Diane Webb, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

The claimant, Mrs Diane Webb, is currently in receipt of Universal Credit (UC) and has been for some time. In January 2026, the defendant, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (DWP) decided to undertake a review of her entitlement to UC. This was not an unusual state of affairs, such reviews are undertaken on a fairly large scale to ensure that recipients only receive the benefits to which they are entitled.

The system by which recipients of UC and the DWP communicate with each other is by use of an electronic journal. The claimant was told that this review was going to take place by an entry in her journal dated 7 January 2026. She was informed that what is termed a “warm up call” would be made to her on 9 January to verbally discuss this review, what it would entail and what was expected of her.

The claimant took issue with that proposal and indicated that she preferred to deal with the DWP remotely. It was a request with which the department was happy to comply. On 9 January, therefore, rather than speaking to her, DWP messaged her through her journal with details of what was needed for the review. One of the things that DWP requested from her was four months’ bank statements.

The claimant was not prepared to provide bank statements other than in a redacted form, The redactions that the claimant sought to make were details of her outgoings. Statements redacted in this way were not acceptable to the DWP, it wanted an unredacted version of the bank statements. Ultimately, on 23 February 2026, because the impasse between what DWP wanted and what the claimant was prepared to give could not be resolved, DWP resolved to suspend the claimant’s UC.

On 10 March 2026 the claimant issued her claim for a judicial review of the decision to suspend her UC. Broadly, the grounds of the challenge, and I quote here from the reasons given by O’Farrell J for an order that she made on 13 March. Her Ladyship summarised the challenge to the decision in the following way: (i) the decision was irrational in that the DWP failed to consider, properly or at all, the hardship caused to the Claimant by the suspension; (ii) there was a procedural breach in that the notification of suspension was not by formal written letter but by a journal note on the portal; (iii) the DWP wrongly identified the Claimant as failing to engage; and (iv) the demand for unredacted bank statements was in breach of Article 5(1)(c) of the UK GDPR and/or Article 8 rights of privacy.

In the course of the hearing the claimant also focused on the Equality Act 2010 in support of a contention that insistence on unredacted statements constituted indirect discrimination. I shall come to that later.

The claim is defended on the basis summarised in paragraph 8 of O’Farrell J’s reasons for her order of 13 March. She observed that the DWP’s response is that: (i) it considered the question of hardship at a case conference but determined that hardship was unlikely to arise given the Claimant’s circumstances; (ii) notice of the suspension was properly given in writing; (iii) the DWP lawfully required the Claimant to provide unredacted bank statements under the Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Claims and Payments) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1380); and (iv) the Claimant’s failure to comply with the request for documents to verify means entitled the DWP to stop the payments under the Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1381).

The order of 13 March, to which I have referred, ordered a rolled-up hearing of this claim. This judgment is given following that hearing.

Mrs Webb appears in person. She is disabled, she suffers from fibromyalgia and PTSD and she has cognitive difficulties. As a result, amongst other things, time is required for her to process information. It is true to say that, in the absence of reasonable adjustments being made today, she feared that her disability would prevent her from advancing her case as effectively as she would have liked.

I have, of course, tried to make those adjustments. Mrs Webb has primarily sought (but not exclusively sought) to rely on her written evidence which is quite extensive. She has provided me with a skeleton argument, a supplemental skeleton and oral submission notes, as well as, of course, her witness statements. I have considered those carefully, as I have the oral submissions that she has made during the course of this hearing and they have all been helpful to me, as of course have the skeleton arguments and oral submissions of Mr Dennis Edwards, counsel for the DWP.

In fact, the nature of this hearing has I think, changed a little since the pleadings were filed, not least because UC has been reinstated and currently remains in payment. At the beginning of the case, I set out my understanding of what was now in issue. Neither party suggested that my understanding of the extant issues was inaccurate.

The agreed issue therefore is whether it was lawful for the defendant to have required four month’s bank statements and, if it was and they are not supplied, will it be lawful to suspend UC going forward subject to the necessary notice to the claimant? That latter question raises the issue of hardship upon which the claimant has relied.

