Alicja Hanna Rolbiecka-Platta v Regional Court in Poznan, The Republic of Poland

This is an appeal, pursuant to section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“EA”), against the decision of District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts) Bristow of 16 May 2025 to order Ms Rolbiecka-Platta’s extradition to Poland to serve a sentence of two years’ imprisonment.

The arrest warrant was issued by the Regional Court in Poznan on 16 July 2024 and certified by the National Crime Agency on 12 August 2024. The request related to a sentence of two years’ imprisonment imposed as an aggregate sentence for 19 offences of fraud over a three year period.

The sentence was originally a sentence of two years suspended for five years imposed on 24 November 2017 subject to the condition that the appellant pay compensation of around £6000. This was a sentence under the institution of voluntary surrender of sentence (I understand this to be an agreed basis of sentence) because the appellant had been of good character.

On 17 May 2018 the appellant was ordered to pay the compensation in monthly instalments. She has paid no compensation and therefore the sentence was activated on 27 August 2019.

Further information obtained from the Polish authorities dated 4 November 2024 indicated that the appellant and her lawyer were told that the sentence would be pronounced on 24 November 2017. Letters were sent to the appellant at the address she had provided but there was no reply and the appellant did not attend court 27 August 2019.

Significantly, the appellant had been told to inform the court of any change of address and had signed a document confirming she had received this instruction. The judicial authority said she had not done this.

On 10 April 2025, in front of the district judge, Mr Wotherspoon for the appellant argued that the appellant was not a fugitive; that extradition was barred by reason of the passage of time because it would be oppressive to extradite Ms Rolbiecka-Platta and that extradition was not compatible with her Article 8 ECHR right to respect for her private and family life.

Mr Squibbs for the judicial authority contended in the court below that Ms Rolbiecka-Platta was a fugitive and that extradition was not barred under section 14 of the EA and that extradition was compatible with her Article 8 rights and was proportionate in the circumstances.

The district judge heard evidence from the appellant and others and rejected each argument. He concluded the following in relation to fugitivity:

“21.

The Judicial Authority asserts that the Requested Person is a fugitive. The Requested Person asserts that she is not. The Judicial Authority must prove that the Requested Person is a fugitive and that must be to the criminal standard. I have applied the familiar principles set out in Wisniewski -v- Regional Court of Wroclaw, Poland [2016] EWHC (Admin). I am sure that the Requested Person is a fugitive. This is for the following reasons. The Requested Person knew about the allegations. On her account, given in her proof of evidence, she accepts that she was first contacted about the allegations by the Polish police in April 2016. She knew about the proceedings. On 20 November 2017 the Requested Peron applied for a sentence under the institution of voluntary surrender of sentence. She knew of the suspended sentence, its requirements and the consequences of failing to comply with those requirements. This was because the sentence was pronounced in accordance with the Requested Person’s request. Thus, she was aware of the contents of the judgment and the associated obligations. The Requested Person did not comply with the financial requirements of suspension. She was under an obligation to inform the authorities conducting the proceedings about any change of her residence address and place of stay lasting over seven days. She knew of these because she received these instructions which she signed. She did not comply with these obligations. Consequently, the document requiring her to appear at the hearing on 27 August 2019 when the sentence was activated was not effective. The Requested Person asserted, in evidence, that she did maintain contact with the Polish authorities. I have rejected that account. I prefer, and I am sure of, the Judicial Authority’s account. This is for several reasons. The Judicial Authority will have provided the information from written records. I can have confidence and respect in the information provided by the Judicial Authority. The cautious approach I have taken with regard to the Requested Person’s credibility on topics of this sort. She has failed to provide any evidence to corroborate her assertions. For all these reasons, I am sure, and I find, that the Requested Person is a fugitive who has knowingly put herself beyond the reach of the Polish justice.”

In the light of his finding that the appellant was a fugitive, the district judge held at paragraph 30 “In those circumstances, she cannot rely on any delay as a ground for holding it to be unjust to extradite her”. At his paragraph 31, he added “In any event, if I am wrong, and the Requested Person is not a fugitive, then I do not consider the delay, since she has become unlawfully at large, to be of such duration that a risk of injustice arises. Moreover, I do not consider that any risk of injustice would arise from the circumstances such as I have found them to be”. The district judge concluded therefore that the appellant’s extradition to Poland was not barred by reason of passage of time pursuant to sections 11(1)(c) and 14 of the Extradition Act 2003.

