Dua Alkarroum, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Hillingdon

This is an application for judicial review of the Defendant local authority’s conduct of its homelessness functions pursuant to Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 (“HA 1996”).

The Claimant is a refugee from Libya and sole parent to 3 children, a daughter aged 11, son aged 10, and a younger daughter aged 9. The Claimant suffers from multiple complex health issues, including cancer, diabetes and other reduced immunity conditions as well as sarcoma (leading to removal of her left lung) which leaves her breathless and unable to walk for long distances. She is undergoing frequent chemotherapy, radiotherapy and other cancer treatment at the Cromwell Hospital and Royal Marsden Hospital in London.

The Claimant was granted refugee status in March 2025 and assessed as homeless shortly thereafter. The Defendant carried out its first Housing Needs Assessment (“HNA1”) on 7 May 2025, which recognised that she needed a three-bedroom accommodation for her family and listed her “aspirations” as being close to her family in Ealing as well as close to public transport so that she could travel to the hospitals. It also listed her preference for accommodation outside the borough of Hillingdon - in Acton, Fulham or Ealing - so that she could be close to family, friends or the hospital. On 12 May 2025, the Defendant conducted a further assessment of her accommodation requirements (“HNA2”); Part 3B of the form listed that she needed three bedrooms on the ground floor but made no mention of any specific location requirements. An updated HNA (undated; “HNA3”) stated her property requirements as involving 3 bedrooms “to avoid overcrowding and infection risk” on the ground floor with lift access with space for storing her oxygen equipment. That assessment stated her preferred location as being near Ealing (within 10 minutes’ walk of family) or close to Cromwell Hospital. That updated HNA indicated as “Priority action” that the authority should “seek alternative TA [Temporary Accommodation] urgently” and “consider short-life property under section 193 if no immediate...”

The Claimant was given interim accommodation in a 2 bedroom flat in Uxbridge on 12 May 2025. On 4 July 2025 the Defendant accepted the main housing duty under s.193 HA1996 and recognised her as having priority need. She has continued to reside in the temporary 2 bed accommodation in Uxbridge, with her 2 elder children sharing one bedroom, whilst the Claimant shares a bed with her younger daughter.

By letter dated 9 September 2025, the Claimant sought a review of the suitability of the temporary accommodation, in the light of the family’s changing circumstances. In that letter, the Claimant's solicitor explained that the property was too small for the family's needs as the Claimant had to share her bedroom with the younger daughter, which meant that both their sleep was disrupted, especially when the Claimant was ill and nauseous during the night after medical treatment or needed to use her oxygen equipment. The letter also explained that, shortly in October 2025, the Claimant's son would turn 10 years of age, meaning that the property would meet the definition of statutory overcrowding, whereby siblings of mixed sex should not be sharing the same bedroom. The letter also set out the difficulties experienced by the Claimant as the temporary accommodation was approx. 1 hour 20 minutes from the hospital and over 1 hour from her mother's house in Ealing. It referred to the Claimant’s dependency on her mother for regular care and assistance with the children and that the current arrangements were unsustainable.

Similar concerns regarding the lack of suitability of the temporary accommodation, with an urgent request to carry out a new HNA/ personalised housing plan (“PNP”) and a referral to Ealing under s.213 HA1996 were raised in separate pre-action protocol letters dated 19 September 2025. In the absence of any response from the Defendant, two further Pre Action Protocol letters were sent on 27 October 2025, respectively in respect of the Defendant’s failure to make the referral and conduct the suitability review, with further correspondence sent on 20 November 2025. The Claimant’s solicitors also submitted further evidence from an occupational therapist which emphasised the need for a ground floor 3 bedroom flat in Ealing, close to her mother and sister and a letter from her consultant oncologist, stating that close proximity to her mother and sister was “medically essential”, enabling reliable assistance with childcare, support during treatment cycles and immediate response in the event of a medical emergency.

