Kara Tobin v The Welsh Ministers & Anor

This is Ms Tobin’s appeal, under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended (“TCPA 1990”), against the decision of an inspector appointed by the Welsh Ministers, the first respondent, to dismiss her appeal against an enforcement notice dated 10 March 2023 issued by the second respondent, Bridgend County Borough Council (“the Council”) as local planning authority.

Permission to bring the appeal was given on 5 June 2024 by HHJ Jarman KC, sitting as a Judge of the High Court. The permission was limited to one only of the four grounds advanced by Ms Tobin; I shall explain that ground later in this judgment. In giving permission, Judge Jarman KC observed that Ms Tobin and the Council had “ample scope to consider some pragmatic way forward”, and he encouraged them to liaise with a view to avoiding the need for a substantive hearing. It is largely in order to facilitate such efforts that the hearing of the appeal has not taken place before now. However, Ms Tobin and the Council have not been able to agree on a pragmatic way forward.

The hearing of the appeal to this court was conducted via Cloud Video Platform. Ms Tobin presented the appeal herself. The Welsh Ministers were represented by Ms Heather Sargent of counsel. The Council did not participate in the appeal. I am grateful in particular to Ms Tobin for the clear, courteous and well-reasoned way in which she presented the appeal, and of course to Ms Sargent also.

The submissions made to me in writing and orally were full and detailed and included much citation of authority. I have had regard to all matters raised before me. However, this judgment will set out only such matters as I consider reasonably necessary to reach and explain my decision, and not every point advanced in the submissions will be mentioned here.

Ms Tobin is disabled. She has two rare neurological conditions which result in sudden and temporary paralysis; she is significantly deaf; and since 2019 she has been registered as Significantly Sight Impaired (SSI). Her disabilities have a substantial effect on her daily life, including the need for her to use a wheelchair. Her partner, Ms Emma Davies, is her registered carer.

The enforcement notice relates to the home that Ms Tobin and Ms Davies share at 12 Penylan, Litchard, Bridgend (“the Property”). The Property is a semi-detached bungalow in a cul-de-sac.

When Ms Tobin and Ms Davies purchased the Property in 2009, there was an existing porch at the front of the Property. In 2021 Ms Tobin and Ms Davies commenced replacement of that porch with a new porch, because the old porch, which was anyway in a state of disrepair, was considered unsuitable for wheelchair access. The new porch was designed to be suitable for Ms Tobin’s requirements and to be able to accommodate a ramp. Its design differed from that of the previous porch in a number of ways. One was that, instead of a flat roof, the new porch had a pitched roof. Another was that the external door of the porch was now at the front rather than, as previously, on the right. For illustrative purposes, a photograph of the porch, taken from the front, is appended to this judgment.

On 26 April 2022 the Council’s Planning Department wrote to Ms Tobin and Ms Davies:

“I write further to the information provided by you in respect of the new porch at the above property.

I confirm that due to its height, Planning permission is required for the porch.

…

I must advise that there is some concern in respect of the pitched roof of the porch and it may need to be amended to be acceptable. As such, you are advised to cease works on the porch until you have Planning permission and Building Regulation approval.”

The Planning Officer wrote again on 8 February 2023:

“I write further to my letter of 26 April 2022 in respect of the porch at the above property.

Records indicate that despite having the opportunity to submit an application in order to attempt to regularise the porch. no application has been received to date.

As previously advised. it is considered that the porch as built may not be acceptable to the Local Planning Authority in its current form and you were advised to cease works until an approval had been obtained however, a recent site visit has revealed that the porch has been completed.

I advise that in absence of an application and as a result of the Local Planning Authority considering that the porch, as built, is not in keeping with the street scene. I confirm that an Enforcement Notice is now being prepared for the removal of the porch.

Should you wish to make any representations in respect of this matter, please put them in writing to planningenforcement@bridgend.gov.uk.”

On 10 March 2023 the Council issued the enforcement notice. The breach of planning control alleged in the enforcement notice was the erection, without permission, of a porch to the front of the Property. The enforcement notice required that the porch be removed and kept removed and that all resultant materials be removed from the land. The enforcement notice took effect on 21 April 2023, and compliance was required not more than two months after that date.

On 1 April 2023 Ms Tobin wrote to the second respondent, asking it to withdraw the enforcement notice. Part of the letter read as follows:

“First, you have failed to consider your obligations under s. 149 of the Equality Act which requires that as a local authority, in the exercise of your functions to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination against disabled persons which include taking steps to take account of disabled persons’ disabilities (s. 149(4)). You will be aware of the authorities applying this duty in the planning context: see, e.g. LDRALtdv SSCLG [2016] EWHC 950 (Admin) (decision quashed which failed to consider impacts on disabled persons). To maintain this notice would be to disregard your obligation toward me under this Act.

The structure is essential for my use of the dwelling. I am registered disabled because (1) I have two rare genetic neurological conditions, and (2) I am significantly sight impaired. This should be known to you because a) I am registered blind and deaf with your authority, b) you have been made aware by my local councillor, c) I have previously been visited by members of your staff in regard to my disabilities. If you are not aware of this, then it is plain that you have failed to conduct basic investigations required to determine whether it was ‘expedient’ to issue the enforcement notice in the first place, and that can attract an adverse award of costs on appeal.

I need to be able to enter or exit the property at all times in my wheelchair because my rare condition causes periodic paralysis (and paraplegia). Our property is on a steep incline (a 0.75m drop from house floor height to the ground) and the only way I can do this is via a ramp.

The current access is inadequate. I have tried to use the stepped entrance to the back of the property. I have fallen on a number of occasions.

In short, to comply with the notice would directly impact my ability to enjoy my own home on account of my disability.”

The Council did not withdraw the enforcement notice.

On 19 April 2023 Ms Tobin appealed against the enforcement notice under section 174 of TCPA 1990, relying on the grounds in section 174(2)(a), (c), (d), (f) and (g). It is unnecessary here to refer to the matters raised in all of those grounds. For present purposes, the most relevant ground of appeal was ground (a): that planning permission should be granted for the erection of the porch. At the heart of Ms Tobin’s case on that ground was that the porch was “vital for access to give full ‘use of a dwelling’.”

The letter under cover of which the appeal was submitted contained the following passages.

“[W]e bought the property with a porch of the same footprint and we have merely tied in the roof … and moved the doorway to the front of the porch in order to build vital access for Ms Tobin (the second resident) who has substantial disabilities of both sensory and neurological nature and requires constant use of a wheelchair ramp.