The point is well made by Mr Wotherspoon that the district judge should not have been considering the injustice limb of section 14 (passage of time) , but oppression. No point is taken by Mr Wotherspoon and in any event he has abandoned his section 14 EA argument on appeal.

What Mr Wotherspoon maintains on appeal is that the factual decision made by the district judge, that the appellant was a fugitive, was wrong. He argues this should not have been a factor in favour of extradition when looking at proportionality under Article 8 and balancing the factors for and against extradition.

In terms of the Article 8 argument, at his paragraph 26 the district judge made the following findings about the appellant’s private and family life:

“The Requested Person is a national of Poland. She was born in Poznan and is now 43 years of age. She speaks Polish. Her parents and sister live in Poland. They send seasonal greetings to each other, and she has a greater degree of contact with them than she has sought to assert. She was married but the marriage was dissolved. She does not have children. She has no family life in the UK. She entered the UK first in September 2016. She has been in the UK for around eight years and eight months. She has made friends and forged other relations in the UK as evidenced by the thirteen or so character references she has provided. She has been employed in the UK. She has been diagnosed with depression and anxiety. She has been prescribed Fluoxetine for those conditions. She has been diagnosed with hypertension and has been prescribed Amlodipine to treat that. The Requested Person does not have convictions, cautions reprimands or warnings in the UK. Internationally, she has not been convicted of offences over and above those described in the AW”.

The district judge considered the Article 8 arguments at paragraphs 35 and 36 of the judgment. He accepted that extradition would interfere with the appellant’s private life established over the eight years she had been living in the UK. He said the key question was whether the interference was proportionate. The district judge said he had considered the relevant authorities and he put into effect the balance sheet approach recommended by the Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski and others [2025] EWHC 1274 (Admin).

At paragraph 40, the district judge found the following factors favoured extradition:

“a.

the public interest in ensuring extradition arrangements are honoured is very high, so too is the public interest in discouraging persons seeing the UK as a state willing to accept fugitives from justice;

b.

the offending described in the AW is serious. It is repeated dishonest offending.

c.

a significant sentence of two years has been imposed;

d.

all of that sentence remains to be served by the Requested Person; and

e.

the Requested Person is a fugitive who deliberately put herself beyond the reach of Polish justice to avoid the prison sentence.”

The district judge set out at paragraph 41 the following factors against extradition:

“a.

there will be an interference with the Requested Person’s private life in the UK;

b.

the offences were committed between 24 August 2011 and 06 November 2014; and

c.

the Requested Person has not been convicted of offences in the UK or internationally, except those described in the AW.”

Permission to appeal was granted by Kimblin J on two grounds:

Kimblin J said the following:

“(1)

I accept that the fugitivity point is arguable. It is for that reason that I have granted permission to appeal. I would not, independently, have granted permission on the Art 8 ground, but given that one may infect the other, I have left that open.

(2)

The Perfected Grounds at 14A and 14B are confusingly expressed as double negatives. It would assist the court if the appellant’s skeleton argument articulates the grounds in plain and clear terms.”

The administrative court’s powers on an appeal against an extradition order are set out in section 27 of the EA. The court may allow the appeal only on being satisfied of one or other of the conditions found in subsection (3) of section 27:

“(3)

– that the district judge ought to have decided a question before him (or her) at the extradition hearing differently; and, had the district judge decided that question in the way he (or she) ought to have done, he (or she) would have been required to order the requested person’s discharge.”

The appellant’s case is that this condition is met.

In Celinski (above) at paragraph 24, the Divisional Court gave the following guidance as to the approach which this court should follow in determining Article 8 ECHR appeals:

“The single question therefore for the appellate court is whether or not the district judge made the wrong decision. It is only if the court concludes that the decision was wrong … that the appeal can be allowed. Findings of fact, especially if evidence has been heard, must ordinarily be respected. In answering the question whether the district judge, in the light of those findings of fact, was wrong to decide that extradition was or was not proportionate, the focus must be on the outcome, that is on the decision itself. Although the district judge’s reasons for the proportionality decision must be considered with care, errors and omissions do not of themselves necessarily show that the decision on proportionality itself was wrong”.