The claimant cites her particular circumstances as a basis for contending that insistence on unredacted statements is, in her case, unlawful in public law terms. She argues that to be forced to do so would cause her enormous trauma. It would be seen by her as surveillance akin to the coercive and destructively controlling surveillance that she had to endure from her former husband who, as a weapon of control, used to check her bank statements on a regular basis. It would, for her, she argues, open a Pandora’s Box in relation to her mental well-being, which it would be difficult, possibly impossible, to close.

I mention above the fact that the claimant also prays in aid the Equality Act. She argues that there has been a failure to make reasonable adjustments to cater for her anxieties and that this failure contravenes the DWP’s duty under that Act in that the decision to require unredacted statements and to suspend UC in the event of noncompliance constitutes indirect discrimination and is an unjustified infringement of her right to privacy. As I have said, she also asserts that it is in breach of data protection requirements contained in the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). In short, she argues that the requirement for the statements is disproportionate and irrational in the context of her circumstances.

The right to require information for the purpose of a review of UC is contained in Regulation 38 Universal Credit PIP Job Seekers Allowance and ESA Claims and Payments Regulations. This provides that it applies to any person entitled to the benefit to which the Regulations relate. That includes UC. Sub-section 2, so far relevant states:

“Subject to regulation 8 of the PIP regulations, a person to whom this regulation applies must supply in such manner as the Secretary of State may determine and within the period applicable under regulation 45 of the Decisions and Appeals Regulations, such information or evidence as a Secretary of State may require in determining whether a decision on the award of benefit should be revised under section 9 of the Social Security Act 1998 or superseded under section 10 of that Act.”

The reason why the DWP say they are entitled to obtain this information is, in my view, obvious. However, they are set out in the witness statement of Mrs Harriet Shelley which I have permitted to be adduced in evidence. It is to ensure that only those who are entitled to UC continue to receive it, and that those who are entitled to it are receiving it in the correct amount.

Regulation 45.6 of the Universal Credit (Decisions and Appeals Regulations 2013) provides that if a UC claimant does not provide the requested information, payment of UC can be suspended. Regulation 47 goes further and permits termination of entitlement to UC in certain circumstances.

It appears not to be in dispute that, as a matter of course, the power under regulation 38 is used regularly to obtain four month’s bank statements from customers whose entitlement to Universal Credit is being reviewed.

Why specifically does the DWP require unredacted bank statements when conducting the reviews that the regulations clearly permit? Universal Credit is means tested, not only as to income but also as regards capital. DWP argues that unredacted bank statements are an obvious aid to assessing continuing eligibility for this means tested benefit.

If the statements are redacted with regard to outgoings, as the claimant wants, then DWP contends it is deprived of the opportunity of ascertaining whether, for example, the statements reveal money going out to a savings account. If that is the case, then the DWP would want information as to what is in that savings account to make sure that that, combined with information that they know about, does not put the claimant above the threshold of UC. Additionally, a perusal of outgoings recorded in a bank statement may lead to a train of enquiry about other possible assets. The example given is a recurring payment out to a building society or bank that may suggest that the customer has a mortgage. That may give rise to questions about the existence of other assets, the ownership of which may disentitle the customer to UC

Let me say that it is not being suggested that the claimant in this case has savings which she has not disclosed but DWP argue that they need to have full unredacted information in order to be assured that that is the case.

This claim is not a challenge to the legitimacy of the Regulations. Of course, just because these regulations exist does not automatically mean that the claimant must lose her claim. It is a challenge to how DWP are applying the regulation in respect of this specific claimant. If she can establish that the request violates her Article 8 rights, her rights under the GDPR or the Equality Act, then she may succeed. However, the rights to privacy involved in all this legislation is not unqualified.

As regards Article 8, the right to privacy is circumscribed if interference serves a legitimate aim and is proportionate. Under the Equality Act a course of action that indirectly discriminates can be justified if it is a proportionate response or a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Under the GDPR Article 6.1(e) there is a specific authorization for the processing of information if necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest.

Mr Edwards argues that the need for unredacted statements meets the qualifications imposed on the rights granted by the legislation upon which the claimant relies.

