John Paul Bizeray v North London Magistrates’ Court

This claim arises out of a police investigation into suspected possession of indecent images of children and, more specifically, the decisions of the North London Magistrates’ Court to extend the Claimant’s pre-charge bail on two occasions in late 2025 and early 2026.

The investigation began in late 2024, when the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) provided information to the Metropolitan Police indicating that a user associated with the Claimant’s details had downloaded a substantial number of indecent images of children, including images in the most serious category.

On 14 January 2025, the Claimant was arrested. A search warrant was executed at his home address, and a number of electronic devices were seized for forensic examination. The Claimant denied any wrongdoing. He was released on conditional bail, including restrictions on any unsupervised contact with children.

In a subsequent interview later that month, the Claimant advanced an account as to how images had come to be downloaded. He asserted that a third party (“the Third Party”), who was then a minor, had been responsible for downloading the material in 2023 and had admitted as much at or about the time. That assertion was later repeated by the Third Party to the police. The Claimant has maintained that position since.

The investigation proceeded with the examination of the seized devices, a process which, on any view, proved to be protracted. The Claimant remained on pre-charge bail while that work was ongoing.

As the initial bail period approached its expiry, the Metropolitan Police (through the officer in charge, DC Orange) applied to the Magistrates’ Court for an extension under the statutory regime governing pre-charge bail. Prior to that application, the Claimant was asked whether he consented to the extension of bail on the existing terms. There is an issue as to whether he did so. I consider this further below.

On 23 October 2025, justices sitting at the North London Magistrates’ Court granted a first extension, continuing bail until 14 January 2026.

A second application for an extension was made at the end of December 2025. By that stage, some of the devices had yielded indications that they might contain indecent images, although full forensic examination of those devices, as well as of others remained outstanding. The Claimant made representations which were placed before the court. On 3 February 2026, the Magistrates’ Court granted a further extension of bail for approximately three months.

The Claimant challenges both of those extension decisions by way of judicial review. He contends, in essence, that the statutory safeguards governing applications of this kind were not observed, including requirements relating to service, candour, and the material placed before the magistrates.

The procedural landscape has, however, moved on. On 23 April 2026, when a third application for an extension was made, the Magistrates’ Court refused to extend bail further. The Claimant was then released under investigation.

The present claim is one strand of a wider body of litigation arising from the same investigation. The Claimant has also brought:

The litigation has a protracted procedural history, involving multiple applications, amendments, and case management directions, culminating in the present rolled-up hearing listed on 16 June 2026.

The Claimant first sought to challenge the extension of his pre charge bail following the decision of the North London Magistrates’ Court on 23 October 2025. On 17 November 2025, he sent a pre-action protocol letter. He thereafter attempted to commence judicial review proceedings by filing a claim on 1 December 2025. That claim, however, was not issued, having been rejected by the Administrative Court Office on 3 December 2025 on the basis that it was procedurally defective, including the absence of a signed statement of truth and the failure to identify the correct defendant.

The corrected claim form was re-filed on 4 December 2025 and acknowledged by the Administrative Court Office on 10 December 2026. The claim was sealed and issued on 15January 2026, together with an application for urgent consideration and interim relief. That application was refused by Deputy High Court Judge Tinkler on 20 January 2026.

On 3 February 2026, whilst the claim was in its early stages, the Magistrates’ Court made the second decision extending the Claimant’s bail. In response, the Claimant sought to expand the scope of his challenge. On 12 February 2026, he filed a further application seeking permission to amend the claim form and grounds to include the second decision and an additional ground of challenge. By order of Ms Justice Obi dated 12 February 2026, that application was granted and directions were made, with an expedited timetable.

Pursuant to that order, the Claimant filed an amended claim form and grounds on 18 February 2026. The First Interested Party had already filed an acknowledgment of service on 6 February 2026 and thereafter filed amended summary grounds of defence on 25 February 2026, to which the Claimant replied on the same date.

