Thomas Connors, R (on the application of) v Bromley Borough Council

This case is about the significance in law, for a local planning authority (LPA)’s statutory discretion to decline to determine (DTD) a planning application on its planning merits (s.70C of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990), of a change in national planning policy. Three grounds for judicial review are advanced by the Claimant at this rolled-up hearing. The Claimant is the owner of the relevant land, which he purchased in February 2025. It is land adjacent to Knockholt Railway on the South Side of the railway, Sevenoaks Road, Halstead TN14 7HR. The Claimant’s planning application (Ref. 25/03902/FPA) was made on 13 August 2025. It was for the removal of 3 existing mobile homes, and a change of use of the land for 2 pitches for occupation by Gypsy Travellers, comprising 2 caravans, 2 touring caravans and 2 dayroom amenity blocks with associated hard surfacing. What he wants is for the application to be determined on its planning merits. By a notice dated 11 November 2025 the LPA communicated its DTD decision in respect of the Claimant’s August 2025 planning application. That decision, made pursuant to s.70C, is the target decision in this judicial review claim. The decision was made by the LPA’s Assistant Director of Planning. It adopted a recommendation in a 7-page Officer Report (OR) written by planning officer Robin Evans. It is common ground between Mr Rudd for the Claimant and Mr Scott for the LPA that the reasons within the OR stand as the reasons for the impugned decision.

Think of Knockholt train station as being at the middle of a clock face. The Claimant’s site at the South Side is at about 8 o’clock, south-west of the train station. There is another nearby site, at about 4 o’clock, to the south-east. This features as Land to the East in the OR, where Mr Evans records that the LPA refused planning permission on 23 January 2025 for the erection of polytunnels (Ref. 24/00497/FULL1). There is a further nearby site at around 12 o’clock, to the north across the railway line. That has been called Jodeen Animal Sanctuary. It featured in letters to the LPA from the Claimant’s planning consultants, Green Planning Studio. Those letters relied on planning inspector Carpenter’s appeal decision of 2 July 2025, granting Edward O’Driscoll planning permission to vary a condition to permit caravans for residential use for occupation by gypsy travellers with an amenity block, septic tank, hard standing, re-profiling of land and boundary fence (Appeal Ref. APP/G5180/W/25/3358392).

The Claimant’s August 2025 application is for a traveller site. So was Mr O’Driscoll’s successful appeal. In December 2024, the Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government issued the revised Planning Policy for Traveller Sites 2024 (PPTS24). It sets out the Government’s planning policy for traveller sites. It identifies the Government’s overarching aim (§3): to ensure fair and equal treatment for travellers, in a way that facilitates the traditional and nomadic way of life of travellers while respecting the interests of the settled community. Specific stated aims (§4) are: (a) that LPAs should make their own assessment of need for the purposes of planning; (b) to ensure that LPAs, working collaboratively, develop fair and effective strategies to meet need through the identification of land for sites; (c) to encourage LPAs to plan for sites over a reasonable timescale; (d) that plan-making and decision-taking should protect Green Belt from inappropriate development; (e) to promote more private traveller site provision while recognising that there will always be those travellers who cannot provide their own sites; (f) that plan-making and decision-taking should aim to reduce the number of unauthorised developments and encampments and make enforcement more effective; (g) for local planning authorities to ensure that their Local Plan includes fair, realistic and inclusive policies; (h) to increase the number of traveller sites in appropriate locations with planning permission, to address under provision and maintain an appropriate level of supply; (i) to reduce tensions between settled and traveller communities in plan-making and planning decisions; (j) to enable provision of suitable accommodation from which travellers can access education, health, welfare and employment infrastructure; and (k) for local planning authorities to have due regard to the protection of local amenity and local environment.

PPTS24 addresses plan-making and decision-making for traveller sites. It explains that LPAs should identify, and update annually, a supply of specific deliverable sites sufficient to provide 5 years’ worth of sites against their locally set targets (§10a). It explains that if an LPA cannot demonstrate an up-to-date 5 year supply of deliverable sites, the provisions in §11(d) of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) will apply. “Gypsies and travellers” are defined as: “Persons of nomadic habit of life whatever their race or origin, including such persons who on grounds only of their own or their family’s or dependants’ educational or health needs or old age have ceased to travel temporarily or permanently, and all other persons with a cultural tradition of nomadism or of living in a caravan, but excluding members of an organised group of travelling showpeople or circus people travelling together as such”.

