CLT, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Hounslow

This is a claim for judicial review brought by the Claimant, CLT, aged 16 years and 11 months at the date of the hearing of the claim. He brings this claim through his litigation friend and sister, CLA, who is now 19. The Claimant currently lives in accommodation owned by the Defendant, the London Borough of Hounslow, in Brentford (“the address”) with CLA. Their mother and father died in 2018 and 2020, respectively. The Claimant challenges the alleged failure of the Defendant to recognise him as a "looked after" child and to provide him with adequate accommodation and support under the Children Act 1989 ("CA 1989").

Since approximately 17 June 2025, the Claimant’s distant cousin, IF, who had previously resided with them so as to provide them with care, has been missing. The Claimant contends that he has been living in squalid conditions without parental responsibility being exercised by any adult, and that the Defendant has unlawfully sought to evade its statutory duties.

The Claimant advances four grounds of challenge. Through Ground 1, he contends that the Defendant owes him the mandatory duty, under s.20 of the CA 1989, to provide him with accommodation as a child in need with no person holding parental responsibility for him and/or his father being prevented from providing him with suitable accommodation or care. The Claimant alleges that he appeared to require accommodation following his father's death in November 2020, at which point no person held parental responsibility for him. He argues that the Defendant’s records confirm it formed this view at the material time and that the Defendant cannot rely on a purported “private fostering arrangement” (“PFA”) with IF to evade its statutory obligations. The Claimant submits that because the Defendant owned the address, had the right to evict him but chose not to, the Defendant itself provided the accommodation, and that a PFA cannot exist in such circumstances nor be used to side-step s.20 duties once they arise. Consequently, under Ground 2, the Claimant asserts that he acquired “looked after” and “eligible” child status, engaging duties under ss.22 to 22G of the CA 1989, which the Defendant breached by failing to maintain suitable care, ignoring reports of neglect and property disrepair, and failing to plan for his transition to adulthood.

Alternatively, under Ground 3, the Claimant argues that the Defendant failed to discharge its duties to him as a child in need under s.17 of the CA 1989 by providing inadequate financial support. Specifically, the Claimant challenges the sufficiency of the current £60 per week allowance against a calculated need of £146.25, an alleged failure to provide necessary support for his post-16 education and an alleged failure to remedy disrepair at the address.

Finally, under Ground 4, the Claimant contends that the Defendant acted unlawfully by failing to conduct enquiries under s.47 of the CA 1989 despite, from 2022, having reasonable cause to suspect he was suffering, or was likely to suffer, significant harm due to IF’s extended absences, the children living alone, lack of food, and poor housing conditions.

For its part, the Defendant denies that the Claimant appeared to require accommodation, relies on the existence of a PFA with IF, and maintains that it has discharged its statutory duties.

The Claimant was born in December 2008 and grew up in Brentford. CLA was born in 2006. The Claimant’s mother suffered from severe mental health difficulties. From 2014, the family lived at the address, a council-owned property. The Claimant’s mother held a secure tenancy at the address.

The Claimant’s mother died in 2018. Following her death, the Claimant’s father succeeded to the tenancy and became the sole tenant. No further successions to the tenancy were permitted. The Defendant’s social services had historically (in 2018 and 2019) conducted Child In Need (“CIN”) assessments because additional family support was required.

On 6 November 2020, the Claimant’s father was hospitalised with Covid-19. A referral stated the children required urgent care. Both children were also hospitalised. Although the father consented to a neighbour, RM, caring for them, by 9 November 2020 the referrer noted there was “no other family or friend” available. The Defendant recorded the difficulty in finding a placement given the children's Covid status.

On 10 November 2020, the Defendant decided the children could return to the address with RM, who agreed to undergo police checks. Significantly, the Defendant’s records show an "Approval to accommodate" form was completed. Such a form is completed and sent to a senior manager for consideration when a child may need to become “looked after”, although, according to the witness statement of Jennifer Hopper, the Defendant’s interim Assistant Director for Family Help and Protection, dated 17 October 2025, it was completed only in draft in respect of section 17 of the CA 1989 and “cancelled” before being submitted for approval. Internal management notes confirm the case was to proceed to assessment to explore care options.

The Claimant’s father died on 11 November 2020. The Defendant confirmed to the hospital that the children could return home with RM “as per a family arrangement”, noting that if care extended beyond 28 days, it would become a PFA.

Between 12 and 14 November 2020, the Defendant arranged for the professional cleaning of the home, conducted checks on RM, and contacted alternative carers suggested by CLA, who were unavailable. A social worker advised the children that without a suitable carer, they would be placed in care. On 16 November 2020, the Defendant facilitated the children's discharge to the address with RM. The EDT recorded that "arrangements have been made by Hounslow Social Services".

On 19 November 2020, the Defendant noted that repossession of the property was inevitable as neither child was eligible to succeed to the tenancy and arrears would accumulate. On 30 November 2020, RM informed the social worker she was unwell; the children consequently moved to the care of a family friend, TB.

In early December 2020, TB informed the social worker he could care for the children temporarily but identified their cousin, IF, as a long-term option. On 10 December 2020, the Defendant recorded that as the children would be with TB for over 28 days, this would be a PFA. The Defendant advised IF to seek legal advice.

On 13 December 2020, the children went to stay with IF and AV in Colchester. On 15 December 2020, a Child & Family Assessment was completed, recording that TB was happy to care for the children until a permanent plan was in place, but that IF and AV were the most likely option. TB expressed concerns about losing the family home at the address. The assessment noted the housing situation was “unclear” and that the children wished to reside in the home where they were raised. The social worker advised the children should be subject to CIN plans.