In Andrysiewicz v Poland [2025] UKSC 23, the Supreme Court at paragraphs 33 to 43 reviewed the role of Article 8 of the ECHR in extradition cases in the light of the principles set out in earlier cases. At paragraph 47 the Supreme Court gave the following guidance:

“We have set out above relevant passages in Norris, H(H) and Celinski at some length because it is clear that there is a need to reiterate the essential points they make. Cases in which a submission founded on article 8 ECHR may defeat the public interest in extradition will be rare. It is most unlikely that extradition will be held to be disproportionate on the ground of interference with private life. Even in cases where interference with family life is relied upon, it will only be in cases of exceptionally severe impact on family life that an article 8 ECHR “defence” will have any prospect of success”.

When it comes to the effect of a requested person being a fugitive, the district judge considered Wisniewski v Poland [2016] EWHC 386 (Admin) where the court discussed how a court should approach a situation where it was alleged that an individual had breached a suspended sentence and would be regarded as a fugitive. At paragraph 60 below, Lloyd-Jones LJ, as he then was, said the following in relation to a fugitive and passage of time:

“60. … I consider that a person subject to a suspended sentence who voluntarily leaves the jurisdiction in question, thereby knowingly preventing himself from performing the obligations of that sentence, and in the knowledge that the sentence may as a result be implemented, cannot rely on passage of time resulting from his absence from the jurisdiction as a statutory bar to extradition if the sentence is, as a result, subsequently activated. The activation of the sentence is the risk to which the person has knowingly exposed himself. In my view, such a situation falls firmly within the fugitive principle enunciated in Kakis and Gomes and Goodyer.The fact, if it be the case, that a person's motive for leaving the jurisdiction was economic and not a desire to avoid the sentence, does not make the principle inapplicable.

…

62.

In the alternative, Mr. Jones submits that a requested person only becomes a fugitive when he is aware of the activation of the suspended sentence. As we have seen, one line of authority in the Administrative Court supports such a view. However, I have come to the firm view that the approach of Ouseley J in Salbut is correct on this point and should be followed.It is not necessary, in order that a requested person be treated as a fugitive, that he knows that his sentence has been activated. It is enough that he knows that it is liable to be activated because of his breach of the terms of its suspension. Any other approach would be inconsistent with the principle in Kakis and in Gomes and Goodyer and would introduce considerable uncertainty into this area of the law. In particular, as Ouseley J. points out, a person who breaches conditions of his sentence which require him to keep in contact thereby becomes somebody whose whereabouts are unknown to the authority which is entitled to know of them and puts it beyond the authority's power to deal with him. It is his conduct in breach of the suspended sentence that has given rise to his lack of knowledge that the sentence has been implemented. He has as a matter of choice placed himself beyond the reach of the criminal justice system concerned. I consider that he is properly to be regarded as a fugitive from the legal process in his case. Where he has, in this way, brought about the delay himself, the passage of time bar should not be available to him. (Emphasis added).”

A more recent case which considered the idea of fugitivity was Makowska v Poland [2020] EWHC 2371 (Admin) where Fordham J said the following at paragraph 28:

“28.

In grappling with the idea of fugitivity, expressed in the authorities which were cited and to which I have referred, I have found it helpful to think in particular about the following three linked themes: (i) locational dynamism; (ii) informational deficit; and (iii) intended consequential elusiveness. That is not to say that these are elements of a litmus test; nor that all three themes can be expected to be present. A person whose location changes, with a lack of information, becoming elusiveness can be seen as a paradigm case of a fugitive. These themes, or some of them at least, can be seen to be met by each of the following situations: a person who flees the country; a person who conceals their whereabouts; a person who evades arrest; a person whose act of leaving a country knowingly prevents themselves from performing obligations; a person who ceases contact with authorities so as to become a person whose whereabouts are unknown to those authorities and cannot be dealt with by those authorities; a person whose actions are the cause of any delays in their pursuit by the authorities. These themes, as it seems to me, reflect the ordinary and natural meaning of the word 'fugitive'. They link directly to the underlying idea of extradition delays being consequential upon the individual's own choices, with what are, in effect, penalising consequences for the individual in an analysis of the extradition circumstances, under the law.

