Court of Appeal Bucharest, Romania v Adrian Lucian Preda

This is an appeal by the judicial authority under section 28 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”) against the decision of District Judge Grego of 5 November 2025 discharging the respondent pursuant to section 21 on Article 8 grounds.

The appellant contended that the judge erred in his proportionality assessment, principally by failing properly to weigh the seriousness of the offending and the public interest in extradition, and by failing adequately to consider protective factors relevant to the respondent’s family.

The respondent submitted that the judge conducted a lawful evaluative exercise, and that the appeal amounts to no more than a disagreement with his conclusion.

Fordham J gave permission to appeal and said that he understood that the judge in the court below did not find the balancing exercise easy but that the appeal was “reasonably arguable. It may or may not ultimately succeed”.

The respondent sought to adduce fresh evidence for the appeal which had been obtained since the hearing in the magistrates’ court which was a recent neuropsychological assessment report and feedback from a psychiatric assessment of one of the respondent’s children, BB.

The new assessment had taken place in early 2026. It concluded that he had an “ADHD profile with severe presentation combined (mixed subtype) and that he also had “severe Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD)”. This was fresh evidence because at the time of the hearing in the court below the witness, Dr Pettle, said BB was “just below the clinical level for ADHD”. Mr Seifert argued that the fresh evidence showed that there was a progress in BB’s neurodiversity.

The approach to be followed by this court when faced with an application to admit fresh evidence in support of an appeal against an extradition order is stated in the familiar case of Szombathely City Court v Fenyvesi [2009] EWHC 231 (Admin); [2009] 4 All ER 324 at paragraph 32. The application was not opposed by the appellant. The evidence had not been available at the time of the hearing in the lower court. This court will consider it de bene esse, evaluate the fresh evidence, consider all the evidence including that which was before the district judge and carry out the balancing of factors as set out in Celinskiv Poland [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin) to decide on the proportionality of the respondent’s extradition in the context of his family’s Article 8 ECHR rights.

For the reasons which follow, I am satisfied that the District Judge’s decision on Article 8 was wrong. The appeal must therefore be allowed.

The respondent is sought pursuant to a Romanian arrest warrant issued on 26 August 2024, following his convictions for a series of serious offences including attempted murder, public order violence, extortion, and participation in an organised criminal group.

The offences arise from events between 2008 and 2013. They include violent confrontations between rival organised crime groups, in which weapons including knives and firearms were being carried and victims sustained life-threatening injuries. The respondent was a member of one of the gangs and was personally responsible for the particularly serious injuries suffered by a member of the opposing gang. The offence in January 2008 involved injuries caused to police officers.

The respondent was sentenced to a term of 5 years 6 months’ imprisonment, of which approximately 5 years 3 months remain to be served.

Further information was provided by the Romanian authorities on 26 August 2025 which gave more detail about the offences. In particular during one of the gang fights (in July 2008) the respondent was carrying a knife and a gun and he hit the victim to the head with a chair which caused him to fall to the floor and be beaten. The victim had a skull fracture, a brain injury and other injuries which were life threatening. The respondent was said to have struck the victim’s head with such force that it was clear he had been attempting to kill him. It was said that the respondent had been part of the ‘Sportivi’ gang that provided protection services. Their aim was to commit offences including attempted murder to become the preeminent gang in Bucharest.

There has been a lengthy procedural history to these extradition proceedings. An earlier European Arrest Warrant for the same offences issued in December 2017 led to the respondent’s arrest in January 2018. Those proceedings were discharged in April 2018 due to the absence of an Article 3 compliant prison assurance.

The Romanian authorities were notified of that discharge on 5 April 2018. They wrote asking for a copy of the judgment on 12 April 2018. At that stage the SIRENE network of communication was used. This then became unavailable to England and Wales with Brexit. The reply was provided to the Romanian authorities on 23 July 2024 by the Interpol office in Romania. For approximately six years no effective steps were taken. A new warrant was then issued. It was certified in March 2025.

A prison assurance was received on 8 May 2025 and there was no challenge to the assurance in the magistrates’ court.

During the period between 2018 and 2024, the respondent remained in this country. He lived with his wife and three children (now aged 12, 9 and 8) continued with his family life, and built up a successful business, The Preda Fight Club, which employs his wife too. He has not committed any offences in the United Kingdom.

The respondent was arrested on the present warrant in April 2024 and appeared before Westminster Magistrates’ Court, where he contested extradition. He has been on conditional bail throughout both sets of proceedings.

The extradition hearing took place on 3 October 2025. Evidence was given by the respondent, his wife, and Dr Sharon Pettle, a consultant clinical psychologist.