3.

The colour does match our property which has been painted yellow for a considerable amount of time but has a black trim to enable Ms Tobin to make out vital aspects of the building as she is Significantly Sight Impaired. This will significantly assist others with similar needs and makes the house a robust example of the Welsh Government’s vision under the WFGA and LPAs guidance.

…

[T]he LPA has knowingly and willingly made a misrepresentation of a formal stop notice requiring cessation of works which have prevented us building a vital access for a wheelchair thus prohibiting use of a dwelling house.

…

[T]he LPA, in spite of this information, and a PPN notice on their systems, Ms Tobin being registered as SSI and deaf with the local authority and the request of the local councillor, they still failed to take due regard of their s.143 [sic] Public Sector Duty under the Equality Act 2010.

[T]he financial, emotional, and physical consequences of the notice would significantly breach the human rights of the residents therein.”

The submission supporting ground (a) said the following inter alia in respect of accessibility:

“The house features a concertina ramp across steps designed to meet the needs of Ms Tobin and all disabilities. … The ramp features landings which act as rest platforms (often left out of designs which are essential for active wheelchairs). The steps are accessible with low rises. These will be colour coded to assist for sight impairments and feature handrails either side of steps which do not cross the ramp.

The ramp provides a 1:12 gradient making use of the steep gradient the house was built on to finish neatly at the side of the porch enabling ease of access to a car etc, while maintaining 1.5m+ space between the finish of the ramp and the boundary fence. This allows for ease of delivery, ease of use of the garage etc.

…

The doorway is an oversized doorway, which, if necessary for an electric wheelchair, gives enough adaptability that it can be enlarged a further 10mm each side. Ms Tobin however uses an active wheelchair so the doorway is 900mm.

…

The porch takes into account the basic rules for those who have any visual impairment from age-related visual problems to Significantly Sight Impaired (SSI). It contains subtle ways of doing this incorporated into the design. The black bricks represent the lower part of the house and the intention is that the ramp internal will be a resin yellow/light colour smooth surface to assist the visually impaired person. The main wall of the porch incorporates, an edge of black bricks which are smooth (for the SSI person), then two rough textured bricks with a smooth middle brick so the SSI person can tell where they are along the wall should they wish not to use a cane. The doorway is edged with black with a yellow centre brick every two layers. The front door lock is in line with a yellow brick level so the person can feel to the lock which is eight yellow bricks up. …”

Ms Tobin submitted that the requirement to demolish the porch would be discriminatory, because it would prevent her as a disabled person from gaining access to her home. She said that the previous porch had been unsuitable for her needs and that the rear access was also unsuitable, and that she had repeatedly fallen when trying to enter her home. Her submission said:

“This prevented us from using our own front door and porch, which we’d been able to use during the time we’d lived in the property, and it prevented Ms Tobin from accessing the building in her wheelchair and Ms Tobin had to use the steps at the side to gain access. She has subsequently fallen several times as, even when not using a wheelchair, she is far more at risk using steps than a ramp. Needless to say a significant risk of danger is created in the event of a fire for Ms Tobin who has paralysis when woken and would not have been able to exit the house safely or expediently in this time.”

Ms Tobin explained the reasons for the main changes in the design of the porch. Two passages in the appeal submission may be noted. Regarding the design of the roof, it said:

“We used a gable roof construction to ensure a window could be placed into it (keeping a south facing window as before) and had a windowed door. (Essential for Ms Tobin’s ability to navigate.)”

The submission gave two reasons why the external door of the porch had been placed at the front rather than, as previously, at the side:

“• Due to extreme concerns over safety.

We have been the victims of hate crime, harassment and stalking for some time; we have security cameras erected, there is a PPN notice with the LA and a hate crime action plan was in place at the time. We have been identified as a medium risk. This is due to the actions of the licencee [sic] in 13 Pen Y Lan (adjacent) and a group of his friends who live in the cul-de-sac. Moving the door to the front prevented the licencee [sic] from watching movements and sheltered both Ms Davies and Ms Tobin from physical attacks or abuse.

• As an essential solution for a ramp which zig-zagged over steps to be built.

This was a practical solution offering a 1:12 gradient (the most optimum) and featured landing platforms and turning circles for Ms Tobin’s wheelchair. The doorway was widened to allow for the wheelchair. The internal door had already been removed by the previous occupants long before we arrived however we still had an internal door. The space allowed for the wheelchair to get into the property and a good turning circle which was essential as Ms Tobin also has a medical alert dog.”

Under the heading “Context and progress”, the submission said:

“We would like to submit as evidence that we bought the property 13 years ago (2009) and it had a porch of the same footprint. … We had been saving up to make repairs to the porch for eleven years because the house needed extensive modernisation when we bought it. In particular there was a very big problem with damp and black mould and it needed to be rewired and a new heating system installed which cost us a large sum. This was made more difficult by the fact that Ms Tobin could no longer work due to becoming disabled and Ms Davies had to accept significant limits to her career progression as she became the registered carer for Ms Tobin who has two rare genetic neurological conditions which result in significant and sudden paraplegia, is deaf and since 2019 has gone blind and is registered SSI with the local authority. This is why we could not afford to repair the porch sooner. In 2021, the porch began to fall away from the house causing a leak in the living room ceiling. Emergency repairs were required, especially as our house insurance would be invalid otherwise.

We followed the GPDO guidelines to the best of our ability and tried to ring the building control and planning departments on numerous occasions (especially as Ms Tobin is blind and the nearest accessible communication was phone, albeit not perfect). …”

So far as countervailing planning harms were concerned, the text supporting ground (a) said inter alia:

“The repair does NOT:

- Overshadow any neighbour or cause any loss of light – the building is set back from our neighbours and is south facing.

- Overlook other homes, causing a loss of privacy – there are no windows facing neighbours.

- Appear out of character with the existing property – the existing property is yellow/buff the same as the porch. It would be in harmony, but we haven’t been able to carry out maintenance to the front of the property due to fear this would contravene the non-compliant ‘stop notice’.

- Appear overdeveloped – the property is not incongruent and does not affect negatively any amenity value (in fact, house sales in the close have been quicker and a nearby property has been valued at 50% higher since the last purchase in 20199, and this is recent so therefore the amenity value change has actually been positive as the Estate Agent would have taken into account any amenity value problems)

- Impact highway safety – the porch is over 10-11m away from any highway and blocks no view of the highway.

- Use hazardous materials such as asbestos or lead – as stated above, all materials are of industry approved quality and provide the least danger possible.