The Claimant made a further application for urgent determination of permission on 14 March 2026, alternatively seeking an expedited rolled up hearing. That application was placed before Mr Justice Kimblin who, on 17 March 2026, made an order directing that the case proceed by way of a rolled-up hearing.

Thereafter, the Claimant made a series of further interlocutory applications, including an application dated 23 March 2026 for protective directions addressing what he described as “rolling mootness”, and a further application for a reporting restriction.

On 31 March 2026, Deputy High Court Judge Ockelton made a further case management order granting the Claimant liberty to amend his claim in the event of a further bail extension decision and directing that the rolled-up hearing be listed as soon as possible after 26 April 2026.

The proceedings then progressed towards a substantive hearing. The First Interested Party filed detailed grounds of resistance on 21 April 2026, and the Second Interested Party filed an acknowledgment of service on 24 April 2026 indicating that it would not make submissions or participate. The Claimant subsequently lodged a hearing bundle, core bundle, and skeleton argument in May 2026. The documentation was extensive and included three lever arch files of authorities. The Claimant lodged a further supplemental bundle of authorities shortly before the hearing and lodged the N244(3) application bundle under CPR 54.16(2)(b) (Exhibits JPB28 to JPB30), running to 286 pages, on 8 June 2026. I received it in hard copy at the hearing and read it over the lunch adjournment. I give him permission to rely on it.

I am therefore required to determine, on a rolled-up basis, both the application for permission and, if permission is granted, the substantive claim for judicial review challenging the lawfulness of the two decisions to extend pre charge bail, taken on 23 October 2025 and 3 February 2026 respectively.

The Claimant seeks:

The claim raises, in substance, a series of interlocking complaints about the procedural integrity of the decisions to extend pre charge bail under the statutory scheme contained in PACE 1984.

The statutory scheme requires the court to be satisfied, on the material placed before it, of three matters:

Whether that supervisory jurisdiction was meaningfully engaged on the facts of this case is, in essence, the unifying question which underpins each of the Claimant’s grounds.

The Claimant attacks the procedural propriety of the extension applications.

The application does not turn on the underlying merits of the criminal investigation, but on whether the process by which the Claimant’s liberty remained subject to restriction complied with the procedural safeguards laid down by Parliament, and whether any departure from those safeguards justifies the grant of public law relief.

The First Interested Party’s case is that the claim is misconceived both procedurally and, on its merits, and that no public law error affecting the lawfulness of the impugned decisions is made out.

Its overarching submission is that judicial review is neither appropriate nor necessary. It is said that the Claimant had, and continues to have, alternative avenues by which to advance his complaints, including appeal routes within the criminal process, applications relating to seized property, conduct complaints, and a civil claim in which he seeks damages under the Human Rights Act (“HRA”) 1998.

In those circumstances, the present proceedings represent, it is argued, an impermissible attempt to invoke judicial review as a remedy of first rather than last resort. As to this the Claimant argues that the statutory scheme under PACE sections 47ZF-47ZG does not provide any express statutory right of appeal or review against the grant of a pre-charge bail extension. Judicial review is the only available mechanism by which the legality or procedural propriety of such an extension may be challenged. The police complaints process is not an alternative remedy to judicial review of the Defendant’s decision. A complaint to the police relates to the conduct of police officers; it cannot quash or set aside a judicial decision of the Magistrates’ Court. Similarly, a civil claim against the First Interested Party would not address the lawfulness of the Defendant’s decision-making process.

The First Interested Party also submits that the claim is now, in substance, academic. The Claimant is no longer on bail; the Magistrates’ Court having refused to grant any further extension in April 2026. It is submitted that the relief sought, principally quashing orders in respect of earlier bail extensions, would have no practical effect on the parties’ current position.

The First Interested Party accepts that there was a failure to serve the First Application on the Claimant, which it attributes to an administrative oversight, and for which an apology has been made. However, it is said that this did not give rise to any material unfairness. The Claimant was in fact aware of the proposed extension, was invited to comment upon it, and expressly indicated that he had no objection to the continuation of the relevant bail condition. In those circumstances, it is submitted that the outcome of the first application would inevitably have been the same.