Here is s.70C of the 1990 Act:

The s.70C DTD power has been authoritatively analysed in R (Moran) v Medway Council [2026] EWCA Civ 484, upholding the decision of Kerr J at [2025] EWHC 350 (Admin). The Court of Appeal has now conducted a comprehensive discussion of the previous case-law (see §§22-42). It explains that the s.70C DTD discretionary power is triggered by the LPA asking this sequence of questions (see §64):

The following clear statutory purpose was derived by the Court of Appeal from the language of s.70C (see §56):

Once the answers to the relevant questions trigger the discretionary power, the terms of s.70C then afford the LPA “a broad discretion, in the sense that there are no matters specified or identified as criteria or particular considerations for the exercise of that discretion” (§65). It is the LPA who is the primary decision-maker on whether it is “prepared to allow … to be undertaken” the “duplication of the consideration of the planning merits of the breach of planning control which is the subject of the enforcement action” (§56). The exercise of discretion is challengeable on public law unreasonableness grounds (§65). That includes outcome unreasonableness: a decision beyond the range of reasonable responses. It includes process unreasonableness, including the species of public law error where the reasoning process fails to take into account something “so obviously material to the exercise of the discretion under s.70C of the 1990 Act as to require it to be taken into account” (§68). It includes the failure to give legally adequate reasons, which must be adequate and intelligible, enabling an understanding of why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the principal important controversial issues, without needing to refer to every material consideration: South Bucks DC v Porter (No.2) [2004] UKHL 33 [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at §36.

The whole point of s.70C is that it is addressing whether the LPA is going to determine the planning application on its planning merits. Parliament has empowered the LPA to decline to do so. There is no circumscription of the discretion, based on the apparent strength of the merits. There is, within the statute or policy or the caselaw, no “fresh claim” test which asks whether material not previously considered support a planning merits claim with a realistic prospect of success (cf. rule 353 of the immigration rules). An LPA may certainly choose to give some consideration to planning merits. In Moran itself there had been an OR which identified as a “key consideration … whether there is any realistic chance that [planning] permission would be granted” (see §9). The LPA submitted to the Court of Appeal (see §52) that it was “not necessary for [it] to provide a full merits determination of the planning application but only to make such assessment as was necessary in order to determine the exercise of the discretion under s.70C”. Dove LJ was careful in stopping short of saying that any “review of the planning merits” is legally necessary, in recording that one had taken place (see §67). Kerr J had explained in Moran at §107 that it can be appropriate to avoid “straying into the very planning merits which s.70C, where it applies, permits the LPA not to determine”. Mr Rudd, rightly in my judgment, stops short of saying that a review of planning merits is always and invariably needed in an exercise of the s.70C. I think an idea inherent in the nature of the s.70C power is that an application for planning permission – independently of whether it would succeed on its planning merits – may nevertheless be the subject of a lawful adverse exercise of this DTD power.

It is common ground that the statutory discretionary power was triggered on the facts of the present case, applying the two relevant questions (§6 above). Firstly, there was a pre-existing enforcement notice (EN) on the whole or part of the application site. Secondly, the application did seek permission for development which (in whole or in part) included development identified as a breach of planning control in a pre-existing EN.

There are two extant ENs. Each was issued on 7 May 2019. Each was appealable under s.174(2) of the 1990 Act. The first was an operational development EN. It identified a breach of planning control under s.171A(1) in installing hardstanding, gates and fences etc and stationing a mobile home for residential and office purposes. It required removal of the hardstanding, gates and fences etc, removal of the mobile home for residential and office, and reinstatement of the land as rough grassland. This was not appealed. The second was a material change of use EN. It identified a breach of planning control under s.171A(1) in changing the use from agricultural to the storage and stationing of a mobile home for office/residential use, the parking of haulage lorries, storage of containers and building materials. It required cessation of the unauthorised use of any part of the land for the storage and stationing of a mobile home for office/residential use, the parking of haulage lorries, storage of containers and building materials. It required removal of all associated materials, leaving the site in a neat and tidy condition, and preparing the ground to enable the land to revert back to its former condition as rough grassland. This EN was appealed and planning inspector Dyer dismissed the appeal on 17 December 2019 (Ref: APP/G5180/C/19/3230784). The ENs remain extant and enforceable. Mr Scott told me there have been three successful criminal prosecutions, resulting in criminal convictions on 11 January 2021, 17 May 2022 and 12 March 2024. The ENs are on the public register. They apply to the Claimant as a purchaser of the land.