- Impact protected trees – there are no protected trees in or near our dwelling.

- Restrict road access – the porch, as above is nowhere near the road.

- Classify as a listed building – it is a 1950s mass produced bungalow.

- Have a negative effect on nature conservation – there is no impact on nature and as it is a pre-existing building there is no likelihood of this either.

- Impact environmental health, such as noise or air quality issues – the building does not cause any of these issues.”

As for the appeal on ground (f) (that the steps required to comply with the enforcement notice were excessive), Ms Tobin referred to permitted development rights, under the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 (“the GPDO”), as demonstrating that measures short of demolition would be appropriate if planning permission for the porch as-built were refused.

In its statement in response to the appeal to the inspector, the Council made the following relevant submissions. In response to the appeal on ground (a), it said:

“The Council are of the opinion that the porch, as built is contrary to Local Planning Policy and Guidance as well as Planning Policy Wales (Edition 11, February 2021).

It is considered that the porch does not promote good design in view of its adverse effects on the visual amenities of the area and whilst the porch is relatively similar in size to others in the area, the roof element does not harmonise with the modest character of the bungalow.

The Supplementary Planning Guidance and SP2 of the Local Development Plan states that ‘all development should contribute to creating high quality, attractive, sustainable places which enhance the community in which they are located …’ and that front extensions which are forward of a definable building line, which includes porches, should be designed to the highest standard in recognition of their prominence in the street scene.

The property, which is the subject of this appeal, is a semi-detached bungalow which is slightly set back off the highway but located at the top of the entrance into the street and, as such, is prominent within the street scene.

The area is characterised by modest semi-detached bungalows, some of which have been extended with dormers and porches; however, there are not many examples of porches within the street and those properties that have porches, the porches have a flat or sloping roof.

There are a pair of semi-detached properties located further down the street which have pitched roof porches; however, these properties have a gable main roof, where the main roof of No.12 is a hipped roof and it is considered that the pitched roof of the porch jars against the roof of the main dwelling, in this instance.

The creation of a pitched roof porch also increases the perception of size and takes away from the main dwelling rather than enhancing it. Given the location of the property within the street scene, it is also considered that the porch has a detrimental impact on the visual amenities of the area in that the porch is out of character with the surrounding area and sets an undesirable precedent for similar extensions within Penylan.

…

The Local Planning Authority considers that the porch as built, by reason of its size, design and siting, is a prominent and incongruous feature within the street scene and has a detrimental impact on the visual amenities of the surrounding area contrary to the provisions of Supplementary Planning Guidance Note 02: Householder Development, Policy SP2 of the Bridgend Local Development Plan (2013) and advice contained within Planning Policy Wales (Edition 11, 2021).”

In responding to the appeal on ground (f), the Council observed:

“Whilst the appellant believes that the breach of planning permission is a minor infringement, the Local Planning Authority considers the works to be detrimental to the amenities of the area and that lesser steps would not overcome the impact.”

In her written submissions in reply to the Council’s response, Ms Tobin said inter alia:

“We are certain you are aware and would automatically have due regard to my disability when determining the application. However, we would like it noted that as in, R (Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] EqLR 60, the observation of due regard must be exercised ‘in substance, with rigour, and with an open mind. It is not a question of ticking boxes’. PSED specifically requires the decision maker ‘to take account of disabled persons’ disabilities’ as part of their due regard to meeting the needs of disabled persons (s. 149(4)), see. e.g. LDRA Ltd v SSCLG [2016] EWHC 950 (Admin).

I would also ask you to consider the ‘human factor’. You will be aware that it is ‘inhuman pedantry to exclude from the control of our environment the human factor’ (Westminster Council v Great Portland Estates [1985] 1 AC 661, 670F (Lord Scarman)). I am a disabled person who sought to rebuild an existing porch, in circumstances where there is little or no harm from the design. I respectfully request that even if there is harm to be found, that it be given very limited weight in the present circumstances.”

The appeal was conducted by the written representations procedure. The inspector also conducted a site visit on 2 February 2024.

The inspector’s decision was dated 13 March 2024. He dismissed the appeal, save only that he varied the time for compliance with the enforcement notice from two months to nine months and that he corrected the requirements of the enforcement notice by deleting, as being superfluous, the words “and keep removed” from the description of the steps required to be taken. Thus the inspector refused planning permission on the application deemed to have been made under section 177(5) of TCPA 1990.

In respect of the appeal on ground (c) (that there had not been a breach of planning control), the inspector found that the new porch was of a materially different design from the old porch and so could not benefit from any planning permission that might have been given in respect of the old porch. He noted, further, that the overall structure of the new porch exceeded 3 metres from the existing ground level and so was not permitted within Class D of Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the GPDO.

The inspector’s reasons regarding the appeal on ground (a) were stated as follows:

“12.

An appeal under ground (a) is that planning permission should be granted for the matters that constitute the breach of planning control. The deemed planning application in this case therefore seeks permission for the erection of a porch to the front of the property.

13.

Having regard to the reasons for issuing the Notice, and the personal circumstances advanced by the appellant, I consider the main issues in the determination of the appeal to be: the effect of the development upon the character and appearance of the host property and surrounding area; and whether any identified harm would be materially outweighed by the matters in favour of the development, including the occupants’ personal circumstances and protected characteristics. Edition 12 of Planning Policy Wales (PPW) was published on 7 February 2024. However, as this amendment simply consolidates previously published content, I am satisfied that it does not raise any other issues that would have a significant bearing on the deemed planning application.

14.

I was able to observe at the time of my site inspection that, by reason of its scale, siting, form and overall design, the porch subject of the enforcement action represents an insensitive and disproportionate addition to the host property. Indeed, it represents a prominent and discordant feature, with a roof form that fails to harmonise with the modest simplicity of the host dwelling. I have fully considered the other properties within the immediate vicinity. However, I have not seen anything to lead me to conclude that the porch subject of this appeal is in-keeping with the prevailing character of the area. Rather, I find that it represents an incongruous feature at an elevated and prominent location in the street scene. I note the fact that the structure could potentially be replaced by a porch that would be compliant with permitted development rights. However, given that such a scheme would reduce the concerns outlined above, I do not consider such arguments to weigh heavily in favour of the development.

15.