On 18 December 2020, TB informed the social worker that the children were due to return from Colchester in the week of 28 December and had expressed a preference to reside permanently with IF and AV. On or around 1 January 2021, the children returned to the address with IF and AV. On 4 January 2021, IF confirmed to the Defendant that he and the children had returned to the family home and he would be caring for them in the long term.

On 25 January 2021, the Defendant issued a Notice to Quit regarding the address. On 26 January 2021, a social worker retrospectively informed IF that the placement would be a PFA if he had the children for 28 days or longer and no financial support would be provided. He was told he could apply for Child Benefit. IF’s agreement to this was noted. On 22 February 2021, the Defendant opened a “use and occupation account” in IF’s name to regulate the occupation of the address. On 19 March 2021, the Defendant applied to register the Notice to Quit.

A PFA assessment on 29 March 2021 noted the home was managed by the Defendant. The arrangement with IF was deemed suitable. No legal guardian was appointed for the children; no application for a care order was made; and no assessment for IF’s approval as a Connected Person Foster Carer was made.

In April 2021 the Defendant decided that IF had no right of succession.

Following visits in May and June 2021 the Defendant noted overcrowding. AV, IF’s partner, reported that the children’s housing situation remained unclear and IF and AV were not paying council tax or rent. By 14 June 2021, the Defendant recorded that the housing account had been put into IF’s name to enable rent payments.

By July 2021, reports had emerged of insecurity in the placement. CLA later evidenced that during this period, IF would disappear for days and AV was inappropriate in her use of alcohol and abusive.

Between February and June 2022, a social worker raised urgent concerns regarding mould, damp, and the tenancy status. A visit on 27 June 2022 was recorded as a “LAC [Looked After Children] Statutory Visit”. This recording was an error of the Defendant: the Claimant and CLA had never been treated as looked after children.

In July 2022, AV moved out. Assessments recorded that IF was frequently absent for extended periods: the children were “living alone”, hungry, and relying on neighbours for food. The home was in a “deplorable” condition with no hot water. Despite noting “high” risks, the arrangement was deemed suitable.

Visits on 3 October and 20 December 2022 were recorded as “LAC statutory visits”. By 23 December 2022, the Defendant accepted that concerns regarding IF's ability to maintain suitable care had materialised.

Visits on 20 February and 3 April 2023 were recorded as “LAC Statutory Visits”. On 10 March 2023, the Defendant unsuccessfully attempted to cause IF to sign a PFA. The housing situation remained unchanged with mould and safety hazards.

IF was reported missing in February 2023 and remained largely uncontactable. By April 2023, rent arrears stood at £8,000. In July 2023, the Defendant’s Housing Officer stated in writing, “The family should start packing their belongings and be out of the property by Monday 17th July 2023 …” unless the debt (now over £10,000) was cleared. IF admitted using rent money for foreign travel.

IF was given a “grace period” by the Defendant until 14 July 2023 to make a part payment towards the rent arrears because there were “other concerning matters” regarding IF’s ability to provide appropriate care going forward; the case needed “ongoing monitoring from the right team”. On 14 July 2023, internal correspondence noted the Fostering Team had not communicated the end of the PFA to IF.

A payment to clear arrears was made by TB- not IF. By 23 August 2023, although arrears remained a risk, the Defendant decided it could not evict the family “due to the children’s circumstances” and noted a “possible wiping of arrears” was to be confirmed and that IF held an “occupant tenancy”. The officer advised that when CLA reached 18, the address could be transferred to her, at which point she could request that IF leave.

On 8 September 2023, the Defendant stated the children were supported under s.17 of the CA 1989. However, a report of 14 September 2023 confirmed IF was neglectful, absent at night, and there was a lack of food. On 6 October 2023, the Defendant issued an emergency food voucher to IF. On 25 October 2023, it was recorded that rent arrears were “paused”, IF was not working, and there were still issues with mould. On 13 December 2023, a request for funds to support IF to make an application for a Child Arrangement Order was made, but the order was never made as IF did not engage.

By early 2024, CLA reported to the Defendant in CIN visits that IF was misappropriating the Claimant’s money, returning late at night, and failing to provide food.

In March 2024 the Claimant and CLA were informed that a sum of money was held by the Court following a medical negligence claim regarding their mother. They had been unaware of this. The Defendant had been aware of this from at least November 2020. CLA was granted access to her share in November 2024 on attaining majority. The Claimant did not have access to his share.

On 18 April 2024, the Defendant recorded that IF was uncontactable and that there was “still no one with parental responsibility”. It was noted that the children lacked finances for food, rent and utilities and were "caring for themselves".

IF remained largely uncontactable regarding the CIN plan. On 5 June 2024, the Defendant provided a food delivery to the children. On 15 July 2024, following a CIN review meeting the Defendant recorded that the rent arrears would be written off once CLA held the tenancy.

On 7 August 2024, a social worker completed a safety plan following IF’s absence over a weekend. On 29 August 2024, the Defendant recorded that it was “worrying” that no adult was in the house at night, the freezer was empty, and there was clear evidence the children were not receiving appropriate supervision. An assessment on 3 September 2024 noted no active contact from IF between January and July 2024.

In April and May 2025, the Defendant recorded concerns regarding financial exploitation by IF. School reports regarding the Claimant’s poor hygiene and uniform corroborated the lack of adequate supervision. The Claimant requested specific educational support, namely tutoring and mentoring for a degree apprenticeship, which the Defendant did not provide. On 6 May 2025, a Service Request form recorded the Claimant as a Child in Need requiring financial support. CLA was being considered for a “discretionary tenancy”.

