Sean Hylton, R (on the application of) v Medway Council

This judgment is given following the hearing of the claim for judicial review brought by Mr Sean Hylton against Medway Council (“Medway”).

The scope of Mr Hylton’s claim requires examination, because some of the matters he raises fall outside the claim for which permission is granted.

He has mental health difficulties which lead to problems with aspects of daily life. Broadly he says Medway has failed properly to discharge their duties to him under the Care Act 2014. But at the centre of his case are claims that since late 2025 Medway has failed to make lawful decisions about the provision of interim support under s. 19(3) of the Act.

Permission to proceed was granted by Aidan Eardley KC, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, on 11 March 2026. The matter came on for hearing on 22 May 2026 on a partly expedited basis.

Mr Hylton does not have legal representation and represented himself. He did so through video link which I permitted, after he had applied to do so, on the basis of problems he experiences with communication in person.

I will address the issues under the following headings:

Summary of Conclusions

In summary I conclude:

Procedural Issues

Procedural Background

In Mr Hylton’s claim form of 10 February 2026, the decision reviewed is said to be dated 22 January 2026, and described as:

“The Defendant’s continuing refusal, confirmed by letter dated 22 January 2026, to provide interim care and support pending reassessment, despite an admitted prior eligibility decision under the Care Act 2014 and ongoing unmet needs.

The Defendant’s admitted failure to implement the 2021 eligibility outcome, where services were not provided and the case was closed.

The Defendant’s failure to arrange independent advocacy pursuant

to sections 67–68 of the Care Act 2014.”

The remedy sought at Section 8 was:

“A mandatory order requiring the Defendant to make immediate

interim care and support provision pending lawful reassessment.

Alternatively, an order requiring the Defendant to make a lawful

interim decision on interim provision forthwith.

A mandatory order requiring the Defendant to arrange independent

advocacy pursuant to sections 67–68 Care Act 2014.

A declaration that the Defendant’s refusal/failure to provide interim

support pending reassessment is unlawful.”

The Grounds were:

“Ground 1 – Breach of Care Act 2014 s.19(3) (interim duty)

4.1

Where it appears that an adult may have needs which meet the eligibility criteria, the authority must take steps to meet needs pending completion of assessment/review. The Defendant’s stated position that it is unable to provide care and support without first reassessing is unlawful on these facts.

Ground 2 – Unlawful fettering of discretion / irrationality

4.2

The Defendant has treated reassessment as a condition precedent to any support, without addressing bridging provision and without giving lawful reasons for withholding interim support.

Ground 3 – Failure to discharge advocacy duties (Care Act 2014 ss.67–68)

4.3

The Defendant has not arranged independent advocacy notwithstanding recorded substantial difficulties participating in the assessment process.

Ground 4 – Equality Act 2010 / public law fairness / Convention rights

4.4

The Defendant’s approach risks failure to make reasonable adjustments for disability and engages Article 8 ECHR.”

Urgent interim relief, and expedition, were sought on the basis that Mr Hylton’s needs were ongoing and unmet and the timetable before the Ombudsman would be lengthy. Medway takes no point that judicial review should not be granted because there was an available alternative remedy.

By order of 12 February 2026, Obi J set short deadlines for Medway to “respond” by 23 February, and for a reply, and ordered that the papers be referred to a judge immediately thereafter for consideration of permission.

On 23 February, Medway responded by a letter from Vicky Nutley, Head of Legal Services, arguing that Mr Hylton’s application is premature, because the assessment process was underway.

Medway appears not to have filed an acknowledgment of service in non-compliance with CPR 54.8. Medway says that it understood the letter of 23 February as substituting for an acknowledgment of service. That is not technically correct, but the substance of its function was for the most part performed. Mr Hylton did not contend that Medway should not be heard under CPR 54.9. That would be a disproportionate consequence. As necessary I regularise any non-compliance in this regard under CPR 3.10.

By order of 11 March 2026, Aidan Eardley KC sitting as a deputy: (1) refused the application for interim relief; (2) granted permission on all grounds; (3) directed that “a degree of expedition” was appropriate.

Mr Eardley KC made procedural directions including: (1) Medway should file Detailed Grounds and written evidence within 21 days, although Medway could file a document stating its Summary Grounds should stand as Detailed Grounds (§5(b)); (2) the parties must agree the hearing bundle; (3) deadlines for skeleton arguments, and (4) directions as to the mutual preparation of an authorities bundle. Instead of Detailed Grounds Medway provided Amended Summary Grounds.

Mr Hylton filed his Skeleton on 11 May in time, and pre-hearing supplemental notes on 19 and 22 May 2026, which Medway did not object to. Medway’s skeleton should have been filed on 18 May but was not provided until the afternoon of 21 May, the day before the hearing, together with witness evidence from Mr Philip Reid. Medway applied for extensions of time for the skeleton and statement (the “Extension Application”).

The Extension Application explained: (1) the statement was filed to bring the Court up to date and (2) the skeleton was late due to a delay in receiving instructions. Medway’s Skeleton (a) added the Head of Service was on a training course and (b) relied on “the developing matters”. Medway accepted a formal application for relief from sanctions had not been made, but asked that this be deemed part of the Extension Application.

After the hearing, without invitation, Mr Hylton filed a further post-hearing supplemental note of 27 May 2026 making a new claim for backdating.

It was apparent the parties’ submissions were incomplete, and it was also necessary fairly to address Medway’s late evidence and Mr Hylton’s post-hearing note. On 4 June I sent the parties a set of questions on which I required targeted further submissions, and invited Mr Hylton to respond to Medway’s late evidence. Useful short responses were provided. These revealed that Mr Reid’s evidence is incomplete and in tension with the documentary record on material points.

Medway’s Procedural Non-Compliance

Medway’s procedural non-compliance has been problematic.

Where the claimant is a litigant in person, it is particularly important that the public body files its documents a timely fashion, and co-operates with the claimant so that the papers before the Court are properly presented.

Medway also did not comply with the directions as to bundles. Mr Hylton had to prepare the bundles himself. It is no criticism of him to say that the bundles were defective. This is a task Medway’s lawyers should have co-operated with him to perform. The bundles did not comply with Part 21 of the Administrative Court Guide. Key documents were missed out, others were unnecessary or irrelevant, there was extensive duplication; and documents which were included were hard to find. The bundles were voluminous but there was no core bundle. There was no authorities bundle.

Medway’s late skeleton and late evidence were also a problem. The excuses that this is a developing matter and key personnel were on a course, are not good answers. Medway should have filed evidence in time, and updated it as necessary, and arranged to ensure that instructions could be obtained.

Medway’s non-compliance with the deadlines for evidence and skeleton meant Mr Hylton had no opportunity before the hearing to file reply evidence as the rules permit, nor to address Medway’s evidence in his skeleton, and little time to think about what Medway was saying.

All this was potentially unfair, in particular for a litigant in person with care needs. Mr Hylton’s written documents and oral submissions before me were conducted intelligently and effectively notwithstanding his care needs. But he should not have been put in this position.

I am conscious of the demands on resource-limited local authorities, but Medway’s approach reveals an insufficient focus on Mr Hylton’s case

No adjournment

In the light of this, I asked Mr Hylton at the start whether he wanted an adjournment. He said he did not. It was undesirable to adjourn the hearing if this could be avoided, given the evidence of urgency, the partial expedition, and the waste of cost and time that would result.

I decided that the hearing should go forward, but noted I might not be able to decide all issues, and would consider how to proceed in the course of writing my judgment. In addition, to ensure fairness, during the hearing I drew Mr Hylton’s attention to key matters arising out of Medway’s late documents and invited him to address them, and then by my directions of 4 June ensured that Mr Hylton had a further opportunity to respond.

Extension Application

Applying the Denton criteria I regard Medway’s breaches in filing its statement and skeleton late as significant, nor do I think that the reasons for the default are good answers, for the reasons above. Nevertheless, although it is a close call, I do not think it is appropriate to exclude them. Little purpose would be served by excluding the skeleton given I had read it. Further, my post hearing directions enabled Mr Hylton to respond to the statement. In the circumstances, in a public law case, I do not think it would be proportionate to exclude the skeleton or statement, subject to two points.

Those are (1) I disregard those passages in the statement which go beyond the documents and are critical of Mr Hylton’s conduct (it is not, in any event, necessary to resolve those issues); (2) issues arise as to Mr Reid’s ex post facto rationalisation of the decisions at §11 of the statement, which I address below.

Consequently, I allow the Extension Application, with costs reserved. But Medway should not assume this means there is licence to adduce late material in this way. On another occasion it may find itself shut out. There may also be cost consequences for its conduct.

The Care Act 2014 creates a comprehensive framework for social care.

Section 1(1) provides: “The general duty of a local authority, in exercising a function under this Part in the case of an individual, is to promote that individual's well-being.” Well-being is expanded on in s. 1(2).