I note the appellant’s reference to the developments within the wider area. However, such developments do not in my view justify the harm identified in this instance. Indeed, I have not been provided with full details of those schemes and have not, therefore, been able to have regard to matters such as the planning policy framework under which those decisions were made. In any event, the schemes cited do not constitute the exact same set of circumstances as this case and, notwithstanding this, it is a well-established principle of planning that each case should be treated on its own particular merits. I note the appellant’s contention that the ramp would change the perception of the overall height of the structure. However, I am not persuaded that such a feature would improve the relationship with the host dwelling or otherwise reduce its prominence in the street scene. I do not therefore consider such arguments to justify a grant of planning permission.

16.

I have had full regard to the personal circumstances of the occupants, including the health and financial implications of planning permission being withheld. I have considered such arguments within the context of the occupants’ right for respect to a private and family life and home, under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998. I have also considered the wider implications of the other Articles of that same legislation and have had due regard to the occupants’ protected characteristics under the Public Sector Equality Duty. However, I have not seen anything to lead me to believe that the porch subject of the enforcement action is the only way of achieving a safe access to the property and, in this respect, I consider that the refusal of planning permission would be both proportionate and in pursuit of a legitimate planning aim. It would not therefore represent an unjustified interference with the occupants’ rights. Moreover, whilst I have sympathy with the financial implications for the appellant, I have not seen anything to lead me to believe that such personal interests justify the identified public harm.

17.

Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, I find that the development causes material harm to the character and appearance of the area and that it therefore conflicts with Policy SP2 of the adopted Bridgend Local Development Plan (2013) (LDP). For the same reasons, it also runs counter to the placemaking principles that underpin national planning policy. Such harm is not outweighed by the material factors in favour of the development. In coming to this conclusion, I have had full regard to the personal circumstances and protected characteristics that have been cited as relevant to the determination of the appeal. On this basis, and having considered all matters raised, I conclude that the appeal under ground (a) should fail and that planning permission should be refused for the matters that constitute the breach of planning control.”

In respect of the appeal under ground (f) (that the steps required to comply with the enforcement notice were excessive), the inspector said:

“18.

An appeal under ground (f) is that the steps required to comply with the requirements of the notice are excessive, and that lesser steps would overcome the objections. In this case, the appellant alleges that the enforcement action is wholly punitive and disproportionate. The ground (f) appeal, however, falls short of outlining the lesser steps which are considered to overcome the objections.

19.

In the interest of completeness, I have considered whether it would be appropriate to vary the requirements of the Notice so that the appellant would have the option to revert to a scheme that would constitute permitted development. However, given that I have not seen any cogent arguments or design details that would suggest that the structure enforced against could be converted to a porch that would benefit from such rights without any major reconstruction, I have decided that such an approach would be inappropriate in this instance. Similarly, in the absence of a fully worked out alternative, I am unable to find that there are lesser steps that would overcome the objections. On this basis I find that the requirements of the Notice are not excessive. The appeal under ground (f) must therefore fail.”

The inspector allowed the appeal in part on ground (g), by extending the time for compliance from two months to nine months, “having considered the general arguments advanced, including the personal circumstances”: paragraph 21. He said: “Within this context, I consider that a nine-month period would appropriately balance the competing public and private interests”: paragraph 22.

An appeal from the inspector’s decision lies to this court on a point of law with the permission of the court: section 289(6), TCPA 1990.

In her Grounds of Appeal to this court, which were settled by counsel, Ms Tobin originally advanced four grounds of appeal, as follows:

The Grounds of Appeal summarise ground 1 more fully as follows:

“The Inspector breached his Public Sector Equality Duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 and/or failed to give adequate reasons. He failed to undertake the ‘rigorous analysis’ required by that section, and undertook a generic ‘tick box’ exercise. He reached no conclusions on the extent of harm from the development, or the impact of demolition on the appellant. His conclusion that planning permission should be refused because the planning harm outweighed the Appellant’s interests was in breach of the PSED and/or inadequately reasoned”.

Judge Jarman KC gave permission on ground 1 only. In his extempore judgment when giving permission, he referred to the public sector equality duty and said this concerning ground 1:

“15.

I do not accept that the ground simply comes down to a reasons point, as submitted by Ms Sargent for the Welsh Ministers, although I accept her submission that the standard of reasoning required in inspectors' decision letters is well established and that what is required is adequate reasoning when reading the decision letter fairly as a whole. Here, the precise implications are set out in just one paragraph, although there are references to the duties elsewhere. In that context, the inspector refers to whether the porch was the only way of achieving a safe access to the property. In my judgment it is arguable that by doing so, that demonstrates that a rigorous consideration of the precise equality implications in this case was not carried out. It is arguably not just a case of what is safe for the appellant but what is convenient and what in the words of the statute are steps necessary to take account of her disabilities. These include sight and hearing impairment and unpredictable seizures, although, as I understand it, there is an access to the rear of the property where the appellant has lived for a number of years. Her case is that that is unsafe because of such matters as unsuitable or unsafe railings, and it does not seem to me that the inspector founded his decision on the basis that that access was convenient taking account to the needs of the appellant. In my judgment it is arguable that in this case, there was not the rigorous consideration of the precise equality implications in the facts of this case and/or that there was insufficient reasoning.”

On 20 January 2026 Ms Tobin filed an application for permission to rely on additional grounds of appeal and on further documentary evidence. By an order dated 23 January 2026 I refused the application to rely on additional grounds and adjourned the application to rely on further evidence to the hearing of the appeal. In the event, the Welsh Ministers agreed that the further evidence could be received.

In view of some of the submissions made by Ms Tobin, ostensibly in support of Ground 1, it is important to have proper regard to the fact that permission was refused on Ground 2 (a Tameside duty of enquiry) and Ground 3 (procedural unfairness). It is impermissible to import those grounds back into the appeal under the guise of submissions on Ground 1.

Ms Tobin’s case on Ground 1, as set out in the Grounds of Appeal settled by counsel, in her own skeleton argument dated 7 January 2026, and in her oral submissions to me, may very shortly be summarised as follows:

The public sector equality duty is created by section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, which provides in part as follows:

“(1)

A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to—

(a)

eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act;

(b)

advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it;

(c)

foster good relations between persons who share a relevant characteristic and persons who do not share it.

(2)

A person who is not a public authority but who exercises public functions must, in the exercise of those functions, have due regard to the matters mentioned in subsection (1).

(3)

Having due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to—

(a)

remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are connected to that characteristic;

(b)

take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it;

…

(4)

The steps involved in meeting the needs of disabled persons that are different from the needs of persons who are not disabled include, in particular, steps to take account of disabled persons’ disabilities.

(5)

Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to—

(a)

tackle prejudice, and

(b)

promote understanding.