The District Judge, having set out arguments in favour and against extradition, discharged the respondent on Article 8 grounds, finding that extradition would have an exceptionally severe impact on his children, particularly in light of the delay and the children’s established lives in the United Kingdom.

The appeal falls to be determined under section 29 of the 2003 Act. The question is whether the judge “ought to have decided the relevant question differently.”

Subject to the approach set out above in relation to the fresh evidence, the appellate function is not a rehearing. The court must decide whether the overall evaluation was wrong, giving appropriate respect to findings of primary fact. The district judge in the court below heard live evidence whilst this court has not.

In all extradition cases the public interest in extradition “weighs very heavily indeed”. In Article 8 cases only consequences which are “exceptionally serious” can outweigh it. This reflects the well-known observations of Norris v Government of the USA (No 2) [2010] UKSC 9, where Lord Phillips emphasised that extradition forms part of the system by which serious crime is prosecuted internationally, and that the interference with family life that usually follows imprisonment should be proportionate. Only where the consequences of extradition are of an exceptional or very serious nature would the Article 8 right to a family and private life outweigh that powerful public interest.

In Celinski (above) at paragraph 24, the Divisional Court gave the following guidance as to the approach which this court should follow in determining appeals in Article 8 of the ECHR cases:

“The single question therefore for the appellate court is whether or not the district judge made the wrong decision. It is only if the court concludes that the decision was wrong … that the appeal can be allowed. Findings of fact, especially if evidence has been heard, must ordinarily be respected. In answering the question whether the district judge, in the light of those findings of fact, was wrong to decide that extradition was or was not proportionate, the focus must be on the outcome, that is on the decision itself. Although the district judge’s reasons for the proportionality decision must be considered with care, errors and omissions do not of themselves necessarily show that the decision on proportionality itself was wrong”.

In Andrysiewicz v Poland [2025] UKSC 23, the Supreme Court, at paragraphs 33 to 43, reviewed the role of Article 8 in extradition cases in the light of the principles set out in earlier authorities. At paragraph 47, the Supreme Court gave the following guidance:

“We have set out above relevant passages in Norris, H(H) and Celinski at some length because it is clear that there is a need to reiterate the essential points they make. Cases in which a submission founded on article 8 ECHR may defeat the public interest in extradition will be rare. It is most unlikely that extradition will be held to be disproportionate on the ground of interference with private life. Even in cases where interference with family life is relied upon, it will only be in cases of exceptionally severe impact on family life that an article 8 ECHR “defence” will have any prospect of success”.

The task for the court is therefore to identify whether the consequences relied upon go beyond the ordinary disruption and hardship which almost inevitably follow extradition, and instead reach the high threshold of being exceptional. In the court below, the exercise required a structured and reasoned balancing of the factors in favour of extradition and of those against.

Having set out the allegations in the arrest warrant at paragraph 4, the district judge initially dealt with the challenge under Article 6. At paragraph 31 of his judgment he turned to the authorities on Article 8. He turned to the judicial authority’s assertions about the factors weighing in favour of extradition at paragraph 37:

“37.

For the JA the prosecution asserts that the court should weigh in favour of extradition the following:

• There is a constant and” weighty public interest in extradition.

• That those accused of crimes should be brought to trial and that those convicted of crimes should serve their sentences.

• Further that the UK should honour its treaty obligations to other countries and there should be no safe havens to which criminals or those accused of criminal activity can flee in the belief that they will not be sent back.

• I note that in the course of submissions the JA did not argue that fugitivity was a relevant factor for consideration. An argument might be raised that the RP was a fugitive for a matter of weeks in 2018 but the JA specifically noted this was not a matter worthy of further consideration.

The requested person relied on various factors against extradition in his Article 8 argument which were set out by the district judge in paragraph 38 of his judgment, these included delay, the effect on his wife and children, the impact on their finances and on the children.

“38.

The RP opposes extradition and prays in aid:

• The court should properly consider the delay in this case. The original offences 1-3 in the warrant date back to January and July 2008. Offence 5 covers a period from 2008-2013. Offence 4 is said to have occurred in May 2013. The original extradition proceedings commenced with the issue of the warrant on 20 December 2017; this was certified on 9 January 2018. Those proceedings were discharged on 3 April 2018. The reason for the discharge which appears to have been avoidable was that the JA did not as requested, provide a Prison Assurance and thus the court could not be satisfied as to the RP’s Article 3 rights.

• Further delay should, the defence assert, be considered. This is the gap in time between the discharge decision in April 2018 and the further warrant being issued on 26 August 2024, certified on 13 March 2025.