Under s. 1(3), in exercising a function under the Act, a local authority:

At the heart of the Act is the “Needs Assessment”. By section 9(1):

By s. 9(4), a needs assessment “must include an assessment of”: “(a) the impact of the adult's needs for care and support on the matters specified in section 1(2), (b) the outcomes that the adult wishes to achieve in day-to-day life, and (c) whether, and if so to what extent, the provision of care and support could contribute to the achievement of those outcomes.” By s. 9(5) The authority “must involve— the adult”.

However, by section 11, if the adult refuses the needs assessment, the local authority is not required to carry it out, and s. 9(1) does not apply, unless the adult lacks capacity to refuse the assessment, or “the adult is experiencing, or is at risk of, abuse or neglect”.

By s.12(3), a written record of the assessment must be provided.

Further provision is made in the Care and Support (Assessment) Regulations 2014. These explain, in particular, that the assessment must be appropriate and proportionate and that the individual should be able to participate as effectively as possible (see Regulation 3).

Once the assessment has been performed, section 13 of the Act provides:

The eligibility criteria are expanded on in the Care and Support (Eligibility Criteria) Regulations 2015, which provide in particular:

Section 14(1) allows a local authority to make a charge for meeting needs subject to certain conditions. Section 17 provides that where a local authority, which has made an eligibility determination under s. 13(1), thinks that if it were to meet that adult’s needs for care and support, it would charge under s. 14(1), it must make a financial assessment.

By the Care and Support (Charging and Assessment of Resources) Regulations 2014, Regulation 10, a financial assessment is deemed to have been carried out in certain cases, even if no financial assessment has actually been done. This usually requires the adult’s consent.

Section 18 then provides:

So if the local authority has determined the adult has an eligible need, then subject to satisfaction of the financial conditions, it must meet that need.

If the authority is satisfied that it is not required to meet the person’s needs, it has a discretionary power to meet needs under section 19(1).

Section 19(3) also creates a power to meet needs in a situation of urgency. I will return to it after setting out the rest of the statutory structure.

Under s. 24, if a local authority is required to meet needs under s. 18, it must “prepare a care and support plan” and “tell the adult which (if any) of the needs that it is going to meet may be met by direct payments”.

By s. 25(1), a Care and Support plan “specifies the needs identified by the needs assessment”; and “whether, and if so to what extent, the needs meet the eligibility criteria”; “specifies the needs the local authority is going to meet and how it is going to meet them” and “includes the personal budget for the adult concerned”. By s. 25(2), where some needs are to be met by direct payments, the plan must specify “the needs which are to be so met” and “the amount and frequency of the direct payments”.

Sections 26 provides the personal budget will state the costs of meeting the needs which the authority is required or decides to meet, and how much the adult and local authority must each pay to meet them.

Section 27 provides:

As to direct payments, s. 31 relevantly provides:

Thus, any obligation to make direct payments under s. 31(2) first requires a personal budget and is also subject to conditions which include that the local authority is “satisfied” that direct payments are appropriate.

The Care and Support (Direct Payments) Regulations 2014, Regulation 7, provide for reviews of direct payments on a regular basis, and in any event whenever the local authority considers they are no longer appropriate. The local authority must take all reasonable steps to reach agreement with the adult concerned as to the result of the review.

Section 19(3) provides:

Consequently, s. 19(3) creates a discretionary power to meet needs for care and support if the needs are thought by it to be urgent, and without any need for a prior needs assessment or financial assessment.

Mr Hylton has been involved in medical treatment and consideration of his mental health difficulties in 2020 and thereafter. There is a difference of view as to what those difficulties are, and what any diagnosis covers. He has asserted his conditions include PTSD, Social Anxiety, ADHD, Suspected Autistic Spectrum disorder, Learning Disability, Bipolar Manic Depression and Interpersonal Sensitivity (see e.g. email of 13 December 2021). I do not need to make findings on the details of those difficulties.

2021 Assessment Processes

There were assessment and eligibility processes in late 2021 and January-February 2022, which I will refer to as the “2021 Assessment Processes”. The documentation is incomplete. I asked further questions and received answers which did not resolve all issues, but did expose that Mr Reid’s statement may be inaccurate and is anyway in tension with the documents. I will reach such conclusions as are possible on the material available.

Reid §5 says that by November 2021, an assessment decided Mr Hylton has eligible; and a Care Plan was agreed in December 2021 proposing support via direct payments. This is not supported by the documents.

An unsigned document called “Conversation 3” dated 11 November 2021 records that Mr Hylton’s care and support needs were assessed and stated his needs were eligible. These needs related to: (1) managing and maintaining nutrition; (2) maintaining personal hygiene; (3) being appropriately clothed; (4) maintaining a habitable home environment; (5) making use of necessary services or facilities in the local community.

“Conversation 3” recommended (1) a referral for Direct Payment to continue funding the homecare support he had arranged; (2) Referral to Imago for help to apply for suitable Independent Living Accommodation in Medway; (3) a referral to the GP. It proposed a: “Proposed Direct Payment Care Package: 1.5-hour daily Monday to Friday: to monitor and prompt personal care, prompt, and assist with planning and preparing meals, help shopping for the day or the week.Hours per week 10.5.” A “Total Weekly Indicative Budget” was recorded as £290 per week.

There is another unsigned document entitled “My Plan” purportedly also dated 11 November 2021, but quite possibly from later, which is inconsistent with “Conversation 3”. It records rejections of eligibility. It says Mr Hylton’s GP was unable to corroborate the mental conditions he claims. There is no recommendation of direct payments. Instead of support, it proposes Mr Hylton consults with his GP for help with managing his mental health problem and for therapeutic support and referral to the mental health team. This may evidence a later revision of Medway’s approach.

There is no record of any personal budget, and it appears there was none.

Although Mr Reid’s statement said there a Care Plan of 6 December 2021 proposing direct payments, no documentation of this has been located.

On 6 December 2021, a direct payment referral was made recording the same eligible needs as Conversation 3, except for §5. The reason for the difference is unclear. It was proposed that there would be an “initial visit and set up”. However, the direct payment processes were not completed, and so Medway never made a final decision on direct payment.

There is a document recording a Financial Assessment Referral dated 6 December 2021. But it is unclear whether this ever actually happened.

Context was given by communications Medway provided after the hearing, which suggest that Mr Reid’s evidence was incorrect. They appear to show as follows, although I make no final findings:

From these exchanges, and the later message of 23 February 2022 (see below), it appears plausible that no needs assessment or eligibility determination was fully completed, and there was no Care Plan of 6 December 2021 proposing direct payments. It is possible that later rethinking is summarised in “My Plan”. However, since (1) these points are inconsistent with Mr Reid’s statement as well as recent positions taken by Medway (e.g. on 26 November 2025 and 22 January 2026 as discussed below), and (2) the documents are incomplete, I make no final findings.

The care sought was it seems of kind for which Medway would charge, so that if it were to meet some of Mr Hylton’s needs, it would charge him subject to a financial assessment, pursuant to s. 14(1) and s. 17. A financial assessment was required. But no financial assessment was ever concluded.

Closure in February 2022

On 2 February 2022, Mr Jarvis wrote to say that he would be closing Mr Hylton’s case, subject to further information from the GP.

There is an email dated 7 February 2022 from Kenneth Jarvis of Medway recording his reasons for closing Mr Hylton’s case. At this point the closure was stated unconditionally. The reasons were essentially a lack of medical evidence to prove his mental health conditions.

However, Mr Reid’s statement (§6) states this was due to an administrative error as relevant medical evidence had been received but not yet uploaded.

On 23 February 2022 a Medway internal note records that the Direct Payment Application was cancelled.

Mr Hylton requested an explanation, and on 23 February 2022, Samantha Solomon of Medway wrote to Mr Hylton to say that (1) although Mr Jarvis had “completed a social care assessment” on 11 January, further medical information had been requested; (2) Mr Hylton’s GP had confirmed that he did not have a diagnosis of PTSD and certain other conditions, but did have a diagnosis of “mixed and anxiety and depression” (sic). (3) She also said when Mr Jarvis required additional information regarding carers, this was not provided, and concluded that (4) “in order for us to make a decision as to whether you have eligible care and support needs we do require you to engage fully in the assessment process”. (5) As to direct payments, she said that he understood Mr Jarvis had discussed having care and support provided in the form of direct payments on the basis that Mr Hylton could provide additional evidence to support the information which he had already provided, but that he had been unable to do this. She concluded that Mr Jarvis was happy to revisit to discuss alternative forms of support.

Again, this is consistent with Medway never having completed a final needs assessment under s. 9(1) or eligibility determination under s. 13(1).

In any event, even if any final needs assessment was made and eligibility determination reached in November-December 2021, I conclude (as I explain below) that Medway’s messages of December 2021-February 2022 (the “December 2021-February 2022 Closure/Revision Decisions”) were or demonstrate, in substance, decisions to revise, revoke or terminate any prior assessment or eligibility decision which had been reached, and any consequential legal processes.