On 23 May 2025, the Defendant rejected the contention that the Claimant was a “former looked after” child (not in fact a claim made by the Claimant). On 16 July 2025, the Claimant disclosed that the address had lacked running water and a flushable toilet for six months. On 1 August 2025, the Defendant wrote to the Claimant suggesting that property maintenance was the responsibility of the siblings as “tenants”. The claim was issued on that date.

The following extracts of the following sections of Part III of the CA 1989 (“Support for Children and Families Provided by Local Authorities in England”) are pertinent to the Claim.

Section 17 concerns the provision of services for children in need, their families and others:

“(1)

It shall be the general duty of every local authority (in addition to the other duties imposed on them by this Part)—

(a)

to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in need; and

(b)

so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the upbringing of such children by their families,

 by providing a range and level of services appropriate to those children’s needs.

…”

Subsection (4A) requires a local authority, before deciding what services to provide, so far as is reasonably practicable and consistent with the child's welfare, to ascertain the child’s wishes and feelings and to give those wishes and feelings due consideration, having regard to the child's age and understanding.

Subsection (10) defines the circumstances in which a child is taken to be "in need" for the purposes of Part III of the CA 1989. A child falls within this definition if, without the provision of services by the local authority, they are unlikely to achieve or maintain (or to have the opportunity of achieving or maintaining) a reasonable standard of health or development, or if their health or development is likely to be significantly impaired, or further impaired, without such services. “[F]amily”, in relation to such a child, includes any person who has parental responsibility for the child and any other person with whom he hasbeen living.

Section 20 concerns the local authority’s general duty to provide accommodation for children:

“(1)

Every local authority shall provide accommodation for any child in need within their area who appears to them to require accommodation as a result of—

(a)

there being no person who has parental responsibility for him;

(b)

his being lost or having been abandoned; or

(c)

the person who has been caring for him being prevented (whether or not permanently, and for whatever reason) from providing him with suitable accommodation or care.

…

(3)

Every local authority shall provide accommodation for any child in need within their area who has reached the age of sixteen and whose welfare the authority consider is likely to be seriously prejudiced if they do not provide him with accommodation.

…”

Subsection (6) mirrors s.17(4A), above, in the context of the provision of accommodation, rather than services, for a child in need.

Section 22 provides for a general duty of a local authority in relation to children looked after by them:

“(1)

In this section, any reference to a child who is looked after by a local authority is a reference to a child who is—

(a)

in their care; or

(b)

provided with accommodation by the authority in the exercise of any functions (in particular those under this Act) which are social services functions within the meaning of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970, apart from functions under sections 17, 23B and 24B.

(2)

In subsection (1) “accommodation” means accommodation which is provided for a continuous period of more than 24 hours.

(3)

It shall be the duty of a local authority looking after any child—

(a)

to safeguard and promote his welfare; and

(b)

to make such use of services available for children cared for by their own parents as appears to the authority reasonable in his case.”

S.1A of, and sched.1 to, the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 list social services functions. They include the provision of accommodation under s.20 as a Part III CA 1989 function. Such provision of accommodation renders a child “looked after” within the meaning of s.22. It follows that when the s.20 duty applies, further duties are triggered: s.22 imposes a general duty on a local authority to safeguard and promote the welfare of a looked after child; s.22B requires a local authority to maintain a looked after child in all respects other than the provision of accommodation; and ss.22C and 22D establish the framework and hierarchy for accommodating a looked after child.

Section 47 falls within Part V of the CA 1989 (“Protection of Children”); it provides for a local authority’s duty to investigate:

“(1)

Where a local authority—

…

(b)

have reasonable cause to suspect that a child who lives, or is found, in their area is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm,

 the authority shall make, or cause to be made, such enquiries as they consider necessary to enable them to decide whether they should take any action to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.”

Subsection (3) mandates that these enquiries must specifically establish whether the authority should make an application to court, exercise any other powers under the CA 1989, or exercise powers regarding child safety orders under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Subsection (5A) obliges the local authority, when determining what action to take, to ascertain and give due consideration to the child's wishes and feelings, insofar as this is reasonably practicable and consistent with the child's welfare. Subsection (8) dictates that if the local authority concludes it should take action to safeguard or promote the child's welfare, it must take that action provided it is within its power and reasonably practicable.

Section 66 falls within Part IX of the CA 1989 (“Private Arrangements for Fostering Children”) and concerns “privately fostered children”:

“(1)

In this Part—

(a)

“a privately fostered child” means a child who is under the age of sixteen and who is cared for, and provided with accommodation in their own home by, someone other than—

(i)

a parent of his;

(ii)

a person who is not a parent of his, but who has parental responsibility for him; or

(iii)

a relative of his [that is: “… a grandparent, brother, sister, uncle or aunt (whether of the full blood or half blood or by marriage or civil partnership) or step-parent;” see s.105(1)]; and

(b)

“to foster a child privately” means to look after the child in circumstances in which he is a privately fostered child as defined by this section.

(2)

A child is not a privately fostered child if the person caring for and accommodating him—

(a)

has done so for a period of less than 28 days; and

(b)

does not intend to do so for any longer period.

…

(5)

Schedule 8 shall have effect for the purposes of supplementing the provision made by this Part.”

The Children (Private Arrangements for Fostering) Regulations 2005 (“the 2005 Regulations”) have been made so as to apply in England by Sched.8 to the CA89. Reg.8 lays down the requirements of a local authority for visiting a child who is being privately fostered in their area. Sched.3 to the 2005 Regulations sets out the essential criteria for assessing the welfare of privately fostered children, including the suitability of the carer, their household and the accommodation, the capacity to meet the child’s physical, educational, and cultural needs. The Schedule also requires consideration of the child's wishes and feelings and ensures that practical arrangements regarding finance and decision-making are satisfactory.