• The RP also provides evidence of the effect of his proposed extradition on his family life and that of his wife and children. Both he and his wife set out those features which though troubling are common when considering Article 8. These involve the financial impact as he is the main earner in the family. Further that their depleted income will threaten their current accommodation. The impact upon the children.”

The district judge at paragraph 39 said “there is therefore a balance to be struck”. He then summarised the evidence of Dr Pettle, a consultant clinical psychologist who dealt with the likely effect of the respondent’s extradition on the children, particularly on BB, the nine year old. Although the district judge chose not to summarise the majority of the evidence he heard, he said that Mrs Preda had said that she felt there was no option other than to return to Romania with the children if the respondent was extradited. She said that the respondent was a hands-on father. The district judge said that BB had emotional dysregulation at school and was “just below the clinical level for ADHD”.

The district judge summarised at his paragraph 40, Dr Pettle’s conclusion as follows:

“Mr and Mrs Preda have created a settled life for their children where there are predictable routines, clear boundaries and expectations for behaviour. They present as a happily rooted family and have lived in the same house for the last seven years. The children are well connected to the school community… There is a warm atmosphere and affection openly displayed. Although their experiences to date may have enabled them to develop some resilience, this has not been tested, and the absence of their father as a central member of the household would be a considerable loss to all the children. The relationships between all the children and their father are close and the children feel safe with, and protected by, him. They have a strong bond with him…. It is not clear whether visits would be possible on a frequent and reliable basis, which is required in order for a sense of closeness to be maintained over such a long period… Alongside the significant loss of a primary caregiver, the children face a sudden and complete shift in their daily lives and routine. A move to Romania would be a massive upheaval.”

Dr Pettle said that BB had particular vulnerabilities after a traumatic birth. At his paragraph 41, the district judge said Dr Pettle had said the following about BB:

“BB had significant problems with separation and showed an emotional intensity in relation to this which was long lasting. The sudden and prolonged absence of his father would be likely to create significant distress and he may be very hard to console. He may become very clingy again and struggle to attend a new school where staff are unfamiliar and he has no friends. His emotional state is very likely to impact on his ability to socialize and form new friendships, and he is likely to show increased behavioural difficulties. He is likely to have problems concentrating and find it difficult to attend to the necessary level. I would expect this to be especially obvious in the education setting for some time.”

The district judge pointed out that the children would have been younger at the time of the earlier proceedings. He said that since then the children would have developed “meaningful relationships with their father”. He said that “The delay in itself, though avoidable and regrettable, would not be sufficient reason to tilt the balance in favour of the RP. However the delay sets a context for the impact of the RP’s extradition on his children and BB in particular.”

The district judge then misunderstood what Dr Pettle had told him. He thought she had said that “the impact on the children and, BB more than the others, of removal, would be significantly more profound at their current ages compared to removal in 2018.”

In fact from counsel’s agreed note of the evidence, that was not said. There were arguments going both ways. In 2018 they would cognitively have had difficulty understanding where their father was whilst in 2025 the children would understand but would find it challenging having to tell their friends what was happening to their father.

The next paragraphs 42 and 43 is where the only analysis of the factors for and against extradition takes place before the district judge’s conclusion at paragraphs 44 and 45:

“42.

AA was 5 years old at the time of the original extradition proceedings. BB was a few months away from his second birthday and CC was six months old. Clearly that intervening period means they have developed appropriate and meaningful relationships with their father. These fresh proceedings were not then commenced for a further [sic] until the issue of the fresh warrant in December 2024. Unquestionably there was lengthy and avoidable delay. The delay in itself, though avoidable and regrettable, would not be sufficient reason to tilt the balance in favour of the RP. However the delay sets a context for the impact of the RP’s extradition on his children and BB in particular. As the psychologist said to me in evidence, the impact on the children and, BB more the others of removal, would be significantly more profound at their current ages compared to removal in 2018.

43.

On the other side of the balance is the seriousness of the offending and the matters raised in favour of extradition by the Judicial Authority.

CONCLUSION

44.

This has not been an easy balancing exercise for the reasons set out immediately above. In my judgement the matters raised by the requested person, not least the impact on his son BB, mean that the consequential interference with family life will be exceptionally severe.

45.

Extradition in this case would not be compatible with the Convention rights of the RP or his immediate family members. In coming to that conclusion, I must order Mr Preda’s discharge from these proceedings.”

Ms Herbert for the appellant judicial authority submitted that the decision was flawed overall in that there was a failure to give reasons for the decision the judge came to. There was little to no analysis in the judgment.