As to the second extension, the First Interested Party contends that the Claimant was served with, and did respond to, the application, and that any alleged discrepancies or amendments were immaterial. It is said that the Claimant’s representations were before the court and were taken into account by the magistrates when granting the extension.

More broadly, the First Interested Party rejects the allegation of any failure of candour. It submits that the applications accurately conveyed the essential features of the case, including the existence of indecent images on devices associated with the Claimant, whilst also placing before the court the Claimant’s account that the Third Party was responsible. It denies any obligation to disclose underlying intelligence in an ongoing investigation, and characterises the Claimant’s criticisms as focusing on immaterial discrepancies, such as errors in dates or drafting, which did not affect the substance of the applications.

In relation to the evidential foundation of the decisions, the First Interested Party emphasises that there was, and remains, a proper basis for suspicion. The intelligence linking the downloads to the Claimant’s details is said to have been reliable, and the presence of indecent images on seized devices is not in dispute. While the Claimant attributes responsibility to the Third Party, that is said to be a matter for the ongoing investigation, not a basis for undermining the lawfulness of the bail extensions.

As to diligence and expedition, it is contended that the investigation justified the grant of further time at the relevant dates. The case involved the analysis of multiple devices, some containing complex or encrypted software, and the need for detailed forensic examination. The magistrates were entitled, it is said, to conclude on the material before them that further time was both necessary and proportionate. The fact that a subsequent application was refused at a later stage does not, on this account, undermine the legality of the earlier decisions, each of which fell to be assessed on the information then available.

Finally, and in any event, the First Interested Party relies on section 31 of the Senior Courts Act (“SCA”) 1981, submitting that even if there were procedural defects, it is highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different. The decisions were taken against the backdrop of serious allegations, supported by evidence of indecent images on devices connected to the Claimant, and it is submitted that it would be unrealistic to suppose that fuller or different representations would have led the magistrates to refuse the extensions.

In relation to Ground 1, the Claimant’s argument proceeds on the footing that the failure to comply with the requirements of service deprived him of a fair opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, with the consequence that both extensions of bail are unlawful. The First Interested Party does not seek to defend every aspect of the process. It accepts, in particular, that the First Application to extend bail was not formally served on the Claimant. However, it submits that, properly analysed, that failure does not vitiate the resulting decision.

On the evidence, the Claimant was not taken by surprise by the First Application. On the contrary, he was expressly notified of the intended application and invited to provide representations. In response, he confirmed in writing that he had no objection to the continuation of the bail condition in its existing form. It is therefore said that, although the formal step of serving the application document itself was omitted, the essential purpose of service namely, to inform the individual concerned of the case being advanced and to afford an opportunity to respond was, in substance, achieved.

In his oral submissions before me, the Claimant asserted that although he had been informed of the application to extend, his agreement was to the terms of the condition attached to his bail and not to its extension. That interpretation of the exchanges between the police and the Claimant lies uneasily, in my view, with the text of the relevant emails which begin with an email from the officer in the case at 11:23am on 30 September 2025 as follows:

“Good morning Mr Bizeray, I hope you are well. I am applying to have your bail extended for a further 3 months beyond the current date while the examination of the digital devices is complete. This is sent to the Magistrate’s Court who review whether the conditions are necessary and proportionate. Could you please outline any representations you have specifically relating to the bail condition currently in place…”

The Claimant’s reply, timed at 3:36pm of the same day was:

“Thank you for your email of 30 September 2025 requesting my representations on the application to extend my pre-charge bail. I confirm that I do not object to the extension of the bail condition as it is currently formulated…” (My emphasis)

The First Interested Party characterises the error in not effecting service as an administrative oversight without practical consequence. Whilst that may underplay the importance of a vital procedural step, from the point of view of a public law remedy it is undoubtedly the case that the Claimant was aware of the proposed extension, was invited to engage with it, and elected not to oppose it. In those circumstances, it is hard to see that the absence of formal service rendered the process unfair or deprived the Claimant of any opportunity to influence the outcome.