By reason of § 19B of Sched. 2 to the CA 1989 and regulation 40 of the Care Planning, Placement and Case Review (England) Regulations 2010, an “eligible child” is a child aged 16 or 17 who has been “looked after” by a local authority for the period of 13 weeks, where that period began after he reached the age of 14 and ended after he reached the age of 16. Under § 19B, an authority must carry out an assessment of an eligible child’s needs with a view to determining what advice, assistance and support it would be appropriate for them to provide him where is still looking after him and after it ceases to look after him and must then prepare a pathway plan for him, which it must keep under regular review. Under § 19C, the authority must appoint a personal adviser for him.

In R (M) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2008] UKHL 14, the House of Lords considered the distinction between the duties owed under s.17 and s.20 of the CA 1989. Baroness Hale of Richmond emphasised that s.17 imposes a general duty to promote the welfare of children in need within the authority's area (a “target” duty; see [18]), whereas s.20 imposes a specific duty to provide accommodation to a particular child. She held that where a child requires accommodation under s.20, the authority must provide it and “… cannot side-step the further obligations which result from that duty by recording or arguing that they were in fact acting under section 17 or some other legislation;” at [42]. The provision of accommodation under s.20 triggers the "looked after" status, which affords the child specific statutory protections and leaving care duties that are not available under s. 17; see [19].

In R. (on the application of G) v Southwark LBC [2009] UKHL 26; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1299 (“G”) it was held that Parliament intended that a child, including one approaching majority, be regarded as a vulnerable individual to whom the local authority owes a duty extending beyond the simple provision of accommodation. Where a child aged 16 or 17 requests accommodation under s.20 of the CA 1989 Act and meets the statutory criteria in s.20(1), the children’s services authority is under a mandatory duty to provide accommodation pursuant to s.20.At [28], Baroness Hale explained that s.20(1):

“… entails a series of judgments, helpfully set out by Ward LJ in R (A) v Croydon London Borough Council [2009] LGR 24, para 75. …

(1)

Is the applicant a child? …

(2)

Is the applicant a child in need? …

(3)

Is he within the local authority's area? …

(4)

Does he appear to the local authority to require accommodation? …

(5)

Is that need the result of: (a) there being no person who has parental responsibility for him; … ; (b) his being lost or having been abandoned; or (c) the person who has been caring for him being prevented from providing him with suitable accommodation or care? …

(6)

What are the child's wishes and feelings regarding the provision of accommodation for him? This is a reference to the requirement in section 20(6) of the 1989 Act [see above] …

(7)

What consideration (having regard to his age and understanding) is duly to be given to those wishes and feelings? …

[the “judgments” at (8) and following are not relevant to the issues in this case]”.

In R (D) v. Southwark LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 182 (“D”), after S disclosed to her school that her father had assaulted her, the local authority was notified. The authority instructed the school to withhold S from her father and directed the father to cease all contact with the child. Subsequently, the authority approached D, the father’s former partner, and requested that she look after S, assuring D that she would receive support. The local authority secured the mother's consent to this placement several days later.

The local authority took the position that it had merely facilitated a PFA and was therefore not obligated to provide financial support to D. However, the judge ruled that no PFA had been established. Instead, the judge found that the authority’s duty to provide accommodation under s.20(1) of the CA 1989 had been triggered. Consequently, the placement with D was deemed to be under s.23(2), requiring the authority to fund the arrangement. The judge further ruled that the authority could not rely on s.23(6)—which would have placed the financial burden on D—because that provision is only applicable if the child has already been “looked after” by the local authority for a period of 24 hours. The Court of Appeal dismissed the local authority’s appeal. At [49] Smith LJ, giving the judgment of the Court, held:

“49.

We are prepared to accept that, in some circumstances, a PFA might become available in such a way as to permit a local authority, which is on the verge of having to provide accommodation for a child, to ‘side-step’ that duty by helping to make a PFA. However, it will be a question of fact as to whether that happens in any particular case. Usually, a PFA will come about as the result of discussions between the proposed foster parent and either the child’s parent(s) or a person with parental responsibility. But we accept that there might be occasions when a private arrangement is made without such direct contact. We accept that there might be cases in which the local authority plays a part in bringing about such an arrangement. However, where a local authority takes a major role in making arrangements for a child to be fostered, it is more likely to be concluded that, in doing so, it is exercising its powers and duties as a public authority pursuant to sections 20 and 23. If an authority wishes to play some role in making a private arrangement, it must make the nature of the arrangement plain to those involved. If the authority is facilitating a private arrangement, it must make it plain to the proposed foster parent that s/he must look to the parents or person with parental responsibility for financial support. The authority must explain that any financial assistance from public funds would be entirely a matter for the discretion of the local authority for the area in which the foster parent is living. Only on receipt of such information could the foster parent give informed consent to acceptance of the child under a private fostering agreement. If such matters are left unclear, there is a danger that the foster parent (and subsequently the court) will conclude that the local authority was acting under its statutory powers and duties and that the arrangement was not a private one at all [emphasis added].”

In Collins v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council [2008] EWHC 2551 (Admin) (“Collins”), the court considered whether a local authority had exercised its duties under s.20 in circumstances where a child was already living with her boyfriend’s mother on a temporary basis before the authority became involved. The defendant argued that D was distinguishable because the local authority in D had expressly requested that the claimant look after a child who otherwise would have had nowhere to live, whereas in Collins, the child already had accommodation when the authority became involved. Michael Supperstone QC (qua Deputy High Court Judge, as he then was) rejected this distinction. He held at [31] that there was no material difference between the two cases. Although the claimant was already living with the carer temporarily, the local authority had played a “central (or ‘major’, see Southwark, para [49]) role” in allowing the arrangement to continue on a long-term basis once the child had expressed a wish to remain there. The social worker had ascertained the child's wishes, informed the carer, asked if she was agreeable, and subsequently arranged planning meetings to secure the child’s future. The court found that through these actions, the defendant had “played and intended to continue to play a significant role in the arrangements for the claimant's future that included her living with [the carer].” Consequently, the authority was found to have been exercising its powers under s. 20; see [31] to [34].