I have also found it instructive to consider the position in a case on the other side of the line, namely the Pillar-Neumann case. That was an accusation warrant case. It related to alleged offences of fraud and embezzlement between November 1997 and 2001 in Austria and the Netherlands, the requested person having moved to the United Kingdom in 1998. The Austrian authorities' case was that, knowing that she was wanted by the Austrian authorities, the requested person had knowingly refused to leave the United Kingdom and go to Austria to be arrested pursuant to a domestic Austrian warrant, which was said to have made her a fugitive. Hamblen LJ explained the Divisional Court's rejection of that contention (see paragraphs 64-70). The requested person had been living openly in the UK, not concealing her identity or location (paragraph 66). As Hamblen LJ explained (paragraphs 69-70): "She was not fleeing the country or concealing her whereabouts. She was not taking any positive steps to evade or avoid arrest. She was simply carrying on living in her country of residence, as she was lawfully entitled to do. Nor was she knowingly placing herself beyond the reach of a legal process. She took no positive steps to place herself anywhere." So, there was no locational dynamism, but rather a consistency of location. There was no informational deficit, but rather an openness and lack of concealment. There was no consequential elusiveness. There was thus no basis for the, in effect, penalising consequences for the individual in the extradition analysis.

Mr Wotherspoon said that the two questions for this court to consider were: “Question 1, was the appellant a fugitive from justice and question 2, whether the order for extradition was a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s Article 8 rights.”

In fact, the questions should have been: the first, whether the district judge was wrong in finding that the appellant was a fugitive from justice and the second whether the district judge was wrong in finding there was no disproportionate interference with the appellant’s Article 8 rights. The question could also be whether this court on standing back could say that these two questions decided by the court below ought to have been decided differently because the overall evaluation was wrong.

The appellant submitted that both questions he had set out should have been determined differently and that the appellant ought therefore to have been discharged by the district judge.

In terms of question 1, the appellant contended that she did not deliberately or knowingly place herself beyond the reach of the Polish authorities and that the district judge erred in finding that she was a fugitive.

Mr Wotherspoon submitted that she lived openly in the United Kingdom, provided addresses to the Polish authorities, and did not seek to conceal her whereabouts. He relied on her proof of evidence where the appellant had said this. Mr Wotherspoon pointed out rightly that the appellant had provided her address to the divorce court in Poznan and said that she had assumed that the criminal court therefore would know her address.

Mr Wotherspoon further contended that any failures to comply with conditions of the suspended sentence, particularly the failure to pay compensation, did not, of themselves, establish fugitivity.

In terms of the Article 8 balancing of factors for and against extradition, Mr Wotherspoon argued that the district judge was wrong to find the offending as serious as he did particularly as the requesting state had originally imposed a suspended sentence.

The court should have taken into account that on 17 May 2018 the judicial authority had ordered her to pay compensation in instalments because of her inability to pay all at once. Mr Wotherspoon relied on the appellant’s statement where she had said she had tried to pay the compensation but was unable to do so from an English bank account and had received no written reply to her written and email correspondence with the Polish court.

The fact that the appellant had been on an electronically monitored curfew for a period of over 660 days should have been taken into account by the judge as a factor against extradition as it amounted to a restriction on the appellant’s freedom.

Other matters the district judge should have given more weight to was that the appellant was a victim of domestic abuse and had health conditions including depression.

Mr Wotherspoon invited the court to quash the order for the appellant’s surrender as it would not be a proportionate interference with her rights pursuant to Article 8 of the ECHR.

The respondent submitted that the district judge correctly applied the authorities, in particular Wisniewski (above), in concluding that the appellant was a fugitive.

Mr Squibbs argued that the appellant had knowingly breached the condition of her suspended sentence, by failing to pay the compensation ordered. She had also failed to inform the authorities of her changes of address, thereby placing herself beyond the reach of the Polish court.

The respondent further submitted that knowledge of the risk of activation of the sentence was sufficient; it was not necessary that the appellant knew that activation had in fact occurred.

In terms of the Article 8 argument, Mr Squibbs drew this court’s attention to the recent authorities on the approach a court should take to a curfew. He relied on Begum v District Court of Zutphen (Netherlands) [2023] EWHC 3291 (Admin) where Johnson J pointed out at paragraph 26 the difference between being subject to a curfew and being subject to imprisonment:

In Begum the appellant had been subject to an eleven hour curfew for four and a half months by the time of the hearing in front of the district judge and a further 18 months of the curfew by the time of the hearing in the Administrative Court.