That conclusion is reinforced by the nature of the decision which the magistrates were required to take. The statutory question was whether further time for investigation was necessary and whether the continuation of bail, on the existing condition, was proportionate. The Claimant’s own response indicated that he did not challenge the continuation of that condition. It follows that even if the application itself had been formally served, there is no realistic basis for concluding that the Claimant would have advanced any materially different or additional case.

The First Interested Party advances a similar case in relation to the second extension, emphasising that, in contrast to the First Application, the Claimant was served with the application and did in fact make representations, which were placed before the magistrates. I note that there is an email to the Claimant from the Officer in the Case dated 2 January 2026 as follows:

“Good morning Mr Bizeray, Thanks for your responses to my application to extend your pre-charge bail. I note the correction to the applicable bail date and have amended the form appropriately. I have emailed the application and your responses/along with the emails and attachments to the correct mailbox. They should already have these as you responded directly to the court.”

The complaint that the “operative” version of the application differed in certain respects is said to be of no consequence, because the alleged differences were either minor or fully ventilated in correspondence, and the Claimant’s responses were before the court in any event.

This feeds directly into the First Interested Party’s reliance on section 31 of SCA 1981. Even if the court were to conclude that there was a breach of the relevant procedural rules, the decisive question is whether it is highly likely that the outcome would have been substantially different had the Claimant been formally served. The First Interested Party’s case is that it plainly would not have been. The Claimant did not oppose the extension in principle; the investigation was ongoing; and the magistrates had before them a sufficient evidential basis to conclude that the statutory criteria were met. On that basis, Ground 1 does not, in the First Interested Party’s submission, disclose any arguable public law error, and in any event cannot satisfy the threshold required to justify the grant of relief.

I accept the substance of the First Interested Party’s submissions on Ground 1. While it is correct that there was a failure formally to serve the first application, that defect must be considered in its proper context. The evidence demonstrates that the Claimant was notified of the proposed extension, was invited to make representations, and, significantly, indicated that he did not object to the continuation of the relevant bail condition. In those circumstances, the underlying purpose of the service requirement, to afford the affected individual a fair opportunity to participate was, in substance, achieved.

Nor, in my judgment, does the position materially differ in relation to the second extension. The Claimant was aware of, and engaged with, that application, and his representations were before the magistrates. Any discrepancies between versions of the application did not deprive him of a meaningful opportunity to address the case that was in fact put before the court.

The court’s concern in public law is with substance, not form. On the facts of this case, the Claimant has not demonstrated that he was denied a fair opportunity to be heard, or that the integrity of the decision-making process was compromised.

In any event, even if a breach is established, I am satisfied that it is highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different had the applications been formally served. The Claimant did not oppose the continuation of bail in principle; the investigation was ongoing; and the magistrates had before them sufficient material to justify the extensions at the time they were granted.

It follows that Ground 1 does not, in my view, disclose any material public law error. The First Interested Party’s submissions on this issue are, in my judgment, well founded.

Ground 2 is a challenge of some breadth and seriousness. It is said that the officer applying for the extensions of bail failed to comply with the duty of candour owed to the court, with the consequence that the magistrates were misled, or at least not fairly informed, as to the true state of the evidence. The First Interested Party rejects that characterisation and submits that, properly understood, the criticism rests on an over forensic analysis of matters which are either immaterial or outside the scope of what was required to be disclosed.

It was accepted that an applicant for an extension of pre-charge bail must present material information fairly to the court. However, that duty, it was argued, does not require the police to set out their case with the detail or balance of a judgment, nor to disclose the entirety of the intelligence or evidential material underpinning an ongoing investigation.

The Claimant nevertheless relies on a number of alleged inconsistencies and omissions, said cumulatively to amount to a failure of candour. These may be summarised as follows:

The First Interested Party submits that, when analysed properly, these criticisms do not disclose any material failure of candour.