In R (Cunningham) v Hertfordshire CC[2016] EWCA Civ 1108; [2017] 1 W.L.R. 2153 (“Cunningham”), the claimant grandmother lodged an appeal against the Administrative Court’s refusal to grant her a judicial review regarding a local authority's refusal to categorise her grandson, R, as a “looked-after” child. R had resided with his mother within the respondent local authority’s jurisdiction. During this time, he was known to social services and was the subject of a child protection plan. The mother was arrested and organised with the claimant that R should stay with her. Nine days later, the mother received a prison sentence of 27 months, and R continued to reside with his grandmother. The local authority viewed the situation as a voluntary private arrangement between the mother and grandmother. Consequently, they declined to accept responsibility for R's support and discontinued his child protection plan.

The grandmother initiated judicial review proceedings. Both parties agreed that R met the definition of a "child in need" under section 17(10) of the Children Act 1989. However, the grandmother contended that the authority should have identified R as a child requiring accommodation under section 20(1). She argued that, had this section been applied, the authority would have formally placed R in her care under section 22C(6)(d), thereby entitling her to support.

The judge found there was no legal flaw in the local authority’s conclusion that the trigger for a s.20(1) duty to arise had not been present. The Court of Appeal upheld his decision. Burnett LJ (with whom Black LJ agreed) said the following:

“21.

A recurrent theme in the claimant's submissions is that if she had not agreed with her daughter to accommodate R, then Hertfordshire would have been fixed with a statutory duty to accommodate him and then support him as a looked after child. That, however, is not how the statutory duty under section 20(1) of the 1989 Act is couched. The duty arises when it appears to the local authority that a child in need in their area requires accommodation. Only then are they obliged to provide accommodation. That is an intensely fact-sensitive inquiry. It is for the local authority to make the assessment. Their conclusion is vulnerable to challenge only on conventional public law grounds, including that it was not one reasonably open to them.

22.

The authorities cited on behalf of the claimant all involved factual circumstances where the local authority were deeply involved in the arrangements for the accommodation of the child. That led to them being found to have acted under their section 20 statutory duty with the result that the child was a looked after child. Indeed, a recurrent theme was that the local authorities in question had misled the person who ended up accommodating the child into believing that public support would be provided. It is in that context that the term “informed consent” was used in the D case [2007] 1 FLR 2181 , para 49 [cited above in full].

…

There is no gloss on the statutory duty, as at least seems to be contended for on behalf of the claimant, that if a private arrangement is made without the implications being apparent to the relative or friend who had agreed to care for the child, the statutory duty under section 20 of the 1989 Act arises. The reference to informed consent in the passage I have quoted arose very particularly on the facts on that case.

23.

In fact, the detail of the arrangement between the claimant and her daughter is unclear. In reality it is likely that she stepped in, as would most close family members, to provide support for R in circumstances where it is uncertain what otherwise would happen to him, and without any regard for finances and the like. The position was no different … when it became apparent that the arrangement would be likely to last until at least February 2013. …

…

26.

As the judge recognised, the factual circumstances in this case led inexorably to the conclusion that on 17 October 2012, R did not require accommodation. … [emphasis added]”

I now turn to a separate but related topic: the legal status of family members remaining in a council property following the death of a tenant. Such status is governed by ss.86A and 88 of the Housing Act 1985 (“HA 1985”). A person is qualified to succeed to a secure tenancy if they occupied the dwelling as their only or principal home at the time of the tenant's death and are a spouse, civil partner, or qualifying family member. However, s.86A(3) precludes a second succession where the deceased tenant was themselves a successor. Where a tenant dies intestate and there is no statutory succession, the tenancy vests in the Public Trustee until the tenancy is validly determined by a notice to quit. In Gateway Housing Association Ltd v Ali [2020] EWCA Civ 1339; [2021] 1 W.L.R. 289, the Court of Appeal confirmed at [40] and following that specific procedures exist to terminate such tenancies under s.18 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994: notice must be served at the last known address of the tenant, addressed to his Personal Representatives, and a copy served on the Public Trustee. The Public Trustee holds no beneficial interest in, or duty regarding, the property (see Gateway at [7]).

The status of an occupier who remains in the property without a right of succession was considered in Holley v London Borough of Hillingdon [2016] EWCA Civ 1052, Briggs LJ stated at [2] that persons in the position of a “second successor” who have no statutory right of succession are, “[i]n reality ... trespassers, against whom the local authority landlord is, as a matter of the law of property, entitled to possession”. A person whose licence to occupy has been revoked is entitled to a “reasonable time” to remove themselves and their possessions before they can be ejected, as established in Minister of Health v Bellotti [1944] KB 298 (see page 306). An implied licence to occupy may arise: as Etherton J (as he then was) held in Lambeth LBC v Rumbelow, January 25, 2001; 2001 WL 239755; [2001] Lexis Citation 1174 (relying on the judgment of Smith J (as she then was) in The Queen v City of Sunderland, Ex parte Pamela Beresford, 14th November 2000; Times January, 16^th 2001 at [42] and [43]). This requires some overt act by the landowner from which permission can be inferred, and a situation where a reasonable person would appreciate that the use was with the landowner's permission.