Further Engagement in 2022-2023

On 8 August 2022, a Medway “Short Contact” Form states Mr Hylton was requesting the previous processes be revived and direct payments backdated. Medway proposed to proceed with a “request for a case to be allocated for SH to have another assessment/have his previous assessment reviewed” This went nowhere after a failure to arrange a new assessment.

There were apparently difficulties in communication between Mr Hylton and Medway and according to the electronic case notes on 6 July 2023 Medway again closed his case “as advised during supervision”. There is no record of this being communicated to Mr Hylton in writing.

2025 Contact

According to Mr Reid’s statement, contact was re-established with Mr Hylton in July-September 2025 and steps taken towards a new assessment.

On 22 October 2025, social workers from Medway visited Mr Hylton. According to Mr Reid’s statement, the assessment did not proceed successfully, but I do not need to address why.

By email of 23 October 2025 at 12:02 Mr Hylton requested an “urgent statutory review and reinstatement of my Care and Support Plan”, described as a request for review under s. 27 of the Act, and seeking the direct payments proposed in Conversation 3.

At 12:12, Mr Hylton also made a request for interim support under s. 19(3). He sought 10.5 hours of funded home care support “As per the 2021 Assessment Recommendation”, and “Direct Payments or commissioned care agency support to cover those hours” and “Reimbursement of reasonable self-funded care costs already incurred since2021”.

On 28 October, without specific reference to s. 19(3), Carla Moody on behalf of Medway proposed an “enablement package of care” consisting of two visits per day, to prompt and support with personal care and nutrition. The package was proposed to “support your independence while ensuring your essential needs were met”, and on the basis that “At the end of the enablement period, we will conduct a review to assess its effectiveness and determine whether any adjustments are required.”

Mr Hylton emailed on 29 October to say that this package of care was inappropriate as he had a regular carer who assisted him with the tasks the proposed calls describe, and that it would do harm by re-triggering past trauma. He said that what he required and was entitled to was reinstatement of the financial proposals of 2021 to pay for his existing carer arrangement. He asked for immediate reinstatement of direct payments “pending any review”. He asked for his email to “be treated as a formal representation under the Care Act 2014” and reserved his right to escalate the matter through the Complaints Procedure and if necessary to the Ombudsman.

On 30 October, Carla Moody responded to re-affirm the enablement package Medway were offering. She said that during the enablement period Medway would review the support required. She did not engage with Mr Hylton’s essential points, that (i) the package was inappropriate as what was required was to fund the existing care and (ii) he was entitled to care under the 2021 proposals. Nor did she clearly engage with the point that Mr Hylton was making two requests, one for reinstatement of the 2021 package as a final Care Plan, but the other for interim support in the meanwhile.

On 11 November 2025, Carla Moody for Medway wrote to say that on 28 October “an enablement package of care was offered to help assess your care needs … as the enablement package has not been accepted, and I am therefore unable to carry out the assessment, I will now proceed with closing this case.” However, in the documents, the enablement package had not been presented as the only means of assessment.

An internal document of 27 November 2025 explains the decision to close Mr Hylton’s case. It states Mr Hylton had declined the enablement package of care twice, stating he wanted direct payment of 10.5 hours. The reasons for closure were: “No longer wishes to participate in the assessment/receive services”. However, the documents instead show Mr Hylton had rejected the proposed enablement package saying that it was inappropriate and, on 29 October, had asked for the direct payments “pending any review”. An assessment could have been conducted without an enablement package.

It is not necessary to reach decisions on this purported closure because Medway has not treated it as definitive and the case has been re-opened.

On 26 November 2025, in response to Mr Hylton’s complaint of 29 October, Yasmin Vaughan of Medway wrote in response to the “outcome of your Care Act assessment and the decision made in November 2021 concerning your direct payment”. She stated that “regarding your direct payment, unfortunately, as the service has been closed since November 2021, we are unable to reinstate your previous package of care… however, a member of the early help and prevention team will contact you shortly to arrange an assessment of your care and support needs. As part of this assessment we can discuss the option of referring you for a care act advocate. Once the assessment is complete and we have reviewed your care and support needs under the Care Act 2014, if you are found eligible, we will discuss all available options to meet your identified needs.” It is not clear what Ms Vaughan meant by “the service” having been closed since November 2021. This decision does not contain any clear focus on Mr Hylton’s request for interim support under s. 19(3).

Ms Vaughan referred to a 2021 assessment and a decision as to direct payments, and “your previous package of care”, although as discussed the documents from 2021 do not show these were completed.

December 2025 Complaint to 22 January Decision

On 1 December 2025, Mr Hylton sent documents to Medway including a Stage 2 Escalation Letter. These made various allegations including unlawful withdrawal of his long-term support, asked Medway to confirm the 2021 eligibility decision remained in force, made a claim for interim support, required back payments from 2021 to date, requested an advocate, and referred to “clear clinical evidence of risk, deterioration and retraumatisation.”

On 13 January, Mr Hylton noted his complaint had been escalated. In the meantime, and pending completion of any further assessment, review or complaint outcome, he requested interim care and support under s. 19(3).

On 22 January 2026, Kam Chatha for Medway gave the second stage escalation decision, explaining Medway was responding to the complaint raised on 1 December regarding: “the outcome of your Care Act Assessment and the decision made in November 2021 concerning your direct payment”. Medway said: “an assessment of your care and support needs was completed in 2021. … the allocated worker at the time assessed you to be eligible under the Care Act 2014, however it appears that services were not provided and the case was closed.” Medway then explained: “As Eligibility under the Care Act is not static; it must be reassessed in accordance with Sections 13 and 27 of the Act to ensure that the provision of care and support accurately reflects the individual’s current needs and circumstances therefore we are unable to provide care and support without first reassessing your needs. To promptly support in assessing your current care and support needs I have allocated your case to Ishola Makanju (Senior Social Worker) who will contact you and make arrangements to revisit the assessment that was undertaken and complete a Care Act assessment which captures your current situation.”.

With regard to an Advocate, it was said: “In relation to your request for an Advocate, as part of the assessment Ishola can make a referral on your behalf for an Advocate who will arrange to meet with you. Please do advise Ishola if you consent for the referral to be made.”

Medway in their submissions and evidence have treated this as its essential decision in response to Mr Hylton’s request for interim support. However, as with Medway’s response of 26 November 2025, it does not directly confront Mr Hylton’s request for interim relief as a separate matter.

Again, Kam Chatha’s decision accepts there was a completed Care Act assessment, eligibility determination, and decision on direct payments of 2021, although the documents from 2021 do not show this. It may be, although do not decide, that Medway’s institutional memory was in error.

Mr Hylton had complained to the Ombudsman, and received a response saying the complaint was under way on 28 January. I have not been informed of what, if anything, happened to the Ombudsman complaint.

Events post 22 January Decision

On 30 January 2026, Medway reached out to arrange an assessment. They sought consent to refer Mr Hylton for advocacy services for the assessment. On 2 February, Mr Hylton consented to advocacy services. Mr Ian Maxey was duly appointed as Mr Hylton’s independent advocate.

On 5 February, Mr Hylton wrote again seeking interim care and support, pending completion of the reassessment. He explained that: “I am a vulnerable adult with ongoing mental health and functional impairments. The absence of care and support during this period is causing practical difficulty and distress. The reassessment process, while necessary, does not remove theneed to address current and urgent needs.” He explained that “In these circumstances, the Council has the power and, in practice, the duty under the Care Act 2014 to meet needs on an interim basis pending lawful reassessment, including where there is dispute or delay. I have previously requested interim provision, and I now renew that request ….”

On 10 February he wrote to say that “Medway Council has not responded to a live request concerning interim provision under section 19(3) of the Care Act 2014, which arises independently of the ongoing complaints ...”, and said that if a clear answer was not received by 16 February he would proceed on the basis that “interim support was refused by default.” The Claim Form was also issued and sealed on 10 February.

On 11 February Mr Hylton again renewed the request for “interim care/support (or interim direct payment/commissioned support)”.

On 19 February 2026 it seems an assessment in person was attempted and failed. It is not necessary to address why.

On 27 February Mr Hylton again renewed the request for interim care and support pending completion of the reassessment and any subsequent care planning. He mentioned his difficulties and explained that without structured support there was a “real risk of deterioration”. He noted that assistance from a friend was ad hoc, not guaranteed, and insufficient.

On 2 March Mr Hylton again wrote to say: “I note I have not received confirmation of any s.19(3) interim decision. Please confirm whether a. decision has been made and provide reasons.”

Mr Hylton, therefore, was proceeding on the basis that there had been no clear reasoned decision on his request for interim support.

On 6 March Mr Hylton wrote to say he understood following a call that: “No interim support is currently in place. MIST support has been discussed but no referral has yet been made. A Care Needs Assessment is being arranged, potentially for next week. As explained during the call, I am currently struggling with self-neglect and deterioration in my wellbeing. Given this situation, I would be grateful if the council could confirm: 1. Whether interim support will be provided pending assessment. 2. The confirmed date and format of the Care Needs Assessment.” MIST refers to the Medway Intensive Support Team.