As to the chronology, it is accepted that there were errors in the dating of the receipt of intelligence. However, these are properly characterised as typographical or drafting errors, which did not affect the substance of the information before the magistrates, that intelligence had been received linking indecent images to devices associated with the Claimant. The magistrates were not concerned with the precise date on which that intelligence was received, but with its existence and implications for the ongoing investigation.

As to the Claimant’s reliance on attribution to the Third Party and associated account material, the First Interested Party emphasises that the Claimant’s account was, in fact, placed before the court. The magistrates were therefore aware that the Claimant denied responsibility and asserted that another person was involved. The failure to provide additional technical or documentary detail in support of that account does not amount to a want of candour. The court was not required, at this stage, to resolve competing accounts in relation to downloading, but to determine whether further investigation was justified.

Similarly, the criticisms directed to the description of devices and forensic findings are said to lack materiality. The applications made clear that multiple devices had been seized, that indecent images had been identified on some of them, and that further analysis remained outstanding. Any imprecision in the description of particular items does not detract from that essential picture, nor is it suggested that the magistrates were misled as to the existence of relevant material.

The challenge to the reference to suspected sexual interest is likewise said to be unsustainable. The First Interested Party submits that it was open to the officer to express a suspicion based on the existence of indecent images on the devices and associated intelligence. There was no obligation to disclose the underlying intelligence in support of that suspicion, particularly in the context of an ongoing investigation.

The Claimant’s reliance on CrimPR 14.20, in argument, is said to be misplaced. That rule governs circumstances in which material is placed before the court but withheld from the opposing party through a closed procedure. This was not such a case. The applications were made in open form, and no material was relied upon in a closed manner. The Claimant’s complaint is, in substance, that more detail should have been provided, not that material was improperly withheld. Rule 14.20 therefore has no application.

More broadly, the First Interested Party submits that the Claimant’s case amounts to an attempt to elevate matters of evidential detail into alleged public law error. The magistrates were not being asked to determine guilt, resolve attribution, or adjudicate on the fine detail of digital forensics. Their task was to determine whether further time for investigation was justified. On the material before them, it is said that they were plainly entitled to conclude that it was.

Drawing those strands together, I would accept the First Interested Party’s submissions on Ground 2. The Claimant’s criticisms, though detailed, do not establish any material failure of candour. Nor do they demonstrate that the magistrates were misled in a way which undermined the lawfulness of the decisions. Even if some matters could have been expressed with greater precision, I am satisfied that any imperfections identified are immaterial and that it is highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different. The central features of the case which were relevant to the decisions namely the existence of indecent images on devices linked to the Claimant, and the need for ongoing forensic investigation would have remained unchanged.

Grounds 3 and 4 are directed not to the bail decisions themselves, but to earlier aspects of the investigative process; essentially an admitted failure to endorse and return the search warrant, and the absence of a contemporaneous, compliant seizure inventory. The Claimant relies on those matters as demonstrating wider deficiencies in the presentation and reliability of the material placed before the magistrates. The First Interested Party submits that neither ground has any bearing on the lawfulness of the two decisions under challenge, and that they disclose no arguable public law error in this claim.

It is convenient to take the two grounds together, given the overlap in both subject matter and analysis.

The decisions under challenge are the extensions of pre-charge bail granted on 23 October 2025 and 3 February 2026. The question for the magistrates on each occasion was whether the statutory conditions for extension were met, including whether further investigation was required and being conducted diligently, and whether continued bail was necessary and proportionate.

Against that background, the First Interested Party submits that the matters relied on in Grounds 3 and 4, namely failures in the execution and recording of the search, are collateral to the issues which the magistrates were required to determine. They concern events in January 2025, well before the applications for extension of bail, and do not directly inform the statutory questions which fell to be decided.