Regarding the payment of money for such occupation, the Court of Appeal held in Westminster City Council v Basson (1990) 23 H.L.R. 225 at p.228 that the acceptance of payments for a “use and occupation” account does not necessarily create a tenancy or licence if the authority has made its intention clear that no such right is being granted.

The interaction between an occupier’s status in property law and the duty to provide accommodation under the CA 1989 was recently considered in DF v Essex City Council [2024] EWCA Civ 1545. The Court of Appeal held that the relevance of an applicant being a trespasser is that their occupation is potentially precarious; see [44] and [45]. If an applicant has no legal right to occupy, the landlord could in principle bring eviction proceedings at any time. The Court emphasised at [45] that “[i]t is the risk of eviction, not the status of trespasser, that is relevant to whether she required accommodation”. Consequently, a child might not require accommodation if, despite their lack of legal title, there is no actual risk of eviction.Section 20 of the CA 1989 and s.175 of the Housing Act 1996 (“HA 1996”) (the key homelessness provision) were provisions of different statutes, with different subject-matters and unrelated legislative histories. There was no indication that they were intended to form part of a single statutory scheme. The provisions specifying the circumstances in which the s.20 duty arose, and those in which the duty under s.193 of the HA 1996 Act to accommodate people who were homeless within s.175 arose, used different terminology and were wholly differently framed. The s.20 duty was triggered when “it appears to” the local authority that the child required accommodation. That was the “language of an evaluative judgement;” by contrast, the definition of “homeless” in s.175 depended primarily on a precise formulation of whether the applicant had a legal right to occupy available accommodation; see [22]. Those considerations strongly suggested that the question of whether a child “requires accommodation” for the purpose of s.20 was a matter of factual evaluation, without reference to the definition of homelessness in s.175; see [23].

The Claimant contended under Ground 1 that the Defendant owes him duties under s.20 of the CA 1989 because he required accommodation following his father's admission to hospital and subsequent death. He argued that the Defendant played a central role in arranging his care with RM and IF and provided the address, thereby triggering the s.20 duty as established in G and D. Conversely, the Defendant submitted that the Claimant lived under private family arrangements which it merely monitored for safeguarding purposes. Relying on Cunningham, the Defendant argued that the involvement of family and friends absolved it of the statutory duty to provide accommodation.

During discussion on 2 December 2025, the parties agreed with me that in respect of Ground 1, further assistance might properly be given to the court as to the Claimant’s status asoccupier of the property. Albeit that status might not ultimately be determinative of the question of whether the Claimant appeared to require accommodation under s.20 of the CA 1989, I could see that it, being of possible relevance to the Claimant’s security of tenure at the address, might help inform my decision. The parties were, therefore, directed to provide an agreed joint note on the law. Agreement could not be achieved and, consequently, the parties filed submissions dated, respectively 5 (Claimant) and 8 (Defendant) December 2025. Through those supplementary submissions, the Claimant argued that, because the Claimant could not succeed to his father’s tenancy, he became a trespasser liable to immediate eviction. He argued that this created a risk of eviction which rendered his position inherently precarious and that the Defendant, by deciding not to enforce its right to possession, effectively provided him with accommodation under s.20 of the CA 1989. Conversely, the Defendant contended that the Claimant occupied the property under a licence or, at minimum, was entitled to a reasonable time to vacate, meaning his occupation remained lawful. Relying on DF v Essex City Council, the Defendant further argued that even if the Claimant were a trespasser, he did not require accommodation because the Defendant had no immediate intention to evict him.

Under Ground 2, the Claimant asserted that because the s.20 duty arose, he acquired “looked after” status and is now an “eligible” child entitled to leaving care support. He submitted the Defendant breached its duties under ss.22 to 22G by failing to maintain suitable care and to plan for his transition to adulthood. The Defendant resisted this, maintaining that as no s.20 duty arose, the Claimant holds no such status.

The Claimant relies on Ground 3 in the alternative to Grounds 1 and 2, arguing that the Defendant failed to discharge its duties to him as a “child in need” under s.17. He challenged the sufficiency of the £60 weekly financial allowance against his calculated needs and criticised the Defendant’s failure to support his educational goals or remedy the disrepair at the address. The Defendant maintained that s.17 imposes a target duty rather than an absolute one and asserted that it acted rationally and within its discretion in providing the level of service it did.

Finally, under Ground 4, the Claimant contended the Defendant acted unlawfully by failing to conduct enquiries under s.47 despite having reasonable cause to suspect he was suffering significant harm due to IF’s absences and the poor living conditions at the address. The Claimant pointed to evidence of neglect, lack of food, and hygiene issues reported by his school. The Defendant denied that the threshold for a s.47 investigation was met and submitted that it discharged its safeguarding functions through regular visits and assessments.

The central issue under Ground 1 is whether, at any material time from November 2020, the Claimant appeared to the Defendant to require accommodation as a result of there being no person who had parental responsibility for him, or the person who had been caring for him being prevented from providing him with suitable accommodation or care (s. 20(1)(a) and (c) CA 1989).

I take as the starting point for my analysis the series of questions which Ward LJ derived from the statute in R (A) v Croydon LBC, and which were approved by Baroness Hale in G. It is common ground that the Claimant was a “child”, “a child in need”, and “within the local authority's area”. Following the death of his father on 11 November 2020, the condition in s.20(1)(a) was satisfied: there was “no person who ha[d] parental responsibility for him”. Further, the alternative condition in s.20(1)(c) was satisfied: the person who had been caring for him (his father) was prevented by death from providing him with suitable accommodation or care. Therefore, the critical judgment which the Defendant had to exercise was whether the Claimant “appeared” to the Defendant to require accommodation.