On 22 December 2025, the Defendant acknowledged the concerns raised by the Claimant in previous correspondence and accepted that the current accommodation “presents challenges given Mrs Alkarroum’s health and family circumstances”. The Defendant indicated that a fresh suitability review would be initiated immediately to reassess her housing needs in the light of the new evidence and that it would explore temporary accommodation options closer to Ealing to reduce her travel burden and improve her access to family support. As part of that letter, the Defendant confirmed that the Claimant “retains her right to request a formal review of suitability under s.202 HA1996”. It also stated that it would also consider the appropriateness of a referral to LB Ealing as part of its review.

On 24 December. 2025, the Defendant completed its suitability assessment and found that the current temporary accommodation in Uxbridge was unsuitable. Given the Claimant’s significant health needs, dependency on family support in Ealing and the property’s size and layout, it stated that it was actively seeking alternative property that met her medical and support requirements. It also stated that it had “initiated a discretionary referral to LB Ealing under section 213 HA1996... in recognition of the Claimant's strong local connection and medical needs”. It confirmed that a copy of the referral would be held on file once it had been completed.

There is no evidence that such referral was made at that point in time. The Defendant served late evidence, two weeks before the hearing, in the form of a witness statement dated 9 April. 2026, from Ms Sultan, the Defendant’s Housing and Homelessness Prevention Officer. Ms Sultan only commenced employment with the Defendant in January 2026 but candidly explained that, due to a change in personnel, she was unable to confirm whether or not the s.213 referral had been made. She could not locate anything on the case file to evidence whether any further determination had been reached about making the referral or whether a referral letter had been sent. She sent a referral to LB Ealing on 27 March 2026 but as at the date of the hearing, no acknowledgment of receipt or response had been received from LB Ealing.

On 5 January 2026, the Defendant telephoned and emailed the Claimant’s solicitors to offer temporary accommodation in a 2 bedroom ground floor. Property in Welland Gardens in Ealing. The Claimant’s solicitor responded that afternoon asking for an explanation why she was being offered a 2 bedroom property rather than the 3 bedroom that she had been assessed as needing. The Claimant’s solicitor sought clarification about the full details of the property with floor and adaptations. He also asked for the offer to be kept open pending a full response and requested that the e-mail should not be interpreted as a refusal of any offer. He repeated the Claimant’s objections to the 3 bed property being offered as a final “main duty offer” rather than temporary accommodation in a further email later that afternoon and requested that the Defendant withdraw that offer and replace it with a new offer of suitable temporary accommodation. He also mentioned the fact that the Claimant had not been informed of her rights of review. The Claimant did not receive any response from the Defendant to that withdrawal request.

On the day of the hearing, the Defendant submitted late evidence, comprising inter alia of electronic records recording the Claimant’s rejection of the offer, despite its location in Ealing, on the basis that the Claimant needed a 3 bedroom property. The Defendant also adduced an offer letter, offering interim accommodation under s.188 HA1996 (rather than s.193). This evidence was admitted as late evidence on the premise that there is no evidence that this letter was actually sent to the Claimant and may only be an internal draft.

In the absence of any response, the Claimant’s solicitor sent a further letter before action and copy of the draft pleadings on 27 February 2026. The deadline for responding to the letter before claim was 3 March 2026 and the Claimant’s solicitor sought further clarifications the day before, emphasising the imminence of the deadline.

Late on 2 March 2026 the Defendant sent a temporary accommodation offer letter in respect of a 2 bedroom property in Slough, stating that it had taken account of the Claimant’s individual circumstances and that it considered that property to be suitable, being of adequate size, affordability and suitably located. That letter set out the Claimant’s rights of review and the consequences of any refusal if the offer was not accepted by the same day, whereby the Defendant would consider that its main duty had been discharged.

In response the Claimant’s solicitors wrote to the Defendant, asking them to withdraw the offer on the basis that the property was not suitable since it was only had 2 bedrooms rather than the 3 bedrooms recognised as a need in the updated HNA3. He stated that the new property was worse than the current temporary property as it was too small and too far away from the Claimant’s hospital and support network. The Claimant received no response to that letter.