The Claimant’s planning application was foreshadowed by a letter dated 3 April 2025 from Green Planning Studio and then accompanied by a letter from Green Planning Studio dated 13 August 2025. The application was “retrospective”. It described the proposal as the use of land for the stationing of caravans for residential purposes, dayrooms and hardstanding ancillary to that use. It said the change of use had started on 7 May 2019 and was completed on that date. It described the existing use as “stationing of caravans for residential use”. Mr Rudd told me that “caravans were brought onto the land” after the Claimant acquired it in February 2025 and before he made the planning application. The evidence is that the ENs have never been complied with in the time since they were issued in May 2019. The items required to be removed were not. The land was never restored. It was not brought into compliance. There has been no wiping the slate clean. There has been no reset.

In the OR, Mr Evans included for the decision-maker a section on planning history, mainly in relation to the application site. In that section of the OR, he described the following. The LPA’s refusal on 14 December 2018 of an application (Ref. 18/00158/FULL1) for planning permission for storage, commercial parking and erection of gatekeepers accommodation. The LPA’s refusal on 22 March 2019 of an application (ref. 19/00312/FULL1) for retrospective planning permission for fences and gates etc. The LPA’s material change of use EN on 7 May 2019 with the appeal dismissed by planning inspector Dyer on 17 December 2019. The LPA’s adverse exercise of the s.70C DTD discretionary power on 8 July 2020 in relation to an application (Ref. 20/01367/FULL1) for retrospective planning permission for replacement gates, fencing and driveway. The LPA’s adverse exercise of the s.70C DTD discretionary power on 18 March 2024 in relation to an application (Ref. 24/00809/FULL1) for retrospective planning permission for a mobile unit and two static caravans for residential use.

The centrepiece of the claim for judicial review is what Mr Rudd describes as a fundamental change within national planning policy. It impacts on green belt land and traveller sites. The starting point is the position as it was before December 2024. It is found in these policy documents dated December 2023: the National Planning Policy Framework 2023 (NPPF23); and Planning Policy for Traveller Sites 2023 (PPTS23). The pre-December 2024 position came to this. (1) A development in green belt land which constituted “inappropriate development” was only to be granted planning permission in “very special circumstances” (NPPF23 §152), which required that relevant harm was “clearly outweighed by other considerations” (NPPF23 §153). (2) A traveller site was defined as “inappropriate development” for green belt land (PPTS23 §16).

The position changed in these policy documents dated December 2024: the National Planning Policy Framework 2024 (NPPF24); and PPTS24 (§* above). Also relevant is the February 2025 Planning Policy Guidance Green Belt (PPG25). The post-December 2024 position comes to this. (1) Within green belt land there is a new species of “grey belt land” (NPPF24 §155a). The relevant criteria for grey belt land (NPPF24 Annex 2) include in particular that it “does not strongly contribute” to any of these three purposes: checking the unrestricted sprawl of large built-up areas; preventing neighbouring towns merging into one another; and preserving the setting and special character of historic towns (NPPF24 §143(a), (b) and (d); PPG25 §064-009). (2) A development within grey belt land is not “inappropriate development” and does not need to meet the “very special circumstances test” (NPPF24 §153) if certain relevant conditions are met, in particular that the development would not fundamentally undermine the purposes of the remaining green belt in the plan area, that there is a demonstrable unmet need for the type of development, and that it would be in a sustainable location (NPPF24 §155; PPG25 §064-010). (3) Traveller sites are not “inappropriate development” in grey belt land if they meet these same relevant conditions (PTTS24 §16).

The Claimant’s position on the planning merits was set out in the Green Planning Studio letters dated 3 April 2025 and 13 August 2025. Essential elements are as follows. First, the land is green belt land, but it would meet the relevant criteria for grey belt land. Second, this is a traveller site which can meet the relevant conditions so as not to be inappropriate development. Third, there is no conflict with the relevant planning policies and the planning balance should come down in favour of granting permission. Fourth, the position is reinforced by the LPA’s outdated Bromley Traveller Accommodation Assessment of need; its inability to demonstrate an up-to-date 5 year supply of deliverable sites, triggering the provisions of NPPF24 §11d (PPTS24 §28); in the context of an expanded definition of “gypsies and travellers”. Fifth, this new approach and its implications are illustrated by inspector Carpenter’s appeal decision on 2 July 2025 in relation to Jodeen Animal Sanctuary, just across the railway from the Claimant’s development site.