The Defendant’s resistance to the claim rests entirely on the contention that the Claimant did not “require accommodation” because suitable private arrangements were made, first with RM, and subsequently with IF. For the Claimant to succeed, I must be satisfied that the Defendant’s conclusion that the s.20 duty did not arise was one that was not reasonably open to it on the facts or was materially flawed by an error of law (see Cunningham at [21]).

The evidence regarding the days immediately surrounding the father's hospitalisation and subsequent death in November 2020 demonstrates that the Defendant did not merely monitor a private arrangement; it orchestrated the placement of a child who had no one else to care for him. The Defendant’s records from 10 November 2020 explicitly record that an “Approval to accommodate” form was completed. While Ms Hopper’s witness statement suggests this was a draft or an administrative error subsequently cancelled, I attach greater weight to the contemporaneous records which reflect the reality of the situation at the time. The referral explicitly stated there was “no other family or friend”. The Claimant was in hospital, and his discharge required the Defendant first to vet and approve a carer.

Applying the principles in D, the Defendant played a “major role” in making these arrangements. The social worker, Ms Hoolihan, organised the discharge, arranged for professional cleaning of the property to facilitate RM’s entry, and conducted police checks. The Defendant did not merely inspect an existing arrangement; it facilitated the placement of a vulnerable child who had no person with parental responsibility to make such arrangements for him. The Defendant was the decision-maker. It determined where the Claimant would go upon discharge.

It is common ground that the Claimant had no statutory right to succeed to the tenancy at the address. Following the expiry of the Notice to Quit in January 2021, he was, as a matter of property law, a trespasser. The Defendant relies on DF v Essex City Council to argue that, notwithstanding this lack of legal title, the Claimant did not “appear to require accommodation” because the Defendant had no immediate intention to evict him. The Defendant submits that, as in DF, the absence of an actual risk of eviction means the accommodation was not “precarious”.

I accept that, as a unitary authority exercising both social services and housing functions, the Defendant was in a good position to assess whether the Claimant’s occupation was precarious. Unlike the social services authority in DF, which had to assess the intentions of a separate third-party housing authority, the Defendant here knew its own intention.

However, while the Defendant’s finding that the Claimant’s position was not precarious may not be impeachable, it was only not precarious because the Defendant was itself providing the Claimant with accommodation. By making a positive decision not to enforce its right to possession against the Claimant, and by creating a “use and occupation” account to regularise his stay, the Defendant was not merely observing a stable situation; it was, by its own forbearance and administrative action, providing that stability. It follows that the Defendant’s argument that the Claimant did not require accommodation because he was not being evicted would involve circular reasoning: the Claimant only had secure accommodation because the Defendant chose to provide it. As established in G, the duty under s.20 is to “provide” accommodation. Where a local authority allows a child to remain in a council property to which the child has no legal title - and against whom it could obtain a possession order at any time - specifically to prevent that child from being homeless and to enable a carer to look after them there, the authority is “providing accommodation”. The Defendant cannot rely on its own decision to provide housing (by not evicting) to negate its statutory duty to provide housing. This would lead to the incoherent result that a local authority could discharge its duties to a child with no parents simply by refraining from evicting them from a council property, while simultaneously denying them the “looked after” status that Parliament intended for children dependent on the state for their home.

In so far as the Claimant’s move to the care of IF in January 2021 is concerned, the Defendant characterised this as a PFA which obviated its s.20(1) duty. First, for a PFA to displace the s.20 duty, the nature of the arrangement - and specifically its financial consequences - must be made plain to the carer before the arrangement is finalised (see D at [49]). The Defendant’s records show that the explanation regarding the lack of financial support was given to IF only on 26 January 2021, weeks after he had moved into the address and purported to assume care. In my judgement, this bears the hallmarks of a retrospective attempt to categorise the arrangement to fit a desired financial outcome, rather than a genuine pre-existing private agreement.

Second, IF was not fulfilling the function of a private fosterer in the manner envisaged by s.66 of the CA 1989. The Defendant granted IF a “use and occupation” account, not a tenancy. When IF failed to pay rent and substantial arrears accumulated - circumstances which would ordinarily lead a landlord to seek possession - the Defendant made a positive decision not to evict the Claimant and the other members of the household. It thereby (again) acknowledged that the Claimant required accommodation and provided it. The records confirm that the decision to “pause” rent arrears and forestall eviction was taken specifically because of the children’s presence and vulnerability.

By refraining from exercising its right to recover the property when IF defaulted, the Defendant was actively intervening to ensure the Claimant had accommodation. It was the Defendant, not IF, who ultimately secured the accommodation. IF’s inability to discharge the rent arrears meant he was effectively prevented from providing suitable accommodation; the Claimant remained in the property only because the Defendant, exercising its social services functions in conjunction with its housing authority powers, stepped in to prevent homelessness. This was a hallmark of provision under s.20, not the passive observation of a functioning private arrangement.

Furthermore, the Defendant’s own records from 2022 onwards acknowledge that IF was not fulfilling the role of a carer. The social work files record that the children were “living alone”, that IF was frequently absent for days or weeks, that he was misappropriating the Claimant’s funds, and that he was failing to provide food. In response to these failures, the Defendant did not merely report on the unsuitability of the arrangement as required under the 2005 Regulations; rather, it stepped in to provide financial support, “safety plans”, and material assistance. Where a local authority knows that a “private” carer has effectively abdicated responsibility but keeps the child in accommodation by providing the necessary financial and housing support itself, the threshold necessary for s.20(1) to be engaged has prima facie been crossed. It is fulfilling more than a major role in making arrangements for the child to be cared for. On the facts of this case, the Defendant was engaging its duties under s.20 without acknowledging it was doing so.