(6)

Compliance with the duties in this section may involve treating some persons more favourably than others; but that is not to be taken as permitting conduct that would otherwise be prohibited by or under this Act.

(7)

The relevant protected characteristics are—

…

disability;

…

sex;

sexual orientation.”

Both before the inspector and before me, the relevant protected characteristic relied on was disability. Reference was made to sex and sexual orientation, in the context of harassment from third parties; however, such reference was not made as an independent reason for granting planning permission for the porch but rather as being relevant to the particular problems that inadequate access to the Property and a requirement to demolish the porch would present to Ms Tobin as a disabled person.

The requirements of the public sector equality duty have been considered in a large number of cases. I shall mention only a few of them. It is important, here as elsewhere, to bear in mind the distinction between statements of general principle and the application of the duty to specific facts, and to bear in mind that even statements of general principle are made in specific factual contexts that are liable to affect the way they are expressed.

R (Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 1345, [2014] Eq LR 60, concerned a challenge to the government’s decision to close the “Independent Living Fund”, which provided funding to persons with disabilities. At [26] McCombe LJ set out the principles that were not significantly in dispute between the parties, of which the most relevant are these:

“(1)

As stated by Arden LJ in R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] 1 WLR 3213; [2006] EWCA Civ 1293 at [274], equality duties are an integral and important part of the mechanisms for ensuring the fulfilment of the aims of anti-discrimination legislation.

(2)

An important evidential element in the demonstration of the discharge of the duty is the recording of the steps taken by the decision maker in seeking to meet the statutory requirements: R (BAPIO Action Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWHC 199 (QB) (Stanley Burnton J (as he then was)).

(3)

The relevant duty is upon the Minister or other decision maker personally. What matters is what he or she took into account and what he or she knew. …

…

(5)

These and other points were reviewed by Aikens LJ, giving the judgment of the Divisional Court, in R (Brown) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWHC 3158 (Admin), as follows:

i)

The public authority decision maker must be aware of the duty to have ‘due regard’ to the relevant matters;

ii)

The duty must be fulfilled before and at the time when a particular policy is being considered;

iii)

The duty must be ‘exercised in substance, with rigour, and with an open mind’. It is not a question of ‘ticking boxes’; while there is no duty to make express reference to the regard paid to the relevant duty, reference to it and to the relevant criteria reduces the scope for argument;

iv)

The duty is non-delegable; and

v)

Is a continuing one.

vi)

It is good practice for a decision maker to keep records demonstrating consideration of the duty.

(6)

‘[G]eneral regard to issues of equality is not the same as having specific regard, by way of conscious approach to the statutory criteria.’ (per Davis J (as he then was) in R (Meany) v Harlow DC [2009] EWHC 559 (Admin) at [84], approved in this court in R (Bailey) v Brent LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 1586 at [74-75].)

…

(8)

Finally, and with respect, it is I think, helpful to recall passages from the judgment of my Lord, Elias LJ, in R (Hurley & Moore) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2012] EWHC 201 (Admin) (Divisional Court) as follows:

(i)

At paragraphs [77-78]

‘[77] Contrary to a submission advanced by Ms Mountfield, I do not accept that this means that it is for the court to determine whether appropriate weight has been given to the duty. Provided the court is satisfied that there has been a rigorous consideration of the duty, so that there is a proper appreciation of the potential impact of the decision on equality objectives and the desirability of promoting them, then as Dyson LJ in Baker (para [34]) made clear, it is for the decision maker to decide how much weight should be given to the various factors informing the decision.

[78] The concept of “due regard” requires the court to ensure that there has been a proper and conscientious focus on the statutory criteria, but if that is done, the court cannot interfere with the decision simply because it would have given greater weight to the equality implications of the decision than did the decision maker. In short, the decision maker must be clear precisely what the equality implications are when he puts them in the balance, and he must recognise the desirability of achieving them, but ultimately it is for him to decide what weight they should be given in the light of all relevant factors. If Ms Mountfield’s submissions on this point were correct, it would allow unelected judges to review on substantive merits grounds almost all aspects of public decision making.’

(ii)

At paragraphs [89-90]

‘[89] It is also alleged that the PSED in this case involves a duty of inquiry. The submission is that the combination of the principles in Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014 and the duty of due regard under the statute requires public authorities to be properly informed before taking a decision. If the relevant material is not available, there will be a duty to acquire it and this will frequently mean than some further consultation with appropriate groups is required. Ms Mountfield referred to the following passage from the judgment of Aikens LJ in Brown (para [85]):

“... the public authority concerned will, in our view, have to have due regard to the need to take steps to gather relevant information in order that it can properly take steps to take into account disabled persons’ disabilities in the context of the particular function under consideration.”

[90] I respectfully agree …’”

R (End Violence against Women Coalition) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2021] EWCA Civ 350, [2021] 1 WLR 5829, concerned a challenge to an amendment by the DPP to the policy relating to decisions on whether to prosecute allegations of serious sexual offences. Its facts were therefore far removed from those of the present case. One ground of complaint was that the DPP had breached the public sector equality duty. The Court of Appeal (Lord Burnett of Maldon CJ, Holroyde LJ and Elisabeth Laing LJ) said this:

“85.

The claimant relies on para 26 of the judgment of McCombe LJ in R (Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] Eq LR 60 for four propositions which are said to derive from section 149 of the 2010 Act about which there was no argument (see the second sentence of para 25 of the judgment). In para 44 of Powell v Dacorum BoroughCouncil [2019] HLR 21 McCombe LJ said that the previous decisions about section 149 must be taken in their contexts. The way in which section 149 will apply on the facts will be different in each case, depending on what function is being exercised. The judgments, including the judgment in Bracking, must not be read as if they were statutes. He referred, with approval, to a similar statement by Briggs LJ in para 41 of Haque v Hackney London BoroughCouncil [2017] PTSR 769.

86.

Section 149 of the 2010 Act applies to a public authority when it exercises its functions (see section 149(1)). It requires a public authority to give the equality needs which are listed in section 149 the regard which is ‘due’ in the particular context. It does not dictate a particular result. It does not require an elaborate structure of secondary decision-making every time a public authority makes any decision which might engage the listed equality needs, however remotely. The court is not concerned with formulaic box-ticking, but with the question whether, in substance, the public authority has complied with section 149. A public authority can comply with section 149 even if the decision-maker does not refer to section 149 (see, for example, Hotak v Southwark LondonBorough Council (Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening) [2016] AC 811).”

There is no legal requirement that decision-makers should make a contemporaneous written record of their consideration of the matters identified in section 149(1) of the Act: see R (TZA) v A Secondary School [2025] EWCA Civ 200, [2025] PTSR 1503, at [76].