In relation to Ground 3, it is accepted that the warrant was not endorsed and returned in accordance with the requirements of PACE. That failure has been acknowledged internally and described as “not acceptable”. However, as the First Interested Party correctly submits, that omission does not render the underlying search unlawful, nor does it undermine the existence of the evidential material obtained as a result. Failures of this kind are not automatically fatal to the legality of the search.

More importantly for present purposes, the Claimant does not, and cannot in this claim, seek to quash the warrant. The narrow question is whether the absence of endorsement and return had any material impact on the magistrates’ decisions to extend bail. In my judgment, it did not. The magistrates were concerned with the existence of a continuing investigation involving the analysis of digital devices. The fact that the warrant paperwork was not properly completed does not bear on whether further time was required for that investigation, nor on the proportionality of continuing bail.

A similar analysis applies to Ground 4, which concerns the absence of a contemporaneous seizure inventory and the alleged deficiencies in the inventory eventually produced. The First Interested Party does not seek to justify any failure fully to comply with Code B requirements. However, the Claimant’s reliance on those matters is misplaced in the context of this claim.

The position before the magistrates was that a number of electronic devices had been seized and were undergoing forensic examination, that indecent images had been identified on some devices, and that further analysis remained outstanding. That position is not undermined by the absence of a contemporaneous inventory or by inconsistencies in the subsequent documentation. Those matters may be capable of bearing on issues of evidence, attribution or civil liability, but they do not materially affect the statutory basis upon which the magistrates were required to decide whether to extend bail.

The Claimant seeks to elevate these matters into a broader submission that the evidential foundation of the applications was unreliable. However, the magistrates were not required to audit the procedural compliance of the search or to determine the evidential weight of individual exhibits. Their task was supervisory and forward looking. On the undisputed facts, there remained an ongoing investigation into serious alleged offending, involving multiple devices and incomplete forensic work. That was sufficient to engage the statutory scheme.

Further, as the First Interested Party submits, these issues are the subject of separate proceedings brought by the Claimant, including applications relating to seized property and a civil claim under Article 8. That provides an alternative and more appropriate forum in which the lawfulness and consequences of the search and seizure can be examined. It reinforces the conclusion that judicial review of the bail extensions is not the proper vehicle for these complaints.

Finally, and in any event, the position falls to be considered through the lens of section 31 of SCA 1981. Even if the Claimant were able to establish that the magistrates ought to have been informed of the failures relating to the warrant or the inventory, it is, in my judgment, highly unlikely that this would have affected the outcome. The core features of the case, the existence of multiple seized devices, the identification of indecent images, and the need for ongoing forensic analysis would have remained unchanged. The defects relied upon by the Claimant do not go to those fundamental matters.

Drawing those strands together, I am satisfied that Grounds 3 and 4 are without merit. They concern matters which are collateral to the decisions under challenge, do not bear materially on the statutory criteria the magistrates were required to apply, and, in any event, could not have affected the outcome. The First Interested Party’s submissions on these grounds are therefore to be accepted.

Ground 5 is directed to what the Claimant characterises as a failure by the First Interested Party to provide sufficient forensic detail in the applications for the bail extensions, and, more broadly, to demonstrate that the investigation was being conducted with the requisite diligence and expedition. It is said that deficiencies in the description of the forensic position, coupled with delay in the examination of devices, undermined the statutory basis upon which the magistrates were required to be satisfied.

The First Interested Party rejects that submission and contends that this ground again reflects an impermissible attempt to impose a standard of detail and scrutiny which the statutory scheme does not require.

The proper starting point is the scope of the magistrates’ function under the statutory regime. The court was required to determine whether further time was needed for investigation and whether that investigation was being conducted diligently and expeditiously. That is a practical and evaluative judgment, not a technical audit of forensic processes or an assessment of evidential sufficiency for charge.

Against that framework, the First Interested Party submits that the Claimant’s focus on alleged shortcomings in forensic particularisation is misplaced. The applications made clear, in substance, that:

That, it is said, was sufficient to enable the magistrates to determine whether further time was required. There was no obligation on the officer to set out the forensic position in the manner of an expert report or to provide granular detail as to each device or stage of analysis. As the First Interested Party puts it, there is no requirement to “draft the application like a judgment”.