In particular the judge, first, failed properly to address the gravity of the offending in this case, where the requested person was a member of an organised crime group, carried a gun and knives and tried to murder an opposing gang member. The judge did not refer to the facts as set out in the further information where the role the respondent played in the violence was set out clearly. It said that he was the one who tried to kill the victim in the gang attack in 2008.

There was furthermore very little consideration of the length of the sentence the respondent had to serve. This illustrated the gravity of the offences committed by the defendant.

Second, the judge failed to engage with evidence of the protective factors available to the family if the father was extradited, including the family’s ability to relocate and the support available in Romania from other family members. The family would live with the maternal grandparents and the children knew them well.

Ms Herbert contended with force that the potential consequences to the wife and children of extradition were not unusual in extradition and it did not cross the threshold in this case. Ms Herbert said there was no analysis about what was exceptionally severe about the family’s situation were the respondent to be extradited.

The result of those two failures was that the judge had erred in not finding extradition compatible with the family’s Article 8 rights.

As regards delay, Ms Herbert contended that it should be taken into account but as the district judge said in his judgment at paragraph 42, it was not determinative of the application.

Mr Seifert for the respondent relied on the judge’s evaluation of the competing factors and the evidence that extradition would cause serious disruption and distress to the children.

Mr Seifert placed particular emphasis on the delay, he said it was at the heart of the case, it affected the respondent’s family life, and had a cumulative effect on three young children who had spent their whole lives in the United Kingdom and were now more settled than they had been in 2018.

He relied on the fresh evidence provided. The neuropsychological assessment of BB (aged nine) conducted by a psychologist on 26 February 2026 where it was concluded that BB had an ADHD profile with a severe presentation 314.01 – combined (mixed subtype). According to one of the tests, BB showed a severe oppositional defiant disorder (ODD). The psychologist recommended therapy and special educational needs support at school but not medication.

Mr Seifert did not accept Ms Herbert’s characterisation of the district judge’s judgment as lacking in analysis. He said the offences on the warrant were set out in the judgment and clearly showed that serious offending had taken place. Nothing there contradicted what was said in the further information.

Furthermore, the district judge found there were exceptionally serious consequences to the family life of the respondent, his wife and their children. The judge had applied the correct test and his decision could not be said to be wrong.

In my judgment, the appellant is correct that the judge failed adequately to engage with the seriousness of the offending and its implications for the balancing exercise.

These are extremely serious offences involving organised violence and life-threatening injury. The respondent was a member of a criminal gang for five years and committed the really serious offences set out in the arrest warrant.

The further information obtained showed that the respondent personally was responsible for the life threatening injuries suffered by one particular victim, a fractured skull and a brain injury. The respondent intended to kill him. The respondent would carry weapons on occasion including a gun and a knife.

There was a lack of analysis when the judge purported to weigh up the factors in favour of extradition. All he said was as I set out above at paragraph 34 (the district judge’s paragraph 43): “On the other side of the balance is the seriousness of the offending and the matters raised in favour of extradition by the judicial Authority”. There was no mention of the really substantial sentence that the respondent was due to serve. The district judge essentially referred back to his own summary of the judicial authority’s submissions.

The seriousness of the offences significantly strengthens the public interest in extradition, which is ordinarily to be regarded as carrying great weight in the balancing exercise.

The judge’s reasoning did not demonstrate that this factor was given the weight required, bearing in mind the principle, emphasised in the authorities, that only consequences of an exceptionally serious character are capable of outweighing that public interest.

The judge’s conclusion rested on the impact on the children and to a lesser extent on the effect of delay.

While those factors are plainly relevant, they did not in my judgment reach the demanding threshold of exceptionality identified in the authorities, namely that the consequences must be “exceptionally severe” if Article 8 is to outweigh the public interest.

Dr Pettle’s evidence as summarised by the district judge was that between 2018 and 2025, the children had developed “appropriate and meaningful relationships with their father”. If that were sufficient to counteract the very high public interest in ensuring extradition arrangements are honoured, then very few parents would be extradited to serve their sentences.

The judge in his reasoning at paragraph 42 said that delay set a context for the impact of the respondent’s extradition on his children and BB in particular. He then went on to misremember the evidence of the psychologist. In fact there were arguments going both ways as to whether the children would be more affected now or in 2018 by the loss of their father.

There was a failure too to set out the strengths of the family which were many. The mother was clearly capable, she was described as resilient. If the mother had to return to Romania with the children, she would go to live with her parents. The children spend each summer with them on their own so they know them well and they know the area where they live. Furthermore, the children speak Romanian even if they cannot read or write it. They would not be completely disadvantaged if they had to return.