As I have said, I think more than once, he argues that it is vital that UC is only paid to those who are eligible and is paid in the correct amount. It is vital, not just for the public purse, but also for the individual so that they are not underpaid or in a position where they are overpaid with the result that repayments have to be made to DWP.

The point he makes in his skeleton argument is that there must be a level playing field for all applicants for UC. He contends that the practice of requiring the disclosure of full, unredacted, bank statements provides a level playing field for all applicants, and, in a complex Social Security Scheme, offers a straightforward and workable way of ensuring that the awards are correctly made.

The claimant’s position is that that may be so as a general proposition, but not in every case and not, as here, where reliance on such a general proposition will cause trauma. In those circumstances, she argues, insisting on unredacted statements is disproportionate and does not constitute at a reasonable adjustment.

Let me make clear that I am prepared to accept, for the purpose of today's determination of her claim, but, at this stage, only for that purpose (because there is no medical evidence to which I have been referred) that disclosing her bank statements unredacted will cause the claimant much distress and psychological trauma. In short, I accept that she is not here today refusing to disclose unredacted statements purely as a matter of principle against a perceived overbearing State but is taking her stand on the basis that compliance will affect her mental health.

The difficulty she faces, though, is the principle enunciated by the Court of Appeal in R (on the application of Johnson) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2020] EWCA Civ 778. The court said:

“I start by saying this, I recognise, as does Lady Justice Rose, the extraordinary complexity of designing a system such as Universal Credit and that it necessarily involves a range of practical and political assessments of the kind which the Court is not equipped to judge.

I also accept that in order to be workable, any such system may have to incorporate bright line rules and criteria which do not discriminate fully between the circumstances of different individuals. For those reasons, I fully accept that the Court should avoid the temptation to find that some particular feature of such a system is irrational, merely because it produces hard, even very hard, results in some individual cases.”

However, Mrs Webb argues UC Guidance is on her side where she is a person with complex needs. In those circumstances, she argues that this decision to continue to require her bank statements is unlawful because it has not been referred to an advanced customer support senior lead (ACSSL).

I have a witness statement from a Mr Colin Mumford. He works at the DWP and it was he who was initially in touch with the claimant via the journal. He confirms that he made no reference to the ACSSL. Mr Edwards argues that such a referral was unnecessary and refers me to paragraph 14 of Mr Mumford’s witness statement which makes clear that he considered a referral to an ACSSL, but, as their remit is to offer “advice, guidance and coaching to DWP colleagues to help support customers with barriers to access (DWP) services or who may be at imminent risk”, it was his considered opinion that referral to the ACSSL was not appropriate.

Mr Mumford points out that he reviewed the DWP’s protected claims at risk guidance and the Universal Credit review policies and procedures in order to be satisfied that he had taken appropriate action with regard to the claimant and the impasse that had developed between what the DWP wanted and what the claimant was prepared to provide. He also escalated this to his senior leader, Maureen O’Hare, who approved the decision to suspend UC in the light of the refusal to provide the bank statements.

In my judgment, in those circumstances I am not satisfied that Mr Mumford departed from guidance when concluding that a referral to an ACSSL was not called for. In any event it seems to me that it is highly likely that the outcome for the claimant would have not been substantially different if Mr Mumford had referred to an ACSSL. That finding engages the provisions of s31(3C) - (3F) Senior Courts Act 1981 and strongly militates against a conclusion of this application which is favourable to the claimant.

In any event, Mr Edwards says reasonable adjustments had been offered in the form of a change in the personnel dealing with her claim from Mr Mumford to another worker, an offer to speak on the phone, and an offer simply to have bank statements uploaded. All were rejected by the claimant. For her part, she offered, and continues to offer, a statement from her bank which shows balances at the beginning and end of each of the last 4 months and the value of payments out in each period. That is not acceptable to DWP because it says it would not enable them to assess whether payments out are of a nature that might signify other assets. As I have made clear, that is precisely the reason why an analysis of payments out is important to the department. As i made clear during the hearing, I agree that what the claimant is prepared to offer in this regard would not enable DWP to be reassured that there are no other assets which might affect the claimant's continuing entitlement to UC.