The nature of the requirement to give reasons for a decision was considered by Judge Thomas Church, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, at first instance in the TZA case: [2023] EWHC 1722 (Admin), [2023] PTSR 2051. That was a case concerning a challenge to a decision to confirm a previous decision permanently to exclude a child (TZB) from a school. The judge said:

“80.

In South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953 Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood said at para 36 that reasons ‘must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal important controversial issues”’ and ‘can be briefly stated’, and ‘[a] reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision’.

81.

It has been established that the standard of reasons that may be required is context-specific, depending on the circumstances of the case: R (Asha Foundation) v Millennium Commission [2003] EWCA Civ 88, per Lord Woolf CJ at para 27.

…

84.

There was no obligation on the GDC to rehearse in its reasons for the Reconsideration Decision what it had said before in relation to the Decision Not to Reinstate. Neither was there any need for it to deal with every point raised before it. It had only to do what was outlined in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Doody and in South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) so that TZA and TZB could understand why the decision went against them, and so they could identify any potential errors in the decision, or the reaching of the decision, that they might wish to challenge.”

The judge’s approach to this point, as well as his substantive decision, was approved on appeal: see in particular the judgment of Underhill LJ, with whom King LJ and Warby LJ agreed, at [88] and [92].

It is relevant to note that in the TZA case the decision-maker had not explained precisely how it had struck the balance between factors militating for and against reinstatement; nevertheless, the challenge to its decision was dismissed. Judge Thomas Church said this:

“98.

In terms of its reasons for deciding not to reinstate TZB, I am conscious that, while the reasons say that the GDC considered GDC’s [scil. TZB’s] characteristics and had regard to the PSED, they do not explain how it came to weigh the PSED factors against those factors militating against reinstatement.

99.

The PSED is intended to ensure that consideration of important equality considerations is ‘baked in’ to the decision-making of public authorities, but the PSED is a duty of process, rather than outcome. As long as the decision-maker has ‘due regard’ to the PSED in a way appropriate to its context, the PSED does not demand any particular result.

100.

In Baker v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2009] PTSR 809, Dyson LJ considered the PSED requirement to have ‘due regard’ and what this meant for the task of the public authority decision-maker:

‘What is due regard? In my view it is the regard that is appropriate in all the circumstances. These include on the one hand the importance of the areas of life of the members of the disadvantaged racial group that are affected by the inequality of opportunity and the extent of the inequality; and on the other hand, such countervailing factors as are relevant to the function which the decision-maker is performing.’ (See para 31.)

101.

The passage from the speech of Elias LJ in R (Hurley) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2012] HRLR 13 cited above under ‘PSED—the authorities’ makes clear that the public authority decision-maker must be alive to the equality implications of a decision when putting them in the balance, and he must recognise the desirability of achieving them, but that it is up to him to decide what weight they should be given.

102.

The ‘countervailing factors’ that the GDC had to consider were substantial: it found at the initial GDC meeting that the violent incidents relied upon by the school had happened as alleged. It found that they amounted to a serious breach of the School’s behaviour policy, and it found that allowing TZB to return to school could harm the education or welfare of others in the School. It didn’t resile from any of those findings on its reconsideration of the Refusal to Reinstate.

103.

The GDC was entitled to give these countervailing factors weight in the balancing exercise it had to perform. It was, in all the circumstances, entitled to come to the conclusion that the balance favoured permanent exclusion. That was a matter for the GDC, and this court should not seek to substitute its own balancing exercise. In those circumstances, the absence of any further explanation of precisely how the balancing exercise was performed does not render its reasons inadequate.”

In St Modwen Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and others [2017] EWCA Civ 1643, [2018] PTSR 746, Lindblom LJ, with whose judgment McCombe and Jackson LJJ agreed, said this at [6]:

“6.

In my judgment at first instance in Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd. v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] EWHC 754 (Admin) (at paragraph 19) I set out the ‘seven familiar principles’ that will guide the court in handling a challenge under section 288. This case, like many others now coming before the Planning Court and this court too, calls for those principles to be stated again – and reinforced. They are:

‘(1) Decisions of the Secretary of State and his inspectors in appeals against the refusal of planning permission are to be construed in a reasonably flexible way. Decision letters are written principally for parties who know what the issues between them are and what evidence and argument has been deployed on those issues. An inspector does not need to ‘rehearse every argument relating to each matter in every paragraph’ (see the judgment of Forbes J. in Seddon Properties v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981) 42 P. & C.R. 26, at p.28).

(2)

The reasons for an appeal decision must be intelligible and adequate, enabling one to understand why the appeal was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important controversial issues’. An inspector’s reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether he went wrong in law, for example by misunderstanding a relevant policy or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But the reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration (see the speech of Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood in South Bucks DistrictCouncil and another v Porter (No. 2) [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1953, at p.1964B-G).

(3)

The weight to be attached to any material consideration and all matters of planning judgment are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the decision-maker. They are not for the court. A local planning authority determining an application for planning permission is free, ‘provided that it does not lapse into Wednesbury irrationality’ to give material considerations ‘whatever weight [it] thinks fit or no weight at all’ (see the speech of Lord Hoffmann in Tesco Stores Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 W.L.R. 759, at p.780F-H). And, essentially for that reason, an application under section 288 of the 1990 Act does not afford an opportunity for a review of the planning merits of an inspector’s decision (see the judgment of Sullivan J., as he then was, in Newsmith v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] EWHC Admin 74, at paragraph 6).

…’”

See also Waterstone Estates Ltd v Welsh Ministers [2017] EWHC 2922 (Admin), per Fraser J at [7]-[8]. The principles stated in these cases are equally applicable to appeals under section 289 of TCPA 1990 as to challenges under section 288.

In the light of the foregoing summary of the facts and of the relevant legal principles, I can state my conclusions briefly.

The inspector expressly referred to the public sector equality duty, though it was not obligatory that he do so. Ms Tobin had brought her protected characteristics and personal circumstances squarely to the attention of the inspector, both in her grounds of appeal and supporting submissions and in the other material filed on the appeal (including her correspondence with the Council), and he was clearly well aware of them. He expressly identified the correct issue that fell for his determination: see especially paragraph 13 of the decision. He identified the planning harm constituted by the porch: see in particular paragraph 14 of the decision. Planning merits were a matter for the inspector; they are not for this court. Similarly, the weight to be given to the competing factors was for the inspector to decide. His conclusion was that the harm caused by the unauthorised development was not outweighed by the personal circumstances of the occupants, including Ms Tobin’s protected characteristics. He explained this conclusion clearly: see in particular paragraphs 16 and 17 of the decision. In my judgment, the inspector properly discharged the public sector equality duty, and the challenge to his decision must fail.

