not prosecuting drivers whose specimens generate a reading of below 40. This is to cater for the possibility of the breathalyser machines “reading high”: see Home Office Circular 46/1983 at [6] (“the prosecution threshold”). This threshold has been described by the Divisional Court as “not an indulgence or an amendment to the statutory maximum”. Rather, it is “the figure which safety…requires if the analyst is to ensure that the defendant was in fact over the statutory limit”: R v Cambridge Magistrates’ Court, ex p. Wong [1992] RTR 382 at 385C.

At 00.54 PC Downes arrested and cautioned the Claimant. The Claimant was transported to the West Cheshire custody facility where he provided two further specimens of breath at 01.41 am and 01.42 am, with respective readings of 42 and 43 µg per 100 ml of breath.

The Claimant was charged with an offence of driving over the prescribed alcohol limit, contrary to section 5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, on the basis that he had driven with 42 µg alcohol per 100 ml of breath.

He was bailed to appear before Chester Magistrates Court on 18 February 2025. On that date he pleaded guilty on the basis of his drink being “spiked”. He contended that his glass of wine had been spiked with a glass of tequila, without his knowledge.

Section 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 creates the offences of driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle with alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit. Section 5(1)(a) provides as follows:

“(1)

If a person –

(a)

drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a road or other public place…

after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of it in his breath, blood or urine exceeds the prescribed limit he is guilty of an offence”.

By virtue of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 offences under section 5(1)(a) are prosecuted summarily. On conviction in England or Wales the maximum punishment is 6 months imprisonment or a level 5 fine on the standard scale, or both. Disqualification from driving and endorsement of the defendant’s driving licence are obligatory.

Under section 34(1) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, where a person is convicted of an offence involving obligatory disqualification, the court must order them to be disqualified for such period not less than 12 months as the court thinks fit:

“…unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to order him to be disqualified for a shorter period or not to order him to be disqualified”.

In R v Wickins [1958] 42 Cr App R 236 at 239-240, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that, following Whittall v Kirby [1947] KB 194, four minimum conditions must be satisfied in order for such “special reasons” to be made out: (1) there must be a mitigating or extenuating circumstance; (2) it must not amount in law to a defence to the charge; (3) it must be directly connected with the commission of the offence; and (4) it must be a matter which the court ought properly to take into consideration when imposing punishment.

On 30 September 2025 a “special reasons” hearing took place before the Judge. This was to determine whether special reasons were present under section 34(1) and if so, whether the court would exercise its discretion to order the Claimant to be disqualified from driving for less than 12 months or not to order him to be disqualified at all.

The prosecution opened the facts of the case by reference to a series of written admissions under the Criminal Justice Act 1967, section 10.

The Claimant gave evidence as did Ella Stewart who had been with him on the evening in question. She admitted spiking his drink with a shot of Tequila Gold. A report from Andrew Stephens, a forensic scientist instructed by the Claimant’s solicitor, dated 29 May 2025 was read. His opinion was that if the Claimant’s drink had not been spiked, at the time of the test his breath alcohol reading was likely to have been “approximately 36 µg alcohol per 100 ml of breath (with a possible range of 35 µg to 37 µg of alcohol per 100 ml of breath)”. This evidence was agreed by the prosecution.

The Judge then heard submissions from both parties. The Claimant’s solicitor’s note indicates that the CPS representative took him to Wickins, Delaroy-Hall v Tadman [1969] 2 QB 208, [1969] 53 Cr App R 143 and Pugsley v Hunter (1973) RTR 284 and that the Claimant’s solicitor relied on R v Cambridge Magistrates’ Court, ex p. Wong [1992] RTR 382. The ratio of Wickins is summarised at [16] above. The other cases referred to are addressed below.

The Judge explained in his decision that he found the evidence of the Claimant and Ms Stewart “clear and consistent”. He directed himself that Pugsley was the “leading case” on spiked drinks. The Judge explained that he had concluded on the balance of probabilities that the Claimant’s drink was spiked with one shot of Tequila Gold; and that he did not know that this had happened.