On 11 March 2026, Aidan Eardley KC gave permission to proceed.

On 18 March 2026, Ishola Mankaju for Medway wrote to respond to the request for interim support, saying: “I am writing to you regarding your request for interim support. We can offer interim support through MIST (floating support/Personal Assistant) and a Reablement Package of care for up to six weeks. Please let me know which option you prefer so I can begin processing.” After the message of 22 January on which Medway primarily relies, this is Medway’s clearest decision on the s. 19(3) request. But there was no reasoning engaging with Mr Hylton’s previous points, nor specifically with s. 19(3).

On 18 March, in response to a request from Mr Hylton of 16 March, the Council also responded to say that specialist psychiatric assessment was not something they could arrange. It was something for the NHS to arrange.

On 19 March 2026, Mr Maxey, as Mr Hylton’s advocate, wrote with regard to the forthcoming assessment. His questions included whether specialist psychiatric assessment and occupational therapy could be included as part of the assessment process. On interim support, he asked: “In regards to the offer of interim care support via the MIST Team (Medway Intensive Support Team), Sean would also like clear confirmation whether the MIST Team is intended to act as interim support pending the assessment, specifically under section 19(3) of the Care Act 2014; what level of support will be provided and, whether any funding will be put in place.”

On 19 March Mr Hylton wrote again about interim support. He noted Medway’s offer of support through MIST and the re-ablement package but confirmed his preference for support from his trusted person, Marlon King, funded by direct payment. In case direct payment was not available, he asked for information as to MIST and the re-ablement package. He also stated “I also require confirmation that any interim support offered is provided on a "without prejudice" basis meaning it does not affect my position in the judicial review that the 2021 assessment (10.5hours/week, £290/week) remains the lawful baseline pending reassessment.”

He also criticised the refusal to arrange a psychiatric assessment saying this should be part of the assessment process and noted that there had been no response on the Occupational Therapy assessment. He made clear that the responses to his requests would be raised in the judicial review proceedings.

On 15 May 2026, Philip Reid who had been appointed as Mr Hylton’s social worker, wrote about the forthcoming assessment, seeking to engage with Mr Hylton in positive terms. He noted he would take into account Mr Hylton’s concerns about communication.

The assessment was arranged for 21 May (the day before the hearing of this claim) but failed to proceed because Mr Maxey, Mr Hylton’s advocate, was unwell. Medway do not criticise Mr Hylton in this regard.

Mr Hylton has stated he is willing to attend a re-arranged assessment on proper terms and specifically if and when Mr Maxey is available. Mr Reid’s statement holds Medway out as wishing to engage positively in the assessment process in order to meet Mr Hylton’s needs.

I have not been informed of any material further steps towards completing the assessment since 21 May nor of any reasons why this has not happened. It is possible things are in suspense pending this judgment.

It is no criticism of Mr Hylton, who is not a lawyer, to note that his documents are non-standard and it is not always easy to identify the claims made. However, proper procedure imposes discipline on what is treated as a claim which a defendant must meet. Claims must be adequately pleaded; and CPR 54.5(1) requires that “The Claim form must be filed (a) promptly; and (b) in any event not later than 3 months after the grounds to make the claim first arose.”. There is a discretionary power to extend time, but no such application was made. Further, CPR 54.4 requires permission from the Court to proceed with a claim for judicial review.

In addition, it is a basic principle of public law that unchallenged decisions or decisions which are not challenged within the scope of a judicial review, or can no longer be challenged, or as to which permission to challenge is refused, are presumed to be valid for the purposes of a judicial review challenge to other decisions, even if in abstract they might have been unlawful. See De Smith on Judicial Review (9^th ed. Online Version), §4.66; H v EssexCounty Council [2009] EWCA Civ 1504, [11-12]; R (Majera) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] AC 461, [29].

It is therefore necessary to identify those claims which are within the scope of the claim; and the main arguments and complaints which are not.

Complaints as to the Assessment

Mr Hylton’s contentions as to what should happen in the forthcoming assessment are not pleaded. They are not within his Claim Form or Grounds. Thus, they are not within the claim for which permission was given. They are also in substance premature. The assessment has not occurred. Medway through Mr Reid has also made clear Medway’s desire to engage in a full assessment seeking properly to assess Mr Hylton’s needs.

Specifically, complaints as to the need for a psychiatric assessment and occupational therapy within the assessment, are not within the claim.

Mr Hylton also asserted a claim for a mandatory order requiring that the assessment be conducted lawfully. This is not in his Claim Form or Grounds. It was to some extent mentioned in the permission papers, in a document entitled “Relief Sought (Interim and Directions)” of 26 February 2026. However, this was at most addressing interim relief, and so cannot expand the claim for final relief. Mr Eardley KC refused interim relief and there has been no renewal of applications for interim relief.

If, therefore, Mr Hylton has valid complaints about the proposed assessment process, they are to be pursued separately.

Housing Related Matters

The papers contain certain complaints as to housing provision. These are not within the claim for which permission has been granted. This is in effect accepted in §61 of Mr Hylton’s skeleton. Medway has in any event accepted that the housing context will form part of the assessment.

Claims as to Interim Support

Instead, the real claim pleaded is a challenge to the validity of Medway’s decisions as to interim support. In that regard, Medway said only the decision of 22 January 2026 needs to be addressed. But there are two other phases: (1) consideration of interim support in October-November 2025, culminating in the decision of 26 November; (2) further consideration of interim support in February-March 2026 and the decision of 18 March.

Medway is wrong to say that only the decision of 22 January 2026 is challenged. The decision challenged is the “continuing refusal, confirmed by letter dated 22 January 2026 …” (§3.1).

This includes a challenge to the prior decisions on interim support leading up to 22 January 2026, in particular the decision of November 2025. Indeed, the decision of 22 January 2026, which does not focus clearly on interim support, cannot be understood independent of the prior exchanges culminating in the decision of 26 November 2025. Further, the permission documents included parts of the October-November 2025 exchanges; and Mr Hylton addressed them at Reply §§19-22. Mr Eardley KC would have been considering them together with the 22 January decision as a whole.

As to the subsequent phase, from 5 February, and in particular the decision of 18 March, there are arguments against its inclusion. It is after the claim form and Mr Eardley KC’s decision. The claim form focusses on the decision of 22 January as something which “confirms” the refusal.

Nevertheless, this subsequent phase is capable of falling within the claim form’s language of a “continuing refusal”. In addition, some of the February requests for support, and some post-22 January evidence of continuing deterioration (see below) were before Mr Eardley KC when giving permission. Mr Hylton’s CPR 54.8A reply addressed continuing refusals. Further, some the continuing issues are addressed in Mr Eardley KC’s reasoning in his order in relation to interim relief.

The Court generally discourages “rolling” judicial review (R (Dolan) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2021] 1 WLR 2326, [118]). However, in R (Raja) v Redbridge DC [2020] EWHC 1456 (Admin), a claim to review a decision under s. 19(3) of the Care Act was held to embrace continuing decision making after the claim form up to the date of the hearing. Fordham J explained:

As in Raja, here we have a continuing statutory function, indeed the same one; a continuing request for interim support; a continuing refusal of that request, and a consistent central issue, namely whether that refusal was reasonable and properly reasoned. Also as in Raja I have to consider mandatory relief as at the date of the order I am asked to grant.

However, here, the parties are not agreed that the challenge could cover post-22 January matters, and this case was not conducted in a disciplined manner. I must consider whether there is a danger that treating the challenge as attacking post-claim form decisions as well could lead to unfairness, if Medway has not sufficiently focussed on the later decisions.

In my view, however, it is appropriate, and consistent with the overriding objective, to regard the scope of the claim as covering the alleged continuing failure culminating in the 18 March 2026 decision, and this will not be unfair to Medway, in the light of the following.

First, for the reasons above, the wording of the claim form and the matters before Mr Eardley KC were capable of covering continuing failure. The issues relating to the 22 January decision, the later continuing failure, and the 18 March decision are intertwined. Further, the 22 January decision does not clearly address interim support, so Medway’s position can only be fully understood by reading it with what came after as well as before.

Second, Medway will not be unfairly prejudiced. Its evidence covers the 18 March decision, and it is unlikely, given its general approach, that it would have produced evidence from the actual decision maker of that decision in any event. Further, though Medway argued in its skeleton the only challenge should be treated as to the 22 January decision, it was always apparent that Mr Hylton was challenging the continuing refusal. Medway’s Summary Grounds (§8) rely on offers of interim support including MIST from after 22 January, and Medway’s arguments at the hearing included that lacunae in the 22 January decision could completed by what came after, and positively relied on the later offers of MIST and re-ablement.