The Claim was issued on 3 March 2026 and the AOS and SGRs were served late on 9 March 2026 (effective date 10 March 2026). The claim was expedited for a rolled up hearing by order of Andrew Burns KC on 9 March 2026.

On 27 March 2026, the Defendant conducted a telephone assessment to produce a further HNA (“HNA4”), which set out her medical condition and the fact that she received regular care from her mother but did not identify any specific care needs or location requirement. HNA4 also recorded (inaccurately) that she was currently residing in a 3 bedroom property.

On the same date, the Defendant made a referral to LB Ealing under s.213 HA1996. That letter stated that the Defendant owed the main housing duty to the Claimant and had been unable to find suitable PRS accommodation in Ealing and requested support from LB Ealing in securing private rented property in Ealing, preferably close to the NW10 area. It stated that “Hillingdon accepts that Mrs Alkarroum requires accommodation within reasonable proximity of NW10 to facilitate the provision of social support and care.” It also listed the property requirements as including 3 bedrooms on the ground floor or lifted with room to store the oxygen concentrator and nebuliser in the main bedroom. To date, LB Ealing has not acknowledged or responded to the referral.

The Defendant served its DGRs late on 31 March 2026 and applied to serve late evidence on 14 April 2026. The Defendant provided further supplementary materials were provided on the morning of the hearing on 28 April 2026.

The Claimant raises three ground of review:

The Defendant contends that Ground 1 is academic as it has offered to seek (and continues to seek) a 3 bedroom property in reasonable proximity to Ealing and the Cromwell Hospital. I do not accept that an open-ended offer to comply at some unspecified time in future renders the lis hypothetical or lacking in utility: there is still a live issue as to whether the efforts made by the Defendant to date pass the Elkundi test in performing its duties, especially where the Claimant has sought declaratory relief regarding the allegations of past breach.

The Defendant accepts that Grounds 2 and 3 are amenable to judicial review but submits that they are rendered academic by the Defendant’s actions in updating the HNA on successive occasions since May 2025 and in making the s.213 referral on 27 March 2026. This raises the relevant time for the assessment of the alleged breach, which must be as at the date of issue. It is true that the Defendant’s subsequent actions, in updating and issuing HNA4 and making the s.213 referral, have ameliorated the situation but they have not rendered the claim academic. There is still a live issue in dispute between the parties. The identification of key housing needs in the HNA is an important precursor to the local authority’s compliance with its duties under s.193(2) so Grounds 1 and 2 are connected. I find Grounds 2 and 3 arguable and therefore grant permission for judicial review.

The HNA precedes and feeds into the suitability assessment so logically it makes sense to deal with Ground 2 first. The Claimant contends that the Defendant failed to assess the Claimant’s housing needs regarding location (SOFG, [57]).

The legal principles are not in dispute between the parties. A HNA a must set out the key needs or the nuts and bolts of any offer of accommodation (R(AN ) v. Barking and Dagenham [2025] EWHC 2265 (Admin) [28 (b)]). Location is a ‘key factor’ that goes to suitability (YR at [37]).

It is true that HNA1 (dated 7 May 2025) identified a three bedroom apartment as a ‘need’, did not identify location as a need but merely listed her desire to be close to her family and the hospitals as an ‘aspiration’. That HNA was updated on several occasions prior to the issue of the claim – Part 3 titled “Determination of Needs” dated 12 May 2025 (HNA2) mentioned her need for a 3 bedroom on the ground floor and storage requirements but only described her location as a ‘preference’. That was updated in on 13 November 2025 (HNA3) but listed her location as “customer aspirations” or “preference”. The updated HNA4 in March 2026 did not contain any information regarding location.

In this case the HNA3 dated 13 November 2025 is the material one prior to the issue of the claim. The adequacy of the HNA has to be assessed in the context that the Claimant was seeking accommodation in a different borough, where the Defendant did not have oversight of the housing stock in Ealing nor any knowledge or private sector arrangements available to LBC Ealing. Although HNA3 merely described the Claimant’s location needs as a preference or aspiration, there was enough explanation there to identify her key requirements, both in terms of space and location, especially in the context where she was seeking accommodation outside the borough where the Defendant had no control over housing allocation. I therefore find that Ground 2 is not made out.