Mr Rudd accepts, rightly in my judgment, that Mr Evans described the purpose of s.70C correctly when he said this in the OR: “The purpose of this section of the Act is to prevent the practice of successive applications being pursued in relation to unauthorised works which have already been subject to an enforcement notice”.

As I saw it, Mr Rudd makes two key points about what he says are deficiencies within the OR. First, a section “policy context” within the OR simply sets out the general statutory duty (s.70(2) of the 1990 Act) to have regard to the development plan and other material considerations, and the s.70C DTD discretionary power. It makes no reference to NPPF24 or PTTS24 or PPG25. Second, the six paragraphs [1] to [6] contained with the “assessment” section of the OR (see §19 below), culminating in the adverse recommendation, does not grapple with the Claimant’s reliance on changed national policy, as illustrated in the Jodeen Animal Sanctuary decision, none of which is addressed anywhere.

The six paragraphs within the “assessment” section in the OR are as follows:

This claim for judicial review has, very properly, been focused on three specific issues. Focus is important in judicial review. The pleaded grounds set the fair framework for the LPA’s response. I remind myself that the claim for judicial review involves: (a) no claim that the outcome is unreasonable; (b) no claim that the reasons for the outcome are unintelligible; and (c) no claim that the representations made on behalf of the Claimant in the Green Planning Studios letters were not fairly considered. I accept the submission of Mr Scott, that the Claimant knows and understands why the decision was made. The statutory discretion was triggered (see [4]). Its exercise was considered appropriate, and reasonable, in light of the planning history (at [5]). The exercise of the power would avoid the prospect of an appeal (see [6]). The LPA’s objectives would be protected. And finally, the LPA would be able “to pursue the extant enforcement notice” (see [6]).

I think that last point is of real significance in understanding the decision. There are two contextual reference points, seen earlier in the OR. One is the description, from the first page of the OR, of the fact that “the land has been hard surfaced, mobile homes have been placed on the land and the use has been changed”. The other is the recording, from comments in response to the application, on the second page of the OR, of an observation from an objector that the land should be “restored to its original state before any development [is] undertaken”. In the pleaded defence (9 January 2026), Mr Scott specifically identified this, within the reasoned decision: “Pursuing enforcement. The OR notes that declining to determine the Planning Applications upholds the ability of the Defendant to enforce the enforcement notices, which given that they have yet to be complied with is a reasonable objective to pursue”. It is clear that the decision in the exercise of the discretion was materially informed by the continuing and ongoing defiance of the ENs, with no steps taken to comply and reset (see §12 above). I think Mr Rudd was right not to seek to challenge the reasonableness of the outcome or the adequacy of the reasons for the outcome, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case.

I agree with Mr Scott that there is a reference within Moran for an approach to a s.70C decision which promotes certainty and enforcement of an extant EN. It is at §57 where Dove LJ was describing benefits flowing from the identified statutory purpose. He said:

This is the first ground for judicial review. Mr Rudd submits, in essence, as follows. There is no question of the occupier of the land subject to the enforcement notice seeking “to insist upon more than one determination of the planning merits of the breach of planning control”: Moran §56 (see §7 above). That means “the mischief” there identified is absent. It follows that the power has been exercised incompatibly with its purpose. That makes the decision unlawful. The appropriate remedy is to quash the decision and require the LPA to decide the planning merits. Kerr J was right to emphasise the idea of an applicant for planning permission “for an unauthorised development” not being able to insist on more than one determination of the planning merits “of that development” (Moran per Kerr J at §104). There has never been any determination of the planning merits of a traveller site. More importantly, the fundamental change to national policy means that a traveller site development is enabled to meet the grey belt land criteria and conditions. Those planning merits have not been determined. This is not two bites at a cherry. It is a new fruit, at which there has been – and could have been – no bite at all. This is not a change in local circumstances, or a local plan or policy. It is a change in national policy. To exercise the statutory discretionary power, notwithstanding a material and fundamental change in national planning policy, frustrates the purpose of s.70C. It is unlawful. That is the essence of the argument.