Johnson J went on to say at paragraph 27 of the judgment:

Mr Squibbs also relied on the authority of Dedza v Regional Court in Olsztyn (Poland) [2022] EWHC 838 where Holman J decided a 25 month tagged curfew did not “tip the balance” when the sentence was one of one year, one month and 22 days of imprisonment. Holman J said at paragraph 26:

“26…The degree of restriction on liberty of a tagged curfew is altogether different from the restriction of being imprisoned 24 hours a day within a prison.”

In terms of the Article 8 submission, Mr Squibbs argued with force that none of the matters relied on by Mr Wotherspoon tipped the case into one where an “exceptionally severe impact” on the appellant’s family life was shown.

The correct approach to fugitivity required a careful assessment of whether the requested person deliberately and knowingly placed themselves beyond the reach of the legal process.

The district judge made clear findings that the appellant knew of the proceedings, the sentence and its conditions, and understood that the consequences of non-compliance was activation. Indeed, the appellant admitted all of these.

The appellant had signed a document accepting that she had to provide any address at which she was living for a period of more than seven days. She said she had emailed and written to the court and provided her address but the district judge found, on the evidence, that she had failed to comply with her obligations, including the obligation to notify changes of address.

Those were findings of fact made after hearing oral evidence and such findings are not lightly to be disturbed on appeal.

The appellant’s submissions sought to characterise her conduct as open and non-evasive. However, the district judge was entitled to conclude on the evidence that he did not accept her account. The district judge had made reasoned adverse findings about the appellant’s credibility.

The appellant knew about the sentence, I did not accept that she would not have realised that a failure to pay the compensation which was a condition of her sentence would lead to the activation of the sentence. I did not accept either that it was acceptable for her to assume that her contact with a family court in relation to a divorce in 2021 would mean that the criminal court would know where she lived. By the time of the divorce, the activation of the sentence on 27 August 2019 had taken place.

The district judge’s findings were justified on the evidence he heard. The principles in Wisniewski support the conclusion that a person who knowingly exposes herself to the risk of activation of a suspended sentence, whilst failing to fulfil a condition and failing to maintain required contact, may properly be regarded as a fugitive.

Applying Fordham J’s approach in Makowska, the appellant’s location changed from Poland to England and then within England so there was a locational dynamism in the case. Second, her lack of provision of her address as found by the district judge was an example of informational deficit.

Finally, the appellant knew that she had failed to pay the compensation and would have known that that failure would activate the sentence of imprisonment, the court’s lack of information about her address, which was deliberate on her part, amounted to intended consequential elusiveness.The Polish authorities were not able to deal with her as they did not have her address and that failure was in breach of her signed agreement that she will keep them informed of a change of address of more than seven days.

In short, the appellant was a fugitive and the district judge was not wrong correct to find he was sure she was one. Ground 1 has no merit.

I have set out above the well-known governing principles. The court must conduct a structured proportionality assessment, weighing the interference with the appellant’s private and family life against the strong public interest in extradition.

The appellate task is not to revisit the evidence de novo but to determine whether the district judge’s conclusion was wrong, recognising that errors or omissions in reasoning do not of themselves establish that the ultimate decision was incorrect.

It is further clear that cases in which Article 8 will defeat extradition are rare, and will generally require an “exceptionally severe impact on family life” (Andrysiewicz above).

The district judge directed himself by reference to the established authorities and undertook a balancing exercise, identifying both the public interest factors in favour of extradition and those personal to the appellant, against.

He concluded that extradition would be proportionate and, importantly, made clear that this conclusion would have been the same even had he not found the appellant to be a fugitive, and even if the expert medical evidence had been accepted in full.

That conclusion was of central importance. It showed that the district judge’s assessment did not depend upon any one factor but reflected a comprehensive evaluation of the competing considerations.

The public interest in extradition is a constant and very weighty one. It reflects the need to honour international obligations, to maintain mutual confidence between Category 1 territories, and to ensure that the United Kingdom does not become a safe haven for those subject to criminal sentences abroad.

In the present case, that public interest is particularly strong. Mr Wotherspoon argued that the district judge should not have called the offending serious, but I disagree. The appellant was convicted of multiple fraud offences involving identity theft over a sustained period (of over three years), and a sentence of two years’ imprisonment was imposed.

The fact that the sentence was initially suspended did not diminish its seriousness. On the contrary, the suspension was conditional upon the appellant’s compliance, and the subsequent activation of the sentence reflected the seriousness of the breach of those conditions. The appellant had failed to compensate the losers in the fraud.