Third, I do not see how the 22 January decision could be sensibly and pragmatically addressed independent of the 18 March decision. The issues are intertwined. Further, addressing mandatory relief will require engaging with the 18 March decision. Excluding the 18 March decision would therefore lead a further hearing inconsistent with the partial expedition granted. It would be disproportionate to have a further hearing.

Consequently, it is consistent with the overriding objective for all issues on interim support to be heard together. The claim for which permission has been granted, and which it is appropriate for me to decide, covers the November 2025 decisions on interim support, the 22 January 2026 Decision, and the 18 March 2026 decision on interim support. I would grant an amendment if formally necessary, but given the “continuing” language of §3.1, this does not appear to be required.

Historic Claims

I also need to resolve whether the claim includes (1) challenges to the December 2021-February 2022 Closure/Revision Decisions; (2) claims as to the alleged non-performance of Medway’s duties under the Care Act in 2021-2022 and later when it failed to follow through with conclusions of “Conversation 3”; (3) a claim for “backdating” of direct payments from early 2022 to now. Together I will call these the “Historic Claims”. Mr Hylton advanced these in various forms. The “backdating” claim needs to be separated into two: (a) an independent claim under alleged duties to pay direct payments from 2021, and (b) a claim for back-dating as relief for the challenge to the current interim support decisions. Medway contended that none of these were within the claim for which permission had been granted.

Although I do not need to decide this, it is likely that all these Historic Claims, would for the purposes of an application for judicial review, likely have been time barred long ago by CPR 54.5(1).

I conclude that the Historic Claims do not fall within the scope of the claim. It is true that §3.1 of the Claim Form, identifying the decisions reviewed, refers to “The Defendant’s admitted failure to implement the 2021 eligibility outcome, where services were not provided and the case was closed.” Medway at one point appeared to accept this wording “can be read” as a claim for review of the Closure/Revision decisions, but went on to clarify its position as being that this part of the Claim Form should read as contending only that the 2025-2026 processes should be based on the 2021 Assessment. In substance, Medway therefore are denying the claim form includes any claim to quash the December 2021-February 2022 Closure/Revision Decisions, or any claim for historic breaches of duty.

Although Mr Hylton disagreed, I think it is correct that this passage of the Claim Form does not bring a challenge to those 2021-2022 Closure/Revision Decisions within the scope of the judicial review, nor does it advance a claim for breach of statutory duty in respect of alleged failure of the assessment processes. The Grounds make no such claims, nor claims as to backdating. Instead, the Grounds are focussed on interim support. But applications for judicial review are centrally defined by grounds: see CPR 54.5(1)(b) and PD 54A §4.2(1)(b). Further, the relief in §8 contains no Historic Claims. So the reasonable reader of the Grounds and relief would not have been likely to think that such claims were being made. The reference to “admitted failures” in §3.1 was instead context to the interim support claims. This is reinforced by the Reply, which treats the 2021-2022 matters as context. Mr Hylton noted the Reply sought a “Liberty to Apply” (§33) but this is not capable of changing the scope of the claim.

Mr Hylton’s non-standard document “Issues for Determination (Permission/Interim)” dated 26 February, filed with his reply, includes a reference to “(1) Continuing Duty/Lawful Discharge:Whether, following the Care Act assessment and support plan dated 11 November 2021 (and the direct payment implementation steps thereafter), the Defendant lawfully discharged its continuing duties under the Care Act 2014 …”. However, in my view this does not change the scope of the claim for which permission was granted. Mr Eardley KC would reasonably have been focussed on the Grounds and relief which do not advance Historic Claims. The grounds identify no basis for such historic unlawfulness. It is unlikely Mr Eardley KC intended to grant permission to proceed with such old Historic Claims, to which he did not refer. No extension of time was sought. Further this document does not advance claims to quash any 2021-2022 closure decisions at all, nor claims for backdating or past payments.

In his post-hearing submissions, Mr Hylton did not in the end contend that his claim included freestanding Historic Claims.

The consequence is that, within the context of this claim for judicial review, the presumption of validity applies to the December 2021-February 2022 Closure/Revision Decisions.

In any event, any such Historic Claims, even if regarded as within the scope of the claim as pleaded, centrally relate to closure and/or revision decisions, and alleged failures to follow through assessment processes, which are now over 4 years ago. Consequently, they would have faced arguments that they were defeated by delay under s. 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act (see below).

I do not address whether the Historic Claims could be brought on some other occasion or in some other forum.

New post-hearing backdating claim

After the hearing, Mr Hylton sent a Post-Hearing Note of 27 May 2026, in which he argued backdating “is a necessary and just element of effective remedy for the continuing breach that was pleaded on Ground 1”. He invited the Court to include within any mandatory order “a requirement that Medway’s reasoned s. 19(3) decision must expressly address and include back-dated Direct Payments from December 2021 or such other date as the Court thinks just”. The attached draft order also included claims for declarations as to invalidity of the closure decisions.

However, the pleaded claim under Ground 1 relates only to alleged breach of s. 19(3) from late 2025. In the light of my conclusions on the scope of the claim, and given the way Mr Hylton advances this new backdating claim, I therefore regard it as advanced only as relief for the claim challenging the interim support decisions under s. 19(3). I address it below.

Decisions as to the Provision of an Independent Advocate

The complaints as to the decisions relating to an independent advocate are within the scope of the claim for which permission was granted.

Mr Hylton argued that Conversation 3 created continuing binding obligations under s. 18; but alternatively that its eligibility decisions (if there were any) and proposals for direct payment created a “baseline” for interim support decisions in 2025-2026. Medway initially accepted Conversation 3 was an assessment, but argued it had “lapsed”, or was “historic”. The initial submissions were incomplete and so my post-hearing submissions sought and received further assistance in this regard.

No Care and Support Obligations arising out of Conversation 3

It has not been made good that the 2021-2022 Assessment Processes triggered any obligations to provide care, and specifically direct payments, as proposed in Conversation 3.

First, the documents summarised at parts E(2)-(3) above suggest that no needs assessment or eligibility determination was completed. In its post-hearing note, Medway was inclined to regard what happened as an “initial needs assessment”, later “flawed” by Mr Hylton’s alleged failure to engage, leading to “termination”, arguing eligibility determination under s. 13(1) was a “continuing duty”. It is not clear what this means, as s. 13(1) envisages a moment of determination of eligibility, of which a written record must be provided under s. 13(2), subject to possible revision later including under s. 27. The more plausible analysis on the documents may be that there never was any completed determination under s. 9(1) or 13(1) (although as noted I reach no final finding). Indeed the “My Plan” document on its face rejects eligibility. Another way of looking at this could be that any initial determinations of 11 November were revised or revoked in December 2021-February 2022, which may what Medway is in substance saying. I address that below.

Second, even if there had been a completed eligibility determination under s. 13(1), it has not been made good that any obligation to provide care under s. 18 ever arose. Since the care was of a kind for which Medway would it seems charge, it seems Medway was obliged to conduct a financial assessment under s. 17. Under s. 19(1)(c) any obligation to provide care would only arise after the conclusion of that financial assessment and (relevantly) a conclusion that Conditions 1 or 2 applied, none of which happened.

The Charging Regulations can permit it to be deemed that a financial assessment has been concluded in certain cases. But under Regs. 10(2)-(3), the conditions would be: (a) Mr Hylton consented to there being no assessment and (b) after that Medway satisfied itself that Mr Hylton’s resources did or did not exceed the financial limit. None of this happened.

Medway oddly argued that Regulation 10(1) was satisfied, which mean would mean there was a deemed assessment that Mr Hylton exceeded the financial limit, although it also argued that s. 18(1)(c) was not satisfied. Mr Hylton understandably did not engage with this technical point but it is clearly wrong. The conditions of Reg 10(1) are that (a) the adult refused a financial assessment or (b) the local authority is unable to carry out a financial assessment because of the adult’s refusal to co-operate, and the local authority nevertheless decides to meet some or all of the adult’s needs for care and support, or for support. There is no basis to think that this is satisfied. No evidence from 2021-2022 shows Mr Hylton refusing, or refusing to cooperate with, a financial assessment. Instead the correspondence shows him chasing up a financial assessment (see e.g. emails of 17 December 2021). Further, Medway did not thereafter decide nevertheless to meet his needs despite any such supposed refusal.

Thus, no financial assessment is deemed to have occurred under Reg. 10 and s. 18(1)(c) is not satisfied by virtue of the operation of Reg. 10.

Instead, although it unclear whether the financial assessment referral was ever fully made, it was clearly necessary. But then the financial assessment process ran into the sand, alongside the February 2022 closure of Mr Hylton’s case. So the relevant processes to trigger any obligation under s. 18 were never completed.

Third, any obligation to make direct payments could only have arisen if there was a personal budget, and the conditions of s. 31 were satisfied, including that Medway was satisfied direct payments were appropriate. Conversation 3 recommended direct payments, and a direct payments referral was made, but the process was not completed, and there was no concluded decision that direct payments were appropriate, nor was there any personal budget before the closure in February 2022. Instead the direct payments referral also ran into the sand. Thus, again, it has not been made good that any obligation to make direct payments was ever triggered.