The argument was attractively presented by Mr Rudd. I accept that this ground is arguable but I cannot accept that it succeeds. I agree with the submissions of Mr Scott. When the Court of Appeal identified the statutory purpose in Moran, they were tracking “the language used” in s.70C (§56) and the sequence of questions which follows from that statutory language (§64). The Court was declining to identify a statutory purpose – as the basis of a Padfield unlawfulness argument – which would serve to confine the operation of the discretionary power, beyond the terms clearly indicated by the statutory language. The Court was careful to emphasise at §56 the previous consideration of “the planning merits of the breach of planning control” (see §7 above). Or, as Kerr J had put it, “the planning merits of the matters enforced against” (Kerr J at §108(4)). The Court of Appeal was also careful to emphasis the statutory overlap between enforcement notice and present application, which may be an overlap “in whole or part” (§56: §7 above). That is why “in whole or in part” features within the second question at §64 (see §6 above). The statutory power is triggered even though there is no complete symmetry between past breach and present application. Once the power is triggered, it is a broad discretion concerned with what the LPA is “prepared” to allow to be undertaken, where the LPA has to make a reasonable choice. In short, the OR is rightly recognised as correctly describing the statutory purpose (§17 above), and the decision was not inconsistent with that purpose.

This is the second ground for judicial review. Mr Rudd submits, in essence, as follows. A relevant and fundamental change in applicable national planning policy is an obviously material consideration. The decision-maker needs to take it into account. It must be given whatever weight is considered appropriate. But it must be considered and addressed. This is a feature which, applying the familiar unreasonableness test, is so obviously material that anything short of direct consideration would not be in accordance with the intention of the statute: see Moran per Kerr J at §§67, 87-89, citing R (Friends of the Earth Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] UKSC 52 [2021] PTSR 190 at §§116-121. It must be. The EN was under the old planning policy framework. It is live and enforceable. If LPAs are permitted not even to think about game-changing changes in national planning policy, the logical consequence is the sterilisation of land. Land will not be brought into use for development, in a new and permitted way, because it was historically inappropriate under a superseded regime. The law must insist on the modest requirement whereby the decision maker thinks about the changed planning policy, when making the discretionary choice as to whether or not to consider the planning application on its merits. Otherwise, there is a sterilising consequence, in precisely the place where the changed planning policy framework is calling for a new direction. To exercise the statutory discretionary power, without being prepared even to consider a material and fundamental change in national planning policy, frustrates the purpose of the change in national planning policy. It permits sterilisation of land, where a change in national planning policy clearly calls for that land to be permitted for development, in a new and permissive way. The refusal of discretion stands as an ongoing block. It means the planning merits will never be considered. It means there is never an appealable decision. That is a stultifying consequence, for any land in respect of which there has been an overlapping EN. These implications must be confronted. Whether or not that calls for the discretion to be exercised favourable to the applicant is a separate question. But decision-makers must face up to it. They cannot exclude this feature from their consideration. In the present case, the point was squarely and clearly raised in the correspondence written by Green Planning Studio. It was disregarded and ignored. That was process unreasonableness. It means the impugned decision must be quashed and remitted, so that the LPA can think again, this time taking into account the changed national planning policy. That is the essence of the argument.

This too was attractively presented. I think it is the high water mark of the case. The point about sterilising implications has real force. Again, I accept that the point is arguable. But, again, I cannot accept that it succeeds. I agree with Mr Scott’s submissions. He has persuaded me that, on the particular facts of this individual case, the decision-maker was entitled to look at the planning history, the position on the ground (with no reset), and the interests in maintaining a clear position and being able to enforce the ENs. All in the context of the objection made, that the land should be restored to original state in accordance with the ENs. The ENs have been disobeyed and ignored while repeated planning applications have been made and rejected in the public interest. That is the essence of the decision: see §§20-22 above. That being so, the decision-maker was acting in a legally legitimate way in the present case, when making this reasoned decision, without engaging with the points which were being made about changed planning policy and changed planning merits. I think the position could be very different if there were a reset (see §12 above). That would remove a central aspect of the reasoned basis for the decision. But whether a feature is to be identified as an obviously relevant consideration, and the linked question of whether the s.70C decision is obliged to give considerations to planning merits, is a fact-specific and case-specific question. I am unable to accept, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, that the LPA was obliged to stray into the very planning merits which s.70C permits it not to determine: see §9 above. In Moran, Kerr J (at §107) had warned against treating that as necessary. And the specific context of his warning is instructive. He cited previous judicial observations about whether “it might be necessary” to consider a planning application on its merits “where the development plan has changed, or some other material planning considerations have changed, so that the underlying merits may be different” (see §105). Kerr J gave his warning about that, precisely because he saw the dangers of treating such matters as “mandatory considerations” (see §107). I think this case illustrates those dangers. I find that the December 2024 change in national planning policy were not, applying the reasonableness standard, an obvious material consideration to which the decision-maker was then duty bound to have regard.