The Claimant seeks to reinforce this ground by pointing to what he describes as a lack of meaningful progress in the investigation, including delays in digital analysis. However, the First Interested Party submits that this overstates the position. The case involved multiple devices, some requiring specialist examination due to complex software, and the forensic process necessarily takes time. The magistrates were entitled to accept that further time was required for that work to be completed.

It is true that, in April 2026, a further application for extension was refused on the basis that the investigation had not advanced sufficiently by that stage. However, as the First Interested Party submits, this does not of itself retrospectively undermine the legality of the earlier decisions. Each application falls to be assessed on the information available at the time it was made. The fact that a later court, with a different evidential picture and further time elapsed, reached a different conclusion does not establish that the earlier decisions were unlawful.

More fundamentally, the Claimant’s argument again elides the distinction between evaluating the merits of an investigation and identifying a public law error in the decision-making process. The magistrates were not required to determine whether the investigation was being conducted optimally, nor whether greater progress could have been made. The question was whether, on the material before them, it was reasonable to conclude that further time was needed and that the investigation was continuing.

On the First Interested Party’s case, there was ample material to support that conclusion. The existence of outstanding forensic work, in a case involving serious allegations and multiple devices, provided a rational and sufficient basis for extending bail at the relevant times.

This reasoning also feeds directly into the application of section 31 of SCA 1981. Even if it were assumed that the applications could have provided more detailed forensic information, it is, in my judgment, highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different. The central fact, that the forensic investigation was incomplete, would have remained unchanged.

I am satisfied for these reasons that Ground 5 is without merit. The Claimant has not demonstrated that the magistrates were misled as to the state of the investigation, nor that the statutory test was applied on an inadequate evidential basis. The criticism amounts, at most, to a complaint that greater detail could have been provided. That is insufficient to found a public law challenge.

In those circumstances, I accept the First Interested Party’s submissions. Ground 5 does not disclose any material error of law, and, in any event, the “no substantial difference” test is plainly satisfied.

Ground 6 represents the culmination of the Claimant’s case. It is advanced as a “systemic” challenge, drawing together the matters relied upon under the earlier grounds and asserting that, taken cumulatively, they demonstrate a failure of the Magistrates’ Court properly to perform its supervisory function under the statutory scheme.

The Claimant’s case is that the combination of non-service, alleged failures of candour, inaccuracies in the presentation of evidence, and shortcomings in the underlying investigation meant that the magistrates were deprived of the material necessary to reach a properly informed decision. It is further said that the refusal, in April 2026, of a further extension of bail demonstrates that, when properly informed, the court would not have granted the earlier extensions.

The First Interested Party submits that this ground adds nothing of substance to the earlier complaints and is unsustainable both in principle and on the facts.

The appropriate starting point is to recognise that Ground 6 is parasitic upon the preceding grounds. It does not identify any free-standing error but rather seeks to assert that a series of individually insufficient criticisms, when aggregated, amount to a defect of a different order. The difficulty for the Claimant is that, as appears from the analysis of Grounds 1 to 5, those underlying criticisms do not establish material unlawfulness in their own right. In those circumstances, it is difficult to see how their combination can properly be elevated into a systemic failure.

More fundamentally, the Claimant’s argument risks mischaracterising the role of the magistrates under the statutory regime. The supervisory function conferred by PACE requires the court to determine, on the material placed before it, whether the statutory conditions for extending bail are met. It does not require the court to conduct a detailed audit of the investigation, to test the evidential foundations of the case at a granular level, or to resolve disputed issues of fact or attribution.

Seen in that light, the suggestion that the magistrates’ function was not meaningfully exercised cannot be sustained. The material before the court, at each stage, included:

On any view, that was a sufficient evidential basis upon which the magistrates could perform the statutory task entrusted to them.