In any event, on the issue of reasonable adjustment Mr Edwards argues that all that is required is a reasonable adjustment, not a counsel of perfection for a particular customer. He argues that an adjustment that inevitably denudes the DWP of the means to ensure that the review is accurately carried out is clearly not a reasonable one. That is clearly a persuasive argument.

Mrs Webb argues that there is “zero humanity”, I think was her expression, in the attitude of DWP. I am not sure that I agree with that perception but recognise that perceptions may legitimately differ.

She says that all she wants is the appropriate safeguarding to be put in place but does not specify what she sees that to be. She says instead, it is up to the ACSSL. Perhaps not the most helpful of replies but I have to recognise the disability under which the claimant suffers in advancing her case in the court room environment. It would be good if there could be some cooperation in how to get the information needed by the DWP to the DWP without causing trauma to the claimant but, regrettably, there appears to be something of a gordian knot.

However, on the question of whether it is lawful for DWP to require unredacted bank statements, I am satisfied that it was, notwithstanding the difficulties that Mrs Webb faces psychologically.

I reach that conclusion having considered carefully all that the claimant has said both in writing and orally. But I find compelling Mr Edwards arguments summarised above in justification of his assertion as to the lawfulness of a request to this particular claimant for unreacted statements and insistence that that request is complied with to avoid the consequences that can ensue from non-compliance.

I am satisfied that the regulations enable the information requested to be sought and that the qualifications as to the applicability of Article 8 and the Equality Act with regard to indirect discrimination mean the claimant's human rights and rights in respect of indirect discrimination have not been infringed in a way which renders unlawful the DWP’s position. Similarly, Article 6 GDPR seems to specifically enable unreacted banking details to be processed because it is in the public interest for the reasons which I have already set out. There is clearly a sensible reason for the processing of the information, and it appears to me to be reasonable and proportionate to insist upon it.

I do not overlook the hardship argument, but it seems to me that this is referable, not to the question of whether it was lawful to insist on unredacted statements, but rather whether it was appropriate to suspend payments for non-compliance with that request.

To some extent that has become academic because payments are no longer in suspension. They may well be in the future if DWP feel that they are not getting the information to which they are properly entitled and which they need for the purpose of conducting a meaningful review. However, at the moment the question of hardship does not arise.

In so far as it is relevant however, it seems clear from the statement of Mr Mumford that hardship was considered, and the view was taken that it was would not cause undue hardship to the claimant to suspend UC. I observe that clearly turning off a revenue stream enjoyed by any applicant will inevitably, in a real sense, cause hardship. The test however is “undue” hardship.

It is right to remind myself that in terms of hardship and the approach taken by DWP regard has to be had to the circumstances that applied at the time the decision to suspend was made and, in particular, what was known by DWP at that time.

At that stage, and this appears not to be in dispute, all that was known was that the claimant suffered from fibromyalgia. These issues with regard specifically to her concern about surveillance and the triggers it created in relation to her traumatic life with her former husband were not known to the DWP and therefore cannot have been taken into account for the purpose of assessing lawfulness. It is difficult to see how the Tameside duty would fix the DWP with that knowledge.

I am satisfied therefore that the claim must be dismissed. The defendant is entitled to require unredacted statements from the claimant and insisting on them is not unlawful. Neither would it be unlawful for UC to be suspended and, perhaps, ultimately terminated provided that, before doing so, DWP complies with its own guidance including a consideration at that time of the possibility of suspension causing undue hardship and it gives the appropriate notice.

I certainly do not overlook the effect that the claimant says this will have on her and I regret that. However, I go back to the observations of the Court of Appeal in Johnson referred to earlier and in particular the recognition of the need for “bright line rules which do not discriminate fully between the circumstances of different individuals” and the obligation to avoid the temptation to find a feature of the system irrational even if it produces “very (my emphasis) hard results in some individual cases”

Finally, I do not overlook that this is a rolled up hearing and that in fact there are two stages to it. Mr Edwards did not suggest with a great deal of enthusiasm that I should find that this case was not at least arguable for the purpose of granting permission. Accordingly, I do grant permission for the hearing, but I dismiss the claim on the basis that the claimant has not made out that the DWP’s conduct is unlawful.