This is the third ground for judicial review. Mr Rudd submits, in essence, as follows. If not an obviously material consideration, a relevant and fundamental change in applicable national planning policy would remain as a consideration to which the decision-maker may have regard if in their judgment and discretion they think it right to do so: see Moran per Kerr J at §87, citing Friends of the Earth at §116. In light of the representations made on behalf of the Claimant in the Green Planning Studio correspondence, the change in national planning policy was a principal controversial issue. The Porter test of legally adequate reasons required an explanation within the reasons, as to why the change in national planning policy was a consideration to which the decision-maker did not think it right, in their judgment and discretion, to have regard. No reason is given for the evaluative conclusion as to the non-relevance of this feature. The reasons in the OR involve no engagement with the national planning policy change and its relevance. That means the reasons are not legally adequate. It means the impugned decision must be quashed and remitted, so that the LPA can think again, this time giving reasons for any repetition of the decision not to take into account the changed national planning policy. That is the essence of the argument.

As with the first two issues, I am satisfied that this attractively presented further ground is arguable, but that it cannot succeed. I agree with the submissions of Mr Scott. I have held that the change in the national planning policy was not, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, an obviously relevant consideration. In public law, legally adequate reasons are not necessarily required to make reference to those matters which are being treated as relevant. It would be a strong thing for public law to require reasons for a decision to address a feature which the decision-maker is entitled to disregard, in order to explain why it was not considered relevant. I do not exclude the possibility that such an argument could succeed. But, in the context and circumstances of the present case, I am satisfied that it cannot. The Claimant received the reasoned decision. The LPA had a choice about whether to permit ventilation on the planning merits, of something which overlapped with ENs which had been and continued to be disobeyed. The LPA made its choice. It gave its reasons. No further level of sophistication was required of them.

Before parting with the case, I will return to one feature of the OR. Mr Evans decided to discuss “other history”, by reference to the Land to the East, where the LPA had refused various planning applications (§2 above). But he did not there also include the Jodeen Animal Sanctuary, on which the Claimant was relying to illustrate an argument about grey belt land and its significance for a traveller site, based on planning inspector Carpenter’s favourable decision of 2 July 2025 (§2 above). The OR does touch on that decision, in referring to an objection which claimed that “the appeal scheme for a traveller site ‘Land North of Knockholt Station’ was already in situ and is not comparable and does not set a precedent for a traveller site on the application site”. I accept Mr Scott’s submission that the Assessment at [5] (§19 above) was describing “similar” and “recent” and “the Planning Inspectorate” by reference to the Claimant’s site. Nothing in the decision turns on the Land to the East. The OR did not get drawn into questions about Jodeen Animal Sanctuary and its comparability. There is no pleaded ground for judicial review about the contents of the “planning history” section of the OR, or about the reasoning at [5] of the Assessment describing “similar” and “recent” applications. Nothing in this claim turns on the contents of the OR relating to Land to the East. I will leave it there.

I will grant permission for judicial review on all three grounds but will refuse the substantive claim. Having circulated this judgment in draft, I am able to deal here with the order and any consequential matters. The parties were agreed as to the substance of the Order which was appropriate, in light of the terms of the judgment, being (1) On all three grounds: (i) permission for judicial review is granted; (ii) the claim for judicial review is dismissed. (2) The Claimant shall by 4pm on 17 July 2026 pay the Defendant’s costs summarily assessed in the sum of £7,700.01. That leaves the Claimant’s contested application for permission to appeal. I have found that the three issues raised arguable issues for substantive determination in the High Court. But I have not been persuaded that an appeal, essentially on the basis that I was wrong not to accept each of them, has a realistic prospect of success in the Court of Appeal. Nor that there are issues of general public importance warranting an appeal. I regard this judgment as a fact-specific and context-specific application of well-established public law principles, following a very recent authoritative exposition by the Court of Appeal in Moran.