Under Ground 1, the Claimant contends that the Defendant is in breach of its duty in s193(2) HA1996 as it has failed to secure suitable accommodation and make it available for occupation by the Claimant.

The Elkundi principles are not in dispute between the parties. Both parties agree that once a local authority has accepted that the duty is owed, the obligation to secure available accommodation is immediate, non-deferrable and unqualified: R (Elkundi) v Birmingham CC [2022] QB 604 at [81] per Lewis LJ.

The Defendant denies that it is in breach; it contends that the case law permits a ‘grace period’ whereby the local authority is given as reasonable time to consider how to comply with its duties. That is a fact specific exercise and complicated in this case, by the fact that the Claimant is seeking accommodation outside the borough, which poses additional difficulty. Whereas the Defendant has a discretion to make a referral to another borough and, once made, that second borough is under a duty to cooperate, the first borough cannot control the process of identifying suitable accommodation through the other borough. That is why the Defendant sought to find accommodation through other routes, including the private rental sector.

Secondly, the Defendant contends that it is entitled to proceed in stages and take an incremental approach; what may be suitable in the short term may differ from long term accommodation. It has made two offers of accommodation which the Claimant has rejected and that has brought its duty to an end.

The difficulties of securing accommodation with limited resources and insufficient housing stock, as well as the complications in finding properties in other localities are well documented in this Court’s case law. Whilst I have every sympathy for the difficulties experienced by the Defendant and its staff, those circumstances (even involving accommodation in another borough) are not exceptional.

In my view, this case falls squarely within the Elkundi principles, as explained by Lewis LJ at [74-83] and the Supreme Court in Imam at [37]-[38]. The situation is that the Defendant accepted that it owed the Claimant the full housing duty under s193(2) on 22-24 December 2025. From that date, it was under a duty to secure that accommodation was available. As Lewis LJ stated at [77] of Elkundi and Lord Sales affirmed at [37] of Imam, that duty is immediate once the duty is owed and is unqualified and non-deferrable. The Defendant cannot defray its responsibility by invoking the intervention of LB Ealing. Ultimately, the s193(2) duty is its responsibility and it remains subject to that duty until it has secured suitable accommodation – whether provided by the Defendant itself or from some other person, including another borough: that is implicit in the wording of s.206(1) HA 1996 and para 79 Elkundi. The idea that there might be some time buffer for compliance built into s.193(2) was expressly rejected by the Court of Appeal in Elkundi at 81-108. The Supreme Court ruling in Imam was more nuanced and accepted at [38] that the local authority could take some time to consider how to achieve the end result but it “would be implicit that the end result would have to be achieved within a reasonable time” and given that “the end result is intended to satisfy an urgent and important need (the provision of suitable living accommodation), a reasonable time to allow for consideration of the appropriate means to secure it would be short”.

In this case, the Claimant has already been living in temporary accommodation for over a year which the Defendant has accepted is unsuitable for her needs. The Claimant asked for a review in September 2025 (nearly 8 months ago) which the Defendant only processed for the first time in December 2025 and, despite categorising the case as urgent and a priority and indicating that it would initiate a referral to LB Ealing, it did not do so for a further 3 months. The referral was made on 27 March – just a month before the hearing and, due to the lateness of that referral, there is still no acknowledgement or update from LB Ealing.

The Defendant relies on the two offers of accommodation that it has made. However, in order to perform its duty within the terms of s.206(1) 1996, it is inherent in the statutory scheme that its duty is to provide “suitable” accommodation not unsuitable accommodation: s.206(1)(a) HA 1996. Otherwise, the authority can sidestep its obligations by offering unsuitable accommodation and insist on use of the appeal procedure to gain time.

As a matter of procedure and practice, it would be wise for the local authority to satisfy itself that any offer of accommodation is suitable and it must be able to explain why that is the case – whether to the applicant at the time of the offer or subsequently in any review or judicial review. Ideally, that would be in writing at the time which would then stand as contemporaneous evidence in any subsequent challenge and protect it against the risk of adverse inferences.

