Marek Krzysztof Staniak v The District Court of Lublin, Poland

This is the renewed application of Mr Marek Krzysztof Staniak (“the Appellant”) for permission to appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”), arising from an order of District Judge Bristow dated 21 August 2025 directing the Appellant’s extradition to Poland pursuant to a conviction arrest warrant issued by the District Court of Lublin on 27 September 2019 and certified by the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) on 27 January 2025.

The request arises from two offences committed in Poland in September 2003. First, on 14 September 2003, the Appellant misappropriated a passport issued in the name of another individual. Secondly, on 17 September 2003, he attempted unlawfully to cross the border from Poland into Germany using that passport, thereby committing an offence against public order.

The Appellant was detained on 17 September 2003 and, on the same day, an investigation was opened and he was charged. He was interrogated as a suspect, informed of his rights and obligations, and admitted the offences.

On 24 November 2003, the prosecutor closed the investigation and sent an indictment to the District Court of Słubice. Following a procedural transfer, the case came before the District Court of Lublin. A summons for trial was issued on 8 May 2004 to the address provided by the Appellant, requiring his attendance on 14 June 2004.

The Appellant did not attend the hearing on 14 June 2004. He was convicted in his absence and sentenced to one year and eight months’ imprisonment, the execution of which was conditionally suspended for a probationary period of five years, together with a fine and supervision by a probation officer.

The prosecutor appealed against sentence, but on 14 January 2005 the Circuit Court of Lublin dismissed the appeal. The judgment thereby became final.

On 14 June 2005, the probation officer applied for enforcement of the suspended sentence, reporting that the Appellant could not be located and had not complied with supervision requirements. On 14 July 2005, the court ordered execution of the custodial sentence. The Appellant failed to report to custody on 5 September 2005, whereupon he was treated as unlawfully at large and steps were taken to locate him.

In subsequent years, a number of enforcement measures were pursued. An initial European Arrest Warrant was issued in 2006 in separate proceedings, following which the Appellant was returned to Poland. He made an unsuccessful application to reopen proceedings concerning enforcement of the sentence, the Polish court finding that his failure to comply resulted from his own conduct, in particular his failure to provide an address while abroad.

After further proceedings in 2007–2008, including resumption of enforcement and reduction of the sentence to reflect time served and payment of the fine, a further European Arrest Warrant was issued on 19 August 2008. That warrant proved ineffective, and enforcement proceedings were suspended in December 2010.

Between 2010 and 2019, the Polish authorities undertook periodic but unsuccessful efforts to locate the Appellant. In 2019, the position was reviewed and a fresh conviction arrest warrant was issued on 27 September 2019 to secure his return to serve the outstanding sentence.

On 16 March 2026, Mr Justice Mould refused permission to appeal on the papers in respect of Ground 1, which asserts that extradition is barred by reason of the passage of time within sections 11(1)(c) and 14 of the 2003 Act, while granting permission on a separate ground under section 20. The Appellant now renews his application in respect of Ground 1 pursuant to CrimPR 50.22. The question is whether that ground is reasonably arguable.

The Appellant advances three bases for contending that the case meets the statutory test for permission:

The Appellant relied upon expert evidence from a Polish advocate, Katarzyna Dąbrowska, addressing the relevant provisions of Polish criminal procedure and their application to his case. That evidence explained the obligations imposed upon a suspect to notify the authorities of any change of address, including an address for service while abroad, and the operation of deemed service where no such address is provided. It also addressed the procedural history of the case and the basis upon which the Polish courts treated the Appellant as having been duly notified of hearings and subsequent steps in the proceedings. The expert was not able to express a clear conclusion that the Appellant had deliberately avoided the process, and her evidence was relied upon to suggest that the question of his knowledge and intention was not free from doubt. At the same time, the expert material confirmed that the Appellant was aware of his procedural obligations and had failed to comply with them, matters which could bear in the opposite direction.

The Respondent resists the application. It submits that the Judge directed himself correctly in law, that his findings as to fugitivity and oppression were properly open to him on the evidence, and that the Appellant’s challenge amounts in substance to a disagreement with conclusions that were well within the range of reasonable evaluative judgment.