In reaching the conclusion that I have so shortly expressed, I have had regard to the various arguments made against it by Ms Tobin. I turn to consider the main ones.

The central complaint was that, although the inspector had referred to Ms Tobin’s protected characteristics, he had not had “due regard” for the purposes of section 149(1) because he had not considered the issue with “rigour” as required by the authorities. I regard the complaint as unjustified and as resting at the level of mere assertion. It is as well to remember the context in which this matter arises. The decision in the present case did not concern (to take an example) the adoption of a policy that might well have wide-reaching implications for equality. In such a case, rigorous consideration might require all sorts of things, such as (again, for example) consultation and economic and demographical analysis. By contrast, the decision for the inspector was, in truth, a simple one, requiring him to address the question that he correctly identified in relation to a specific set of facts. What is required by rigorous consideration in any given case is dependent on the factual context. In the present case, the question was in truth a simple one, whatever its answer might have been. There is no basis for saying that the inspector failed to give conscientious consideration to the public sector equality duty in the light of the factors that he accurately identified.

Before me, Ms Tobin maintained the complaint, set out in paragraph 46 of the Grounds of Appeal, that the inspector made only “generic” references to planning harm occasioned by the porch and impacts on her of removal of the porch, without identifying the “level” of that harm and those impacts, with the result that it remained unclear how the balancing exercise had been performed. I do not consider that there is anything in this point. To speak of weighing competing considerations in the balance is to use metaphorical, or at least extended, language. The exercise is one of judgement, not scientific measurement. The inspector clearly identified the “material harm” caused by the development (see in particular paragraphs 14 and 17 of the decision) and asked himself whether this was materially outweighed by the occupants’ personal circumstances, including the health and financial implications of requiring removal of the porch, and Ms Tobin’s protected characteristics. There is no basis for alleging or supposing that he misunderstood those countervailing considerations or failed to have regard to them. As the case law mentioned above makes clear, the weight to be given to the competing factors was a matter for him, not for the court, and he was not obliged to explain how he had weighed those factors (even if, as I doubt, it makes sense to seek an analytical answer to that question). If the exercise of judgement results in a decision that is unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, the decision will be open to challenge on the ground of irrationality. However, permission to appeal on that ground was refused by Judge Jarman KC.

With reference to the reasons given for granting permission to appeal on Ground 1 (see paragraph 33 above), Ms Tobin submitted that the inspector had failed to consider the public sector equality duty with proper rigour, because he had limited his focus to the safety of access and had not also considered the convenience of access in the light of her protected characteristics. In my judgment, there are several answers to this point. First, as Ms Tobin herself acknowledged, she advanced the appeal to the inspector on the basis of the need for safe access, not convenience of access. In the context of a statutory appeal to the inspector against an enforcement notice, the requirement to have “due regard” does not, in my view, involve a requirement to have regard to potential equality impacts not raised by the appellant unless they are such as are reasonably apparent even if they have not been raised. Convenience of access, insofar as it is more than safety of access, was neither raised nor reasonably apparent as a potential equality impact calling for separate consideration. Second, to focus on the words “a safe access”, as though they indicated some restriction on the scope of the inspector’s regard to the matters relevant to his decision, is to succumb to precisely the minute analysis of the text of the decision, as though it were a legal opinion or judgment of a court or statutory provision, that has been disapproved by the courts. If the decision is read fairly and as a whole, it is clear that the inspector was aware of and had regard to all of the material implications that removal of the porch would have for the occupants. Third, and relatedly, if an inspector is not required to mention every material consideration in his decision, but only the main issues in dispute (see St Modwen’s Developments), his decision can hardly be open to criticism because it does not mention, as a matter pertaining to a central issue in dispute that is mentioned, something that was not raised before him. Fourth, neither the evidence nor the inspector’s reasoning gives any basis for supposing that convenience of access raised any different issues from safety of access. Ms Tobin had made clear that she and Ms Davies had intended to erect only a porch that benefited from permitted development rights. The inspector noted that the porch could potentially be replaced by one that was compliant with permitted development rights; he considered, though he ultimately rejected, the possibility of permitting Ms Tobin to revert to a scheme that would constitute permitted development. The specific design feature that he noted as being objectionable was the form of the roof. There is nothing to suggest that a lower porch, or a porch with a different form of roof, would be either less safe or less convenient for access than the existing porch; indeed, in her reply to the Council’s response to her appeal to the inspector, Ms Tobin herself said: “If permission is not granted to the porch, we would propose, instead of the porch being demolished, that it be ‘taken down’ (i.e. its height reduced) so that it does not exceed 3m”. The inspector was not persuaded that the existing porch was the only way of achieving safe access.

This brings me to a distinct point raised by Ms Tobin, namely that the inspector failed to grapple with less intrusive and potentially more proportionate alternatives to demolition. This relates to paragraph 19 of the decision. The complaint is that, instead of disregarding potential alternatives because he had not been provided with full details of possible schemes, the inspector ought to have sought further information. Ms Tobin relied on the decision of Lang J in LDRA Limited v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWHC 950 (Admin), by which she set aside the decision of the Secretary of State’s inspector to allow the developer’s appeal and grant planning permission. For present purposes, the relevant issue concerned the effect of the development on access by disabled persons to the riverside. Lang J held that, in considering that issue, the inspector had not discharged the public sector equality duty. She said:

“32.

Applying the legal principles set out above, I have concluded that the Inspector did not have due regard to the duty under section 149 in this case. In particular, because of the lack of any detailed consideration of the value of the existing amenity to disabled persons (including, for the immobile, being able to sit in the car and look at the river); the lack of any other comparable amenity in the Birkenhead area; the practical difficulties which would be experienced by persons with restricted mobility and their carers in descending and climbing the steep footpath to the riverside; and the apparent failure to consider whether the loss of the car park would not be merely ‘less convenient’ for disabled persons but might well mean that they would be unable to access the riverside at all. If the Inspector was not fully appraised [sic] of the relevant information, he was under an obligation to seek the information required. The statutory equality duty was not mentioned in the planning officers’ report, nor in the Inspector’s decision. Of course, the Inspector could comply with the duty without specifically referring to it. But there is no indication in the decision that the Inspector considered the factors set out in section 149, and tellingly there is no reference, express or implied, to the statutory considerations of removing or minimising disadvantages suffered by disabled persons, and taking steps to meet the needs of disabled persons. I consider it is likely that the Inspector overlooked section 149 in reaching his decision, and thus made an error of law.”