However, the Judge concluded that special reasons had not been found in the Claimant’s case. The Claimant’s solicitor’s note indicates that this was, essentially, for two reasons.

First, the Judge held that once the Claimant was before the court there was “no room for [the] principle [of] de minimis”. This reflected an application of the principle set out in Delaroy-Hall. There, the Claimant’s specimen of blood had given a reading of 96 mg (miligrams) of alcohol per 100 ml, against a legal limit of 80 mg. In two other linked cases the readings were, respectively, 108 mg and 82 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

The Divisional Court set aside the findings of special reasons for not imposing disqualifications in all three cases, holding that the fact that the alcohol content of the blood of a driver exceeded the legal maximum only by a very small amount was not a “special reason” for not imposing the otherwise mandatory disqualification order. As Lord Parker CJ explained, giving the judgment of the court, at 215E-216A:

“Parliament has laid down a statutory limit of alcohol in the blood, 80 [mg] per 100 [ml] of blood, no more, no less. At the same time it has laid down a mandatory penalty of disqualification. Just as the amount of the excess cannot affect the issue of guilt or innocence so also it is of no consequence in regard to disqualification. As has already been said, there may be facts which constitute special reasons, but the amount of the excess is not one of them…a special reason must be something other than the commission of the offence itself.

This conclusion is strengthened by a consideration of what might be involved if the amount of the excess was held to be a special reason. In the three appeals now before the court the excess amounts were respectively 16, two and 28 [mg], which indicates plainly enough the variation in ideas that would result. Unless the line is drawn with certainty, it would be almost impossible to achieve any uniformity in practice and courts would be exercising a dispensing power which the Act does not confer upon them.

One possibility which was canvassed in argument was the application of what is commonly called the “de minimis” principle, particularly in relation to Last’s case, in which the amount of excess was only two [mg]. If in any case the amount of the excess is truly minimal, *216 this would, we hope, provide a good reason for not prosecuting the offender, but once the matter comes before the court, there is no room in this class of case for the principle of “de minimis.” To introduce the principle would open the door to variability which the positive provisions of the Act were designed to keep shut”.

Second, the Judge recorded that even if the Claimant’s drink had not been spiked, his breath specimen would still have generated a reading above the legal limit of 35 µg alcohol per 100 ml of breath, as it would have been 36 µg alcohol per 100 ml of breath. This meant, as the Judge explained, that the Claimant could not show that “but for the lacing of the drink, his alcohol limit would not have exceeded the [prescribed] limit”. This indicated that he was applying Pugsley. There, the Divisional Court held that in order to show special reasons in a spiced drink case, the defendant has to prove that:

“the quantity of alcohol in his blood in excess of the statutory maximum [was] attributable to the additional drink which was put into his glass unknown to him, in other words…[that]…that it was the additional drink which cause him to commit the offence”: [289]

Having found no special reasons, the Judge disqualified the Claimant from driving for a period of 36 months, as well as imposing a fine, the victim surcharge and an order for costs.

In Wong the applicant had consumed some wine and taken 2 doses of Benylin cough linctus. He was stopped by police while driving his car. A specimen of breath analysed at the police station gave a reading of 40 µg alcohol per 100 ml of breath. Evidence showed that the cough linctus contained alcohol in such quantity that it would account for 1.7 40 µg alcohol per 100 ml of breath. His evidence was that he had been unaware that the linctus contained any alcohol. He argued that as it was the practice of the police not to prosecute an offence of driving with excess alcohol unless the figure on analysis was 40 µg alcohol per 100 ml of breath or more, special reasons existed for the justices not to impose any disqualification. The justices found that the facts were not capable of amounting to special reasons and disqualified him from driving for 12 months.