In my judgment, and notwithstanding Mr Meredith’s able arguments to the contrary, the Appellant’s challenge to the finding of fugitivity does not give rise to a reasonably arguable ground of appeal.

The District Judge correctly identified the legal test developed in the case law, namely whether it had been established to the criminal standard that the Appellant knowingly and deliberately placed himself beyond the reach of the Polish authorities. The question was one of fact and evaluation, with which an appellate court will not interfere unless the conclusion reached by the Judge was not properly open.

I do not accept that the Judge’s reasoning was undermined by the matters relied upon by the Appellant. The Judge was entitled to have regard to the Appellant’s knowledge of the proceedings, his subsequent departure from the jurisdiction, and his failure thereafter to provide the authorities with a reliable means of contact. Taken together, those matters were capable of supporting the inference that the Appellant deliberately placed himself beyond the reach of the legal process.

As to the criticism of the inference drawn from timing, I am not persuaded that it was speculative or impermissible. The Judge was entitled to consider the chronology as a whole, including the proximity between the Appellant being notified of court correspondence and his departure from Poland. The absence of personal service or a specific finding as to knowledge of a trial date did not preclude the drawing of a wider inference as to intent.

Nor do the matters relied upon as pointing away from concealment materially weaken the conclusion. The fact that the Appellant may have lived or travelled openly abroad does not, without more, answer the central question of fugitivity, which is whether he knowingly placed himself beyond the reach of the authorities. The Judge was entitled to conclude that such conduct was consistent with, rather than inconsistent with, deliberate evasion in circumstances where no effort was made to engage with the proceedings or to keep the authorities informed of his whereabouts.

Similarly, the reliance placed on expert evidence does not demonstrate an arguable error. The question of fugitivity was ultimately one for the court. The fact that the expert was unable to express a clear view as to intentional evasion did not prevent the Judge from reaching his own conclusion on the totality of the evidence.

Finally, I do not accept that the Judge failed to exclude reasonable alternative explanations. His conclusion, read fairly, reflects an evaluative judgment that the evidence established the necessary intent to the criminal standard. That was a conclusion he was entitled to reach.

The Appellant’s challenge amounts to a disagreement with findings that were properly open to the District Judge on the evidence. It does not disclose any arguable misdirection or any inference that was not available to him.

In my judgment, the Appellant’s reliance on exceptional circumstances does not give rise to a reasonably arguable ground of appeal.

It is common ground that, where a requested person is properly to be regarded as a fugitive, the threshold for reliance on the passage of time is a stringent one (Gomes v Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21 at [33]). A fugitive may resist extradition on passage-of-time grounds in the most exceptional circumstances: Gomes at [31]. The focus throughout is the effect of the passage of time on the requested person. Culpable delay on the part of the requesting state, particularly prolonged and unexplained periods of inactivity, may be taken into account and, in a borderline case, may tip the balance: Kakis v Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779, (per Lord Edmund-Davies at [785]; and see Zengota v Poland [2017] EWHC 191 (Admin) at [32]. However, the mere passage of time, even if substantial, is insufficient without “something more” of an unusual or striking nature (Kakis at [782]).

I am not persuaded that the present case arguably meets that exacting standard. While the lapse of time is undoubtedly substantial, the District Judge was entitled to conclude that the length of the delay, whether considered alone or in combination with the other matters relied upon, did not amount to an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of the authorities.

In particular, the Judge was entitled to reject the submission that the history of the case disclosed culpable inactivity of a kind capable of altering the analysis. The material before him did not compel a conclusion that the requesting state bore responsibility for the delay in any way that could properly be characterised as exceptional. That was a conclusion he was entitled to reach on the evidence.

Nor do I accept that the Appellant’s personal circumstances elevate the case into the realm of exceptionality. The fact that he has established a settled life abroad is a feature frequently encountered in cases of this kind. The Judge was entitled to conclude that such matters, whether taken individually or cumulatively, did not take the case outside the ordinary run of fugitive cases.

It is also material that the Appellant was aware of the proceedings against him and remained at large over an extended period. In those circumstances, the Judge was entitled to treat the consequences of delay as not giving rise to any legitimate basis upon which the Appellant could now rely on the passage of time as an exceptional feature.