In this case, however, both of those offers were unsuitable:

The Welland Gardens property, although suitably located in Ealing close to the Claimant’s mother and the hospitals, on its face only met one of the Claimant’s needs, namely location. It did not address the other needs recognised by the Defendant in its updated HNA, namely the need for a 3 bedroom property with storage space for her medical equipment. The Defendant refers to the fact that there was an additional reception room that was capable of conversion into an extra bedroom. I have not been shown any evidence of this – such as floor plans or witness statement setting out the space or layout of the property and how the conversion would work. Further, there is no evidence of that fact being brought to the Claimant’s attention, despite the Claimant’s solicitor requesting full details of the property. The Claimant’s position is that she was not made aware of it. Ms Sultan did not mention this fact or support it with a statement of truth; it is simply referred to in the SGRs. In the absence of direct contemporaneous evidence of this consideration being discussed at the time, I cannot conclude that the property had sufficient space or was capable of being converted to meet the Claimant’s needs. On its face, a 2 bedroom property would be unsuitable as the Claimant would still be in the intolerable position of having to share a bed with her 9 year old daughter and the two older siblings – aged 10 and 11 respectively having to share a room. Within the next 6 months all three children will be over 10 years old and a 2 bed flat will be even more overcrowded.

The Slough property was no better, or even worse, than the current accommodation in Uxbridge. It was still a 2 bed property, so the unsatisfactory family living arrangements would continue. It was of similar distance to the Claimants mother and the hospitals which is already proving too much for the Claimant with her disabilities and isolating her from her support network. And it would be even further from the children’s schools, so would aggravate the current situation rather than improve it.

The assessment of those properties has to be viewed in the context that the Claimant and her children have already been living for some time in temporary accommodation that it is unsuitable. The Defendant has already had the benefit of the incremental approach and placed the Claimant temporarily in unsuitable accommodation in March 2025. Whilst in theory, the Defendant could move the Claimant and her children to further temporary accommodation for the immediate short term while long-term accommodation is found, it is imperative that the alternative temporary accommodation is suitable. That is the fundamental premise underpinning the statutory regime. As Lewis LJ observed at [83], so long as the applicant remains in unsuitable accommodation, the Defendant is in breach of its s193(2) duty. It cannot remedy that breach by substituting another unsuitable offer for the current unsuitable placement. That compounds rather than resolves the breach. There is little point in causing upheaval and disruption for the family in moving them from one unsuitable temporary accommodation to another unsuitable temporary accommodation, when that would still be a breach of the main duty.

Accordingly, I find that the Claimant was entitled to reject the two offers as unsuitable and they do not discharge the Defendant’s duty. That duty is ongoing – as the Defendant itself has explicitly recognised in its referral letter to LB Ealing – and the Defendant remains in breach of its s.193(2) duty.

The Defendant contends that the Court should refuse to grant permission or grant relief since the statutory right of review with an appeal to the county court in ss.202-204 HA1996 provides an alternative remedy. The Defendant contends that its main housing duty has been “discharged” i.e. that it ceases to apply by virtue of the Claimant’s refusal of the two offers of accommodation made pursuant to s.193(3), (5) (7) or (7AA). The Claimant was made two offers of accommodation but did not avail herself of the statutory review process within the 21 day time limit. In such circumstances, the Defendant contends that the Administrative Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the suitability of the accommodation offered as that would usurp the exclusive preserve of the local authority.

I accept that judicial review is a last resort and should not be used prematurely where there are other more appropriate avenues of challenge available. Generally speaking, the residual jurisdiction of the High Court should not be used as a backstop for the appellate jurisdiction (R(Bano) v Waltham Forest LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 92, [35]). However, the availability of another remedy is not a jurisdictional bar but a discretionary consideration, having regard to the nature, adequacy, convenience and effectiveness of the other means of redress in the statutory context and the individual circumstances of the case (R (Ammori v SSHD [2025] EWHC 2013 (Admin) [32]).