The applicant’s application for judicial review of the justices’ decision succeeded. At 385D-E, the Divisional Court held that because (i) the applicant was unaware that that linctus contain alcohol; (ii) even with the linctus the applicant’s specimen gave a reading that was only just at the figure justifying prosecution; and (iii) there was no bad driving, the prosecutor had properly conceded that the case was one where the justices could regard the facts as being capable in law of amounting to special reasons. Since the justices had indicated that they had found against the applicant as a matter of law, they had fallen into error.

The Claimant advanced two overlapping grounds of judicial review to the effect that the Judge had erred in law or acted irrationally in applying Delaroy-Hall instead of the more recent and relevant authority of Wong.

Although the Judge’s reasons quoted Wong, it does not appear that he applied it: rather his reasons suggest that he concluded that the facts of this case were not capable in law of amounting to special reasons because the Claimant’s reading was at or over the prescribed limit (despite that being the scenario in Wong). The CPS has conceded that such an approach was wrong. In my judgment this was an appropriate concession for the following reasons.

First, this case is on all fours with the facts of Wong, in that (i) the applicant was unaware that his drink had been spoked with tequila; and (ii) even with the tequila, the applicant’s specimen gave a reading that was only just above the figure justifying prosecution (at 42 µg alcohol per 100 ml of breath, compared to the 40 µg reading in Wong). Further, if the applicant had not ingested the tequila, his specimen would have given a reading of around 36 µg alcohol per 100 ml of breath: [19] above. This is comparable to Wong, where the evidence showed thatif the applicant had not drunk the linctus, his specimen would have given a reading of 38 or 39 µg alcohol per 100 ml of breath: 384D. Accordingly but for the linctus or the tequila, the readings in both cases would have been below the prosecution threshold.

Second, although Delaroy-Hall does not appear to have been cited in Wong, Delaroy-Hall was decided in the context of samples of blood not breath and before the introduction of the breathalyser regime and Home Office Circular 46/1983. Blood and breath testing operate under distinct evidential regimes. Delaroy-Halldid not involve spiked drinks. It is therefore factually distinguishable from this from Wong and this case. It remains good law to the extent that it stands for the proposition that absent any spiking, the fact that a reading is “only just” over the prescribed limit cannot amount to special reasons, but that was not the scenario here.

Third, there is no tension between Wong and Pugsley: on the contrary the Divisional Court’s decision in Wong was explicitly reached by reference to Pugsley: 385E. As noted at [25] above, in Pugsley the Divisional Court held that in order to make out special reasons in a spiked drinks case, a defendant had to show that the quantity of alcohol in the blood in excess of the statutory maximum was attributable to the additional drink that had been ingested through the spiking process.

Pugsley related to the regime for testing blood and not breath. It pre-dated the introduction of the breathalyser regime, the Home Office Circular 46/1983 and the prosecution threshold of 40 µg alcohol per 100 ml of breath. No such charging threshold applies to the testing of blood.

The effect of Wong is to apply the Pugsley principle to the breath testing context, and to confirm that special reasons can be made out where a defendant can show that the quantity of alcohol in the breath in excess of the prosecution threshold (and not merely the statutory maximum or prescribed limit) was attributable to the spiking. That was the position here, underscoring the relevance of Wong to this case.

As the most relevant, and recent, Divisional Court authority Wong should have been applied by the Judge; and his reliance on Delaroy-Hall and to Pugsley (without the gloss placed on it by Wong) instead was an error of law.

For these reasons the claim for judicial review succeeds on both grounds.

The CPS accepts that the Judge’s decision with respect to special reasons and the other penalties the Judge imposed fall to be quashed. I agree that such an order is appropriate.

As to next steps, neither party argued that the case should be remitted back to the Magistrates under section 31(5)(a) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (“the SCA”), to begin the special reasons process entirely afresh, in the sense of hearing the evidence again. Such a course would be unnecessary given that the findings of fact made by the Judge remained unchallenged by either party; would run the risk of inconsistent findings being reached on the same evidence for no good reason; and would be unfair to the Claimant.