These failures to trigger care or direct payment obligations occurred due to the breakdown of the 2021 Assessment Processes. Mr Hylton complained that this involved breaches of duty by Medway, as part of his Historic Claims, and I address the relevance of that below.

Termination or Lapse

Further, to the extent any assessment was concluded, and any eligibility determination and direct payment decisions were made, they were terminated, revoked or revised in the December 2021-February 2022 Closure/Revision Decisions.

The February 2022 closure decisions are imperfectly and informally documented, as already discussed. Medway never formally engaged any processes under s. 27 of the Act, for example. But what needs to be resolved is the substantial effect of the communications and decisions of December 2021-February 2022.

The Act does not provide a distinct power to reconsider eligibility decisions, but since s. 25(1)(b) provides that a Care Plan includes decisions on eligibility; and s. 27(2) provides for review of a Care Plan, it must be possible to review eligibility decisions under s. 27(2), as well as under s. 27(4)(a) after a change of circumstances. By implication the same must be possible even if eligibility determinations are not recorded in a Care Plan.

Further, if a prior eligibility determination was not revoked when a person’s case was closed, that could create an incoherent situation in which obligations might continue which the authority had decided not to satisfy.

In my opinion, if there ever was a completed assessment or eligibility determination on or around 11 November 2021-6 December 2021, the record from December 2021-February 2022 must in substance be understood as containing or evidencing decisions to review and/or revoke any such prior assessment and eligibility determination and not just to fail to proceed with any further processes under the Act.

The messages from early December show Medway reviewing needs and eligibility. The messages of 2 and 7 February show the case being closed which impliedly means a rejection of eligibility and any decision on direct payments. Ms Solomon’s message of 23 February clearly shows Medway was no longer accepting the asserted needs or eligibility or the appropriateness of direct payments. Further, although the role of the “My Plan” document is unclear, it may show a later rejection of eligibility.

Complaints about the December 2021-February 2022 Closure/Revision Decisions and alleged failures to complete Care Act processes

Mr Hylton complains as part of his Historic Claims that (1) the December 2021-February 2022 Closure/Revision Decisions were unlawful, because they did not validly engage the processes under the Care Act 2014 or were insufficiently reasoned, and (2) the breakdown of the 2021 Assessment Processes amounted to a breach of Medway’s duties under the Care Act, because Medway should have completed those processes. He points in this regard to the admitted error as to the medical evidence. He argues that if, therefore, care duties did not arise under s. 18 or s. 31, or if any eligibility determination was purportedly terminated, this was due to unlawfulness.

However, whether that is so or not, any such Historic Claims are old, and are not within the scope of the claim for which permission was given, as I have already decided. Consequently, the presumption of validity applies and the December 2021-February 2022 Closure/Revision Decisions must be presumed valid for the purpose of this judicial review, even if in abstract they were flawed decisions or did not properly engage the processes under the Care Act. In the circumstances, it is not necessary for me to engage with whether or not those decisions were justified or flawed when made or whether there were any breaches of duty in these respects at those times.

Further, s.31(6) Senior Courts Act provides that where there has been “undue delay” the court may refuse to grant “any relief sought on the application”. Medway therefore argued that s. 31(6) would have barred any attempt within the context of this claim for judicial review either to quash the December 2021-February 2022 Closure/Revision Decisions or to seek relief as to alleged breaches of duties committed by the failure of the assessment processes. It argued there had been extensive delay, and granting relief would be contrary to good administration. It added institutional memory of such decisions is likely to be lacking, in a context where many care applicants need to be considered. Mr Hylton countered that good administration favoured “a lawful and reasoned resolution of an unresolved Care Act pathway”.

I do not need to resolve this point, and the submissions on it were very limited and no authorities were cited. I therefore do not decide it.

It is sufficient to observe for present purposes that, even if such Historic Claims were within the scope of the claim for which permission was granted (and I have concluded they are not), the arguments that it would be too late to grant relief within the scope of this judicial review as to such old processes appear at first sight to have real pragmatic force. I add that, even if such claims were within the scope of the permission granted, this would likely have been by accident, as I doubt that Mr Eardley KC intended to grant permission for such Historic Claims.

Conclusion on the Effect of the 2021 Assessment Processes

The result is that the framework within which I approach the November 2025-March 2026 decisions on interim support, is that there was no binding decision on eligibility or any such decision was terminated long ago. So any obligations on Medway to meet Mr Hylton’s needs must start afresh.

However, this does not mean that Conversation 3 is irrelevant to the interim support decisions. As I explain below, Mr Hylton is right to say the recommendations expressed in it, or the decisions reached in it (if it reached completed decisions), were relevant considerations which Medway should have taken into account in the 2025-2026 interim support decisions.

The end result makes pragmatic sense. Even if there ever was a completed assessment or positive binding eligibility decision (which is unresolved), Medway are not now bound to implement any old 2021 eligibility decision, which was not treated as in force between February 2022 and late 2025. Nevertheless, Medway have not yet reassessed Mr Hylton in any considered fashion. The decisions of December 2021-February 2022 do not amount to a concluded reasoned reconsideration of Mr Hylton’s needs. So whatever precisely happened in respect of Conversation 3 in 2021-2022, it remains either (a) an assessment that in fact happened (if it was completed), even if not now binding as to eligibility under s. 13(1), or anyway (b) the closest thing available to a considered assessment.

Mr Hylton’s challenge to the decisions as to interim support is focussed on four points: (1) Medway is wrong to refuse interim care and support on the basis that it must first re-assess (Ground 1); (2) its reasoning on interim support is irrational because it does not address “bridging provision”, and (3) it has given no lawful reasons (both Ground 2); (4) claims under the Equality Act and for breach of Article 8 (Ground 3).

Further, (5) Mr Hylton argues the direct payments provided for in the 2021 Assessment are the “baseline”, or the “minimum evidential baseline” or the “sole justifiable response”. The latter was a point he developed at the hearing in the light of Raja [16-17, 52, 57].

I conclude that the interim support decisions of November 2025, 22 January 2026, and 18 March 2026, are invalid and must be quashed, because they (a) were a mis-application of the s. 19(3) power, (b) failed to take into account relevant considerations, and/or (c) were inadequately reasoned.

However, I do not agree that it has been shown that providing direct payments in line with Conversation 3 is the sole justifiable response. Nor do I agree that it has been made good that it is a “baseline” in the sense of a necessary minimum level of support.

Public law grounds of challenge

The local authority’s power to offer or withhold interim support under s. 19(3) is discretionary. Its decision can only be challenged by way of judicial review by making good a ground of challenge allowed by public law.

The established grounds of challenge relevant to Mr Hylton’s claim include: (1) illegality, including misapplication of the statutory power; (2) taking into account irrelevant considerations or failure to take into account relevant considerations; (3) irrationality, in the sense of a decision which no reasonable public authority could reach; (4) inadequacy of reasons.

As Fordham J observed in Raja [16], “the merits are for the defendant as primary decision-maker and the built-in latitude for reasonable evaluative judgments, to be respected by courts, is a very significant one.”

Legality and misapplication of the statutory power

A decision is illegal and can be reviewed if is (non-exhaustively) it is based on a legal error in the construction of the statutory power, or involves a failure to act in accordance with the statutory purpose for which the power was conferred (see De Smith on Judicial Review, §5-002, 5-019, 5-077).

Relevant Considerations

The law on relevant considerations was summarised by Morris J in Davey v Oxfordshire CC [2017] EWHC 354 (Admin) at [51]-[55]. First, the decision maker must take into account factors which are required by law to be taken into account. Second, there are factors which may be taken into account but do not have to be. Third, there are factors which depending on the situation ought to be taken into account. These have been variously described as “relevant” or “clearly relevant” or “so obviously material” to the exercise of the relevant discretion that they ought to have been taken into account. Failure to do so will vitiate the decision.

Adequacy of Reasons

In Davey [59], Morris J held that decisions on social budgets were subject to review for inadequacy of reasons, and the same should apply to decisions under s. 19(3), at least where there is time to give a reasoned decision. In any event, where reasons are given for a decision, they must be adequate.

The standard of adequacy is context-specific. Local authorities approaching their powers under s. 19(3) are not required by administrative law to produce complex formal decisions. As Morris J said in Davey [60] in a related context: “the Courts should be wary of overzealous textual analysis of social care needs assessments carried out by social workers … with a risk of taking them away from front line duties” (citing R (Ireneschild) v Lambeth LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 234, [57], [71]-[72]) and should not be “prescriptive as to the degree of detail”.

Nevertheless, the reasons must be intelligible and adequate; they must enable the reader to understand why the decision was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the principal important controversial issues; although they must refer only the main issues in dispute, not every material consideration. See the classic exposition in South Buckinghamshire DC v Porter [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953, [36].