In this case, the right of statutory review extends, by virtue of s. 202(1)(f)-(h), inter alia to any decision of the local authority as to the suitability of accommodation offered by way of a private rented sector offer or final accommodation offer, whether or not the applicant has accepted that offer (s.202(1A) and (1B)). This creates the counter-intuitive position that, in order to avoid becoming intentionally homeless and causing the main housing duty to come to an end, the applicant may well have to accept the offer and move into unsuitable accommodation but then challenge suitability through the review and subsequent county court appeal process, with its attendant delays.

The right of access to the statutory review procedure are qualified by certain pre-conditions in s.193(3) (5) (7) and (7AA) being satisfied. If those criteria are not satisfied then the housing authority’s duty will not come to an end but it will, despite the offer, continue to be subject to the duty: see the Court of Appeal in Norton [2022] FSR 1802 at [43].

In summary:

In this case, the Defendant has not specified which category the two offers fell under. But in any event, there were procedural irregularities which meant that these pre-conditions were not satisfied.

As regards the Welland Gardens offer, there is no evidence that the offer letter (disclosed late on the morning of the hearing) was actually sent to the Claimant. Ms. Sultan does not refer to this letter in her witness statement although Counsel explained that it was used to prepare the SGRs and DGRs. That letter appears incomplete as it does not include the Claimant’s DOB nor any reference to other members of her family.

In any event, had the letter been sent, it would have been inaccurate and confusing. That letter was headed as a “Interim Accommodation Offer” under s.188 HA1996 not an offer under s.193. As such, it did not mention the rights of review or consequences of acceptance or refusal (as those provisions do not apply to s.188 offers). As such, the right of review was not sufficiently notified to the Claimant in the circumstances of her case.

Indeed, para 11 expressly stated that “You do not have a right to request review of the decision that the accommodation is suitable for you. However, you may seek a judicial review”. Given that express statement, it is unattractive for the Defendant to seek to oust judicial review on the basis that the Claimant had an alternative means of redress, in circumstances where (had the letter been sent), they did not inform the Claimant of her rights and, moreover, expressly renounced them.

As regards the Slough offer, this was made very late in the afternoon (16.46) on the day before the deadline for issuing proceedings. The Defendant had been sent another PAP letter and a copy of the draft pleadings and had just been reminded of the imminent deadline for issuing the claim. The Defendant did send a formal offer letter for the temporary 2 bedroom accommodation in Slough, setting out the review information and its views on suitability. It notified the Claimant that the offer would expire the same day and “strongly advise[d] the Claimant to accept the offer and then request a review .. to prevent [her] from becoming homeless in the event that the review goes against you.” However, the accommodation offered in Bronte Close was no better than the current temporary 2 bedroom accommodation in Uxbridge, at equivalent travelling distances to the Claimant’s family and the hospitals, which the Defendant had, 8 weeks previously, found to be unsuitable and classed her case as urgent. Although that letter complied with the formal information requirements, giving the Claimant less than 15 minutes before the close of business to accept the offer, in circumstances where the Claimant had been in pre-action correspondence for nearly 6 months and was on the verge of issuing proceedings, was not reasonable or fair.

It is true that those Norton defects could have been raised as part of any s.202 review process, whether under s.202(1)(g) suitability or more generally under s.202)(1)(b). However, in the individual circumstances of the Claimant’s case, I do not find that the review process afforded adequate, convenient or effective redress.

The facts of this case are very different from the situation described in Bano. In this case, the Claimant was already living in unsuitable premises (which the Defendant expressly recognised as unsuitable and classified her situation was urgent). She and her children had been living in those conditions for over 8-10 months. The new offers were no better than the current temporary arrangements, with no guarantee of when suitable permanent accommodation would become available. Of the date of judgment, there is still no indication when suitable accommodation might be made available. The Claimant, supported by her OT and cancer specialist, have provided compelling evidence that her living arrangements, for both herself and her children are intolerable and unsustainable.

In this situation, where the Defendant has been in breach of its s.193(2) duty for several months – at least 4 months from its recognition on 22-24 December 2025 but possibly longer; 7 months since the date of her request for a review in September 2025 which was not addressed until December. That goes well beyond a reasonable time to comply with its immediate and unqualified duty.