Instead, Mr Rosser invited me to consider substituting my own decision for that of the Judge, under section 31(5)(b) of the SCA. The CPS opposed this course. I consider that they were right to do so.

Under section 31(5A) of the SCA, the power conferred by section 31(5)(b) can only be exercised where “there would have been only one decision which the court [below]…could have reached”. In my judgment that is not the case here, for the following reasons.

First, the fact that the case has proceeded on an agreed basis that but for the spiking of his drink, the Claimant would not have been prosecuted does not necessarily mean that special reasons under section 34(1) would be made out. As Ms Squire neatly put it, Wong makes clear that the Claimant’s circumstances are capable in law of amounting to special reasons, but it does not require such a finding to be made.

That a special reasons decision is a matter of judicial evaluation and discretion was made clear in Delaroy-Hall at 215D:

“It does not, however, follow that, if [the Wickins] conditions are satisfied, disqualification should not be ordered. The conditions were expressed as the minimum requirement before a court could properly abstain from imposing a period of disqualification otherwise mandatory. Moreover, even if the conditions are satisfied there may be some overriding reason, to be found, for example, in the legislation constituting the offence, which precludes a court from regarding as a special reason something which at first sight appears to fall within the scope of those four conditions”.

Similarly, in Wong at 385K-386C, the court declined to substitute its own view on the special reasons issue noting that there are two stages in deciding whether to find special reasons and whether those reasons should excuse disqualification:

“…as was made clear in Reg. v Newton (David) [1974] RTR 451, there are two stages in deciding whether to find special reasons and whether those reasons should excuse disqualification. Lord Widgery CJ said, at p 457 A–C:

‘It is desirable that we should stress in this court today the importance of a court dealing with this kind of decision having regard to the fact that it always in the end will have a discretion even if a special reason is proved. There is, we fear, some tendency abroad to think that if something which can be a special reason is proved, that is an end of the matter. I hope I have said enough to indicate that that is not an end of the matter, and that the final question of whether the driver merits the avoidance of disqualification must be decided having regard to all the circumstances in the case, and having regard in particular to the driver's own conduct.’

That second question is essentially a question for the justices. Moreover, this case has proceeded not by way of appeal but by way of judicial review. Where there is an appeal by way of case stated the justices find facts and it is open to the Divisional Court in dealing with those facts to express its own view. Here there are no express findings of fact upon which this court could act. Although, therefore, the circumstances may be thought here to be strongly in the applicant's favour on the second question, it would not in my view be appropriate for this court to impose its view or to pre-empt the view of the justices”.

Second, as Ms Squire highlighted, the material before the Magistrates included evidence as to the manner of the Claimant’s driving and his behaviour at the roadside. These are matters which are capable of bearing on whether the Claimant knew or ought to have appreciated that he was unfit to drive; and which could therefore be relevant to the special reasons issue.

Third, the terms of section 34(1) itself make clear that even when special reasons are made out, there is a further judicial discretion to be exercised as to whether the defendant should be disqualified for a shorter period than 12 months or not disqualified at all.

In these circumstances the most appropriate course is to remit the matter to a differently constituted Magistrates Court to determine the special reasons issue afresh, on the basis of the Judge’s unchallenged findings of fact.

For all these reasons the Claimant’s claim for judicial review is allowed on both grounds.

The Defendant’s decision on 30 September 2025 not to find special reasons is quashed. The Defendant’s decision on 30 September 2025 to impose a financial penalty, victim surcharge, costs and to disqualify the Defendant for a period of 36 months is also quashed.

The Claimant’s case is remitted to the Defendant for a fresh determination as to special reasons, on the basis of the following preserved factual findings: (i) the Claimant’s drink was spiked; (ii) the Claimant did not know the drink was spiked; and (iii) if the Claimant’s drink had not been spiked, the reading would have been 36ug and so below the prosecution threshold. This determination should be made by a freshly constituted bench of Magistrates. Ideally the hearing will take place as soon as possible.

By consent I make no order for costs.