Operation of s. 19(3)

Section 19(3) provides that the local authority “may meet an adult's needs for care and support which appear to it to be urgent” “without having yet” carried out a needs assessment or financial assessment or made a determination under s. 13(1). As explained in Raja [30], the s. 19(3) power exists even if there is an existing assessment, pending a revised assessment.

Under the Care and Support Statutory Guidance 2025:

The purpose of the s. 19(3) power is thus to address urgent needs before a s. 9 assessment has been made, or a s. 13(1) eligibility determination is reached, or while an assessment is being reviewed under s. 27.

It is inconsistent with the terms and purpose of s. 19(3) for the local authority to approach it on the basis that no interim support will be provided unless an assessment is first carried out.

While a local authority may wish to explore matters with the person in need to determine whether interim support is appropriate, and “assess” the position in that sense, it is inconsistent with the intended operation of s. 19(3) to require a full s. 9(1) assessment before interim support is granted. Indeed, there may be cases where no initial exploration at all should be required, depending on the situation.

Instead, in a situation where a s. 9(1) assessment has not yet occurred or is underway, the local authority must consider whether there are needs which are urgent, and whether it is appropriate to meet them before the s. 9(1) assessment is completed. But it can (at least generally) take into account when the assessment is likely to occur, and any reasons for delay.

Yet if there are thought to be urgent needs, it may be appropriate to meet them before any full s. 9(1) assessment is carried out, and potentially even before any assessment or exploration at all can be carried out.

Evidence of urgent needs

The evidence of urgent needs and deterioration in Mr Hylton’s position falls into two parts; that available before 22 January 2026 and that provided afterwards. Medway argued that it had little or no evidence of urgency before 22 January and that it was entitled to take into account that Mr Hylton had apparently been managing since 2021.

Before 22 January 2026 there was less evidence relevant to urgency. Nevertheless, Mr Hylton’s communications did raise risks of deterioration, in particular in his messages of 1 December 2025.

After 22 January, deterioration is raised in the email of 5 February 2026 and the communications of 6 March. Further, in the legal proceedings, in a “Current Harm Snapshot” of 26 February 2026, Mr Hylton identified urgent needs and a deterioration of his position in relation to daily tasks, hygiene, and leaving the property. Evidence was provided, in particular in the form of (1) a document from Southern Water identifying outstanding charges; (2) a witness statement from Mr Hylton’s carer and friend Marlon King recording deterioration in Mr Hylton’s position and saying that he would have to reduce support from 1 March 2026. It seems Medway had these documents before 18 March. Mr Lawson said they may only have come to the attention of Medway’s legal department as they were not directed to the social workers, but Medway should have been taking account of relevant information provided through both channels.

Subsequently Mr Hylton has also provided a GP letter of 13 March 2026 reporting what Mr Hylton says are his current difficulties. There is also a statement of Charlene Burgess dated 12 March 2026 which records her view of Mr Hylton’s needs, and declines in his position that occurred after she reduced support in 2022. Finally, Medway’s skeleton (§22) also refers to a “draft” report from a Dr Udenze, but this was not provided to me. It is not also clear when the above documents were provided to Medway. (Given the conclusions I have reached, those two gaps do not matter for the purposes of this judgment.)

The decisions on interim support were flawed

Medway adduced no witness statements from the relevant decision makers. In his statement, Mr Reid explained why he did not think the decisions of 22 January were “unreasonable” (§11) and also addressed the later decisions on interim support (§§19, 27). However, Mr Reid was not the relevant decision maker and he does not identify any personal knowledge of how the relevant decisions were made. What he says does not meaningfully elucidate the reasons for the decisions recorded in the documents. In the circumstances his witness evidence on this point is essentially retrospective argument; it is of no real weight to make adequate inadequate reasons, nor in showing the basis of the decision, nor to show that relevant considerations were taken into account (see the summary of the relevant principles in R (United Trade Action Group Ltd) v Transport for London [2021] EWCA Civ 1197; [2022] R.T.R. 2 at [25] (“UTAG”). There was no formal challenge to the admissibility of this part of his evidence, but it has little force.

The decision of 22 January misapplies the statutory power, fails to take into account relevant considerations, and is inadequately reasoned. First, it does not consider whether there are any urgent needs which should appropriately be met before the assessment is completed. Instead, it appears wrongly to pre-condition any support on conclusion of a new s. 9(1) assessment or revision of any earlier assessment. This would, if anything, be borne out by Mr Reid’s statement (to the extent of assistance at all) which argues (§11(d)) that “any support would have required a new assessment”.

In Medway’s Summary Grounds at §7, it is asserted that “it is not accepted that there is sufficient urgencyas the Claimant had been managing for some considerable time and at least since 2021.” However, the 22 January 2022 decision contains no such reasoning. While I accept complex formal reasoning is not required in a s. 19(3) decision, Medway did at least need to consider the question of urgency and whether it justified interim support.

Further, this statement in the Summary Grounds is retrospective argument by Medway’s lawyers. It is unsupported by the contemporary documents from Medway. Nor is it supported by evidence from the decision maker. Nor is it even supported by Mr Reid’s statement, if relevant at all, which says only that Medway were not aware of any changes in Mr Hylton’s situation. But Mr Hylton had raised issues of deterioration, including on 1 December. It is also not the case that the fact that a need has been unmet for years necessarily means there is no urgency to meet it now.

Indeed, Medway never said that Mr Hylton’s needs were not perceived as urgent in October 2025 to March 2026, never said that s. 19(3) was not engaged, and instead had offered and has since re-offered interim support by way of re-ablement packages and MIST. The disagreement has been as to whether this is the right interim support.

Medway’s Summary Grounds also argue that “The Defendant has exercised its discretion to offer a suitable interim solution” (§12). However, the 22 January decision does not appear to be a considered exercise of the s. 19(3) discretion at all, or anyway does not adequately explain its reasons.

Medway’s Summary Grounds also assert, at §8, that direct payments take time to set up. However, if this is advanced as a reason why there could be no urgency justifying Mr Hylton’s preferred solution, it is not a reason identified in any of the decisions, nor is it supported by a witness statement from the decision maker(s), nor even by Mr Reid. It is doubtful that Medway actually rely on this point any more. It is not mentioned in their skeleton argument nor was it relied on at the hearing.

The second main flaw is that the decision ignores the decisions on needs and eligibility reached, or at least initially reached, in the 2021 Assessment Processes and in particular Conversation 3. The 22 January decision states that the case was closed and that eligibility is not static. However, no consideration is given as to whether the fact of and reasoning in Conversation 3 should inform the current decision on interim support. I do not read the 22 January decision as considering how much weight on the facts should be given to the 2021 Assessment Processes, but rather as ruling them out of the equation altogether.

In my view, however, the apparent decisions reached in Conversation 3 2021 are obviously material, and were relevant considerations that should have been taken into account in considering interim support; and anyway the reasoning in respect of them is inadequate. There is of course, as already discussed, an uncertainty on the documents we now have, as to whether Conversation 3 reflects actual completed decisions as to assessment of needs and eligibility. But it does at least reflect the fullest considered assessment of how to meet Mr Hylton’s needs and has never been replaced. Further, Kam Chatha was accepting that Conversation 3 had been an assessment and a decision on eligibility, which reinforced its relevance. Thus, the analysis in Conversation 3 remains relevant, particularly when one of the main bases for the closure of Mr Hylton’s case in 2022 was not a reasoned decision of an absence of need, but (it appears) an erroneous belief that medical documentation not been provided. I do not think Conversation 3’s assessments and recommendations can be properly and rationally be ruled out of account a priori simply because eligibility is not static, or because the previous case was closed, but that is how Kam Chatha’s reasoning deals with it.

However, I am not prejudging in what ways Medway should give consideration to the 2021 Assessment Processes in the future. As already discussed it is unclear what actually happened in them. On any reconsideration, Medway could take into account any more developed understanding of what actually happened.

These flaws are not cured by reading the decision of 22 January 2026 together with the earlier decision of 26 November 2025, and Ms Moody’s offer of 28 October 2025, as Medway contends they should be.

The decision of 26 November shares the same flaws as 22 January. In substance it similarly states that support will be considered after an assessment and gives no express consideration to urgency or interim support. It does add “we are unable to reinstate” the previous package of direct payments cannot be reinstated “as the service has been closed since November 2021”. However, this appears to be considering only final care and support. It is also unclear what it means. It seems unlikely it means that Medway does not ever provide direct payments. Most likely Medway was saying no more than that the previous direct payments proposals were shut down in 2021-2022. If so, again that is not a logical reason why direct payments could not appropriately be used now for interim support, especially when Medway accept the February 2022 closure of the case was at least in part due to an error.