In addition, as the respondent submitted, there was a distinct public interest in ensuring that court orders, including suspended sentences and their conditions, are respected and enforced.

Even if the appellant were not to be characterised as a fugitive, the circumstances that she was aware of her obligations to pay compensation and nevertheless failed to pay one zloty, was a relevant factor in favour of extradition.

First, private life and length of residence. The district judge recognised that the appellant had established a private life in the United Kingdom over a number of years. The evidence included a reference from her employer and from a number of friends and colleagues. This showed that she was a valued worker and a kind and helpful friend to many.

It was accepted that extradition would interfere with the appellant’s private life but there was nothing that approached the threshold required to render extradition disproportionate, nothing to elevate it into the category of an exceptionally severe impact on the private life of the appellant.

The district judge was entitled to conclude that the impact on the appellant’s private life did not reach a level of exceptional severity.

Second, bail conditions and the curfew. The appellant relied on the period spent on bail subject to a curfew. The district judge was entitled to take this into account, but equally entitled to conclude that it did not materially affect the proportionality assessment.

The authorities set out at paragraphs 40 to 44 above, make clear that time spent on curfew rarely carries decisive weight unless the case is otherwise finely balanced. The district judge was entitled to consider that this was not such a case.

Moreover, there was no evidential basis upon which to conclude that the curfew had such a significant or particularised impact on the appellant’s life as to alter the overall balance.

Third, the appellant’s financial circumstances and failure to pay compensation. The appellant submitted that her failure to pay compensation was due to practical difficulties and financial hardship. The district judge rejected the appellant’s account and found that she had not maintained contact with the authorities or taken effective steps to comply with the conditions of the sentence.

That was a finding of fact open to the district judge and this court sees no proper basis to interfere with it. In any event, even if some weight were to be given to the appellant’s explanation, it does not materially diminish the strong public interest in enforcing the sentence imposed by the Polish court. It is for the Polish authorities to decide whether to waive compensation in the circumstances.

Fourth, the appellant relies on her account of having been subjected to domestic abuse but the district judge expressly declined to accept that account as reliable.

In circumstances where the judge heard oral evidence and made an adverse credibility assessment, there is no basis for this court to revisit that finding. Further, even if that factor were taken at its highest, it would not of itself be capable of rendering extradition disproportionate in the absence of consequences of exceptional severity.

Fifth, the appellant placed reliance on expert evidence indicating the appellant has depression, suffers from anxiety and that there is a risk of deterioration if extradited.

The district judge accepted that the appellant suffered from mental health difficulties but was not persuaded that the expert’s more serious conclusions could safely be relied upon, having regard to concerns as to the appellant’s credibility. That was an evaluation open to him to make.

In any event, and importantly, the district judge made clear that even accepting the expert evidence at its highest, the conditions described did not approach the threshold required to render extradition disproportionate. There was no evidence that adequate medical care would not be available in Polish prisons.

Standing back, the case is not finely balanced.

The public interest in extradition is strong, reflecting the seriousness of the offending and the need to enforce a custodial sentence imposed by a competent court in a Category 1 territory.

The factors relied upon by the appellant—whether taken individually or cumulatively—do not approach the level of exceptional severity required to outweigh that public interest.

This remains so even if the appellant were correct on fugitivity. The district judge’s alternative conclusion on proportionality was clear, reasoned, and unimpeachable.

The district judge correctly identified the balancing exercise required by the authorities and weighed the relevant factors as set out at paragraphs 15 and 16 above.

Importantly, he concluded that extradition would be proportionate even if the appellant were not a fugitive and even if the medical evidence were accepted at its highest.

That approach demonstrates that the district judge carried out an overall evaluation which was not dependent on any single factor.

The appellant’s challenges largely amounted to disagreements with the weight assigned to various factors. However, errors in emphasis or reasoning do not suffice unless the ultimate conclusion is shown to be wrong. That has not been shown. The cumulative effect of the factors relied on by the appellant does not reach the high threshold required to render extradition disproportionate.

The district judge’s conclusion that the public interest in extradition remained strong, and that the impact on the appellant did not attain the level of exceptional severity required, was one he was entitled to reach.

The Article 8 challenge fails. Extradition would constitute a proportionate interference with the appellant’s Convention rights.

The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the district judge ought to have decided either of the relevant questions differently, or that any such different decision would have required her discharge.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.