The absence of a PFA of a nature that would remove the Defendant’s section 20(1) duty is further evidenced by the Defendant’s own administrative conduct. For example, a case note from 10 March 2023 (over two years after the arrangement began) shows the Defendant then attempted to have IF sign a private fostering agreement. There is no evidence this was ever signed. This belated attempt to formalise the status suggests that no such agreement existed or was relied upon at the material time in 2021. The arrangement was not a private contract between individuals; it was a placement orchestrated and sustained by the Defendant, using its own housing stock and funds to keep the Claimant accommodated in the absence of effective parental care.

The Defendant relies on Cunningham to argue that the existence of a willing family member to care for a child negates the need for accommodation. However, Cunningham is materially distinguishable. In that case, the grandmother intervened immediately and autonomously to care for the child in her own home. In the present case, the Defendant assumed primary responsibility in making the initial arrangements regarding the children following their father’s death; the Defendant provided the address without which the arrangement with IF could not have functioned, as IF moved into the Defendant’s property to care for the Claimant; and the arrangement with IF was orchestrated by the Defendant allowing a non-tenant to reside in council property to care for a child who was also a non-tenant. These factors demonstrate a degree of state intervention and provision that far exceed the private family arrangement in Cunningham.

Standing back and viewing the facts as a whole, the Claimant was a child with no parents and no legal right to his home. The Defendant arranged his care, vetted his carers, and provided the accommodation by permitting him to remain in council property. To characterise this as a private arrangement in which the child did not “require” state accommodation was an error of law and a conclusion that was not reasonably open to the Defendant.

Accordingly, I find that the Defendant should have found in law that the Claimant appeared to the Defendant to require accommodation under s. 20(1) of the CA 1989. The duty arose on or around 11 November 2020. The Defendant has failed to discharge that duty lawfully. Ground 1 succeeds.

The Defendant had characterised this ground as not amounting to a ground for judicial review. In the course of discussion, both Counsel agreed with me that the issues raised through Ground 2 were coterminous with Ground 1 and that if the Claimant were to succeed on Ground 1 it would follow that the Claimant was a looked after child within the meaning of s.22(1) of the CA 1989 from November 2020. It would then follow inexorably that the Defendant owed him the specific statutory duties consequent upon that status. Furthermore, the Claimant is now aged 17. Having been looked after for a period exceeding 13 weeks since the age of 14, he meets the definition of an “eligible child” under § 19B(2) of Sched.2 to the CA 1989. This status triggers the specific duties referred to above to prepare him for adulthood. I formally allow the Claim under Ground 2 as well as Ground 1.

My decision on Grounds 1 and 2 means that any conclusion in respect of Ground 3 would be academic. Had it not been academic, I would have dismissed the Claim on Ground 3. Section 17 imposes a general duty on local authorities to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in need. As was made clear by the House of Lords in G, this is a target duty rather than an absolute duty to meet every assessed need of every individual child. The nature and extent of the services provided under s.17 are matters for the discretion of the local authority, involving difficult decisions about the allocation of finite resources. The Court can only intervene if the authority’s decision is unlawful, irrational, or procedurally unfair. It is not for the Court to determine precise maintenance sums. The Defendant set the rate here based on the specific household composition, in circumstances where CLA has independent funds. Regarding the request for private tutoring, s.17 does not mandate specific educational interventions upon request. Further, s.17 is not the primary vehicle for effecting housing repairs. In my judgment, Ground 3 amounts to an invitation to the Court to act as a primary decision-maker and to substitute its own assessment of the Claimant’s needs for that of the social workers. That is not the function of judicial review. The Defendant assessed the Claimant as a child in need, provided a social worker, and provided financial support. While the level of support was not what the Claimant desired, the Defendant’s actions remained within the scope of its statutory discretion. Accordingly, had this ground arisen for determination, I would have found no public law error. Ground 3 fails.

The threshold for “significant harm” under s.47 CA 1989 is a high one, and the determination of whether it is met falls squarely within the professional judgement of social workers. The evidence demonstrates that the Defendant was actively involved with the family throughout the relevant period, conducting regular child and family assessments, devising a CIN plan, ensuring social worker allocation and providing support. Through these interventions, the Defendant made enquiries into the Claimant's welfare and housing conditions. While the Claimant disagrees with the outcome of those assessments, in my judgement the Defendant was entitled to conclude that the risks identified, including the housing disrepair and IF’s inconsistent care of the Claimant, did not trigger the need for s.47 enquiries. The court will not lightly interfere with the operational risk assessments of frontline social services. The decision that the threshold for significant harm was not met, and that the Claimant’s needs could be addressed through a Child in Need plan, was not irrational. Ground 4 is dismissed.

For the reasons set out above, the claim for judicial review succeeds on Grounds 1 and 2. By way of relief, the Claimant seeks a mandatory injunction; an order directing the Defendant to accommodate the Claimant at the address; and damages under Article 8 of the ECHR. In my judgment a mandatory order is neither necessary nor appropriate. Further, an order specifying where the Claimant should be accommodated is not appropriate, as such relief might unduly fetter the exercise of the Defendant’s statutory duties. The Claimant’s further claim for damages was not pursued at the hearing before me and I make no such order. I will quash the Defendant’s failure to find that the Claimant appeared to require accommodation within the meaning of s.20(1) CA 1989 and grant the Claimant declarations that the Defendant failed to comply with its duties under ss.20, 22, 22G of and §§ 19B and 19C of Sched.2 to the CA 1989. I will invite the Defendant to reconsider the case in light of the judgment.