Drawing these matters together, I am not persuaded that the Appellant has identified any respect in which the District Judge erred in concluding that the threshold of exceptional circumstances was not met. The conclusion reached was an evaluative one, firmly grounded in the evidence, and was well within the scope of decisions reasonably open to him.

Accordingly, the contention that this is an exceptional case in which a fugitive may rely on the passage of time is not reasonably arguable.

In my judgment, the Appellant’s case on oppression does not give rise to a reasonably arguable ground of appeal.

The District Judge directed himself by reference to the correct legal principles. The test for oppression focuses on whether extradition would result in injustice or hardship going beyond that which is ordinarily to be expected, having regard to the effect of delay.

In Scott v Government of the Commonwealth of Australia [2020] EWHC 2924 (Admin), at [68], Bean LJ provided a helpful summary of the law relating to the passage of time and oppression:

“68.

There is a valuable summary of the present state of the law, though it is not to be read as a statute, in the judgment of the Divisional Court (Aikens LJ and Popplewell J) in Loncar v Croatia [2015] EWHC (Admin) 548 at paragraph 29 (3)-(8):

‘(3) Where the delay is not brought about by the requested person himself, the essential question underlying the ground that the passage of time has made it unjust to extradite him is whether, by reason of that passage of time, a fair trial is impossible: Gomes at paragraphs [32 7 33]. Nevertheless prejudice in the conduct of his defence at a trial or retrial may be a factor contributing to a conclusion that a return would be oppressive, notwithstanding that it will not of itself satisfy the injustice criterion.

(4)

The test of oppression “by reason of the passage of time” will not easily satisfied; hardship, a comparatively commonplace consequence of an order for extradition, is not enough: Gomes at paragraph [31].

(5)

The gravity of the offence is relevant to whether changes in the circumstances of the accused which have occurred during the relevant period are such as would render his return to stand trial oppressive. The more serious the offence, the less easy it will be to satisfy the test of oppression: Kakis per Lord Diplock at page 784; Gomes at paragraphs [31].

(6)

The length of time is itself an important consideration in whether a return would be oppressive: Wenting v High Court of Valenciennes [2009] EWHC 3528 (Admin).

(7)

Where the delay is not brought about by the requested person himself, it is a relevant factor if the delay has engendered in the requested person a legitimate sense of security from prosecution or punishment: Gomes at [26]; La Torre per Laws LJ at [37].

(8)

Where the delay is not brought about by the requested person himself, the culpability of the delay by the judicial authority may contribute to establishing the oppressiveness of making an order for his return, and may be decisive in what is otherwise a marginal case: Kakis per Lord Edmund Davies at page 7855, La Torre per Laws LJ at paragraph [37]; Gomes at paragraph [27].’”

The Judge properly directed himself that the question is whether, by reason of the passage of time, extradition would result in hardship going beyond that which ordinarily attends removal, and that the assessment is an evaluative one for the court on the evidence as a whole.

I am not persuaded that his conclusion is arguably open to challenge. Although the period of delay in this case is substantial, that is not of itself sufficient. The essential question is the effect of that delay upon the Appellant. The Judge was entitled to conclude that the matters relied upon did not demonstrate hardship of the requisite character or degree.

In relation to the Appellant’s personal circumstances, the Judge’s assessment of the evidence was well within the bounds of reasonable evaluation. The material before him was limited, and he was entitled to regard it as insufficient to establish a settled position of such strength that extradition would now be oppressive. The reliance placed on residence, employment and the ordinary incidents of life in the United Kingdom did not, without more, take the case beyond the ordinary consequences of extradition.

Nor do I accept that the Judge failed to engage with the impact of delay. On the contrary, he addressed it and concluded that the Appellant had not demonstrated the “something more” required to satisfy the statutory test. That was a conclusion he was entitled to reach.

As to the submission that the delay was attributable to the requesting state, the Judge was entitled to conclude that the history of the case did not disclose culpable inactivity of a kind capable of rendering extradition oppressive. In circumstances where the Appellant was aware of the proceedings and remained at large, it was open to the Judge to conclude that the passage of time did not materially alter the analysis.

Drawing these matters together, I am not satisfied that Ground 1 discloses any reasonably arguable basis for challenge on any of the three bases advanced.

In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that Ground 1 is reasonably arguable. The renewed application for permission to appeal on that ground is accordingly refused.