The evidence shows that the children are settled and functioning well, albeit that BB like many children has ADHD and ODD.

In assessing the impact on family life, I have considered the position of each member of the respondent’s family, and in particular the children, as required by Beoku-Betts v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 39, where it was made clear that the family unit must be considered as a whole and that each member is to be treated as a potential victim of the interference with Article 8 rights. That approach underscores the importance of careful attention to the children’s welfare. However, it does not lower the high threshold identified in Norris and reaffirmed in Celinski and Andrysiewicz.

I have also considered the fresh evidence now relied upon in relation to BB. At the extradition hearing, Dr Pettle identified particular concerns in relation to BB, who was born prematurely and had suffered intracranial bleeding at birth. He had some ongoing emotional dysregulation and attentional difficulties, albeit at that stage below the clinical threshold for ADHD.

The fresh evidence included material which indicated that BB had since been assessed as having severe ADHD and associated behavioural difficulties. However, the evidence also recorded that he remains an engaging and communicative child, functioning at an acceptable level educationally, and able to form social relationships.

Dr Pettle’s core opinion was that the respondent’s extradition would lead to a profound sense of loss and significant upheaval for the children, particularly given the close family unit and the respondent’s role within it. That evidence is important and I take it fully into account. It illustrates that the impact on the children would be serious and potentially long-lasting. However, even taking the updated diagnosis and vulnerabilities at their highest, the evidence does not demonstrate consequences qualitatively beyond those which are ordinarily encountered where one of the parents goes to prison for a lengthy period.

Even taking the children’s circumstances at their highest, the consequences identified, while significant, do not in my judgment reach the level of being “exceptionally severe” so as to outweigh the very strong public interest in extradition.

The disruption caused by extradition, however serious, and I accept it is a serious disruption for this family, is of a kind frequently encountered in extradition cases and falls within the category of consequences which the authorities treat as ordinarily proportionate.

The judge did not adequately explain why this case was different in kind rather than degree, which is the critical distinction required when applying the “exceptionally severe” threshold reaffirmed in Andrysiewicz.

The delay was significant and is a relevant factor. It is not clear why there was a nearly sevenyear delay. There was a failure of communication. It appears to be more likely to be the fault of the English authorities rather than the Romanian ones as the latter’s letter was not responded to. Mr Seifert made a fair point that the Romanians failed to follow up the letter but there is no suggestion that the Romanians were not pursuing the extradition.

However, rightly, the judge expressly found that delay alone would not justify discharge. Delay does not, in my judgment, elevate the impact on the family to the level required to outweigh the public interest, applying the stringent test identified in the authorities.

Standing back, I am satisfied that the District Judge’s proportionality assessment was wrong. He gave too little weight to the gravity of the offences and too much weight to the effect on the family, BB in particular.

The seriousness of the offences was shown in more detail by the further information. This said that the respondent personally caused the life-threatening head injuries to the victim in July 2008 intending to kill him. The warrant said that the respondent was a member of a criminal gang for many years which used extortion and provided protection services. The offences and the sentence imposed by the Romanian court show that there is a very weighty public interest in extradition in these circumstances.

Against that must be weighed the fact that the respondent had been living in the UK for about thirteen years and he has built a life for himself here. He has left his criminal connections behind and had started a successful business which employs his wife.

The main matters relied on by Mr Seifert were the consequences on the family of extradition considering the delay. The children have spent the majority of their lives here. The family is settled and doing well in this country. They are a close family, the father plays an important hands-on role, the children will miss their father and all he brings to the family when he is serving his sentence.

There would have been poor consequences to the children had the extradition order been made in 2018 as opposed to now. They would have been less likely to understand the loss of their father when very young.

I accept the evidence shows that there will be poor consequences to them of an extradition now. The three children will find a transition to living full time in Romania very challenging. They will have to go to new schools and they are likely to lose their friends left behind in England. I take into account the fresh evidence that BB has ADHD and ODD which would be so if he were in Romania or in England but the transition is likely to be more difficult for him than the other two children.

There are many positives about the respondent who has put a criminal lifestyle behind him and who along with his wife is providing a secure and stable family life to the three children of the family. The consequences for the respondent’s family, however, although serious, do not meet the threshold of being exceptionally severe.

Overall, the weighty public interest in extradition for these very serious offences, even with the delay in the proceedings between 2018 and 2026, outweighs the serious consequences of extradition to the respondent and his family. In short standing back the decision was wrong.

The appeal is allowed.

The order discharging the respondent is quashed.

The case is remitted to the District Judge with a direction to proceed in accordance with section 29(5) of the Act.