In those exceptional circumstances of continuing breach, it is appropriate to exercise my residual discretion to entertain the application for judicial review. I take heed of the exceptional nature of that jurisdiction as emphasised by Sales LJ (as he then was) in R(Glencore Energy UK) v Revenue and Customs [2017] 4 WLR at [53] and as applied in Bano at [32-38]. But given the Claimant's significant health complications and her need for privacy during the night when she is ill and recuperating from chemotherapy and radiotherapy, the anxiety it is causing her and her daughter in sharing a bed and the need for her older children to have space and privacy as they become teenagers, I consider there is a pressing need to provide effective scrutiny and relief. The Claimant is out of time to request a review of the offers made and would be left with no recourse.

The Claimants contends the Defendant was in breach of s.213 HA 1996 in failing to make a referral to LB Ealing.

There is no obligation to make a referral under s.213 - this is a discretionary matter for the local authority. The issue here is that Defendant indicated that it would initiate the referral process in December 2025 but appears to have done nothing about it until 27 March 2026, shortly before the hearing. The Defendant has been unable to find any evidence showing that the referral was made.

I do not accept the Claimant’s argument that this is a Padfield frustration of the statutory purpose – that puts the point too highly. At its highest, the Defendant indicated that it would start the process and consider making a reference (but did not make an assurance that it would culminate in a referral or indeed a successful outcome). I therefore find that Ground 3 is not made out.

For all of the above reasons, I am prepared to give declaratory relief that the Defendant was, and remains, in breach of its s.193(2) HA 1996 duty.

The Claimant has sought mandatory relief, requiring compliance with s.193(2) HA 1996, relying on the principles regarding mandatory relief in Iman. In Imam, the Supreme Court held that, once it has been found that a local authority has breached its statutory duty, the court should ordinarily exercise its discretion by granting a remedy to uphold the rule of law. It should only withhold that remedy where there was clear justification or where performance was impossible (§49). The onus is on the local authority to justify why a mandatory order should not be made, with a detailed explanation of its situation and the impact that order would have on its ability to discharge its statutory functions and act in the public interest (§54).

In this case, the Defendant has not demonstrated that it has taken all reasonable steps to perform their duty, as required by Imam. It made two offers of accommodation, both of which were unsuitable. It has more recently after 27 March 2026 made other searches which have not resulted in any suitable offers. It has also belatedly made the s.213 referral to LB Ealing – this is all too little too late. I do not accept that limited resources, housing stock constraints or the fact that the request involves accommodation in another borough should per se absolve or dilute responsibility. Even if LB Ealing cannot assist, it is still open to the Defendant to find other private sector rentals in Ealing. I accept that finding a 3 bedroom propery in Ealing may be unaffordable for the Claimant but have been given no information regarding the availability of any contingency fund, which was recognised as one of the factors in Imam.

At this stage, I am inclined to grant the mandatory order sought but am conscious that I should not make an order that is impossible to comply with or one that would create a situation that is unfair for other homeless persons in the borough. The Defendant has provided very little evidence on this matter and has very recently taken steps to refer the case to LB Ealing where it may be possible to find accommodation within their list that is suitable. I therefore defer final consideration until both the Defenant and LB Ealing have had the opportunity to respond and file evidence regarding the availability of suitable ground floor 3 bedroom accommodation near to the Claimant’s family or the hospitals or whether there are other means to achieve compliance in the near future. The Defendant sought an extension of 3-4 months which is too long. I therefore allow one month for any evidence and will consider mandatory relief and costs at a short CVP hearing or on the papers, as appropriate.

In terms of costs, although Grounds 2 and 3 were unsuccessful, the Claimant has succeeded on Ground 1, which formed most of the substantive arguments. The Defendant’s arguments on admissibility and alternative remedy added complexity which in the end went nowhere so the Claimant is entitled in principle to its costs on those issues. I will determine costs (and any payment on account) after resolution of the mandatory relief issue so that all costs can be determined together.