The Claimant’s reliance on the refusal of a further extension in April 2026 is also misplaced. As the First Interested Party correctly submits, that decision reflects the assessment of the court at a later point in time, on a different evidential footing, including the passage of further months without sufficient demonstrable progress. It does not follow that the earlier decisions were unlawful. The statutory scheme requires each application to be assessed on the material then available, and there is no inconsistency in a court granting extensions at one stage and refusing them at a later stage when circumstances have changed.

Nor does the April decision demonstrate that, had the Claimant’s criticisms been made good at the earlier stage, the outcome would have been different. The First Interested Party is entitled to emphasise that the earlier applications were made at a point when significant forensic work remained outstanding, and when the magistrates were entitled to conclude that the statutory criteria were met. The April decision indicates, if anything, that the magistrates were performing their function throughout in a meticulous and considered way.

More broadly, the Claimant’s formulation of this ground again tends to merge the distinction between merits and legality. At its highest, the argument invites the court to conclude that the investigation was unsatisfactory, or that the presentation of the case could have been fuller or more precise. Even if that were so, it does not establish that the magistrates acted unlawfully in extending bail on the material before them. The supervisory function does not require perfection, but a rational assessment of the statutory conditions.

Even taking the Claimant’s case at its highest, the overarching question is whether it is highly likely that the outcome would have been substantially different had the alleged deficiencies not occurred. For the reasons already given in relation to the earlier grounds, the answer is plainly in the negative. The central features of the case would have remained unchanged.

I am satisfied that Ground 6 is without merit. It does not demonstrate any systemic failure in the exercise of the magistrates’ supervisory function but rather amounts to a restatement of earlier complaints which do not individually, or cumulatively, establish any material public law error. In any event, it is highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different.

The First Interested Party submits that the present claim represents an inappropriate recourse to judicial review where alternative remedies either existed or remain available. The Claimant has, as the evidence shows, pursued (and continues to pursue) a number of parallel avenues of challenge arising out of the same underlying investigation.

Those alternative remedies may be summarised as follows.

Taken together, those routes provide comprehensive and appropriate mechanisms for the determination of the very issues which, in substance, underpin much of the Claimant’s complaint, namely the lawfulness of the search, the handling of evidence, and the consequences of the investigation. They are, in my judgment, better suited to the resolution of those matters than a judicial review directed at interlocutory bail decisions. The fact that the remedies available may not be precisely coextensive with those available via judicial review is not an answer to the question of whether judicial review is only, and properly, being used as a remedy of last resort. The availability of effective alternative remedies is also, in itself, a powerful discretionary reason for refusing relief.

For the reasons set out above, none of the Claimant’s grounds of challenge disclose any material public law error in the decisions of the Magistrates’ Court to extend his pre-charge bail on 23 October 2025 and 3 February 2026. He has failed to demonstrate that the statutory requirements were not satisfied or that the magistrates were misled in any material respect.

The Claimant has available to him alternative remedies through which his substantive complaints can properly be pursued. This claim amounts to an attempt to use judicial review as a collateral vehicle to challenge aspects of an ongoing investigation which are properly the subject of those alternative procedures.

The claim is now, for all practical purposes, academic. The Claimant is no longer subject to bail; the Magistrates’ Court having refused a further extension on 23 April 2026. The grant of a quashing order would have no practical effect. Nor is this, in my judgment, a case in which it would be appropriate to grant declaratory relief notwithstanding that position. The issues raised are fact sensitive and directed to the particular circumstances of these applications; they do not give rise to a discrete point of wider public importance requiring authoritative determination.

These considerations reinforce the application of section 31 of SCA 1981. Even if some defects were established, the absence of continuing prejudice, together with the existence of alternative avenues of redress, strongly supports the conclusion that relief should in any event be refused.

Accordingly, even if any of the individual grounds had been made out (which, for the reasons already given, they have not), I would in any event have declined to grant relief in the exercise of the court’s discretion.

Accordingly, were I to give permission I would refuse the substantive claim for judicial review. I therefore refuse permission.