I do not accept that Ms Tobin is entitled to pursue that point before me. Ground 2 in her Grounds of Appeal, settled by counsel and argued by him at the permission hearing, was a failure by the inspector properly to consider the appeal on ground (f), “in breach of his duty of sufficient inquiry and/or procedural unfairness”: see paragraphs 30 to 32 and 51 to 57 in the Grounds of Appeal, where it was specifically contended that the inspector had unlawfully failed to ask Ms Tobin for the fully worked-out alternative, the absence of which was noted in paragraph 19 of the decision. Judge Jarman KC expressly held that the ground was not arguable, and he refused permission to pursue it. Ms Tobin cannot pursue the same matter by repackaging the complaint as an aspect of Ground 1.

Anyway, in respectful agreement with Judge Jarman KC, I do not consider the argument to have merit, however it may be packaged. In Tapecrown Ltd v First Secretary of State [2006] EWCA Civ 1744, Carnwath LJ, with whom Wilson and Hughes LJJ agreed, said this concerning appeals under ground (f) (viz. that the steps required to comply with the enforcement notice were excessive):

“33.

In short, the inspector has wide powers to decide whether there is any solution, short of a complete remedy of the breach, which is acceptable in planning terms and amenity terms. If there is, he should be prepared to modify the requirements of the notice, and grant permission subject to conditions (or to accept a section 106 agreement, if offered). I would emphasise, however, that his primary task is to consider the proposals that have been put before him. Although he is free to suggest alternatives, it is not his duty to search around for solutions. I will return to the latter point in connection with the grounds of appeal.

…

46.

As I have said, I would not wish to lay down any general rules. I would accept that as a general proposition, given the limitations of the written representations procedure, an appellant would be well advised to put forward any possible fall-back position as part of his substantive case. It is not the duty of the inspector to make his case for him. On the other hand the inspector should bear in mind that the enforcement procedure is intended to be remedial rather than punitive. If on his consideration of the submissions and in the light of the site view, it appears to him that there is an obvious alternative which would overcome the planning difficulties, at less cost and disruption than total removal, he should feel free to consider it. In such circumstances fairness may require him to give notice to the parties enabling them to comment on it. I would expect the Inspectorate to have an established practice for dealing with that situation efficiently and expeditiously.”

I make two general points. First, context is critical. Second, while potential impact on protected characteristics may very well be a material consideration for an inspector who is deciding whether or not to seek further information or comments from the parties, the underlying principle, namely the requirement of fairness, applies in all cases. (In this regard, I refer, without the need for quotation, to the observations of Underhill LJ in the TZA case, [2025] EWCA Civ 200, at [24] and [82]. Although the dicta were in a very different context, the essential point is of wider application: if matters are relevant under general principles, an analysis in terms of the public sector equality duty is unlikely to add much of substance to consideration of the legality of the decision-making process.) In the present case, the inspector turned his mind to the possibility of a less extreme solution than demolition of the porch. However, not only had he not been provided with any firm proposals; he clearly did not think that any likely alternative would involve less than a major work of reconstruction. He was therefore entitled to think that fairness did not require him to explore the matter further.

In her skeleton argument and in oral submissions to me, Ms Tobin submitted that, in producing his decision, the inspector had failed in a number of respects to follow the guidance in the Inspector Training Manual produced by Planning & Environmental Decisions Wales. Ms Tobin did not suggest that the Inspector Training Manual was itself a source of legal obligation. (See, in respect of the English equivalent, Tiwana Construction Limited v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2025] EWHC 1485 (Admin), per Eyre J at [57].) It follows that what may be material to a section 289 appeal on a point of law is not the fact of departure from the guidance but either (i) the resulting irrationality or (ii) a specific error of law, independently identifiable though corresponding to a departure from the guidance. In the present case, permission to appeal on the ground of irrationality (Ground 4) was refused by Judge Jarman KC. Ms Tobin sought to submit, under Ground 1, that the inspector failed to have due regard to issues that she had raised in respect of vulnerability, harassment and hostile conduct in connection with her occupation of the property: “Those matters were not advanced as free-standing allegations, but as part of the factual context explaining why controlled and secure access to the home was necessary for safety, dignity, and practical use”: skeleton argument, paragraph 93; reliance was placed on paragraph 24 of Annex 4 in the Inspector Training Manual, which concerns fear of crime and adverse effects on health. In this regard I make the following observations. First, the material put before the inspector concerning hate crimes and vulnerability did not relate to the demolition of the porch; rather, they comprised (i) an assertion in Ms Tobin’s request to the Council to withdraw the enforcement notice that the complaints about the porch had been made by the person said to have committed the hate crime and (ii) an explanation for the moving of the front door from the right to the front of the porch. The former is not germane, planning merits being a matter for the inspector. As to the latter, the inspector did not comment on the position of the door and did not mention it as a reason for refusing the appeal on ground (a). Second, the matter now raised concerning harassment and vulnerability was in no sense front and centre of the appeal to the inspector, and there was no requirement that he make express mention of it. Third, the inspector made clear that he had taken into account Ms Tobin’s personal circumstances, including the health and financial implications of a refusal of planning permission. Fourth, as the inspector made clear at the end of paragraph 14 of the decision, the probable fact that a structure complying with permitted development rights could be erected was actually something that did not assist (and, it might be thought, militated against) Ms Tobin’s case: her needs and concerns could probably be addressed without contravention of planning control, which makes such contravention harder to justify.

Ms Tobin made some other points in support of Ground 1. In particular, she pointed to the facts that the Welsh Ministers hold no contemporaneous records of the inspector’s site visit and that the inspector did not hold a hearing or inquiry but dealt with the matter by way of written representations. However, lack of contemporaneous notes is not a ground of appeal and does not support Ground 1. The procedure to be adopted was a matter for Planning & Environmental Decisions Wales. Ms Tobin did not object when she was told that the appeal would be conducted under the written representations procedure, and she has not advanced a ground of appeal in that respect. Neither these nor any other matters advanced by Ms Tobin have dissuaded me from the conclusion stated in paragraph 47 above.

The appeal is dismissed.

This judgment is being handed down by email, without attendance of the parties. If consequential terms of order can be agreed, I shall consider a draft order for approval. Otherwise, there will be a further, short hearing by Cloud Video Platform.