Nor can the decisions of January 2026 and/or November 2025 be saved by reading them together with Ms Moody’s offers of some support on 28 and 30 October 2025:

First, Ms Moody’s offers do not address themselves to the framework of the discretion in s. 19(3). While Ms Moody did state that she was making these offers to deal with Mr Hylton’s “current needs” (see email of 28 October) she does not engage with whether Mr Hylton has urgent needs and if so how to address them pending an assessment. Instead, as Medway’s communications suggest, the enablement package seems to have been regarded at least in large part as a means of assessment. Second, Ms Moody did not engage with the 2021 Assessment Processes. Third, she did not engage with the central point Mr Hylton had made on 29 October, that the enablement package would not deal with his needs as what he required was support to enable him to manage his established carer arrangement and temporary enablement packages would not really assist and instead would harm. This required consideration.

Overall, Ms Moody appears simply to be offering support Medway is content to offer independent of s. 19(3), without considering what is appropriate if s. 19(3) applies.

Finally, Mr Reid argues (§11(b)) that “Whilst Mr Hylton could be considered for interim support, such has been offered between September and November 2025.Where this has been offered it was refused at the time. I do not consider it unreasonable that there was no further offer in January 2026.” But the decisions of November 2025 and the offers of 28-30 October were themselves flawed, for the reasons above. Mr Hylton’s refusal to accept that the offers of 28-30 October were satisfactory cannot itself be a sufficient reason to refuse interim support, or to fail properly to consider it, in January 2026, still less in February-March 2026.

The problems are also not cured the later decision of 18 March 2026, which is also flawed. In it, Ishola Manjaku for Medway simply offers interim support through MIST or a reablement package of care for up to six weeks. There is no further reasoning. There is no engagement with whether there are urgent needs, and if so what if any interim support is appropriate under s. 19(3); no consideration of the 2021 Assessment Processes, and no engagement with Mr Hylton’s central point, that reablement or enablement packages are not appropriate support, both of which were relevant considerations. Nor was there any resiling from the refusal of 22 January.

Further, there was no consideration of the evidence of urgency which Mr Hylton had produced since 22 January, which was by this stage an additional relevant consideration.

A valid reading of this decision is that, as with Ms Moody’s approach in October-November 2025, the 18 March 2026 decision is not actually engaging with what is appropriate support under s. 19(3) at all, but rather simply making an offer of some services which independent of s. 19(3), Medway is willing voluntarily to provide in any event.

Consequently, the 18 March 2026 decision is vitiated for lack of consideration of relevant matters, or in any event for inadequacy of reasons.

A wide range of other complaints by Mr Hylton were made about Medway’s decisions and reasons. Given the conclusions I have reached, it is not necessary to consider all of these.

Medway’s discretion is wide and it is not required to produce lengthy detailed and formal reasons. Nevertheless, standing back, and considering Medway’s engagement with Mr Hylton over the whole period from October 2025, he was entitled to conclude that his requests for interim support had not been adequately considered and the reasons given for their rejection were incomplete.

Fordham J in Raja said the Court in this sort of context will “look to see whether there is a “reasoned decision document … involving the specialist and expert local authority officers conducting a section 19(3) reasoned decision, explaining how they have approached the urgency and the need and the … alternatives, and giving the justification as to why [their] response is the appropriate response …” [50] and said that “it will be the harder for the defendant to resist a reasonableness claim, invoking the built-in latitude applicable to it as the primary decision-maker, when it is unable to point to a document in which someone, having the statutory function entrusted by Parliament, grapples with the key questions and reasons out an adverse response” [51]. Nothing approaching that was provided by Medway here.

However, I do not accept that Conversation 3 provides an obligatory “baseline” or that direct payments are the “sole justifiable response”:

Apart from Conversation 3, no other sufficient reasons were given why direct payments were inherently the sole justifiable response to Mr Hylton’s needs under s. 19(3). Little argument was addressed to this. I do not preclude that this point might have greater force on any reconsideration but it is not made good now.

Not premature or academic or pointless

Medway’s Grounds of Defence, and Ms Nutley’s letter argue that the claim as to the interim support decisions is premature or academic, because the assessment processes are underway. It is true that once a new assessment is concluded, it will overtake any decisions under s. 19(3). However, the assessment has not yet concluded. It is unclear when it will conclude. It is therefore useful to determine the issues on interim relief.

In addition, it is useful to grasp and resolve the respective contentions of Mr Hylton, that the evaluations and proposals of Conversation 3 in one way or another are a necessary “baseline”, and of Medway, that they can be ignored altogether. It appears that the irreconcilability of those respective positions has played a large part in preventing matters moving forwards co-operatively.

It is true that on any reconsideration Medway will have a wide discretion under s. 19(3). But Medway did not argue that relief should be refused under Senior Courts Act 1981 s. 31(2A) on the basis that it was highly likely that the outcome would not be substantially different on any reconsideration and no basis was identified which could enable me to infer that this would be highly likely. As to Mr Reid’s statement: (1) it does not say that the same decision would inevitably or highly likely be reached, and confines itself to saying that he does not think the decision of 22 January was “unreasonable”; (2) it commits the same error as the decision of 11 January, of saying that a new assessment is required before any support (see §11(d)).

It is wholly plausible, although I do not in any way prejudge, that on a proper consideration of s. 19(3), different offers might be made to the offers of 18 March 2026, even if that does not involve direct payments. I should not substitute myself for Medway as the primary decision maker.

In the circumstances I do not accept that granting relief would be premature, or academic, or pointless.

Equality Act and Article 8 EHCR

It is not necessary to consider Mr Hylton’s complaints that Medway’s approach to interim support breaches s. 20 and 149 of the Equality Act.

I have already concluded that Medway’s decisions are vitiated for a failure to consider relevant considerations including whether he had urgent care needs, the issues relating to which cover his claimed disabilities.

Nor does his complaint under Article 8 ECHR add materially to his case when the decisions on interim support will be quashed in any event.

Further, in both cases, these points were mentioned by Mr Hylton in his Grounds without any concrete reasoning nor citation of authority, and they were not pursued in his skeleton argument or at the hearing. No specific reasoning has been advanced to engage either basis which would give them concrete force above the primary grounds. Specifically, no reason was given why either could make direct payments the sole justifiable response.

In the circumstances, these points do not have sufficient particularity to justify being determined, especiallywhere the decisions are being quashed anyway. See CPR PD 54A §4.2(1)(b); R (Talpada) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 841, [69].

The claim for provision of an independent care advocate is now academic given an independent advocate has been provided since 5 February. The advocate is working both on the assessment and on interim relief issues.

In the circumstances I will quash the interim support decisions of November 2025, January 2026, and 18 March 2026. There is no basis to make quashing prospective only and neither party sought this.

Senior Courts Act 1981 s. 31(5) and CPR 54.19 provide that when the Court makes a quashing order, it may either (a) remit the matter to the decision maker and direct it to reconsider in accordance with the judgment of the court, or (b) substitute its own decision.

It follows from the reasoning above that the appropriate course is to remit the question of what if any interim support should be granted under s. 19(3) to Medway. Since I do not find there is any sole justifiable response, the discretion remains Medway’s and should be reconsidered by Medway. It is appropriate that Medway be directed to reconsider the matter in short order. I will consider submissions on how long that should be.

Mr Hylton sought a mandatory order (a) requiring the provision of interim support by way of direct payments; (b) alternatively requiring reconsideration forthwith. Order (a) would be inappropriate as the discretion remains Medway’s. Mandatory order (b) is unnecessary given the order for reconsideration I will grant under s. 31(5).

Mr Hylton sought a declaration that Medway’s refusal/failure to provide interim support pending reassessment is unlawful. It is sufficient to quash the interim support decisions. Declaratory relief would add another layer of complexity and is unnecessary.

Backdating

In his post-hearing note Mr Hylton claimed the Court should order that Medway’s further s. 19(3) decision must address and include back-dated direct payments from December 2021 or such other date as the Court considers just. No such claim was advanced in the claim form but Medway did not object to it on procedural grounds.

Medway opposed such backdating relief. I conclude it fails. Three reasons are sufficient. First, there was never any binding obligation to provide direct payments, for the reasons explained in part G(2) above. Second, the decisions to close or revise the 2021 Assessment Processes are presumed valid, which means that any prior decisions toward direct payments were revised or revoked. Third, as already discussed, it has not been made good that any direct payments are the sole justifiable response now.

Backdating could only be an appropriate response under s. 19(3) if it was an appropriate way to meet needs shown to be urgent within s. 19(3).

It will be for Medway to consider within its discretion, when re-considering its decision on interim support, to what extent if at all any backdated direct payments are appropriate ways meet any urgent needs under s. 19(3).

I will quash and remit the interim support decisions. Otherwise the relief sought by Mr Hylton is refused. Unless an order can be agreed I will hear submissions from the parties on the terms of the order.

I make one final comment, for the benefit of all parties. It is important the assessment proceeds as soon as practicable. This is the only way that proper consideration can be given to Mr Hylton’s needs by Medway as the Act anticipates. It could unblock the current impasse in which Medway and Mr Hylton have found themselves for the past months.